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KANT AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Robert Hanna

KANT AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

ROBERT HANNA presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe. But Hanna shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their ideas only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the Critical Philosophy. Hanna's book therefore comprises both an interpretative study of Kant's massive and seminal *Critique of Pure Reason*, and a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine. Hanna considers Kant's key doctrines in the *Critique* in the light of their reception and transmission by the leading figures of the analytic tradition—Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defence of Kant's theory of analytic and synthetic necessary truth. These will make *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* compelling reading not just for specialists in the history of philosophy, but for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues.

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ROBERT HANNA

CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD
2001

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in

Oxford New York

Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi
São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto

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Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

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First published 2001

First published in paperback 2004

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hanna, Robert.

Kant and the foundations of analytic philosophy / Robert Hanna.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

1. Analysis (Philosophy). 2. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

3. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804—Influence. I. Title.

B808.5.H35 2001 142'.3—dc21 00–060632

ISBN 0–19–825072–X (hbk.)

ISBN 0–19–927204–2 (pbk.)

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Typeset by Graphicraft Ltd., Hong Kong

Printed in Great Britain

on acid-free paper by

Biddles Ltd., King's Lynn, Norfolk

To MTH and ETH

*The fundamental things apply,
as time goes by*

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Since the late 1980s I have been deeply interested in the connections between Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and the historical foundations of analytic philosophy. What struck me like a slap in the face back then, just as now, is how the leading figures of the analytic tradition from the 1880s up through the 1950s and 1960s—Frege, Moore, Russell, and early Wittgenstein; Carnap and the Vienna Circle; later Wittgenstein and the ordinary-language philosophers; and Quine—quite self-consciously rejected the main doctrines of the first *Critique* and yet also quite unconsciously absorbed Kant's way of formulating the very distinctions and problems they were dealing with. Shining examples are the familiar and perhaps all-too-familiar dichotomies between analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori, rationalism and empiricism, pure logic and empirical psychology, logicism and intuitionism, realism and idealism, and so on. Where would analytic philosophy be without these enabling contrasts and worries? In this sense, the analytic tradition is the reversed image of the first *Critique*.

In 1991 or thereabouts I read Alberto Coffa's important book, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*. Coffa's thesis is that the sort of philosophical semantics practised by Carnap and the other members of the Vienna Circle was the direct result of a long and subtle dialectical engagement with Kant's theory of the a priori. That, of course, was grist for my mill: it seemed to be only an instance of a more general fact. It also so happened that at the same time I was working my way through Stephen Schiffer's equally important book, *Remnants of Meaning*. Schiffer raises a very disturbing question—namely, what if the semantic project that lies at the heart of recent and contemporary analytic philosophy is in fact incoherent and impossible? As I read Coffa's book in parallel with Schiffer's, I gradually realized that our late-twentieth-century sense of the obvious wrongness of Kant's views on the crucial analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, and on all the others too, was based on a certain conventional understanding of the first principles of analytic philosophy. But if Schiffer is correct, then that conventional understanding is itself, at the very least, not *obviously* right. This in turn led me to the thought that, although Kant's doctrines had been officially trounced, they had not actually been refuted in any decisive way—not by a long shot. For these reasons, it seemed to me that a reconsideration of the connection between Kant's first *Critique* and the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Frege to

Quine could usefully illuminate both Kant's theoretical philosophy and some topics of central contemporary concern. Hence, after a suitable period of time had elapsed, this book.

And while I am in the confessional mode, one other prefatory comment. Everyone has heard the equally wicked and witty remark, usually attributed to Quine, that there are two kinds of philosophers—those who are interested in the history of philosophy and those who are interested in philosophy. Part of my motivation for undertaking this project was to show how thoroughly that remark and the attitude it expresses misrepresent the real nature of our subject. For example: it is now clear that analytic philosophy as it was practised in 1950—the year of the first public presentation of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'—was in large part the result of working out to the bitter end a bold project initiated by Frege in the 1880s. But things might have gone very differently after 1950 if Frege's project had, in 1950, been placed in a broader historical perspective. I mean to say that we cannot do philosophy in the present without implicitly adopting an understanding of philosophy's past and also that we cannot *properly* do philosophy in the present without making this implicit historical understanding explicit—that is, without critically examining the intellectual origins and genesis we normally take for granted. So one might then say that there are two kinds of philosophers: those who are interested in the history of philosophy and those who *should* be.

Writing books is usually a solitary occupation, but philosophy is always a social activity; thus I have been helped by many people. I would particularly like to thank Paul Guyer, Christopher Shields, and Sir Peter F. Strawson for their comments on versions of Chapter 3; Mark Balaguer for his comments on a version of Chapter 4; and Alex Oliver for comments on a version of Chapter 5. Many thanks, too, are hereby directed to George Bealer, Jerrold Katz, Patricia Kitcher, Michael Potter, Peter Railton, and Christopher Shields for (for me anyhow) fog-lifting conversations about various aspects of the project. My editors at OUP, Peter Momtchiloff, Charlotte Jenkins, and Hilary Walford, have been unfailingly helpful, efficient, and pleasant throughout the several stages of the process of getting my manuscript into decent shape and then into print. Above all, however, I owe a personal debt of gratitude to Paul Guyer and Peter Strawson for their long-standing support of the very idea of this project.

Many undergraduate and graduate students participated in various versions of a repeating cycle of three seminars—on Kant's first *Critique*, on the semantics and epistemology of necessary truth, and on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy—that I ran at the University of Colorado at Boulder, at York University, and then back at Boulder again, from 1992 to 1999. Their intelligent comments and questions were a constant source of good ideas; and their appropriately directed expressions of bemusement and scepticism provided the perfect system of critical checks and balances. Thanks to you all. In a similar vein, I would like to thank audiences at the

University of Wyoming, University of British Columbia, York University, and Bowling Green State University, and also members of the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club, the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, the North American Kant Society, and the UK Kant Society, for their comments on presentations of bits and pieces of this and closely related material.

I have also been aided by institutions. The Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder granted me release time from teaching during the Spring term of 1993, making it possible to compose the earliest drafts of Chapters 3–5. And both the University of Colorado and York University generously gave me travel money to test drive some of my ideas.

My indebtedness to my wife, Martha Hanna, and to our daughter, Beth, is of a different although ultimately more important nature. The quotation on the Dedication page is taken from the song ‘As Time Goes By’. It was written by the little-known philosopher Herman Hupfeld, but—as everyone knows—memorably performed by Dooley Wilson in that most sentimental and wonderful of all old movies, *Casablanca*.

R. H.

1 January 2000
Boulder, Colorado

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A NOTE ON THE TEXT

For convenience I cite Kant's works infratextually in parentheses. These citations normally include both an abbreviation of the English title and also the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard 'Akademie' (Ak.) edition of Kant's works. For references to the first *Critique*, however, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. And for references to Kant's *Reflexionen*—i.e. entries in one or another of the ten volumes of the (largely) untranslated *Kants handschriftlicher Nachlaß*—I give the entry number in addition to the Akademie volume and page numbers. For quotations from Kant's works I generally follow the standard English translation whenever one is available, but have also corrected or modified them slightly wherever it seemed appropriate. In the crucial case of the first *Critique*, however, I have sought both maximum translational accuracy and maximum philosophical flexibility by freely combining the two leading translations, Kemp Smith and Guyer-Wood, with my own terminological fine-tunings. Because the Akademie edition contains only the B version of the first *Critique*, I also consulted the following German composite edition: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. W. Weischedel, Immanuel Kant Werkausgabe III (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). The translations of the *Reflexionen* are my own.

ABBREVIATIONS

- A *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. M. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974)
- Ak. *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 29 vols., ed. Royal Prussian (now German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: G. Reimer (now de Gruyter), 1902–)
- BL ‘The Blomberg Logic’, in *LL* 1–246
- CJ *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952)
- CPR *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St Martin’s, 1965)
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
- CPrR *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956)
- DS ‘Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space’, in *TP* 361–72
- DWL ‘The Dohna-Wundlacken Logic’, in *LL* 425–516
- FS ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, in *TP* 85–105
- GMM *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. J. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981)
- I. ‘Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality’, in *TP* 243–75; generally known as the ‘Prize Essay’
- ID ‘On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World’, in *TP* 373–416; generally known as the ‘Inaugural Dissertation’
- JL ‘The Jäsche Logic’, in *LL* 519–640
- LL *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
- MFNS *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, trans. J. Ellington (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970)
- NE ‘A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition’, in *TP* 1–45
- O. ‘An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism’, in *TP* 67–76
- OD ‘On a Discovery according to which any New Critique of Pure Reason has been made Superfluous by an Earlier One’, in *The*

- Kant–Eberhard Controversy*, trans. H. Allison (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 107–60
- OPA ‘The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God’, in *TP* 107–201
- OT ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’, in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H. Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 237–49
- P.* *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. J. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977)
- PC* *Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–99*, trans. A. Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967)
- PM ‘Physical Monadology’, in *TP* 47–66
- R.* *Reflexionen = Kants handschriftlicher Nachlaß*
- RP* *What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?*, trans. T. Humphrey (New York: Arabis, 1983)
- TP* *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
- VL ‘The Vienna Logic’, in *LL* 249–377

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Introduction

Philosophy and the history of philosophy are one. You cannot do the first without also doing the second. Otherwise put, it is essential to an adequate understanding of certain problems, questions, issues, that one understand them genetically.

Charles Taylor¹

This book has two intimately intertwined topics. First, it is an interpretive study of Immanuel Kant's massive and seminal *Critique of Pure Reason*; but secondly and equally, it is a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to W. V. O. Quine.

By Kant's own reckoning, the first *Critique* is an extended reflection on a single question: 'Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?' (*CPR* B19). Translated out of Kant's jargon, this question raises a deep and broadly applicable philosophical difficulty: how can the same judgement be at once necessarily true, referred to the real or natural world in a substantive way, yet cognizable by creatures minded like us apart from all sense experience? For easy reference, I will call this 'the Modal Problem'.

Kant's Modal Problem comprehends four important subthemes of the first *Critique*: (1) the nature of judgement—in all four senses of (i) a particular truth-evaluable 'judgement' (*Urteil*) or 'proposition' (*Satz*), (ii) an act of propositional affirmation or 'holding-for-true' (*Fürwahrhalten*), (iii) the mental state or process of 'judging' (*Beurteilen*), and (iv) the mental capacity for judging or the 'power to judge' (*Urteilstkraft*); (2) the crucial distinction between 'concepts' (*Begriffe*) and 'intuitions' (*Anschauungen*); (3) the intimately related and equally crucial distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements; and, last but not least, (4) the protean distinction between a priori and a posteriori, which cuts right across the other three subthemes.

Ultimately, however, neither Kant's proposed solution to the Modal Problem, nor any of its implicated subthemes, fully makes sense except against the backdrop of Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism. Hence a central feature of my account is a new interpretation of his special brand of idealism. The nub of that interpretation is that Kant's answer in the first *Critique*

¹ Taylor, 'Philosophy and its History', 17.

to his leading question about synthetic a priori judgements grows directly out of his long-standing engagement with an even more fundamental problem. In his pre-Critical work of 1763, ‘The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God’, Kant speaks in passing of ‘the deepest science of all, where the word “representation” is understood with sufficient precision and employed with confidence, even though its meaning can never be analysed by means of definition’ (OPA Ak. ii. 70). A decade later, in a famous letter to his former student Marcus Herz, he returns to the same idea while describing the main topics of what eventually became the first *Critique*:

[I] was then making plans for a work that might perhaps have the title, ‘The Limits of Sense and Reason’. I planned to have it consist of two parts, a theoretical and a practical. The first part would have two sections, (1) general phenomenology² and (2) metaphysics, but only with regard to its nature and method.³ . . . As I thought through the theoretical part, considering its whole scope and the reciprocal relations of its parts, I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to pay attention to and that, in fact, constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. *I asked myself: What is the ground of the reference of that in us which we call “representation” to the object?* (PC Ak. x. 129–30, emphasis added)

A representation is a *Vorstellung*—literally, a ‘putting’ (*stellung*) of something ‘before’ (*Vor*) a conscious mind. Later in the letter to Herz, Kant goes on to say that he is especially concerned with the question of how an a priori (that is, non-empirical or non-sensory) mental representation can correctly refer to real objects. He wants to know ‘how my understanding may form for itself concepts of things completely a priori, with which concepts the things must necessarily agree’ (PC Ak. x. 131). And the task of finding an answer to that question largely determines both the focus and the trajectory of Kant’s intensive work in the so-called silent decade leading up to the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But the particular question about a priori necessary objective mental representations, crucial as it is, cannot be answered without first answering the question about objective mental representations in general; indeed, an answer to the latter question largely determines an answer to the former question. So the absolutely fundamental question of Kant’s revolutionary new approach to philosophy as adumbrated in 1772—which ‘constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics’—is this: how are objective mental representations possible?

In the Critical period, Kant’s technical term for any sort of objective mental representation is “cognition” (*Erkenntnis*): ‘The genus is *representation* in general (*repraesentatio*). Subordinate to it stands representation with

² This corresponds to the Transcendental Aesthetic.

³ This corresponds to the Transcendental Logic and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.

consciousness (*perceptio*). . . . An objective perception is *cognition* (*cognitio*)' (CPR A320/B376–7).⁴ If we abstract away for a moment from the purely mental or conscious component of a cognition—which Kant (slightly misleadingly⁵) calls its 'form'—then we are left with its 'content' or 'matter' (*Inhalt*, *Materie*). The representational content is the essential—or individuating—part of a cognition in the sense that it determines precisely which object the cognition refers to. That is, it determines the object directedness, aboutness, or *intentionality* of the cognition.⁶ Put this way, and recalling that we have momentarily abstracted away from the purely mental or conscious aspects of a cognition, then we can clearly see that Kant's fundamental philosophical question is effectively equivalent to the question: how are *meanings* possible? In the philosopher's lexicon, 'meanings' are nothing other than object-directed representational contents, taken together with the formal or logical elements contained within such contents. This immediately implies that Kant's fundamental question belongs to the domain of *philosophical semantics*.⁷ For this reason, I will dub the problem that Kant's transcendental idealism is ultimately designed to solve 'the Semantic Problem'. Now, as Kant makes quite clear in his letter to Herz, but also later in the first *Critique* itself (CPR Bxvi. B166–7), his underlying intention in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is that his solution to the Modal Problem will follow directly from his solution to the Semantic Problem. In this sense, Kant's transcendental idealism is at once a general *cognitive semantics* and a general *theory of necessary truth*.

Once we have isolated the Semantic Problem and the Modal Problem as the key difficulties that Kant is struggling with in the first *Critique*, then we are in a good position to see the segue between the twin topics of this book. If the *Critique of Pure Reason* is indeed at bottom a general cognitive semantics and a general theory of necessary truth, then it seems to me that we cannot properly understand the first *Critique* without undertaking at the same time a critical reassessment of the philosophical reception and fate of these doctrines in the tradition of analytic philosophy up to Quine.

⁴ For more on the term "cognition", see Ch. 1 n. 13. ⁵ See Ch. 1 n. 11.

⁶ See Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, bk. two, Ch. I, esp. p. 88; Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Investigation V; Aquila, *Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts*; and Searle, *Intentionality*.

⁷ For surveys, see Hacking, *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?*, and Kretzmann, 'Semantics, History of'. Kant's semantics falls into a mentalistic tradition that runs backwards through early modern philosophy (esp. Locke and Descartes) and the Scholastics (esp. Aquinas), to Aristotle; forwards in one track from Kant through von Humboldt to Chomsky, Fodor, and Jackendoff; and forwards in another track from Kant through Trendelenburg (Brentano's teacher) to Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, early Gilbert Ryle, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, and John Searle. For rejections of semantic mentalism, see Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*; Dummett, 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (I–II)'; Quine, 'Mind and Verbal Dispositions'; and Quine, 'On Mental Entities'.

It is doubtless somewhat hazardous to attempt a comprehensive and uncontroversial formulation of the origins and nature of analytic philosophy, given both its complex historical development and the patent fact that one of the most vigorous and contentious debates in recent and contemporary analytic philosophy concerns precisely *what* the origins and nature of analytic philosophy really *are*.⁸ But even granting that, at least two partial characterizations of it do seem to be unobjectionably correct. First, the analytic tradition is an Austro-German and Anglo-American philosophical movement that got underway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by promoting semantics and a theory of necessary truth based on mathematical logic together with a thoroughly conventionalistic construal of language to front-and-centre position in philosophy, thereby displacing to the periphery its traditional ontological, epistemological, and psychological concerns. Secondly, the leading figures in the analytic tradition are (1) Gottlob Frege in Germany in the 1880s and 1890s; (2) Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and their Austrian-born student, colleague, and sometimes *bête noire* Ludwig Wittgenstein in England from the late 1890s into the early 1920s; (3) the 'logical positivists' or 'logical empiricists' (especially Rudolf Carnap) in Austria and Germany from the mid-1920s through the mid-1930s, and then later in the USA from the late 1930s until the late 1940s;⁹ (4) Wittgenstein again and the Oxford-centred 'ordinary-language' movement (led by J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, P. F. Strawson, and H. P. Grice) in the 1940s and 1950s;¹⁰ and, finally, (5) W. V. O. Quine in the USA in the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond.

Where precisely do Kant and the *Critique of Pure Reason* come into this familiar picture of the analytic tradition and its Hall of Fame? One obvious

⁸ See e.g. Bell and Cooper (eds.), *The Analytic Tradition*; Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*; Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*; French et al. (eds.), *The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*; Glock (ed.), *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*; Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*; Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*; Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, esp. Chs. III–VI; and Tugendhat, *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy*, esp. pt. I. Dummett has argued in 'Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic and Ought it to Be?', 441–2, and in *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* that analytic philosophy must be identified with linguistic philosophy. But this identification is almost certainly too narrow: see e.g. Hacker, 'The Rise of Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy'; Monk, 'Was Russell an Analytical Philosopher?'; and Monk again, 'What is Analytical Philosophy?'

⁹ Logical empiricism or positivism originated in the writings of members and associates of the Vienna Circle (*Wiener Kreis*), including A. J. Ayer, Gustav Bergmann, Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Gödel, Carl Hempel, Otto Neurath, W. V. O. Quine, Hans Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, Alfred Tarski, and Friedrich Waismann. See Ayer (ed.), *Logical Positivism*; Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, chs. 9–19; and Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*.

¹⁰ See Dummett, 'Oxford Philosophy'; Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*, chs. 5–6; and Hanna, 'Conceptual Analysis'.

fact is that the rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the century-long dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe.¹¹ But the deeper fact is that the analytic tradition *emerged* from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their views only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the first *Critique*. So I think that the overall career of analysis up to Quine almost perfectly reflects Alberto Coffa's crisp dictum about the logical positivist or empiricist phase of the tradition—that it 'was born in the effort to avoid Kant's theory of the a priori'.¹² And essentially the same point is nicely encapsulated in a characteristically forthright self-observation made by Russell in *My Philosophical Development*: 'Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant . . . I have sought solutions of philosophical problems by means of analysis; and I remain firmly persuaded . . . that only by analysing is progress possible.'¹³

Assuming that I am correct in closely connecting the rise and flourishing of analytic philosophy up to Quine with the extended and complex process of rejecting Kant's theoretical philosophy, this puts the contemporary student of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in a philosophically rather odd but at the same time quite unprecedented and potentially exciting position. The Kant we study nowadays is manifestly a Kant who has been reworked and represented to us by those who participated directly in the analytic tradition's long and winding struggle with the first *Critique*. That is, by necessity we read Kant's theoretical philosophy from *within* the historical and conceptual framework of analytic philosophy. But two consequences seem to follow immediately from our becoming self-consciously aware of that fact, each of which partially determines the shape and subject matter of this book. First, those of us writing about Kant's first *Critique* at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and therefore 100 years after the beginning of the analytic tradition, cannot possibly ignore the dialectical interplay between Kant's views and those of his leading analytic critics without risking misunderstanding Kant's theories. Secondly, to re-examine several of Kant's key doctrines in the light of their critical reception and transmission by the leading figures of the analytic tradition is also critically to re-explore the foundations of analytic philosophy from a specifically Kantian point of view.

¹¹ I do not mean to underestimate the crucial importance of Hegel's philosophy during the early and mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, by the 1860s and 1870s—in Germany at least—Kant's ideas had made a decisive comeback, via neo-Kantianism. See Beck, 'Neo-Kantianism', and Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*, chs. 3–7. The Hegelian influence survived somewhat longer in England than in Germany, but in the form of neo-Hegelianism—in which Kantian and Hegelian ideas cohabited very comfortably; see Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, chs. 3–4.

¹² Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, 21.

¹³ Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, 14–15. See also Hylton, 'Logic in Russell's Logicism'.

I have suggested that analytic philosophy up to Quine is to be partially identified with the thesis that semantics lies at or very near the centre of philosophy. So Ryle was not so very far from the truth when he wittily remarked that ‘preoccupation with the theory of meaning could be described as the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy’.¹⁴ I have also suggested that the other core element of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine is a theory of necessary truth deriving from the fusion of mathematical logic and linguistic conventionalism. So in a Rylean tone of voice we might say that analytic philosophy is the joint product of two intimately connected occupational diseases: a preoccupation with the theory of meaning, and a preoccupation with the logico-linguistic theory of necessity. In order to be able to relate Kant’s main doctrines in the first *Critique* to their later exciting adventures in the analytic tradition, we should have before us at least a schematic history of that two-headed obsession. Further fine points of detail, including chapter-and-verse references, and the inevitable qualifications needed for a richer and more fully adequate understanding of the analytic movement, can be added later as we go along.

As Coffa persuasively shows, the analytic tradition had its first stirrings in the early to mid-nineteenth century with Bernard Bolzano’s criticisms of Kant’s logic in his *Theory of Science* (1837),¹⁵ and with Hermann von Helmholtz’s criticisms of Kant’s views on perception and geometry in the 1860s and 1870s.¹⁶ Indeed, with the benefit of historical hindsight, we can see very clearly that Bolzano’s focus on the philosophy of the formal sciences strongly anticipates the logicistic, rationalistic, and platonistic orientation of early analytic philosophy, and also that Helmholtz’s focus on the epistemology of the natural sciences and non-Euclidean geometry just as strongly anticipates the empiricistic and exact-science-oriented slants of the middle and later phases of the analytic tradition.

If Bolzano and Helmholtz are the advance guard of analytic philosophy, then Frege is the first of its two Founding Fathers. Frege’s claim to this status rests largely on three logical treatises in the foundations of mathematics—the *Begriffsschrift* (1879),¹⁷ *Foundations of Arithmetic* (1884), and *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (1893)—and his two essays, ‘Function and Concept’ (1891) and ‘On Sense and Meaning’ (1892). Of crucial importance in Frege’s writings are his trenchant critique of ‘logical psychologism’ (i.e. the thesis that logic or

¹⁴ Ryle, ‘The Theory of Meaning’, 350.

¹⁵ See Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, ch. 2.

¹⁶ See *ibid.*, ch. 3, and Hatfield, *The Natural and the Normative*, ch. 5. See also Sect. 5.5 below.

¹⁷ “*Begriffsschrift*” means ‘conceptual notation’ or ‘concept script’. The general idea is that mathematical logic must take the form of a universal ideographic symbolism—a *characteristica universalis*. See Boole, *The Laws of Thought*, and Frege, *Conceptual Notation and Related Articles*.

mathematics is fully explained by empirical psychology) as found, for example, in J. S. Mill's *System of Logic* (1843); his rejection of Kant's theory that truths of arithmetic are synthetic a priori; his theory of analytic truth as deductive derivability from logical definitions and universal logical laws; his logicism—that is, the project of theoretically reducing arithmetic to logic via his famous definition of number in terms of sets of one-to-one correlated sets; his analytical strategy of contextual definition, obeying the dictum that a word or term has meaning only in the context of whole propositions; and last but not least his metaphysically realistic¹⁸ theory of linguistic meaning—his theory of non-physical, mind-independent 'sense' (*Sinn*) or descriptive content, and mind-independent (although sometimes physical) 'Meaning' (*Bedeutung*) or reference.

Russell is the second Founding Father of the analytic tradition. His first philosophical book was a neo-Kantian study of the philosophy of space, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* (1897). But he soon gave up what was left of his Kantianism under the powerful influence of Moore.¹⁹ Moore was at this time a violent anti-idealist and a radical platonic realist.²⁰ According to him, concepts are literally the objective constituents of the world; propositions in turn are essentially connections of concepts and thereby objectively exist in the world as well; and every object of sensation or perception is fully mind-independent. The writings of the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong²¹ added fuel to the engine of Russell's platonic realism by convincing him that propositions are abstract or 'subsistent' ontic complexes containing both individual objects and concepts or universals; and also that most well-formed, meaningful mental presentations or verbal expressions stand for an object, whether that object actually occurs in space and time or not. And, perhaps most importantly of all, the works of the Italian logician and mathematician Giuseppe Peano²² and Frege jointly convinced him that logicism was a fully viable philosophical programme. In the period 1900–14, Russell assimilated but also brilliantly synthesized these influences, particularly in *Principles of Mathematics* (1903), 'On Denoting' (1905), *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13),²³ *Problems of Philosophy* (1912), and *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914). Russell's signal contributions to the foundations of the analytic tradition are his conception of philosophical analysis as the decomposition of logical,

¹⁸ It is not quite accurate to call Frege's theory 'platonistic', although it certainly has some platonic features; see Ch. 4 n. 6.

¹⁹ See esp. Moore's 'Critical Notice of B. A. W. Russell, *Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*' (1899), 'The Nature of Judgment' (1899), 'The Refutation of Idealism' (1903), and 'Kant's Idealism' (1904).

²⁰ See Baldwin, G. E. Moore, chs. I–II.

²¹ See Meinong, *On Assumptions* (1st edn., 1902), and Russell, 'Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions' (1904).

²² See Rossi-Landi, 'Peano, Giuseppe'; Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 4, 10; and Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, 129–31.

²³ Co-authored with A. N. Whitehead.

semantic, epistemological, psychological, or ontological complexes into simples or atoms; his sharp distinction between knowledge by description (conceptual or propositional cognition) and knowledge by acquaintance (intuitive or perceptual cognition); his denotational or (to use Ryle's phrase) "Fido"-Fido' semantics, according to which words have meaning solely by standing for objects; his theory of definite descriptions in 'On Denoting', which says that most or even all apparent singular terms can be theoretically eliminated by translating them into special contextually defined logically complex general terms; and finally his extension of logicism to geometry.

Then: enter Wittgenstein. From his arrival in Cambridge in 1911 through the publication of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in 1921, Wittgenstein absorbed, refocused, and crucially transformed the Fregean–Russellian logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. Indeed, he turned analytic philosophy in a fundamentally new direction that initiated its second major phase. This Tractarian turn essentially contains four doctrines. They are a 'picture theory' of meaning for the denotational parts of language, according to which propositions are structurally isomorphic with what they are about;²⁴ a theory of logical constants as strictly non-denotational or functionally defined parts of language; two highly restrictive distinctions between logical sense and logical nonsense, on the one hand, and between 'saying' (= describing, stating) and 'showing' (= indicating, ostending) on the other; and lastly a closely related doctrine of logical truths as vacuous linguistic tautologies. The overall upshot, however, is a strong emphasis on the fundamental philosophical importance of language—especially 'ideal' logical languages or *Begriffsschriften*.

Wittgenstein's achievement significantly contributed to the creation of a new submovement within the overall analytic development—namely, logical empiricism or positivism.²⁵ This submovement began in the discussions and writings of the members of the Vienna Circle. In turn, the philosophical interests and outlook of the Circle had six main sources of inspiration and cognitive funding: Hume's epistemological empiricism, as updated by Ernst Mach; neo-Kantian philosophy;²⁶ the Helmholtzian conviction that philosophy should take its cue from the exact sciences and eschew speculative metaphysics; non-Euclidean geometry and Einstein's theory of relativity; Frege's and Russell's logicism; and, above all, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Combining the intellectual

²⁴ Or at least that is the standard interpretation. See e.g. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, ch. III. But see also Diamond, *The Realistic Spirit*, Introduction II and ch. 6, for a revisionist reading of the *Tractatus* according to which everything propositional (including logic) is literally nonsense. If correct, this radically sharpens the contrast between what Frege, Moore, and Russell did and what Wittgenstein was actually up to.

²⁵ On the transition between the *Tractatus* and logical empiricism, see Coffa, *Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, chs. 8–12, and Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*, ch. 8.

²⁶ See Richardson, *Carnap's Construction of the World*, chs. 4–6.

inputs from these sources with Wittgenstein's conversations with some members of the Vienna Circle in the late 1920s and early 1930s,²⁷ Carnap and the other empiricists then gradually developed three basic views. The first was the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a proposition is the method or rule by which it is empirically tested for truth; the second was the conventionalist, linguistic, or more accurately logico-linguistic theory of necessary truth, which holds that necessary truths are nothing but either truths of elementary logic or else theorems logically derivable from a set of arbitrarily chosen axioms or postulates for a given formal or natural language system; and the third was a blanket rejection of the very idea of the synthetic a priori²⁸ and of metaphysics more generally.

Wittgenstein returned to England in 1929, whereupon he promptly and rather perversely set about destroying his own earlier views.²⁹ The eventual positive result of this destruction was a strong emphasis on a painstaking, micrological description of the basic concepts implicit in 'ordinary' or natural languages and everyday speech practices, as opposed to the logical study of formalized languages.³⁰ But the negative result was a deep scepticism about the very possibility of systematic philosophy, including classical semantic and logical analysis in either its rationalist-platonist or empiricist-positivist versions.³¹ Wittgenstein's new doctrines—or anti-doctrines—circulated in samizdat form and by word of mouth for many years, but were eventually published in the hugely influential *Philosophical Investigations* (1953).

The intellectually liberating ideas of the *Investigations* produced an odd interference pattern within the rolling wave that was the analytic tradition in the 1940s and 1950s, in the sense that they somewhat paradoxically at once gave it impetus and also tended subversively towards its dissolution. Still, even allowing for the important differences between Wittgenstein's early and later views, there remains an underlying thread linking both of them, and those of the intervening logical empiricists, together—namely, a primary focus on language, and on the thesis that all philosophical questions are ultimately—in some sense—questions of language. This crucially transforms Kant's famous Copernican Revolution in philosophy (*CPR* Bxvi), which says that all philosophical questions are ultimately questions about the origins, nature, scope, and limits of human cognition.³² Hence it has been aptly called 'the linguistic

²⁷ See Waismann, *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*.

²⁸ This is slightly overstated for expository convenience; for qualification, see Ch. 5 n. 10.

²⁹ This is not to deny the existence of many important continuities between earlier and later Wittgenstein: e.g. prop. 3.326 of the *Tractatus* (p. 57) strongly anticipates the intimate linkage of meaning and use in the *Philosophical Investigations*, etc.

³⁰ See e.g. Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn*, pt. III.

³¹ If Diamond is correct, this deep scepticism about systematic philosophy infuses the *Tractatus* as well; see *The Realistic Spirit*, Introduction II.

³² See Sects. 1.1 and 1.2.

turn'.³³ Viewed in this synoptic way, what otherwise appears to be a sharp or even unbridgeable dichotomy between the doctrines of the early and later Wittgenstein can be smoothly bridged by construing it as an essentially domestic difference between ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy.

Influential as it was, the linguistic phase of analytic philosophy did not stay permanently in place. Just as Wittgenstein had transformed the logicist phase of analytic philosophy and initiated its linguistic turn, so Quine again transformed analytic philosophy and initiated its third phase. Quine's main intellectual influences were Frege's and Russell's logico-mathematical writings, on the one hand, and the writings of Carnap and the other members or affiliates of the Vienna Circle, on the other. But there were also lesser yet still significant elements of pragmatism, neo-Hegelian holism, and neo-Kantian verificationism in his work, perhaps more or less unconsciously inherited from Harvard's philosophical heavy-hitters of the previous two generations—William James, Josiah Royce, and C. I. Lewis.³⁴ In any case, particularly in 'Truth by Convention' (1935), 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951), *Word and Object* (1960), 'Carnap and Logical Truth' (1963), and 'Epistemology Naturalized' (1969), Quine thoroughly rejected the 'very ideas' of meanings or intensions, modality and modal logic, the analytic/synthetic distinction, atomistic verificationism, and the a priori/a posteriori distinction. Then on the ruins of logical empiricism he built a new form of empiricism—one that is thoroughly holistic, behaviouristic, and fallibilistic. Although Quine managed to retain an important element of linguistic philosophy in his great sensitivity to the 'use versus mention' distinction,³⁵ his version of analysis was above all guided by philosophical naturalism,³⁶ or the thesis that all serious metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological questions in philosophy can be answered only by direct appeal to the natural sciences. For this reason it seems highly appropriate to dub Quine's transformation of the analytic tradition the 'scientific turn'. Otherwise put, after Quine analytic philosophy is *scientific philosophy*.³⁷

To summarize, we have three salient facts. First, there is the overarching explicit or implicit concern of all analytic philosophers from Frege to Quine with semantics and the logico-linguistic theory of necessity. Secondly, there is the overarching three-part symphonic structure³⁸ of the analytic tradition:

³³ The phrase is Gustav Bergmann's. See Rorty, 'Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy'.

³⁴ See Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy*.

³⁵ See Carnap on the material mode versus the formal mode of speech in *The Logical Syntax of Language*, sects. 64, 74–81; Tarski on object languages versus metalanguages in 'The Semantic Conception of Truth', 349–51; and Quine on semantic ascent in *Word and Object*, 270–6.

³⁶ See e.g. Kitcher, 'The Naturalists Return', and Papineau, *Philosophical Naturalism*.

³⁷ See Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*.

³⁸ i.e. the middle part of the analytic tradition up to Quine further divides into two subparts: ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy.

(1) logicistic philosophy (led by Frege, early Moore, and early Russell); (2) linguistic philosophy (led in its first or ideal language phase by early Wittgenstein and Carnap, and then in its second or ordinary language phase by the later Wittgenstein); and (3) scientific philosophy (led by Quine). But, thirdly and perhaps most importantly, there is the underlying dialectical engine of philosophical analysis—namely, its ongoing critical struggles with the central doctrines of the first *Critique*. The first thing to go was Kant's philosophy of arithmetic, by Frege's means;³⁹ then Kant's idealism and theory of judgement, by Moore's means;⁴⁰ then Kant's philosophy of geometry, by Russell's means;⁴¹ then Kant's doctrine of the meaningfulness of analytic or logical truths, by early Wittgenstein's means;⁴² then Kant's doctrine of the synthetic a priori, by Carnap's means (although significantly prefigured by early Wittgenstein and Schlick);⁴³ and then finally Kant's seminal analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, by Quine's means.⁴⁴ Seen in this light, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the inner drama of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond⁴⁵ is its century-long love–hate relationship with Kant's theoretical philosophy.

I have one further point to make in this particular connection. It has been forcefully argued by several leading contemporary philosophers that analytic philosophy has now reached a stage of crisis⁴⁶ in its development. This crisis arises from the very unsettling fact that many and perhaps even most analytic philosophers now question the defensibility and ultimate intelligibility of the very idea of analysis. But how can there be analytic philosophy without a cogent and coherent conception of philosophical analysis? In this sense, the analytic consensus in contemporary philosophy—as intellectually vigorous, institutionally secure, and one might even say bull-marketish, as it undoubtedly is—is speeding towards a crash. Michael Friedman has very plausibly traced the origins of this crisis back to analytic philosophy's rejection of Kant, via its intimate but stormy relationship with logical positivism.⁴⁷ Perhaps, then, our re-examination of the first *Critique* and the historical foundations of analytic philosophy up to Quine will also throw some light upon the underlying causes and possible remedies of this unwholesome situation.

³⁹ See Sect. 3.3.

⁴⁰ See Sects. 2.3 and 2.4.

⁴¹ See Sect. 5.5.

⁴² See Sects. 2.2 and 3.1.

⁴³ See Sects. 5.0 and 5.6.

⁴⁴ See Sect. 3.5.

⁴⁵ For the beyond, see Hanna, 'A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism'. Scientific essentialists reject Kant's thesis of the strong equivalence between necessity and apriority (see Sect. 5.2).

⁴⁶ See e.g. McDowell, *Mind and World*; Norris, 'Doubting Castle or the Slough of Despond: Davidson and Schiffer on the Limits of Analysis'; and Putnam, *Words and Life*. Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* and Schiffer's *Remnants of Meaning* laid the groundwork for this line of thinking.

⁴⁷ See Friedman, 'Kant and the 20th Century', 44–5, and Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*, 1–14.

Before we get properly underway, however, I also have to lay down three caveats.

First, given its double-barrelled topic, my account does not follow in a perfectly strict way either the textual organization of the first *Critique* or the historical development of the analytic tradition. Instead its organization is thematic rather than textual-exegetical or conventionally historical.

Secondly, in order to avoid the ever-present danger of this book's becoming a loose, baggy monster, I have had to focus fairly selectively on certain key Kantian topics and also on certain corresponding key topics in the analytic tradition.

For these two reasons, however, a brief preliminary sketch of the contents of the chapters may help to orient the reader. In Chapter 1, I state and explicate my overarching interpretive proposal that Kant's positive theoretical philosophy as presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is at bottom a general theory of objective mental representation, or a general cognitive semantics; and then I begin the justification of that proposal by undertaking a preliminary discussion of Kant's theory of cognition, with a special emphasis on judgement. This is extended and widened in Chapter 2 with a discussion of the conditions under which cognitions are possible. This chapter unpacks in some detail my interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. Then I cover in sequence the natures of analytic (Chapter 3) and synthetic (Chapter 4) judgements. These two chapters also focus, respectively, on the cognitive semantics of concepts or descriptive terms, and the cognitive semantics of intuitions or directly referring terms. Chapter 5 deals with Kant's doctrine of necessary truth, and especially with his doctrine of synthetic a priori judgements. Here I argue on Kant's behalf for 'modal dualism'⁴⁸—the thesis that there are two irreducibly different kinds of necessary truth. To confirm this thesis, I apply Kant's doctrine of the synthetic a priori to the highly controversial case of geometry and then look closely at the well-known objection(s) to Kant's doctrine from non-Euclidean geometry. Finally, in the Concluding Un-Quinean Postscript I offer a Kantian response to a radical worry—due of course to Quine—about the very idea of the a priori, and make a few tentative remarks about the broader implications of the first *Critique* for the future of analytic philosophy.

My third caveat is this. After much consideration, I have decided not to give a detailed or extended treatment of Kant's theory of the nature and justification of synthetic a priori truths of the transcendental metaphysics of nature—or, as he sometimes labels it, 'ontology' (*RP Ak.* xx. 260). Hence I present no detailed or extended interpretation of the Metaphysical Deduction, the Transcendental Deduction(s) of the pure concepts of the understanding, the Schematism of the pure concepts, the Analytic of Principles (Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience, and Postulates

⁴⁸ This apt term was, I think, invented by David Chalmers.

of Empirical Thought), or the Refutation of Idealism. There are three reasons for this decision. First, the nature and justification of transcendental ontology is not a topic on which Kant has been directly engaged by Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein early or late, Carnap and the logical empiricists, or Quine. Instead, when dealing explicitly with Kant or with Kantian themes, they have focused almost exclusively on certain highly contested flashpoints: analytic versus synthetic; intuitions (or singular terms, directly referential terms) versus concepts (or general terms, descriptive terms); a posteriori versus a priori; the very idea of a synthetic a priori proposition; whether mathematics is grounded in pure intuition or in pure logic; the logical versus the psychological; realism versus idealism, and so on. Secondly, and somewhat more pragmatically, to work out Kant's theory of transcendental-ontological synthetic a priori propositions, with careful attention paid to all its aspects and implications, would take another book at least as long as the one I have already written. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this is a topic already heavily and excellently covered by mainstream English-speaking Kant scholarship over the last 100 years.⁴⁹ It is not my task to tread this well-trodden ground again. Instead, I want to see what philosophical sense can be made of some key doctrines of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in relation to the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine. That is more than task enough.

⁴⁹ See esp. (in reverse temporal order) Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*; Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*; Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*; Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*; and Kemp Smith, *Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*.

1.

Kant and the Semantic Problem

If we discard [Kant's] antiquated terminology, and state his position in current terms, we find that it amounts to the assertion that *consciousness is in all cases awareness of meaning*.

Norman Kemp Smith¹

1.0. Introduction

What is Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* about? While the first *Critique* is notoriously long, dense, and difficult to grasp in its details, for contemporary readers there nevertheless seems to be an easy answer to this question. It is about the nature, scope, and limits of human knowledge—more precisely, about the problem of adequately justifying our scientific and more generally rational beliefs in the face of radical Humean or anti-metaphysical scepticism, on the one hand, and radical Cartesian scepticism about the external world, on the other. But as a matter of fact this pat answer is to a large extent predetermined by a certain long-standing and widely shared interpretive model of the first *Critique*. According to this canonical model, Kant is doing transcendental epistemology.² Bruce Kuklick plausibly speculates that in North America its proximal cause is C. I. Lewis:

After the [First World] war Hegel became, for Americans, a silly pompous, and *defeated* figure, unworthy of the great tradition. Indeed, the wonder is not that Hegel vanished, but that Kant remained. And in line with this development the Kant who remained was not the Kant pregnant with elements of transcendent metaphysics. It was the Kant

¹ Kemp Smith, *Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, p. xli.

² See e.g. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*; Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume*; Beck, *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant*; Bennett, *Kant's Analytic*; Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*; Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*; Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*; Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*; and Van Cleve, *Problems from Kant*.

whom C. I. Lewis expounded, the austere transcendental epistemologist, not the transcendent metaphysician. To make the point in terms of the canon: the Kant of the canon synthesizes rationalism and empiricism; he is much less the father of Hegel.³

Kuklick's thumbnail gloss on Kant historiography also correctly indicates that there have traditionally been two distinct canonical ways of reading Kant: as a 'transcendent metaphysician'; and as an 'austere transcendental epistemologist'. According to the metaphysical reading, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is about the nature, scope, and limits of ontology—in particular, about answering the questions 'what basic sorts of beings are there?' and 'what is ultimately real?' This reading held sway in Germany from shortly after the publication of the first *Critique*,⁴ through the Idealist period, until the emergence and flourishing of neo-Kantian philosophy in the mid- to late nineteenth century,⁵ when it was gradually replaced by the epistemological reading. By contrast, in England and North America the metaphysical reading of Kant survived pretty much intact through the neo-Hegelian period until the early 1920s; but ever since then—Lewis's *Mind and the World Order* appeared in 1929—the epistemological reading has been the Anglo-American norm.

In my opinion, neither of these interpretive models of Kant's theoretical philosophy is wrong. Each, indeed, validly brings out an aspect of the first *Critique*. Nevertheless, each also presents a somewhat one-sided view—as it were, a flat or two-dimensional projection of a robustly three-dimensional object.

In addition to these two canonical readings of the first *Critique*, there is at least one other way of looking at Kant's theoretical philosophy—a way that is more fully explanatory and better rounded—that needs to be illuminated and explored. I make no special claims of originality for my third way; indeed, to a large extent it is merely the result of fusing two important pre-existing tendencies in recent Kant scholarship. First, it has been quite convincingly shown that Kant can be read as a *logico-semantic theorist*.⁶ (For Kant, 'logic' includes not only the classical or Aristotelian/Scholastic theory of deductive entailment, sentential connectives, and monadic quantification, but also much of what we would now regard as semantics—the theory of concepts and their constituents,

³ Kuklick, 'Seven Thinkers and How They Grew: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz; Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Kant', 133–4. The leading popularizer of Lewis's epistemic interpretation—even when he disagreed with Lewis—was L. W. Beck.

⁴ See Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*.

⁵ See Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*.

⁶ See e.g. Brandt, *The Table of Judgments: Critique of Pure Reason A67–76; B92–101*; Brittan, *Kant's Theory of Science*; Butts, 'Kant's Schemata as Semantical Rules'; Hintikka, *Logic, Language-Games, and Information: Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic*; Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*; McDowell, 'Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality'; McDowell, *Mind and World*; Reich, *The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments*; Schwyzer, *The Unity of Understanding*; Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes*; and Sellars, 'Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience'.

the theory of judgements or propositions, the theory of truth, and so on.) And, secondly, it has been equally convincingly shown that Kant can be read as a *philosophical psychologist*.⁷

Now Kemp Smith pointed out as early as 1923 that it is reasonable to regard the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a treatise about the conditions of the possibility of the human mind's conscious apprehension of meanings. What this strongly suggests to me is that, while the logico-semantic and psychological interpretations of Kant may seem on the surface disparate and incommensurable, they are really only two sides of the same coin. Kant's theoretical philosophy is at once thoroughly logico-semantic *and* thoroughly psychological in nature.⁸ Or, as I put it in the Introduction, in my view the first *Critique* is a general theory of objective mental representation—a general cognitive semantics. In order to justify this interpretive thesis, in the rest of this chapter and in the next as well I will explicate the basic doctrines of the first *Critique* from an explicitly cognitive-semantic point of view.

1.1. Kant's Cognitive Semantics

The most obvious objection to my way of reading the first *Critique* is the charge of anachronism—that I am falsely imposing contemporary conceptions and distinctions on a quite foreign eighteenth-century outlook. So what we must see is how it is that Kant, from his earliest philosophical writings forward, is a cognitive semanticist.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, Kant's famous 1772 letter to Herz contains a working outline of the first *Critique*, and explicitly tells us that its 'key' lies in answering the question of how mental representations of objects are possible:

⁷ See e.g. Ameriks, *Kant's Theory of Mind*; Aquila, *Matter in Mind*; Aquila, *Representational Mind*; Brook, *Kant and the Mind*; Falkenstein, *Kant's Intuitionism*; Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*; Keller, *Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness*; Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*; Powell, *Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness*; Waxman, *Kant's Model of the Mind*; and (leading the way in 1963) Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*. More generally, see Zoeller, 'Main Developments in Recent Scholarship on the *Critique of Pure Reason*', 457–66.

⁸ See also Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 6, 17–34, 398. Hence the first *Critique* shares much in common with recent works on the mentalistic side of the philosophy of language—see e.g. Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*; Fodor, *The Language of Thought*; Fodor, *Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind*; Jackendoff, *Patterns in the Mind*; Jackendoff, *Semantics and Cognition*; Peacocke, *A Study of Concepts*; and Searle, *Intentionality*.