


OXFORD

Islam and the European Empires

Edited by
David Motadel



THE PAST & PRESENT BOOK SERIES

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Note on Transliteration

This book generally follows a simplified version of the transliteration system used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish terms are transliterated without diacritical markings (macrons and dots). The use of the *ayn* and *hamza* is indicated by a ‘ and a , ’ respectively. Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish words in common usage in English are printed according to the form given by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. Although Arabic, as the medium of the Qur’an, has a privileged position in the Muslim world, the languages of Islam have always been diverse, ranging from Urdu to Russian to Indonesian. In view of this linguistic diversity, regional spellings and transliterations, including for common religious terms, have been retained where appropriate in each contributor’s chapter.

Introduction

David Motadel

This book is about the engagement of the European empires with Islam.¹ The expansion of Europe engulfed vast parts of the Islamic world, gradually subjugating Muslims around the globe, from the West African savannah to the shores of Southeast Asia, under non-Muslim imperial rule. In the heyday of empire, Britain, France, Russia, and the Netherlands each governed more Muslim subjects than any independent Muslim state. European politicians and colonial officials believed Islam to be of considerable political significance, and were quite cautious when it came to matters of the religious life of their Muslim subjects. Governing the religious affairs of Muslims became, in fact, central to imperial rule. In the colonies, European authorities regularly employed religious leaders and Islamic institutions to enhance social and political control. At the same time, their empires were increasingly challenged by religious resistance movements and Islamic insurgencies. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, government corridors in London, Paris, and St Petersburg were haunted by the specter of pan-Islamism.

Historians have long been interested in religion and empire. Yet, the literature in the field remains overwhelmingly dominated by studies on Christian missions, which are usually seen as an integral part of the European colonial expansion—‘first the missionary, then the Consul, and at last the invading army’, as it was once famously put.² This view can be traced back to the colonial period itself, finding one of its most profound visual expressions in Horace Vernet’s *Première messe en Kabylie*, painted in 1855 (Fig. 1). A growing number of historical studies, however, suggest that the role of Christian missionary movements in the European empires was generally less significant than commonly assumed, and that mission and formal empire were, in fact, two very different endeavors. While missionaries often acted outside colonized territories, imperial rulers regularly pursued a policy of religious neutrality and noninterference and refused to give missions special status in the colonies in order to avoid religious unrest. Historians of empire have increasingly emphasized that there was often little connection between

¹ This introduction is based on the historiographical essay by David Motadel, ‘Islam and the European Empires’, *Historical Journal*, 55/3 (2012), 831–56.

² J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London, 1902), 215, quoting Wen Ching, *The Chinese Crisis from Within* (London, 1901), 12.

Bible and flag.³ Besides, scholars have demonstrated that the accomplishments of missionaries in terms of conversion have generally been exaggerated, and that European Christians contributed less significantly than commonly assumed to the centuries-long expansion of Christianity, which mostly depended on local agents and indigenous church movements. In short, the extensive corpus of documents produced by missionaries bears little relation to either their accomplishments in the global spread of Christianity, or their relevance within the European empires. Religious life in the European empires was shaped not by Christian missionaries but by native religious groups.

European emperors and empresses ruled over Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, Buddhists, Hindus, indigenous Christians, and followers of numerous animist beliefs.⁴ Religious affiliation became an important lens through which colonial officials viewed their subjects. Across the world, the governing of religion was a pivotal concern of imperial authorities. In the European empires nowhere was this perceived to be of greater importance than in Islamic regions, as Muslims were usually regarded as especially sensitive subjects and prone to revolt.

The history of Islam within the European empires has attracted considerable attention among scholars. Studies have examined the ways in which the imperial powers engaged with Muslims and their faith, addressing the accommodation of Islam in the colonies as well as anti-colonial Islamic resistance movements. Yet, although these works have significantly increased our knowledge of the engagement of the imperial states with their Muslim subjects, they have been written primarily within the historiographical frameworks of specific empires and geographical regions. Despite addressing similar questions and problems, most scholars working on Islam and empire have taken little notice of works on different empires. Comparative studies are missing.⁵ This book brings together historians who work on Islam in different imperial contexts and geographic regions, offering

³ A. N. Porter, *Religion versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914* (Manchester, 2004); A. N. Porter, 'Religion and Empire: British Expansion in the Long Nineteenth Century, 1780–1914', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 20/3 (1992), 370–90; Brian Stanley, *The Bible and the Flag: Protestant Missions and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Leicester, 1990); Norman Etherington, 'Missions and Empire', in Robin W. Winks and Alaine Low (eds), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, v: *Historiography* (Oxford, 1999), 303–14; Norman Etherington, 'Introduction', in Norman Etherington (ed.), *Missions and Empire* (Oxford, 2005), 1–18; Owen White and J. P. Daughton, 'Introduction: Placing French Missionaries in the Modern World', in Owen White and J. P. Daughton (eds), *In God's Empire: French Missionaries and the Modern World* (Oxford, 2012), 3–25; Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky, 'Introduction', in Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky (eds), *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, NY, and London, 2001), 1–15; and Paul Werth, *At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905* (Ithaca, NY, and London, 2002).

⁴ Susan Bayly, *Saints, Goddesses and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society 1700–1900* (Cambridge, 1989), gives a fascinating account of the religious heterogeneity encountered by colonial officials overseas.

⁵ Francis Robinson (ed.), *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, v: *The Islamic World in the Age of Western Dominance* (Cambridge, 2010), is primarily a general history of the Muslim world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although a number of contributors do discuss the relationship between religion and European imperialism.




Fig. 1 *La première messe en Kabylie* by Horace Verne (1854), depicting missionaries and Muslims in French Algeria (AKG Images).

the first comparative account of the history of Islam in the European empires. Besides providing general overviews and condensing research results, the chapters give new insights into their subjects. They are arranged according to specific themes, so that the very structure of the book provides a comparative analytical framework. The volume is by no means intended to be a comprehensive or definite account of the history of Islam and the European empires. Instead, it constitutes a first attempt to provide a bigger picture, which may be taken further by future comparative research.

The question about the ways in which the European imperial powers engaged with Muslims and their faith is addressed in three parts. Chapters in the first section of the volume examine the accommodation of Islam in the imperial order (Part I). Contributions in the following part explore the role of Islam in anti-colonial resistance movements across the Muslim world (Part II). The third and final section of the book examines the relationship between Islam, information, and colonial knowledge (Part III). There are obviously significant overlaps between the themes of these three parts, and a number of chapters explicitly allude to them. Taken together, the contributions reveal the complexities and variations of the European imperial encounter with Islam. Differences and ambiguities in the accounts are, of course, hardly surprising given not only the very different forms that imperial rule took across the globe, but also the heterogeneity of the Muslim world itself.⁶ Taking these differences into account, the contributions present a story full of contradictions and discontinuities, but also, and perhaps more importantly, of remarkable similarities and parallels.

ISLAM AND IMPERIAL RULE

Historical writing about imperialism has long been influenced by the notion of an antagonism between the Christian European empires and Islam. European colonialism has been described as just another episode in a long history of conflict between Islam and Christendom that began in the early Middle Ages. The reality was, of course, rather more complex. Muslims formed an integral part of the European empires, just as Muslim powers such as Persia or the Ottoman empire

⁶ Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven, 1968), has famously illustrated the cultural diversity within the Islamic world. Discussions about the heterogeneity of Islam, both globally and within Muslim majority societies, can also be found in Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge, 1981); Aziz Al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities* (London and New York, 1993); and Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Oxford, 1996). On the emergence of modern conceptions of the 'Islamic world' among Muslims and non-Muslims, see Cemil Aydin, 'Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Idea of the "Muslim World"', in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds), *Global Intellectual History* (New York, 2013), 159–86; and Nile Green, 'Spacetime and the Muslim Journey West: Industrial Communications in the Making of the "Muslim World"', *American Historical Review*, 118/2 (2013), 401–29. On the construction of communities—though national, not religious—more generally, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983).

had accommodated Christians and Jews as *dhimmis* for centuries.⁷ From the beginning of the European expansion into Muslim lands, imperial authorities not only made significant efforts to integrate Islam into the colonial state, but often actively employed Islamic structures.

The chapters in the first part of the book explore various aspects of the imperial politics of religion in the colonized Muslim world, addressing the employment of religious dignitaries and leaders by the imperial authorities, the integration of Islamic institutions such as mosques, law courts, waqf endowments, and madrasas into the colonial state, and the control and regulation of religious rituals such as the pilgrimage to Mecca. Colonial officials in Muslim lands, as elsewhere, were usually eager to embed their rule in existing structures and hierarchies, and religion was considered central in this respect. Religious practices, laws, and elites were considered crucial sources of moral and political authority that could be employed to enhance social discipline and imperial control. The first part of the book shows the remarkable extent to which the imperial states became involved in the religious lives of their subjects. To administer Islamic affairs, European authorities tended to institutionalize Islam and to introduce centralized religious bureaucracies and ecclesiastical hierarchies which had previously been unknown in most parts of the Muslim world.

The imperial politics of Islam was first studied by historians of Napoleonic Egypt.⁸ Shortly after the invasion of 1798, French colonial authorities decided to administer Egypt using the Islamic judicial system and employing religious leaders. The Qur'an was repeatedly interpreted in favor of the *Grande Armée*, and proclamations were translated into Qur'anic Arabic to give religious legitimacy to the occupying regime. Napoleon himself attended a public celebration of the Prophet's birthday (*mawlid*) in Cairo. In other parts of the empire, the French continued these policies, deploying Islam in support of their rule. In Algeria, which was invaded in 1830, French authorities used local shari'a courts and the Islamic judiciary to sustain order.⁹ Gradually, formal rules and modern bureaucratic structures were introduced into the traditional Islamic legal system. Qadis, now paid by the

⁷ Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues, *Christians and Jews under Islam* (London and New York, 1997); and articles in the classic by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 vols (New York, 1982). On the Islamic gunpowder empires more generally, see Stephen F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Cambridge, 2010).

⁸ Christian Cherfils, *Bonaparte et l'Islam d'après les documents français et arabes* (Paris, 1914); and, for more recent scholarship, Christopher J. Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (New York, 1962); Jean Thiry, *Bonaparte en Égypte: Décembre 1797–24 août 1799* (Paris, 1973); and Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (New York, 2007), especially 123–42; see also Jacques Frémeaux, *La France et l'Islam depuis 1789* (Paris, 1991), 35–54; and the articles in Pierre-Jean Luizard (ed.), *Le choc colonial et l'Islam: Les politiques religieuses des puissances coloniales en terres d'Islam* (Paris, 2006), which mainly focus on French colonial policies towards Islam.

⁹ Allan Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria* (Princeton, 1985); and James McDougall, 'The Secular State's Islamic Empire: Muslim Spaces and Subjects of Jurisdiction in Paris and Algiers, 1905–1957', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 52/3 (2010), 553–80. Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France (1871–1919)*, 2 vols (Paris, 1968), provides a more general account.

state, were placed under strict surveillance. Merging French legal principles and shari'a, a hybrid Islamic–French law, the *droit musulman algérien*, was created. As scripturalist interpretations of Islam seemed easier to control, the shari'a was strengthened at the expense of customary law. Although it thereby lost much of its flexibility and autonomy, in the end the Islamic judicial system survived. Later the French adopted similar, though not identical, policies to integrate religious structures within the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco.¹⁰ In her chapter, 'Islam and the French Empire in North Africa', Julia Clancy-Smith compares the accommodation of Islam in all three French possessions in the Maghrib, pointing out that, although colonial officials generally sought to respect religious structures and practices, their engagement with Islam could differ considerably across the region. While more interventionist policies were pursued in Algeria—reflected in attempts to integrate religious courts, schools, and pious endowments into the colonial state—in Tunisia and Morocco colonial authorities meddled less in religious matters. Looking more closely at the intersection of Islam and empire in the protectorate of Tunisia, Clancy-Smith shows that French policies varied over time, oscillating between interventionism and non-interference. In any case, colonial officials in Tunisia tried to keep (pre-colonial) religious institutions in place to bolster their rule. The Husaynids were allowed to maintain their hold over Islamic affairs, with the bey continuing to act as the highest judicial authority, and the 'ulama maintained, on the whole, control over courts, schools, and funds. Although their responses to the imperial conquest were mixed, Islamic dignitaries did not issue any major call for resistance, while the French were at pains to cultivate good relations with them. Anxious to avoid religious tensions, colonial authorities in Tunisia would even ensure (in contrast to their counterparts in Algeria) that the 1905 Law of Separation of church and state did not affect Islamic institutions. Major religious conflicts only emerged in the interwar period, when Catholic revivalism, culminating in the Tunisian Eucharistic Congress of 1930, provoked massive anti-colonial protests.

The policies in the Maghrib eventually served as a model for French officials in colonial West Africa, which was conquered at the end of the nineteenth century. The French engagement with Islam in West Africa has attracted interest from historians for decades.¹¹ Although cautiously monitored by the colonial administration,

¹⁰ Arnold H. Green, *The Tunisian Ulama 1873–1915: Social Structure and Response to Ideological Currents* (Leiden, 1978), 129–230; and Moshe Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and its Consequences* (London and Portland, OR, 2000), 63–121; and, on the coordination of French policies in North Africa, see William A. Hoisington, 'France and Islam: The Haut Comité Méditerranéen and French North Africa', in George Joffé (ed.), *North Africa: Nation, State, and Region* (London and New York, 1993), 78–90.

¹¹ Christopher Harrison, *France and Islam in West Africa, 1860–1960* (Cambridge, 1988). On the question of the coherence of French policies towards Islam in nineteenth-century West Africa, see Donal Cruise O'Brien, 'Towards an "Islamic Policy" in French West Africa', *Journal of African History*, 8/2 (1967), 303–16; and, in response, David Robinson, 'French "Islamic" Policy and Practice in Late Nineteenth-Century Senegal', *Journal of African History*, 29/3 (1988), 415–35; see also Jean-Louis Triaud, 'Islam in Africa under French Colonial Rule', in Nehemia Levzion and Randall L. Pouwels (eds), *The History of Islam in Africa* (Athens, OH, 2000), 169–88; Gregory Mann, 'Fetishizing Religion: Allah Koura and French "Islamic Policy" in Late Colonial French Soudan (Mali)', *Journal*

Muslims were granted full religious autonomy and could run their own law courts, pious endowments, and schools. In their search for local allies, the French soon became convinced that it was more useful to cooperate with the shaykhs of the Sufi brotherhoods than with the seemingly less influential traditional chiefs.¹² The shaykhs and their lodges were granted full autonomy and in return they endorsed the colonial regime. Some of them even legitimized French rule in religious terms and helped to promote the secular Third Republic as a 'Muslim power', a *puissance musulmane*. This cooperation with the colonial regime helped the Sufi shaykhs to consolidate their position in French West Africa. Under foreign rule, their Islamic institutions grew.¹³ The French even sponsored the hajj of loyal religious leaders and soon expanded this policy to wider parts of the population. By the mid-twentieth century, French authorities supported the hajj of hundreds of ordinary West African Muslims.¹⁴ Of course, these policies had their limits. Despite the notable efforts made by the colonial administration to employ Islam, historians have pointed out that, particularly in the early phase of conquest, French interference frequently undermined and even destroyed Islamic structures.¹⁵

French policies toward Islam in West Africa, which at any time relied on the close surveillance of Islamic structures, have often been compared with British rule in the region, which has usually been described as less interventionist.¹⁶ Indeed, the classic example of the accommodation of Islam in the British empire is West Africa. In the protectorate of Northern Nigeria, established at the turn of the twentieth century in the territories of the former Sokoto caliphate, Islamic leaders and institutions enjoyed remarkable autonomy. The system of colonial government established by Frederick Lugard, high commissioner of the protectorate from 1899

of *African History*, 44/2 (2003), 263–82; and Hélène Grandhomme, 'La politique musulmane de la France au Sénégal (1936–1964)', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 38/2 (2004), 237–78.

¹² David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Oxford and Athens, OH, 2000); and also David Robinson, 'France as a Muslim Power in West Africa', *Africa Today*, 46, 3/4 (1999), 105–27; David Robinson, 'The Murids: Surveillance and Accommodation', *Journal of African History*, 40/2 (1999), 193–213; the articles in David Robinson and Jean-Louis Triaud (eds), *Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraires et stratégies Islamiques en Afrique occidentale française v. 1880–1960* (Paris, 1997); the articles of David Robinson in David Robinson and Jean-Louis Triaud (eds), *La Tijāniyya: Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique* (Paris, 2000); and Lucy Behrman, 'French Muslim Policy and the Senegalese Brotherhoods', in Daniel F. McCall (ed), *Aspects of West African Islam* (Boston, 1971), 185–208.

¹³ Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares, 'The Formation of an "Islamic Sphere" in French Colonial West Africa', *Economy and Society*, 28/4 (1999), 497–519.

¹⁴ Gregory Mann and Baz Lecocq, 'Between Empire, *Umma*, and the Muslim Third World: The French Union and African Pilgrims to Mecca, 1946–58', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 27/2 (2007), 167–81.

¹⁵ Martin A. Klein, *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum, 1847–1914* (Stanford, 1968); and Cheikh Anta Babou, *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913* (Athens, OH, 2007), have shown the less accommodating side of French policies toward Islam.

¹⁶ Michael Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule* (London, 1968); William F. S. Miles, *Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger* (Ithaca, NY and London, 1994); and William F. S. Miles, 'Partitioned Royalty: The Evolution of Hausa Chiefs in Nigeria and Niger', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25/2 (1987), 233–58. A concise comparison is given by Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa* (London and New York, 1984), 202–301.

to 1906, has often been described as the major example not only of indirect rule, but also of the accommodation of Islam in the colonial state.¹⁷ Under the control of only a few British officials, Muslim authorities of the caliphate, most notably the local judges and the powerful amirs, were employed to govern on a local level. Their autonomy was, of course, not absolute. Recent studies have noted the limits of British indirect rule in Islamic Northern Nigeria and pointed out that religious leaders and the 'ulama were far less loyal to the British than usually assumed.¹⁸ And even though colonial officials accepted Islamic law within their jurisdiction, their presence affected various Islamic legal practices, and many of their edicts and rulings even destroyed Islamic institutions.

While research has focused on the intersection of Islam and empire in West Africa, the eastern part of the continent has remained surprisingly neglected.¹⁹ In the chapter, 'Islam and Imperialism in East Africa', Felicitas Becker shows that most Islamic leaders in East Africa did not call for resistance against European intrusion, but instead sought cooperation. This response, she points out, was not surprising, given the history of exchange, pluralism, and interaction with foreigners in the Indian Ocean setting. After all, many Muslim leaders believed that they could benefit from cooperation. In German East Africa, colonial officials took the Muslim population and their religious structures quite seriously. Indeed, among the richest files from the German period in the archives are the folders on 'religious movements'. Yet Becker points out that even though anxious about the political impact of Sufi orders, Mahdist movements, and the 'ulama, the Germans ultimately showed considerable pragmatism, pursuing a policy of religious neutrality,

¹⁷ Frederick D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh and London, 1922), is the foundational text; see also Margery Perham, Lugard, 2 vols (London, 1956–60), ii: *The Years of Authority 1898–1945*, 1–280 and 375–638. Scholars have long questioned Lugard's alleged policy of indirect rule, see Hubert Deschamps, 'Et Maintenant, Lord Lugard?', *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 33/4 (1963), 293–306; and, in response, Michael Crowder, 'Indirect Rule: French and British Style', *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 34/3 (1964), 197–205; and I. F. Nicolson, *The Administration of Nigeria 1900–1960: Men, Methods, and Myths* (Oxford, 1969), 124–79; on the spread of Islam under British rule, see C. N. Ubah, 'Colonial Administration and the Spread of Islam in Northern Nigeria', *The Muslim World*, 81/2 (1991), 133–48; on the conflict between missionaries and colonial authorities over Islam, see Andrew E. Barnes, "'Religious Insults': Christian Critiques of Islam and the Government in Colonial Northern Nigeria", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 34/1–2 (2004), 62–81.

¹⁸ Muhammad S. Umar, *Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to British Colonial Rule* (Leiden, 2006). On British interference in Muslim matters, see also Muhammad S. Umar, 'The Tijāniyya and British Colonial Authorities in Northern Nigeria', in Triaud and Robinson (eds), *La Tijāniyya*, 327–55; Peter Kazenga Tibenderana, 'The Role of the British Administration in the Appointment of the Emirs of Northern Nigeria, 1903–1931: The Case of Sokoto Province', *Journal of African History*, 28/2 (1987), 231–57; Peter Kazenga Tibenderana, 'The Irony of Indirect Rule in Sokoto Emirate, Nigeria, 1903–1944', *African Studies Review*, 31/1 (1988), 67–92; Auwalu Hamsu Yadudu, 'Colonialism and the Transformation of the Substance and Form of Islamic Law in the Northern States of Nigeria', *Journal of Law and Religion*, 9/1 (1991), 17–47; and Jonathan Reynolds, 'Good and Bad Muslims: Islam and Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 34/3 (2001), 601–18.

¹⁹ Said S. Samatar (ed.), *In the Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa* (Trenton, NJ, 1992), contains studies on some aspects of the intersection of Islam and imperialism in the northern parts of East Africa.

cooperating with Islamic leaders, and employing Muslims in their colonial administration. In the British parts of East Africa, colonial bureaucrats adopted a similar policy, although they were more experienced and less excitable when dealing with Islamic affairs than their German counterparts. British officials in the region made considerable efforts to integrate Islamic judicial structures into the colonial state. To control the religious courts, they subordinated them to European colonial courts, creating a hybrid legal system. In the process, the emphasis of Islamic law shifted from 'law as process' to 'law as structure'. Becker's chapter also demonstrates that the role of missionaries in colonial East Africa was quite complex. Whereas the Germans were anxious not to give missions too much room, the British did not impede missionaries (as they did in other parts of their Muslim empire), though their general policy of noninterference still provided the framework for the expansion of Islam.

The largest Muslim population of the British empire lived, of course, in the Indian subcontinent. Influenced by the events of 1947, historians have long focused on Muslim political representation and separatist activism in British India.²⁰ From the middle of the nineteenth century the British increasingly treated the Muslim population of India as a distinct group, thereby contributing to the rise of modern Muslim community consciousness. British endorsement of the foundation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906, and the introduction of separate electorates in 1909 provided, albeit unintentionally, an environment in which Muslim separatism could develop. Colonial officials made significant efforts to cooperate with loyal Muslim leaders such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and were at pains to accommodate Muslims in the colonial state. Studies on Muslim political representation and activism in British India have been primarily concerned with social and political aspects, rather than with religion as such. Only recently have scholars begun to enquire more deeply into British policies towards the religion of their Muslim subjects in India, addressing themes such as the role of the Islamic judiciary system and the creation of the colonial 'Anglo-Mohammedan law',²¹ the

²⁰ P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge, 1972); Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860–1923* (Cambridge, 1975); and, more recently, Francis Robinson, 'The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6/8 (1998), 271–89; see also the studies by David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920–1932* (Delhi, 1982); David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (Berkeley, 1988); and Farzana Shaikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–1947* (Cambridge, 1989). Shaikh gives a good overview of the complex historiographical debate about Islam, British rule, and communalism in the subcontinent (pp. 1–9). On the special role of Shi'i politics in British India, see Justin Jones, *Shi'a Islam in Colonial India: Religion, Community and Sectarianism* (Cambridge, 2012), especially 147–85.

²¹ Michael R. Anderson, 'Islamic Law and Colonial Encounter in British India', in Chibli Mallat and Jane Connors (eds), *Islamic Family Law* (London, 1990), 205–23; Scott Alan Kugle, 'Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia', *Modern Asian Studies*, 35/2 (2001), 257–313; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change* (Princeton, 2002), 17–37; and Nandini Chatterjee, 'Muslim or Christian? Family Quarrels and Religious Diagnosis in a Colonial Court', *American Historical Review*, 117/4 (2012), 1101–22; for a comparison with the *droit musulman algérien* in French Algeria, see David S. Powers, 'Orientalism, Colonialism, and Legal History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and India', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31/3 (1989), 535–71; and for a

role of Islam in the colonial army,²² and the engagement of the colonial authorities with specific religious rituals, most importantly the hajj.²³ British officials were concerned about the pilgrimage for medical reasons, fearing the spread of diseases, as experienced with the massive cholera epidemic during the 1865 hajj. Moreover, they suspected that the annual gathering facilitated pan-Islamic ideas and anti-colonial radicalism. In the chapter 'British Imperial Rule and the Hajj', John Slight addresses London's policies towards the yearly ritual. Slight demonstrates that British involvement with the pilgrimage was not only prompted by anxieties about the spread of dangerous germs and ideas, but also by a wide range of other considerations, generally overlooked by historians. Of major concern to the authorities were the so-called 'pauper pilgrims', who could only afford a one-way ticket to the Hijaz. Stranded on the Arabian peninsula, the presence of these destitute Muslims from British-controlled lands troubled colonial officials, who were anxious about their empire's prestige in the Islamic world. After all attempts to regulate the group's travels proved unsuccessful, the British routinely repatriated them at considerable expense. Indeed, Slight shows that Britain developed a global administrative apparatus to deal with the flow of pilgrims to Mecca. Its involvement in the hajj echoed, to some extent, the practices of the older Islamic empires, although it took place in the modern world of steamships, railways, and telegraphed pilgrimage reports. Employed in the hajj administration were also a significant number of Muslim intermediaries, who, as Slight points out, extensively shaped imperial policies. Finally, the chapter shows how Britain's relationship with the hajj was complicated by the political situation in the Arabian peninsula. During the Arab Revolt of 1916–18, for instance, British authorities grew ever more concerned about the hajj, as they believed that their policies towards the pilgrimage had political and propagandistic consequences. And following the Saudi-Wahhabi conquest of 1924, Whitehall even ignored the protests of its own Muslim subjects—especially those from India—about Wahhabi doctrine in order to establish an alliance with the new guardians of the Ka'ba.

comparison with colonial West Africa, see Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, 2002), 127–66.

²² Nile Green, *Islam and the Army in Colonial India: Sepoy Religion in the Service of Empire* (Cambridge, 2009); see also Nile Green, 'The Faqir and the Subalterns: Mapping the Holy Man in Colonial South Asia', *Journal of Asian History*, 41/1 (2007), 57–84; and Nile Green, 'Jack Sepoy and the Dervishes: Islam and the Indian Soldier in Princely Hyderabad', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 18/1 (2008), 31–46.

²³ John P. Slight, 'The British Empire and the Hajj, 1865–1956' (PhD, University of Cambridge, 2011); see also William R. Roff, 'Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the Nineteenth-Century Hajj', *Arabian Studies*, 6 (1982), 143–60; Takashi Oishi, 'Friction and Rivalry over Pious Mobility: British Colonial Management of the Hajj and the Reaction to it by Indian Muslims, 1870–1920', in Kuroki Hidemitsu (ed.), *The Influence of Human Mobility in Muslim Societies* (London, 2003), 151–79; Michael B. Miller, 'Pilgrims' Progress: The Business of the Hajj', *Past and Present*, 191/1 (2006), 189–228; Michael Christopher Low, 'Empire and the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance, 1865–1908', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 40/2 (2008), 269–90; and Saurabh Mishra, *Pilgrimage, Politics and Pestilence: The Haj from the Indian Subcontinent, 1860–1920* (Delhi, 2011).

In Southeast Asia, British officials ultimately pursued similar policies to those in India. In British Malaya, the involvement of the imperial administration with religious courts, schools, waqf endowments, and the hajj resulted in an increasing institutionalization and bureaucratization of Islam.²⁴ Yet the most important power in the region was the Dutch empire. Although in the Dutch East Indies confrontations between Christian conquerors and Muslim subjects were frequent, Islamic institutions continued to function within the imperial framework.²⁵ The colonial government maintained Islamic schools and courts and tried to administer Islam in a modern bureaucracy. And just like their British counterparts, Dutch officials became heavily involved in the organization of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. In the chapter 'The Dutch Empire and the Hajj', Eric Tagliacozzo examines the Dutch engagement with pilgrims from the East Indies. Although the first Dutch who arrived on the shores of the Indies archipelago in the sixteenth century were still bewildered by their encounters with people called 'hajjis', the pilgrimage increasingly became a subject of colonial policy as Dutch control over the region tightened. In the nineteenth century, a complex bureaucracy was established to regulate the hajj and to cope with issues such as pauper pilgrims, sanitary problems, and the threat of anti-colonial and pan-Islamic extremism. Colonial officials became main facilitators of the hajj, supplying steamships and even battling banditry in the Arabian peninsula. Under imperial rule, greater numbers of Indies pilgrims could embark on the hajj than ever before. At the same time, as Tagliacozzo points out, the bureaucracy provided colonial officials, afraid of Muslim militancy, with an instrument of surveillance and control. As in the French and British empires, the hajj was seen as a political matter by Dutch authorities.

Yet, it was not only the overseas empires, but also some of the European continental empires that expanded into Muslim regions. Following the involvement of Franz Josef I in the Balkans in 1878, Habsburg authorities encountered a significant Muslim population.²⁶ Eager to establish religious institutions independent from those of the Ottomans and keen to monitor and control Islam in the Balkans, imperial officials under the ambitious and able bureaucrat Benjamin Kállay, governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, introduced an elaborate religious administration. The faithful were organized under the authority of a single religious leader, the

²⁴ Moshe Yegar, *Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and Implementation* (Jerusalem, 1979).

²⁵ Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596–1950* (Amsterdam, 1993); see also Muhammad Hisyam, *Caught Between Three Fires: The Javanese Pangulu under the Dutch Colonial Administration 1882–1942* (PhD, Leiden University, 2001); and the classic Georges Henri Bousquet, *La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas* (Paris, 1939).

²⁶ Robert J. Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878–1914* (New York, 1981); Ferdinand Hauptmann, 'Die Mohammedaner in Bosnien-Herzegowina', in Adam Wandruzka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, iv: *Die Konfessionen* (Vienna, 1985), 670–701; Muhamed Mufaku al-Arnaut, 'Islam and Muslims in Bosnia 1878–1918: Two Hijras and Two Fatwas', *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 5/2 (1994), 242–53; Mark Pinson, 'The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878–1918', in Mark Pinson (ed.), *The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Their Historical Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia* (Cambridge, MA, 1994), 84–128; and Rupert Klieber, *Jüdische—Christliche—Muslimische Lebenswelten der Donaumonarchie 1848–1918* (Vienna, 2010), 157–68.

Reis-ul-Ulema (head of the 'ulama), who was assisted by a council of religious dignitaries, the *Ulema-Medžlis* (council of the 'ulama), which oversaw the waqf endowments, madrasas, and shari'a courts, as well as the work of the local imams, 'ulama, and *hodžas*. Habsburg officials would also employ religious authorities when recruiting thousands of Muslims into their armies.²⁷ In 1882, the Mufti of Sarajevo (who would soon become the first *Reis-ul-Ulema*), Mustafa Hilmi Omerović, even issued a fatwa encouraging the faithful to serve in the Austro-Hungarian ranks.

The situation in the tsarist empire was remarkably similar, although it contained a much larger Muslim population.²⁸ Muscovy had already begun expanding into the Muslim areas of the Volga-Ural region in the sixteenth century. With Russia's annexation of the Caucasus and the Crimea in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its nineteenth-century expansion into the heart of Central Asia, many more Muslims came under the czar's rule. In the chapter 'The Russian Worlds of Islam', Robert D. Crews examines the relationship between state and mosque in the Muslim lands of the tsarist empire, arguing that the Russian rule of Muslims was more tolerant and successful than has often been assumed. After a period of suppression under Peter the Great, marked by the destruction of mosques and forced conversions, in the late eighteenth century Catherine II introduced a policy of religious tolerance. Although Russian rulers saw themselves as the leaders of Orthodox Christendom, they also promoted themselves as patrons of Islam. In fact, tsarist rule was heavily based on confessional foundations, and Islam was an important pillar of the imperial order. Officials and bureaucrats, such as the famous Konstantin von Kaufmann, the first governor-general of Russian

²⁷ Richard B. Spence, 'Die Bosniaken kommen! The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Formations of the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914–1918', in Richard B. Spence and Linda L. Nelson (eds), *Scholar, Patriot, Mentor: Historical Essays in Honor of Dimitrije Djordjević* (Boulder, CO, 1992), 299–314; and, on the fatwa of the Mufti of Sarajevo, see Fikret Karčić, *The Bosniaks and the Challenge of Modernity: Late Ottoman and Habsburg Times* (Sarajevo, 1999), 119–20.

²⁸ Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA and London, 2006); see also Robert D. Crews, 'Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia', *American Historical Review*, 108/1 (2003), 50–83; Robert D. Crews, 'Islamic Law, Imperial Order: Muslims, Jews, and the Russian State', *Ab Imperio*, 3 (2004), 467–90; Allen J. Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910* (Leiden, 2001); Elena I. Campbell, 'The Autocracy and the Muslim Clergy in the Russian Empire (1850s–1917)', *Russian Studies in History*, 44/2 (2005), 8–29; Vladimir Bobrovnikov, 'Islam in the Russian Empire', in Dominic Lieven (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Russia*, ii: *Imperial Russia, 1689–1917* (Cambridge, 2006), 202–23; and Paolo Sartori, 'An Overview of Tsarist Policy on Islamic Courts in Turkestan: Its Genealogy and its Effects', in Svetlana Gorshenina and Sergey Abashin (eds) *Le Turkestan russe: Une colonie comme les autres?* (Paris, 2009), 477–507. These works have emphasized the accommodation of Islam in the tsarist empire. Studies that have stressed the less accommodating side of Russian rule in its Islamic periphery are Firouzeh Mostashari, *On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and Islam in the Caucasus* (London, 2006); Kelly O'Neill, 'Between Subversion and Submission: the Integration of the Crimean Khanate into the Russian Empire, 1783–1853' (PhD, Harvard University, 2006); Kelly O'Neill, 'Constructing Russian Identity in the Imperial Borderland: Architecture, Islam, and the Transformation of the Crimean Landscape', *Ab Imperio*, 2 (2006), 163–92; A. S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India* (Oxford, 2008), especially 51–87; and also articles in part I in Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Komatsu Hisao (eds), *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries)* (London, 2001).

Turkestan, made significant attempts to accommodate Islamic structures in the empire. They employed trusted Muslim dignitaries and members of the 'ulama, who were to act as intermediaries and to exert power in their local communities. Paid by St Petersburg, they became government officials and part of the imperial state. Crews shows that tsarist Russia can also serve as a good example of the imperial bureaucratization of Islam. In 1788, Catherine II created the Orenburg Muslim Ecclesiastical Assembly in Ufa. Headed by a mufti who was on St Petersburg's payroll, the body was to administer and control Muslims across the empire. The assembly had authority over the local 'ulama, but was subordinated to the tsarist Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the following decades, similar bodies were founded in different regions of the empire—in 1831 in the Crimea, and in 1872 in the Caucasus, where assemblies for the Sunni community and for the Shi'a were established. The institutionalization of Islam in hierarchical and ecclesiastical structures had a considerable impact on the religious practice of Muslims under Russian rule. Through this system, the imperial state tried to control almost every part of Muslim life, including marriage and funerary rites, the number of mosques and imams, and the hajj. Yet, Muslim leaders, too, could exploit the new bureaucracy to their own advantage, using it to petition the state and to employ tsarist authorities to settle disputes, enforce the shari'a, and exert authority in their communities. Crews also discusses the place of Islam in the Romanovs' multi-confessional armed forces. Curbing the army chaplains' drive to convert non-Christian soldiers, from the late eighteenth century onwards military officials established posts for field imams who were not only responsible for overseeing religious observance in the units, but were also used to monitor the political mood in the ranks.

Overall, the contributions in the first part of the book show that European authorities adopted a wide range of means to accommodate Islamic structures within their empires. Islamic institutions were not only tolerated, but regularly used to enhance and bolster colonial rule. Yet, the history of Islam and imperialism also had a more violent side—the expansion of European powers into the Muslim world also provoked conflict and religious unrest.

ISLAM AND ANTI-COLONIAL RESISTANCE

Throughout the high age of empire, European authorities were confronted with religious insurgency and Islamic anti-colonialism. Across Africa and Asia, religious leaders called for holy war against non-Muslim rule over the *dar al-Islam*. At times, this call was preceded by the appeal for emigration from the colonized territories, drawing on the concept of hijra. Though we must be cautious not to adopt an essentialist view of these resistance movements, there seem to be some striking similarities between them.²⁹ They were led by religious authorities. Their

²⁹ William R. Roff (ed.), *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse* (London, 1987), and other works have stressed the importance of specific social and political

slogans were religiously charged. Religious forms of organization and Islamic polities were promoted as viable alternatives to non-Muslim rule. The movements were usually rooted in the pre-colonial era and regularly went along with internal struggles and attempts to transform local communities and to establish theocratic states. Emphasizing the significance of religion should by no means imply that socioeconomic forces and material conditions were unimportant.³⁰ Nevertheless, the role of religion needs to be taken seriously in order to fully understand these movements. Islam often played a crucial part in shaping social and political life in Muslim communities and proved to be a highly effective legitimizing, organizing, and mobilizing force in a considerable number of popular anti-colonial movements. Islam could be used to overcome ethnic, social, and linguistic disunity. And after all, religion provided one of the most obvious demarcations between invaders and invaded, thus offering an attractive vehicle of protest against foreign rule rooted in indigenous culture.

There were different types of Islamic resistance movements, most notably Sufi brotherhoods and networks, Mahdist movements, and reformist groups, all on occasion backed by the traditional 'ulama.³¹ To be sure, there were many varieties and streams within each of these movements, and the lines that can be drawn between them are not clear-cut. Some scholars have, in fact, described them as part of the same wave of Islamic renewal and reformism that spread across the world from the eighteenth century onwards.³² The chapters in the second part of this book examine various anti-colonial uprisings in the Muslim parts of the European empires, enquiring into the role that religion and religious violence played in them, and examining the forms of Islam by which they were dominated.

Messianic movements arguably posed one of the most potent threats to imperial rule.³³ Centered on a charismatic leader and driven by millennial expectations, entire societies could rise in revolt against foreign intrusion. The most prominent example is the late nineteenth-century Mahdi uprising in Sudan, when self-proclaimed Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad waged holy war against Ottoman-Egyptian rule and

contexts in shaping Islamic movements and discourses across the world, although the emphasis on diversity bears the risk of overlooking crucial similarities. On more general discussions about diversity in the Muslim world, see the literature in footnote 6.

³⁰ Edmund Burke III, 'Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections', in Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus (eds), *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements* (Berkeley, 1988), 17–35.

³¹ For a comparison between various Islamic anti-colonial movements, see Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (The Hague, 1979), 39–104; and Nikki R. Keddie, 'The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 36/3 (1994), 463–87, especially 481–5. Peters (pp. 41–4) and Keddie (pp. 466–7 and 481), mainly distinguish between 'messianic' and 'Wahhabi type' revolts. Part IV of Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), *Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges* (Oxford, 2012), also provides some comparative insights into anti-colonial jihad movements.

³² John Obert Voll, 'Foundations of Renewal and Reform: Islamic Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', in John L. Esposito (ed.), *The Oxford History of Islam* (Oxford, 1999), 509–47.

³³ For the general context, see Michael Adas, *Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1979); and the classic by Bryan R. Wilson, *Magic and the Millennium: A Sociological Study of Religious Movements of Protest among Tribal and Third-World Peoples* (London, 1973).

its British protectors, conquered Khartoum, and established a theocratic state, banning smoking, alcohol, and dancing. In 1896, London sent an army under the ruthless Herbert Kitchener against the Islamic state, now led by Ahmad's successor, 'Abd Allah al-Ta'ayishi. The campaign took more than three years and ended with the total defeat of al-Ta'ayishi. A topic of continued fascination, the revolt has been the subject of numerous popular books.³⁴ Historians, too, for decades have been drawn to the subject, examining the wider social and political circumstances of the Sudanese Mahdiyya and its legacy, the role of reformist puritanical ideas that shaped the movement, and British official assessments of millennial Islam.³⁵ Studies have also explored the structure of the theocratic regime itself, including its organization, its eschatological propaganda, its ceremonies and rituals of power, and its ambivalent relationship with the local Sufi brotherhoods.³⁶ But although the Sudanese Mahdiyya continues to be a subject of particular fascination, it was by no means the only anti-colonial rebellion in Africa that was fueled by messianism. After the turn of the century, various Mahdist revolts challenged British rule in Northern Nigeria, specifically the uprisings in Burmi (1903), Satiru (1906), and Dumbulwa (1923).³⁷ In 1907, German troops waged a colonial war against

³⁴ Dominic Green, *Armies of God: Islam and Empire on the Nile, 1869–1899* (London, 2007); Fergus Nicoll, *Mahdi of Sudan and the Death of General Gordon* (London, 2005); Michael Asher, *Khartoum: The Ultimate Imperial Adventure* (London, 2005); and Robin Neillands, *The Dervish Wars: Gordon and Kitchener in the Sudan, 1880–1898* (London, 1996). Popular fascination with the Mahdiyya goes back to the times of the revolt itself. Famous contemporary accounts are F. R. Wingate, *Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan* (London, 1891); and Winston S. Churchill, *The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan* (London, 1899); on Churchill's views of the Mahdi revolt, see Richard Toye, *Churchill's Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made* (London, 2010), 50–60.

³⁵ Alice Moore-Harell, *Gordon and the Sudan: Prologue to the Mahdiyya 1877–1880* (London and Portland, OR, 2001), on preconditions of the Mahdiyya; Gabriel Warburg, *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya* (London, 2003), on the legacy of the movement; John Obert Voll, 'The Sudanese Mahdi: Frontier Fundamentalist', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10/2 (1979), 145–66, on the influence of reformist ideas; and David Steele, 'Lord Salisbury, the "False Religion" of Islam, and the Reconquest of the Sudan', in Edward M. Spiers (ed.), *Sudan: The Reconquest Reappraised* (London, 1998), 11–34, on British perceptions of the Mahdi.

³⁶ P. M. Holt, *Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881–98: A Study of Its Origins, Development and Overthrow* (Oxford, 1958), provides the most comprehensive account; see also A. B. Theobald, *The Mahdiyya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881–1899* (London, 1951); and Kim Searcy, *The Formation of the Sudanese Mahdist State: Ceremony and Symbols of Authority: 1882–1898* (Leiden, 2011).

³⁷ Paul E. Lovejoy and J. S. Hogendorn, 'Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905–6', *Journal of African History*, 31/2 (1990), 217–44; Thea Büttner, 'Social Aims and Earlier Anti-Colonial Struggles: The Satiru Rising of 1906', in Thea Büttner and Gerhard Brehme (eds), *African Studies* (Berlin, 1973), 1–18; R. A. Adeleye, 'Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 6 (1972), 193–214; C. N. Ubah, 'British Measures against Mahdism in Dumbulwa in Northern Nigeria, 1923: A Case of Colonial Overreaction', *Islamic Culture*, 50/3 (1976), 169–83; Asma'u G. Saeed, 'The British Policy Towards the Mahdiyya in Northern Nigeria: A Study of the Arrest, Detention and Deportation of Shaykh Sa'id b. Hayat, 1923–1959', *Kano Studies*, 2/3 (1982–5), 95–119; John Fisher, 'British Responses to Mahdist and Other Unrest in North and West Africa, 1919–1930', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 52/3 (2006), 347–61; Muhammad S. Umar, 'Muslims' Eschatological Discourses on Colonialism in Northern Nigeria', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 67/1 (1999), 59–84; and Peter B. Clarke, *Mahdism in West Africa: The Ijebu Mahdiyya Movement* (London, 1995), 35–44.

Mahdist movements in northern Cameroon.³⁸ In other parts of the world, too, Mahdism served as a vehicle for anti-imperial agitation. The Dutch empire in the East Indies had already been confronted with anti-colonial messianism in the early nineteenth century. During the Dipanagara revolt of the 1820s, Javanese rebels drew not only on mystical Islam but also on various messianic ideas to mobilize resistance.³⁹

The most prevalent forces of armed anti-colonial struggle in the Islamic world, however, were Sufi orders.⁴⁰ Among the best known of these movements was 'Abd al-Qadir and his Qadiri brotherhood, which led the jihad against French colonial troops in Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s.⁴¹ But al-Qadir and his followers were not the only anti-colonial force in the country.⁴² The Rahmaniyya brotherhood, for instance, also confronted the French invaders and later continued its resistance within the framework of the colonial state.⁴³ Across the Maghrib, Sufi orders played a crucial role in anti-colonial resistance. After the turn of the twentieth century, French troops became embroiled in a war with the followers of the Sanusi brotherhood in the Sahara.⁴⁴ Led by Sanusi shaykh Ahmad al-Sharif

³⁸ Thea Büttner, 'Die Mahdi-Erhebungen 1907 in Nordkamerun im Vergleich mit antikolonialen islamischen Bewegungen in anderen Regionen West- und Zentralafrikas', in Peter Heine and Ulrich van der Heyden (eds), *Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika* (Pfaffenweiler, 1995), 147–59; and, more generally, Martin Z. Njeuma, 'The Foundation of Radical Islam in Ngaoundere, 1835–1907', in Jean Boutrais (ed.), *Peuples et cultures de l'Adamaoua (Cameroun)* (Paris, 1993), 87–101.

³⁹ Peter Carey, *The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785–1855* (Leiden, 2007). Dipanagara's millenarism was based on a syncretism of various strains of centuries-old Javanese folkloric eschatology, most importantly the idea of the prophet *ratu adil*, and newer ideas of the Islamic Mahdi, see Adas, *Prophets of Rebellion*, 93–9; and Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1/4 (1959), 299–323, especially 308–9.

⁴⁰ On the general context, see Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *Muslim Communities of Grace: The Sufi Brotherhoods in Religious Life* (London, 2007), 200–35, especially 202–14; and Nile Green, *Sufism: A Global History* (Oxford, 2012), 187–238, especially 191–214.

⁴¹ Raphael Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (New York, 1977), remains the most authoritative account; see also the classic by Colonel Paul Azan, *L'Émir Abd El Kader, 1808–1883: Du fanatisme musulman au patriotisme français* (Paris, 1925); and articles published in Marcel Émérit (ed.), *L'Algérie à l'époque d'Abd-El-Kader* (Paris, 1951); on the role of religion in his struggle, see Pessah Shinar, 'Abd al-Qadir and 'Abd al-Krim: Religious Influences on their Thought and Action', *Asian and African Studies*, 1 (1965), 139–74; and on the pre-colonial roots of al-Qadir's jihad, see Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and its Interpretations in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria* (London and New York, 2002).

⁴² Benjamin Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York, 2009), gives a broad overview; see also Peter von Sivers, 'The Realm of Justice: Apocalyptic Revolts in Algeria (1849–1879)', *Humaniora Islamica*, 1 (1973), 47–60; the articles in part II of Burke and Lapidus (eds), *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements*; and, more generally, Fanny Colonna, 'Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria', *Economy and Society*, 3/3 (1974), 233–52.

⁴³ Julia Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters* (Berkeley, 1994).

⁴⁴ Jean-Louis Triaud, *La légende noire de la Sanusiyya: Une confrérie musulmane saharienne sous le regard français (1840–1930)*, 2 vols (Paris, 1995), especially vol. ii; Jean-Louis Triaud, *Tchad 1900–1902: Une guerre franco-libyenne oubliée? Une confrérie musulmane, la Sanusiyya, face à la France* (Paris, 1987); and Russell McGuirk *The Sanusi's Little War: The Amazing Story of a Forgotten Conflict in the Western Desert, 1915–1917* (London, 2007); see also the classic of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford, 1949); and, on the origins of the order, Knut S. Vikør, *Sufi and Scholar on the*

al-Sanusi, they would later also oppose the Italian occupation of Cyrenaica. While Italian authorities officially sought to accommodate Islam in Libya, they waged a merciless colonial war against the Muslim rebels and everyone they suspected to be supporting them.⁴⁵ When, in 1931, they hanged the elderly Sanusi commander 'Umar al-Mukhtar, waves of outrage spread across the Islamic world.⁴⁶

In his chapter 'Religious Revolts in Colonial North Africa', Knut S. Vikør provides a comparative study of 'Abd al-Qadir's war against the French in Algeria and the conflicts between the Sanusiyya and the French and Italians, enquiring more generally into the role of Sufi networks in anti-colonial resistance in North Africa. Both 'Abd al-Qadir and Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi drew their authority and won their initial tribal support through their leadership of a regional Sufi order. Both were pious Sufis who only took temporary leadership of the local forces, and returned to a life of scholarship and piety after the war. Yet Vikør also points to some crucial differences between Sanusi and Qadiri resistance. Whereas Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi turned the Sufi lodges into centers of resistance and drew on their shaykhs to lead the jihad, the Algerian Qadiriyya provided less stringent structures to draw on and 'Abd al-Qadir, as a consequence, founded a theocratic polity based on Islamic and modernist Ottoman models during his struggle. On the whole, the Sufi orders were more instrumental in mobilizing and unifying support among the tribes in Libya than they were in Algeria. Examining the reasons for the prominent role of the brotherhoods in various anti-colonial struggles more generally, Vikør points out that the relationship between religion and resistance was often more complex than is usually assumed. He stresses that only some aspects of the organizational framework of particular Sufi orders, under specific political and social circumstances, could generate militant resistance. The involvement of the brotherhoods in anti-colonial struggles in times of crisis required a considerable, though temporary, transformation from usually purely religious organizations into political ones.

The intersection of Sufi brotherhoods and anti-imperialism has also been studied by historians of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. In the mid-nineteenth century, the legendary al-Hajj 'Umar Tal and the Tijaniyya confronted the French expansion in the West African savannah.⁴⁷ In French Senegal, another famous Sufi shaykh,

Desert Edge: Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi and his Brotherhood (London, 1995). A fascinating contemporary account of Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi's resistance is G. F. Abbott, *The Holy War in Tripoli* (London, 1912).

⁴⁵ Salvatore Bono, 'Islam et politique coloniale en Libye', *The Maghreb Review*, 13 (1988), 70–6; and Anna Baldinetti, 'Italian Colonial Rule and Muslim Elites in Libya: A Relationship of Antagonism and Collaboration', in Meir Hatina (ed.), *Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: 'Ulama' in the Middle East* (Leiden, 2009), 91–108, give insights into attempts to accommodate Islam in colonial Libya. Anna Baldinetti, 'Italian Colonial Studies on the Sufi Brotherhoods in Libya', in Anna Baldinetti (ed.), *Modern and Contemporary Libya: Sources and Histories* (Rome, 2003), 125–39, explores the underlying conceptions of this policy.

⁴⁶ Romain Rainero, 'La Capture: L'exécution d'Omar El-Mukhtar et la fin de la guérilla libyenne', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 28/111–2 (1980), 59–74.

⁴⁷ David Robinson, *Holy War of Umar Tal: The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1985), is the definitive study on the subject; see also David Robinson, *Chiefs and Clerics: Abdul Bokar Kan and Futa Toro 1853–1891* (Oxford, 1975), especially 28–53; Fernand Dumont, *L'Anti-Sultan, ou Al-Hajj Omar Tal du Fouta, combattant de la foi (1794–1864)* (Paris,

Amadu Bamba, and his order, the Muridiyya, engaged (at least initially) in anti-colonial resistance.⁴⁸ Equally important was militant Sufi opposition to European rule in East Africa. In Somaliland, the 'Dervish movement' of Salihi shaykh Muhammad 'Abd Allah Hasan, the 'mad mullah' as the British called him, confronted Italian, British, and Ethiopian troops after the turn of the twentieth century.⁴⁹ Hasan's Salihiyya also stood in conflict with the rival Qadiri brotherhood, which itself opposed the German presence in East Africa.⁵⁰

Sufi resistance has long also attracted the attention of scholars of the tsarist empire. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the three legendary imams Ghazi Muhammad, Hamza Bek, and Shamil called for holy war, or *ghazawat*, against Russian troops in the Northern Caucasus. Imam Shamil, a reckless military genius immortalized in Tolstoy's *Hadji Murad*, fought the tsarist army for almost thirty years. Enforcing shari'a legislation, the imams merged the local communities of the northern Caucasus into an imamate. The Russians confronted the rebels with extreme brutality.⁵¹ Studying these conflicts, historians have long tended to emphasize the role of the Naqshbandi brotherhood in organizing the anti-tsarist struggle and unifying Muslims in the imamate.⁵² Only recently have scholars begun questioning the importance of the Sufi brotherhood in the anti-Russian resistance, arguing that the Naqshbandiyya had no crucial influence on the jihad movement or, indeed, the organization of the imamate.⁵³ Moreover, they have pointed out that Sufi ideas played only a marginal

1971); Murray Last, 'Reform in West Africa: The Jihād Movement of the Nineteenth Century', in J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds), *History of West Africa*, ii (London, 1974), 1–29, especially 17–23; and Christian Coulon, 'Prophets of God or of History? Muslim Messianic Movements and Anti-Colonialism in Senegal', in Wim van Binsbergen and Matthew Schoffeleers (eds.), *Theoretical Explorations in African Religion* (London, 1985), 346–66.

⁴⁸ Babou, *Fighting the Greater Jihad*; and Cheikh Anta Babou, 'Contesting Space, Shaping Places: Making Room for the Muridiyya in Colonial Senegal, 1912–45', *Journal of African History*, 46/3 (2005), 405–26.

⁴⁹ Abdi Sheik-Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856–1920)* (London, 1993), is the most comprehensive study; see also Robert L. Hess, 'The "Mad Mullah" and Northern Somalia', *Journal of African History*, 5/3 (1964), 415–33; and John P. Slight, 'British and Somali views of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan's Jihad, 1899–1920', *Bildbaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, 10/7 (2010), 16–35; for contemporary interpretations, see H. G. C. Swayne, *Seventeen Trips through Somaliland and a Visit to Abyssinia: With Supplementary Preface on the 'Mad Mullah' Risings* (London, 1903); and Douglas J. Jardine, *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland* (London, 1923).

⁵⁰ B. G. Martin, 'Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonial Rule: Shaykh Uways B. Muhammed Al-Barawi and the Qadiriya Brotherhood in East Africa', *Journal of African History*, 10/3 (1969), 471–86; and Michael Pesek, 'Islam und Politik in Deutsch-Ostafrika', in Albert Wirz, Andreas Eckert, and Katrin Bromber (eds), *Alles unter Kontrolle: Disziplinierungsverfahren im Kolonialen Tanzania (1850–1960)* (Cologne, 2003), 99–140.

⁵¹ Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan* (London, 1994); Moshe Gammer, 'Shamil's Most Successful Offensive: Daghestan 1843', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 12/1 (1991), 41–54; and, on the early history of Russian imperialism in the Caucasus, Michael Khodarkovsky, 'Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550–1800', *Journal of Modern History*, 71/2 (1999), 394–430.

⁵² Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar*; and, most strongly, Anna Zelkina, *In Quest of God and Freedom: Sufi Responses to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus* (London, 2000).

⁵³ Alexander Knysh, 'Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm: The Issue of the Motivations of Sufi Resistance Movements in Western and Russian Scholarship', *Die Welt des Islams*, 42/2 (2002), 139–73; Michael Kemper, *Herrschaft, Recht und Islam in Daghestan: Von den Khanaten und Gemeindebünden zum jihād-Staat* (Wiesbaden, 2005); and Clemens P. Sidorko, *Dschihad im Kaukasus: Antikolonialer*

role and that the three imams were in fact mainly concerned about the enforcement of shari'a, the abolishment of the *adat*, and the foundation of an Islamic polity, and thus acted in the tradition of the reformist 'shari'a movement' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, confronting the North Caucasian Islamic resistance, the Russian imperial state consciously tried to strengthen *adat* law.⁵⁴ In his chapter 'Muslim Mobilization in Imperial Russia's Caucasus', Michael Reynolds reassesses the nineteenth-century *ghazawat* against Imperial Russia. Reynolds underlines the importance of reformist ideas and the lack of Sufi influence on the imams' resistance movements, although he warns against dismissing the influence of Sufism entirely. In contrast to earlier scholarship, Reynolds argues that the 'shari'a movement' was not a distinctly Caucasian phenomenon devoid of external influence, but since the late seventeenth century had been strongly influenced by puritanical ideas from the Middle East. After all, Islam in the Caucasus was far from homogeneous and even within one group interpretations of faith and doctrine were rather diverse. Moving beyond the discussion of the particular religious influences that shaped the *ghazawat*, Reynolds presents a broad account of the imams' two distinct, though linked, struggles—the war against empire and the internal battle against un-Islamic practices. The chapter gives detailed insights into the rigidly regulated life of the imamate with its segregation of the sexes, bans on alcohol and tobacco, restrictions on music and dancing, and interference in sartorial norms, and shows that these policies were anything but popular among the mountain communities. Overall, it demonstrates that religion defined the conflict between the imams and Russia. The legitimacy and legislation of the imamate were based on religion, and Islamic slogans enabled the warlords to mobilize Muslims across tribal lines. At the same time, Reynolds points out that the *ghazawat* also needs to be seen as part of the broader historical phenomenon of clashes generally generated by imperial expansion.

The question of the importance of Sufi influences on anti-colonial revolts has been discussed by historians in more general terms. Some have even suggested rethinking the role of Sufism in anti-colonial resistance altogether, arguing that the influence of Sufi brotherhoods in Islamic anti-colonial movements has been widely overestimated, and instead emphasizing reformist influences.⁵⁵

There is no doubt that Islamic reformism was highly influential in various anti-colonial struggles. Many of the Islamic reformist movements emerged in the eighteenth century, most famously perhaps Wahhabism in the Arabian peninsula, and became powerful forces against European colonialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Muslim revivalists preached a renewal and purification of Islam, putting new emphasis on the Qur'an and the hadith. Only the return to

Widerstand der Dagestanen und Tschetschenen gegen das Zarenreich (18. Jahrhundert bis 1859) (Wiesbaden, 2007). Sidorko gives an excellent historiographical overview on pp. x–vii.

⁵⁴ Michael Kemper, 'Adat Against Shari'a: Russian Approaches Toward Daghestani "Customary Law" in the 19th Century', *Ab Imperio*, 3 (2005), 147–74.

⁵⁵ Kemper, *Herrschaft, Recht und Islam in Daghestan*; Michael Kemper, 'The Changing Images of Jihad Leaders: Shamil and Abd al-Qadir in Daghestani and Algerian Historical Writing', *Nova Religio: Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions*, 11/2 (2007), 28–58; and Knysh, 'Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm'.