# RELIGION, INTOLERANCE, AND CONFLICT

A Scientific and Conceptual Investigation

EDITED BY STEVE CLARKE, RUSSELL POWELL, AND JULIAN SAVULESCU

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Preface

The events of 9/11 have brought the complex relationships between religion, intolerance, and conflict to the attention of many commentators, prompting those who see religion as a force for the promotion of tolerance to make their voices heard alongside those who see religion as a promoter of intolerance. This volume surveys empirically informed approaches to understanding the ways in which religion increases or decreases tolerance, social cohesion, violent conflict, and political compromise. Although the chapters represent a wide range of scientific and philosophical perspectives, they are united by their commitment to a rigorous empirical investigation of the subject matter.

The volume provides a forum for conversation across three otherwise disparate fields that stand to benefit from interaction: evolutionary anthropology, experimental psychology, and analytic philosophy. Contributors to this volume who approach the subject matter through the methods and concepts of evolutionary theory emphasize the ultimate causes, or adaptive values, of religious belief and behavior. Those working in the tradition of experimental psychology aim to uncover the proximate links between religion and prosocial/antisocial behavior by specifying the psychological and social circumstances under which these behaviors are likely to manifest. Analytic philosophers, meanwhile, work to clarify some of the key concepts that figure in scientific discussion, and to consider the ethical and policy implications of the empirical results.

When we consider the collection of papers as a whole a consistent theme emerges. While there may be some circumstances under which religion promotes intolerance and discord within social groups, it generally promotes social cohesion and tolerance within particular social groups; and while there may be some circumstances under which religion promotes tolerance and harmony between social groups, it generally promotes intolerance and hostility between differing social groups. This is, we believe, an empirically supported descriptive generalization about the relationship between religion and tolerance. However, we seek to do more than merely *describe* the social implications of religion in these chapters. Several of our contributors also ask whether we should try to *change* the current state of affairs and how we should go about doing so. The collection is therefore a merging of the empirical, the conceptual, and the normative.

Although one of the themes that emerges from the collection is that religion is an overall promoter of intolerance between differing social groups, this is a very broad generalization. There will be circumstances under which religion

may promote tolerance of out-groups and circumstances under which religion may promote intolerance of in-group members.

Furthermore, some of the most effective promoters of tolerance between different groups have emerged from religious traditions. For example, the Mennonites have played very constructive roles in peace-building enterprises in the twentieth century, in such conflict-ridden places as Nicaragua, Somalia, South Africa, and Northern Ireland (Appleby 2000: p. 143). We might also mention the many positive contributions that Quakers, Unitarians, and various other Christian groups, as well as socially engaged Buddhists, have made to promoting tolerance between differing social groups and to promoting social justice. Unfortunately, the effects of the efforts of these religious promoters of tolerance between groups appear to be outweighed by the tendency of many other religious groups to promote intolerance between differing social groups.

Questions that are addressed in this volume include the following: Is religion a central cause of interpersonal, intergroup, or interstate conflict? Is religiosity associated with intolerant behavior or dispositions? Are different modes of religiosity or religious orientation characterized by different relations to tolerance, intolerance, and conflict? What role does religion play in maintaining cohesion or solidarity in small-scale and large-scale societies, respectively? Does religion have an evolutionary function, and if so, how might this be manifested in cognition, behavior, and social relations? Can contemporary science inform traditional humanistic understandings of the genesis and perpetuation of religious conflict, and does it offer any clues as to how the latter can be reduced or prevented? What is tolerance and should it be understood in the same way in different religious and cultural traditions? What are the social and psychological limits of religious tolerance and of religious freedom? This volume compiles work from an eminent group of scientists and philosophers in an attempt to move toward a more complete understanding of the social implications of religion, and to explore potential avenues for the amelioration of religious conflict and the promotion of religious tolerance.

The first contribution to the collection is an introductory essay by Russell Powell and Steve Clarke. In this essay the concept of tolerance is analysed and classic arguments in favor of religious tolerance due to Mill, Bayle, and Locke are considered in the context of the rise of religious tolerance in Europe associated with the Enlightenment. The authors then consider psychological research on the relationship between religion and intolerance. It was widely assumed by leading figures in the emerging human sciences, such as Freud and James, that religion engendered positive dispositions and behaviors; however, mid-twentieth-century empirical work suggested that religious commitment is inversely correlated with tolerant attitudes. This surprising finding motivated a series of attempts to distinguish between different religious orientations and to see if these were associated with tolerant or intolerant attitudes. Powell and

Clarke consider empirical work on "extrinsic religious orientation" (religion construed as a means to self-serving ends), "intrinsic religious orientation" (religion construed as a source of one's values), as well as "religion as quest," "religious fundamentalism," "right-wing authoritarianism" and "Christian orthodoxy." They also discuss the distinction between prejudice and intolerance, which is not always clearly drawn in the empirical literature, and they consider the relationship between religion and in-group/out-group effects. Finally, they turn their attention to work in evolutionary anthropology, exploring the evolutionary origins of religion. Religion appears to have played a role in coordinating the activities of groups, and this may help to explain its simultaneous propensities to encourage tolerance of in-groups and intolerance of out-groups.

In Chapter 2, Harvey Whitehouse looks at the effects of religious ritual on tolerance and intolerance. He distinguishes between the rare traumatic rituals that are typical of small religious groups and the high-frequency routinized religious rituals that are typical of established world religions. He argues that rare traumatic rituals contribute to intense relations of trust and tolerance within small religious groups but also foment out-group hostility and intolerance. High frequency routinized rituals do less to directly establish trust and toleration of the in-group, but they allow for the extension of attitudes of toleration and trust to a much broader in-group. Because groups with routinized rituals can unite larger populations, Whitehouse argues, they will tend to out-compete groups who lack similar group-identifying markers. He also suggests that in times of hardship and conflict it may be difficult to maintain tolerant attitudes on a large scale. A way to create universal attitudes of tolerance, he suggests, may be to reduce people's levels of "existential anxiety."

In Chapter 3, Robin Dunbar argues that the recent revival of multilevel selection theory in evolutionary biology provides us with new ways of understanding the evolutionary origins of religion. He suggests that standard analyses of the origins of human cooperation rely too heavily on punishment as a means of ensuring group bonding, as punishment is a less effective bonding mechanism than has often been supposed. Participation in religious rituals may have played a crucial role in enabling cooperative societies to form and permanent human settlements to be established. However, a side effect of the greater in-group tolerance that ritual participation provides is an increased hostility to out-groups amongst the religious. Dunbar suggests that because religion evolved to weld groups of 100–200 into cohesive societies, it may be a less than ideal bonder of larger groups, and this fact may explain the widespread tendency of larger religions to fragment.

Dominic Johnson and Zoey Reeve, the authors of Chapter 4, also argue that religion is an evolutionary adaptation that promotes the functioning of social groups. Dunbar is willing to entertain group-level selection but not group

selection proper. However, Johnson and Reeve suggest that in the context of significant inter-group conflict in human evolution, religion may have been favored by natural selection due to fitness benefits that accrue to the group. They argue that religion is an adaptation for war, steeling us against fear, encouraging self-sacrifice and heroism, and providing us with a propensity to dehumanize our enemies, making it easier to overcome moral qualms about killing them. As an adaptation for war, religion promotes in-group cooperation and strong intolerance of out-groups.

Chapters 2 to 4 explored issues relating to the evolution of religion. Chapters 5 to 7 focus on psychological research. Dan Batson, the author of Chapter 5, critically examines recent work on the relationship between religion and intolerance towards out-groups, to which he has been a major contributor. He looks at the various dimensions of religiosity mentioned earlier and considers whether or not particular prejudices are proscribed by the religions that research subjects adhere to. He argues that while extrinsic religion is associated with proscribed prejudice, intrinsic religion is not—but he contends that the latter is nevertheless associated with prejudices that are not proscribed by one's religion. In contrast, he finds that the quest orientation towards religion is not associated with either proscribed or non-proscribed prejudices and is associated with increased tolerance.

In Chapter 6, Newheiser et al. present data to support Gordon Allport's characterization of religion as both a "maker" and "unmaker" of prejudice and intolerance. They present evidence demonstrating the contemporary role that religion plays in promoting intolerance of, and prejudice against, homosexuals in Europe. However they also present data which, viewed through the lens of "Terror Management Theory," suggests that religion acts as a buffer against the increases in prejudice and intolerance that arise when people become aware of their own mortality. Religion can afford a sense of "symbolic immortality" as well as a belief in an afterlife, which reduce feelings of existential anxiety and help prevent us from viewing those who do not share and support our worldviews as a threat to our existence, thereby reducing proclivities toward prejudice and intolerance.

In Chapter 7, Will Gervais and Ara Norenzayan turn their attention to anti-atheist prejudice. This is an important form of prejudice because there are probably more than half a billion atheists in the world. However anti-atheist prejudice is little studied. Gervais and Norenzayan produce evidence to show that in North America prejudicial and intolerant attitudes towards atheists are even more severe than those towards Muslims and homosexuals. They suggest that distrust (rather than fear or disgust) of atheists is at the heart of these attitudes, as ordinary religious believers share with John Locke the view that those who do not believe in God are not to be trusted because they do not fear supernatural punishment for moral transgressions.

The next six chapters have philosophical orientations. The first of these, Chapter 8, is due to Joshua Thurow who explicates the meaning of the question "Does religion cause tolerance or intolerance?" Thurow analyses the terms "tolerance" and "intolerance" as well as "cause" and "religion." He argues that it is important to work out what our motivations are when asking the above question, for only when we are clear on what our terms mean and clear on what we want to achieve, will we be in a position to know what evidence to look for. He suggests that the claim that religion causes intolerance (or tolerance) is implicitly the claim that religion is disposed to cause intolerance (or tolerance) to a greater degree than other human beliefs, practices, and institutions. He also suggests that we, in fact, want to know whether religion causes forms of tolerance and intolerance that we broadly agree to be good or bad. Those who claim religion causes (generally good) tolerance do not usually have in mind tolerance of (bad) displays of homophobia, for example.

In Chapter 9, Roger Trigg attends to the relationship between religious freedom and toleration. He distinguishes between two different Enlightenment views of religion. One sees religion as a source of intolerance and a threat to scientific knowledge which should be kept out of the public sphere. On this view the state should remain strictly secular while tolerating private religious practice. On a competing view, which Trigg advocates, following Madison, it is held that we have a basic right to religious freedom. Trigg argues that it is unrealistic and authoritarian to try to keep religious concerns out of the public sphere. He also suggests that recent work in the cognitive science of religion might serve as grounds for a natural right to religious freedom. Belief in supernatural agency and other aspects of religion arise from the normal functioning of our cognitive architecture and so are natural for us.

Tony Coady turns his attention to the issue of religious disagreement as a source of intolerance and civic danger in Chapter 10. Coady challenges simplistic criticisms of religions due to some of the "New Atheists." He clarifies the meaning of the term "religion" and argues that religion is often unfairly blamed for violence and intolerant behavior driven by other factors. Furthermore, he points out that there is much violence and intolerance that is driven by purely secular ideologies. Coady carefully examines the interplay of religious and political ideas and institutions, showing how ideas of liberalism, freedom of conscience, and the separation of Church and State permeated mainstream Catholic thought in the twentieth century. Like Roger Trigg, Coady considers it impractical and counterproductive to exclude religion from the public sphere. He develops a range of suggestions to deal with religious disagreements and to promote compromise and tolerance.

In Chapter 11, Owen Flanagan addresses a comparative question. It is widely believed that the followers of Eastern religions, such as Buddhism and Confucianism, are more tolerant than followers of Abrahamic religions. Flanagan asks why this should be the case, if indeed it is the case. His answer is

a nuanced one; however, two related themes stand out. First, in so far as there are supreme forces in Eastern religions, such as the Buddhist (and Hindu) cycle of karma, these are perceived impersonally. Second, in so far as there are supernatural beings in Eastern religions, these are finite agents who are not omnipotent, all knowing, all loving, all good, etc. Lack of belief in a punitive "know-it-all" God explains why followers of Eastern religions are more tolerant than followers of Abrahamic religions, Flanagan suggests.

In Chapter 12, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong looks at the impact of religious beliefs on compromises. Following Margalit he distinguishes between thin compromises, where what is given up does not include basic values and personal relationships, and thick compromises where basic values and personal relationships are sacrificed, at least to some degree. He argues that some think compromises are good, but that religious beliefs can undermine the possibility of some such good thick compromises being made. The reasons he identifies for this conclusion are not unique to religion but are, he holds, a product of absolutist thinking which is influential in secular as well as religious contexts.

Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson are the authors of Chapter 13, our final chapter. They start with the now widely made observation that religion in general, and a disposition to believe in supernatural agents in particular, is a natural phenomenon. Yet the tendency of religion to unite groups and promote hostility and suspicion of out-groups, they suggest, is highly problematic in our globalized world, making religious disputes liable to trigger violent conflicts involving increasingly lethal weapons. Although Persson and Savulescu consider that the rise of science has deprived religions of epistemic credibility, they also recognize that, as a natural phenomenon, it is unlikely that religion will be wiped out. They consider how non-believers should respond to this state of affairs and argue for ways in which the influence of religion can be kept out of policy formation in a liberal secular society.

A commentary has been provided by John Perry and Nigel Biggar of the MacDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics, and Public Life at Oxford University. They look to advance debate and focus on points that they take to be neglected, at least to some degree, in the thirteen chapters in the volume. The points they press are that religion-as-such is not a helpful explanatory category, that intolerance is sometimes good, that compromise is sometimes bad, that war can be just, that prejudice is not peculiar to religious believers, and that public and religious reasons are not easily distinguished. A second commentary, drawing out key themes in the thirteen chapters and focussing on practical social and ethical issues, has been provided by the editors.

The collection originated in a conference hosted by the Oxford Martin Institute and which took place in the Old Indian Institute in Oxford between May 17 and 19, 2010. The conference was organized by the editors of this collection as a part of the "Science and Religious Conflict" project, funded by an Arts and Humanities Research Council Standard Grant AH/F019513/1,

which was hosted by the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and the Institute for Science and Ethics in the Oxford Martin Institute, both of which are directed by Julian Savulescu. The conference included thirteen original papers as well as a summary of proceedings by Richard Dawkins and a panel discussion convened by Roger Bingham from The Science Network. Ten of the presenters at the conference were able to provide us with written-up versions of their papers. We then added a paper by Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson and a paper by Josh Thurow. One more chapter, authored by Russell Powell and Steve Clarke began life as a background paper circulated to the conference participants. All thirteen papers went through a thorough reviewing process and were all significantly revised as a result.

Any discussion of the relationships between religion, intolerance, and conflict courts controversy. Because of the controversial nature of our subject matter and because we think that insight is gained by examining a range of different views, we have sought out authors, who, as well as being leading international figures in their respective fields, hold a diverse range of views. Different people will come to the subject matter of this volume with different presuppositions and some may feel disappointed that we have not represented the views that they favor to a greater degree. Theists could perhaps focus on the contributions by Johnson and Reeve, Gervais and Norenzayan, Sinnott-Armstrong, and by Persson and Savulescu, and decide that our collection is overly anti-religious. And it is equally possible that atheists may look at the contributions by Newheiser et al., Trigg, Coady, and by Perry and Biggar and decide that we are much too concessive towards religion. We hope, though, that many readers who examine the contents of our collection will recognize that we have made an honest effort to produce a collection of thematically unified essays that is diverse and balanced, while also containing contributions of the highest quality.

Steve Clarke
Russell Powell
and Julian Savulescu

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Contents

Commentaries

Biographical Notes on Contributors

C. Daniel Batson is Professor Emeritus at the University of Kansas. As one of the leading figures in the psychology of religion for the latter part of the twentieth century, Professor Batson has argued that the traditional distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations does not exhaust all possible religious orientations. He has operationalized and tested alternative forms of religiosity in a wide range of influential experimental designs, examining their associations with altruism, prejudice, and intolerance.

Nigel Biggar is Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at Oxford University. His interests include the importance of certain kinds of religion for the moral health of liberal societies, and his recent publications include (co-edited with Linda Hogan) *Religious Voices in Public Places* (OUP, 2009), *Behaving in Public* (Eedermans, 2011), and *In Defence of War: Christian Realism and Just Force* (OUP, 2013).

Steve Clarke is Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University, Research Fellow in the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University, and James Martin Research Fellow in the Institute for Science and Ethics, also at Oxford. His book *The Justification of Religious Violence* is forthcoming with Wiley-Blackwell.

C. A. J. Coady is Professorial Fellow in Applied Philosophy in the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne. Professor Coady has done internationally renowned work on ethical and conceptual problems relating to war, humanitarian intervention, terrorism, and other forms of political violence, and he has published and lectured extensively in political ethics and the philosophy of religion.

R. I. M. Dunbar is Professor of Evolutionary Psychology in the Department of Experimental Psychology, at the University of Oxford, and Fellow of the British Academy. He has done pioneering work on the evolution of sociality, and is renowned for formulating what has become known as "Dunbar's Number," a measurement of the cognitive limit to the number of individuals with whom one can maintain stable relationships. More recently, he has begun to work on evolutionary and cognitive approaches to religion.

Owen Flanagan is the James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Neurobiology at Duke University. He has done pioneering work on the relevance of empirical moral psychology to ethical theory, and he has

published widely in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and Chinese philosophy. Professor Flanagan writes about the social and philosophical implications of scientific research into the roots of compassion, altruism, and peaceful human relationships.

Will M. Gervais is Assistant Professor in the Psychology Department at the University of Kentucky. His current research focuses on the causes and consequences of religious (dis)belief. His Master's thesis, which focused on prejudice against atheists, received the Canadian Psychological Association's Certificate of Academic Excellence.

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Beate Küpper is Professor for Social Work and Education in Group and Conflict Situations at the University of Applied Sciences Niederrhein in Germany. She works on groups-focused enmity, social dominance, and status preservation as an explanation for and outcome of prejudice and discrimination, including that between religious groups.

Anna-Kaisa Newheiser is Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Psychology at the University of Exeter and holds a PhD in social psychology from Yale University. Her research addresses the question of how group-based biases are perpetuated, which is exemplified in her work on the relation between religiosity and intergroup attitudes.

Ara Norenzayan is Professor of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, and Faculty Associate of the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies. His areas of research include evolutionary and cognitive approaches to religious thought and behavior, issues of cultural variability and universality in human psychology, and relations between culture and evolution. He is the author of *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict* (Princeton University Press).

John Perry is Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics, and Public Life at Oxford University. He holds a PhD in theology from the University of Notre Dame and is the author of *The Pretenses of Loyalty: Locke, Liberal Theory, and Political Theology* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Ingmar Persson is Professor of Practical Philosophy, University of Gothenburg, and Distinguished Research Fellow, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. His publications include: *The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life* (Oxford University Press, 2005; co-authored with Julian Savulescu) *Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement* (Oxford University Press, 2012); and *From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons and Responsibility* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Russell Powell is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. Prior to his appointment at Boston he was AHRC Fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy, and James Martin Research Fellow in the Institute for Science and Ethics, at Oxford University. Dr Powell holds advanced degrees in philosophy, biology, and law, and prior to his academic work in philosophy he worked as an attorney in complex pharmaceutical liability litigations. His research interests range from the philosophy of biology and bioethics to political and legal philosophy.

Zoey Reeve is a PhD student in politics and international relations at the University of Edinburgh. Her thesis offers an interdisciplinary, multilevel explanation of the process of radicalization towards violence in inter-group conflict, drawing on work in terrorism, evolutionary psychology, and religion. Zoey has an undergraduate degree in psychology and two Master's degrees, one in terrorism, and one in politics and international relations.

Julian Savulescu is Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford. He directs the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics in the Faculty of Philosophy. He is co-author with I. Persson of *Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), and he edits the *Journal of Medical Ethics.*

Katharina Schmid is a lecturer in New College and Research Fellow in the Department of Experimental Psychology at the University of Oxford. She specializes in the psychology of intergroup relations, intergroup conflict, and social identity. In particular, her focus is on multiple categorization processes, especially on antecedents, correlates, and consequences of social identity complexity.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University, as well as Senior Research Scholar at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and a co-investigator of the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics. He has been Vice-Chair of the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association and Co-director of the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Program. He has published extensively on empirical moral psychology, ethics, philosophy of law, and philosophy of religion.

Joshua C. Thurow is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at San Antonio. His main areas of research are epistemology and the philosophy of religion. He has published in such journals as *The Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Studies*, and *Synthese*, and is the co-editor of *The A Priori in Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He was a participant in the Cognition, Religion, and Theology Project at the University of Oxford.

Roger Trigg is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, Senior Research Fellow in the Faculty of Theology, and a member of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He was the Founding President of the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion, and as a member of the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion at Oxford, he works on the cognitive science of religion and its theological and philosophical implications.

Alberto Voci is Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Padova, Italy. He specializes in prejudice reduction, perceptions of group variability, the antecedents of in-group bias and, more broadly, the motivational and cognitive processes related to the dynamics between personal and social identity.

Harvey Whitehouse is Chair of Social Anthropology, Director of the Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, and Professorial Fellow of Magdalen College at the University of Oxford. Professor Whitehouse specializes in evolutionary and cognitive approaches to religious belief and behavior, combining approaches from the cognitive sciences with Darwinian perspectives on religious evolution. He is currently Director of a project on "Ritual, Community, and Conflict," funded by an ESRC Large Grant.

Andreas Zick is Professor for Socialization and Conflict Research in the Faculty of Educational Science at the University of Bielefeld in Germany. His research is focused on prejudice and discrimination, including legitimization strategies of prejudices, anti-Semitism, conflict, and violence.

Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance: Views from Across the Disciplines

Russell Powell and Steve Clarke

THE NEW RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AND THE NEW ATHEISM

The events of 9/11 have set off two academic debates. One is a debate about the causes of those events and the other is a more general debate about the influence of religion in society. While a few authors have wanted to stress the unprecedented nature of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 (e.g. Barber 2003), most have looked for precedents and tried to explain these events by relating them to earlier ones. However, scholars have been divided about the right approach to adopt. On one side are those scholars, such as Pape (2005) and Goodin (2006) who, perhaps motivated by the relative lack of terrorist activity inspired by religious causes in the twentieth century, have wanted to stress the importance of the political dimensions of Al Qaeda's conflict with the United States and its allies, and the relative unimportance of the religious aspects of that conflict.[1] According to Pape, apparently religiously inspired Islamic suicide bombing is best explained in purely political terms. It has "a simple strategic goal: to compel the United States and its allies to withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula and other Muslim countries" (2005: p. vi). On this view religion is incidental to the activities of religious terrorists. However, other scholars have wanted to stress the role of religion—particularly salvific religion—in transforming actions that would otherwise be straightforwardly political and means-end rational into ones that are not intelligible without recourse to the world views of particular religions. According to Michael Ignatieff, for religiously motivated terrorists:

> What matters most is securing entry into Paradise. Here, political violence becomes subservient not to a political end, but to a personal one. Once violent means cease to serve determinate political ends, they take on a life of their own.

> When personal immortality becomes the goal, the terrorists cease to think like political actors, susceptible to rational calculation of effect, and begin to act like fanatics. (Ignatieff 2004: p. 124)[2]

While political theorists and political philosophers dispute the role of religion in causing terrorism, a broad-based intellectual movement, which has come to be known as New Atheism (Stenger 2009), takes it for granted that religion is a key cause of terrorism and seeks to re-open old debates about the influence of religion on society. New Atheists, including Harris (2004), Dawkins (2006), Dennett (2006), and Hitchens (2007) have advanced a highly polemical attack on religion.[3] Whereas old atheists such as Russell (1967) were mostly content to make the case for accepting atheism, and generally adopted an attitude of respect for and tolerance of religious belief, New Atheists often urge us not to respect religion and to try to mitigate its influence. According to self-declared New Atheist Victor Stenger:

> Perhaps the most unique position of New Atheism is that faith, which is belief without supportive evidence, should not be given the respect, even deference, it obtains in modern society. Faith is always foolish and leads to many of the evils of society. (Stenger 2009: 15)[4]

In the strident words of the Christian opponent of New Atheism, Dinesh D'Souza, New Atheists, "blame religion for the crimes of history and for the ongoing conflicts in the world today . . . they want to make religion—and especially the Christian religion—disappear from the face of the earth" (D'Souza 2007: p. xv.). If D'Souza is right, or even partly right, then the New Atheist suspicion of the consequences of religion, and their concomitant rejection of respect for religion, are causes of New Atheist intolerance toward religion. It seems plausible to think that many of the New Atheists have joined some Christian opponents of Islam, and some Muslim opponents of "the West," in challenging the widespread liberal assumption that religious tolerance is generally justified. Such New Atheists do this in a more thoroughgoing way than intolerant religious believers, however, arguing that we should be less tolerant than we currently are of *all* religions.

Susan Mendus informs us that " . . . for much of the 20th Century, political philosophers, too, believed that religious toleration was a "done deal," a completed chapter in the history of western liberal democracies" (2007: Lecture Two). She cites leading political philosophers Rawls (1993) and Walzer (1997) as holding this view. But it now seems implausible to think of religious toleration as a "done deal." The religious violence and religious intolerance that ravaged Europe in the seventeenth century may have been brought under control for a significant period of time, but the thought that this state of affairs would inevitably become a permanent one now seems very presumptuous. What is particularly striking is how little it has taken for the recent liberal consensus about the virtues of religious tolerance to be brought

into question. The terrorist attacks of the first decade of the twenty-first century are important events, but they do not approach the significance of the religious wars of the seventeenth century, either in terms of damage done or in terms of their political impact. And yet we are faced with a chorus of voices urging Christians not to tolerate Islam, Muslims not to tolerate "the West," and atheists not to tolerate religion.

Here we seek to contribute to the newly emerging (old) debates about religion and tolerance by focusing on the causal relationship between religion and tolerance. Is religion a cause of tolerance, is it a cause of intolerance, or do some aspects of religion cause tolerance while others cause intolerance? We begin by looking briefly at the concept of tolerance, and at the historical emergence of the political ideal of religious tolerance. We then examine, in somewhat more detail, work in psychology where the causal relationship between religion and tolerance has long been a focal point of research efforts. We conclude by briefly discussing emerging work in the anthropology of religion that is relevant to the issue of religious tolerance.

WHAT IS TOLERANCE?

When we decide to tolerate an action or a practice, we decide to forego an opportunity to interfere in some instance of that activity or practice. Many of the Fellows and students at Christ Church College, Oxford, do not like the steady stream of tourists looking through their college grounds—and collectively, at least, they are in a position to stop it. However, they decide not to exercise this power. They decide to put up with, or tolerate, tourism. In order for their inaction to count as a genuine instance of toleration they must find tourism in the college grounds objectionable. If they did not find it objectionable then their attitude would be one of indifference or approval, and we do not use the terms "toleration" and "tolerance"[5] to describe cases where inaction is the result of indifference or approval (Williams 1996: p. 20). An attitude of tolerance is only possible when some action or practice is objectionable to us, but we have overriding reasons to allow that action or practice to take place. An exception to this generalization concerns a secondary sense of the term "tolerance." We are said to develop a tolerance of aspirin or caffeine when, typically through heavy use, we become less affected by aspirin or caffeine. In this usage "tolerance" is synonymous with "insensitivity" and no negative normative judgment concerning the heavy use of caffeine or aspirin need be implied. In a third sense, "tolerance" refers to a character trait or virtue that an agent may have or may strive to acquire. Possession of the virtue of tolerance makes one more disposed to perform acts of toleration (in the primary sense) than one would be otherwise.

Unsurprisingly, those who are the beneficiaries of the tolerant (in the primary sense of the term) attitude of others do not always appreciate the implicit disapproval that is implied by the fact that they (or their behavior) are tolerated by others.[6] For example, homosexual activist groups have sometimes objected to the implied disapproval delivered by the various churches that claim to "tolerate" homosexuality. They argue that homosexuals are deserving of a greater degree of respect than toleration implies (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2003).

Perhaps the most sophisticated of the various attempts to define toleration is due to Andrew Cohen. According to him:

> an act of toleration is an agent's intentional and principled refraining from inter-fering with an opposed other (or their behaviour, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has the power to interfere. (Cohen 2004, p. 69)[7]

If the agent has not considered refraining from interference, or has considered it and does not intend to refrain from interference, then that agent's action cannot be described as tolerant. Only inaction that is *intended* can count as toleration. The stipulation that a lack of interference must also be principled is included to rule out unprincipled non-interference, or interference that is explained by some motive that one did not endorse as a value. I might disapprove of an action and believe that it ought not to take place, but if I fail to act to try to stop it because I am merely lazy, then we would not describe my attitude as one of toleration (unless, perhaps, I endorse laziness as a value). My non-interference must be grounded on some sort of principle, although not necessarily a moral one, to count as tolerance.[8]

Non-interference is central to tolerance, but this should not be understood too broadly. The non-interference involved in toleration is *direct* non-inter-ference in acts and practices. It need not imply indirect non-interference in acts and practices. A devout Catholic may decide to tolerate Protestant religious practices in her community and to not interfere in the conduct of Protestant religious services, despite her disapproval of these. However, she may feel that the attitude of tolerance that she displays does not extend to refraining from proselytizing on behalf of the Catholic Church to Protestants. She hopes to achieve the end of converting Protestants to Catholicism, causing inter alia, the cessation of Protestant religious practices, but takes the view that it would be wrong to do so by means other than by rational persuasion. The clause "situations of diversity" is included in the above definition of tolerance on the grounds that if there were no diversity between peoples, then there would be no differences between them to object to.[9] Cohen includes the final clause "where the agent believes she has the power to interfere" to distinguish toleration from resignation.[10] If we believe that we have no power to stop the objectionable practice or activity, then our attitude toward that activity is not one of tolerance but of resignation.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

The most straightforward way of justifying toleration is pragmatic, and those who endorse a pragmatic justification of tolerance are in the good philosophical company of David Hume (1778). Our community may not approve of the practices of some or other religion and, collectively, we may be able to prevent these from taking place. However, if we act to suppress such practices, then we may provoke civil unrest and this may lead to violent confrontation or perhaps even war between rival religious groups. Recognizing this danger, we may decide that it is, all things considered, in our interest to tolerate the religious practices of our rival group, even though we continue to disapprove of these. Many defenders of religious tolerance have found pragmatic justification to be too weak for their liking because it is contingent on circumstances and these can change. If the only basis for tolerating the practices of a religious minority is that we calculate that the costs of suppressing the minority group do not outweigh the benefits, then it seems that we will be warranted in being intolerant towards them when circumstances change and we find that they are more easily suppressed.[11]

Non-pragmatic defences of religious tolerance are associated with the liberal tradition. Liberal toleration is distinctive because it involves a clear separation of the state from religious organizations, one that mirrors the liberal distinction between a public sphere and a private sphere. On classical liberal views, the state has jurisdiction over the public sphere and no entitlement to interfere in the private sphere. Religious practice is generally understood as falling within the private sphere and thus ought not to be subject to state interference (De Roover and Balagangadhara 2008). Not only must the state refrain from interfering in religious practice, on most contemporary interpretations of liberalism the state is understood as having a responsibility to act as a neutral arbiter between competing groups (including religious groups) within society, and to prevent attempts by any of these to interfere with the practices of others (Spector 2008).[12] To this extent, religious tolerance is institutionalized in the modern liberal state.

Attempts to justify the association of the value of religious tolerance with liberalism draw on three main sources: An appeal to the value of autonomy associated with John Stuart Mill (1859), an appeal to epistemic uncertainty in the religious sphere associated with Pierre Bayle (1685), and an appeal to the unfeasibility of religious coercion associated with John Locke (1689). The Millian argument is the most familiar to contemporary liberals and is most closely associated with the widespread view amongst liberals that there is a right to religious freedom. This right is grounded in an appeal to the value of individual autonomy, and on the liberal view religious expression is often regarded as a key area in which individuals can express their individual autonomy. Bayle's appeal

to epistemic uncertainty is less discussed by modern liberals than Locke and Mill's respective attempts to justify tolerance, but it continues to be discussed (e.g. Margalit 1996; Quinn 2001: 65–72). According to Bayle (1685) religious believers should allow for the possibility that their own religious beliefs are false and that those of their various rivals are true. Since they ought to be interested in discovering and respecting religious truth, they ought to tolerate other religious beliefs, which may possibly be true.[13]

Locke (1689) is conventionally interpreted as arguing for religious toleration on the grounds that religious persecution is ineffective and is therefore irrational. In arguing this way, Locke assumes that the main point of religious persecution is to instill particular beliefs in people rather than to change their practices, since the latter surely can be achieved via persecution. However, his claim that coercion cannot be effective in changing religious beliefs is simply an assertion that is not explicitly based on relevant psychological evidence, and has been strongly challenged by Waldron (1991). But even if Waldron is wrong, and one cannot coerce a devout believer to change her religious beliefs, one can surely use effective coercion to prevent her from proselytizing on behalf of her religion and from effectively transmitting religious practices, and perhaps some religious beliefs, to future generations; and this may be enough of a victory for the opponent of religious toleration. However, Locke (1689) is sometimes interpreted as making a different point. On Stanton's (2006) reading of Locke, coercion is ineffective not because it cannot change belief, but because God will not welcome coerced belief. This is of course a theological assumption, and those who do not share it will not be moved by Stanton's interpretation of Locke.[14] So the price of accepting this, perhaps more plausible reading of Locke, is that so construed his argument will be likely to influence fewer people.

Those who argue for tolerance of particular acts and practices will not usually want to argue for tolerance of all practices in the same domain of activity (Raphael 1988; Scanlon 2003). For example, those who argue for tolerance of sexual diversity typically do not want to extend tolerance to paedophilia. Likewise, those who argue for the tolerance of other religions often draw the line at "sects" which seek to retain members by utilizing "brainwashing" techniques. These individuals are even more unlikely to tolerate religious activities that involve, for example, animal (and perhaps even human) sacrifice. So defenders of particular instances of religious tolerance face a two-fold problem. They need to explain why some religious acts and practices of which they disapprove should be tolerated, while other religious acts and practices, which they also disapprove of, should not be tolerated. Mill (1859) suggested the "harm principle" as a guide to the appropriate limits of tolerance (Raz 1988). Practices that involve unjustified harm to others should not be tolerated. Of course, exactly what constitutes "harm" and what counts

as "unjustified" is a matter of dispute. However the harm principle is a plausible starting point for the delineation of the limits of tolerance.

THE RISE OF TOLERANCE

The rise of religious tolerance in Europe is typically associated with the Enlightenment. Medieval and early modern Europeans were typically not tolerant of unorthodox religious practices. In fact, Christianity is sometimes seen as the least tolerant of all religions (Zagorin 2003). This tendency towards intolerance may be explained by the salvific character of much Christian thought, particularly Protestant thought (Mendus 2007: Lecture One). It is hard to justify tolerance of other religions if one sincerely believes that faith in such religions will lead to the denial of salvation and perhaps to eternal damnation. However, the connection between salvation-driven arguments for religious intolerance and Protestantism should not be overstated. Mainstream Catholic thought had it that heresy should not be tolerated because of the threat that it poses to salvation. According to Aquinas:

> With regard to heretics . . . there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death. (*Summa Theologiae*, 2nd part of the 2nd part, question 11, article 3)

Salvific arguments for religious intolerance were usually only applied to heretical Christians by mainstream Catholic theologians, who tended to tolerate non-Christian religious practices, within limits (Kaplan 2007: pp. 294–330). However, a minority of theologians argued for the forcible conversion of non-Christians. Notoriously, Duns Scotus argued for the forced conversion of Jews (Turner 2006). His core arguments do not appeal to any particular features of Judaism and so they would seem to apply to all forms of religion other than Christianity (Clarke 2012).

Perhaps a mainstream view in history is that Europe was in the grip of theocratic intolerant oppression until the Age of Enlightenment in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, when Church and State were separated and principled arguments for tolerance were developed (e.g. Zagorin 2003, Grayling 2007). The motivations for the shift to a culture of tolerance are, on such views, a combination of the rise of urban commerce and a reaction to the bitter religious wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth

century in Europe, which manifestly failed to produce a lasting settlement to differences between Catholicism and the various Protestant religions. It is easy to move from this view to the claim that much of the rest of the world is still in the grip of theocratic intolerance and needs to catch up.

However, some historians, including Walsham (2006) and Kaplan (2007), resist the above "Whiggish" view of progress in the Western treatment of religion. They tend to emphasize the various ways in which pragmatically grounded local instantiations of religious tolerance were developed across Europe in advance of the Enlightenment, and the extent to which religious conflicts continued to occur in Europe during the Enlightenment. On this latter view, Western ideas of religious tolerance may not be part of a triumphal movement that is destined to dominate the globe. They might instead be part of a relatively ephemeral intellectual movement that will fail to take root, or persist, without the succour of Western liberal culture. A virtue of this latter view is that its advocates are able to contemplate the possibility of non-Western forms of religious tolerance that are not grounded in the individualist values of the liberal tradition.

One such possible alternative is the "millet system" which flourished in the Ottoman Empire (Kaplan 2007: 240–5). Under this system, Islam was the official religion, although Jewish and Christian religious communities were officially recognized and allowed to organize separately. Kymlicka describes the millet system as a " . . . federation of theocracies" (1996: p. 82). In a liberal society it is relatively easy for individuals to shift religious allegiances, and it is generally presumed that individuals have a right to do so. Under the millet system, however, it was very hard for individuals to shift religious allegiances, or to have religious allegiances to religious groups that were not recognized by the state. So, while the system promoted inter-religious tolerance, within limits, it did nothing to promote intra-religious tolerance. The millet system was designed to uphold established community values and not individual values.[15] Without endorsing the millet system, both Kymlicka (1996) and Kaplan (2007) recognize that it was successful in producing strong, cohesive religious minority communities, and relative harmony between communities.[16]

EARLY SCIENTIFIC WORK ON RELIGION AND INTOLERANCE

Both the New Atheists and their opponents tend to focus on particular examples of religion causing tolerance or intolerance, rather than engaging in a more systematic analysis of the relevant empirical research. Here we take a close look at the relevant empirical research. Of course, a tendency to produce tolerance or intolerance is not the only aspect of religion that one might focus

on. Even if it is shown that religion is a net cause of intolerance, it might be argued that this disbenefit is outweighed by the potential benefits that religion can generate, with respect to mental health, criminal behavior, altruism, and so forth (for reviews of the numerous papers examining these effects, see Gartner 1996; Koenig, McCullough, and Larson 2001; Aukst-Margeti and Margeti 2005; Moreira-Almeida, Neto, and Koenig 2006). And prominent New Atheists, like Richard Dawkins, do not consider the potential costs associated with the eradication of religious institutions. They simply claim that religion has served as an agent of intolerance and an effective promoter of intergroup conflict, (e.g. Dawkins 2001),[17] and conclude on that basis that it should be minimized or eliminated.

Our ability to distinguish causes from mere correlations in the social sciences is limited, in part because a detailed mapping of the causal structure of the human social psychological world would require carrying out controlled manipulations of variables which are neither practically feasible nor ethically permissible. As a result, most of the work in the social sciences linking religion in its various manifestations, to intolerance in its equally varied cognitive and behavioral dimensions, is far from definitive. Such work has been geared toward identifying psychometrical constructs that explain and predict substantial elements of observed data. As a result, virtually all research on the link between psycho-religious variables and intolerant attitudes and behaviors has been correlational, and the evidentiary case that has been built around it is circumstantial. Still, work in the psychology and sociology of religion is painting an increasingly detailed picture of the connections between religion and intolerance. New Atheists often portray themselves as courageously coming to the defence of empiricism, naturalism, and reason in their battle against intellectually indefensible and morally divisive religious worldviews (Dennett 2003); their critics, meanwhile, charge them with ignorance of theological and sociological complexities, as well as a tendency to attribute negative social outcomes to religion when these can more readily be explained by recourse to secular (e.g. political) factors (Cavanaugh 2007). We shall now see how these respective views fare in light of the evidence uncovered.

The scientific study of religion during the early part of the twentieth century began to sketch a portrait of religion as a prosocial cultural force. Towering figures in the emerging human sciences saw religion as engendering dispositions and behaviors that benefit communities (James 1902), mitigate aggressive and destructive impulses (Freud 1927), and provide specific reinforcements for adherence to moral norms (Skinner 1969; for a discussion, see Saroglou et al. 2005). By mid-century, however, evidence of the connection between religiosity and intolerance had begun to mount (Allport and Kramer 1946; Adorno et al. 1950; Stouffer 1955). Religiosity, as measured (for example) by church attendance and frequency of prayer, was consistently shown to covary positively with attitudes, values, dispositions, and behaviors that are conducive to ethnic, racial,

and religious intolerance, even controlling for socio-economic factors such as education, age, geographic region, and so on. For example, in a seminal study on the link between religion and intolerance, Stouffer (1955), a prominent sociologist and pioneer of survey research, examined the willingness of Americans to extend civil liberties to communists, socialists, and atheists. Stouffer found a significant *inverse* correlation between religious commitment (in terms of participation measures) and tolerance (p. 144). In addition, he discovered that different levels of intolerance were associated with different religious denominations in America, including (in descending order of manifest intolerance) Southern Protestants, Catholics, Northern Protestants, and Jews. Work in sociology and political science over the next five decades largely confirmed these findings (see e.g. Nunn, Crocket, and Williams 1978; Sullivan et al. 1982; McClosky and Brill 1983; Beatty and Walter 1984; Reimer and Park 2001), including a number of cross-cultural replications (Ponton and Gorsuch 1988; Eisinga, Felling, and Peters 1990).

Religiosity is gauged by a variety of measurements, including denominational affiliation, church attendance, and orthodoxy, which constitute the so-called "three B's": *belonging*, *behaviour*, and *belief*. The causal relationships between these dimensions of religiosity have been hard to disentangle (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993). Some studies have found that church and synagogue attendance (but not the frequency of personal prayer) are correlated with the support of suicide bombing and combative martyrdom (e.g. Ginges et al. 2009). Others have identified strong connections between denomination and intolerance (Beatty and Walter 1984; Reimer and Park 2001), while still others found belief to be the most important dimension and claim to have shown that a commitment to biblical literalism or adherence to doctrinal orthodoxy more broadly (Jelen and Wilcox 1990), best explains observed variations in tolerance (but see Eisenstein 2006). Since biblical literalism is a central component of the evangelical tradition, this latter finding would explain the high positive correlation between evangelicalism and intolerance (Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman and Green 1998).[18] Precisely which dimensions of religiosity are the most important determinants of intolerance remains unclear.

The social scientific literature has demonstrated a consistent, substantial, and generally negative association between the various components of religiosity and levels of political tolerance. At the same time, an equally sizable and wide-ranging body of evidence began to take shape purporting to link religiosity with prejudice (Batson 1976; see also Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993 for a review).[19] We will discuss the conceptual and empirical link between prejudice and intolerance in more detail later. For now, it is sufficient to note that there is essentially no evidence that religious people are any less prejudiced than *non-religious* individuals, and there is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that they are generally *more* prejudiced, depending on the category of prejudice under study (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).

EXTRINSIC/INTRINSIC RELIGIOUS ORIENTATIONS

Despite the early findings, it seemed to many researchers that religion has two faces when it comes to social behavior: one that produces a sense of compassion, brotherhood, and concern for others, and another darker face that leads to intolerance, bigotry, and violence. Perhaps, then, there were competing inclinations associated with different dimensions of religiosity (or ways of being religious) that were not adequately captured by social scientific instruments.

The influential psychologist Gordon Allport described the quintessential paradox of religion when it comes to intolerance. Allport argued that religion is responsible for both making and unmaking prejudice:

> While the creeds of the great religions are universalistic, all stressing brotherhood, the practice of these creeds is frequently divisive and brutal. The sublimity of religious ideals is offset by the horrors of persecution in the name of these same ideals. (1954: 444)

As Allport suggests, although Christianity is associated with principles of universal love, benevolence, and peace, the concrete history of Christianity (as well as other great religions) is punctuated by episodes of unimaginable hatred, intolerance, and violence, as noted by Bertrand Russell (1967) in his famous essay rejecting the moral foundations of Christianity. It is this curious and paradoxical character of religion that leads some people (including many of the New Atheists) to claim that the surest cure for prejudice is secularization, while others continue to insist that the best way of fostering compassion, tolerance, and peace is to increase religiosity.

To measure the dimensions of religiosity that are conducive to prosocial and antisocial behavior, respectively, Allport and colleagues (Allport 1966; Allport and Ross 1967) introduced and operationalized a distinction between two religious "orientations" that were hypothesized to have asymmetrical implications for intolerance, prejudice, and other anti-social attitudes and behaviors. Allport's religious orientations consisted of functional descriptions of psychological processes, rather than specific religious content. The first, which he called "extrinsic religious orientation" ("ER"), was conceived as a religiousness that was instrumental in nature, with religion used as a means to obtain an assortment of self-serving ends, such as personal comfort and social rewards of both the terrestrial and heavenly variety. ER individuals, who were found to comprise a substantial proportion of the religious population, use religion for its intra-psychic benefits, such as increased self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and the reduction in subjective uncertainty (Hogg and Abrams 1993), which flow from the social endorsement of one's values and social-cultural worldview (Kirkpatrick 1989). These palliative functions are particularly important for high ER individuals, who are characterized by insecure personalities and as responding defensively to worldview threats in ways that

can lead to prejudice, intolerance, and aggression. According to Allport, ER individuals tend to be prejudiced and intolerant, not because their religion makes them so, but because the same personality traits (such as low self-esteem and insecurity) that motivate them to engage with religion in an instrumental fashion also lead them to derogate and discriminate against values-violating out-groups.

The second orientation, which Allport referred to as the "intrinsic religious orientation" ("IR"), describes the psychological internalization of the values and norms of one's religion (Allport and Ross 1967: 441). Allport (1966) argued that ER was consistent with prejudice and intolerance, while its intrinsic counterpart all but ruled out these anti-social traits. He even went so far as to advocate public policy that would increase the proportion of intrinsically to extrinsically religious people.

Allport's work triggered an avalanche of research in the psychology, sociology, and political science of religion. Most of the initial work confirmed Allport's early results: namely, that ER is positively associated with anti-social attitudes ($r = 0.34$), while IR is either uncorrelated or perhaps even negatively correlated with the same ($r = -0.05$) (see Donahue (1985) for a meta-analytic review). Although the ER/IR distinction is still in use today, a major conceptual and empirical challenge has been mounting, with a number of prominent researchers advocating the abandonment of Allport's distinction (see e.g. Altemeyer 1988; Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990). This dissatisfaction stems in part from the fact that the ER/IR scales have failed to covary as negatively and consistently as Allport had predicted, and as such they do not seem to represent opposite ends of a single religious spectrum. Nor are ER and IR so unconnected that they resemble orthogonal modes of religiosity. Some authors have even suggested that ER does not measure religiosity at all, but instead captures broader structural features of personality (Wulff 1991).

Moreover, ER and IR do not produce the asymmetrical pattern of intolerance that Allport had envisioned. While IR has consistently been shown to have little or no correlation with *ethnic* prejudice, it has been significantly associated with discrimination and lower levels of helping in connection with homosexuals, women, communists, and members of other religions (Kirkpatrick 1993; Batson et al. 1999; Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck 1999; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999). Indeed, IR is both negatively and positively correlated with intolerant, discriminatory attitudes toward out-groups, with the valence depending on the kind of prejudice (McFarland 1989; Duck and Hunsberger 1999) and political issue (McClosky and Brill 1983; Layman and Green 1998) being tested for.

Perhaps the strongest reason for abandoning Allport's distinction is that any correlation between IR and intolerance (and its respective indicators) is significantly diminished once "social desirability" effects are taken into account (Batson, Naifeh, and Pate 1978). IR is associated with a higher *self-report*