


WITTGENSTEIN: COMPARISONS & CONTEXT



P. M. S. HACKER

OXFORD

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For

Hanoch and Vered Ben-Yami

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PREFACE

Wittgenstein's contribution to twentieth-century analytic philosophy is second to none. His ideas changed the riverbed of twentieth-century thought. The *Tractatus* was the paramount influence upon the Vienna Circle and its associates and upon Cambridge analysis of the inter-war years. The *Investigations*' impact upon post-war linguistic philosophy was equally profound. Wittgenstein's place in the history of philosophy is assured. His investigations into philosophy of language, of logic and mathematics, metaphysics and epistemology, into philosophy of psychology, and into the nature of philosophy itself are original and revolutionary. In every philosophical subject he touched, he approached the problems from a new direction, revealed the hidden presuppositions of philosophical thought in ways that had never been done before, and questioned them.

Wittgenstein's ideas are not easy to understand. His writings are stylistically a contribution to German letters. What he says is perfectly clear. But, as he himself admitted, it is by no means clear why he says what he says. A great deal of patience and effort is needed to clarify his thoughts, and to follow his footsteps through the jungles of philosophy. But what he discloses to those who follow his pathway is a route to philosophical understanding. And the view, when one has finally broken through the jungle and reached the sunlit heights, is wondrous. I have spent many years of my life struggling with Wittgenstein's writings and thoughts. I cannot imagine a more rewarding intellectual journey. I have tried to do justice to his great ideas in the various books I have written about them.

In 2001, I published a volume of my essays on Wittgensteinian themes entitled *Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies*. Since then, I have continued, in the interstices between my work on conceptual problems in cognitive neuroscience and on philosophical anthropology, to think and write about his ideas. In this volume, *Wittgenstein: Comparisons and Contrasts*, I have collected together some of my recent essays, and one older one.

The opening essay 'Philosophy: a Contribution not to Human Knowledge but to Human Understanding' is my final attempt to

draw together my reflections on the nature of the subject that has fascinated me since the days of my youth. The remarks on philosophy in the *Investigations* §§89–133 and in *The Big Typescript*, sections 86–93, explain why, conceived as a part of our quest for knowledge, philosophy, unlike the sciences, has so little to show for more than two thousand years of endeavour. It is not because philosophy is so much more difficult than natural science, but because it is so very different from it in its proper goals, methods, and achievements. Progress is the form of science, but not of philosophy (or art). Philosophy cannot achieve knowledge in the manner in which the sciences do, and advances in philosophy are not to be measured in the currency of scientific progress. It aims at *understanding*, and the form of understanding at which it aims is categorially distinct from the forms of understanding characteristic of the empirical sciences. Wittgenstein identified what the tasks of good philosophy are, how they are to be undertaken, and what one can hope for from the subject. He clarified why there is no room in philosophy for theories on the model of scientific theories, and no room for theses, opinions, or doctrines. He described the manifold roots of conceptual confusion in philosophy, in the sciences, and in the quotidian reflections of Everyman. And he explained how they can be extirpated. I tried, in *Insight and Illusion* (both in 1972 and in the extensively revised second edition in 1986) and again in *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning* (both in 1980 and in the extensively revised second edition in 2009), to explain Wittgenstein's later conception of the subject and to defend it against the manifold objections that had been advanced against it. To be sure, it involves a dramatic shift in perspective that runs against the grain of the whole of our philosophical tradition.

Once unravelled, Wittgenstein's ideas are powerful and illuminating. They delineate the scope of philosophy, clarify the rationale for its limits, and give philosophy a perennial role, not in policing usage, but as a tribunal of sense. Nevertheless, I had some hesitations about some of his remarks and some qualifications of substance. In Essay 1, I have tried to advance a conception of philosophy that is wholly inspired by Wittgenstein, but is not quite the same as his. For his account does not apply, without supplementation, to practical (i.e. moral, legal, and political) philosophy. Moreover, one should not, as Wittgenstein sometimes did, exaggerate its critical and therapeutic aspect at the expense of its constructive analytic aspect of providing a synoptic representation of segments of our conceptual scheme. The non-cognitive claim needs to be qualified in order to make room for knowledge, not of the 'metaphysical structure of the world', but of

hitherto unnoticed comparative features of grammar. Such knowledge does not take the form of discovery, but of realization. For, to be sure, ‘nothing is hidden’ (PI §559)—we have but to put together what we already know. But when we have arrayed familiar grammatical rules in a way appropriate to the question that confronts us, we learn something we had never realized before. Wittgenstein’s suggestion that philosophical problems and conceptual confusions arise only when language ‘is idling’ (PI §132) seems to me to be incorrect and shown to be so in the sciences, in public affairs, and in the thoughts and reflections of Everyman.

The next two essays are concerned with comparing Kant and Wittgenstein. This is a theme that occupied me in my first foray into Wittgenstein studies, *Insight and Illusion*. There, much influenced by Peter Strawson’s *The Bounds of Sense*, I drew parallels between these two great thinkers, who devoted more time to reflections on the nature of their subject than any other philosopher. When I came to write a second edition of *Insight and Illusion*, I modified my claims, for I realized that I had exaggerated the affinities between these two philosophers. I repudiated the idea, then quite common, that Wittgenstein was advancing a form of transcendental argument. As the years passed I became convinced that more needed to be said on this delicate issue. The second essay ‘Kant and Wittgenstein: the Matter of Transcendental Arguments’ confronts this question again.

I also became increasingly sceptical about Strawson’s analytic reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental deduction. It seemed to me not only that Strawson’s conception of consciousness and self-consciousness was awry, but also that Kant, despite his profound criticisms of the rationalist doctrine of the soul, was never able to shake off the Cartesian, Lockean, and Leibnizian misconceptions of apperception and of self-consciousness. The investigations into the nature of consciousness that I had undertaken for my recent book *The Intellectual Powers: a Study of Human Nature* (2013) convinced me that the *philosophical* conceptions of consciousness, deployed by successive generations of philosophers ever since Descartes, were faulty, one and all. This encouraged me to examine afresh Kant’s heroic efforts to handle the concept of consciousness in his Transcendental Deduction. Essay 3 ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: a Wittgensteinian Critique’ presents the results of my investigations. My conclusion was that although Kant had indeed brought down the house that Descartes and Locke had built, he was himself trapped in the rubble. There are indeed affinities between Kant and Wittgenstein, but Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is not Kantian, nor is it a

continuation of the Kantian project. Kant, Wittgenstein might have said, didn't put the question marks deep enough down. An 'I think' is not able to accompany all my representations (it cannot, for example, accompany my being in pain), but an 'I can say' must be able to accompany all my representations.

In the last two decades, my primary preoccupations have been in the domain of the philosophy of psychology. This was a subject Wittgenstein had transformed and reinvigorated in the 1940s, and his insights, although now neglected by many philosophers engaged in current philosophy of mind, by many cognitive scientists and members of the 'consciousness studies community', are second to none since Aristotle. When I contributed an essay for the *Festschrift* for my friend and mentor Anthony Kenny, I seized the opportunity to write 'The Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology'. This was, I hope, a fitting tribute to one who, in his own writings, had shed so much light on Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology and showed us all how to make good use of it. Viewed from afar, Wittgenstein's major reorientation of philosophy of psychology can be described under five headings.

First, he shifted the method of enquiry in philosophy of psychology away from introspection (still dominant in James and Russell) towards scrutiny of the use of our psychological vocabulary, the circumstances of the use, and the point and purpose of the expressions. Moreover, he elaborated and exemplified a novel methodology for investigation of the conceptual structures of our psychological thought and language.

Secondly, he focused sharply on the manifold ways in which the first-person use of psychological verbs differs from their third-person use, and elucidated these differences in ways that contrast dramatically with the received psychological and epistemological ways of explaining them in terms of 'privileged access' and 'first-person authority'. He showed that the behavioural criteria for other-ascription of psychological predicates are logically, conceptually, bound up with their meaning. He showed that the groundless first-person use of many of these verbs presupposes, for its intelligibility, the recognition of the behavioural grounds for their other-ascription. He showed that the immunity to doubt enjoyed by some first-person psychological utterances is not due to the presence of indefeasible certainty, and that the absence of the possibility of ignorance is not due to the presence of infallible knowledge. And he showed that to *have* experiences is not to *own* anything, that having an experience is not a form of 'logically non-transferable ownership' (Strawson).

This removed the foundations from the Cartesian and empiricist constructions.

Thirdly, his discussion of the possibility of a private language constitutes the most important battery of philosophical arguments in the twentieth century, arguments whose impact ramifies widely throughout philosophy. In the domain of the philosophy of mind, they show that the conception of the 'inner' and the 'outer' that has dominated philosophical and psychological thought since Descartes is irredeemably flawed. They show that the associated notion of epistemic privacy of subjective experience is incoherent. In philosophy of language, the same battery of arguments makes it clear that language can have no semantic foundations in subjective experience, for there is no such thing as assigning a meaning to a word by reference to a private analogue of public ostensive definition. This ramifies further, since it also implies that our vocabulary of perceptual qualities (of colours, sounds, smells, etc.) cannot be explained as names of subjective ideas (or 'mental representations'). So the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities must undergo radical revision. In epistemology, the arguments show that empirical knowledge cannot have foundations in subjective knowledge of how things sensibly appear to one to be. These consequences of the private language arguments ramify yet further outside philosophy: in theoretical linguistics, experimental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. For their conceptions of linguistic meaning, of consciousness and self-consciousness, of knowledge of the mental attributes of others, of sensation and perception, of voluntariness and intention, are inextricably bound up with classical Cartesian and empiricist misconceptions.

Fourthly, he showed that the philosopher's 'self' is a fiction, that the mind is not an entity of any kind, and that the subject of psychological predicates is the human being as a whole, not some part of the human being, such as the mind, the brain, or the fictitious self. In this respect, Wittgenstein swept aside a long Platonic–Augustinian–Cartesian dualist tradition. His reflections are in the Aristotelian monist tradition of viewing human beings as an indissoluble organic unity, rather than as a provisional union of mind and body. This too has ramifying consequences for psychology, theoretical linguistics, and cognitive neuroscience.

Finally, he clarified the nature and limits of thought and the relation between thought and its linguistic expression. Contrary to what both he and Frege had once supposed, the sentence is not the perceptible clothing of a thought. What a creature *can* think depends upon its behavioural repertoire.

Given the depth and originality of Wittgenstein's revolution in philosophy of psychology, it seemed worth attempting to survey the long and twisting path he travelled to achieve his great insights, and to show how these achievements can be accommodated within the constraints set by his conception of philosophy and its methods. This is what I have tried to do in the fourth essay.

The fifth essay 'Wittgenstein's Anthropological and Ethnological Approach' pursues a complementary theme. In all his later philosophy, in stark contrast with the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein assigns primary *conceptual* significance to *practice*. He liked to quote Goethe's line in *Faust* 'Im Anfang war die Tat' ('In the beginning was the deed'). This is diametrically opposed both to the Gospel's assertion 'In the beginning was the Word', and to the dominant philosophical presupposition that 'In the beginning was the thought'. The primacy of practice is manifest in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, in his philosophy of mathematics, and in his philosophy of psychology. Wittgenstein's conception of language and speech is normative through and through. Speaking a language, no less than playing games, is a rule-governed activity. To be sure, the rules are not rules of a calculus (as he had thought when he wrote the *Tractatus*). Like the rules of field games, they leave a degree of free play, they do not attempt to lay down rules for circumstances that never arise, they do not try to regulate what does not need regulating, and they commonly leave room for indeterminacy. Moreover the rules must be conceived in a homely manner: they are what is given in response to requests for explanations of meaning in the practice of teaching and learning a language, or in answering questions about what an expression in use means, of correcting mistakes and infelicities, and of resolving misunderstandings. The rules of which Wittgenstein speaks are not akin to stipulative rules in an axiomatic calculus or in mathematics. Although they may sometimes be identical with rules for the uses of words in a dictionary (e.g. 'A vixen is a female fox'), they are not crafted for lexicographical purposes. And forms of explanation such as 'That ☞ □ is magenta' are not to be found in dictionaries, any more than 'That ☞ animal is a zebra' or '*This* is thumping'. Wittgenstein was, to be sure, not the first to conceive of speech as a rule-governed activity, but he was the first to raise the question of what welds a rule and the action that accords with it into an internal relation. And his answer was: the *practice* of going by the rule, the recognition of a uniformity, and the employment of the uniformity as a standard of correctness. Following a rule is a human practice, exhibited in human behaviour. A language is not the totality of possible

well-formed sentences that can be generated from a fund of 'axioms' (i.e. definitions), by means of formation and transformation rules, any more than a game is the set of all possible moves. Nor is a language the totality of sentences actually used. To learn a language is *to learn to do things*, to learn to participate in the 'language-games' of the society into which one is born. It is in this sense that Wittgenstein's approach, as he himself observed, is anthropological or ethnographical. It is also historicist through and through, although, paradoxically, it is historicism without history. It is these features of his philosophy that I explore in the fifth essay.

The sixth essay 'Two Conceptions of Language' is a further development of these ideas. In it I attempt to give an overview of the philosophical Gigantomachia in the philosophy of language of our age. The twentieth century in philosophy was, above all, the century of logic and language. It is hardly surprising that the great innovations in logic initiated by such giants as Frege, Russell, and the young Wittgenstein, and continued by such influential figures as Carnap and Tarski, transformed philosophical reflections on language. It was during the second half of the century that the conception of human languages as meaning-calculi came to dominate philosophy and theoretical linguistics alike (as is manifest, e.g. in the works of Noam Chomsky, Donald Davidson, and Michael Dummett). However, it did not lack philosophical critics, who viewed the calculus conception of language, inspired as it was by the methods of mathematical logic, as misguided. It was precisely the anthropological conception of language as a human practice that was the focus of Wittgenstein's reflections in the 1930s, in which he recognized the 'grave mistakes' in what he had set out in the *Tractatus* (Preface, PI). He ploughed up the ground yet again, and advanced a quite different conception of language, speech, and communication. Subsequently, others, such as J. L. Austin, Paul Grice, Peter Strawson, Alan White, and Bede Rundle similarly moved away from calculus conceptions, sometimes for different reasons. What I tried to do in Essay 6 was to give a synoptic comparative view of these two conceptions, to make clear the nature of the differences between them, and to show the exorbitant price that has to be paid for the calculus conception of language.

The seventh essay was motivated by the need to rectify misunderstandings of Wittgenstein that had become rife in the marketplace. It had become common to suggest that the notion of grammar that Wittgenstein introduced in the early 1930s changed by the time he wrote the *Investigations* later in the 1930s and in 1944/5. Not only was it thought to have changed, but it also allegedly played a much

more limited role in his thought. What he had argued in *The Big Typescript* and *The Blue and Brown Books* to be grammatical propositions were held to be dogmatic substantive philosophical doctrines, theses, and opinions. By the time he wrote the *Investigations*, it was suggested, he had come to eschew all these doctrines, theses, and opinions, and to avoid all forms of dogmatism. So there is a massive difference between the ‘middle Wittgenstein’ and the ‘third Wittgenstein’. This idea illustrates the perils of multiplying Wittgensteins. There is only one Wittgenstein, who wrote only two books and produced two distinct philosophies. The new interpretation of his work involves ramifying misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, ignorance of his writings (especially of the *Nachlass*), and egregious misrepresentation of what he meant by ‘thesis’, ‘doctrine’, and ‘opinion’, as well as misconstrual of what he was warning against in his renunciation of dogmatism. In ‘Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses, and Dogmatism’ my purpose was to show that there is complete continuity between Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar in *The Big Typescript* and in the *Investigations*, that there is no change in what he deemed to be a grammatical proposition, and to make clear what he meant by ‘thesis’, ‘opinion’, and ‘dogmatism’.

The eighth essay ‘Intentionality and the Harmony between Language and Reality’ addresses some misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s dissolution of one of the salient problems of intentionality, and answers an objection. The misunderstandings turn on the resolution of the problem in the *Tractatus*. If what one thinks when one thinks truly is what is the case, then what does one think when one thinks falsely, i.e. when what one thinks is *not* what is the case? But what one thinks when one thinks truly is no different from what one thinks when one thinks falsely. How can this be? In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein resolved the problem by means of the picture theory of the proposition with the aid of the metaphysics of objects, states of affairs, and facts. This, to be sure, needs clarification, lest one suppose that Wittgenstein claimed that when one thinks truly what one thinks is *identical* with what is the case, as opposed to being *isomorphic* with what is the case. To be sure, the representing fact is distinct from the represented fact, even though it has something in common with it, namely, logical form. His resolution of the problem in the *Investigations* was quite different. There is indeed *an internal relation* between what one thinks and what is and what is not the case. But the relation is forged in grammar, not by means of metalogical relations between thought, language, and reality. One objection to this account is that it does not explain

how the expectation that *e* can be satisfied by *d*, or how the order to *V* can be fulfilled by *W* (as the order to leave the room may be fulfilled by jumping out of the window). The essay proposes an answer to this objection.

So much for the eight essays that bear directly on Wittgenstein and his philosophy.

Many philosophical commentators on the philosophical scene have observed that Wittgenstein's influence declined in the 1980s and 1990s. In the last decade interest in Wittgenstein has not significantly revived. Diseases of the intellect that many of us thought had been permanently extirpated underwent mutation and broke out afresh in somewhat different forms (sense-data, for example, became qualia). Despite the encouraging fact that Wittgenstein societies have sprung up in various countries, his ideas are on the whole neglected by leading figures in contemporary philosophy. Few attempt to apply his methods to new domains in philosophy or in conceptual criticism of the natural sciences, the sciences of the mind and brain, and the social sciences for which criticisms he gave both a rationale and a warrant. There are, no doubt, many reasons for this. I shall select a few.

First of all, Wittgenstein scholarship, with some notable exceptions, allowed itself to become distracted from the serious task of trying to interpret his philosophy of language, his philosophy of logic and mathematics, and his philosophy of psychology. The scholarly task of clarifying the numerous difficult passages in Wittgenstein's writings was, for the most part, cast aside. This occurred primarily because of the publications of the New Wittgensteinians, led by Cora Diamond and James Conant, on the paradox of the *Tractatus*—writings that disregard everything that Wittgenstein ever wrote or said about his first book.¹ The penultimate remark of the book, and the question of what sort of nonsense the book consists in, has occupied numerous philosophers on both sides of the Atlantic for the last three decades. The questions raised are perfectly legitimate. They can readily be answered. What is illegitimate is that they should dominate debate on Wittgenstein and his philosophy in so futile a manner for three decades. For even assuming counterfactually that the New Wittgensteinians

¹ As I showed in 'Was he Trying to Whistle it?', repr. in *Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001), pp. 98–140. Everything that Wittgenstein ever wrote about the *Tractatus* conflicts with the interpretations of the New Wittgensteinians, but they have assiduously avoided confronting this obvious fact—a fact that proves beyond reasonable doubt the incorrectness of their interpretations.

illuminate *Tractatus* 6.54 and thereby the point and purpose of the book, they have shed no light whatsoever on any of the salient themes of the *Tractatus* (e.g. the picture theory of meaning, the account of intentionality, the explanation of generality, the explanation of logical necessity, the idea of what can be shown by language but cannot be said in language, the account of arithmetic and natural science). Nor have they laboured to clarify Wittgenstein's profound criticisms of Frege and Russell in the book. The excuse that all of these remarks are nonsense anyway is, to say the least, feeble—not least because the reasons they are said to be nonsense are couched in the very same formal concepts that allegedly render the sentences of the *Tractatus* nonsense. Nor have the New Wittgensteinians shed any light on other remarks in Wittgenstein's voluminous writings, least of all on his numerous later remarks on the *Tractatus*. This debate, on what Geach called 'Ludwig's self-mate', has not fertilized other philosophical investigations, as did previous debates on family-resemblance, language-games, rule-following, criteria, and private languages. Philosophers with little direct interest in Wittgensteinian exegesis can happily disregard a three-decade debate that turns on what sort of nonsense Wittgenstein was talking. All this has contributed to a decline of interest in Wittgenstein, to a pointless diversion of Wittgenstein scholarship, and has impeded the transmission of his philosophy to the next generation.

Secondly, Wittgenstein's ideas, as he well knew, are at odds with the spirit of the times. We live in a culture dominated by science and technology. We are prone to think that all serious questions can be answered by the natural sciences. The very idea that there are conceptual questions that are not amenable to scientific methods has become difficult to grasp. The further suggestion that they are to be handled by careful examination of the use and misuse of words seems demeaning: 'What is the mind?', 'How is thought related to language?', 'Do we have a free will?' are serious questions, not linguistic trivialities. Philosophy has struggled with them futilely for more than two thousand years—it is time to let science answer them! In such a cultural context, Wittgenstein's ideas are even more difficult to understand than they were fifty years ago.

Thirdly, the last few decades have seen the rise of an ambitious new cooperative endeavour of artificial intelligence theorists, computer engineers, cognitive (computational) psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers. This new field of study goes under the name of 'cognitive science'. It aims to resolve the mystery of consciousness (which was held to be the last great barrier to a

scientific understanding of the universe), to make clear the nature of the mind and its relation to the brain, to explain the nature of language and linguistic competence, to resolve the problem of the freedom of the will, and so on. Whether this was new science or merely bad philosophy was debatable, and was debated. What was not debatable was that this heady mix that purported to be able to solve philosophical problems by empirical speculations was inimical to Wittgenstein's philosophy in general and his philosophy of psychology in particular. Speculative cognitive science, and especially cognitive neuroscience, captured the imagination of the educated elites, undermined their critical faculties, and befuddled their intellectuals.

Fourthly, Wittgenstein's ideas were equally at odds with the currently dominant forms of philosophy: with the contemporary heirs of philosophy of mind, with post-Quinean American naturalism, and with the revival of metaphysics.

Cognitive science invaded and largely displaced the philosophy of mind that had flourished in the decades after Wittgenstein's death. The remarkable work produced by Ryle, Hampshire, Malcolm, von Wright, Anscombe, White, Kenny, Rundle, and others, was progressively sidelined. What took its place was, first, *theory*: central state materialism, anomalous monism, functionalism; then the philosophical offshoots of *cognitive science*; and finally *consciousness studies*. Each satisfied the philosophical marketplace for a decade or two, before yielding its place to another novelty. The net achievement in understanding was minimal.

The most influential philosopher in the USA in the second half of the twentieth century was Quine. He was, as he himself wrote, an 'apostate' from the doctrines of the Vienna Circle. For he rejected their distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, and the mistaken claim that all necessary truth is true by convention. His influence in the USA was great, and it encouraged the idea of the unity of philosophy and science in the quest for knowledge, and the complementary idea that philosophy, like science, is concerned with constructing theories concerning what exists, and with postulating the existence of things in order to explain features of our thought and language. Quine's conception of language was behaviourist, rather than normative, and he advocated the replacement of traditional epistemology with a new science of naturalized epistemology that would be a neuroscientific form of learning theory. Quine's ideas chimed with American pragmatism, and fitted well a culture mesmerized by the power of science. Although Wittgenstein did not make use

of the analytic/synthetic distinction,² his philosophy was, despite numerous surface similarities, diametrically opposed to Quine's.³ He insisted on the autonomy of philosophy and its radical discontinuity from science, on the categorial differentiation of necessary propositions from empirical ones, and on the normativity of language. He advanced analytic hermeneutics and defended methodological pluralism with respect to explanation. Quine's dominance in the USA ensured that Wittgenstein's influence on American philosophy would fade away once his American pupils and followers had disappeared from the scene.

In Britain, Quine's influence was minimal. But Davidson's, a decade later, was very great indeed, and it gave a powerful impetus to theory building in philosophy. This was supported by Dummett's parallel homespun endeavours, which did much to destroy the Oxford post-war tradition in linguistic philosophy that had been so receptive to Wittgensteinian ideas. The preoccupation with theories of meaning for natural languages ran its course. But it prepared the way for the revival of metaphysics, the impetus for which was provided by Lewis and Kripke. To be sure, there was and is much unclarity and disagreement about what exactly metaphysics is ('the study of the fundamental structure of reality as a whole', 'the study of the ultimate categories of being', 'the study of *de re* necessities', 'the most general attempt to make sense of things'). The idea that philosophy, despite the 'wilderness years' of the logical positivists, linguistic philosophers, and Wittgensteinian philosophers, had a subject matter of its own came as a great relief. It meant that philosophy was engaged, like other sciences, in the pursuit of knowledge of the world, and that it could achieve solid knowledge in a subject matter of which it could not be robbed (as it had been robbed in the past by physics and psychology). In this milieu, it is hardly surprising that Wittgenstein's animadversions to metaphysics were brushed aside. To most of those who succumbed to the ancient siren-song of metaphysics, the philosophy of Wittgenstein was simply irrelevant.

So, the times are out of joint. But the rejection of Wittgenstein's philosophy and methodology has not been the result of the refutation of his ideas and the proven inadequacy of his methods. Indeed, it has not even rested on comprehension of his ideas. This makes it all the

² Save to note that there is a similarity between his conception of mathematics and Kant's view that the propositions of mathematics are synthetic a priori (PG 404; cf. RFM 246).

³ I have examined the relationship between their philosophies in detail in *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Philosophy* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1996), chap. 7.

more important for those who do understand Wittgenstein's philosophy to keep Wittgensteinian scholarship alive (for there is much, especially in his philosophy of mathematics, that is not yet understood), to transmit his great ideas to the next generation, and to further Wittgensteinian philosophy by putting his methods to good use both in philosophy and in the analytical criticism of conceptually problematic science (e.g. in psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary sociobiology, economics, fundamental physics, and cosmology).

The final two essays are concerned with such background historical and comparative matters. 'Passing by the Naturalistic Turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac' was stimulated by reading a remark that Quinean-inspired naturalism is the most laudable and distinctive development in philosophy over the last thirty years. This striking claim seemed to me worth investigating. Quine advanced three different forms of naturalism: ontological, philosophical, and epistemological. I briefly commented on the first two, and then focused upon his conception of naturalized epistemology. This bizarre programme is neither coherent nor a substitute for epistemology. I followed this up with an examination of Quine's forays into epistemology. His observations are wanting in both depth and acumen.

The last essay, 'Analytic Philosophy: What, Whence, and Whither?' investigates seven different ways in which analytic philosophy has been characterized, and finds them all inadequate. The suggestion that 'analytic philosophy' is simply a family-resemblance concept is also rejected. Rather, I suggested that, like 'romanticism', it is essentially a *historical* category with a distinctive family-resemblance character. This is demonstrated by sketching the development of analytic philosophy from early Moore and Russell, through the logical positivism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein, to Cambridge analysis in the inter-war years and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and its affiliates, and thence to the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, and to Oxford analytic philosophy and its offshoots after the Second World War. After the 1970s analytic philosophy lost its sense of direction. The revolutionary fervour that had characterized its previous phases was gone. The methodological self-consciousness diminished. The critical function of its heyday disappeared.

Contemporary philosophy that purports to be in the analytic tradition is increasingly heterogeneous. Like a mighty river approaching its delta, it has split into numerous rivulets meandering aimlessly through the marshlands. It has, for various extraneous reasons, become over-specialized. It is imbued with the spirit of scholasticism,

conflating pedantry with precision, and confusing technicality with clarity. In many ways, it has actually broken with the analytic tradition. For the most part, linguistic and connective analysis have been repudiated—consulting ‘intuitions’ has become an easy alternative to the careful selection and weighing of linguistic facts. Metaphysics has been embraced with enthusiasm, although there is little clarity or consensus on what current metaphysics is supposed to be. The insistence on the autonomy of philosophy, on its differentiation from the sciences in both goals and methods, has been widely abandoned. Whether all this represents the dying embers of a once great movement of thought, or whether this phase is merely a pause before the further development of something that can be deemed a continuation of the analytic tradition, only time can tell.

ORIGINAL PLACES OF PUBLICATION

I have imposed uniformity of reference style upon the different papers in this collection. Many of the papers have been amended in order to correct errors, to add qualifications or further clarifications. Chapter 4 was originally published in the *Festschrift* in honour of Anthony Kenny *Mind, Method, and Morality*. In order to make it suitable for the present collection the opening paragraph which paid tribute to the honorand has been omitted. Chapter 8 was written as a reply to an article by Professor Timothy Craig. To make it suitable for this collection its responsive character has been removed.

The original publication locations are as follows:

Chapter 1, 'Philosophy: a Contribution not to Human Knowledge but to Human Understanding', in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), *The Nature of Philosophy*, in *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 65* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), 129–53.

Chapter 2, 'Kant and Wittgenstein: the Matter of Transcendental Arguments', in French as 'Kant et Wittgenstein, le problème des arguments transcendants', in Arley R. Moreno and Antonia Soulez (eds.), *Grammatical ou Transcendental? Cahiers de Philosophie de Langage*, vol. 8 (L'Harmattan, Paris, 2012), pp. 17–44; in English in Nuño Venturinha (ed.), *The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations* (Routledge, London, 2013).

Chapter 3, 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction: a Wittgensteinian Critique', in A. Marques and N. Venturinha (eds.), *Knowledge, Language and Mind* (De Gruyter, Berlin, 2012), pp. 11–35.

Chapter 4, 'The Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology', in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Cottingham (eds.), *Mind, Method and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2010), 275–305.

Chapter 5, 'Wittgenstein's Anthropological and Ethnological Approach', in Jesus Padilla Galvez (ed.), *Philosophical Anthropology: Wittgenstein's Perspective* (Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, 2010), 15–32.

Chapter 6, 'Two Conceptions of Language', in German in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2013.

Chapter 7, 'Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses, and Dogmatism', *Philosophical Investigations* 35 (2012), 1–17.

Chapter 8 is a much revised version of 'Intentionality and the Harmony between Thought and Reality: a Rejoinder to Professor Crane', *Harvard Review of Philosophy* 19 (2013), Spring issue.

Chapter 9, 'Passing by the Naturalistic Turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac', *Philosophy* 81 (2006), 221–43.

Chapter 10, 'Analytic Philosophy: What, Whence, and Whither?', in A. Matar and A. Biletsky (eds.), *The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes* (Routledge, London, 1998), 1–32.

I am grateful to the editors of these journals and the publishers of these books for permission to reprint my papers.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. WITTGENSTEIN'S PUBLISHED WORKS

The following abbreviations are used to refer to Wittgenstein's published works. The list includes derivative primary sources and lecture notes taken by others.

- AWL *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, from the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald*, ed. Alice Ambrose (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979).
- BB *The Blue and Brown Books* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958).
- BT *The Big Typescript, TS 213*, edited and translated by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 2005).
- CL *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters—correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa*, ed. B. F. McGuinness and G. H. von Wright (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995).
- CV *Culture and Value*, ed. G. H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, tr. P. Winch (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
- LFM *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939*, ed. C. Diamond (Harvester, Hassocks, Sussex, 1976).
- LRKM *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore*, ed. G. H. von Wright (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974).
- LW I *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I*, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982).
- LWL *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930–32, from the Notes of John King and Desmond Lee*, ed. Desmond Lee (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
- M 'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930–33', in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1959).
- NB *Notebooks 1914–16*, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1961).

- PG *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. R. Rhees, tr. A. J. P. Kenny (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974).
- PI *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009).
- PLP *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, by F. Waismann, ed. R. Harré (Macmillan, London, and St Martin's Press, New York, 1965).
- PPF *Philosophy of Psychology: a Fragment*, published in PI, 4th edition (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009).
- PTLP *Proto-Tractatus: An Early Version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, ed. B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg, and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971).
- RFM *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe, rev. edn. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1978).
- RPP I *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Volume I, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
- RPP II *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Volume II, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
- TLP *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961).
- WWK *Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, shorthand notes recorded by F. Waismann, ed. B. F. McGuinness (Blackwell, Oxford, 1967). The English translation, *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), matches the pagination of the original edition.
- Z *Zettel*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1967).

2. NACHLASS

All references to unpublished material in the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* are by MS or TS number followed by page number.

3. WORKS BY QUINE

- AM 'On Austin's Method', repr. in *Theories and Things*.
 EC 'Empirical Content', repr. in *Theories and Things*.
 EN 'Epistemology Naturalized', in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969).
 FME 'Five Milestones of Empiricism', repr. in *Theories and Things*.
 FSS *From Stimulus to Science* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995).
 MVD 'Mind and Verbal Dispositions', in S. Guttenplan, ed., *Mind and Language* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975).
 NLWM 'Naturalism; or, Living Within One's Means', *Dialectica* 49 (1995).
 NNK 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', in S. Guttenplan, ed., *Mind and Language* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975).
 PL *Philosophy of Logic* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970).
 Q *Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary* (Penguin Books, London, 1990).
 RR *Roots of Reference* (Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1974).
 SLS 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory', repr. in Quine's *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays* (Random House, New York, 1966).
 TT *Theories and Things* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981).
 TTPT 'Things and their Place in Theories', repr. in *Theories and Things*.
 WO *Word and Object* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960).