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The Myth of Parisian Scholars' Opposition to the System of Papal Provision (1378–1418)

Eric D. Goddard *

The attitude of Parisian scholars toward papal influence in the distribution of ecclesiastical benefices (papal provision) is an important theme in the politics of the Great Schism. Current works addressing the subject have consistently maintained that a *general* critique of papal provision emerged among scholars at the University during the pontificate of Benedict XIII (1394–1408).¹

Even supporters of this position acknowledge that there is little evidence of university opposition to papal provision prior to 1394. The vocal criticism of this practice in the fourteenth century came from ordinary collators, whose powers of patronage decreased as those of the papacy increased. University scholars, on the other hand, generally benefited from papal provision. Popes often favoured the promotion of university-educated candidates. The collective petitions (*rotuli*) submitted to the pope by universities or groups of scholars frequently received preferential treatment, and those studying at a university often received the right to be absent from their benefices for a specified number of years.²

It is clear, however, that Parisian scholars did repeatedly and vehemently call for the suppression of Benedict XIII's powers of papal provision. They advocated this policy as early as 1395. They supported the subtraction of obedience which included suppression of papal power over benefices in 1398, and they called for a renewal of this policy in 1405 and 1406. Current studies argue that this opposition to Benedict reflected university hostility to the system of papal provision as a whole, as well as a desire to return to unrestricted ordinary collation as part of a wider defense of 'ecclesiastical liberties'. However, these studies do little to explain why scholars had not opposed papal provision before 1394 or why they would completely turn against a system that seemed to offer them so many advantages.³

If Parisian scholars really did oppose papal provision in general, then decisions made by the French crown and clergy between 1406 and 1408, making ordinary collation the point of departure for France's future beneficial policy, should have met with their approval. However, as even those arguing for the University's general opposition to papal provision under Benedict admit, Parisian scholars emerged between 1409 and 1412 as the staunchest *defenders* of papal provision and *opponents* of ordinary collation. The only explanations current studies have for such a transformation rest upon the University's alleged disappointment with ordinary collators during the regimes of substruction (1398–1403) and neutrality (1408–9), as well as their belated recognition of the advantages offered them by papal provision.⁴

The present study offers a simpler solution: there is no evidence for widespread, general opposition to papal provision at the University before 1394 and after 1408 because such opposition never existed. Even when relations with Benedict were at their worst, the vast majority of Parisian scholars did not envision a restriction on papal provision that would last beyond the resolution of the Schism, and they did not view unrestricted ordinary collation as a positive objective in itself.⁵ In fact, the immediate circumstances of Benedict's pontificate are sufficient to explain Parisian scholars' particular opposition to Benedict's involvement in beneficial provision, although they continued to support papal provision in general and returned to an open advocacy of it once a new pontiff was enthroned.

However easily this interpretation fits with evidence before 1394 and after 1408, it amounts to a dramatic departure from current interpretations of beneficial politics at the University of Paris under Benedict XIII. This re-interpretation relies on two types of sources. The first includes statements by the University or Parisian scholars concerning beneficial policy during the period between 1378 and 1418, especially the debates at a series of clerical assemblies summoned to consider France's ecclesiastical and beneficial policy between 1395 and 1408. The second includes the successful petitions from Parisian scholars actually registered during the pontificate of Benedict XIII. This dual examination clearly reveals the particular nature of Parisian opposition to papal provision under Benedict, and it also makes clear how errors, limited evidence, and questionable interpretive strategies have led past studies to opposing conclusions.

This study has three parts. The first discusses the period leading to France's initial substruction of obedience from Benedict XIII in

1398, emphasizing the lack of evidence for general opposition to papal provision at the University, as well as the roots of particular opposition to Benedict's exercise of these powers. The second discusses the period between the total substraction of obedience in 1398 and France's declaration of neutrality in 1408, showing how the seeds of a more general restriction upon papal provision were sown, although most Parisian scholars did not support this policy. The third part, drawing more heavily on existing studies, explains why the seeds of beneficial conflict sown between crown and University in 1407 did not grow into open conflict until a decade later.

I. Toward Substraction (1394–8)

By the time of Benedict's accession in 1394, scholars at the University of Paris had long favoured solutions to the Schism that involved neither the force of arms (*via facti*) nor the necessary vindication of the Avignon claimant. The University had only endorsed Clement VII's legitimacy under pressure from Charles V (May 1379), and a perceptible undercurrent of dissent continued at the University until resistance to Clement was officially outlawed there in February 1383. The papacy, which was supported by the royal administration, silenced opposition at the University both by threatening to deprive scholars of their ecclesiastical benefices and by offering them generous access to papal provision. Parisian scholars took advantage of this access, sending an official *rotulus* after their declaration in favour of Clement in 1379, another after the prohibition of opposition to Clement at the University in 1383, and a third after a renewed statement of loyalty in 1387.⁶ Nevertheless, when royal commitment to the *via facti* softened between 1392 and 1394, Parisian scholars returned with enthusiasm to debating possible non-violent solutions to the Schism, drawing up a set of written proposals in a June 1394 letter that supported the ways of compromise and council but gave preference to the *via cessionis* (seeking the resignation of both popes).

Although the royal administration had refused to take any decisive action in favour of union as long as Clement lived, his death prompted a dramatic move toward exclusive support for the *via cessionis*. The crown first attempted to prevent the election of a successor to Clement, but the

Avignon cardinals frustrated this effort by choosing Cardinal Pedro de Luna as Pope Benedict XIII (28 September 1394). Next, royal efforts focused on convincing Benedict to embrace the *via cessionis* voluntarily, but although Pedro de Luna had made statements in support of cession while serving as a papal legate in Paris (1392–1394), he showed no eagerness to adopt the policy once pope. The royal administration was therefore wary of Benedict's call for a royal embassy to Avignon to negotiate a joint royal-papal approach to the Schism. The desired embassy departed in May 1395, but not before the crown had secured a declaration in exclusive support of the *via cessionis* from an assembly of the French clergy (February 1395).⁷ During the embassy itself, the crown's uncompromising pursuit of cession clashed with Benedict's implacable resistance to it, and the encounter ended in an open and apparently irreconcilable breach.

While Parisian scholars had previously been at the vanguard in the pursuit of union, the crown's headlong, exclusive pursuit of cession risked outstripping university opinion. Scholars enthusiastically supported efforts to prevent a new papal election, but a division subsequently opened between scholars committed to the exclusive pursuit of cession and those at least willing to consider other options. The University's official opinion at the February 1395 assembly favoured the first point of view, mentioning the three *viae* discussed in the letter from June 1394 but endorsing exclusive pursuit of cession.⁸ However, the university letter intended for delivery to the pope during the royal embassy was not so exclusive; it continued to express some support for the ways of council and compromise. Members of the royal delegation exerted pressure upon university representatives not to deliver their letter to the pope, and they received no opportunity either to speak publicly before the pope or to have a private audience with him. After the embassy's return, university leaders edited their undelivered letter to express exclusive support for the *via cessionis* and then publicized its text as an open letter to 'all the faithful' (August 26). This marked an open break between university leaders and Pope Benedict XIII, but it also divided a pro-cessionist university leadership from those Parisian scholars not ready to commit so exclusively to the *via cessionis*.⁹

These developing divisions over ecclesiastical policy had growing beneficial stakes. Since the pontificate of John XXII, Parisian scholars had adopted the custom of submitting *rotuli* of beneficial supplications to the pope, particularly at the time of his coronation. Inclusion in these collective petitions in a pope's first year constituted a major opportunity

for scholars to benefit from initial demonstrations of papal largesse, to replace provisions from the previous pope (usually voided by his successor), and to secure graces that would enjoy precedence by virtue of their early date. Pope Benedict had explicitly invited Parisian scholars to send him their *rotulus* and had indicated that he would respond favorably to it.¹⁰ However, pro-cessionist university leaders (including Pierre Plaoul and Jean de Guignicourt), in consultation with the royal administration, had agreed that the official Parisian *rotulus* should be withheld.¹¹ Simon de Cramaud later described this action as an effort to 'avoid tepidity in pursuit of union in the church', reflecting the common belief that individuals who had received provisions from a pontiff would be less eager to push for his resignation.¹²

However, while the University did not submit an official *rotulus* to Benedict, it was still possible for Parisian scholars to seek provision through other avenues: collective petitions assembled by smaller groups of Parisian scholars (termed particular *rotuli*); *rotuli* from other French universities which did not follow the Parisian example in withholding collective petitions; *rotuli* offered by civil and ecclesiastical patrons; and independent petitions. Individual Parisian scholars thus faced a choice between adherence to the cessionist policy of beneficial self-denial and continued recourse to papal provision.

An examination of successful supplications registered under Benedict indicates that most Parisian scholars chose the latter option, finding ways to submit supplications to Benedict even though the University sent no official *rotulus*. A comparison of the total number of successful petitions from Parisian scholars during this coronation year of Benedict XIII (1394–5) to that of Clement VII (1378–9) indicates that both petitioners and petitions declined by only about thirty per cent.¹³ This decrease, while significant, tends to belie later claims that the withheld *rotulus* constituted wholesale beneficial self-denial in the University.¹⁴

There was, however, a higher correlation in the upper echelon of Parisian scholars between the decision not to petition Benedict and exclusive support for the *via cessionis*. None of the Parisian scholars and graduates most vocal in support of cession during this initial period submitted successful individual supplications to Benedict in his first pontifical year.¹⁵ Meanwhile, submission of supplications declined by about half in 1394–5 among the seventy-five Parisian scholars who would support the policy of subtraction at the Third Clerical Assembly (1398).¹⁶ In contrast, Pierre D'Ailly, Nicolas Clamanges, and Jean Gerson, who had all been vocal in the cause of reform and supportive

of the *via cessionis* prior to 1394, received generous provisions from Benedict and were soon critical of the crown's exclusive pursuit of the *via cessionis*.¹⁷ Thus, while many scholars quietly circumvented the University's beneficial policy, the issue created a division among its leading scholars.

While most outside petitions from scholars passed without recorded comment, the dominant pro-cessionist party reacted angrily to scholars who flouted the official policy of beneficial self-denial most flagrantly. The Book of the Proctor from the English-German nation records the condemnation of Pierre d'Ailly and five other masters as 'suspect in relation to the union of the church', based upon a report from university *nuntii* in Avignon. This report, arriving on the heels of the failed royal embassy (August 1395), likely focused on details of papal favours received by D'Ailly and raised suspicion that his actions had undermined the policy of cession. For its part, the English-German nation (the only nation for which a proctor's book survives for this period) made efforts to exclude D'Ailly from future discussions of ecclesiastical politics.¹⁸

A particular *rotulus* submitted in December 1395 through the papal legate also provoked the special ire of university leaders by requesting for its supplicants the date and prerogatives normally given to petitions in the University's official *rotulus*. University leaders dispatched a vitriolic missive to Avignon, referring to their colleagues as 'sons of Satan' and beseeching the Avignon cardinals (the majority of whom had now committed to the *via cessionis*) to see that the supplications bore no fruit. They also passed a statute officially prohibiting the submission of particular *rotuli* based upon university association on pain of expulsion from the University.¹⁹ One of the offending scholars referred later to the injuries and opprobrium he had suffered for petitioning in this *rotulus*, and five of the other masters reported being expelled from the University.²⁰

A recognition of the beneficial cost to University leaders of supporting the *via cessionis* must shape interpretation of their first official call for the suppression of papal provision on 31 August 1395. Occurring only five days after the release of the University's letter edited to support cession exclusively, it belonged to a set of policy proposals submitted to the king that also included suppression of papal taxation, prohibition of opposition to cession, and support for those who favoured this policy. Existing studies have taken one phrase within the proposal—which characterizes the suppression of papal provision as a 'return to common

law' rather than a 'denial of due obedience'—as evidence for the advent of a *general* critique of papal provision at the University.²¹

It is true that individuals favouring a wholesale rollback of papal provision would later justify their proposals using the language of 'common law' and 'ancient liberties'. However, given the acerbity of the immediate beneficial conflict between pro-cessionist university leaders and Benedict XIII, corroborating evidence is required to show that this proposed policy transcended immediate circumstance and envisioned a lasting restriction on papal provision. Given the lack of such evidence, which will be demonstrated, this reference to 'common law' appears to be an isolated rhetorical flourish rather than a summary expression of the University's long-term beneficial policy.

In the year between this initial proposal and the opening of the Second Clerical Assembly (August 1396), the divide between the Pope and pro-cessionist university leaders deepened, and the beneficial stakes rose. Besides refusing cession, Benedict rewarded its opponents. He annulled in advance any future agreement to cession he might make (presumably fearing coercion). And he began actions to excommunicate pro-cessionist scholars and to deprive them of their benefices.²² He also reportedly commented on the University's withheld *rotulus*, stating that 'no other sovereign pontiff had been so injured and insulted by the university'.²³

This information comes from an appeal made by the University to a 'future orthodox pope' in March 1396. Benedict both annulled this appeal and began proceedings against the master who had posted it in Avignon. On 3 August 1396, the University reiterated its appeal, arguing that Benedict's obstruction of the *via cessionis* made him a favourer of schism and suspect of heresy. It also suggested that a scandalized church might legitimately withdraw obedience from him. And it implied that past papal ejections by secular authorities might provide useful precedent.²⁴

Although the royal administration was not yet ready to take decisive action against Benedict, these university appeals helped motivate the crown to summon a Second Clerical Assembly (16–31 August 1396). This assembly is critical for the present argument, for it is here, current studies maintain, that the University's general critique of papal provision emerged most clearly.²⁵

The official question under consideration at the assembly was whether to deny Benedict's fiscal (and even spiritual) authority in order to

convince him to adopt the *via cessionis*.²⁶ University spokesmen favoured this policy for reasons related specifically to Benedict's pontificate.²⁷ The Cistercian theologian Mathieu Pillaert,²⁸ who was first to speak after the introduction of the University delegation, argued for suppressing Benedict's power over benefices because he was using this influence 'to seduce good men to follow his opinion instead of the true way of cession'. Pillaert also focused on the need to suppress papal taxation. He justified this measure as a way of preventing Benedict from bribing supporters, rather than basing his critique on any explicit concern with the liberties and franchises of the church.²⁹

Pierre Plaoul, who had earlier advocated withholding the university *rotulus*, was now designated as an official spokesman. He also argued that in order to incline Benedict toward cession, France should deny all power over benefices and pecuniary emoluments both to him and to those prelates refusing to oppose him.³⁰ However, Plaoul neither indicated that these arrangements should last beyond the present crisis nor made any appeal to common law or ancient liberties. Indeed, a papal spokesman accused him of arguing that though a subtraction of obedience violated canons and written law, such 'laws and rights' should be 'put aside' in this divine cause (*causa dei*).³¹

Current studies do not, in fact, maintain that either of these scholars evinced a general opposition to papal provision.³² They do, however, adopt two misguided analytical approaches that make such general university opposition appear to come from other quarters. The first of these—which affects interpretation of the Third (1398) and Fourth (1406) Clerical Assemblies as well—is the practice of taking statements from Parisian *graduates* not appearing as university spokesmen as representative of university opinion.³³

This has a particularly dramatic effect in the case of the Norman abbot and Parisian canonist Pierre le Roy, whose speeches at each of the clerical assemblies in question evinced a general critique of papal provision, a historical defence of ordinary collation, and scarcely any mention of particular grievances against Benedict.³⁴ It is also significant in relation to the royal counsellor and Parisian theologian Gilles des Champs (also from Normandy). He later defended subtraction based upon the systemic abuses of papal provision and royal prerogative in defence of ecclesiastical liberties at the Third Clerical Assembly of 1398.³⁵

Current studies rightly point out that individual obligation to the University did not end with graduation, but the university association was not primary for either of these individuals during Benedict's pontificate.³⁶ As an abbot and a royal counsellor, respectively, le Roy and Des Champs were naturally most concerned with the interests of ordinary collators and the crown, both of whom had reasons for opposing papal provision that were potentially in conflict with the interests of university scholars. The fact that both were from Normandy, a region known for lay influence over ecclesiastical patronage and resistance to papal provision, limits their representivity still further.³⁷ A final problem with this approach is that other Parisian graduates, such as Pierre D'Ailly and Ameilh du Breuilh, would later express opinions diametrically opposed to Le Roy and Des Champs, but their opinions are not taken as representative of the University.³⁸ Overall, because the opinions of Parisian graduates varied widely (often as a function of the privileges they had received and the offices they held), it is wise to base generalizations regarding university opinion upon official declarations of the University or statements of its official spokesmen, while still recognizing the potential for such statements to cover over internal dissent.

A second source of misunderstanding for the Second Clerical Assembly in particular concerns the emphasis that current studies place upon the *partial* nature of the subtraction allegedly proposed by the University, rather than the *immediate* character that university spokesmen actually emphasized. This is significant, for support of *partial* subtraction in particular is supposed to correlate with a general critique of papal provision and taxation.³⁹ The major source of this mistaken emphasis is the tendency to take the statement by Pierre le Roy as representative of University opinion, a problem dealt with above.

However, this emphasis also fails to recognize the axis upon which debate at the assembly turned. The royal administration showed by its conduct of the assembly that it was not ready for immediate action and hoped that the assembly might merely prepare the ground for a final appeal to Benedict. Parisian scholars, however, were desperate for immediate relief from their untenable beneficial position. By emphasizing fiscal grievances and remedies, Parisian scholars were simply proposing the least radical measures that might bring them immediate relief. There is no evidence of *general* opposition to papal provision in the statements of university spokesmen, and the appeal of 3 August 1396 had made it clear that the university leadership was quite prepared to

deny Benedict's spiritual authority along with his fiscal powers if that were the policy adopted by the crown.⁴⁰ The critical change between 1396 and 1398 was not the move of the University from partial to total substruction (as is often argued) but the shift of the crown from delay to action.

Several developments between August 1396 and May 1398 help account for this change in the royal administration. First, Benedict finally refused (1 April 1398) to renew a grant of ecclesiastical taxation that the crown had enjoyed since 1369.⁴¹ The Dukes of Berry and Burgundy, in particular, viewed this source of revenue as indispensable. Lacking papal sanction, they needed direct approval for this taxation from the clergy themselves. But they could only obtain such approval if they could promise prelates the type of protection from papal sanctions that only a total substruction of obedience from Benedict could provide.⁴²

Second, the diplomatic situation in 1398 was also more favourable for substruction. Closer French ties with England and Florence (instead of Milan) favoured the *via cessionis*. A joint French-English-Spanish embassy issued a final appeal to Benedict to accept resignation (September 1397), and this same embassy had explicitly threatened Benedict with substruction if he refused to comply by February 1398. Together, these political preconditions provided a more solid foundation for decisive action.

Finally, the two-year delay after the Second Clerical Assembly had provided time for the theoretical formulation of the substruction policy. This arguably reached its most mature form in the treatise of Simon de Cramaud, *De substraccione obediencie*, composed at the request of the royal chancellor Arnauld de Corbie in 1396–1397, which became the basis of the dominant line of argumentation in favor of substruction at the Third Clerical Assembly in 1398.⁴³ These factors helped to galvanize the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy (then the dominant parties in the royal administration) in support of substruction by May 1398 when a Third Clerical Assembly was summoned to consider ecclesiastical policy once again.

University leaders were also active during this period, urging the royal administration to pursue substruction and attempting to consolidate support for the policy within the University itself. In February 1397, Jean Courtecuisse spoke for the University before the king, where he advocated suppression of papal taxation and beneficial provision. An ensuing debate at a university assembly, with scholars speaking for

and against the substruction policy, concluded that substruction was indeed reasonable.⁴⁴ Following this assembly, there was an attempt within the University to force at least some masters to take an oath in support of cession *and* substruction, an effort in which Norman masters reportedly played a leading part.⁴⁵ Then, in February 1398, the University once again requested the royal administration to go ahead with its substruction plan.

Support for substruction within the University was far from unanimous, however. Raoul d'Ulmont had addressed a strongly anti-substructionist tract to Charles VI early in 1397.⁴⁶ Henricus Poelman, a member of the English-German nation and rector of the University from December 1397 to March 1398, also made his staunch opposition to substruction clear.⁴⁷ The effort to compel adherence to substruction by oath gives the clear indication that sufficient support for the policy was not forthcoming. Finally, the royal decision in December 1397 (soon disregarded) that the subject of substruction should not be discussed at the University for a one-year period suggests the depth of the dissension that had developed on the issue.

Turning to the Third Clerical Assembly (May-July 1398), there is general consensus that the speech made by the university's official spokesman Pierre Plaoul offered specific support for the royal policy of total substruction rather than a more general critique of papal provision.⁴⁸ As in 1396, Pierre Plaoul called for the suppression of papal provision as a necessary expedient for pursuit of cession, itself the only viable remedy for schism.⁴⁹ While maintaining such substruction was in conformity with divine law, Plaoul again declined to make any appeal to 'common law' or the 'ancient liberties' of the church.⁵⁰ Instead, by comparing substruction to Moses's staff, carried in the hand during times of peace but thrown down as a snake in conflict, Plaoul indicated that substruction was a *temporary* expedient, albeit one that might be used again in the future.⁵¹ Plaoul also emphasized the University's distinctive beneficial situation, arguing (rather implausibly) that the decision of university masters not to send a *rotulus* to Benedict was a guarantee of the University's impartiality and a reason why its opinions should be heeded.⁵² He suggested that university masters were limited in what they could do to end the Schism because of the continuing fiscal powers of the papacy, and he maintained further that the pope had managed to win over many former advocates of cession through the distribution of benefices.⁵³ Overall, it is clear that Plaoul's call for substruction was rooted firmly in concerns particular to the Schism

(and Benedict's pontificate) rather than any general opposition to papal provision.

The collective written opinion submitted on behalf of the University as part of the voting process conformed to Plaoul's argument. The statement itself called for the immediate suppression of Benedict's powers of ecclesiastical provision and taxation because they served to perpetuate the Schism. It gave no indication, however, that such subtraction should continue in any form once union was restored. The statement claimed that a recent assembly (11 June 1398) of the faculties and nations of the University (including around four hundred masters of arts) had favored subtraction 'by common consent and without contradiction'.⁵⁴ However, since nations and faculties voted *en bloc* at university assemblies and leaders had clear opportunities to apply pressure in such assemblies (if not to exclude opponents from them altogether), such claims of 'common consent' might well cover over substantial internal opposition. The papal spokesman Pierre Ravat claimed in the course of the Third Clerical Assembly that scarcely half, or even a third, of Parisian scholars freely supported subtraction.⁵⁵

Unfortunately, the votes cast by seventy-five individual Parisian scholars during the Third Clerical Assembly cannot be used to test this contention. It had been decided that each French university was to have a single, collective vote at the assembly. However, after most of the voting had been concluded and the University of Paris had issued its collective opinion in support of subtraction, these scholars also submitted bulletins of vote (with no other university similarly represented).⁵⁶ Seventy-four of these scholars voiced support for immediate, unconditional, and total subtraction, making it clear that they had been asked to vote, not in order to obtain a sample of university opinion, but to bolster support for royal policy.⁵⁷

These schedules can, however, shed light on Parisian attitudes toward papal provision, especially when compared with similar opinions submitted by prelates at the assembly.⁵⁸

While not required as part of their support for total subtraction, at least forty-one of these prelates and thirty-six Parisian scholars offered individual comments on papal provision, taxation, and other fiscal matters.⁵⁹ On the issue of how long restrictions on papal provision should last, French prelates were clearly divided: twelve supported open-ended measures, nine linked the duration of sanctions to the length of the Schism, and the remaining individuals offered less definite opinions.⁶⁰

Parisian scholars, on the other hand, were more united. None of their bulletins of vote expressed clear support for open-ended restrictions on papal provision. Twenty-two bulletins linked the duration of sanctions to the length of the Schism, and the remaining schedules were non-committal or idiosyncratic.⁶¹ Since support for such open-ended restrictions was linked with general opposition to the system of papal provision, it is clear that at the Third Clerical Assembly such opposition was far more prevalent among French prelates than among Parisian scholars.

This finding is the capstone of the first phase of the present argument. If evidence for Parisian scholars' general opposition to the system of papal provision was to emerge anywhere during this initial period, it should have been here: among the University's strongest partisans of substruction, in a setting where others, particularly French prelates, felt free to offer such critiques. The fact that such opinions scarcely appear among Parisian scholars strongly suggests that general opposition to the system of papal provision within the University was not nearly as strong as has frequently been supposed. Evidence from the course of events following the substruction of obedience confirms this interpretation.

II. From Substruction to Neutrality (1398–1408)

While a narrow interpretation of Parisian scholars' opposition to papal provision (related to conflict with Benedict XIII rather than hostility toward the system as a whole) best fits the evidence leading up to 1398, it provides the only coherent explanation for the University's engagement between 1398 and 1408. Except for a brief period between 1403 and 1405, the University maintained its opposition to Benedict during this period. The royal administration, in turn, capitalized upon the University's hostility toward Benedict to lay the foundation for its own increased control over beneficial provision, in the name of defending 'ecclesiastical liberties'.

Royal ordonnances following from the decision of the Third Clerical Assembly fulfilled the desire of pro-cessionist Parisian scholars to be freed from Benedict's authority.⁶² The royal declaration of total substruction (27 July 1398) protected Parisian scholars from the threat of deprivation or excommunication. A subsequent royal ordonnance

(8 August 1398) formally denied efficacy to most beneficial provisions issued by Benedict, although some complementary measures were later necessary to deprive all papal provisions of their force.⁶³ These ordinances also made election and ordinary collation the point of departure for the distribution of benefices during the substraction period.⁶⁴

Parisian scholars, however, never placed their faith in unrestricted ordinary collation. Soon after the substraction (August 1398), university scholars began compiling *rotuli* of supplications to present to a board of prelates that they hoped would be established to intercede with ordinary collators on behalf of university scholars and royal candidates in relation to beneficial appointments.⁶⁵ This four-member commission was in place by February 1399, when a French clerical assembly promised Parisian scholars nomination to one thousand benefices in alternation with royal candidates.⁶⁶

The principal problem with this system was lack of cooperation from ordinary collators who continued to prefer their own candidates over university scholars nominated by the board of prelates. Parisian masters went on strike during Lent 1400, claiming that they had not been granted their promised share of benefices.⁶⁷ In March 1400, King Charles VI addressed an angry letter to recalcitrant collators, threatening them with royal displeasure if they failed to provide university scholars with the required benefices.⁶⁸ Local studies indicate that individuals promoted during the substraction period tended to be royal officials or members of the *familia* of ordinary collators, though most had university training.⁶⁹ While Parisian scholars never viewed the restoration of unrestricted ordinary collation as a positive objective, they were nonetheless quite disappointed with the beneficial regime of the substraction period.

The combination of this disappointment and commitments made by Benedict helps to explain why a number of Parisian scholars supported the restoration of obedience in 1403. The Duke of Orléans and other French universities (especially Toulouse) had provided the impetus for the restoration. At Paris the French and Picard nations, as well as the faculties of theology and medicine apparently supported it, while the Norman nation and the faculty of decrees opposed it.⁷⁰ After securing Charles VI's personal restoration (28 May), Orléans sought to head off potential opposition (especially from the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy) by producing a document in which Benedict XIII made a series of commitments: 1) to hold an assembly of the Avignon obedience within a year, at which the subject of ecclesiastical liberties would be considered; 2) to respect beneficial provisions made during the substraction period;

and 3) to engage wholeheartedly in pursuit of the *via cessionis*. This effort was largely successful, although the Duke of Burgundy and the Norman nation, which acquiesced only three days after the official declaration, stated that their restoration was contingent upon Benedict's fulfillment of his written commitments.⁷¹

Far from penalizing his erstwhile foes by denying their petitions, Benedict used the submission of the University's official *rotulus* in 1403 as an occasion to gain as many supporters as possible within the University. There were twice as many supplications approved in this *rotulus* as there had been in the *rotulus* of 1378, a rate of growth far above any other French university.⁷² Even Benedict's most outspoken opponents had their supplications approved, and the list of Norman supplications approved through the official *rotulus*, despite the nation's notorious stubbornness, was particularly large.⁷³ Benedict granted Parisian scholars the further favour of treating all provisions granted in his tenth year as if they had been granted in his first.⁷⁴ Since the official *rotulus* received the date of 18 October 1403, this gave new supplications from the university precedence over many of those granted in 1394, when particular *rotuli* from Parisian scholars were usually dated 23 October and later. With these provisions and Benedict's written commitments, it appeared very briefly that university masters had obtained all their objectives: privileged access to ecclesiastical benefices, papal commitment to the *via cessionis*, and protection from reprisals for past opposition.

However, over the course of the next two years (1403–1405), Benedict made clear that he had no intention of abiding by his commitments. Rather than summoning a council of the obedience to consider 'ecclesiastical liberties', Benedict actually increased papal taxation, even attempting to levy a tithe on Parisian scholars. Rather than respecting provisions made during substruction, Benedict required clerics to resign such benefices, be re-appointed, and pay (in addition to fees associated with papal provision) all the revenues that they had collected while holding the benefices 'illegitimately'. Finally, Benedict failed to show any inclination to resign following the death of Boniface IX (30 September 1404), ending any illusion of his willingness to adopt the *via cessionis*.

Parisian scholars led the growing tide of opposition to Benedict. As early as January 1404, Chancellor Jean Gerson, who had praised Benedict two months earlier, delivered a sermon that praised the ways of council and cession and declared that dedication to ineffective means for the pursuit of union (e.g. arms, anathemas, and discussion) was equivalent to resisting union. After establishing direct contacts with

Innocent VII in an ineffective attempt to win him over to the cause of cession (November 1404), the University appealed to the Parlement (24 April 1405), requesting exemption from papal jurisdiction for any benefices received by election or ordinary collation during the substraction period. Several months later (November 1405) the University suspended classes to protest papal attempts to levy a tithe on university scholars.

By May 1406, the University had formulated the argument that the substraction of obedience still remained in effect because Benedict had failed to fulfill his written commitments.⁷⁵ University spokesmen Jean Petit and Pierre Plaoul sharpened such arguments in favor of substraction in two cases before the Parlement: the first to secure the condemnation of an anti-substractionist letter from the University of Toulouse (May–July 1406) and the second to secure a provisional judgement from the Parlement in favour of substraction (September 1406). Finally, the University proposal for a renewal of total substraction prompted the summoning of a Fourth Assembly of the Clergy in November 1406.

The crown and the Parlement had taken a number of actions to restrict Benedict's fiscal powers even before this assembly. The royal administration had begun to confirm elections conducted during the substraction period on an individual basis as early as March 1405, and royal letters on 3 July 1406 officially confirmed all benefices granted during the substraction period. Later in the same month, the Parlement responded favourably to the arguments of university spokesmen and Jean Jouvenal, *avocat du roi*, condemning the epistle of the University of Toulouse. Two months later, the Parlement again delivered a partial victory to the University by issuing an *arrêt* ending all annates, procurations, and other papal taxes (September 1406). As prelates assembled in November 1406 to consider ecclesiastical policy, Benedict's beneficial powers, along with his spiritual sanctions, were the principal elements of his authority that still remained intact.

This Fourth Assembly was summoned to consider the University's substraction proposal, and discussion seemed at first to centre upon it. Jean Petit, Simon de Cramaud, and Pierre Plaoul appeared as spokesmen of the University and advocates of the substraction policy, while Guillaume Filliastre, Ameilh du Breuil, and Pierre D'Ailly (the last two individuals also Parisian graduates) appeared as opponents of substraction. Nevertheless, it was Pierre le Roy, appointed by the crown to speak in favor of substraction, and Jean Jouvenal, *avocat du roi*, who were to have the most decisive influence on the course of the assembly. A

description of how the debate unfolded will clarify how this result came about.

Jean Petit was the first to advance the argument for renewed total substraction based upon the conditional nature of the restoration of obedience and the failure of Benedict to fulfill his written commitments. Conveniently, however, Petit maintained that papal provisions received by scholars in 1403 should remain valid, since the substraction had only returned to force after Benedict actually violated his commitments. The subsequent speaker for the University, Simon de Cramaud, followed Petit's essential argument.⁷⁶

While this argument fitted well with the interests of the University and was an accurate reflection of stipulations made by the Norman nation and the Duke of Burgundy, opponents of substraction were quick to point out that it did not fit the facts of Charles VI's decision. Filliastre argued that the king's restoration of obedience had preceded production of the written schedule by the duke of Orléans and had not been formally conditional upon it. He added that the University itself had indicated its full and unconditional restoration of obedience to Benedict by submitting its *rotulus* and by accepting rich provisions from him.⁷⁷ After this rebuttal, Pierre le Roy, appointed by the king to speak in favor of substraction (but not a university spokesman), opened a new line of argument.⁷⁸ As at the Second and Third Clerical Assemblies, le Roy offered a categorical critique of papal fiscality in general and papal provision in particular, based on appeals to historical precedent and 'ecclesiastical liberties'. He made little reference to the misdeeds of Benedict, and he did not limit the fiscal reforms he proposed to the duration of the Schism. Guillaume Filliastre, was quick to recognize the shift Le Roy's argument represented, saying that the canonist's suggestion of a permanent restriction of papal provision was 'a completely new question', having little to do with the substraction proposal of the University.⁷⁹

Subsequent university spokesmen—Pierre Plaoul and Jean Petit (speaking a second time)—did not follow Le Roy's argument. Rather, Pierre Plaoul argued that ending the Schism was like responding to a 'violent thing' in which restrictions posed by 'the order of law' should no longer be respected.⁸⁰ He maintained that in order to slay the serpent of schism, nourished by ecclesiastical benefices, the king could suppress the powers of the pontiff, but this was an extraordinary measure, justified by the schismatic, or even heretical character of Benedict himself.⁸¹ For his part, Jean Petit argued that any oath taken by the king included

implicit protection for the king's conscience and divine honour, whose preservation permitted the king to renew subtraction in the present case, regardless of the formal conditionality of the restoration the king had decreed.⁸²

Jean Jouvenal, *avocat du roi*, who spoke last in the assembly (and thus without possibility of rebuttal) took up Le Roy's arguments and gave them a distinctly royalist turn.⁸³ His major premise was that any power justly acquired by the crown could never be renounced, though individual monarchs might choose not to exercise it.⁸⁴ His minor premise was that the suppression of papal provision during the Schism was justified because of the burden it placed on the poor who had to seek papal provisions at a great distance, the unreasonable ratio of expectative graces to vacant benefices, and the system's prejudicial impact upon the power of princes over the benefices they had founded.⁸⁵ The clear implication was that the crown was justified in exercising immediate control over the beneficial system because of the special conditions of the Schism but that this authority, once legitimately acquired, would never be alienated.

The final decision of the Fourth Clerical Assembly (4 January 1407) embodied the arguments of Jouvenal dressed in Le Roy's language, and it essentially ignored the University's proposal. This decision spoke at length about restoring the liberties of the church and returning rights of collation to ordinary collators (except for benefices vacated *in curia*), all under the protection of the crown. The duration of these proposed measures was explicitly open-ended, limited only by the decision of a general council, to which the church of the realm and the dauphinate might choose to submit.⁸⁶

There is mixed evidence regarding the degree of support for this decision in the assembly as a whole. Only one bulletin of vote survives (in favour of the proposal), and Simon de Cramaud reported that the ratio of support for the position was nine to one among representatives.⁸⁷ However, only three days later a smaller group of prelates called for the ordonnances of the subtraction period to be restored to force, something the University had proposed and the present decision did not do.⁸⁸ Finally, about a week after the original decision (12 January 1407) a number of prelates issued a declaration specifying that their earlier declaration had been intended only to re-establish the liberties of the church; that they had not intended to establish an ordinance; and that the king should not be principally involved in establishing such an ordinance.⁸⁹

The University also reacted strongly against the decisions of the Assembly, and points of divergence clearly emerged in three documents issued by the University in that same month: a renewed appeal from Benedict to a future pope, a list of accusations against Benedict, and an epistolary appeal to the king.⁹⁰ First, the University made clear that it was concerned with Benedict's misdeeds rather than any return to ecclesiastical liberties. According to the university appeal, if Benedict had fulfilled the conditions he made at the time of the restitution of obedience, he would not be charged with violating the liberties of the church.⁹¹ Second, the University feared the open-ended nature of the measures adopted. Scholars made clear in their letter to the king that it was not their purpose to adopt substruction so as to remain permanently without a head, but rather to separate themselves from a 'pestiferous man' in order to adhere to a true head once ecclesiastical unity had been re-established.⁹² Finally, the University was upset that the assembly had not, in fact, actually adopted the substruction from Benedict that had been the University's goal in pressing for the assembly in the first place. The University declared its own substruction from Benedict (a symbolic gesture), and warned the king not to impede 'the hope of the whole church' by rejecting the 'medicine [of substruction] so near at hand'.⁹³

Subsequent royal actions showed that the concerns of the clergy and the University were well-justified. The decisions of the Fourth Clerical Assembly did in fact become the basis for royal ordonnances drawn up and sealed (though not published) in February 1407. These letters contained provisions opposed by the University, including a general critique of papal provision (rather than criticism of Benedict's misdeeds) and an open-ended duration for the fiscal restrictions on the papacy, pending a contrary decision by a general council, *to which the French church submitted itself*.⁹⁴ Finally, because these letters were not immediately published, neither university scholars nor French prelates actually received relief from Benedict XIII's exercise of beneficial powers.⁹⁵

The letters were finally published on 15 May 1408, just a few days before France declared its neutrality vis-à-vis both papal claimants (25 May). Deepening disillusionment with Benedict and the murder of the Duke of Orléans (November 1407), who had been the pontiff's most loyal supporter, both contributed to this denouement. On its own, the declaration of neutrality would have been sufficient to eliminate Benedict's influence over papal provision. The publication of the 1407 letters just prior to this declaration therefore suggests a desire to establish a

precedent independent of the Schism for royal protection of ecclesiastical liberties, to which the crown or ordinary collators might appeal even after the resolution of the Schism.

III. Aftermath (1408–18)

Although the royal ordonnances of 1407 (published in 1408) laid the foundation for beneficial conflict between parties favouring ordinary collation based upon ‘traditional liberties’ and university scholars who still favoured papal provision, the full emergence of this conflict depended upon the alignment of two factors: the ascendancy of a party in the royal administration anxious to champion the cause of ‘traditional liberties’ and the emergence of a reunified papacy that could once again lay claim to powers of papal provision. For the next decade one or the other of these factors would be lacking.⁹⁶

Between 1408 and 1413, the ascendancy of the Burgundians, who favoured the University of Paris and supported papal provision, averted the emergence of any potential conflict. The declaration of neutrality (May 1408) freed Parisian scholars from Benedict’s control, and scholars were reasonably well-provided under the interim beneficial regime adopted (1408–9). The crown made no attempt to prevent the University from sending supplications to Alexander V immediately following his election (January 1409), although the pontiff did make some concessions to ordinary collators. Scholars also sent supplications to John XXIII (May 1410) after the untimely death of his predecessor, engaging in a lengthy struggle over the dates and privileges to be assigned to their provisions.⁹⁷

University masters did move toward an open revindication of papal provision in 1412. On 23 February, the University rector described any attempt to interfere with papal influence in beneficial collation as ‘altogether pestiferous, scandalous, and pernicious to the status of the universal church’, and he added that such interference was particularly harmful to university students and ‘deeply damaging’ above all to the Faculty of Arts at Paris.⁹⁸ Then on 7 March, all the faculties of the University issued a formal declaration opposing unrestricted ordinary collation.⁹⁹ These declarations may well have been a reaction to the outbreak of civil war in France (beginning in July 1411) and the fear that

the Armagnacs, who favoured the cause of 'ecclesiastical liberties' and restrictions on papal provision, might come to power.

Such concerns were justified, for the Armagnacs did gain control of Paris in August 1413 after the Cabochien uprising and the flight of the Duke of Burgundy. A royal ordonnance (25 October 1413) complained almost immediately of violations of the 'liberties of the church'. However, a swift papal grant to the crown of the right to designate 530 benefices for its clerics (of which 90 were for individuals associated with the Parlement) silenced the opposition of the Armagnacs until the Council of Constance once again left the church without a head (14 May 1415).

It was the election of Martin V (11 November 1417) that precipitated renewed conflict between crown and University regarding the distribution of ecclesiastical benefices. The beneficial regime initially proposed by Martin V had several provisions favoured by university scholars. First, it allowed ample scope for papal provision by reserving only one third of non-elective benefices in France to ordinary collators. Second, it decreed that doctors or licentiates in law or theology would be eligible for bishoprics, and only this group (together with formed bachelors in theology) would be eligible for the principal capitular dignities. Finally, it ruled that in the case of two valid expectations bearing the same date, university graduates were to receive priority. Given these provisions, the University was anxious to recognize Martin V and to return the system of papal provision to full operation.

However, the French royal administration (now dominated by the Armagnacs and the Dauphin, the future Charles VII) was determined that French recognition of any pope would be contingent upon a prior recognition of French ecclesiastical liberties. The Parlement and the Grand Conseil (in the presence of the Dauphin) had passed an ordonnance (25 November 1417) that restored the ordonnances of February 1407 to force and forbade ambassadors of the King at the Council of Constance to make any agreements prejudicial to ecclesiastical liberties. Several days later, the Dauphin warned the University against acknowledging any papal accession before receiving royal authorization.

In early 1418, the conflict finally erupted. While the crown delayed in its recognition of Martin V, Parisian masters presented their *rotulus* to the pontiff, an action that clearly signalled recognition of his legitimacy. Parisian scholars also violated a royal prohibition by deliberating on the papal election, and they further angered the Dauphin by renewing their appeals from 1412 in favour of papal provision. On the basis of

the ordonnance of November 1417 (with the precedent of the 1407 decisions), the Dauphin claimed that the University's revindication of papal provision was an effort to impede the course of royal decrees and constituted the crime of *lèse-majesté*. The University was forced to give in, stating that it had not intended to impinge upon royal prerogatives and that it would not pursue such appeals in the future. Then in March 1418, another royal ordonnance reaffirmed the regime of ecclesiastical liberties, declaring the right of churches in France to proceed to the collation of benefices, without regard to the reserves, expectations, or other rights claimed by the Roman curia.

* * *

France would witness many fluctuations in beneficial politics over the course of the next half century.¹⁰⁰ The fall of Paris to the Burgundians in 1418 and the English control of Normandy would afford a new scope to papal provision in the north, and Charles VII himself would prove willing to recognize the validity of papal provision when it suited his interests and purposes. However, an important line had been crossed. The scope afforded to papal provision henceforth depended directly upon the consent of secular authorities. In practice, this would mean that the direct access of university scholars to papal provision was much restricted.

Past studies have argued that Parisian scholars played a key role in offering a critique of the system of papal provision, if not actually favouring the extension of royal control over benefices. This article has demonstrated that Parisian opposition to papal provision under Benedict XIII stemmed from a particular conflict with the pontiff and concern over the Schism rather than general opposition to the system itself. The statements by university spokesmen during his pontificate and the clear university support for papal provision before and after his pontificate both make this point clear.

In essence, the royal administration capitalized on the circumstances of the Schism and the University's opposition to Benedict to establish royal protection of ecclesiastical liberties as a potential counterbalance to the prerogative of papal provision in the distribution of ecclesiastical benefices. Because the financial support received by university scholars from ecclesiastical benefices was a critical source of their independence, increased royal influence over beneficial provision meant increased dependence of university scholars upon the crown. In this sense, the conflict over papal provision during the pontificate of Benedict XIII may

be viewed as a crucial episode in the extension of royal influence over the University of Paris.

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1. V. Martin, *Les Origines du Gallicanisme* (2 vols, Paris, 1939) is the staunchest and most straightforward advocate of this view. Noël Valois, *La France et la Grande Schisme d'Occident* (4 vols, Paris, 1896-1902) adopts this overall interpretation, although his discussion is often more nuanced; the framework of events provided in his work is reliable and has been used in this article. Howard Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud and the Great Schism* (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1983) and idem, 'The politics of France's subtraction of obedience from Pope Benedict XIII, 27, July 1398', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 115/5 (1971), 366-97, follows this interpretation up through the subtraction of obedience. On the means and mechanism of papal provision, see Guillaume Mollat, *La Collation des bénéfices à l'époque des papes d'Avignon (1305-1378)* (Paris, 1921). For the historical development and significance of the system, see Geoffrey Barraclough, *Papal Provisions* (Oxford, 1935).
 2. On ordinary collators' opposition to papal provision, see Mollat, *La Collation*, 121-9. While there was some overlap between the two groups, the vast majority of ordinary collators (even university graduates) were no longer actively involved in the activities of the universities, and the vast majority of university scholars exercised no powers of collation. On the practice of submitting university *rotuli*, references to related literature, as well as the text of supplications and provisions for Parisian scholars up to the outbreak of the Great Schism, see W.J. Courtenay (ed.), *Rotuli Parisienses: Supplications to the Pope from the University of Paris*, i: 1316-1342 (Boston, 2002) and W.J. Courtenay and E.D. Goddard (eds), *Rotuli Parisienses*, ii: 1352-1378 (Boston, 2004).

3. Cf. Martin, *Origines*, i. 246–69. This paucity of explanation relates to the practice of placing opposition to papal provision, along with any other instance of resistance to papal power (e.g. resistance to papal taxation, opposition to officials appointed by the pope, discussions of theoretical limits on papal power), under the heading of ‘Gallicanism’, without treating their dramatically different fiscal implications. Thus, Howard Kaminsky portrays incidents such as the University’s ‘Gallican’ resistance to the venal (papally appointed) chancellor Jean Blanchard as foreshadowing later ‘Gallican’ resistance to papal provision (*Simon de Cramaud*, 46–47, 147–8), without addressing the fact that resistance to the chancellor clearly correlated with the financial interests of university scholars, while opposition to papal provision arguably went against them. This study focuses on the issue of papal provision, avoiding the use of the term ‘Gallicanism’ and the confusion that comes with it.
4. Cf. Noël Valois, *Histoire de la Pragmatique Sanction de Bourges sous Charles VII* (Paris, 1906), p. viii; Martin, *Origines*, ii. 162–4.
5. Pearl Kibre, *Scholarly Privileges in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962), 232, does appear to favour this position but provides little supporting material and has had little impact on subsequent debate over this issue.
6. Partial editions of the first and third *rotuli* may be found in H. Denifle and E. Chatelain (eds), *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (4 vols, Paris, 1891–7) [hereafter *CUP*], iii. #1428–1433 and #1537–1541. For reference to the second (unregistered) *rotulus*, see *CUP* iii. #1474.
7. Referred to as the First Clerical Assembly, it was followed by a series of assemblies, of which four others (1396, 1398, 1406, 1408) would be officially numbered (smaller assemblies in 1399 and 1403 were not). On the constitution and evolving nature of these assemblies, see Hélène Millet, ‘Du conseil au concile (1395–1408): Recherche sur la nature des assemblées du clergé en France pendant le Grand Schisme d’Occident’, *Journal des savants* (1985), 137–59.
8. C.E. Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis* (6 vols, Paris, 1665–73), iv. 737, 739.
9. Gilles des Champs, Jean Courtecuisse, Pierre Plaoul and Simon de Cramaud all fall into the former category; Pierre d’Ailly, Nicolas de Clamanges, and Jean Gerson are the principal representatives of the latter. Determining the relative size of these two constituencies is difficult in particular because the latter category of scholars had to keep a low profile and lacked opportunities for constructive engagement in a polarized political atmosphere. For the original text of the University’s letter see, Du Boulay, *Historia*, iv. 740–7. Evidence of royal pressure on university representatives is found in the journal of Gontier Col: E. Martène (ed.), *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum, dogmaticorum, moralium, amplissima collectio* (9 vols, Paris, 1724–33) [hereafter *Amplissima collectio*], vii. cols. 508–9.

10. M.L. Bellaguet (ed.), *Chronique du Religieux de Saint Denys*, republished with a new introduction by Bernard Guenée (6 vols-in 3, Paris, 1994) [hereafter, *RSD*], ii. 218: '... si rotulum placeret pro seipsis dirigere, illum liberaliter signaret'.
11. The lone description of the consultation that led to this decision comes from Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove (ed.), *Oeuvres de Froissart: Chroniques (Tome 15: 1392–1396)* (Brussels, 1871), 129–30. According to this account, the king summoned scholars from the University of Paris to receive counsel regarding how to proceed with Benedict. Citing ills caused by the Schism, these scholars appear to initiate the idea of withholding the Parisian *rotulus*. The king then affirms this policy as reasonable and indicates his intention to follow the same course with his own clerics. Froissart indicates that the royal dukes showed little inclination to similar beneficial self-denial: the Duke of Berry sent many *rotuli*, and support for the policy was weak among the dukes of Orléans, Burgundy, and Brittany. The other French universities submitted *rotuli*, although that from the University of Angers does not survive in papal registers.
12. Simon de Cramaud, *De substraccione obediencie*, ed. Howard Kaminisky (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 162: '... tolleret quamcunque occasionem tepiditatis in prosecucione unionis suppositis suis'. Papal provisions to scholars came principally in the form of expectative graces which entitled the holder to stand in line for a benefice meeting certain criteria, but these would in all likelihood bear fruit only after years of delay, if ever. In the event of a papal resignation, unmet expectations received as well as the time and money spent obtaining them would be wasted.
13. For 1378 I have counted 1,995 supplications from 1,415 individuals, while for 1394 I have counted 1,660 supplications from 1,127 individuals. These figures are based on an enumeration of petitions in volumes 47–56 and 82–95 of the *Registra Supplicationum* in the Archivio Segreto Vaticano [hereafter ASV Reg. Suppl.]. For the sake of consistency in comparison, supplications have been included only if university study is mentioned explicitly in the petition and if there is clear internal or external evidence that the individual was a scholar at the University of Paris at the time of, or prior to, the submission of the petition. Results of further research may lead to slight adjustments in these figures.
14. Such supplications violated the spirit of the decision to withhold the university *rotulus*. For an indication of early restrictions on this practice and the University's later decision to outlaw particular *rotuli*, see below (note 19). The attribution of a spirit of beneficial self-denial to the University appears clearly in a letter of King Charles VI in December 1400: '... que aux supposts de nostredite fille l'Université, qui pour la grande ferveur qu'ils avoient de poursuivre le fait de ladite union, n'avoient voulu demander ou requerir aucunes graces dudit Benedic à sa creation...' (Du Boulay, *Historia*, v. 186).

15. These included Pierre Plaoul, Gilles des Champs, Jean Courtecuisse, Simon de Cramaud, Jean Petit, and Pierre le Roy. Jean de Guignicourt, the other advocate of withholding the Parisian *rotulus*, had died later in 1394 (Lettenhove, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, xv. 132).
16. Twenty-seven of these scholars did have supplications approved during Benedict XIII's coronation year. Forty-eight had no registered supplications in 1394–5, but only twenty-six of these had registered petitions at other times, suggesting that their absence from registers in this year was the result of purposeful absention. These scholars and the opinions they submitted at the Third Clerical Assembly are further discussed below (note 57).
17. Jean Gerson had defended the *via cessionis* in a *quaestio* from 1392 and sermons before the king in the early 1390s (John Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism* (Manchester, 1960), 30–4). Gerson received a privileged *motu proprio* provision of a canonry and prebend at Notre-Dame in Paris, as well as an appointment to succeed d'Ailly as chancellor (ASV Reg. Suppl. 89, f.28r; Reg. Suppl. 86, f.111v). Pierre d'Ailly had worked with Nicolas de Clamanges (and the Norman theologian Gilles des Champs) in drafting the university letter which expressed preferential support for the *via cessionis* and possible support for the ways of council and compromise. Pierre d'Ailly received a canonry in Bayeux for himself (he was later promoted bishop of Le Puy, then Cambrai), as well as papal approval for several *rotuli* of his familiars (cf. Bernard Guenée, *Between Church and State: The Lives of Four French Prelates in the Late Middle Ages* (Chicago, 1991), 171–2, 176–7). D'Ailly then argued against the unilateral pursuit of cession at the First Clerical Assembly, issued similar opinions at the time of the Second Clerical Assembly, and preached a sermon celebrating the restoration of obedience in 1403. Clamanges received two expectations of benefices in Paris and Châlons-sur-Marne (ASV Reg. Suppl. 83, f.138v; ASV Reg. Suppl. 84, f.188r), and he later became a papal secretary.
18. The official reason for D'Ailly's mission to Avignon in the autumn of 1394 was to provide Benedict with counsel regarding the union of the church (cf. H. Denifle and F. Ehrle (eds), *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, (7 vols, Graz, 1956) [hereafter *ALKG*], v. 406), so the failure to achieve that objective would have tended to reflect poorly on his preparatory efforts. Royal instructions for members of the May-July 1395 embassy recognized the possible tension between official policy and individual interest, binding them by oath not to request anything from the pope, whether directly or indirectly, until they had received a response on the issue of union (*Amplissima collectio* vii. cols. 446–7). On the efforts of the English-German nation to exclude d'Ailly from deliberations concerning ecclesiastical policy, see H. Denifle and E. Châtelain (eds), *Liber procuratorum nationis Anglicanae (Alemanniae) in Universitate Parisiensi (Auctarium Chartularii Universitas Parisiensis. Vol. 1, Paris, 1894) [hereafter *AUP* i], col. 708.*

19. Bibliothèque Municipale de Rouen, Ms 1533, f.202r-v : '[Q]uasdam universitatis nostre Sathane filios verumptamen non magistros sed dumtaxat in iure canonico licentiatos, bacallarios/202v/vel scolares, ex episc. Vasaten. directorio atque consilio apud dom. nostrum summum pontificem quendam rotulum supplicationum pro graciis beneficiorum transmissum contra nostras sanctiones, quapropter donationibus paternibus vestriis humillime supplicamus quatenus intuitu cause presentis . . . prefatum rotulum adnulare impedireque dignemini ne in nostris ecclesie . . . sortiatur effectum'. The text of the letter ('contra nostras sanctiones') seems to indicate that some type of prohibition on such supplications was already in place. For the text of the *rotulus*, see ASV Reg. Suppl. 90, f.100v (partially edited in *CUP* iv. 16 #1733). For the text of the later statute, see *CUP* iv. 13 #1727 (22 February 1396).
20. ASV Reg. Suppl. 91, f.105r (Guillelmus Saalez): '... qui propter rotulum nuper pro parte nonnullorum Parisius graduatorum v.s. presentatum multa dampna iniurias et opprobria sustinuit;' ASV Reg. Suppl. 91, f.110r: *Rotulus quorundam Parisiensium de studio expulsorum* (partially edited in *CUP* iv. 19 #1735). These may be the same five masters who along with Pierre d'Ailly were held by the university to be 'suspect in regard to the union of the church' in August 1395 (*AUP* i. col. 708). However, the grounds of this suspicion could hardly have been their inclusion in the prohibited *rotulus*, as its composition and submission did not occur until several months later. At least two of these masters (Alanus Corre and Mauritius de Sancto Paulo) were later readmitted to the university, for they can be found supplicating along with Parisian bachelors and licentiates in law in 1403 (ASV Reg. Suppl. 100, f.190v, 202v; partially edited in *CUP* iv. #1790 at 64 and 68).
21. E. Martène and U. Durand (eds), *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, (5 vols, Paris, 1717), ii. col. 1136: 'nec hoc est recedere ab obedientia sibi debita, sed magis redire ad jus commune'. On the purported implications of this phrase, see Martin, *Origines*, i. 246–7, and Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 150.
22. Valois, *France* iii. 86.
23. Du Boulay, *Historia*, iv. 818: '... alicui summo Pontifici tanta irrogata fuit contumelia, quanta ipsi fuerat per Universitatem'.
24. For the text of the first appeal, Benedict's response, and the second appeal see *ibid.*, 803–26.
25. Cf. Martin, *Origines*, i. 270–2; Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 205.
26. Cf. Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 163.
27. As at the Third and Fourth Clerical Assembly, several speakers spoke for (Bernard Alemant, Pierre le Roy, and Hugh Lenvoisie) and against (Pierre Ravat, Sancius Mulier, and Elias Lestrangle) the proposal under consideration, with spokesmen from the University (Matheus de Pillaert and Pierre Plaoul) given a separate opportunity to speak, thus effectively weighting the debate against Benedict (cf. *ALKG* vi. 208–24, the main written record of the assembly.)

28. Referred to in the text simply as 'frater Matheus . . . prior Bernardinorum Cisterciensis', this is clearly Matheus Pillaert, alias de Dunis (*CUP* iii. 551 #1604 n.2; cf. Thomas Sullivan, O.S.B., *Parisian Licentiates in Theology, A.D. 1373–1500: A Biographical Register*, i: *The Religious Orders* (Boston, 2004), 285–7). Although not referred to explicitly as a university spokesman, he was a doctor in theology and spoke immediately after the introduction of the university delegation.
29. *ALKG* vi. 220: 'quod pape auferatur collacio beneficiorum . . . quia per hoc seducuntur et inclinantur boni homines ad ipsum et ad sequendum opinionem suam, et ad devianum a vera via, que est cessionis . . . Secunda, ut auferantur pape omnes fructus sive emolumenta temporalia, que recipit super ecclesias et clerum, ut sunt annate beneficiorum, procuraciones et similia. Et istam fundavit aliis quatuor rationibus concludentibus, quod propter illas peccunias seducit multos tam clericos quam laycos, quibus dat et mictit magna munera et iocalia; tam illis, qui sunt de parte intrusi, quam aliis, dicendo quod si hec emolumenta auferantur, talia agere non poterit. Tercia, quod prelati poterant pape obsistere renitenti cedere'.
30. *Ibid.*, 221: 'Petrus Plou nomine universitatis Parisiensis prosequendo . . . quod collacio beneficiorum et emolumenta pecunaria deberent auferri pape [et prelati sibi obsistere renitenti cedere pro tanto bono] assignando rationes multas, per quas aparebat papam facilius ad cessionem inclinari'.
31. Cf. 'Allegationes episcopi Aniciensis, olim Xanctonensis', quoted in Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 165 n. 62.
32. Martin simply says that the Cistercian prior followed Alemant's argument (that Benedict's fiscal powers should be denied and that his spiritual powers might be) and that Plaoul echoed him (Martin, *Origines*, i. 270–1). Not mentioning de Pillaert at all, Kaminsky implies that Plaoul supported total subtraction (Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 165).
33. Discussions of these three assemblies are found in Martin, *Origines*, i. at 271–2, 275–90, and 313–22, where Gilles des Champs and Pierre le Roy are the only speakers specifically cited as representative of the University's categorical opposition to papal provision. Kaminsky is committed to a similar position (cf. Cramaud, *De subtractione obediencie*, 17).
34. For records of his speeches at each of the three Assemblies, see *ALKG* vi. 221 and Bourgeois de Chastenot, *Nouvelle histoire du concile de Constance. Preuves* (Paris, 1718), 29–36 and 164–76. His bulletin of vote from the Third Clerical Assembly also survives (H. Millet and E. Poulle (eds), *Le Vote de la soustraction d'obédience en 1398*, (Paris, 1988), i., 258 #257).
35. For the text of this speech, see Bourgeois de Chastenot, *Preuves*, 37–49. For the text of his bulletin of vote, see Millet and Poulle (eds), *Vote*, 184 #154.
36. Cf. Martin, *Origines*, i. 342. It is significant, for example, that the only entries for Des Champs and le Roy in volume IV of the *Chartularium* are for their entries in the *rotulus* of 1403, while there are numerous entries for

- the University's official spokesmen, Pierre Plaoul, Jean Courtecuisse, and Jean Petit.
37. For the extensive lay involvement in ecclesiastical patronage in Normandy, see Guillaume Mollat, 'Le Droit du patronage en Normandie du XI^e au XV^e siècle', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 33 (1937), 463–84, 725–88 and 34 (1938) 21–69.
 38. At the Fourth Clerical Assembly, all official speakers were Parisian graduates except Guillaume Filliastre, who nevertheless professed deference to the University (cf. Bourgeois de Chastenet, *Preuves*, 124: '... Ma tres-belle Dame l'Université, je ne l'appelle pas ma mere; car je ne suy pas digne d'estre son fils, mais je me repute serviteur d'elle...').
 39. Such reasoning holds that a willingness to separate the pope's fiscal authority from his spiritual authority can be taken to imply that the former is less legitimate (or altogether illegitimate). This is usually expressed in terms of 'Gallicanism', as discussed above.
 40. Du Boulay, *Historia*, iv. 823 [831] [pages 823–4 are misnumbered 830–1 in the edition].
 41. Pope Urban V had first given Charles V the permission for such a tax for a two-year period in order to wage war against England and raise the ransom of Jean II, and the tax had been repeatedly renewed by both Gregory XI and Clement VII (Valois, *France*, ii. 375–6). So important was this revenue to the crown that the royal dukes had appealed the pope's decision, but to no avail (Valois, *France* iii. 143).
 42. The written schedules submitted by the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy at the Third Clerical Assembly make clear the centrality of taxation to their considerations (Millet and Poulle (eds), *Vote*, 51–3 #5). During the subtraction period, the repeated taxes levied by the royal administration of the Church, ostensibly to finance the pursuit of union, would provoke widespread dissatisfaction (cf. *RSD* ii. 688).
 43. Cf. Cramaud, *De subtractione obediencie*, 13.
 44. *RSD* ii. 526. The inclusion of Pierre Plaoul among the scholars speaking against the subtraction policy leads one to question how balanced the debate was in fact. Plaoul had advocated withholding the university *rotulus* in 1394 and later became a principal advocate of the subtraction policy.
 45. F. Ehrle (ed.), *Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte*, xii: *Martin des Alpartils Chronica actuatorum temporibus domini Benedicti XIII* (Paderborn, 1906), 34: '... et ad requestam universitatis Parisiensis predicti, qui dictam viam cessionis utriusque firmiter tenendam iuraverant, tractatibus nacionis Normanorum seducti, quia alie naciones non sic ardentem persequerentur dictam viam, ad quam ex estatuto per ipsam universitatem facto noviter, in quacunq[ue] facultate graduandos astrinxerunt et quam plurimos de universitate, qui dictam viam noluerunt iurare, insecuti fuerunt, pluribus minas cum effectu adiscientes...'.
 46. Cf. R.N. Swanson, *Universities, Academics, and the Great Schism* (Cambridge, 1979), 116.

47. *AUP* i. cols. 765–7. Poelman was eventually expelled from the university in 1399, though permitted to return at the time of the Restoration of Obedience in 1403.
48. Kaminsky argues that the University expanded its earlier support of *partial* substraction to include the royal policy of total substraction (*Simon de Cramaud*, 216). However, Des Champs and Le Roy both spoke at the Third Clerical Assembly, so the arguments presented above apply here as well. For the text of Plaoul's speech, see Bourgeois de Chastenet, *Preuves*, 63–74 and Du Boulay, *Historia*, iv. 835–43.
49. Bourgeois de Chastenet, *Preuves*, 65: 'Dico igitur quod est necessariam, et quod de necessitate salutis, sub poena peccati mortalis et damnationis, oportet subtrahere: licet igitur, et expedit, et pro hujus deductione ponam aliquas propositiones'.
50. The idea of ancient laws and liberties appears nowhere in the written record of his discourse. He goes so far as to assert that in such extraordinary circumstances remedies are not to be found in written law (*ibid.*, 64: '... cum in iure scripti aut similes inveniuntur; iste tamen casus, aut similis totaliter non reperitur in iure, nec etiam reperitur remedium, et medicina').
51. *Ibid.*, 72: 'Unde via regis comparari potest virgae Moysi, quae coram Pharaone in terram projecta, erat serpens. Sic, quandiu Rex istam viam in manu tenebit, ducet populum in terram promissionis, id est pacis: sed si eum dimitteret, caderet in terram, et esset serpens, quoniam scisma visibiliter perpetuaretur: et sic patet quod ad D.N. Regum speciali privilegio pertinet proseguere cessionem, et ejus exsequutionem'.
52. *Ibid.*, 64: 'Et hoc apparet, quia Papa dilexit Universitatem, cum fuit electus et hoc sciebat Universitas. Universitas autem, ne propter privatam, publica ecclesiae utilitas, et prosecutio impediretur, noluit facere rotulum, sed etiam pro prosecutione ecclesiasticae unionis, propria bona, et suorum suppositorum exposuit, ut patet per ambasciatores iteratos ad Alemanniam, ad Angliam, et Hispanias, et hoc est manifestum. Ex quo apparet ejus bona affectio. Universitas autem semotis cunctis inordinatis affectionibus, hanc materiam XVIII annis, vel circiter examinavit, ex quo videtur praeferenda illis qui non ita materiam cognoverunt, aut sunt affectati propter Beneficia accepta, aut refutata'.
53. *Ibid.*, 69: '... qui sunt de Universitate, amplius non poterunt laborare, quia Papa contra eos procedet ad exterminium, considerata ejus obstinatione, et sic non debet dari dilatio. Item sequetur aliud inconveniens, quia si Papa habeat negativam, se armabit contra Regem, armis quibus Rex deberet uti. ... Videtur autem nunc casus similiter docente experientia. Multi, et bene noti, tempore Clementis, erant pro via cessionis, ardentius, ut apparebat: mortuo autem Clemente, Papa eos ad se attraxit per Beneficia, et promotiones, propter quod nunc sunt contrarii dicte viae, et ejus exequutioni, et continue tales multiplicantur, quia vident plures se non posse promoveri, nisi sint de opinione Pape, ei adherentes contra cessionem, et ejus exequutionem, et sic necesse est removere tales

- promotiones; alias sequeretur confusio Regni, et per tales praeparatur adventus Antichristi'.
54. Millet and Poulle (eds), *Vote*, 174 #140: '... d'un commun consentement et sanz contradiction d'aucun ...'.
 55. Bourgeois de Chastenet, *Preuves*, 12: 'Quod allegatur quoad hoc etiam Parisiensis Universitas, audivi a valentibus viris, etiam de Universitate, si placet Regi scrutari vota singulorum, reperietur media aut tertia pars, pro aliquali subtractione, etc'. Cf. Valois, *France*, iii. 140. Nicholas Becherer also refers to quiet opposition to the subtraction at the University of Paris (J. Weizsäcker (ed.), *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter König Ruprecht* (Gotha, 1882), 397): '... quam quidem subtractionem dominus rex domini duces aliqui prelati una cum universitatis majori parte concluderunt, attamen quamplurimis tacite non consensientibus'.
 56. Many of these schedules mention a summons from the king to appear and give an opinion. The Dukes of Berry and Burgundy (working through Simon de Cramaud) were acting on behalf of the incapacitated king during the assembly.
 57. The remaining scholar, Nicolas de Beaurain, advocated partial subtraction followed by total subtraction if the pope proceeded to excommunications (cf. Millet and Poulle (eds), *Vote*, 212 #195). All seventy-five schedules are listed in Millet and Poulle (eds), *Vote*, at 306–7 under '*Opinions des universitaires*'. On the circumstances of their submission, see Valois, *France*, iii. 179–81.
 58. A list of all French prelates voting at the assembly can be found in Millet and Poulle (eds), *Vote*, 307–11. This analysis does not include collective opinions of French universities (6) or the votes of royal counsellors (7), royal dukes (4), or the president of the assembly, and each bulletin is counted as a vote. This comparison is limited to scholars (74) and prelates (126) supporting immediate, unconditional, total subtraction, thereby insuring that differences in attitude toward papal provision do not merely reflect differences of opinion on the wider question of policy. This is not an attempt to resolve the wider debate over the level of support for subtraction at the Third Clerical Assembly (cf. Valois, *France*, iii. 178; Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 225–6).
 59. This does not include the twenty-one scholars and thirteen prelates who simply affirmed the opinion of the University of Paris which also addressed fiscal concerns.
 60. The breakdown of votes among prelates (referenced by bulletin number in *Vote*) is as follows: those favouring open-ended restrictions on papal provision – 22, 41, 42, 59, 61, 73, 121, 235, 250, 252, 257, 274; those linking sanctions to the duration of the Schism – 49, 56, 64, 73bis, 85B; 95, 97; 135, 291; those offering idiosyncratic or less definite opinions – 12, 14, 32, 33, 87, 89, 96, 130, 238, 239, 241, 249, 251, 264, 266, 267, 278, 280, 288, 289.

61. The breakdown of votes among Parisian scholars (referenced by bulletin number in *Vote*) is as follows: those linking sanctions to the duration of the Schism – 146, 148, 149, 153, 155, 156, 162, 167, 171, 172, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 191, 194, 199, 200, 205, 217, 220; those offering idiosyncratic or less definite opinions – 152, 157, 159, 163, 164, 174, 197, 198, 201, 208, 211, 213, 218, 221.
62. On the constitution of the substraction regime, see especially Geoffrey Barraclough, 'Un document inédit sur la soustraction d'obédience de 1398', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 30 (1934), 101–15 and Kaminsky, 'The Politics of France's Substraction of Obedience from Pope Benedict XIII', 392–8.
63. There were three degrees of right with which an individual might lay claim to an ecclesiastical benefice by virtue of a papal grace: *ius ad rem* merely entitled the holder to a legal judgment regarding whether his claim to a particular benefice was valid; *ius in re* followed upon a judge's institution of the claimant in the benefice in question and entitled him to collect the revenues of the benefice; and 'real possession' followed after the individual had exercised *ius in re* for three consecutive years. The ordonnance of 8 August denied any claim to *ius ad rem* based upon graces conferred by Benedict (cf. Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 239). A further royal ordonnance (7 May 1399) was necessary to keep some individuals from trying to obtain benefices based upon graces from earlier popes (especially Clement VII). Privileged *motu proprio* provisions retained their technical validity during the Schism, but the Parlement, often charged with adjudicating beneficial disputes, generally refused to recognize them (cf. Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 239; Guillaume Mollat, 'L'application en France de la soustraction d'obédience à Benoît XIII jusqu'au concile de Pise', *Revue du Moyen âge latin* 1 (1945), 152–3).
64. This restoration of election and ordinary collation was not a necessary corollary of the substraction policy, for some groups (notably, the Avignon cardinals) had hoped that the substraction regime would proceed on a *sede vacante* basis, with the papal camera administering the rights and possessions of the papacy until the election of an uncontested pope (cf. Kaminsky, *Simon de Cramaud*, 213–15).
65. *AUP* I. cols. 780–81. The faculty of medicine was still composing its *rotulus* in November 1398 (Valois, *France*, iii. 309 n. 2).
66. *ALKG*, vii. 43: '... quod mille nominatis per universitatem provideatur per prelatos de beneficiis alternis vicibus...'
67. *RSD* ii. 746: 'Quia prelati Francie, substractione durante, de beneficiis ecclesiasticis suppositis Universitatis Parisiensis non competenter, ut promiserant, providebant, nec exactores regii eos uti privilegiis antiquis et libertatibus non sinebant, per totam quadragesimam a lectionibus et predicationibus cessaverunt'.
68. Cf. Du Boulay, *Historia*, v. 186–7, where the letter is dated to 1409; this dating is followed by *CUP* iv. 164 #1865. Valois, *France*, iii. 309 n. 1,

following an earlier study, argues for the dating of the letter to March 1400. Though writing after Valois, Martin ignores his redating of the letter and reverts to the date suggested by Du Boulay (*Origines*, ii. 162–3). The date of this letter is especially significant because it is the most specific evidence of the dissatisfaction of Parisian scholars with the regime of ordinary collation. If dated to 1409, this letter might support the argument, made in current interpretations, that Parisian scholars once supporting a definitive return to ordinary collation, afterward became disillusioned, and returned to support for papal provision. If dated to 1400, as accompanying circumstances indicate, it becomes clear that university scholars struggled against ordinary collators from the start, and it undermines any argument that the future political engagement of Parisian scholars was motivated by a desire to return to ordinary collation.

69. Cf. Hélène Millet, 'Quels furent les bénéficiaires de la soustraction d'obédience de 1398 dans les chapitres cathédraux français?', in N. Bulst and J.P. Genet (eds), *Medieval Lives and the Medieval Historian* (Kalamazoo, 1986), 123–37.
70. Cf. Valois, *France*, iii. 336. Evidence of at least partial support for the policy in the faculty of medicine comes from a particular *rotulus* submitted in 1403 by twenty masters in the faculty, in which they claimed to have resisted subtraction and to have laboured strenuously for the restoration of obedience (ASV Reg. Suppl. 100, f.25v–27r; cf. CUP iv. 62 #1789).
71. Originally, the Norman nation refused to hold a University assembly to discuss the restoration. They continued to maintain their opposition until three days after the official announcement. In making their restoration conditional, they may have been following the example of the Duke of Burgundy who, unlike Charles VI, had made the same stipulation three days earlier (*RSD* iii. 94, 98, 100).
72. Jacques Verger, 'Le recrutement géographique des universités françaises au début du XV^e siècle d'après les suppliques de 1403', in *Les Universités Françaises au Moyen Age* (New York, 1995), 122–73, at 141.
73. Jean de Courtecuisse, who had called the pope a perjurer and a schismatic as late as 1402, received a provision (ASV Reg. Suppl. 98, f.153v; cf. CUP iv. #1793 at 75), as did Guillaume Euverie, who wrote a tract accusing the pope of vituperating the University and its efforts for peace (ASV Reg. Suppl. 98, f.236r; cf. CUP iv. #1796 at 100). Also included among petitioners were the Normans Gilles des Champs, Jean Petit, and Pierre le Roy, all of whom had been prominent in the effort to secure the subtraction of obedience (ASV Reg. Suppl. 98, f.153v, 156r, 157v; cf. CUP iv. #1793 at 75 and 76 and #1794 at 77). On levels of provision to Normans in 1403, see Verger, 'Recrutement géographique', 145.
74. E. von Otenthal (ed.), *Die Päpstlichen Kanzleiregeln von Johannes XXII. bis Nicolaus V.* (Innsbruck, 1888), 143. In a discourse from 9 November 1403, Jean Gerson had requested that this favour be accorded at least to the *rotulus* of the University (Valois, *France*, iii. 349 n. 4).

75. The University had instructed its spokesman Jean Petit to outline this argument in a royal audience granted to him as a representative of the University in May 1406. Jean Petit incurred displeasure for not developing the thesis for subtraction as categorically and absolutely as the University desired.
76. For the speeches of Petit and Cramaud, see Bourgeois de Chastenet, *Preuves*, 105–17 and 118–24.
77. For this argument see the speech of Guillaume Filliastre (*ibid.*, 125–41, at 132 and 138).
78. *Ibid.*, 164–76. The chronicler Jean Jouvenal des Ursins does portray Pierre le Roy as a supporter of the University's position (cf. J. Michaud and M. Poujoulat (eds), *Histoire de Charles VI*, in., (*Nouvelle collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, Vol. II, Paris, 1857), 441), but this chronicler relied on information in the *Chronique du Religieux de St. Denis* for events prior to 1416. Further, as the son of Jean Jouvenal, whose opinions corresponded with those of Le Roy (see below), his argument that the opinions of Le Roy were in line with those of the University served to buttress his father's position with the credibility provided by university support.
79. Bourgeois de Chastenet, *Preuves*, 199–200.
80. The University never fully abandoned the argument of conditionality. Simon de Cramaud raised it again in his second speech (*ibid.*, 215) as did Jean Petit (*ibid.*, 223). For the text of Plaoul's speech, see *ibid.*, 177–99.
81. *Ibid.*, 185.
82. *Ibid.*, 222–9.
83. For the text of Jouvenal's speech, see *ibid.*, 230–4.
84. *Ibid.*, 231. He used the example of the right to royal influence in papal election, justly acquired by Pepin and Charlemagne and transmitted to subsequent French kings.
85. *Ibid.*, 231: 'Car les povres son trop grevés de les aller querir si loin; et ainsi ces expectations qui se donnent, ne sont mie bien raisonnables aux Benefices vacans. C'est à donner occasion à de moult grands maux, et les reservations que l'en fait chacun jour, sont contre raison, car les Princes qui ont fondé les Benefices, les deussent donner'.
86. Martène and Durand (eds), *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ii. cols. 1307–10, at 1309: 'Et ista reductio intelligitur fore perpetua, etiam schismate cessante, beneficiis illorum exceptis qui in curia morientur: dum tamen per generale concilium Ecclesiae aliter non fuerit ordinatum, cujus ordinationi se submittit dictorum regni ac Delphinatus Ecclesia'.
87. Valois, *France*, iii. 472–3.
88. Du Boulay, *Historia*, v. 139: '... et quod facta et ordinata tempore subtractionis praedictae secundum formam literarum eiusdem valeant et teneant inviolabiliter'.
89. Martène and Durand (eds), *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ii. col. 1310: '...nec erat intentionis quod fieret aliqua nova ordinatio super istis, quodque si foret aliqua ordinatio facienda, fieri per regem principaliter non deberet, convenientius videbantur quod in serie praedicti instrumenti non

poneretur ista verba, per regem ordinandum, et similia in dicto instrumento contenta, quae formam novae ordinationis sonare videbantur'.

90. These three documents are found in Martène and Durand (eds), *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ii. cols. 1295–1307 and 1340–44, and Du Boulay, *Historia*, v. 134–7.
91. Martène and Durand (eds), *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ii. col. 1302: 'Quod si saltem conditionem alteram adimplevisset qua fuerat obligatus, in suis antiquis libertati sub tenere ecclesiam Gallicanam non ex omni part criminaretur'.
92. Du Boulay, *Historia*, v. 136: '... Non enim substrahendum est, ut semper sine capite maneamus; sed a viro pestifero recedere oportet ne coninquinemur, et ut etiam adepta unitate vero capiti adhaereamus...'
93. Ibid., 136: 'Ideo quantum in nobis est, ab eo nos substrahimus ne Schismatis eadem macula contaminemur... videte ne medicina iam proprius admota paucorum versipellis astutia speratam sanitatem impediat'.
94. *CUP* iv. 144 #1835: '... quo usque per Concilium generale canonice celebrandum aliud fuerit ordinatum: ad cuius Concilii ordinationem dicta dicta ecclesia Gallicana et Dalphinatus se summittit'.
95. This desire for immediate relief may help to explain why certain university scholars militated for the publication of the royal letters (cf. Valois, *France*, iii. 598) despite their long-term prejudicial implications for the beneficial interests of the University.
96. This framework of events is based upon Valois, *France*, iv. especially 21–43, 175–225, and 410–36. Some members of the University did call for the publication of these letters in 1407 and 1408 (cf. *RSD* iii. 518 ff, 636 ff; Valois, *France*, iii. 598). However, they appear to have been more concerned with the short-term relief they might provide in the ongoing struggle with Benedict than with their long-term beneficial implications.
97. *CUP* iv. 178 #1881, 184 #1891, 209 #1925, 224 #1941.
98. *CUP* iv. 226–32 #1943 [23 February 1412] at 229: 'quod hoc fieri sit omnino res pestifera, scandalosa, exemplo perniciose statui et utilitati ecclesie universalis et aliarum, necnon specialiter et singulariter Universitatum studiorum et studentium, et maxime illorum de facultate predicta dampnosa penitus...'
99. Du Boulay, *Historia*, v. 222: 'Concors est Universitas per omnes Facultates quod non veniant seu devoluantur collationes beneficiorum ad ordinarios'. Cf. *CUP* iv. 233 #1944, where volume reference for Du Boulay is wrongly given as iv rather than v.
100. On developments in beneficial politics between 1418 and 1461, see Valois, *L'Histoire de la Pragmatique Sanction de Bourges sous Charles VII* (Paris, 1906).