

EMOTION & VALUE

Edited by

SABINE ROESER
& CAIN TODD



OXFORD

Emotion and Value

Emotion and Value

EDITED BY

Sabine Roeser

Cain Todd

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

© the several contributors 2014

The moral rights of the authors have been asserted

First Edition published in 2014

Impression: 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014940450

ISBN 978-0-19-968609-4

Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CRO 4YY

Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

In memory of Peter Goldie

Acknowledgements

The idea for this volume arose from the happy coincidence of three conferences that took place independently in three different countries in May 2011, all focusing in some way or another on emotion and value. Cain Todd and Julien Deonna organized a conference on 'Emotion, Self, and Time' at the University of Geneva, in collaboration with the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences and the Thumos Research Group, which was generously funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Sabine Roeser organized the conference 'Moral Emotions and Intuitions' in The Hague, generously funded via the Philosophy Department at TU Delft and via her research project on 'Moral Emotions and Risk Politics', funded by NWO (Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research). Sabine Roeser's research team members Dr Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist and Sofia Kaliarnta were also involved in the organization, and Henneke Filiz provided for excellent organizational support. Peter Goldie and Moritz Müller organized the workshop 'Emotion: Phenomenology and Content' at the University of Manchester's Centre for Emotion and Value, funded by a grant from the Mind Association.

This convergence, amongst others, alerted us to the lively, and growing, philosophical interest in these issues and motivated us to further pursue the fruitful discussions that took place at these events. This volume contains chapters by several of the speakers at these conferences, and we would like to thank all of our contributors for providing such original and stimulating perspectives on a range of different issues concerning the many connections between emotion and value. We would also like to thank Peter Momtchiloff for his support and encouragement in bringing this volume to fruition, and the anonymous referees provided by OUP for their helpful comments at the initial stage of planning the collection.

Our work in editing this volume has been made possible by a number of research grants and bodies. Cain Todd's work on the volume took place while being funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF), at first as an official member of the Thumos Research Group at the University of Geneva and the Swiss Centre for Affective Science (CISA), and latterly through the SNF at the University of Fribourg on the project 'Imagination, Emotion, and Value'. Sabine Roeser's work was funded by an NWO VIDI grant on 'Moral Emotions and Risk Politics' (grant nr 276-20-012).

Finally, and most importantly, we must thank Peter Goldie, whose original idea it was to put together this edited collection. He was to be one of the editors, and a contributor to the volume, but sadly he passed away while the proposal was in preparation. We dedicate this volume to the memory of Peter, whose rich and nuanced work on emotion, and on value, has been so important and influential, as is attested by many of

the chapters collected here. Few have done more for philosophical research on emotion. He was a wonderful writer, an inspiring and generous speaker, and a mentor and friend for many of us working in this field. He is very much missed.

Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd

Contents

<i>List of Contributors</i>	xi
1. Emotion and Value: Introduction <i>Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd</i>	1
Part I. Emotion and the Nature of Value	
2. In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? <i>Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni</i>	15
3. Evaluative Phenomenology <i>Michelle Montague</i>	32
4. Emotion, Attention, and the Nature of Value <i>Michael Brady</i>	52
5. Emotions as Unitary States <i>Jonathan Dancy</i>	72
6. Relatively Fitting Emotions and Apparently Objective Values <i>Cain Todd</i>	90
Part II. Emotion, Evaluation, and Justification	
7. Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification <i>Adam C. Pelsner</i>	107
8. Why Recalcitrant Emotions Are Not Irrational <i>Sabine A. Döring</i>	124
9. Surprise <i>Adam Morton</i>	137
10. Emotions Fit for Fiction <i>Greg Currie</i>	146
Part III. Emotion, Value, and the Self	
11. Emotional Self-Trust <i>Linda Zagzebski</i>	169
12. Self-Empathy and Moral Repair <i>Nancy Sherman</i>	183
13. Emotions and the Virtues of Self-Understanding <i>Michael Lacewing</i>	199

X CONTENTS

14. Emotion and Agency	212
<i>Jan Slaby and Philipp Wüschner</i>	
15. Evaluating Existential Despair	229
<i>Matthew Ratcliffe</i>	
<i>Index</i>	247

List of Contributors

MICHAEL BRADY
University of Glasgow

GREG CURRIE
University of York

JONATHAN DANCY
University of Reading/ University of Texas at Austin

JULIEN A. DEONNA
University of Geneva

SABINE A. DÖRING
Tübingen University

MICHAEL LACEWING
Heythrop College, University of London

MICHELLE MONTAGUE
University of Texas at Austin

ADAM MORTON
University of Alberta

ADAM C. PELSER
United States Air Force Academy

MATTHEW RATCLIFFE
Durham University

SABINE ROESER
Delft University of Technology

NANCY SHERMAN
Georgetown University

JAN SLABY
Free University Berlin

FABRICE TERONI
University of Bern

CAIN TODD

Lancaster University

PHILIPP WÜSCHNER

Free University Berlin

LINDA ZAGZEBSKI

University of Oklahoma

1

Emotion and Value

Introduction

Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd

The last few decades have witnessed a growing interest in, and expanding literature on the emotions, in a number of domains, and from a number of different perspectives. There have been monographs exploring the historical and cultural dimensions of the emotions, a great deal of empirical work in psychology and neuroscience concerning the nature and neural bases of emotion, philosophical theories about the relationship between emotion and other mental states, and the role of the emotions in disclosing and constituting various types of value.¹ Although the primary focus of the present collection is on this last topic, the issues touched upon are diverse and wide-ranging, drawing on many different areas of philosophy as well as on relevant empirical work undertaken in other disciplines. The contributions that follow all explore various important connections between emotion and value, including the role that emotions play in evaluative thought and experience, and in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. The nature of such experience, directed at both self and world, and its epistemic credentials constitute the key themes that unite all of the contributions. As many of the issues discussed have hitherto been pursued largely independently in a number of separate philosophical domains, such as the philosophy of mind, metaethics, aesthetics, value theory, and the philosophy of emotions, we hope that one of the virtues of this book will be to bring together this cutting-edge research into a more unified overview of the field.

It is fair to say that philosophers and psychologists working on the emotions have reached something of a consensus about the complex, dual but interrelated nature of the affective and cognitive components of these states. Emotions are both world-directed, disclosing what is of value in general, and yet also fundamentally

¹ For a brief overview of some of this literature, see the references at the end of this introduction. Particularly useful bibliographical information and overviews of the relevant fields can be found in Davidson et al. (2003); Sander and Scherer (2009); Goldie (2012); Deonna and Teroni (2012).

self-directed, providing access to our own subjective experiential states and evaluative stances. Perhaps most distinctively, emotions comprise and are concerned in particular with bodily states of the subject. They thus involve the heart and the head, body and mind, the world outside and the world within. These dichotomies have been central to the various philosophical conceptions of emotion that have previously been articulated. Although few today would argue that emotions must be simply reducible to one or the other of their non-cognitive or cognitive components, the precise make-up of their 'Janus-faced' nature remains a matter of debate, and this is reflected in the diverse roles that emotions are held to play in different areas of philosophy.²

One traditional view in metaethics, as well as in moral psychology and decision theory, has been that emotions are opposed to rationality, objectivity, and justification. Indeed, one way of categorizing metaethical theories would be under the broad headings of rationalism or sentimentalism respectively.³ Rationalists generally maintain that moral thought has to be based in reason in order to lead to justified moral judgements. Sentimentalists emphasize instead the dependence of value on affective states such as emotions, but insofar as they share the idea that emotions are non-cognitive, they are prone to question the objectivity attributed to moral judgements by their opponents.⁴

A similar dichotomy in approaches can be witnessed in decision theory. The normative approach holds that well-grounded decisions are made in accordance with rationality, while the alternative empirical approach holds that, as a matter of fact, people make many decisions in an emotional, unconscious, irrational way, where these notions are equated. This latter approach has been popularized, for example, by Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (2011), in his recent book *Thinking Fast and Slow*. Empirical research in moral psychology also frequently presupposes such a dualistic framework, for example in the highly influential work of neuropsychologist Joshua Greene (Greene 2003, 2007) and social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (Haidt 2001; Greene and Haidt 2002). These scholars argue that because emotions play an important role in moral judgements, this undermines the credibility of these judgements, based as they supposedly are on irrational, unconscious motives. These views also resonate in the common appeals to be rational and not to be emotional in decision-making, since being emotional is by definition taken to be inferior.

In contrast with such pessimistic assessments of the connection between emotion and rationality, however, many contemporary emotion scholars in philosophy and psychology now think that emotions are an important source of practical rationality. After a long period of relative neglect by analytic philosophers, Robert Solomon (1976)

² The apt description of emotions as 'Janus-faced' comes from de Sousa (2007).

³ Clearly, of course, this is an oversimplification even of the main fault-line that runs between Humean and Kantian approaches to ethics, but it does reflect important differences in the ways emotions have been viewed in metaethical theories.

⁴ For a rich and sophisticated account of these issues, and in particular how sentimentalism fails to map neatly onto the divide between realists and expressivists in metaethics, see D'Arms and Jacobson (2006).

broke new ground and initiated a wave of philosophical research into the emotions, by arguing that they are cognitive states, specifically judgements of value. The attribution of a cognitive nature to emotions has been highly influential and has informed the majority of philosophical accounts of the emotions ever since.⁵ Outside the confines of philosophy, the research of the neuropsychologist Antonio Damasio (1994), for example, has been highly influential. He showed that people with damage to their amygdala in the temporal lobe lose their capacity to feel emotions and at the same time are no longer capable of making concrete moral and practical judgements.

It is thus now widely accepted that emotions play an important epistemological role in evaluative thought and experience. However, moving away from narrowly centred judgement-based theories, philosophical discussion has more recently been keen to stress that unlike merely intellectual, propositional evaluative knowledge, emotions uniquely provide (or purport to provide) direct experiential acquaintance with evaluative states of affairs. Their distinctive phenomenal character, bodily feelings, valence, motivational pull, and world-directed intentionality, all serve to connect us, as it were, directly with the evaluative world.⁶ The values they have been claimed to reveal, or to constitute, range from the aesthetic and moral to the epistemic, psychological, and self-reflective. Naturally, the questions of whether and how emotions perform this function, and the exact scope of the relevant values encompassed, are at the centre of deep philosophical dispute; and hence at the heart of this volume.

One common theme in the recent literature has been an appeal to perception as a useful model for illuminating emotion. Indeed, perceptual theories have come to encompass both accounts of emotion that emphasize these states' cognitive components (e.g. Roberts 2003), as well as accounts that emphasize their essentially bodily nature (e.g. Prinz 2004). Such theories are attractive insofar as our perceptual states too are world-directed and yet possess a distinctive phenomenal character; and, it has seemed to many, these two features are somehow intrinsically connected. Emotional phenomenal character and intentional content, like perceptual character and content, seem to go hand-in-hand. Moreover, philosophers sympathetic to the perceptual model have been keen to emphasize purported similarities between the epistemic roles of perception and emotion—the former in justifying sensory knowledge of the world, the latter in justifying evaluative knowledge.⁷ In terms of the general analogy with perception, it is also worth noting that philosophy here echoes certain developments in affective science, where 'appraisal theories' of emotion have exercised a recent dominance.⁸

Representatives of these various positions on the connection between emotion and value can be found in several contributions to this book, such as those by Döring and

⁵ Prominent treatments include, for example: Rorty (1980); Lyons (1980); de Sousa (1987); Gordon (1987); Greenspan (1988); Nussbaum (2001).

⁶ Amongst such works are: Goldie (2000); Tappolet (2000); Roberts (2003); Prinz (2004); Helm (2007); Roeser (2011).

⁷ For an excellent overview of perceptual theories see Deonna and Teroni (2012: ch. 6).

⁸ For an overview see Davidson et al. (2003); Sander and Scherer (2009).

Pelser, as too can objections to such views. For, inevitably, such accounts of emotion have their critics, who are keen to undermine the supposed analogies between perception and emotion in terms of the relationship between intentional content and phenomenal character, as well as to highlight the poorer epistemic credentials of the emotions in grounding evaluative knowledge. Alternative positive accounts of the evaluative nature of emotion can be found in the chapters by Deonna and Teroni, Brady, Dancy, Todd, and Montague in this volume.

In addition to addressing these numerous general connections between emotion and value, sometimes at a level of relative abstraction, much of the work undertaken in this volume has important implications for current research in philosophical domains that are directly concerned with specific types of value (and sometimes with specific emotions) such as those present in metaethics, moral psychology, and aesthetics. Prominent philosophical issues here include the role that emotions play in practical rationality, in self-understanding and well-being, in moral judgement, and in the appreciation of fiction. These apparently disparate themes are all addressed in several of the contributions to the volume, and are bound by one particular thread, namely, the normative nature of emotions in general—a topic approached under many different guises depending on subject matter and inclination: ‘appropriateness’, ‘fittingness’, ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘rationality’ are all notions employed by philosophers in trying to understand the particular normative force of the connection between emotion and value. We leave it for the reader to try and trace this often delicate and complex thread throughout the subsequent chapters in more detail, but in the remainder of this introduction we will provide a brief overview of the chapters and highlight some of the salient interconnections.

The book is organized as follows. Part I addresses the role of emotion in our understanding of the nature of value. Part II examines the possible justificatory role emotions may play in evaluation. Part III examines the special role that emotions play in relation to the self, specifically to self-evaluation and self-experience.

Part I: Emotion and the Nature of Value

Whether and how emotions resemble perception, how emotional experiences represent value, and the nature of the connection between the various elements constituting emotional phenomenology and evaluative intentional content are all issues pursued in the chapters collected in Part I of this volume.

In the chapter, ‘In What Sense are Emotions Evaluations?’, *Julien Deonna* and *Fabrice Teroni* consider whether emotions are, as many have maintained, kinds of evaluations. Addressing some of the main theories supporting such a view, including the perceptual theory of emotions, they argue that each is unsatisfactory. According to Deonna and Teroni, this is in large part because of a mistaken presupposition on which such theories rest, namely that emotions possess only one type of content. In

response, they outline their own novel theory of emotion—the attitudinal theory—which, they claim, avoids the various problems afflicting other accounts by holding that emotions should not be conceived as evaluations in terms of what they represent, but rather in terms of the sort of attitude subjects take towards what is represented. They then explore what sorts of attitudes emotions are and defend the idea that they are felt bodily attitudes.

Michelle Montague, in her chapter ‘Evaluative Phenomenology’, also defends the idea that emotions are evaluations, but without assimilating them to perceptions or traditional propositional attitudes. She argues for the strong claim that emotions are essentially experiential evaluative representations. In doing so, however, she rejects the common idea that emotional phenomenology can be reduced to some type of sensory or bodily phenomenology, and holds instead that emotions have their own distinctive *sui generis* kind of phenomenology, which she calls ‘evaluative phenomenology’. Recalling some of the key themes raised by Deonna and Teroni, the novelty of Montague’s position lies in tying an emotion’s evaluative phenomenology inextricably to its intentionality, and thereby illuminating the *sui generis* way in which emotions represent evaluative properties. In the process, she offers a detailed account of the nature of evaluative phenomenology, and how it differs from other types of phenomenology.

Drawing on recent empirical evidence, *Michael Brady*’s chapter ‘Emotion, Attention, and the Nature of Value’ explores how attention impacts upon the accuracy of the emotional assessments of one’s evaluative situation. In particular, he is concerned to highlight differences between positive and negative emotional responses in accounting for the different effects of valence on attentional breadth. Broadening his theme to encompass the nature of emotional evaluation, Brady claims that the empirical evidence lends some support to Nozick’s view that positive affect involves seeing the world or one’s life as unified, integrated, and coherent, and that negative affect involves seeing these things as fragmented, and lacking in unity or harmony. An important implication, Brady suggests, is that value is a matter of organic unity, which in turn supports the idea that a useful coping strategy when bad things happen is to attempt to integrate such things into the pattern of one’s life. In examining this important connection between emotion and attention, therefore, Brady contends that we thereby learn something important about the nature of the values and the content of the evaluations associated with emotional experience.

In his contribution, ‘Emotions as Unitary States’, *Jonathan Dancy* tackles the fundamental issue of whether emotions are unitary states. This is a difficult problem given that emotions seem to contain many different components, including feelings, beliefs, perceptions, and desires. Arguing that various current proposals are unsatisfactory, Dancy suggests that the assembly of elements constituting the moral emotions are unified by a normative relation. Agreeing with Peter Goldie’s account that emotions are plausibly thought of as processes, he argues that the coherence of such states consists in

a particular reason-relation that is articulated in terms of the appropriateness of each of an emotion's elements to the circumstances that concern it.

This normative notion of appropriateness resurfaces in several of the following chapters (specifically in those of Todd, Döring, Currie, and Zagzebski) and is a key component of so-called 'fitting attitude' or 'sentimentalist' analyses of value, in which emotions and other affective states are held to play a central role. Parallel to, but hitherto largely independent of the discussions concerning the nature and epistemic status of emotional evaluative experiences, an increasing number of philosophers working in value theory have become attracted to these analyses in which it is held that value or evaluative concepts can be somehow illuminated in terms of appropriate or fitting affective or emotional responses.

Cain Todd's chapter 'Relatively Fitting Emotions and Apparently Objective Values' examines the connection posited between emotion and value by so-called sentimentalist theories. Todd aims to show that such theories are threatened by relativism insofar as, contrary to their aim, they fail to offer an informative way of objectively specifying the nature of 'fittingness' when confronted with essentially contestable evaluative concepts. He examines one recent attempt to avoid these problems, proposed by Justin D'Arms, which relies on the class of natural emotions to provide a plausible analysis of certain evaluative concepts. Todd argues, however, that D'Arms's 'rational sentimentalism' rests on an inaccurate conception of emotional phenomenology and to that extent fails to secure the sentimentalist enterprise of specifying a notion of objective fittingness. In conclusion, Todd offers an alternative account of the phenomenology of emotions—one which appeals to the notion of 'apparent objectivity', but which has as a consequence that any version of sentimentalism based upon the emotions must contend with a relativistic notion of fittingness.

How the notion of fittingness discussed here relates to the notion of epistemic justification and to the rationality of our emotional responses is an important question that resurfaces in some of the discussions in Part II and Part III.

Part II: Emotion, Evaluation, and Justification

Some of the epistemic issues touched upon in the contributions to Part I of the volume become the primary focus of attention in several of the chapters in Part II, which is broadly concerned with the general epistemology of emotions, encompassing two separate but related topics: (i) the role of emotions in justifying evaluative judgements and grounding evaluative knowledge; (ii) justifying the appropriateness of certain emotional responses themselves.

Adam C. Pelsner's chapter 'Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification' is concerned with the epistemic status and role of emotion in evaluation. Discussing perceptual theories of emotion, he focuses on the purported resemblance between emotion and sense perception insofar as both states are often taken to give

rise to beliefs. Noting that such beliefs are generally trusted, he is chiefly concerned with the question of whether, in the case of emotion experience, the resulting beliefs are ever epistemically justified. Confronting certain sceptical views, Pelser argues that emotion is indeed a basic source of epistemic justification. More specifically, he claims that emotions themselves can non-inferentially confer justification on the beliefs to which they give rise. Labelling this claim the *justificatory* thesis, Pelser offers a sustained and systematic defence of the epistemic justification of emotion-based beliefs, and in the process upholds some form of the perceptual theory of emotion.

Sabine Döring too, in her chapter 'Why Recalcitrant Emotions Are Not Irrational', defends a perceptual model of emotion, focusing on an influential objection to this model posed by Bennett Helm, who points out that while recalcitrant perceptions are not irrational, recalcitrant emotions are. Döring argues against this that although recalcitrant emotions share a cognitive conflict between experience and judgement with recalcitrant perceptions, in neither case does such conflict amount to self-contradiction, and hence suffice for irrationality. Rather, she contends, recalcitrant emotions typically lead to practical conflict, and this is what explains the misguided intuition that they are therefore irrational. Offering a complex exploration of the issues of justification, cognitive conflict, and rationality, Döring's chapter touches on recurrent themes in several of the chapters in the final section of the volume.

While discussion of the issues raised in the previous chapters has, where it has been relevant, primarily been concerned with moral emotions, the final contributions in this section, by Adam Morton and Greg Currie, focus on different kinds of emotions. In his chapter 'Surprise', *Adam Morton* addresses the nature of surprise and focuses on its rationality, specifically on the question of why it sometimes make sense to be surprised when improbable things occur. Morton is also interested in understanding the value and disvalue of surprise, given that we both desire and fear the unexpected. In discussing the contrastive nature of this and similar emotional states, and the phenomenology of surprise, his chapter touches on the nature of emotional justification in general and its connection to other mental states, such as beliefs and desires.

Greg Currie's chapter on 'Emotions Fit for Fiction' offers an important additional orientation, to the domain of fiction and aesthetic value. Currie explores the similarities and differences between the nature and appropriateness of our emotional responses to fiction and towards the real world. Holding that fictions are representations of reality rather than alternatives to it, he argues that the emotions we have in response to fictions are appropriate because of how things are represented, not because of how they are. In this crucial respect they differ from the emotions we direct at events and things in the real world. However, Currie notes, there are many ways for emotions to be appropriate, and in one of them truth sometimes matters even for fictive emotions. Specifically, it matters when we have reason to think that a representation is confusing us about what is true, and getting what he calls 'an emotional free-ride' in consequence. He argues, in conclusion, that the responses we are intended to have to a fictional representation can be very far indeed from the responses we would, or should, have to

similar events in the real world, even if they come to us via testimony or some other form of representation. Yet the notion of appropriate emotional responses to fiction too is intrinsically connected to the evaluative nature of such responses

Currie's chapter thus remains directly engaged with many of the themes raised in Part II: with the appropriateness of emotional responses, with their phenomenology, and with the role they play in justifying and explaining our evaluative reactions.

Part III: Emotion, Value, and the Self

This part explores the role that emotions play in the evaluation and experience of the self. The chapters included here concern the epistemic legitimacy of the first-person point of view and the role emotions can play in undermining, as much as strengthening, that point of view. Most of the chapters in this part are also concerned with psychological aspects of emotions; for example, those aspects that are central to cases of trauma, guilt, and existential despair.

In her chapter 'Emotional Self-Trust' *Linda Zagzebski* defends the rationality of emotional self-trust, analogous to an account she has developed on epistemic self-trust. She holds that just as beliefs can be true or false, emotions can be appropriate and inappropriate, fitting or unfitting. Zagzebski argues that the fittingness of emotions cannot be reduced to the fittingness of beliefs; specifically, emotions entail an evaluative perspective that cannot be reduced to beliefs. When it comes to the justification of our emotions, we have to follow similar patterns as in the justification of our beliefs. In the end, all self-reflection and justification is circular, as we cannot prove its reliability from an independent source. We have to start justification by trusting certain of our beliefs and emotions; we cannot start from a void. A responsible epistemic agent employs what Zagzebski calls 'epistemic conscientiousness', which involves trying our best to make our emotions fit their objects in a way that is parallel to epistemic conscientiousness, which involves trying to make our beliefs true. In both cases we have no non-circular guarantee that our faculties fit their objects. This is where we have to trust their disposition to be fitting. As noted previously this notion of fittingness is a key one in understanding the nature of emotions and their epistemic role, and one that directly connects Zagzebski's chapter with several other chapters in the volume.

Nancy Sherman's chapter 'Self-Empathy and Moral Repair' too is concerned with the first-person point of view, specifically with self-empathy and how it can contribute to overcoming moral injury after war. In cases of traumatic experiences, it can be difficult to accept one's actions and emotions. Self-empathy, Sherman contends, can help to cope with feelings of shame and guilt. In order to illustrate these ideas, she discusses two examples of soldiers who have experienced traumatic dilemmas at war. The first example is that of a major who tries to behave in a humane way to the surviving family members of civilian casualties, but his attempts to show his compassion are disrupted by bureaucracy. He experiences the resulting shame as more damaging

to his agency than his experiences in combat. The second example is that of a captain who feels shame for not having prevented the death of a member of his group through an accident. Even though these soldiers were not directly to blame for what happened, they nevertheless felt responsible. Sherman argues that the notion of self-empathy can help one to adopt a benevolent, forgiving stance towards oneself that can contribute to coping with such difficult experiences and negative emotions.

Similar themes of self-assessment and perspective are central to *Michael Lacewing's* chapter 'Emotions and the Virtues of Self-Understanding', which studies the important but hitherto largely neglected relation between moral enquiry and developing self-understanding. Lacewing, like Zagzebski, is concerned with the trustworthiness of our own perspective, and he sees emotions as an important source of our knowledge of reasons for actions. However, he notes, they can also be misleading in unconscious ways that are hard to access, for example, due to certain defence mechanisms. The question then is how such mechanisms can be deconstructed in order to improve the epistemic role of emotions. Lacewing discusses the importance of intellectual courage and communal enquiry to this task, focusing on the connection between defence mechanisms and the rejection of parts of the self deemed inappropriate. He argues, in a way that echoes Sherman's main thesis, that acceptance and compassion can play important roles in deconstructing defence mechanisms and hence in improving and enriching moral reflection.

The chapter 'Emotion and Agency' by *Jan Slaby* and *Philipp Wüschner* discusses metaphysical concerns with the role of emotions in constituting value that connects it to the chapters in Part I. However, its main focus is on how value is related to the perspective of agents as caring subjects, as subjects for whom things matter. They thus examine the connection between emotions, caring, and existential commitment. Specifically, they argue that human emotions are active engagements with the world rather than passively undergone experiences. The authors develop an account according to which emotions constitute as well as detect value. They argue, further, that we can make sense of this apparent paradox by considering the point of view of a socially engaged person and the way in which she is emotionally situated. Understanding the phenomenology of an emotion is crucial to making sense of the way that emotions impact on our agency and how that in turn contributes to our further emotional experiences. They close their discussion by reflecting on what they call the active-affective 'minimal self' and how its erosion in, for example, severe depression supports their account.

This leads us to the final chapter of the volume, 'Evaluating Existential Despair' by *Matthew Ratcliffe*, which has depression as its key focus and incorporates a detailed analysis of passages from Tolstoy's memoir, *A Confession*. Ratcliffe explores the seemingly revelatory nature of some depression experiences and, in the process, draws attention to various important connections between evaluative beliefs and affective feelings. He starts his chapter by discussing a posthumously published essay by Peter Goldie, in which Goldie discusses the experience of someone whose intellectual life has 'gone cold'. This person still *knows* that a book is worth reading, but lacks the

emotional engagement necessary for setting oneself to read, write, and develop one's ideas. Ratcliffe expands on this to offer a broader discussion of the phenomenology of 'existential despair', which he understands as 'a painful sense that no human activity of any kind could ever be of any worth'. He raises the pressing question of whether or not such a predicament involves a correct evaluation of human life, and offers a partial response to the challenge of existential despair by focusing on distinctively interpersonal forms of concern.

Conclusion

The contributions to this volume testify to the rich, complex nature of emotions and their close, manifold links with a range of different values. They demonstrate not merely the growing significance of current philosophical research in this area, but also that many of the purported traditional dichotomies between, for example, reason, objectivity, and justification on the one hand, and irrationality, subjectivity, and unwarrantedness on the other, are no longer viable. Emotions, whatever their limitations, are an indispensable source of evaluative thought and experience, a key component of practical rationality, and a crucial ingredient in self-understanding and well-being. We hope that this volume provides some inspiration for future research in this rapidly expanding area, but also that, given the centrality of emotions to our evaluative conception of ourselves and our world, many outside the confines of academia may draw some insights from the chapters within.

References

- Damasio, A. (1994). *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Putnam's).
- D'Arms, J. and Jacobson, D. (2006). 'Sensibility Theory and Projectivism'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, ed. D. Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 186–218.
- Davidson, R., Scherer, K., and Goldsmith, H. (eds.) (2003). *The Oxford Handbook of Affective Sciences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- de Sousa, R. (1987). *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- de Sousa, R. (2007). 'Truth, Authenticity, and Rationality'. *Dialectica* 61: 323–45.
- Deonna, J. and Teroni, F. (2012). *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction* (London: Routledge).
- Goldie, P. (2000) *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Goldie, P. (ed.) (2012). *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Gordon, R. (1987). *The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Greene, J. D. (2003). 'From Neural "Is" to Moral "Ought": What Are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?' *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 4: 847–50.

- Greene, J. D. (2007). 'The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul'. In *Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development*, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 2–79.
- Greene, J. D. and Haidt, J. (2002). 'How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?' *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 6: 517–23.
- Greenspan, P. (1988). *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification* (New York: Routledge).
- Haidt, J. (2001). 'The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment'. *Psychological Review* 108: 814–34.
- Helm, B. (2007). *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux).
- Lyons, W. (1980). *Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Nussbaum, M. (2001). *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Prinz, J. (2004). *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Roberts, R. (2003). *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Roeser, S. (2011). *Moral Emotions and Intuitions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Rorty, A. (ed.) (1980). *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Sander, D. and Scherer, K. (eds.) (2009). *The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Solomon, R. (1976). *The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion* (Garden City, NJ: Anchor Press).
- Tappolet, C. (2000). *Emotions et Valeurs* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France).

PART I

Emotion and the Nature of Value

2

In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?

Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni

Introduction

Why think that emotions are ways of evaluating? This chapter puts forward an original account of emotions as evaluations apt to circumvent some of the chief difficulties with which alternative approaches find themselves confronted. We shall proceed by first introducing the idea that emotions are evaluations (sec. I). Next, two well-known approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are in and of themselves unemotional but are alleged to become emotional when directed towards evaluative contents are explored. According to the first approach, emotions are nothing but evaluative *judgments*. Sec. II reminds the reader of the problems associated with this idea: one of its consequences is to deprive creatures with limited cognitive capacities of any sort of partaking of emotional life. According to the second approach, which is often praised for its capacity to avoid the pitfalls facing an appeal to evaluative judgments, emotions are perception-like experiences of evaluative properties and are as such within the reach of creatures bereft of conceptual capacities. This *perceptual* theory is taken up in sect. III, in which we explain why it remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgment theory the idea that what makes emotions evaluations is the specific contents that they have. On this basis, we proceed by outlining in sect. IV an alternative—the *attitudinal* theory of emotions. Its main point of departure from current theorizing about the emotions consists in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but rather in terms of the sort of attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore here what sorts of attitudes emotions are and defend the idea that they are felt bodily attitudes.

I. Emotion as Access to Value

Why is the idea that emotions are apprehensions of values so attractive? Ordinary language certainly vouchsafes for the existence of a close connection between emotions