

EMOTIONS IN HISTORY

Emotional Lexicons

Continuity and Change in the
Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000



UTE FREVERT ET AL.



OXFORD

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General Editors

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*Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of
Feeling 1700–2000*

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This book came into being at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, where a team of historians, ethnologists, sociologists, and literary critics is working on a history of emotions in modern times. The volume is the first outcome of a collective project that enables us to gain an insight into knowledge of emotions guided by propositions and subject areas. From the eighteenth century onwards, encyclopedias, dictionaries, and lexica were key providers of knowledge in European societies and the USA, making it available to a broad reading public.

To produce this treasure we consulted over 200 reference works spanning three centuries in German, English, and French. Coordinated by Karola Rockmann, we were supported by the work of Kate Davison, Philipp Ruch, Nushin Atmaca, Melanie Behrens, Karin Bengtson, Birgit Brodtkorb, Veronika Faiz, Letizia Haas, Timm Hoffmann, Marcel Mierwald, Clara Polley, Joseph Prestel, Rabea Rittgerodt, Kristina Schäfer, Bernhard Schneider, Marie Schubenz, and Julia Tenner. For almost two years they besieged the libraries of Berlin and exhausted the possibilities of the World Wide Web. They examined the core emotion terms and the related vocabularies of emotion for each of the chapter topics in some 10,000 articles, filling several metres of shelves with photocopies and creating more than 8,000 data files from scans, lists, and databases on a common server. On request, this material is accessible to other scholars.

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1

Defining Emotions: Concepts and Debates over Three Centuries*

Ute Frevert

Everyone is talking about emotions. They have become a constant issue during the so-called age of therapy of the second half of the twentieth century, and not only between psychologists and their ever-increasing number of clients. Today, line and human resources managers are sent to expensive training sessions to learn how much commercial success depends upon reading and controlling one's own emotions, as well as those of others. Politicians and those in the public eye are judged according to whether they have empathy, and are able to show fitting and appropriate emotion at the proper time. Advertising has discovered the power of feelings and passion for successful marketing, while firms christen their cars or cosmetic products with such promising names as 'Emotion'. 'Emos' is how devotees of a youth culture who seek to express their feelings in music, personal habitus, and form of dress label themselves.

The sciences have also come up with new discoveries about emotions and their efficacy. It is said that feelings play an important part in health and sickness. They determine value judgements and influence decisions. Neuroscientists seek to demonstrate how they are formed in the brain, which regions of the brain are affected, and how they are related to other behavioural motivations.

At first glance, this onward march of emotions seems to be something radically new. In the absence of historical awareness, it would be easy to assume that never before has there been an obsession of this kind, that never before have emotions been dealt with in this way and displayed so openly. Two American cultural analysts, Philip Rieff and Christopher Lasch, have argued that it has been the triumph of the therapeutic paradigm in the 'age of narcissism' to place the emotions of the individual centre stage, and make them the focus of numerous medial, commercial, and scientific strategies.¹

But is there any truth in this? Is it really only in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries that we have become so obsessed with emotions, in a rather special and unique way? Had no one ever allowed his or her emotions to bother him or her before? Was there any less knowledge of emotions and what they might

* Translated from the German by Keith Tribe.

¹ Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: Norton, 1978).

lead to? Was the public that engaged with such knowledge somehow less interested and eager to learn?

Libraries and archives testify to the fact that emotions are by no means a new or original topic of either popular or scholarly reflection. Philosophers, literary specialists, and art historians have in recent years shown how theories of the emotions left their mark on ancient rhetoric, on the theatre of early modernity, and on modern literature. The eighteenth-century 'era of sensibility', along with the nineteenth-century period of Romanticism, feature as highpoints of an artistic preoccupation with emotions.²

Today's experimental cognitive and neurosciences lack depth by comparison. When they address emotions, they do so as a rule in ignorance of their predecessors who, as philosophers, physicians, and psychologists, studied human emotions for centuries. Modern research takes no account of the way in which the knowledge gathered together by this work was organized, how empirical findings were ordered by theoretical frameworks, and how ordered knowledge of this kind entered the public domain. At most, only historians of the sciences and sociologists of knowledge have taken an interest in this, but even they have hardly begun to explore the topic of emotions.³

1. DEBATES ON EMOTION IN MODERNITY

This book will not change any of that. It does not present a historical account of philosophical or psychological research on emotions, nor does it take up and develop studies on the poetics and politics of emotion undertaken in literary and art history. It has a different purpose: it is directed towards the social reflections and arguments about emotions in which contemporaries of the modern period engaged. These discussions involved both scientific opinion and moral and pedagogic considerations. Initially, theological principles played a role, as did political and economic considerations. Medical specialists contributed to discussion, and

² A selection from the now abundant literature: Hilge Landweer and Ursula Renz (eds), *Klassische Emotionstheorien: Von Platon bis Wittgenstein* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008); Ingrid Kasten et al. (eds), *Kulturen der Gefühle in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2002); Doris Kolesch, *Theater der Emotionen: Ästhetik und Politik zur Zeit Ludwigs XIV* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2006); Penelope Gouk and Helen Hills (eds), *Representing Emotions: New Connections in the Histories of Art, Music, and Medicine* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek, *Affektopoetik: Eine Kulturgeschichte literarischer Emotionen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005); and Martin von Koppenfels, *Immune Erzähler: Flaubert und die Affektpolitik des modernen Romans* (Munich: Fink, 2007).

³ A scientific history of psychological research into the emotions does not yet exist. See, however, Claudia Wassmann, *Die Macht der Emotionen: Wie Gefühle unser Denken und Handeln beeinflussen* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2002). On scientific interest (or disinterest) in the emotions, see Lorraine Daston, *Wunder, Beweise und Tatsachen: Zur Geschichte der Rationalität* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch, 2001) (this particular compilation of selected texts was published only in German). See also the focus articles on 'The Emotional Economy of Science' in *Isis*, 100/4 (2009), 792–851, especially Fay Bound Alberti, 'Bodies, Hearts, and Minds: Why Emotions Matter to Historians of Science and Medicine', 798–810.

even lawyers had their say. The outcome was a debate in which very many voices took part, which developed rapidly in the eighteenth century, and which has continued up to this day.

But how might it be possible to reconstruct a debate of this kind? And to what end—what might we gain from it? The cognitive value of such a reconstruction is dictated by the questions that are posed. At the most general level, what is at stake is the importance attributed to emotions in the modern world. Individual, specific feelings such as anger, shame, or anxiety are not the focus of attention here. Instead, we are interested in determining the place that emotions generally commanded in European societies that have, since the eighteenth century, been subject to rapid and radical change. How can emotions be recognized and identified? What significance did they have for what was understood at any given time by ‘being human’, by individuality, or by subjectivity? What role did they play in designs for social order? Were they thought to be important, or unnecessary? Were they regarded as disruptive or helpful? In what form and with what intensity were they thought pleasant or unpleasant? Were they simply accepted as a given, or was it thought that they could be shaped and changed? Was it possible to cultivate them, and did they for their part contribute to cultivation and education? Were there domains in which emotions were more of a disadvantage, and others in which they were thought to be indispensable? Was everyone equipped with the same range of emotions, or were individuals distinguished by their ability and preparedness to experience and express emotions, and judged accordingly?

Running through all of these questions is a degree of scepticism regarding the oft-invoked argument by Max Weber that modernity has led to the disenchantment of the world. In this new, totally rationalized world, there is supposedly no place for emotions; at best, they are given free rein only in private life, and can cause as much good as evil. Emotions are to be eliminated as quickly as possible from the sciences, as well as from the public relationships of economic agents, citizens, and members of society. In this instance rational interests and dispassionate negotiations prevail.⁴

Norbert Elias aligned himself with Weber’s argument in his oft-cited book on the European civilizing process.⁵ He sought to demonstrate that the process of early modern state formation was linked to an increasing affective control of subjects. According to Elias, the thresholds of shame and embarrassment rose progressively, and the upper and middle strata became used to guarding their emotions. With the increase of social differentiation, ‘chains of interdependence’ multiplied and condensed: as a consequence, men and women were forced to rationalize their

⁴ Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and eds. from Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 323–59.

⁵ Norbert Elias, ‘Towards a Theory of Civilizing Processes’, in *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephan Mannell trans. Edmund Jephcott with some notes and corrections by the author, rev. edn. (Malden: Blackwell, 2010), 363–447 [Ger. orig., ‘Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation’ (1939)].

appetites and behaviour. External coercion was translated into an inner compulsion, and emotional impulse was replaced by calculated behaviour.

Elias's grand narrative has been subjected to a great deal of criticism. Sociologists have not always been convinced by the supposed connection between social structure and the structure of personality. Historians have questioned the empirical evidence, while anthropologists have rejected such a linear conception of the civilizing process. That any such linear process was quite capable of being 'reversed' was amply demonstrated in the course of the twentieth century. There was little trace of individual self-regulation and affective control in the violent excesses of that 'age of extremes'.⁶

One central point has, however, been neglected here: the concept of affect or of drive that Elias employs, and that can also be found in Weber. In their contemporary definition, both concepts have a physical, bodily sense. According to the *Brockhaus*, affect involves powerful 'mood-swings' that manifest themselves physically. 'Drive' (*Trieb*) was translated into 'instinct' and, invoking Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung, classified as a basic and endogenous need with a physical source.⁷ Elias adopted this distinction and proceeded to study those affects or drives that form the basic anthropological elements: sexuality, aggression, food intake, and excretion.

This selection, as much as it situates Elias contextually within the psychoanalytic movement of the 1930s, restricts our view of what is characteristic about personality structures. By reducing the emotional system to a handful of innate drives, we lose sight of the cultural genesis and development of complex emotions. It can be supposed that emotions are more than 'spontaneous urges' and drives shaped by evolution. Looking back at the relevant writings of the last 300 years, one finds an impressive variety of terms and definitions, ranging from tender sensitivities via gentle shifts of mood to powerful and lasting passions. If we are to measure their influence on the 'psychogenesis' of modern human subjects, then the theory of rationalization and civilization that is based solely upon drive and affect is inadequate.

Instead, we might assume that, since the Enlightenment, modernity has brought about a comprehensive understanding of emotions, but one that is deeply ambivalent and fluctuating, varying according to contemporary experience and perspective. Affect and passions did not mean the same thing for philosophically inspired contemporaries around 1800 as they did for philosophers of life around 1900, or existentialists around 1950. The excess and Dionysian rapture espoused by many followers of Nietzsche would have provoked sheer outrage on the part of the early Kantians. Pietist-inclined priests and Catholic theologians had a far more positive view of emotions than rationally oriented Protestants, for whom religious 'enthusiasm' was an abomination. 'Sentimentals' and romantics were slated for their

⁶ Gerd Schwerhoff, 'Zivilisationsprozeß und Geschichtswissenschaft: Norbert Elias' Forschungsparadigma in historischer Sicht', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 266 (1998), 561–605; Hans-Peter Duerr, *Der Mythos vom Zivilisationsprozeß*, 5 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988–2002).

⁷ 'Affekt', in *Brockhaus*, 15th edn, i (1928), 126; 'Trieb', in *Brockhaus*, 15th edn, xix (1934), 70–1.

'touchiness' and mystic yearnings. Colleges for teachers and the doctrines with which they worked emphasized emotions to a greater or a lesser extent, and also differed in which emotions they sought to cultivate and develop in children and youth, both female and male. Authors who were concerned with the development of political order had a great deal of time for some emotions, but little for others. Important political events such as revolution and war altered the perspective upon emotions, both among participants and critics.

Can any definite patterns be recognized behind all these differences of location and perspective? Are modern debates about emotions really marked only by dissonance and differences of opinion? Or, alternatively, are there perhaps recurring points of reference, underlying themes, and developmental trends that create order and connection in an apparent chaos?

2. PROSPECTIVE CONNECTIONS

What about the argument that modernity is marked out by distinct phases of individualization and subjectification? What might *individualization*—that is, the progressive emancipation of the individual from religious decrees, occupational commitments, and social attributes—mean for a discussion of the nature of emotions? What role do emotions play, on the other hand, in processes of *subjectification*, in which the individual is inserted into social and political contexts and subordinated to new norms and orders? In theory, it might be anticipated that people who drop out of prescribed roles and ordering frameworks concentrate more on themselves and their own 'inner life', searching there for an answer to the burning question: who or what am I? What am I as a person, what makes me unique and unmistakable? Emotions here become very important: as proof of subjectivity and life. It was Johann Gottfried Herder in 1769 who exclaimed, 'I feel! I am!',⁸ and there are similar emphatic declarations in contemporary French philosophy and literature. Here feelings document a specific quality of the individual, of securing its existence, reflecting upon itself, and placing it in dialogue with its surroundings.

It can be supposed that it is this last element that lends emotions a special dignity and value in a modern society that is characterized by a high level of social dynamism. Emotions connect human beings to one another, but also to nature and to objects. Yet, unlike the latter connection to the world of nature and objects, emotions among humans are founded upon reciprocity. They create relationships, whether fleeting or lasting. In a society whose members are ever more mobile, and in which the figure of what is alien and foreign assumes new shapes in everyday life, emotions facilitate social bonding. They also provoke conflicts and give rise to enduring antagonisms in the form of established prejudices. It can also be

⁸ Johann Gottfried Herder, 'Zum Sinn des Gefühls', in *Schriften zu Philosophie, Literatur und Kunst im Altertum*, ed. Jürgen Brummack and Martin Bollacher, iv (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker-Verlag, 1994), 233–42; here, 236.

supposed that emotions play an important role in furthering the social integration (*Vergesellschaftung*) of the human being, and this fact also guarantees them a prominent place on the agenda of important issues.

If these suppositions are valid, it can be further assumed that, since the eighteenth century, emotions have become the object of far-reaching projects for *education* and *discipline*. The bourgeoisie, the most significant buttress of a modern meritocratic society, should have an interest in lending emotions—in its dual function as marker of both individuality and sociability—a particular form, and regulating their expression. But at the same time there are boundaries to be drawn, and distinctions to be made. We argue that *differentiation* and *hierarchization* occur on three planes: first, with respect to the aristocracy; secondly, with respect to the social underclasses; and, thirdly, with respect to the inhabitants of non-European countries and regions.

To take the first of these, it seems plain that the formation of a habitus of bourgeois emotion first came about by the adoption of positions opposed to that social stratum (or social rank) that had been dominant, and from which the ascendant bourgeoisie wished positively to distinguish itself: the *aristocracy*. Bourgeois criticism was directed not only at presumption and extravagance, but also at evasion and dissimulation. Nobles, as it was claimed, wore masks; they were inauthentic and dishonest. They could not be trusted, since they hid their real emotions behind a fake façade. Quite possibly they had no real feelings at all, given that they had been trained from a very young age to deceive and mislead those around them. In any case, they played with the feelings of others, and were themselves unfeeling, scheming, and calculating.

By contrast, members of the middle classes (*Bürger*) presented themselves as persons with genuine, undistorted emotions. As such, they were capable of friendship, opening up their hearts and inviting others to read what was written there. They allowed themselves to be moved by the pleasures and sorrows of their fellows, thereby gaining the strength to actively assist and support them. They married for love, not from the cool calculation of mutual advantage. They were just as loving with their children, endowing them with trust rather than anxiety and deference. They even treated their servants and workers humanely, and with consideration.⁹

But they also felt a certain distrust of their servants and workers, not least because they seemed so far removed from the habitus of bourgeois emotion. The way in which members of the *lower social strata* dealt with emotions and expressed them must have been a source of irritation and displeasure for the bourgeoisie. Most workers and peasants were simply thought incapable of 'elevated' or 'noble' emotions: their impulsive way of life was wild and unbridled, and rational arguments were useless. Passions would suddenly erupt quite powerfully, rendering 'the people' putty in the hands of skilful political agitators.

⁹ Early guidance for this 'middle-class' emotional habitus could be found in the writings of the noble Baron Adolph von Knigge, particularly in *Über den Umgang mit Menschen*, ed. Gert Ueding (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1977). Here, Knigge broke explicitly from the 'artificial' habitus of the 'courtier' (p. 34). This did not exclude the noble reader per se, in the light of the fact that the blunt dichotomy of bourgeoisie/noble tends to disregard the strong internal differences in both groups.

Similar qualms were cultivated with regard to the members of other nations and continents. It was not only within European discourses of nationality that prejudice and stereotypes regarding emotions played a major role. It is known that the European perspective upon *extra-European and non-Western societies* was marked by a self-conscious regard for difference and hierarchy, and it was upon this basis that modernity's discourse of the civilizing process and its colonial practice was built. What is less well known is the important part played in this by emotions. It can be assumed that Europe's refined bourgeois economy of emotion saw itself in stark contrast to the rude, uncivilized habitus of non-Europeans. In this view, civilization meant, not least, the export of European standards of emotion to colonial societies.

But how did this civilization project relate to the ideas that circulated in Europe's civil societies regarding the nature and origin of emotions? Where did these ideas come from, upon what kind of knowledge (or belief) were they based, and how was this knowledge generated and diffused? How did older conceptions of emotion, often suffused with religion or natural philosophy, relate to new orthodoxies that presented themselves in terms of a modern *scientificity* insisting on empirical evidence? What image of the person and her or his emotions did the new, triumphant nineteenth-century natural sciences convey? What influence did this have on psychology, which emancipated itself from philosophy in the late nineteenth century, forming itself into an empirical and experimental science? If experiment and perception played an increasing role, it can be presumed that the body as a producer of emotions moved into the foreground. This *somatization* could have replaced the preceding privilege accorded to 'spirit' or 'soul' as emotional points of navigation.

What does this mean for the social estimation of emotions and their potential cultural variation? Was the body thought to be natural—a universal independent of culture? Is it therefore possible to observe a process of the *universalization* of emotions, inscribed in each human body—and possibly animal bodies too? Or were the body and its physiology rather bearers of differences, as in the conception of a 'special' female anthropology? From the late eighteenth century onwards, medical specialists constructed a standardized male body from which the female body deviated in significant ways, and this quite probably had consequences for the sensibility and feelings that such bodies produced. What was the relationship between universalization and particularization, and what *criteria of difference* were there other than that of *gender*? What role was played by *age*, *species*, and the characteristic that became ever more vigorously discussed in the late nineteenth century, *race*?

And, it can also be asked: what practical consequences followed from such distinctions? Did this represent a challenge to the inner- and extra-European project of developing emotions? Did it annul them, or did it rather spur them on? Did they possibly even contribute to a *moralization* of emotions, or is modernity rather characterized by a process of *de-moralization*, uncoupling emotions and feeling from morality? It would be theoretically conceivable to interpret processes of somatization and universalization as contributions to de-moralization. But if differences

are emphasized, then these would probably also be connected with moral evaluations. From there it would be only a short step to a *politicization* of emotions, as they emerged in the moral philosophical discourse of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Traces of a political valorization and instrumentalization could also be found in those conceptions of order that elevated ‘the pursuit of happiness’ to a civil right, and turned the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’ into a core idea of modern politics.

3. EMOTIONS IN THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

Nonetheless, how can we historically localize and verify the supposed connections between scholarly, social–political, and cultural perspectives upon emotions? Where did those discussions and debates take place, in which contemporary knowledge of emotions developed, became organized, and diffused?

One answer is the encyclopedia—the genre of national repertoires of knowledge, first emerging in the eighteenth century and surviving right up to the present.¹⁰ This was both a part and a direct expression of the ‘knowledge offensive’ connected with the Enlightenment and modernity. Quite apart from a dogmatic effort to fix and define, encyclopedias reflected the constant renewal of thinking in new knowledge and new empirical material. At the same time such lexica did not confine themselves to a limited circle of aficionados and the like-minded. They rather aimed to become the common property of a broad public, and in this way develop social influence. This purpose was served especially by those encyclopedias initiated as large-scale publishing projects, whose long print runs and high edition turnovers helped them spread throughout their respective language areas in Western and Central Europe.

It is difficult to overestimate their value as a source of information and orientation for an ever-growing reading public that was both educated and wished to be educated. They were not seen simply as compendia that made knowledge and information available. They also had an important standardizing function: presenting definitions, distinguishing the important from the unimportant, and making judgements. In this way they became a significant educational medium, selecting, ordering, and storing knowledge. In short, on the one hand, such lexica convey available knowledge in circulation at a particular point in time, while, on the other, they provide insight into the normative principles and orientations that they offer up for public use.¹¹

¹⁰ Dictionaries and lexica had long existed before the eighteenth century. See, e.g., John Considine, *Dictionaries in Early Modern Europe: Lexicography and the Making of Heritage* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). On the history and proliferation of the encyclopaedia, see Paul Michel et al. (eds), *Allgemeinwissen und Gesellschaft: Akten des internationalen Kongresses über Wissenstransfer und enzyklopädische Ordnungssysteme* (Aachen: Shaker, 2007), especially the contribution by Madeleine Herren, ‘General Knowledge and Civil Society’, 489–508.

¹¹ Utz Haltern, ‘Politische Bildung und bürgerlicher Liberalismus: Zur Rolle des Konversationslexikons in Deutschland’, *Historische Zeitschrift*, 223 (1976), 61–97; Ulrike Spree, *Das Streben nach*

In this they are unquestionably superior to sources that focus upon the work of the leading thinkers of modernity. If we here pulled together what leading philosophers had to say about emotions—from Adam Smith to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Nietzsche to Martha Nussbaum—we would, of course, gain great insight into complex arguments and their mutual points of contact.¹² But we would discover nothing about what actually happened outside accepted literature, about what knowledge did in fact circulate and with what kinds of instructions for use it came.

The same goes for debates occurring within individual disciplines, about which we can read in the relevant specialist literature and reference works. This is writing by experts for experts; by contrast, general encyclopedias and lexica sought to present as complex a picture as possible of available knowledge about emotions, incorporating the perspectives of different disciplines. The weighting of perspectives did shift over time, so that the texts also convey an impression of the influence that particular sciences—from theology and philosophy to medicine, psychology and the neurosciences—exerted upon the definition of a concept of emotion at any one time.

Another methodological advantage is the international nature of the genre. Encyclopedias and lexica were published in many European countries. The prototype was English, the most well known of which became Ephraim Chambers's two-volume *Cyclopaedia* of 1728. From 1731 to 1750 the Leipzig bookseller Johann Heinrich Zedler published the sixty-volume *Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*; and from 1751 the French *Encyclopédie* began to appear, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. Other countries followed suit in the nineteenth century, often clearly borrowing from these renowned models.¹³

We can, therefore, use these encyclopedias and lexica to investigate concepts of feeling and emotion, and the knowledge entering into them, across many countries. This allows us to follow processes of transfer and adoption as well as national peculiarities and failed receptions. One limitation is the West European origin of the genre, and the associated repertoire of languages that the authors bring with them. As a rule, we will here use as source texts only those written in English,

Wissen: Eine vergleichende Gattungsgeschichte der populären Enzyklopädie in Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000); Anja zum Hingst, *Die Geschichte des Großen Brockhaus: Vom Conversationslexikon zur Enzyklopädie* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995). Despite apparent continuity (up to and including Wikipedia), the genre has been undergoing a transformation in both form and function since the second half of the twentieth century: changes in the audience, whose former exclusivity has dissolved, have also meant changes to function and contents.

¹² Ritter/*Gründer*, i (1971), 89–100; ii (1972), 454–74; iii (1974), 82–101, 258–68; ix (1995), 609–14, 675–81; Karlheinz Barck (ed.), *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe*, i (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000), 16–49; ii (2001), 629–60; iv (2002), 684–724; v (2003), 487–508, 703–33.

¹³ The first encyclopedic lexicon in Russia was published in seventeen volumes in the years 1835–41. Cf. Walter Sperling, 'Vom Randbegriff zum Kampfbegriff: Semantiken des Politischen im ausgehenden Zarenreich (1850–1917)', in Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), *Politik: Situationen eines Wortgebrauchs im Europa der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007), 248–90. A four-volume encyclopedia appeared in Warsaw in Polish as early as 1781, followed by an eight-volume work in 1830. (This information was provided by Dr Ingrid Schierle, German Historical Institute, Moscow.)

German, and French. While the works produced in these language areas were important and set the standard to be followed, they are nonetheless unrepresentative of global and extra-European development. And this is also why this book sees itself only as a building block of a more wide-ranging and demanding project: a historical semantics of emotions.

Of primary importance to such a semantics are concepts that are defined and explained in a dictionary or lexicon. This does not involve the reconstruction of a 'vocabulary of emotions', but the generic and collective concepts of the many individual words related to *emotions*.¹⁴ Among these are concepts such as *affect*, *appetite*, *emotion*, *sensation*, *feeling*, *temper*, *passion*, *fervour*, *sensibility*, and *drive*, in their parallel English, German, and French versions.¹⁵ These concepts and their (unstable) meanings give us initial access to what contemporaries in a given time and place thought about emotions, what they knew about them, and how this knowledge helped them to order, distinguish, demarcate, and evaluate feelings.

At the same time these concepts draw attention to the degree in which knowledge of emotions and their classification have altered over time. What was understood by *affect* in the eighteenth century is no longer what we understand by the term in the twenty-first century. The social contexts of the concept, and the systems of knowledge upon which it drew, have changed dramatically. The same can be said of *emotion*. In the nineteenth century, it was still rarely used, and even then, in a restrictive sense (often in connection with social unrest and *émeutes*); but in the course of the twentieth century, it fought its way to the front of the vocabulary of emotion, and now it dominates not only current scientific debate, but also everyday language and advertising.

We draw on various scholarly traditions and tendencies in seeking to trace semantic change in concepts of emotion, and then connect these changes to the process of social development. The approaches offered by intellectual history, the history of ideas, and the history of the sciences are of importance here, together with Reinhart Koselleck's major project in conceptual history, including its critical extensions and revisions.¹⁶ We take our periodization from Koselleck: our reconstruction begins around 1750 with the initiation of the historical movement today known as modernity. Unlike the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, however, we also include the period of high modernity. This is linked to our assumption that a second *Sattelzeit* emerges in the latter nineteenth century, and this fundamentally

¹⁴ On the project of a German vocabulary of emotion, cf. Ludwig Jäger (ed.), *Zur Historischen Semantik des deutschen Gefühlswortschatzes: Aspekte, Probleme und Beispiele seiner lexikographischen Erfassung* (Aachen: Alano, 1988). The project did not make it beyond commencement, an indication not only of its limited feasibility, but also of the methodological problems in the identification of emotional terminology and in deciding on a corpus of relevant sources.

¹⁵ Along with these general emotion concepts, other theme-specific terms and concepts have been evaluated in each chapter.

¹⁶ Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, 7 vols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972–92); Willibald Steinmetz, 'Vierzig Jahre Begriffsgeschichte: The State of the Art', in Heidrun Kämper and Ludwig Eichinger (eds), *Sprache—Kognition—Kultur: Sprache zwischen mentaler Struktur und kultureller Prägung* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 174–97.

reorganizes knowledge of emotions. Of decisive importance here is the turn in psychology towards natural sciences, and its rise to become a leading science of the twentieth century, having a major and continuing impact upon the way in which men and women lead their lives.

While the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* project sought to identify the leading socio-political concepts of modernity and analyse their semantic transformation, our own concerns are marked more strongly by historical anthropology. Concepts such as *feeling*, *affect*, and *passion* are not primarily part of a socio-political language, but instead refer to what we might call basic human capacities. Historical semantics can show how what was thought to be the essential nature of the *Humanum* did in fact vary over time, and how this variability was influenced by social, political, and cultural processes.

However, such influence can very rarely be read directly out of dictionary headings. The contextualization of concepts and their meanings was often neglected in encyclopedias and reference works, especially in those from the late twentieth century that eliminated the normative sense of their predecessors and limited themselves to very brief summary definitions. To make up for this problem we have also drawn upon the sources to which these entries refer, taking account of cross-references, together with synonyms, associated terms, neighbouring words, and antonyms. This approach has made it possible to assemble vast terminological fields, and tackle the total architecture of concepts of emotion.

Control concepts have been consistently employed to shed light on the social, political, and cultural coordinates of the central classificatory concepts. If, for example, we encountered repeated references to *feelings* or *mood* as feminine qualities, we linked these to contemporary references to *femininity* or *gender characteristics*. In this way it was possible to construct a complex yet methodologically consistent picture of the historical semantics of emotion. Since all information came from the same source—that of the encyclopedia—the control concepts conformed to analogous criteria of selection and form.

This does not rule out the possibility of there being dissonance and temporal irregularities across entries, which indicate differing speeds and media of reception. Also of importance here is the fact that the latest specialist debates did not feature in general reference works of this kind, or, if so, then only with considerable delay. Some individuals were, however, sufficiently prominent that their work quickly found its way into the reference pages—for example, Charles Darwin, whose 1872 work *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* was translated into German the same year, and was widely referred to by the 1880s.

Inconsistencies of this kind indicate the limits of employing reference works in this way. The general knowledge that encyclopedias sought to convey does not seem to have corresponded precisely to the contemporary state of knowledge at any given time. There are further doubts regarding the degree to which the genre was able to penetrate society. Even though its readership was more extensive than the number of experts in specialist disciplines, it was nonetheless limited during the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries to a small stratum of educated people. Only very occasionally were special issues published that appealed more directly to a lower-class readership.

Nonetheless, there is no alternative to the encyclopedia if we want to reconstruct widely diffused knowledge of emotions in their contemporary structure, regional distribution, and historical variation. Although this represents only a section of knowledge in circulation, and neglects a 'higher' literature that has long been a central medium of emotional formation, it is an excellent source for this initial excursion into the 'topographies of the emotional' that modern societies and their systems of knowledge have created.

4. KNOWLEDGE OF EMOTIONS IN THE CENTURY OF ENLIGHTENMENT

'Everyone is talking about appetite, desires, the passions of temper, movements of temper and its inclinations.'¹⁷ This was in Zedler's *Universal Lekicon* of 1733; further eighteenth-century reference works testify to the great interest that there was at this time in the nature of emotions. At first sight this might seem surprising: emotions in the Age of Enlightenment? This seems to be a contradiction in terms. Was the Enlightenment not supposed to be about the rational understanding of the world and its creations? Surely, given this, emotions were of quite marginal importance:¹⁸

On reflection, however, it can be assumed that this interest in emotions derived from the impulse towards enlightenment itself. In no respect did 'enlightenment' mean the reduction of individuals to their capacity for rational thought. A person also came across as being enlightened if phenomena that contradicted this way of thought were illuminated and explained. In this sense, feelings and changes of temper and mood could themselves be subjected to rational analysis, and everyone could talk about it.

Moreover, there is yet another and more critical interpretation of this statement from Zedler's *Lexicon*. Might it not be that the great contemporary interest in 'appetite' and 'passions' suggests that enlightenment and rationalism are not so indissolubly connected as has been assumed? Might it not be evidence that during the Age of Enlightenment there were also the beginnings of a new and thorough appreciation of emotions?¹⁹

There is ample proof of this in encyclopedias and lexica. In 1743, we can read in Zedler: 'The source of all our knowledge is sensibility: it lays the basis for "reflection" and judgement.'²⁰ This was expressed more emphatically in the French *Encyclopédie* in 1765: 'Sensibility is the mother of humanity.'²¹ Without sensory

¹⁷ 'Begierde', in Zedler, iii (1733), 918.

¹⁸ Horst Möller, *Vernunft und Kritik: Deutsche Aufklärung im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986); Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *Europa im Jahrhundert der Aufklärung* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000).

¹⁹ Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), esp. ch. 6; Hartmut Böhme, 'Gefühl', in Christoph Wulf (ed.), *Vom Menschen: Handbuch Historische Anthropologie* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1997), 525–48.

²⁰ 'Sinne', in Zedler, xxxvii (1743), 1694.

²¹ 'Sensibilité', in Diderot/d'Alembert, xv (1765), 52.

sensibility there could be no understanding, no memory, and no imagination. Appetites and passions were a necessary part of human nature: 'Without appetite this life is impossible.' 'These are the passions which set everything in motion, which animate the tableau of this universe, which give, one could say, spirit and life to its various parts.'²² Of course, these had to be refined through education and practice if such cognitive transfers were to be effected. It was only the conscious cultivation of the senses that permitted the individual to perfect her or his nature, and become a member of civil society endowed with the appropriate sympathies.²³

Sympathy, or the ability to empathize with suffering and pleasure, the capacity for fellow-feeling, became a cardinal human virtue in the eighteenth century, a means 'for the good and the maintenance of society'.²⁴ The Scottish moral philosopher Francis Hutcheson wrote in 1728 that it rested on the 'Constitution of our Nature' and was a 'publick Sense' that made one's own happiness dependent upon that of others.²⁵ In 1759, Adam Smith, a student of Hutcheson, made 'sympathy', which he defined as 'fellow-feeling for the misery of others', the cornerstone of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. He argued that, in the absence of *sentiments*, *passions*, and *emotions* (treated as broadly synonymous), society would not be possible; contra Bernard Mandeville, *self-love* and selfishness alone could not form the basis of any social community.²⁶

These arguments gave his contemporaries a great deal of material for discussion and controversy. British reference works, especially the first edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in 1768, eagerly took them and elaborated them. Two main questions came to dominate discussion: first of all, what role did human self-love play in the development of 'benevolent affections'? Secondly, were these *benevolent affections*, such as *pity*, *compassion*, and *public sense*, naturally innate to every human being, or were they acquired culturally? The second question was controversial, since a great deal depended upon the way it was answered. If you agreed with John Locke and the physician David Hartley that emotions were not formed instinctively, but through a process of 'association', then you ascribed much greater importance to the education of young people than those who believed that emotions were instinctive, like the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid.²⁷

The 'sentimentalists' of moral philosophy (Hume, Hutcheson, Smith) believed that all human beings were equally endowed with an 'innate propensity' to take pleasure in the happiness of their fellow creatures, and deplore their sorrows; but this was cast in doubt not least by consideration of 'savages'. In 1810, the *Encyclopædia*

²² 'Begerde', in *Zedler*, iii (1733), 920; 'Passions', in *Diderot/d'Alembert*, xii (1765), 145.

²³ Georg August Flemming, *Versuch einer Analytik des Gefühlsvermögens* (Altona: Hammerich, 1793), 9, 34–5; Sigrid Weigel, 'Pathos—Passion—Gefühl', in *Literatur als Voraussetzung der Kulturgeschichte: Schauplätze von Shakespeare bis Benjamin* (Munich: Fink, 2004), 147–72, esp. 164–5.

²⁴ 'Passions', in *Diderot/d'Alembert*, xii (1765), 145.

²⁵ Francis Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* [1728], ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 23.

²⁶ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* [1759] (New York: Prometheus, 2000), *passim*; Emma G. Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Thomas Rommel, *Das Selbstinteresse von Mandeville bis Smith* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2006).

²⁷ 'Passion', in *EB*, 3rd edn, xiv (1797), 1–16.

Britannica noted that ‘savages’ had no *public sense*, their actions being motivated ‘from self-love variously modified’. Only with civilization was it possible to teach this *public sense* as well as individual *sensibility*, which depended only partially on the organization of the nervous system. Sensibility ‘is experienced in a much higher degree in civilized than in savage nations, and among persons liberally educated than among boors and illiterate mechanics’.²⁸

Cultivation and education were, therefore, indispensable interventions in the make-up of ‘human nature’. This implied no general discredit or denigration. In fact, during the eighteenth century it became usual to ascribe a positive value to the natural world, primarily as a form of criticism of the artifice attributed to aristocratic culture. But nature was not regarded as the sole tutor of the human race, to be left to its own devices. In 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote that nature develops ‘our faculties and our organs’ while men teach us how to use them.²⁹ Related to the field of emotions, this meant that nature created the individual faculty for sensibility, while humans gave instruction on how this faculty could be applied for individual and general benefit.

Enlightened contemporaries, considering themselves to know more than the theologians of previous centuries who had condemned human drives and appetites as evil, presumed that natural inclinations, senses, temperaments, and passions were an important part of the formation of an individual. But they also laid emphasis on the idea that the life of emotion was extremely dependent on external stimuli and influences. Climate, nutrition, but above all ‘education, type of life and behaviour’ lent ‘the soul a particular direction... more affected by things of a certain kind than another’.³⁰

To feel and be moved was in the eighteenth century perfectly respectable. Sensibility, *sensibilité*, *Empfindsamkeit*—everywhere in (Western) Europe this song was sung. Literature and poetry described it as the supreme value, and sought to cultivate it in their readers. Fulsome feeling was extolled, and said to be a condition of the ability to make moral judgements. Samuel Richardson’s epistolary novels *Pamela* and *Clarissa* of the 1740s, Rousseau’s *Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse* of 1761, and Goethe’s *Leiden des jungen Werther* in 1774 were the most successful texts that set up models of sensitive behaviour that could also be imitated. The great influence of these novels is shown by their notable public reception, but so, too, is the mass of enthusiastic letters from their readers a testimony to the impact they had on the personal life, conduct, and culture of emotion of many contemporaries.³¹

²⁸ ‘Sense’, in *EB*, 4th edn, xix (1810), 148; ‘Sensibility’, in *EB*, 4th edn, xix (1810), 152.

²⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, Or, On Education: Includes Emile and Sophie, Or, The Solitaries*, ed. and trans. Christopher Kelly and Allan David Bloom (Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2010), 162.

³⁰ ‘Leidenschaft’, in *Krünitz*, lxxv (1798), 21, 24.

³¹ G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Frank Baasner, *Der Begriff ‘sensibilité’ im 18. Jahrhundert: Aufstieg und Niedergang eines Ideals* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1988); Gerhard Sauder, *Empfindsamkeit, i. Voraussetzungen und Elemente* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1974). On the letters from readers, see Robert Darnton, ‘Readers Respond to Rousseau: The Fabrication of Romantic Sensitivity’, in *The Great Cat Massacre*, 215–56.

But, soon enough, in the midst of this euphoria a sceptical note was struck. In 1793, Johann Christoph Adelung wrote that ‘sensibility is the capacity of being easily moved to gentle sensations’. In principle he had nothing against this, but did warn of ‘hypersensitivity’ (*Empfindeln*).³² In 1810, the *Encyclopædia Britannica* mocked the prevailing exaggerations and insisted on distinguishing ‘real sensibilities from ridiculous affectation’.³³ In 1798, a similar sentiment was expressed in Krünitz’s *Encyklopädie*. While passion as such was presented in a positive light, a ‘life without passion’ being far more disagreeable than the damage that the passions could cause, there was nothing but scorn and derision for what was called an ‘unrestrained partiality to an inane sensibility [*Empfindeley*] for its own sake’. There was nothing wrong with ‘healthy feelings’, the entry went on, and ‘noble, genuine tenderness’; this last was, after all, a ‘virtue, a gift of God’. But the ‘plague’ of sensibility was a ‘deliberate and practised folly’, and as such related to ‘Pietistic hyperbole’ (with which it did in fact share common roots). Everything was quite hopelessly overstated, ‘every impression became a woe, every thought became an affect’. ‘Everything else was subordinated to, even sacrificed for, love and feeling.’ ‘Genuine, active and useful virtue’ did not stand a chance here; instead of lending a helping hand, the ‘sensitive soul’ dissolved in tears of compassion. They were ‘idle bystanders’ and ‘empty dawdlers’, and certainly not ‘useful citizens worthy of respect’.³⁴

This kind of pointed philippic against a ‘compulsion to be Siegwart or yearning for Charlotte’ could be read in other reference works.³⁵ Concerned male contemporaries sat in judgement on what they criticized as the regrettable extremes of an era that had made emotions an important element of, and resource for, human existence. By skewering and caricaturing the excesses of this movement, they exposed at the same time their own normative standards, which coincided with the Enlightenment and the claim to civil liberty. They sang the praises of sociability and civil virtue, active sympathy and ‘gentle feelings and passions’ among friends.³⁶ What was important was active engagement, purposeful intervention instead of self-referring lamentation and introspection.

Educational intervention was needed for this. Those who wanted to prevent youths from becoming mawkish, weak, and doleful from an excess of sensibility would have to purge the theatre and literature of countless ‘tragedies’, and put ‘novels of derring do’ in the place of Werther and Siegwart. But one should not try too hard. It was not a good idea to make too much of ‘heroic plays’ that inspired young men to ‘recklessness’. Instead, public education should seek ‘to moderate the temper of pupils with examples and models’.³⁷

This line of argument makes two things clear. First of all, sensibility, sense impressions, and passions were seen as open to cultivation. In the ‘pedagogic’

³² ‘Empfindeln’, ‘Empfindeley’, and ‘Empfindsam’, in *Adelung*, 2nd edn, i (1793), 1799–80.

³³ ‘Sensibility’, in *EB*, 4th edn, xix (1810), 152.

³⁴ ‘Leidenschaft’, in *Krünitz*, lxxv (1798), 157, 366, 368, 371, 378–9.

³⁵ Johann Clemens Tode, *Der unterhaltende Arzt über Gesundheitspflege, Schönheit, Medicinalwesen, Religion und Sitten*, i (Leipzig: Faber & Nitschke, 1785), 216.

³⁶ ‘Leidenschaft’, in *Krünitz*, lxxv (1798), 104.

³⁷ ‘Leidenschaft’, in *Krünitz*, lxxv (1798), 21, 474, 480.

eighteenth century, there was a general conviction that even innate and ‘natural’ inclinations could be altered ‘by the way one was brought up, by human society, good lessons and skilful exercise’.³⁸ With the education of boys in mind, it was argued in 1798 that ‘the power of the soul has to be drilled and hardened, as do the limbs of the body’.³⁹

Secondly, there was no consensus on the proper measure for these powers of the soul and the capacity for sensibility. It shifted between ‘recklessness’ and ‘meekness’, between hardness and softness. The scale of emotions was a large one; the golden mean was difficult to ascertain, and seemed increasingly different for women and for men. We will examine this more closely below, together with the changes to which such attempts at standardization were subjected. Every era had its own norms, defined its own extremes, and invented its own ways of imposing its ideals upon man and woman.

5. CONCEPTS OF EMOTION: AFFECT, PASSION, FEELING

Each period also created its own concepts of emotion, or lent them altered meanings if they retained older terms. In retrospect it seems that, as a whole, the spectrum definitely shrank. Today we no longer talk of feeling, passion, fervour, affect, sensibility, sentiment, appetite, changes of temper, and its inclination, but for the most part simply of emotion.

This conceptual reduction is most evident in the sciences. Psychology deals almost entirely in terms of affects and emotions, and hardly talks at all about feelings, affect, or passions.⁴⁰ But it is not only the reference works specific to particular disciplines that have agreed to make emotion a leading concept, either doing without other concepts altogether, or treating them as subordinate. This process can be seen at work, even in today’s encyclopedias. The 2006 *Brockhaus* still provides a broad menu of concepts related to emotions. Apart from the term *Affekt* we can also find entries for *Emotion*, *Empfindung*, *Gefühl*, *Gemüt*, *Leidenschaft/Passion*, *Sensibilität*, *Stimmung*, and *Trieb*. All the same, there is a clear focus upon *Emotion* and a clear turn away from older concepts, whose particular characteristics are levelled out. The entry *Leidenschaft/Passion* contains only a few lines, mostly consisting of an exposition on the history of philosophy (much the same happens with

³⁸ ‘Neigung’, in *Zedler*, xxiii (1740) 1654; Ulrich Herrmann (ed.), *Das pädagogische Jahrhundert. Volksaufklärung und Erziehung zur Armut im 18. Jahrhundert in Deutschland* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1981).

³⁹ ‘Leidenschaft’, in *Kriinitz*, lxxv (1798), 373.

⁴⁰ English-language psychological literature uses ‘emotion’ as a complex central term; some authors distinguish between ‘drive’ (hunger, thirst, etc.) and ‘emotion’, and categorize both under ‘affect’. Cf. Carroll Izard, *The Psychology of Emotions* (New York: Plenum Press, 1991). German-language psychological literature likewise prefers the term *Emotion* and sometimes uses it synonymously with *Gefühl*. Cf. Günter Pössinger, *Wörterbuch der Psychologie* (Munich: Humboldt Taschenbuchverlag, 1982), 56; Philip Zimbardo et al., *Psychologie* (Berlin: Springer, 2007), 442–59.

Affekt). *Gemüt* also gets short shrift, being described as ‘an imprecise concept for the emotional side of an inner life’. *Emotion* or *Emotionalität*—the latter encompassing ‘the entirety of the life of emotion’—does by contrast gain in substance, reinforced by the term *emotional intelligence*, which has, since Daniel Goleman’s bestseller, entered everyday language.⁴¹

What is behind all this? One could simply dismiss this development as another instance of a blanket Anglicization, and it is true that the progress of *Emotion* in the German language would be inconceivable without the growing importance of English as both a scientific and an everyday language. But there is, or was, even in English a variety of words to express emotions: *affection*, *feeling*, *appetite*, plus *passion*, *sentiment*, *sensation*, *sensibility*, or *sensitivity*. Why are they used less and less, and why has the concept *emotion* been privileged? What has been gained by this, and what lost?

But perhaps these are not the right questions. If this modern contraction in the vocabulary of emotions is viewed from a longer perspective, it becomes plain that it follows on from a process of extension that reached its highpoint in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The sheer diversity of concepts of emotion that can be documented for this period was unprecedented, existing neither before, nor after it. This suggests that an explosion in the number of concepts and ideas took place that no theory or discipline could keep in check. Hence we should in fact treat the nineteenth century as a special case requiring explanation: what is unusual and thereby interesting, is the diversity of concepts, not their singularity.

What made the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries so special was the parallel existence of different systems of thought, each of which defined its own concepts and differentiated them from others. There was the long-established Aristotelian tradition, which had been systematized by Thomas Aquinas, and which was influential well into the modern period. Its core concept was *pathos/pathé*, translated as ‘affect’ and ‘passion’, or *Leidenschaft* in German. The soul (*anima*) was the seat of these passions, moved by them and able to pick up sensations of pleasure or displeasure. This sensation, this movement, was transferred from the soul to the body and set it in motion.

The soul and its ‘capacity to strive’ was, therefore, central to this tradition. This latter quality was brought about by both the rational will and sensory perceptions (passions), where the will was conceived to be a positively active factor, while the passions were passively suffered. Although the will underwent a clear moral upgrading, the passions were generally valued as natural drives that were of use to the person. It was seventeenth-century philosophers, especially Hobbes and Spinoza, who ascribed a positive and vital function to affect and passion. At the same time, they did, like Descartes and Leibniz, increasingly discriminate between

⁴¹ ‘Affekt’, in *Brockhaus*, 21st edn, i (2006), 233–4; ‘Emotion’, in *Brockhaus*, 21st edn, viii (2006), 21; ‘Gemüt’, in *Brockhaus*, 21st edn, x (2006), 413; ‘Leidenschaft’, in *Brockhaus*, 21st edn, xvi (2006), 550. As early as the 18th edn, *Brockhaus* described *Affekt* as a ‘synonym for emotion’: i (1977), 70. Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence* (New York: Bantam Books, 1995).

life-preserving drives and bodily instincts, on the one hand, and conscious morally relevant *sentiments*, on the other.⁴²

This philosophical tradition was prominently represented in the encyclopedias and dictionaries of the eighteenth century. Entries regularly cited writers from antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern period, instructing readers on concepts and models that had formerly been widely accepted. But they also registered new developments. In Britain this meant the rise of *moral philosophy*, which lent emotions—*feelings, passions, affections, sensations, instincts, appetites*—a central role in individual and social development. At about the same time, but mostly independently from this, an intellectual and cultural movement developed in France that had a high regard for *sensibilité*, and was associated with an anti-Stoicist conception of the human being as emotionally vibrant.⁴³ In Germany, by contrast, the debate conducted in the lexica over terms such as affect, passion, and fervour was initially dominated by followers of Leibniz–Wolff, who treated the human being primarily as a creation of mind and reason. The Scottish Enlightenment had very little impact, although the main texts associated with it were quickly translated. German lexica devoted little or no space to the political impulse of *civic activism*, nor to the way in which the Scottish conception of individual and society rested upon a sensory, emotional, and moral foundation; nor was there any support for it. It was not until the early nineteenth century that the Scots’ ‘philosophy of emotion’ was dealt with, and even then the tone was thoroughly negative and dismissive.⁴⁴

By this time Immanuel Kant had become the most authoritative philosopher in German-speaking regions. He also gave a fresh impulse to the discussion of affect and passion by introducing ‘emotion’ as an independent ‘property of the soul’, placing it between cognition and appetite.⁴⁵ As the perception of like or dislike, of pleasure and pain, emotion had a sensory as well as a mental quality. Pure and subjective sensory perception was, according to Kant, refined by the generalizing activity of reason and, in the form of taste, became the power of aesthetic and moral judgement.⁴⁶

⁴² Catherine Newmark, *Passion—Affekt—Gefühl: Philosophische Theorien der Emotionen zwischen Aristoteles und Kant* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), chs 5–7; Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26–97.

⁴³ Baasner, *Der Begriff ‘sensibilité’ im 18. Jahrhundert*, 68, 125, 128–9, highlights the autonomy of this trend in France, which, he says, developed independently of that in Britain.

⁴⁴ For this reason, the general encyclopedias could not relate to the well-documented reception of the British debate on sensibility and moral sense. Cf. Sauder, *Empfindsamkeit*, 73–85; Wolfgang Martens, *Die Botschaft der Tugend* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1968). Fania Oz-Salzberger also attaches great importance to the Scottish ‘philosophy of emotion’ in the German sensibility debate in *Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 67 and *passim*. The encyclopedias did not support this interpretation. Cf. ‘Sensualismus’, in *Brockhaus*, 8th edn, x (1836), 154; and Jacob Friedrich Fries, *Neue Kritik der Vernunft*, i (Heidelberg: Mohr & Zimmer, 1807), 75.

⁴⁵ Here he was referring, without naming, to the philosopher Tetens, who, in 1777, had published the two-volume *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur*.

⁴⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, ed. and trans. Robert B. Loudon, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 125–48.

Thus a new concept was found that had no place of its own in the older philosophical theories. This can be seen clearly in contemporary lexica. In *Chambers*, *Zedler*, and the first edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the concept of *emotion* (*Gefühl*) was not a separate heading, but was included under *feeling* (or *Fühlen*) as 'one of the five external senses'.⁴⁷ It was in the fourth 1775 edition of Johann Georg Walch's *Philosophische Lexicon* that the concept *Gefühl* first appeared (previously there had been only the entry *Fühlen*), and assigned to this were the tactile perceptions of external objects.⁴⁸

This changed in the nineteenth century. Feeling in the sense of the perception of external (mechanical) stimuli became marginal to the definition; what now predominated was the feeling that took place within a human being. Its 'most essential feature' was 'subjectivity, the relationship of consciousness to one's own being', as well as 'independence'. This was 'in no way a specially modified (obscure) cognition or wish, but a particular and characteristic mental activity'.⁴⁹ In this way, emotion as a phenomenon proper to consciousness was emancipated from perception as a primarily physiological occurrence. What was often used synonymously in everyday language was increasingly differentiated by the dictionaries, and the philosophers they cited. Perception, it was said, related to an external object that left behind an internal impression. By contrast, emotion took place entirely within the subject itself: it is, 'accordingly, consciousness of the condition in which I am placed by a perception'. This condition is described as non-physical: 'The origin of perception is sensory, the origin of emotion is mental. The former arises from the senses being affected; the latter through the work of our mental principles upon themselves.'⁵⁰

In the Kantian tradition, sensory 'affectations' played a much smaller role than the mental principle or, as it was called in 1824, 'psychic individuality'. A strong distinction was made between the 'lower' and 'higher' purposes of the soul; 'mere physical well-being' was ranked very much lower than the 'condition of real psychic well-being'. The latter was determined by reason, the former by sensualism.⁵¹ Even if one could not do without sensory perception, the decisive factor was whether, and how, rational consciousness would transform it into emotion.

This definition of emotion as a 'mental condition' in which the subjectivity of the human being was expressed was decisive for its ennoblement in the nineteenth century. It revealed itself in the increasing length of entries, as well as in the growing number of composites: *Gefühlsreligion*, *Gefühlsmenschen*, *Gefühlsphilosophie*, *Gefühlspädagogik*, and *Gefühlspolitik*.

⁴⁷ 'Feeling', in *Chambers*, 1st edn, i (1728), 18–19; 'Fühlen, Gefühl', in *Zedler*, ix (1735), 2225; 'Feeling', in *EB*, 1st edn, ii (1771), 582.

⁴⁸ 'Fühlen', in *Walch*, 2nd edn, i (1740), 1075; 'Gefühl', in *Walch*, 4th edn, i (1775), 1503. Similarly, 'Fühlen', in *Krünitz*, xv (1778), 440; there is no entry for *Gefühl* in *Krünitz*. See also 'Gefühl', in *Adelung*, 2nd edn, ii (1796), 477, which describes *Gefühl* as 'the sensation produced through the stimulation of the nerve-papillae [*Nervenwärtchen*]'.
⁴⁹ 'Gefühl', in *Ersch/Gruber*, section 1, lvi (1853), 22.

⁵⁰ 'Gefühl', in *Brockhaus*, 2nd edn, iii (1813), 89, 91: 'Feeling is cognition via the senses, without the involvement of the power of judgement, which raises the feelings to emotions.' A similar definition is given in 'Empfindung', in *Damen Conv. Lex.*, iii (1835), 400.

⁵¹ 'Gemüt', in *Brockhaus*, 6th edn, iv (1824), 106–7.