Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

Volume III The Consummate Religion

G. W. F. HEGEL

Edited by Peter C. Hodgson

LECTURES on the PHILOSOPHY of RELIGION

Lectures on the Philosophy of religion

Volume III: The Consummate Religion

Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion represent the final and in some ways the decisive element of his entire philosophical system. His conception and execution of the lectures differed significantly on each of the occasions he delivered them, in 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831. The older editions introduced insoluble problems by conflating these materials into an editorially constructed text. The present volumes establish a critical edition by separating the series of lectures and presenting them as independent units on the basis of a complete re-editing of the sources by Walter Jaeschke. The English translation has been prepared by a team consisting of Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson, and J. Michael Stewart, with the assistance of H. S. Harris. Now widely recognized as the definitive English edition, it is being reissued by Oxford in the Hegel Lectures Series. The three volumes include editorial introductions, critical annotations on the text, textual variants, and tables, bibliography, and glossary.

'The Consummate Religion' is Hegel's name for Christianity, which he also designates 'the Revelatory Religion'. Here he offers a speculative interpretation of major Christian doctrines: the Trinity, creation, humanity, estrangement and evil, Christ, the Spirit, the spiritual community, church and world. These interpretations have had a powerful and controversial impact on modern theology.

Peter C. Hodgson is Emeritus Professor of Theology in the Divinity School, Vanderbilt University.

This page intentionally left blank

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

VOLUME III

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION

Edited by

PETER C. HODGSON

Translated by
R. F. BROWN, P. C. HODGSON, and J. M. STEWART
with the assistance of
H. S. HARRIS

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in

Oxford New York

Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in

Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

This volume, first published by the University of California Press, 1985,
is a translation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, Die vollendete Religion
(vol. 5 of *G. W. F. Hegel Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*),
edited by Walter Jaeschke, copyright © 1984
by Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH, Hamburg

© Peter C. Hodgson 2007

The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)

First published 2007

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above

You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available

Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd, King's Lynn, Norfolk

ISBN 978–0–19–928355–2

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS ix
FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS xiii
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 1
1. Text, Title, and Translation 1
2. The Structure and Development of "The Consummate Religion" 9
a. Hegel's Lecture Manuscript 10
b. The Lectures of 1824 24
c. The Lectures of 1827 36
d. The Lectures of 1831 47
Comparative Analysis of the Structure of "The Consummate Religion" 54

PART III. THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT 61
Introduction 61
1. Definition of This Religion 61
2. Characteristics of This Religion 63
A. Abstract Concept 65
B. Concrete Representation 73
a. The Idea In and For Itself: The Triune God 77
b. The Idea in Diremption: Creation and Preservation of the Natural World 86
c. Appearance of the Idea in Finite Spirit: Estrangement, Redemption, and Reconciliation 90

α. Estrangement: Natural Humanity 92
β. Redemption and Reconciliation: Christ 109
C. Community, Cultus 133
Standpoint of the Community in General 133
α. The Origin of the Community 142
β. The Being of the Community; the Cultus 149
γ. The Passing Away of the Community 158
THE LECTURES OF 1824 163
Introduction 163
1. The Consummate Religion 163
2. The Revelatory Religion 170
3. The Religion of Truth and Freedom 171
4. Relation to Preceding Religions 172
I. The Metaphysical Concept of God 173
II. The Development of the Idea of God 185
A. The First Element:
The Idea of God In and For Itself 189
B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance 198
1. Differentiation 198
a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World 198
b. Natural Humanity 201
c. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil 205
d. The Story of the Fall 207
2. Reconciliation 211
a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual 211
b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ 216
c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence 219
C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit 223
1. The Origin of the Community 224
2. The Subsistence of the Community 233
3. The Realization of Faith 237
THE LECTURES OF 1827 249
Introduction 249
1. Definition of This Religion 249

2. The Positivity and Spirituality of This Religion 251
3. Survey of Previous Developments 262
4. Division of the Subject 271
A. The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself 275
B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance 290
1. Differentiation 290
a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World 290
b. Natural Humanity 295
c. The Story of the Fall 300
d. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil 304
2. Reconciliation 310
a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual 310
b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ 316
c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence 322
C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit 328
1. The Origin of the Community 330
2. The Subsistence of the Community 333
3. The Realization of the Spirituality of the Community 339

APPENDIXES

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF ACCORDING TO THE LECTURES OF 1831 351
EXCERPTS BY DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF THE LECTURES OF 1831 359
LOOSE SHEETS RELATING TO HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT 375
FRAGMENTS FROM THE MICHELET TRANSCRIPTS 387

PAGINATION OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCES 389
GLOSSARY 399
INDEX 409

This page intentionally left blank

ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

[. . .] = Editorial insertions in the text.

⟨ . . . ⟩ = Passages in the margins of the *Ms.*, including both passages integrated into the main text and unintegrated passages that are footnoted.

˜ . . . ˜ = Passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings. These symbols are used only in the case of textual variants, which offer a different version of the designated passage, usually from a different source, not textual additions, which occur at the point marked by the note number in the main text. Normally the variant is placed in the notes at the end of the parallel in the main text; exceptions are noted.

– = Freestanding en dash indicating a grammatical break between sentence fragments in footnoted *Ms.* marginal materials.

[1] [2] [3] etc. = Footnotes containing (a) unintegrated marginal materials from the *Ms.;* (b) textual variants, additions, and deletions; (c) special materials from *W* and *L*, both variant readings and additions; (d) editorial annotations. The type of note is designated by an initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Notes are at the bottoms of the pages and are numbered consecutively through each text unit.

[*Ed.*] = Editorial annotations in the footnotes; materials following this symbol are editorial.

34 | = Page numbers of the German edition, on the outer margins with page breaks marked by vertical slash in text. The German edition is *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte,* Vol. 5, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, III: Die vollendete Religion.* Edited by Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg, 1984.

[73a] = Sheet numbers of the *Ms.*, in the text at the point of occurrence; "a" and "b" refer to the recto and verso sides of the sheets.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

W W_1 W_2 = *Werke.* Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. Vols. 11–12 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.* 1st ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke (Berlin, 1832) (W_1); 2d ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke and Bruno Bauer (Berlin, 1840) (W_2). When no subscript is used, the reference is to both editions. Part III is contained in vol. 12 of both editions under the title *Die absolute Religion.*

L = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.* Edited by Georg Lasson. 2 vols. in 4 parts. Leipzig, 1925–1929 (reprint, Hamburg, 1966). Part III is contained in vol. 2/2 under the title *Die absolute Religion.*

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Ms. = Hegel's lecture manuscript of 1821

D = Deiters transcript of the 1824 lectures

G = Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures

Ho = Hotho transcript of the 1824 lectures

K	=	Kehler transcript of the 1824 lectures
P	=	Pastenaci transcript of the 1824 lectures
An	=	Anonymous transcript of the 1827 lectures
B	=	Boerner transcript of the 1827 lectures
Hu	=	Hube transcript of the 1827 lectures
S	=	Strauss excerpts from a transcript of the 1831 lectures

SPECIAL MATERIALS IN W AND L

These are given in parentheses and identify the no-longer-extant sources of the variant readings and additions making up the special materials found in *W* and *L*. Since the source of special materials in *W* relating to the *Ms.* cannot be identified with certainty in each instance, the source designation is omitted from these passages, although the probability in most cases is that it is from *Hn*.

(Hn)	=	Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures
(MiscP)	=	Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own hand
(1827?)	=	Unverified transcripts of the 1827 lectures
(1831)	=	Transcripts of the 1831 lectures
(HgG)	=	Notes by Hegel in the copy of *G* used by W_1 and W_2
(Ed)	=	Editorial passages in W_1 and W_2
(Var)	=	Variant readings in *W* or *L*

This page intentionally left blank

FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS

WORKS BY HEGEL

Werke = *Werke.* Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. 18 vols. Berlin, 1832 ff. Some volumes issued in second editions.

GW = *Gesammelte Werke.* Edited by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 40 vols. projected. Hamburg, 1968 ff.

Vorlesungen = *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte.* 10 vols. Hamburg, 1983 ff. Vols. 3–5 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion,* edited by Walter Jaeschke.

Berliner Schriften = *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831.* Edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1956.

Briefe = *Briefe von und an Hegel.* Edited by J. Hoffmeister and J. Nicolin. 4 vols. 3d ed. Hamburg, 1969–1981.

Early Theological Writings = *Early Theological Writings.* Partial translation of H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften,* by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner. Chicago, 1948.

Encyclopedia (1817, 1830) = *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.* Translated from the 3d German ed., with additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts, by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. 3 vols. Oxford, 1892 (reprint 1975), 1970, 1971. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse.* 1st ed. Heidelberg, 1817: forthcoming in *GW,* vol. 13. 3d ed., Berlin, 1830: *Werke,* vols. 6–7 (containing additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts); forthcoming in *GW,* vol. 19. 6th ed., based on the 3d ed. without additions, edited by F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959. Citations given by section numbers in the 1817 or 1830 editions.

Faith and Knowledge = *Faith and Knowledge.* Translated by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, 1977. *Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie.* Tübingen, 1802. *GW,* vol. 4 (edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler).

History of Philosophy = *Lectures on the History of Philosophy.* Translated from the 2d German ed. (1840) by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. 3 vols. London, 1892. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.* Edited by C. L. Michelet. 1st ed., Berlin, 1833: *Werke,* vols. 13–15. Because of variations between the two German editions, the English translation often does not correspond exactly to the cited German texts. A new German edition is being prepared by P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke: *Vorlesungen,* vols. 6–9.

Nohl, *Jugendschriften* = *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*. Edited by H. Nohl. Tübingen, 1907 (reprint, Frankfurt, 1966). These and other early writings will be newly edited and appear in *GW*, vols. 1–2.

Phenomenology of Spirit = *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford, 1977. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807. *GW*, vol. 9 (edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede).

Science of Logic = *Science of Logic*. Translated by A. V. Miller. London, 1969. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Vol. 1, *Die objektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1812–13. *GW*, vol. 11 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). Vol. 2, *Die subjektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1816. *GW*, vol. 12 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, *Die Lehre vom Sein*. Berlin, 1832. Forthcoming in *GW*, vol. 20 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). The English translation uses the 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, hence there is not an exact correspondence between it and *GW*, vol. 11, Book 1.

WORKS BY OTHER AUTHORS

Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* = A. G. Baumgarten. *Metaphysica*. 7th ed. Halle and Magdeburg, 1779.

Descartes, *Discourse on Method, Meditations, Principles of Philosophy* = René Descartes. *A Discourse on Method and Selected Writings*. Translated by John Veitch. New York and London, 1951. Contains: *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (1637); *Meditations on the First Philosophy* (1641); *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644).

Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*	=	Johann Gottlieb Fichte. *Gesamtausgabe.* Edited by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. 30 vols. Stuttgart–Bad Canstatt, 1962 ff.
Kant, *Critique of Judgment*	=	Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment.* Translated by J. C. Meredith. Oxford, 1952. *Kritik der Urteilskraft.* 1st ed., Berlin and Libau, 1790; 2d ed., Berlin and Libau, 1793. *Werke,* vol. 5.
Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*	=	Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Practical Reason.* Translated by L. W. Beck. New York, 1956. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.* Riga, 1788. *Werke,* vol. 5.
Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*	=	Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason.* Translated from R. Schmidt's collation of editions A and B by N. Kemp Smith. London, 1930. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* 1st ed., Riga, 1781 (A); 2d ed., Riga, 1787 (B).
Kant, *Werke*	=	Immanuel Kant. *Gesammelte Schriften.* Edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. 24 vols. Berlin, 1902–1938.
Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*	=	Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Die philosophische Schriften.* Edited by C. J. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 1875–1890.
Leibniz, *Selections*	=	Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Selections.* Edited by Philip P. Wiener. New York, 1951. Contains *The Monadology* (1714), *The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason* (1714), and other writings.
Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften*	=	Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. *Sämtliche Schriften.* Edited by K. Lachmann and F. Muncker. 3d ed. Leipzig, 1886–1924.
Neander, *Gnostische Systeme*	=	August Neander. *Genetische Entwickelung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme.* Berlin, 1818.

Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube* or *Glaubenslehre* = Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelische Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt.* 1st ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1821–22 (cf. Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* Div. 1, vol. 7/1–2, edited by H. Peiter [Berlin and New York, 1980]). 2d ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1830–31. The two editions differ considerably; Hegel knew only the first. Comparative references to the 2d ed. may be checked by paragraph number in the English edition: *The Christian Faith.* Translated from the 2d German ed. by H. R. Mackintosh, J. S. Stewart, et al. Edinburgh, 1928.

Spinoza, *Chief Works* = Benedictus de Spinoza. *Chief Works.* Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. New York, 1951. Contains: *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670); *The Ethics* (1677); *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (1677); *Correspondence.*

Wolff, *Theologia naturalis* = Christian Wolff. *Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars prior, integrum systema complectens, qua existentia et attributa Dei a posteriori demonstrantur.* Editio nova. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1739. *Pars posterior, qua existentia et attributa Dei ex notione entis perfectissimi et natura animae demonstrantur.* 2d ed. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1741.

This page intentionally left blank

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

1. Text, Title, and Translation

This volume contains Part III of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion;* its subject matter is the Christian religion, for which Hegel's philosophical designation is the "consummate" or "revelatory" religion.

The lectures on the philosophy of religion were delivered four times over the eleven-year period 1821–1831. Hegel's conception and execution of them differed so significantly on each of the occasions they were presented that all past attempts to conflate the several series into a single, editorially constructed text have unavoidably done violence to the materials. Hence the fundamental principle of this edition is to establish authentic and critical texts by separating the lectures and publishing them as independent units on the basis of a complete reediting of the available sources. These include Hegel's own lecture manuscript (*Ms.*), composed for the first lecture series in 1821; auditors' notebooks or transcripts of the 1824 lectures, of which the principal one was prepared by K. G. Griesheim;[1] the text of the 1827 lectures contained in G. Lasson's edition of 1925–1929, as compared with the two editions of the *Werke* (1832 and 1840) and checked against several recently discovered 1827 notebooks of lesser quality; excerpts by D. F. Strauss from a transcript of the lectures of 1831, of which all

1. The 1824 transcript by C. Pastenaci breaks off at the end of Div. I of Part III, leaving essentially only Griesheim as the source of the main text, checked against P. F. Deiters's much briefer transcript and supplemented by the variant passages from H. G. Hotho's freely edited notebook.

of the original transcripts have been lost; and those passages in the *Werke* for which original sources are no longer extant, which have been footnoted at appropriate places in relation to the *Ms.* and the 1824 and 1827 texts.

Details concerning editorial principles and procedures are contained in the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1 of this edition,[2] while a comparative analysis of the structure and development of Hegel's treatment of "The Consummate Religion" in each of the lecture series is provided in Sec. 2 of the present Introduction.

The most difficult editorial question relating to Part III of the lectures concerns its title, since Hegel himself used several titles. In the lecture manuscript he first wrote *Die vollendete Religion* ("The Consummate Religion"), but added the words *oder offenbare* ("or Revelatory") below the title, as an addition to it. The heading in the Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures is *Die offenbare Religion,* although Hegel began these lectures immediately by describing Christianity as *die vollendete Religion.* C. Pastenaci offers as a title *Die vollendete Religion oder die geoffenbarte Religion, christliche Religion,* while P. F. Deiters gives *Die notwendige, die offenbare, die christliche Religion,* and H. G. Hotho *Die christliche Religion.* Of the transcripts used by Lasson for the 1827 lectures, the Königsberg Anonymous had as its heading *Die offenbare Religion,* while J. E. Erdmann offered as a title the words used by Hegel in the opening sentences of the 1827 lectures: *Die vollendete Religion, die Religion, die für sich ist, oder die Religion, die sich selbst objektiv ist.*[3] Finally, according to Strauss's excerpts, the title in 1831 was *Die vollendete Religion.*[4]

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. 1, *Introduction* and *The Concept of Religion,* ed. P. C. Hodgson (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984) (*Vorlesungen,* Vol. 3). Vol. 2, *Determinate Religion* (*Vorlesungen,* Vol. 4), is scheduled for publication in 1986 or 1987.

3. *L* 2/2:237. Among the presently available transcripts for 1827, the title in the Berlin Anonymous is *Die geoffenbarte Religion,* while J. Hube uses *Christliche Religion,* and I. Boerner is similar to Erdmann, except that *offenbar* replaces *vollendet.*

4. This is confirmed by the introductory paragraph of the 1831 lectures as transmitted by *W* (see 1827 lectures, n. 3).

It is evident that the two most frequently occurring titles are *Die vollendete Religion* and *Die offenbare Religion.* The former has been selected as the title of the new edition because it appears to be the primary heading in the *Ms.* and because it occurs more frequently in the body of the texts of all the lecture series. Unfortunately, both *vollendet* and *offenbar* are adjectives that resist felicitous translation into English. For the former we have preferred "consummate" to alternatives such as "final," "perfect," or "complete," since it encompasses all of these meanings, and all are indeed intended. For *offenbar* we have settled on "revelatory" in order to stress the *process* of "making open" or "becoming manifest" and thus to be able to distinguish *offenbar* from *geoffenbart,* which refers to something that *has been* "revealed" in historical, positive fashion. Hegel clearly intended a distinction as well as a relation between these terms (see 1827 lectures, p. 252). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he described Christianity as *Die offenbare Religion,*[5] whereas in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* he titled it *Die geoffenbarte Religion;*[6] thus the usage in the philosophy-of-religion lectures indicates a return to the earlier (and more suggestive) title. In some contexts we translate *offenbar* as "manifest," but for the title we prefer a term that also suggests the connection with *geoffenbart* and maintains whatever distinction Hegel may have intended between *offenbaren* and *manifestieren.*

Notably, none of the manuscripts or transcripts in our possession contains the title *Die absolute Religion.* While this phrase occurs in the text of the lectures along with all the others, it is reasonably certain that Hegel did not use it as a title. Instead, Marheineke introduced it when he published the lectures in 1832—possibly viewing it as more felicitous than *Die vollendete Religion* and assuming that *vollendet* and *absolut* meant roughly the same thing for Hegel (see especially the Introduction to the 1824 lectures). Although this is the title by which Part III of the philosophy-of-religion lectures has become familiar (Lasson perpetuated the tra-

5. *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* chap. VII.C (*GW* 9:400 ff.). Unfortunately, both Baillie and Miller translate this term as "revealed."

6. *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 564 ff.

dition), it is probably the least suitable of any of the titles. While there are indeed similarities between "consummate" (in the sense of "final" or "perfect") and "absolute," the two terms have distinct nuances. Christianity is the "consummate" religion in the sense that the concept of religion has been brought to completion or consummation in it; it simply *is* religion in its quintessential expression. But while the object or content of religion is the absolute, religion itself does not entail absolute knowledge of the absolute: that is the role of philosophy. The representational forms of religious expression, even of the Christian religion, must be "sublated" (annulled *and* preserved) in philosophical concepts. Thus in Hegel's scheme of things there is an *absolute knowledge* (the science of speculative philosophy) but a *consummate religion*. Whether religion as such is to be superseded by philosophy is another question, which we shall consider in due course.

As an alternative to all of the philosophical (or system-related) names for this religion, one might employ as a title its historical name, "the Christian religion," which also occurs in the texts of the lectures. This was in fact the solution adopted by the volume that was a forerunner to this one, *The Christian Religion: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Part III: The Revelatory, Consummate, Absolute Religion.*[7] However, in the context of the systematic structure of the philosophy of religion, and of the place of religion in the philosophical system as a whole, the historical names of the religions are out of place, and Hegel used them only rarely (though he does indeed speak of the "Christian religion" more freely than he does of the others). Certainly very concrete historical realities lie behind Hegel's philosophical redescriptions, but the redescriptions are designed precisely to elicit a grasp of the distinctive stage of *consciousness* present in each religion, and for this purpose the historical names are of little service. In any event, to maintain consistency with Volumes 1 and 2, it is appropriate that Volume 3 be entitled *The Consummate Religion*. To bring out the fact that Hegel commonly used *two* titles or names for Part III, our title

7. Ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson (based on the edition by Georg Lasson), American Academy of Religion Texts and Translations Series, no. 2 (Missoula, Mont., 1979).

could have been *The Consummate or Revelatory Religion,* thus approximating the complete title as found in the *Ms.* But such a title is unwieldy, and it is advisable in any case to maintain consistency with Volume 3 of the German edition, which is titled *Die vollendete Religion.*

For all intents and purposes, what is offered here is a new edition, not a revision of *The Christian Religion.* While distinguishing the sources (indeed more clearly and accurately than the Lasson edition, on which it was based), *The Christian Religion* wove them together under a common set of section headings. This was feasible since Hegel treated the topics of Part III in roughly the same *order* in all of the lectures. The advantage of being able to compare what Hegel had to say on the same topic at different times was offset by obscuring the still significant structural and substantive differences that obtained between the four series of lectures. To bring the latter out clearly, and thus to provide the textual context in terms of which valid interpretations of Hegel's developing thought can be established, is the primary objective of the present edition. Thus the four lecture series (the *Ms.,* 1824, 1827, 1831) are distinguished and presented as autonomous units (the latter only in outline form, on the basis of Strauss's excerpts). Just as important, all of the texts have been completely reedited on the basis of the original sources, and the translations are based on the newly edited texts. Lasson's treatment of the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures still left much to be desired in Part III, although what he offered was a distinct improvement over his work on Parts I and II. However, Lasson's version of the 1827 text serves as the primary source for our new edition, since the best of the original transcripts for these lectures have all been lost.[8] Thus, with the exception of the 1827 lectures, the reader will discover that the new edition bears only a distant resemblance to *The Christian Religion.*

The translation of Hegel's lecture manuscript has been prepared by P. C. Hodgson; of the 1824 lectures and of the materials in the Appendix, by J. M. Stewart; and of the 1827 lectures, by R. F. Brown and P. C. Hodgson. All translation drafts have been thor-

8. For details, see Secs. 3-5 of the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1.

oughly checked and revised by H. S. Harris and put into final form by the editor with the assistance of J. M. Stewart. In addition to his detailed editorial work on the German text, W. Jaeschke has helped with some of the translation puzzles for the English edition.

The Appendix to this volume is of special note. The first item contains the text on the ontological proof from the 1831 lectures as provided by the *Werke* at the end of volume 12.[9] In the 1831 lectures Hegel once again treated the proofs for the existence of God in relation to the various religions, as he had done in the *Ms.* and in 1824, whereas in 1827 all of the proofs were drawn into *The Concept of Religion.* The proof that corresponds to the Christian religion is the ontological proof, for reasons Hegel makes clear, and thus the proper location for this material is in Volume 3. However, it cannot appropriately be attached to the *Ms.* or the 1824 text (and obviously not to the 1827 text, which in other respects the 1831 lectures approximate); hence we have placed it in the Appendix.

The second item in the Appendix is the text for Part III of the excerpts prepared by D. F. Strauss of a transcript of the lectures of 1831.[10] Because of the decision on the location of the proofs, Hegel found it necessary in 1831 to adopt the structural arrangement of the 1824 lectures; he thus included a section on "The Abstract Concept of God," where the ontological proof is discussed. (Strauss's excerpted version may be compared with the full text transmitted by the *Werke.*) In other respects the substance of the 1831 lectures approximates that of 1827, although an interesting rearrangement of materials on "natural humanity" and the question of good and evil occurs,[11] and Hegel introduces for the first time as a divisional principle the reference to the three "kingdoms" of the Father, Son, and Spirit,[12] which was adopted by both editions of the *Werke.*

The third item in the Appendix contains several of the loose sheets of notes used by Hegel in preparing those portions of the

9. See below, *Ontological Proof,* n. 1.
10. See below, 1831 *Excerpts,* n. 1.
11. See below, 1831 *Excerpts,* nn. 14, 26.
12. See below, 1831 *Excerpts,* n. 7.

lecture *Ms.* that treat Greek, Roman, and Christian religion (the notes on Greek and Roman religion are appended to Volume 2). These sheets are from the literary estate of Karl Rosenkranz (Hegel's former student and biographer), now deposited in Houghton Library of Harvard University. It is not clear how these sheets came into Rosenkranz's hands, but it is clear that they do not belong to the miscellaneous papers used in preparation of the later lectures, and it is unlikely that they were composed after the *Ms.* was completed and inserted into it (as was for instance sheet 3 of the *Introduction*). Rather they were almost certainly a preliminary sketch of portions of the *Ms.*, probably completed in mid-July 1821.[13] This is evident from the content, which is similar to the *Ms.*'s depiction of the relation of Christianity to previous religions, although the sheets are much more schematic and the conception less fully articulated. Moreover, they contain materials found only in the *Ms.*, such as the outline of the concluding section on "the passing away of the community" and references to ending "on a note of discord." They also contain allusions and references, such as to the Low Country "beggars" (the Gueux), that did not find their way into any of the lecture series. These sheets help us to understand how Hegel composed his lectures: he worked from preliminary sketches to a more fully articulated manuscript, to which he later added papers containing revisions and elaborations. Normally the preliminary sketches would have been destroyed once the manuscript had been composed.

Finally there are found in the Appendix several brief fragments from lost transcripts of the 1821 and 1824 lectures prepared by Carl Ludwig Michelet. The second of these transcripts, described by Philipp Marheineke as having been written "with unmistakable care,"[14] was used by Bruno Bauer in preparing the second edition of the *Werke,* and portions of it (while unidentifiable) are included among the variant readings from W_2 given in our footnotes to the 1824 text. Michelet himself quoted a few passages from his own notebooks of Hegel's lectures in his *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel,* Part 2 (Berlin,

13. On the dating, see below, *Loose Sheets,* n. 20.
14. See his preface to W_2 (11:vii).

1838). These recoverable fragments, all of which are from Part III of the *Lectures,* are of value primarily as a confirmation and correction of the Griesheim version of the 1824 lectures at certain points. The second of the fragments from the first lecture series confirms the text of the *Ms.* on an interesting point. Our notes accompanying the fragments set them in their appropriate contexts.

Following the Appendix, and a table showing the pagination of the original sources, the German-English glossary is found, which in its successively amended versions has served as a translation guide for all three volumes. We stress the term "guide" since there are obviously contexts in which the equivalences listed in the glossary are inappropriate. The glossary is limited to a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation; it certainly is not an exhaustive list of Hegel's systematic vocabulary. The general principles guiding the translation of the *Lectures* as a whole are discussed in Sec. 6 of the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1, and the specific arrangement of the glossary is explained at the beginning of the listing.

Some adjustments in the translation of specific terms have occurred in Volume 3 as compared with Volume 1, occasioned partly by the different context in which they occur and partly by the experience of the translation team. For *anschauen* in some instances we are now using "envisage," and for *Anschauung,* "envisagement," although the standard term remains "intuition." When *Bestimmung* means "vocation" in the sense intended by Fichte, we so translate it. For *seiend* we have experimented with "subsisting" as an alternative to the awkward expression "having being," especially in phrases such as *eine in sich seiende Weise,* "an inwardly subsisting mode," or *der ansichseiende Geist,* "the implicitly subsisting spirit." Similarly, for *Seiende,* when it refers to finite entities, we have employed "subsisting being" and sometimes even "entity." The disadvantage of this policy is that it is then no longer possible to reserve "subsist" exclusively for *bestehen.* In the case of *Vorstellung* we have found it necessary to be more flexible when it is used in nontechnical contexts, as it often is in Volume 3. We have employed "image" or "imagination" (as when one has a hundred thalers in one's "imagination"), "view" (e.g., the Reformed "view" of the sacrament of Communion), and even "notion," although rarely

(such "notions" are not worthy of further consideration). To maintain the distinction between *Vorstellung, Begriff,* and *Idee,* we *never* use "notion" for *Begriff* or "idea" for *Vorstellung,* and we avoid such expressions as "conceptual picture" or "picture thinking" for *Vorstellung. Begriff* is consistently translated as "concept," *Idee* as "idea," and in its technical sense *Vorstellung* remains "representation." Finally, when *Geist* clearly refers to the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God in the context of discussions of the Trinity or the community of faith, it is appropriate to capitalize it in translation. Here *Geist* is being used as a religious *Vorstellung* rather than as a philosophical *Begriff.* For the sake of consistency, capitalization normally occurs when the term is preceded by a definite article: thus "the Spirit," but "spirit."

Hegel's citations of biblical passages, of which there are a good many in this volume, are often imprecise. Generally we translate Hegel's version into modern English (guided by the Revised Standard Version), and if this version is sufficiently accurate, we simply give the reference in square brackets following the quotation; otherwise additional necessary information is provided in the footnotes. In the case of Synoptic parallels, the source closest to Hegel's quotation (frequently Matthew) is cited. References to classical authors are given in the abbreviated form customary today, without attending to the question of which editions Hegel may have used. Information on symbols, abbreviations, and frequently cited works in the footnotes is provided at the beginning of the volume. We have avoided the repetition of detailed information found in the editorial footnotes to Volume 1, giving instead cross-references to these notes.

2. The Structure and Development of "The Consummate Religion"

As pointed out in the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1, this edition makes possible for the first time a comprehensive comparison of the four series of lectures Hegel presented on the philosophy of religion as well as an analysis of the development in his conceptualization and treatment of this subject. A comparative analysis of Parts I and II will be found in the Introductions to the first two volumes; we turn now to Part III, *The Consummate Religion.* The attentive reader will discover that differences of nuance, emphasis,

and substance are much greater among the several lecture series for Part III than had earlier been suspected, despite the similar ordering of topics. The altered polemical context, especially for the 1824 and 1827 lectures, reverberates through to the very end.

For what follows, readers will be helped by referring to the table providing a synopsis of the structure of *The Consummate Religion*, which is printed on pp. 54–55. The section headings in the *Ms.* are part of the original document except for those enclosed in square brackets, which have been added by the editor. However, the numbers and headings in all the other documents are the work of the editor without being specifically identified as such. Even when headings occur in the original transcripts, we must assume that they are not attributable to Hegel himself but rather to the transcribers. Thus we have felt free to revise and supplement the headings in the transcripts in order to bring out the systematic structure of Hegel's lectures as clearly as possible. They certainly do have such a structure even if Hegel did not make a point of enumerating and identifying the stages of his oral presentation in just the way we have done, though the formulations used for our headings are frequently suggested by wording in the texts themselves. References are made to the more detailed discussion of specific matters in the editorial footnotes, so as to avoid repetition between the Introduction and the notes.[15] In this Introduction, we can offer only a brief sketch, which provides at most merely the foundations of an interpretative commentary, and which does not attend to the growing body of secondary literature.[16]

a. Hegel's Lecture Manuscript

Introduction

Hegel starts (in Sec. 1) by reminding his hearers that "this religion" was earlier defined (at the very end of the general *Introduction*

15. These references are cited not by page numbers but by note numbers, which run consecutively through each text unit. By using the running heads, readers can readily identify the appropriate text units.

16. For a survey of this literature, especially as it relates to Part III of the lectures, and for a commentary on aspects of Hegel's philosophical interpretation of Christianity, see Walter Jaeschke, *Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels* (Darmstadt, 1983).

to the *Ms.*) as the one in which the concept of religion has returned to itself or become objective to itself by becoming an object of human consciousness explicitly. Since, as pointed out in Part I of the *Ms.* (Sec. B.2, 3), the concept of religion *is* the relationship of finite consciousness to its absolute object, God, and ultimately the unity between them based on the absolute's self-mediation or self-consciousness, the religion in which this relationship is made fully manifest is the "consummate" and the "revelatory" religion (see *Ms.*, nn. 3, 16). Hegel continues (in Sec. 2) by establishing that the Christian religion, as thus defined, has certain "characteristics" (*Bestimmungen*), the chief of which is that it is the religion of *revelation*. It is so, not because *something* is revealed in historical or positive fashion, but because the very being of God is to be open, manifest, revelatory. God's eternal nature *is* his "revelatory action," which is to say that God *is* spirit—infinite spirit revealing itself to finite spirit, the absolute idea "appearing" to worldly consciousness, and thus returning to itself as infinite self-consciousness or absolute spirit. From this fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion several others follow: it is the religion of truth, reconciliation, and freedom—the first because *the true* is its content and is cognized *as* it is, the second because the implicit unity of divine and human nature has now become explicit (in at least one individual), and the last because freedom means to be at home with oneself in the other.

The Two Triads

In the lecture manuscript, Hegel's philosophical redescription of the Christian religion is structured in two triads, one within the other.[17] The outer triad is an analytic framework already applied to each of the determinate or finite religions in Part II. This analysis considers first the "abstract concept" of divinity of the religion in question; then its "concrete representation" of divinity and of humanity's relationship to it in terms of specific symbols, images, and other thought-categories (the "theoretical" relationship to God); and finally the practices of its "cultus" by means of which there is an actual participation in or communion with deity (the "practical"

17. A second inner triad is found in Sec. C and is discussed below, but it is not of significance for the overall structure of the *Ms.*

relationship to God). In the 1827 lectures, Hegel also uses this framework to structure his presentation of the concept of religion in Part I. If the concept of religion is absolute spirit in its self-mediation (a matter on which Hegel achieved clarity at the end of the 1824 *Concept*), then we can expect that religion as such will reflect the development or self-realization of absolute spirit in the three moments of its substantial self-unity, its self-differentiation, and its self-reunification or return to self.

The inner triad sets forth the concrete representation of God that is found in the Christian religion. As is clear from the "division of the subject" found at the beginning of Sec. B, this triad is composed of: (a) the idea of God in and for itself (the immanent Trinity); (b) the idea in diremption or differentiation (creation and preservation of the natural world); (c) the appearance of the idea in finite spirit (the "history" of estrangement, redemption, and reconciliation). At this point a tension in Hegel's thought emerges. If what constitutes the "concrete representation" of God in the Christian religion is the self-mediation of the triune God both inwardly and outwardly—and this is indeed Hegel's view of the matter—then one would expect a trinitarian structure. But what is in fact offered is a philosophical triad, drawn from the three branches of philosophy—the logical idea, nature, and (finite) spirit—and recapitulated in Hegel's depiction of "the revealed religion" in §§ 567–570 of the *Encyclopedia*. It has the peculiar result that the "Son" (anthropology and christology) occupies the third moment of the triad rather than the second. The third trinitarian moment, the "Spirit," becomes a kind of appendage, treated under Sec. C of the outer triad, "Community, Cultus." What is required, then, to give an adequate account of the distinctively Christian idea of God is to combine the second and third moments of the philosophical triad (nature and finite spirit) in the second moment of the trinitarian dialectic (God's self-differentiation or self-diremption by creating a world of *both* nature *and* finite spirit as God's own otherness *ad extra*) and to incorporate the third moment of the outer triad (community, cultus) into the third moment of the trinitarian mediation (God's return-to-self in and through the transfigured subjectivity of the community of Spirit). The philosophical triad is grounded

in the dialectic of thought itself, namely, the three logical moments of the syllogism: universality (*Allgemeinheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*), and singularity (*Einzelheit*).[18] But genuinely trinitarian speculation requires a modification so that the moments become: abstract unity (universality), differentiation (particularity + finite singularity), return (subjectivity or infinite singularity)—or, as Hegel finally expressed it in 1831, the kingdoms of the Father, Son, and Spirit.

Hegel made just such an adjustment in the later lectures. Sec. C of the *Ms.* becomes the "third element" of the development of the idea of God, "Community, Spirit" (1824 and 1827),[19] or the "Kingdom of the Spirit" (1831). And Secs. b and c of the inner triad in the *Ms.* are combined into the "second element," namely, God's "representation" and "appearance" in the world (1824 and 1827), or the "Kingdom of the Son" (1831). Thus the original analytic scheme of "abstract concept," "concrete representation," and "community, cultus," is broken apart, and the inner triad is converted into genuinely trinitarian moments. With respect to the second moment of the latter (namely, God's worldly appearance or the kingdom of the Son), there are still two phases, but they no longer correspond to the philosophical distinction between nature and finite spirit. Rather they are the phase of differentiation (including now not only the natural world but also the "fall" of humanity into estrangement and evil) and the phase of reconciliation (beginning with the appearance of the idea of divine-human unity in a single individual). The "turning point"—the extreme of divine self-divestment and the moment initiating the return—is no longer the creation of the first Adam (as the *Ms.* depicts it) but the incarnation and crucifixion of the second Adam (see n. 88). In 1824 the structure of the lectures is adjusted accordingly, so that Secs. b and c.α of the inner triad in the *Ms.* together comprise the moment

18. See *Science of Logic,* pp. 600 ff., 664 ff. (*GW* 12:36 ff., 132 ff.), and *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 181 ff.

19. There is already an anticipation of this in the words Hegel added to the heading of Sec. B in the *Ms.*—whether immediately or in preparation for the 1824 lectures is not certain—namely, that concrete representation involves the "determination," i.e., the "development of the idea [of God]," and "weaves itself by itself into the cultus." See *Ms.,* n. 39.

of differentiation, while Sec. c.β comprises the moment of reconciliation. In this way the disproportionately large amount of material in Sec. B.c—over a third of the entire *Ms.* text for Part III—is spread out, and the disproportionately small amount of material in Sec. B.b is supplemented.

The Abstract Concept of God

Under Sec. A of the outer triad, Hegel considers the form of the proof of the "existence" of God appropriate to the revelatory religion, namely, the ontological proof, following the pattern already established in the treatment of the determinate religions, where the cosmological and teleological proofs were taken up in relation to the abstract conception of divinity found in the various "finite" religions.

The *concept* of God in this religion is that he is the absolute idea, or is the idea of *absolute spirit.* It must now be shown that this concept has "reality" (*Realität*), that "being" (*Sein*) or "existence" (*Existenz*)[20] is contained in it. This is the case because the very concept or idea of absolute spirit is to be the unity of divine and human nature. Spirit is a process of actualization, of manifestation, "the living process by which the implicit unity of divine and human nature becomes explicit, or is brought forth." Therefore, *if* God is properly defined as absolute spirit, he necessarily has reality, is indeed the most real of all realities.

The *abstract* definition of this idea of spirit is the unity of concept and being, and the so-called ontological proof shows this unity in a *formal* way. At the strictly formal, logical level, the proof is quite simple, since logic shows that the *concept* (*Begriff*) is "the third to *being* [*Sein*] and essence [*Wesen*], to the *immediate* and to *reflection.* Being and essence are so far the moments of its *becoming;* but it is their *foundation* and *truth* as the identity in which they are

20. In Part I of the 1824 and 1827 lectures, Hegel makes it clear that the usual expression "existence of God" (*Dasein Gottes*) is at best imprecise and in the strict sense inaccurate, since God does not "exist" like other finite entities in the sense of having "determinate being" (*Dasein*). Normally he speaks of the "being" or "reality" of God, but occasionally uses the loanwords *Existenz* and *existieren.* See Vol. 1, 1827 *Concept,* pp. 414 ff., and the discussion of the translation of the terms *Sein* and *Dasein* in the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1, pp. 57–58.

submerged and contained."[21] In the *true* concept, being as the most empty, indeterminate, and immediate philosophical category is contained, and in this respect it is not saying very much to say that God "has being." But Hegel acknowledges that "the concept in our sense is not what is ordinarily meant by 'concept.'" What is ordinarily meant is that concepts (or thoughts) are just in the head and that what is *real* is life, the immediate world, empirical human being, and the like. This is the point of view of subjectivity, of the understanding, and it is from this point of view that Kant and others have criticized the Anselmian proof. Anselm (according to Hegel) argued that the concept of God is that he is the "most perfect" and that being (or reality) is necessarily contained in this concept since, as everyone knows, what is unreal or merely imagined is less "perfect" than what is real. This is "quite correct," says Hegel, and Anselm was also correct in recognizing that the unity of concept and being could not just be presupposed by religion and philosophy; it had to be *demonstrated*, even if Anselm's proof still had the form of understanding. Of course, it is just this classical presupposition of the unity of concept and being, of thought and reality, that has broken down in modern times, Anselm's proof to the contrary notwithstanding. This is why Kant's critiques of reason are such a watershed in the history of consciousness. Kant is correct "in the finite realm": being or reality certainly is *not* contained in the *subjective* concept (i.e., in the thoughts we have in our brains). The task of speculative philosophy is to demonstrate, in the light of critical philosophy, that the subjective or finite concept is not the *true* concept. Only this can serve any longer as the philosophical basis for the fundamental presupposition of religion that God *is*.

Concrete Representation

We come now to the three moments of the inner triad of the *Ms.* to which reference has already been made.

1. The *first* of these, Sec. B.a, concerns "God in his eternity, the idea in and for itself, *God as triune,*" which is also the "absolute idea of philosophy," a "purely speculative content" (n. 51). This section remains relatively constant across the four lecture series,

21. *Science of Logic,* pp. 577 ff., cf. pp. 82 ff. (*GW* 12:11 ff., 11:33 ff.).

although the wealth of material it contains is gradually worked out more consistently. By the term "Trinity" Hegel ordinarily means the immanent, logical, or preworldly Trinity—that is, the *actus purus* of the inner divine life, the process of differentiation and return contained *within* the eternal idea ("the show of finitude . . . has not yet taken place"). At the same time Hegel recognizes that the divine differentiation *ad intra* is the ground for the possibility of God's relation to the world *ad extra* and that the outward relations reenact the inner distinctions without simply reduplicating or repeating them (see n. 79)—in effect a correspondence between (not an identity of) the immanent and economic Trinities. The truth of the Trinity is most adequately grasped in purely speculative, logical categories as the dialectic of unity, differentiation, and return. It is a mystery, but a rational mystery—the mystery of reason, of thought itself. The truth of the Trinity may also be grasped in the representational language of love and personality. Love entails a union mediated by relationship and hence distinction; to be a person means to be reflected into self through distinction, to find one's self-consciousness in another, to give up one's abstract existence and to win it back as concrete and personal by being absorbed into the other. But when the understanding enters in and tries to count three divine "persons," it falls into irresolvable contradictions and the "harsh" equation $3 \times 1 = 1$. Thus, in the *Ms.* at least, Hegel is not much attracted to the representational language of traditional trinitarian doctrine and its central symbols, "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." Nonetheless, truth is present in these symbols, as it is in the prefigurations of the Trinity in the triads of Hindu and Greek religion, of Plato and the Pythagoreans, of Alexandrian Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, and finally of Boehme and Kant.

2. In Sec. B.b, Hegel addresses the difficult question of the relation between God and the *natural world.* The latter *corresponds* to the second moment of the inner dialectic of the divine life, but Hegel makes it clear many times that the created world is not simply *identical* with God in the moment of self-differentiation ("the eternal Son of the Father") (see n. 79). This would entail a crude pantheism, which he consistently avoids.[22] His position is rather

22. See especially Sec. A of *The Concept of Religion* in the 1827 lectures, where Hegel defends himself vigorously against the charge of pantheism.

that of panentheism: the world exists in God and is dependent on God (creation is a continuous preservation), but is not in any empirical sense identical with God. Yet the element of explicit and present *difference* does seem to presuppose an implicit and teleological *identity,* for the vocation of both God and world is to achieve actuality together, to move toward union in an eschatological consummation. The quality of the natural world, as a "disappearing moment" in this process, is precisely to sublate itself, "to pass over," "to take itself back into the final idea." Here Hegel's affinity with Neoplatonism and German mysticism is evident. At the end of this section he considers briefly the presence of the idea (the "wisdom of God") in nature and the emergence of spirit out of nature.

3. Sec. B.c is the lengthiest and most complex of the *Ms.,* for reasons already discussed (see also n. 88). By means of the Greek letters α and β Hegel divides it into two parts. In the *first part* (α) he treats finite spirit qua finite—as estranged, cloven, "natural humanity"—that is, theological *anthropology.* Human being is "natural" and merely finite when it chooses to exist according to the immediacy, particularity, and externality of the natural world (n. 90). This is the life of desire, of singularity, of utter dependence on nature. This is in fact the "original condition" of humanity; but also, because human being is spirit, it is not false to represent the original condition mythically as our having been created in the image of God: spirit is *implicitly* the divine idea itself. This original condition, however, is neither "good" nor "evil," and it is wrong to think of human being as either good or evil "by nature," which is a doctrine of "recent times."

Humanity becomes either good or evil (for the most part, evil) with the *transition* from its so-called original condition (whether primitive or mythical) to the actual conditions of historical existence and culture. The transition involves essentially an act of *cognition* or *knowledge* (Hegel's term is *Erkenntnis*), the willful choice of what is natural and immediate, a choice for which human beings are responsible, with the result that they are guilty. It is this knowing choice that is in the strict sense evil. The role of knowledge in the occurrence of evil is the central theme of *the story of the fall,* but Hegel is primarily concerned with the contradictions that are present in the story. First there is a contradiction with respect to *knowl-*

edge: on the one hand, the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is forbidden by God, yet on the other hand it is precisely this knowledge that is the likeness of God in humanity, without which Adam would be just like the beasts. Then there is a contradiction with respect to *mortality* (see n. 118): is it a punishment for sin (the penalty of death for eating of the fruit), or is it a concomitant of finitude (in order to gain immortality Adam would have to eat of the tree of life but misses the chance)? By bringing out these contradictions we are able to see through the mythical form of the story and to grasp its speculative truth: cognition is the spiritual essence of humanity and intrinsically good; yet when conjoined with finitude it yields the choice of nature rather than of spirit, and hence inner rupture and outward evil. Evil is now seen to be a dialectical necessity in the rise of consciousness, not an inscrutable, absurd force. Cognition both "gives the wound and heals it."

In the *second part* (β) of Sec. B.c, Hegel attends to the reversal out of this situation, the "elevation" of spirit out of its natural will and evil and into consciousness of the universal, of God—in other words, *christology.* He clearly demarcates the stages of this lengthy analysis by a series of Greek letters ((α) through (ε)). The first point to be established (point (α)) is that humanity is conscious of the universal as its *own* essence, its *own* infinity: *both* absolute essence *and* infinite subjectivity are essential. This can be otherwise expressed as "*the unity of divine and human nature*" or simply the "divine idea," which humanity bears implicitly within itself, the consciousness of which "consummates religion as the cognition of God as spirit." But in the second place (point (β)), because of ignorance and evil this cognition must *come to* us, this implicit idea must *appear* explicitly, and it must appear in such a way that it is empirically universal for immediate consciousness, which is the state that most of us are in. This means that it must appear in a "wholly temporal," "completely ordinary" human being—but one who is at the same time known as the divine idea, not merely as a teacher. Such an immediate certainty and presence of divinity is the "Is" of truth for natural consciousness—divine truth present as an empirical, historical *fact* in all its "isness."

At this point Hegel sums up the steps of the argument and further elaborates them. First, the divine idea is present implicitly *in* the *whole* of humanity immediately (a recapitulation of point (α) above). The quotations from Schiller and Goethe support this point, if our reading of them is correct (nn. 129, 131): "the *entire* realm of spirits," with all its "anguish," is needed in order that God may enter into possession of his own infinitude. Second, the divine idea is realized *for* humanity in a *single individual.* First it must be shown that *individual subjectivity as such* is the true form in which universality appears ("substance is subject"). But then it must be established that only *one* single, unique individual can be the ultimate appearance of the universal, for otherwise divinity would become an abstraction, and the idea of divine-human *unity* would be dispersed. "Once is always. . . . In the eternal idea there is only one Son." (On the arrangement of these points, see n. 133.)

That any particular historical individual should be this "holy one" for us requires "a local and exclusive occasion." In the case of the Christian religion, this occasion is Christ (i.e., Jesus of Nazareth[23]). Even though the only true attestation that he is the divine idea is the witness of the Spirit in forming the community of faith, *Christ's teaching* (point (γ)) is a kind of attestation since it unifies the whole of his life and destiny in which the divine idea is portrayed (*dargestellt*). "The words of Christ confirm the truth of the idea, what he has been for his community." In a fairly detailed exegesis, which has its own rigor, though certainly not of a historical-critical kind, Hegel distinguishes three aspects of the teaching: its concentration on inwardness and intentionality, displacing all worldly interests, elevating its hearers to the "heaven within," the "universal soil" and "homeland" of spirit—the kingdom of God, of which communal love is the closest approximation; its "revolutionary" opposition to all the established orders (of religion, family, civil society, and the state); and the relationship of Christ to God and humanity ("he states very specifically his identity with the Father" and "refers to himself as the Son of Man"—i.e., the one man who is humanity as such).

23. In accord with the conventions of his time, Hegel uses the word *Christus* as a proper name (see n. 211).

The burden of the next section (point (δ)) is to show that *the life and death* of this teacher are in conformity with these teachings in the sense of actualizing their content, the kingdom of love, so that it can indeed be said that "it is the divine idea that courses through this history." Hegel never shows very clearly what it is about Christ's *life* that manifests this conformity other than the teaching itself "and the love with which he conducted himself." Rather it is Christ's *death* that is central. In passages that are among the most powerful of the *Ms.*, he argues that since death is the ultimate destiny and negativity of finite spirit, the death of *this* individual is the supreme portrayal of the *unity* of the divine and the human, the highest divestment of the divine idea—this and not the divine *imago* in fallen Adam, as suggested earlier. "God himself is dead." This death is both the deepest anguish and the highest love, because love means the supreme surrender of oneself in the other. The "speculative intuition" is that the "monstrous unification" of the absolute extremes of divinity and death, of the eternal God and mortal humanity, is love itself—the very love that was the substance of Christ's teaching. As if that were not enough, this is no ordinary death but the dishonoring death of a political criminal; yet what the state dishonors is converted into the highest honor (here we are given a preview of the decadence of the Roman Empire, with which Hegel will shortly compare our own time).

The redemptive death of Christ (we have not discussed Hegel's views on satisfaction) already represents the "transfiguration" of human finitude, the beginning of the "return" of the divine idea to itself. But what has still to be added is the "envisaged consummation" of this return. This first appeared for immediate consciousness in the mode of actuality as something that happened to a single individual—*the resurrection and ascension* of Christ (point (ε)). Although Hegel does not say so directly, this has nothing to do with a physical miracle or visible appearances: "resurrection" rather means the "death of death," and "ascension" the "festive assumption of humanity into the divine idea." Hegel makes no attempt to unpack these metaphors at this point. Rather, as he surveys and summarizes the three spheres (the inner triad) of "Concrete Representation" at the conclusion of this section, he empha-

sizes that Christ's return and elevation to the right hand of God is only *one* aspect, only one side of the consummation of the third sphere, which includes not only one single individual but also the community of the Spirit: the divine idea is brought to completion in the world of actuality only when the *many* single individuals have been brought back into the unity of the Spirit, into the *community* (see n. 184). In other words, given the arrangement of the *Ms.*, Sec. C of the outer triad, "Community, Spirit," really ought to become point (ζ) of the second part of the third sphere of Sec. B, since it consummates the return of the divine idea to itself out of its worldly diremption. In this fashion, "concrete representation" "weaves itself by itself" into "community, cultus" (n. 39). Hegel is already cognizant of the tensions present in his original design, according to which Son and Spirit both belong to the third sphere, while the second is occupied solely by the natural world.

Community, Spirit

Sec. C is composed of another inner triad, which is neither theological nor philosophical but historical, namely, the sequence of origin, preservation, and perishing that applies to all historical phenomena. Preceding this triad, however, is a transitional section ("The Standpoint of the Community in General"), which expands upon the transitional remarks at the end of Sec. B. The transition is one from the sensible to the spiritual presence of God—that is, from the Christ of history to the community of the Spirit. We must make this transition without at the same time shunning sensible presence "in monkish fashion." The transition is necessary because the single individual in whom God was present has been "removed from the senses and raised to the right hand of God"; God is now present in the inwardness and subjectivity of the spiritual community. The subjectivity in question is a renewed, transfigured, communal subjectivity—in essence a unique and unsurpassable *intersubjectivity,* distinguishable from all other forms of human love and friendship. Privatistic and exclusivistic modes of existence are set aside, as are all distinctions based on mastery, power, position, sex, and wealth, and in their place is actualized a truly universal justice and freedom. The symbol "Holy Spirit" refers to the unifying

and liberating power of divine love arising from infinite anguish—the same love that was objectively represented on the cross of Christ but that now works inwardly, subjectively, building up a new human community. "This is the Spirit of God, or God as the present, actual Spirit, God dwelling in his community." This spiritual community is the same as the kingdom of God proclaimed by Christ: "The kingdom of God *is* the Spirit," or more precisely, "the kingdom of the Spirit." Thus already in the *Ms*. Hegel has introduced the term by which he will eventually characterize the third moment of the consummate religion, the moment of the return of the divine idea to God and of the consummation of all things in God.

Sec. C.α on the "origin" of the community is concerned with the question of the "verification" of the divine mission in Christ. The speculative aspect of the question ("Does God have a Son whom he sends into the world?") is properly dealt with in the framework of the trinitarian mediation of spirit as grasped philosophically. But the historical aspect of the question ("Was this Jesus of Nazareth the Christ?") cannot be answered by supposed historical proofs based on miracles. The only genuine proof is the witness of the Spirit, the evocation of faith by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the departure of Christ. This is the "origin" or "arising" (*Entstehung*) of the community, and indeed the existence of the community is the "proof" of Christ. While the community has a specific historical referent and founder, the proof of the identity of this founder as the Christ—the proof that the history of his teaching, life, death, and resurrection was "strictly adequate to the idea"—is a proof of faith and the Spirit, not a proof of history.

Sec. C.β considers the "being" (*Sein*) of the community. First, this is a community of faith and teaching. Faith is the certainty of absolute truth for spiritual consciousness as a whole; since it has a content or is a form of *objective* truth (and not mere subjective feeling), it can be taught, and this teaching must be secured in fixed expressions (as tradition and doctrine). Second, the developed community is a *church,* which takes on the form of a worldly organization and even generates the principles of civil and political life out of itself. Finally, the central act of the community is *cultic*—"an eternal repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the church." The focus of the cultus is accordingly

the sacraments, and above all the sacrament of Holy Communion or the Lord's Supper. This sacrament entails not only a "mystical union" with but also a sensible "partaking" of God in Christ (*Genuss* is the word Hegel customarily uses for "communion," and it has the connotation of sensible enjoyment or physical partaking). It is only with respect to the cultus that the Western Christian confessions differ from one another: the Catholics venerate the host as such because it is divinity present in sensible form, while the Lutherans claim that the sacrament is efficacious in faith, and the Reformed theologians regard it as a mere memorial. This section concludes with a look at various ways in which the relation between the objectivity of God ("grace") and the subjectivity of human volition and freedom has been understood; it seems to anticipate elements of the discussion in the 1824 lectures of spiritual "rebirth" and the "realization" of faith in the world.

Everything historical eventually passes away (Sec. C.γ). Is the same to be said of the community of the Spirit?[24] Such would seem not to be the case if the kingdom of God has been established eternally and if the gates of hell shall not prevail against Christ's teaching and church, although, to be sure, single individuals perish and pass over to the kingdom of heaven. This would be to end on a discordant note, and the signs of the time (n. 251) do indeed point to a considerable discord in this respect. Our age is like that of the Roman Empire in its abandonment of the question of truth, its smug conviction that no cognitive knowledge of God can be had, its reduction of everything to merely historical questions, its privatism, subjectivism, and moralism, and the failure of its teachers and clergy to lead the people. It is indeed an apocalyptic time, but the world must be left largely to its own devices in solving its problems. Philosophy can resolve this discord only in a manner appropriate to itself, by zealously guarding the truth, but it must recognize that its resolution is only partial. The community of Spirit as such is not passing away, but it does seem to be passing over from the ecclesiastical priesthood to the philosophical; if so, the truth of religion will live on in the philosophical community, in which it must now seek refuge.

24. In what follows we do not attend to the variant readings in W_2, some of which are significant. See nn. 248, 250, 256, 259.

b. The Lectures of 1824

Introduction

The Introduction is considerably expanded in the 1824 lectures and is divided into four sections, although only two of them are clearly marked (see 1824 lectures, n. 2). In the first section, Hegel enlarges upon his "definition of this religion" found at the beginning of the *Ms.* Against the danger of subjectivism in theology, of which he was especially cognizant in 1824,[25] Hegel stresses the objectivity and absoluteness of content of the Christian religion. The "absolute identity" of "infinite and finite spirit" is religion, and since it is the absolute that constitutes this identity—an identity that includes dialectically the element of difference—the absolute itself *is* religion. Since the consummate religion is the awareness of just this content, it is also the "absolute religion" (a title that Hegel employs more frequently in the 1824 Introduction than elsewhere). But the absolute is not simply an external object that lies permanently beyond subjective consciousness; rather it is present in a profound unity with the subject and is itself *absolute* or *infinite subjectivity.* In this way the "great advance" of our age—the turn to the subject—may be affirmed, but only when it is properly defined. The proper subject matter of religion is not the sensibility and feeling of the finite subject, which abandons any cognition of God, but the infinite self-consciousness of the absolute subject, which encompasses finite subjects within itself. If religion lacks divine content, then it will be filled with contingent, empirical content, and a similarity with "Roman times" arises; the comparison that Hegel made at the end of the *Ms.* is thus transferred to the beginning of Part III of the 1824 lectures.

Secs. 2 and 3 expand upon the other "characteristics" of this religion as adumbrated in Sec. 2 of the *Ms.* Introduction, namely,

25. Hegel has in mind the theology of feeling of Schleiermacher in particular but also of Jacobi and Fries. See Vol. 1, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 52; and 1824 *Concept,* nn. 20, 37. One consequence of surrendering all objective content in theology, in Hegel's view, was the turn to a purely historical attitude, which investigates what was said and done in the past but makes no judgments as to its truth or present-day validity. Theologians are like "countinghouse clerks" (Vol. 1:166). Thus we find not only an antisubjectivist but also an antihistoricist polemic in Hegel's 1824 lectures.

that it is the revelatory religion and the religion of truth, freedom, and reconciliation. The material is presented more clearly and in somewhat different form, but no new themes are introduced. The concluding brief survey of the relation of the consummate religion to the preceding religions (Sec. 4) anticipates a much fuller articulation in 1827; in the form presented in 1824, it has overtones of the stages of consciousness as delineated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

The Metaphysical Concept of God

This is no longer the first moment of an outer triad but the first of the two main divisions of the 1824 lectures. The contrast between these divisions is between the *abstract* and the *concrete* concepts of God in the consummate religion. Abstractly, God is the absolute idea; concretely, he is the inward and outward self-mediation of absolute spirit, by which it "develops" and "actualizes" itself. But this distinction is not hard-and-fast, since even the "abstract" or "pure" or "metaphysical" concept must objectify or realize itself; precisely this is the proof of God's "being" or "existence."

Hegel's summary of the ontological proof in its classical (Anselmian) form and of the modern (Kantian) refutation of it is very similar to the text in the *Ms.*, especially to certain marginal passages that were added when he lectured in 1824. What is primarily new in 1824 is Hegel's attempt to go beyond the Anselmian form of the ontological proof and to develop a modern, post-Kantian version of it based on his own logic. The primary problem with Anselm's version is that it is circular: it presupposes metaphysical "perfection," that is, the unity of concept (thought) and being (reality), and therefore its conclusion is already contained in the presupposition. But the presupposition of the unity of thought and reality is precisely what is at issue in our time. This presupposition must be questioned, even though the modern presupposition that what is most real is sense experience is no more satisfactory. Today we must start from the *difference* between being and thinking, the real and the ideal, and show how their unity results only from the *negation of their antithesis.* Only in this fashion can it be *shown* (as opposed to being merely presupposed) that being is contained

in the concept. This is the case because the concept is a *movement* that determines itself to *be;* it is the process of "self-determination into being," it *realizes* itself, "it objectifies itself for itself." The self-objectification of the concept is the idea. "The *idea* is truth in itself and for itself—the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity."[26] Such an argument is based on Hegel's doctrine of the concept as elaborated in volume 2 of the *Science of Logic*[27]—the progression from subjectivity to objectivity to idea—but here he gives only the barest sketch of it and does not really present it in the form of a proof of the being of God. Perhaps he could assume that his students were familiar with its logical foundations, especially since he was lecturing on logic and metaphysics during the same term.

The Three Elements

We have already explained how and why the two triads of the *Ms.* become the "three elements" (or "forms") of the self-development of the idea of God in the 1824 lectures. Hegel himself alludes to this altered conception (see n. 68). At the outset he establishes a link with the preceding section by claiming that the "concrete" development and realization of the *idea* of God is a further specification of the impulse toward realization already present "abstractly" in the *concept* of God. He then proceeds to an exposition of the three elements or of the moments of the "divine history" by developing the distinctions involved in four different categorial frameworks, those of logic, consciousness, space, and time. Presumably he does this because of his insistence that the idea of God must be available not only to philosophers but also to ordinary religious folk, not only to conceptual thought but also to representational expression.

The four frameworks may be set forth in tabular form as shown on the following page.

Of the several observations that could be made about this schema, we shall limit ourselves to two. First, the logical category "particularization" (*Partikularisation*) seems intended to include both the "particularity" (*Besonderheit*) of nature and the individual

26. *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 213.
27. *Science of Logic,* pp. 575 ff. (*GW* 12:5 ff.).