MADHYAMAKA AND YOGĀCĀRA

Allies or Rivals?

Edited by

JAY L. GARFIELD
JAN WESTERHOFF

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Madhyamaka and Yogācāra

Introduction

MADHYAMAKA AND YOGĀCĀRA: ALLIES OR RIVALS?

Jay L. Garfield and Jan Westerhoff

THE ESSAYS IN this volume are aimed at answering a philosophical question arising from the study of Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine: Are the philosophical positions of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools consistent with one another, or do they represent irreconcilable visions of the fundamental nature of reality? This question arises naturally from a consideration of the philosophical visions advanced by principal figures in these schools and from a consideration of Buddhist doxography as it first emerges in the Indian context, and then later ramified in Tibet and in East Asia.

Philosophically, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are each attemps to spell out the metaphysics of emptiness characteristic of the Mahāyāna. But they do so in very different vocabularies, and in very different ways, grounding their analyses in distinct sets of Mahāyāna sūtras. This by itself does not entail their inconsistency. They might turn out to be distinct perspectives that, together, yield a coherent whole. On the other hand, the fact that important figures associated with each of these traditions explicitly take on and refute positions advocated by the other (see, for instance, Candrakīrti's attack on Yogācāra in *Madhyamakāvatāra)*, and the fact that authoritative sūtras of one school explain their superiority to those taken as authoritative by the other (as, e.g., the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra*), suggest real doctrinal tension.

In Tibet and China, Yogācāra and Madhyamaka are often distinguished doxographically, in terms of the positions associated with them (the ultimate reality of mind versus its emptiness; the reflexivity of awareness versus its nonreflexivity; the existence versus the nonexistence of the external world, etc). In addition, they are often ranked against each other. On the other hand, even when Madhyamaka is ranked above Yogācāra, there are doxographical traditions in which a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra (called in Tibet the *Great Madhyamaka*) is ranked above both, suggesting a higher consistency that transcends apparent inconsistency.

While the doxographies of Tibet and China are indeed retrospective, hermeneutical, and perhaps even procrustean, they are not to be ignored. The literatures they systematize indeed largely cohere, and they constitute corpora of commentarial literature that are historically coherent. Madhyamaka literature comments on Madhyamaka texts, and, when polemic, takes issue with Yogācāra texts, and vice versa. And when Śāntarakṣita attempts his grand synthesis in *Madhyamakālaṁkāra,* it is clear that he is responding to the sets of literature later systematized by Tibetan and Chinese doxographers. The doxographic categories must hence be taken seriously, and, just as their consistency or inconsistency was a matter for dispute among Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese scholars over the first two millenia of Buddhist history, it remains a topic for dispute among contemporary scholars.

The dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka is not idle, or of interest only to intellectual historians. These are complex and profound doctrines, and to the extent that we cannot even determine whether they are mutually consistent, it is fair to say that we do not fully understand them. Just as, in the great monastic universities of India and Tibet, debate about doctrinal matters is meant to facilitate deeper understanding of both sides of the debate, we offer this set of essays in the hope to deepen understanding of these two schools. Of course the vast literatures subsumed under each of these heads are hardly as homogeneous as traditional doxographers would maintain. They emerge from the reflection of multiple scholars over many centuries. So we might also expect that this investigation would lead to greater nuance not only in our understanding of the broad doctrines that characterize each of these schools, but also of the variation in doctrine subsumed by each.

Chaisit Suwanvarangkul opens our investigation by inquiring into the fundamental terms of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra analysis—*pratītyasamutpāda* and *dharmadhātu*. He explores their semantic range in the literature of these two schools and the evolution of the understanding of these crucial terms in the course of the interaction between the schools, asking whether the conception of truth in terms of *pratītyasamutpāda* as it is articulated in Madhyamaka is consistent with the articulation of truth in terms of *dharmadhātu* as articulated in Yogācāra.

Mattia Salvini also addresses questions concerning language that lie at the foundation of our understanding of the relationship between the literature of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools. In his essay he explores the differences between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra approaches to the philosophy of language as well as the very different understandings of core philosophical vocabulary and concepts that inform these schools. This examination sets the stage for an exploration of the respects in which the disparities between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra might either rest on real differences between fundamental conceptual frameworks, or might be apparent differences reflecting differences in their use of and approach to language.[1]

Let us first consider the view that these are inconsistent systems. From a systematic perspective the philosophical projects of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka indeed seem to be diametrically opposed: Yogācāra is both ontologically and epistemologically foundationalist; Madhyamaka is antifoundationalist in both senses. Yogācāra proposes a theory of the ultimate nature of reality; Madhyamaka rejects the possibility of any such theory. Yogācāra maintains the ultimate reality of mind and the nonexistence of the external world; Madhyamaka accepts the conventional existence of both.

Sonam Thakchöe argues that this difference is deep, ontological, and grounded in the very different understandings of *trisvabhāva* theory. He argues that if one adopts a Yogācāra understanding of the three natures, it is impossible to see Madhyamaka as anything but nihilism. On the other hand, if one adopts a Madhyamaka perspective on this doctrine, Yogācāra appears to be committed *both* to nihilism and to reification—nihilistic regarding the conventional and the external world, and reifying mind and ulitmate reality. He argues that this distinction also informs the difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika schools of Madhyamaka.

Mark Siderits generalizes this argument for irreconcilable difference, advocating that these two schools reflect two very different attitudes toward the project of antirealism. Mādhyamikas, he says, are committed to a global antirealism, while Yogācāras must restrict the scope of their antirealism to the external and the conventional. This represents a different view of the very structure of antirealistic critique. Beyond particular philosophical difference, Siderits argues, these two schools diverge sharply on the role of philosophical analysis in the Buddhist project: while for Mādhyamikas it is a central soteriological vehicle, for Yogācārins it stands behind meditative practice.

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[1] In this context see also Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha 3:9, and, for the discussion of some later sources, Harris 1991: 128.

David Eckel's contribution centers on Bhāviveka's criticism of Yogācāra. Focusing on Bhāviveka's account of the Yogācāra in chapter 5 of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and the *Tarkajvālā*, he discusses Bhāviveka's understanding of the sources of the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra dispute, his style of argumentation, the structure of his argument, and particular points of disagreement. Running through all of these controversies is an undercurrent of resentment at the Yogācāras' "undigested pride" in their interpretation of the central texts of the Mahāyāna. Bhāviveka provides the most extensive available evidence about the intellectual and emotional shape of this controversy in what might be called the classic period of Indian Yogācāra (the period of Dharmapāla, Sthiramati, and Xuanzang).

Dan Lusthaus examines both the adversarial and accomodating moments in dialogue between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophy in India, using Chinese commentaries as a lens. He argues that, while Mādhyamikas were indeed harsh critics of Yogācāra, most Yogācāra scholars were sympathetic to early Madhyamaka, although not to its development in Madhyamaka scholastic literature. Lusthaus argues that rereading the Indian literature with close attention to Chinese commentaries shows us that late Madhyamaka indeed slides into a kind of nihilism, while Yogācāra is consistent with a robust realism to be found in early Madhyamaka.

While these scholars emphasize the doxographically enshrined differences between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, there are also reasons to believe that the schools' positions may in the end not be so far apart. The apparent oppositions may dissolve as we look more closely. First of all, it is actually not clear whether we would want to characterize early Yogācāra as a foundationalist theory, as a type of idealism that sees the ontological foundation not in the Abhidharma's *dharmas*, but in some kind of mental phenomena. While this might be the most natural interpretation of central passages in Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣa* Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavarttika,* and Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā,* it is certainly not the view of Asaṅga in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* in which the body is characterized as an important condition of mind, or indeed in Vasubandhu's *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa,* where he seems to deny the reality of both mind and the external world as the proper understanding of the Yogācāra doctrine of mind-only. Vasubandhu states, "By the perception of mind-only there is the nonperception of knowable things. By the nonperception of knowable things, there is the nonperception of mind."[2] This passage certainly gives the impression that mind is here not regarded as an existentially ultimate foundation, but rather that it is itself to be transcended in the same way in which knowable (external) things are to be transcended by the realization of mind-only.[3] Nevertheless, the question of foundationalism (or lack of it) in early Yogācāra is complex.[4]

Jan Westerhoff argues that even at the very beginnings of Mahāyāna philosophy, there are prospects for unity between the two schools. He argues that Nāgārjuna, the very founder of the Madhyamaka school, was more sympathetic to Yogācāra ideas than the Madhyamaka tradition and traditional doxographers might lead us to think. He suggests that Nāgārjuna saw the meditative practices associated with Yogācāra as indispensible to realizing Madhyamaka philosophical positions and that he saw the Yogācāra view as indispensible propaedeutics to Madhyamaka.

The connection between Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka and Yogācāra is further explored in Eviatar Shulman's contribution. He suggests that common interpretations of Nāgārjuna are based on a very selective reading of his body of works and often fail to come to terms with Nāgārjuna's unrelenting critique of existence. Shulman argues that Nāgārjuna advocates a strong antirealist philosophy, which views "the world" as intimately related to the way it is perceived and experienced. This presents an interesting parallel with Vasubandhu's metaphysical vision. Vasubandhu emphasizes the lack of differentiation between subject and object and sees the external world as dependent on the mind. The difference between the two thinkers might therefore be read as one of temperament and style, not one of substance.

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[2] *cittamātropalambhena jñeyārthānupalambhatā jñeyārthānubalambhena syāc cittānubalambhatā*

[3] Jay Garfield, in "Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Three Natures" in his *Empty Words. Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 128–151: 150) reads this verse as primarily rejecting attachment to a self and to one's mental state at the same time as rejecting external objects. But *citta* can here also be understood as referring to what is fundamentally real according to the Yogācāra system.

[4] There are other passages where Asaṅga appears to be quite clear about the existent of the dependent nature, the mental basis on which faulty imputations are superimposed. In *Madhyāntavibhāga* 1.2 he asserts the existence of the imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa = paratrantra*) empty of all duality (*abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate | śūnyatā vidyate tu atra tasyām api sa vidyate*). See Harris 1991: 125–126.

But even if we disregard the connection between early Madhyamaka on Yogācāra ideas, the history of Buddhist thought presents us with a variety of other reasons for seeing Madhyamaka and Yogācāra to be less antagonistic than they sometimes appear.

As Jonathan Gold points out in his chapter, the famous and longstanding doctrinal disputes between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra began with Bhāviveka, a century or two after the creation of foundational Yogācāra texts. Gold suggests that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu's supposed anti-Madhyamaka passages should be read as more broadly about the relation between Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna. They argue to not read the Mahāyāna scriptures as implying a wholesale rejection of traditional Buddhist doctrine, especially karma and nirvana. The core Yogācāra contribution to the interpretation of the Mahāyāna doctrine of the emptiness of all conceptual-linguistic constructs is an awareness of its frame: Linguistic emptiness, properly understood, cannot thoroughly undermine the doctrinal validity of karma and nirvana, because it is inconceivable, and so is strictly "beyond disputation" and supports neither the "existence" nor "nonexistence" of other doctrinal entities, and because *its* proper understanding only arises *after*, and in dependence upon, one having gained confidence in *them*. The disputational, anti-Hīnayāna rhetoric of much of Mahāyāna is thus replaced with an ecumenical, pan-Buddhist inclusivism, based in an acknowledgement that until liberation, the ultimate is inconceivable.

Moreover, despite the fact that there was a great deal of debate between proponents of the two schools, it is important to be aware that the debate literature tells only one side of the story. Leading Yogācāra authors commented on Madhyamaka texts. Asaṅga, Sthiramati, and Guṇamati composed commentaries on the foundational text of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Dharmapāla commented on Āryadeva's *Catuḥśātaka* and *Śataśāstra* (Ruegg 1981: 49–51). And in the 8th century the Indian master Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla set out to create a synthesis of both systems known as Yogācāra-Madhyamaka (*rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa*).

Their underlying view is perhaps best summed up in Śāntarakṣita's famous verses from the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*:

> On the basis of the Cittamatra, know that there are no external things. In addition, on the basis of this approach, know that there is no self anywhere.

> Riding the chariot of the two systems, holding the reigns of reasoning, the Mahāyāna is indeed obtained.[5]

The soteriological structure set out in these verses is very clear. First the practitioner has to establish by Yogācāra arguments that external physical objects (that is, objects belonging to the first of the five physicopsychological components, the *rūpa-skandha*) do not exist. The resulting system reduces all existents to the merely mental, and, more particularly, to the foundational consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*). As a second step one has then to apply Madhyamaka arguments to this foundation in order to demonstrate that it, too, fails to exist by intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatas*). The realization of the Mahāyāna is therefore not obtained by choosing between two contradictory philosophical systems, but by applying the arguments of each in its proper place.

That this two-level conception is not alien to Madhyamaka is also supported by Bhāviveka in his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*, which notes that, "As the succession of leaves etc. comes from the great power in the lotus-root, streams of objects come from the mind, though the mind is not fundamentally real."[6] The important point about this metaphor is that the root of the lotus is not connected to anything else[7] (unlike, for example, a tree, whose root is embedded in the ground), floating on a lake and covering the entire lake with the leaves and flowers that sprout from it. In the same way, Bhāviveka argues, the entire realm of saṃsāra flows from the mind, even though the mind itself does not have any fundamental status (*dravya*, *rdzas*). What we find here is an agreement with the key Yogācāra idea that the world is mind-made, without taking on board the further assumption that the mind plays a foundational ontological role.

According to the synthetical approach of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the Yogācāra theory of the three natures—the imputed nature (*parakalpitasvabhāva*), dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) and perfected nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*)—is in place in order to prevent the two conceptual extremes of superimposition (*samāropa*) and excessive denial (*apavāda*) and, thereby, also the two extreme views of nihilism and foundationalism.[8] The former are prevented by pointing out that the imputed nature is not fundamentally real, while the latter are prevented by noting that there is some basis (the dependent nature) on which the imputed nature is imputed.[9] Yet neither the dependent nature nor the perfected nature are fundamentally real. Any scriptural claims for their fundamental reality, this account claims, has to be interpreted as a provisional teaching (*neyārtha*), as a teaching put forward to combat the specific difficulties of an audience tending toward the extreme of excessive denial.[10]

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[5] *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* 92–93. *sems tsam la ni brten nas su | phyi rol dngos med shes par bya | tshul 'dir brten nas de la yang | shin tu bdag med shes par bya || tshul gnyis shing rta zhon nas su | rigs pa'i srab skyogs 'ju byed pa | de dag de phyir ji bzhin don | theg pa chen po pa nyid 'thob ||*

[6] *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* 5.48 *yathā parṇādisantānā bahuśālukaśaktitāḥ | tathādravyasataś cittāc citrāḥ saṃtativṛttayaḥ* Malcom David Eckel, *Bhāviveka and his Buddhist Opponents* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2008, 258). See also Christian Lindtner, "Cittamātra in Indian Mahāyāna until Kamalaśīla" in his: *A Garland of Light. Kambala's Ālokamālā* (Asian Humanities Press, Fremont CA, 2003, 143–145).

[7] *de la rtsa ba'i 'brel pa gzhan med par* (Eckel 2008: 414).

Nevertheless, one might object that this apparently irenic resolution may be just another way of reinstating the view that these positions are inconsistent. After all, if the role of Yogācāra is merely that of a stepping-stone to Madhyamaka—metaphysics for dummies, as it were—and if Madhyamaka constitutes the true view whose comprehension it enables, this is not a vindication of Yogācāra as consistent with Madhyamaka, any more than the institution of teaching Newtonian mechanics as a preliminary to relativistic physics is a vindication of the consistency of these two views. In the same way we might as well speak of a "synthesis" of Lamarckian and Darwinian theories of evolution, where this means that we first teach a student Lamarckism to introduce them to the idea that traits *are* inherited, in order to subsequently dispell their erroneous view that traits acquired during an organism's lifetime can be passed on by inheritance. So, the very staging of progress as Śāntarakṣita presents it suggests that the views of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are *inconsistent*.[11]

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[8] As Eckel nicely observes, the relation between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra is exactly symmetrical in this respect. Both proclaim to tread the middle path between two extremes, but what the Yogācāra postulates to ward off excessive denial is considered to be reification by the Madhyamaka, while the Madhyamaka rejection of what it considers to be reification is deemed to be excessive denial from a Yogācāra perspective. M.D. Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra in Ch. XXV of the Prajñāpradīpa," in Christian Lindtner (ed), *Indiske Studier* 5 (Miscellanea Buddhica, Copenhagen 1985, 25–75: 31).

[9] Ian Charles Harris, in *The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Brill, Leiden, 1991: 107), writes: "This means that something must still be present once ignorance has been uprooted and the mental concepts associated with it have been suppressed. However this can no longer be presented as merely external existents. Reality is no longer seen as independent, or other, to self."

[10] David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1981: 95).

[11] See Richard King: "Yogācāra and its relationship with the Madhyamaka school," *Philosophy East and West* 44:4, 1994, 659–683: 664.

This is the position taken by James Blumenthal, who argues that while Śāntarakṣita adopts certain specific Yogācāra ideas, his final outlook is Madhyamaka, and that his final position regarding the relation between the two systems is hierarchical: that Madhyamaka presents the correct metaphysical account of reality, and that Yogācāra is important only as an intermediate position to be considered by one not ready for the full Madhyamaka view.

Another way of locating the Yogācāra within the Madhyamaka philosophical landscape is to consider it as an elucidation of Svātantrika Madhyamaka.[12] For the Svātantrika there can be substantial theories of conventional truth, theories that can deviate from the intuitive or commonsensical position we hold on the world. If this is accepted a (Svātantrika-)Madhyamaka can perfectly well accept the force of the Yogācāra arguments refuting the existence of external objects as the best *conventional* theory of the world, a theory that is supported by experiences made during meditative training,[13] without admitting that the theoretical entities it postulates (such as the *ālayavijñāna*) exist at the level of ultimate truth.

Jay Garfield takes yet another approach to synthesis, suggesting a phenomenological reading of Yogācāra through a reading of Vasubhandu's *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* along with a methodological or heuristic reading of Madhyamaka. Garfield argues that at least in this text, we see Yogācāra not as an ontological position, but as an investigation of experience, and that we can parse that investigation through the Madhyamaka technique of the *catuṣkoṭi* to develop a richer understanding of that Yogācāra analysis. On this view, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are not rivals, simply because their projects are orthogonal and consistent with one another.

Once again, such a synthesis may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, we see Yogācāra as a way of elucidating Madhyamaka, and, thus, consistent with it. On the other hand, there is a tension: Madhyamaka set out to show that the Yogācāra view of the world cannot be an ultimately true theory. But then again, according to Madhyamaka, Madhyamaka is not an ultimately true theory, either, since, if Madhyamaka arguments are successful, there are no ultimately true theories. And if for the Mādhyamika *all* theories (including Madhyamaka) are relegated to the level of the propaedeutic,[14] Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are in the same boat. Each constitutes a way of seeing things. And this brings us back to where we started: Are these ways of seeing things consistent, or inconsistent? We invite the reader to inquire with us in the chapters collected in this volume.

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[12] Ruegg 1981: 88.

[13] Harris 1991: 108–109, King 1994: 681, note 56.

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14. See Candrakīrti's commentary on 18:5 and 8 of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

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Pratītyasamutpāda *and* Dharmadhātu *in Early Mahāyāna Buddhism*

Chaisit Suwanvarangkul

THE SANSKRIT WORD *pratītyasamutpāda* ("dependent arising" or "dependent origination") is one of the terms that indicate the Buddha's teaching on the process of birth and death, and it occurs in the canons of all the schools of Buddhism. Another term is *dharmadhātu*: "domain of reality." According to the *dharmadhātu* theory in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (DBh), all beings create themselves, and even the universe is self-created. *Dharmadhātu* has come to represent the universe as completely corelative, generally interdependent, and mutually originating. It is stated that there is no single being that exists independently.

The aim of this chapter is to find out how the terms *pratītyasamutpāda* and *dharmadhātu* developed and changed over time and united into one truth. First, I will consider the *pratītyasamutpāda* in the sixth *bhūmi* of DBh in order to understand its connection with the *dharmadhātu*. Next, I will consider the development from *dharmadhātu* to *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Mādhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (MAnVBh) chapter 2, *Āvaraṇapariccheda, Daśaśubhādyāvaraṇam* of *Yogācāra*. And finally I will consider the relationship between *pratītyasamutpāda* and *dharmadhātu* in the MAnVBh chapter 1, *abhūta-parikalpa* stanza 1 in the *Sad-asal-lakṣaṇa*.

To explore the relationship of these two truths is to know about Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. As *pratītyasamutpāda* is the main idea of Madhyamaka and can be linked to the idea of *śūnyatā*. *Dharmadhātu* is one of the main ideas of Yogācāra. Can these two truths go simultaneously together or do they go in a contrary direction?

I. From pratītyasamutpāda *to* dharmadhātu *in the Sixth* bhūmi *of the DBh.*

The sixth *bhūmi* of the DBh is outlined into several sections as follows[1]:

A. Having obtained the ten equalities (Aramaki, 1974: 168), the Bodhisattva enters the sixth *bhūmi*.
B. The Bodhisattva contemplates the birth and death of all sentient beings in order to complete compassion.
C. The Bodhisattva contemplates the birth and death of all sentient beings by the ten characteristics (Aramaki, 1974: 171) of *pratītyasamutpāda* as follows, (1) the relationship between *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pratītyasamutpāda*.
D. The meaning of each of the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda*.
E, F. (2) the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda* are mind only.
G. (3) the two actions of each of the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda* (Aramaki, 1974: 177)
H. (4) the continuation from one chain to another chain in each of *pratītyasamutpāda*.
I. (5) the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda* are the vicissitudes of *kleśa*, *karma* and *vipāka*.
J. (6) the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda* are beyond past, present and future lives.
K. (7) the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda* have three kinds of sufferings (Aramaki, 1974: 183).
L. (8) (9) (10) the Bodhisattva contemplates the arising and cessation of the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda*.
M. the conclusion of ten characteristics of the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda*.
N. when the Bodhisattva contemplates the ten characteristics of the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda*, the three doors of liberations become manifest.
O. when the Bodhisattva contemplates the non-arising and non-cessation of the ten characteristics of the 12 chains of *pratītyasamutpāda*, the wisdom of Bodhisattva vow becomes manifest.
P. the ten kinds of emptiness (also ten kinds of signlessness, and ten kinds of wishlessness) become manifest. (Aramaki, 1974: 191)

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[1] A, B, C, — are the sections separated by J. Rahder (ed.) DBh, Louvin, 1926.

Q. the Bodhisattva attains the ten kinds of Bodhicittas. (Aramaki, 1974: 191)
R. After the Bodhisattva have practiced the skillful means and wisdom, the enlightenment becomes manifest.
S. in the sixth *bhūmi*, the Bodhisattva attains million millions of concentrated abilities and is protected by million millions of Buddhas.

The sixth *bhūmi* mentions *pratītyasamutpāda* and explains the relationship between *pratītyasamutpāda* and the three liberations (三解脱門 or 三三昧 *vimokṣa-traya*). The three liberations in the sixth *bhūmi* are emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. In this *bhūmi*, the Bodhisattvas use their wisdom to contemplate the cycle of birth and death of all creatures in terms of the following ten aspects, forward and back ward in time:

1. the interconnections of the elements of becoming (*bhavāṅgānusaṃdhitas*);
2. being all in one mind (*ekacittasamavasaraṇatas*);
3. differentiation of one's own action (*svakarmasaṃbhedatas*);
4. inseparability (*avinirbhāgatas*);
5. the procession of the three courses of affliction, action, and suffering (*trivartmānupravartantas*);
6. the connection of past, present, and future (*pūrvāntapratyutpannāparāntāvekṣaṇatas);*
7. accumulation of the three kinds of suffering (*triduḥkhatāsamudayatas*);
8. production by causes (*hetupratyayaprabhavatas*);
9. attachment to origination and annihilation (*utpādavyayavinibaṃdhatas*); and
10. contemplation of becoming and annihilation (*bhāvakṣayatāpratyavekṣaṇatas*).[2]

After contemplating the *pratītyasamutpāda* with these ten aspects, the Bodhisattvas then expound as follows:

> tasyaivaṃ daśākāraṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ pratyavekṣamānasya/
> nirātmato niḥsattvato nirjīvato niḥpudgalataḥ svabhāva-śūnyataḥ

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[2] Cleary, p. 748

kāraka-vedaka-rahitataś ca/ pratyavekṣamānasya śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukham ājātaṃ bhavati/[3](DBh p. 102 ll. 3–6)

Thus while Bodhisattvas contemplate the *pratītyasamutpāda* in these ten aspects, because of contemplating it in terms of being without self, without being, without soul, without person, inherently empty, without doer or subject, the door of liberation through emptiness becomes manifest to them.

tasyaiṣāṃ bhavāṅgānāṃ svabhāva-nirodhātāyantavimokṣapratyupasthānato/ na kiṃcid dharmanimittam utpadyate/ ato' syānimitta-vimokṣa-mukham ājātaṃ bhavati/ (DBh p. 102 ll. 6–7)

Because of the nullity of intrinsic of nature of these elements of becoming, being in the presence of ultimate liberation, no sign of any elements occurs to them. Hence, this door of signlessness becomes manifest to them.

tasyaivaṃ śūnyatānimittam avatīrṇasya na kaścid abhilāṣa utpadyate/ anyatra mahākaruṇāpūrvaṃgamāt/ sattvaparipākād evam asyāpraṇihita-vimokṣa-mukham ājātaṃ bhavati/[4] (DBh p. 102 ll. 7–9)

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[3] In *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* edited by Vaidya (p. 33 ll. 26–28), this passage is as follows:

> tasyaivaṃ dvādaśākāraṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ pratyavekṣamānasya nirātmato niḥsattvato nirjīvato niṣpudgalataḥ kāraka-vedaka-rahitato 'svāmikato hetupratyayādhīnataḥ svabhāva-śūnyato viviktato 'svabhāvataś ca prakṛtyā pratyavekṣamānasya śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukham ājātaṃ bhavati[/]
>
> While Bodhisattvas thus contemplate the *pratītyasamutpāda* in these twelve aspects, because of contemplating it in terms of being without self, without being, without soul, without person, without doer or subject, without owner, depending on cause and belief, inherently empty, kept apart, the door of emptiness liberation becomes manifest to them by the original cause of own-being.

[4] In *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* edited by Vaidya (p. 34 ll. 1–2), this passage is as follows:

> tasyaivaṃ śūnyatānimittam avatīrṇasya na kaścid abhilāṣa utpadyate/ anyatra mahākaruṇāpūrvakāt sattvaparipācanāt/ evam asyāpraṇihita-vimokṣa-mukham ājātaṃ bhavati/
>
> In those who have thus descended into emptiness and signlessness, no desire whatsoever arises, except, led by great compassion, for the full development of sentient beings: thus this door of liberation of wishlessness becomes manifest to them.

> When those who have descended to emptiness and signlessness, no desire whatsoever arises, except, led by great compassion, for the full development of sentient beings: thus this door of liberation of wishlessness becomes manifest to them.

In this way, the Bodhisattvas contemplate the fact that all creatures in *saṃsāra* dependently originate. In the *pratītyasamutpāda*, there are no ideas of self and other, of agent and perceiver, of being and nonbeing. As the liberation of emptiness arises, the contaminated being of the Bodhisattva turns into the purified being of the Bodhisattva, or the *dharmadhātu*.

After the Bodhisattvas have contemplated the *pratītyasamutpāda*, the door of liberation through emptiness becomes manifest to them. After realizing that the *pratītyasamutpāda* is not a real entity, they gain absolute liberation through the origination of solitude. They continue to contemplate the *pratītyasamutpāda* until the door of liberation through signlessness becomes manifest to them. The condition of being without self, without being, without soul, without person arises after the realization of emptiness, and no sign of any thing occurs to them after the signlessness. But still they have great compassion for all creatures. The wish to help all creatures is still in their minds, and the door of liberation through wishlessness becomes manifest to them. The Bodhisattvas contemplate the fact that all creatures are still in *saṃsāra* due to *pratītyasamutpāda*. The Bodhisattvas understand the relationship between the *pratītyasamutpāda* and the three doors of liberation as follows:

> sa[5] imāni trīṇi vimokṣamukhāni bhāvayann ātmaparasaṃjñāpagataḥ kāraka-vedaka-saṃjñāpagato bhāvābhāvasaṃjñāpagato/ bhūyasyā mātrayā mahākaruṇā-puraskṛtaḥ prayujyate/ apariniṣpannānāṃ bodhyaṅgānāṃ pariniṣpattaye/ (DBh p. 102 ll. 9–11)

> Causing these three doors of liberations to become manifest, they leave behind the ideas of self and other, of agent and perceiver, of being and nonbeing. All the more, filled with compassion, they work to perfectly attain the elements of enlightenment which they have not yet attained.

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5. In *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* of Vaidya (p. 34 l. 3), this word is “ya” instead of “sa.”