

*The Little Book of*  
**CHILD AND  
ADOLESCENT  
DEVELOPMENT**



**KAREN J. GILMORE** *and*  
**PAMELA MEERSAND**

OXFORD

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Karen J. Gilmore  
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UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Oxford New York  
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Published in the United States of America by  
Oxford University Press  
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data  
Gilmore, Karen J., 1948– author.

The little book of child and adolescent development / Karen J. Gilmore, Pamela Meersand.  
p. ; cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-19-989922-7 (alk. paper)

I. Meersand, Pamela, 1956– author. II. Title.

[DNLM: 1. Child Development. 2. Child Psychology—methods. 3. Adolescent  
Development. 4. Adolescent Psychology—methods. 5. Psychoanalytic Theory. WS 105]  
RJ499

618.92'89—dc23

2014019490

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9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America  
on acid-free paper

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## Disclosure Statements

There are no conflicts to disclose. I am clinical professor of psychiatry at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, and training and supervising analyst at the Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research. There are no funding sources or other possible conflicts of interest. Karen Gilmore, M.D.

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# A Psychoanalytic Orientation to Development in the Twenty-First Century

## The Challenge

In attempting to craft a concise introduction to human development, we face a near impossible task in contemporary psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic theories of development, like their associated psychoanalytic schools, suffer from proliferation, fractionation, and a scarcity of shared theoretical assumptions. Moreover, the lack of empirical foundations (with the exception of attachment theory) and the failure to interface and integrate with progress in other disciplines, such as biological research, neuroscience, and trends in theory-making, has marginalized the entire field (Stepansky, 2009), leaving the many developmental theories embedded within the various schools untouched. Among these, a significant proportion are “part” theories (*ibid*), tilted toward infancy and early childhood; they produce “psychoanalytic babies” (Thoma & Kachele, 1987; Tolpin, 1989) who (mostly) bear little resemblance to actual babies, who fail to thrive because their schools abandon them after early childhood, and who are rarely nurtured by the fruits of advances in developmental science. In fact, many theories, or at least some of their important adherents, openly discredit attempts to align developmental research and findings with the developmental theories of their school; they dispute the psychoanalytic value of any observational data when obtained outside of the consulting room (Wolff, 1996). In the view of some commentators, efforts to integrate

psychoanalytic theories with each other, or to maintain a pluralistic field, and/or keep pace with scientific progression have foundered on the shoals of insular partisanship (Stepansky, 2009). In this book, we sweep aside these differences and the historical resistance to the integration of new scientific knowledge with an admittedly biased broom: We propose a developmental orientation that incorporates what we consider fundamentals of psychoanalytic thinking and developmental science, creating an open system that can be inclusive and reconfigured in pace with knowledge. Developmental thinking is work in progress and subject to continuous correction and augmentation. Although discovery may not find immediate application in psychoanalytic theorizing or clinical work, the active interface between psychoanalytic developmental theories and developmental science keeps our theory-making an organic, evolving process in sync with contemporary society, ultimately enriching psychoanalytic theory and clinical work. And although postmodern theories may disavow interest in childhood history, many were themselves offspring of new findings from developmental research. Indeed, it has been argued that developmental thinking is the premiere fount of creativity in psychoanalysis (Govrin, 2006). We believe that vibrant and relevant psychoanalytic developmental thinking adds a crucial component to twenty-first century developmental science and psychiatry, highlighting the importance of the mind of the child and the autobiographical narratives that shape adult experience: The child is (and always will be) the father to the man (Cooper, 1989; Freud, 1938).

## Our Position in the Psychoanalytic Terrain

In brief, the fractionated landscape can be divided, for our purposes, between the *traditional* or classical theories (see glossary) originating before 1980 and the postmodern or post-postmodern schools that have proliferated over the last three decades. Traditional schools—those that emerged before 1980—have detailed developmental ideas that are more or less comprehensive. Most incorporate some

version of Freud's original psychosexual progression, but these developmental theories vary considerably in their school-specific notions of psychopathology, their concepts of therapeutic action, and their interest in actually observing infants and children to test their hypotheses. The traditional developmental theories originated in psychoanalytic explorations of the mental life of adults and children, but some have incorporated and integrated observational and research data, depending, of course, on its approach and theoretical bias (Fajardo, 1993, 1998).<sup>1</sup> In contrast, the psychoanalytic schools emerging in the last decades of the twentieth century, the postmodern or post-postmodern schools, which, as noted, have arguably sprung from advances in infant observation, question the clinical utility of developmental thinking and data, childhood history (Govrin, 2006), remembering and reconstruction (Blum, 2003a,b; Fonagy, 2003), and the mind of child. The here-and-now is the primary focus of exploration, and the here-and-now is not mined for its illumination of the past. Even those who utilize observations of mother–infant interactions to clarify the psychoanalytic situation are not truly developmental by our definition, because they do not explore the complex transformational journey from infancy to the adult on the couch. As noted, many contemporary analysts from the gamut of theoretical positions argue persuasively that developmental theory and/or research findings are outside the purview of psychoanalysis (Auchincloss & Vaughan, 2001; Wolff, 1996).

In this context, we position ourselves in the pre-postmodern camp, because we believe in the centrality of emergent ego capacities as a crucial aspect of developmental progression and because we adhere to the idea that effective treatment establishes links to childhood history and facilitates continuous and coherent self-representation. Our orientation is a highly selective amalgam of psychoanalytic ideas and relevant information from general theories of development and empirical research: an integration of ego-psychological psychoanalytic thinking, developmental science, stage thinking, systems theory, intrapsychic and environmental considerations, and one- and two-person psychology. Our

utilization of developmental research as a rich source of data and our openness to multiple theoretical approaches to developmental progression is, we believe, in the tradition of Anna Freud's emphatic endorsement of actually *looking at children*, thereby gaining opportunity to see developmental transformations and the synthetic function in action (A Freud, 1963, 1981). Moreover, despite her theoretical conservatism, she offered an early example of *nonlinear systems* thinking (i.e., the integration of complex strands of development in multiple arenas—see glossary) in her proposal of *developmental lines* (Mayes, 1999).<sup>2</sup>

We unapologetically embrace a degree of pluralism that, despite prominent proponents such as Pine (1988), has historically been disparaged among some psychoanalysts as “cut and paste” (Demos, 2001) or model-mixing theories (Mitchell, 1988). According to Stepansky (2009), pluralism in psychoanalysis has begotten only a “plurality of theories” (p. 110). We consider our synthesis to be an integration of these pluralisms so that at the very least, there is a psychoanalytic baby, toddler, latency age child, adolescent, and emerging adult that is recognizable to psychoanalysts at large and yet open to shifts in emphasis, new information, or advances in science. We are heartened by the words of developmental scientist, Alison Gopnik: “being a pluralist does not mean being a wimp. For any particular developmental phenomenon, one theory or another will be true, and we want to know which one it is” (Gopnik, 1996, p. 221). That we freely utilize “theory fragments, almost-theories, and pseudotheories” (Gopnik, 1996, p. 221)—what Stepansky calls “part-theories”—reflects the reality that developmental scientists increasingly acknowledge: “The fact of the matter is we do not yet have a theory of development, and perhaps we never will” (Keller, 2005). There is no unified theory in psychoanalysis or in general psychology. Even the holistic postmodern approach of systems thinking, in ascendance for roughly half a century, has its detractors and, like most new ideas, has been critiqued, defended, and finally diminished in its absolute hegemony, although still profoundly applicable to many phenomena (Berman, 1996; L'Abate & Colondier, 1987; Thelen & Bates, 2003).

However, to the extent that any classical theory presumes to discover the origins of all mental phenomena in mental conflict (as delineated in classical metapsychology [Rapaport & Gill, 1959]) we diverge and decamp. We share the conviction that neurotic psychopathology originates in childhood, that transference contains crucial elements of the patient's past relationships that enter into the co-construction of the here and now, and that therapeutic technique involves transference exploration in order to understand its meaning and gain access to childhood dynamics, positions, and conflicts; however, these propositions do not demonstrate that the "roots and causes" of mental phenomenon can be discovered by the analytic method. The psychoanalytic method examines the historical vicissitudes of object relations, fantasy, cognitive capacities, talents and drives, but cannot say that prodigious musical talent, for example, has a "psychological cause." We nonetheless believe that psychoanalytic exploration of personal history is fundamental to the treatment process, in contrast to "post-postmodern thinkers" who have (more or less) dispensed with the baby in favor of the here-and-now and the equal contributions of patient and analyst to transferences. However, in keeping with the spirit of developmental scientists, insights and new perspectives from contemporary theories "bobbing about around us" (Gopnik, 1996, p. 221) are incorporated into our thinking when they fit the phenomena being considered.

## Contemporary Developmental Science

The larger field of developmental science has its own theoretical controversies and its own struggle with causality. Nonlinear systems theory, a paradigm that was applied to psychological entities since its early origins in family work, conceptualizes processes in ways that resonate with psychoanalytic notions of complex, multiply determined transformative exchanges between environment and inner life (Seligman, 2003). Systems theory is especially favored by the co-constructionist post-postmodern schools (Demos, 2001, 2007) because it decenters causality, leading to the characterization

of both the psychoanalytic endeavor and human development as transactional processes that self-organize. Dynamic systems theory does away with the Aristotelian notion of “efficient cause;” that is, the assumption that an event is the result of prior events, in favor of “formal cause,” which locates causality in the organization or patterns of component systems that arise from their flow and dynamic exchange to produce a “whole.” The second half of the twentieth century reverberated with the rise of postmodern systems thinking, which created seismic shifts in the fields of developmental psychology, sociology, history, and evolutionary sciences, to name just a few. But systems theory also has a “shadow side” (Berman, 1996). Most relevant to this discussion is the usual problem of the newest revelatory theory: Systems thinking has become the explanatory tool applied to all natural and man-made phenomena, leading one critic to complain, “if it is everything, it is really nothing. If all phenomena follow the same system principles, we have no basis for understanding anything apart from anything else” (Littlejohn, quoted in Jurich & Myers-Bowman, 1998, p. 83). The idiosyncratic past history of holistic systems and their components, the unique and specific processes that govern different aspects of human existence, the distortions created by convulsive disasters, and primary causality, even in regard to very limited outcomes, are homogenized by a theory that purports to be entirely free of context and specificity in regard to content. The neglect of the part for the whole disallows the contributions from innate or genetic predispositions and leads to considerations of larger and larger systems to effect, permit, or sustain individual transformation. There is no schizophrenia, only a schizophrenogenic family system embedded in a schizophrenogenic society (Jurich & Myers-Bowman, 1998). Causality or, at least, probabilistic causality is inconsistent with such thinking, as is the possibility that knowledge (of the patient) is, at least in part, independent of the knower (Held, 1995). The theory also can be read to downplay the role of conflict in the transformative process; indeed, “the underlying ‘hum’ as it were, is the karmic notion that conflict is unreal, that there are no accidents in the universe, and that all systems are essentially perfect as they are” (Berman, 1996, p. 44) or,

at the very least, moving toward perfection. The theory thus paradoxically lends itself to a kind of “systemic determinism,” similar to psychoanalytic “psychic determinism,” which neglects external impingements and catastrophes, context, individual constitution, genetic blueprint, and any other forces not intrinsic to the intersystemic dynamic in its backward search for causes.

In our view, the “shadow side” critique is applicable to the relational, two-person turn in psychoanalysis, especially insofar as the theor(ies) deemphasize the role of biological givens, memory, unconscious fantasy, “deficits” (Pine, 1994), and the events and traumas of childhood that are experienced and contained within the individual psyche. Their position challenges the foundational idea that the patient’s history is discovered in the transference and undermines notions of therapeutic action based on elucidation of the meaning of transference enactments and memories that bear the imprint of the child’s mind (Govrin, 2006; also see Lafarge, 2012). There is no revelation of childhood templates, relationship dynamics, or working models that point to a meaningful piece of the patient’s psyche independent of the knower, and therefore intrinsic to the patient’s mental life. In defense of developmental thinking and the psychology of the individual mind, Govrin (2006) critiques such “post-postmodern” theorists’ reluctance to embrace developmental theory due to “its objectivized universal childhood stages or psychobiological drives that determine or predict later psychological experience and universalist claims about the panhuman content of unconscious fantasies.” Govrin asserts that such a disclaimer is “not only denied by their own clinical material, which itself relies on such formulas, but also threatens a deep source of psychoanalytic thinking and creativity grounded in the conviction that we can ‘know’ something about another human being separate from ourselves” (Govrin, 2006, p. 526 referencing Chodorow, 1999).

Rejection of pluralism and the findings of related sciences would seem contradictory to the complexity and uncertainty that dynamic systems theory embraces. Like developmental scientists Gopnik and Keller, we consider theoretical pluralism to be a legitimate starting point on the way to (perhaps unachievable and even undesirable)



integration. Demos, following the tradition of Mitchell (1988), decries cut-and-paste theorizing as an avoidance of the inevitable incompatibility of fundamental principles with findings of contemporary research; in her view traditional schools must give up hallowed ideas like drive and other biologically based motivational systems, including attachment (Demos, 2001, 2008). However, true to Govrin’s hypothesis, psychoanalysts who think developmentally and utilize new findings in developmental science to advance, augment, refine, reconfigure, and broaden psychoanalytic ideas, add immeasurably to psychoanalytic thought: Recent examples include Fonagy’s “truly developmental” theorizing about sex (Fonagy, 2008); Lafarge’s remarkable blending of classical and new thinking in her explication of screen memories (LaFarge, 2012), and Vivona’s revelatory use of current research to refute a “nonverbal” period of development, with repercussions in our conceptualization of infants’ minds (Vivona, 2012).

## Guided Pluralism

Therefore, with the caveats that follow, we find ourselves mostly allied with the traditional (also called “grand” [Govrin, 2006] or “modern” [Chodorow, 2004]) schools, as “modern ego psychologists.” According to a comprehensive exegesis by Marcus (1999), modern ego psychology is a pluralistic world unto itself: It offers a “general psychology *describing* all mental function” (p. 867) (note that *describing* is a far more modest claim than “discovering roots and causes”), focuses on ego development and mental structure, diminishes the preeminence of drive and appreciates other motives, integrates object relations, and keeps abreast of advances in cognitive neuroscience and developmental research. Marcus’ definition implies that psychoanalytic theory cannot illuminate *psychological origins* of such mental phenomena as autism, heterosexuality, homosexuality, or addiction—that is, it cannot answer *why* questions—but rather examines *how* the ego grapples to synthesize these and myriad other complex outcomes derived from biological

and environmental sources. This is not equivalent to systems theorists' rejection of causality, but rather reflects our humble recognition that knowledge of ultimate causes is not only beyond psychoanalytic research, but also beyond the reach of contemporary developmental science.

Modern ego psychology is thus at variance with the early ego psychologists' versions of "general psychology" intended to elucidate the "psychological origin and development" of all psychological phenomena (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). Even though we share an interest in describing how mental structure is formed during infancy and early childhood—building up agencies, processes, and contents, how development proceeds to its completion, how meanings and motives evolve over time, and how childhood conflicts are rewritten and reissued over the course of a life, we do not claim to know "why." Moreover, despite many commentators' refutation of the antiquated notion that psychopathology can be positioned along a developmental continuum, this idea continues to lurk in aspects of our lexicon and should be extinguished (Rinsley, 1985; Vaillant, 1992; Wallerstein, 1994; Westen, 1990, 2002). So, even while agreeing with Freud's basic assumption that a formulation of the mental life of the child is necessary in order to scaffold the search backward for the psychological history of a given symptom or trait, we do not insist that we know or can discover exactly what went awry in development and at what moment, based on adult presentation and recall. Memory, especially screen memories, are rich veins of psychoanalytic exploration and understanding, capturing a complex mixture of veridical perception, experience, naïve cognition, unconscious fantasy (Erreich, 2003), and moments of personal meaning that have lasting impact on autobiographical narratives (Lafarge, 2012), but they do not offer simple causality.

## Phases

Most traditional developmental theories, both within psychoanalysis and developmental science, identify universals in developmental

acquisitions and tasks and adhere to the progression of development as a maturational program (without necessarily embracing Freud's singular psychosexual motor). Within traditional psychoanalysis, differences accrue in regard to timing, presumptions regarding normative progression, and relative emphases on psychosexuality, object relations, or narcissistic needs. Moreover, as previously noted, the various schools differ about the value of actually looking at children to confirm their hypotheses (Grignon, 2003). The "grand" schools consistently emphasize early childhood and accept the presence of the oedipal period as a watershed, but they differ in terms of how they conceptualize and weight the oedipal versus pre-oedipal period, how they elaborate development across the lifespan, their interest in emerging capacities, and in environmental impingements. In concert with these theories, we continue to see the oedipal period as pivotal, because it marks a developmental shift that introduces remarkable new capacities in symbolic thought, triadic relations, affective range and nuance, mentalization, and creative imagining, reorganizing prior development and reverberating into the future. It encompasses a revolutionary transformation of the mind and a shift in memorial capacity that essentially alters access to prior content (Shapiro, 1977).

In contrast, postmodern theorists tend to dispense with the familiar developmental stages that, beginning with Freud's psychosexual stage progression, have traditionally served to organize psychoanalytic—and in fact, general developmental—thinking (Lyons-Ruth, 1999). Their reasons for doing so are complex and multiple, ranging from their emphasis on systems thinking, which posits unweighted lifespan processes, to their rejection of pre-set/hardwired stages/singular narratives (Arnett et al., 2011; Chodorow, 1999; Demos, 2008; Harris, 1996; Hendry & Kloep, 2007), to the political climate that challenges the idea of normative pathways that have served to designate variations as healthy, pathological, or disordered (Auchincloss & Vaughan, 2001). These thinkers, in accord with lifespan theorists outside psychoanalysis, view the developmental process as continuous and universal, extending over the entire course of life, with sustained momentum from birth

to death. The formulation of psychoanalysis as a developmental process is more or less included in this thinking (for examples illustrating broad application of developmental ideas, see Settlage, Curtis, Lozoff, Silberschatz, & Simburg, 1988; Shane, 1979, 1980). In contrast, developmental ego psychologists in the Anna Freud tradition, like Neubauer (1996, 2001) and Abrams (1990), disagree with the notion that the process of change during psychoanalysis itself is “developmental” and view development as a limited process that ends with the attainment of adulthood. For them, developmental progression is a series of novel mental organizations and emerging capacities due to maturational advances; once the adult form is achieved, other processes assume importance and account for change.

The current literature emanating from general developmental science reflects parallel tension between “stage thinkers” and “process” (or systems) thinkers. Similar to their psychoanalytic brethren, process thinkers see transformation occurring across the lifespan, arising from the “systemic interaction of different resources and challenges, and not simply the passing of time” (Hendry & Kloep, 2011, p. 71). They consider human development to be a continuous self-organizing process inseparable from the surround. Some of the moderate theorists in this group differentiate among processes that impact human development and acknowledge agents outside the patterns produced by interaction: Humans experience *maturational shifts*, such as the universal experience of physical maturation; they experience *normative social shifts* dictated by the particular culture, such as the expectations about academic capacities or age at marriage. Finally, there are *non-normative shifts* determined by individual resources and prior experience (Hendry & Kloep, 2002). To all these thinkers, generalizations about stages of life, even those confirmed by research, are inevitably a reflection of the culture in which they occur. Although the process of transformation is universal, generalizable, and perpetual, the content and reflections upon these processes are context specific.

In contrast, phase theorists contend that “typical” features and challenges meaningfully identify a given stage and a child who

belongs there, even while acknowledging the vast variations possible. Phases are partly determined by environmental demand, but are also solidly embedded in biological maturation, which loops back to pace environmental expectation. Certainly, all individuals in a phase are not alike and all psychological arenas in one individual in a phase are not at the same level of development. This idea is fully incorporated in developmental lines (nonlinear and synthetic) thinking (A Freud 1963, 1981). But, like Anna Freud, we find that such groupings serve to organize our thinking and reflect the environmental reality. Most children grapple with bodily transformations, maturation, and environmental demands in roughly the same time period. Cultural expectations, applied to all children in a certain phase within that culture, have an impact on the developmental experience, including on its timing, especially as the child interfaces with extrafamilial society in latency, adolescence, and adulthood.

Unfortunately, thinking in phases has been equated with rigid linear sequences and normative paths, and has rightfully required correction within psychoanalysis. We are confident that a more open-ended and updated psychoanalytic view of development can serve to redress some real errors committed in the name of psychoanalytic developmental theory in the past. We also believe that developmental phases scaffold understanding of the serial mental organizations that characterize the mind of the child as it evolves and allow us to recognize naïve cognitions that emerge in the mental life of adults. Ours is a compromise position that sees developmental phases as a series of new organizations of multiple individually evolving but mutually interactive systems, replete with variability but nonetheless identifiable and implicitly acknowledged by changing environmental demands.

## Errors and Correctives

Many problematic psychoanalytic assertions are part of the psychoanalytic positivist past and reflect the arrogant overreach of the then-dominant theory in mental health. However chastened

our field may be at present, some of these ideas nonetheless continue in psychoanalytic clinical thinking, specifically in regard to developmental progression (Gilmore, 2008). As suggested earlier, they arose from an inflation of fundamental and cherished psychoanalytic insights, such as psychic determinism and the genetic hypothesis, into a general psychology without due regard for developmental complexity. In brief, these include the following implicit or explicit proposals: (1) that psychodynamics drive development; (2) that specific developmental outcomes are determined by psychic experience in specific developmental epochs; in other words, the continuity of development is mirrored by a continuity of psychopathology (Bradley & Westen, 2005; Westen, 1990); (3) that we can know what constitutes normal and abnormal developmental outcomes and that we can explain outcomes by examination of mental content (Reisner, 2001)<sup>3</sup>; (4) that observations of infants can be directly applied to the patient–analyst relationships (Wolff 1996), thereby discounting the multiple reorganizations and novel capacities introduced by intervening development; and (5) that environmental and cultural influences can always be relegated to a secondary role. Freud’s shift from the seduction theory to the role of mental life and conflict in neurogenesis was itself never a complete abandonment of environmental influence (Gilmore, 2008; Lothane, 2001); he continued to recognize that the environment deeply influences the form, challenges, and crises of developmental progression and called for observational data to augment theory (Freud, 1905, 1915).

The postmodern emphasis on two-person psychology, intersubjectivity, and their developmental implications are correctives to many of these errors, but can lead to the compromise of certain psychoanalytic priorities. New ideas seem to come at the cost of personal history, the dynamic unconscious, sex and aggression, endowment, and ongoing developmental opportunity that can be deleterious or beneficial. For this reason and others discussed earlier, we demur from an absolute embrace of two-person, nonlinear systems thinking, recognizing that both the systems’ model and relational theory emerged historically in reaction to positivist and

mechanistic views. In their even-handedness, these theories undermine the psychoanalytic emphasis on intrapsychic life and diminish the violent deforming impact of trauma. Moreover, they explicitly eschew the role of constitutional endowment and genetic blueprint, arriving at conclusions that, like early psychoanalytic thinking, fail to recognize the powerful shaping effect of biological givens.

Classical theorists who utilize systems thinking (see Galatzer-Levy, 1995, 2004; Gilmore, 2008; Mayes, 1999, 2001; P. Tyson, 1998, 2002, 2005; Tyson & Tyson, 1990) have offered pluralistic integrations of the co-constructed present and the patient's childhood past. As P. Tyson noted, while endorsing a systems approach:

...developmental theory too must be regarded as useful, as our patients come to us with a past that includes a history of unresolved conflicts. An understanding of possible developmental paths might shed some light on understanding the ways in which old patterns of interacting with others, old patterns of resolving conflict, creep gradually into the analytic process despite the opportunities it offers for change. (1998, p. 12)

Thus while observing the dynamics of the here-and-now, we listen for elements woven into mental life from the there-and-then, in addition to other sources known and unknown, such as genetics, in utero events, biological maturation, environmental influences, trauma, and so on. In this, we believe we follow the lead of many scientific disciplines addressing human development; we acknowledge our particular arenas of interest, recognizing that other vantage points focus elsewhere. Nonetheless, we welcome insights and information from these other viewpoints and from related disciplines, because these illuminate the multiple systems at work in the process of development. The course of individual human development can be best understood as the evolving manifestation of a complex dynamic process, provided there is room in that formulation for pre-existing psychopathology, unfolding genetic predispositions, conflict, the dynamic unconscious, biological maturation, and environmental shifts.

Moreover, as will become apparent from what follows, each system that concerns us directly is a composite of many contributing systems, including variables outside our proper domain—such as the timing and emergence of genetic limitations or disorders, cultural demands, the disorders of bodily growth familiar to pediatricians, environmental impingements, or even the appearance of a powerful salutary person at a critical juncture in development. The recruitment of these variables into mental life is inevitable but complex; linear causal formulations, psychic determinism, or the presumption of infinite freedom have no place in this conceptualization. Nonetheless, we believe we can restore a coherent personal history to our patients.

## Core Psychoanalytic Priorities

What makes our perspective psychoanalytic? Clearly, there are many psychoanalytic theories, each with their own view of development, and developmental theories (or partial theories) proliferate in every field that addresses psychology, life narratives, childhood, cognition, sexuality, and so on. From our perspective, psychoanalytic developmental theories distinguish themselves by emphasizing the evolution of mental life, the role of adaptation, the unconscious mind, and subjective experience. Like classical or traditional theories, we incorporate the organizing frame of psychic structure derived from, but not ending with, Freud's structural hypothesis (Tyson & Tyson, 1990). Even without that framework, *most* of the following features are consistent with most psychoanalytic theorizing, to the extent that it includes ideas about development:

First is the prioritization of early interpersonal experience (not simply infancy but early dyadic experience); from birth, this is the fundamental paradigm for development and reverberates in most, if not all, important arenas. This interpersonal environment immediately engages with the infant's capacity for relatedness and shapes its potentials (Weil, 1970). Early object relations are preserved in procedural memory and infiltrate all of development.



Second, we consider the reverberations of maturational transformations of body and brain because these drive development forward. Ongoing physical maturation is the organizing premise of developmental neuroscience, developmental cognitive psychology, pediatrics, education, infant research, and many other related fields. From the psychoanalytic point of view, bodily transformation imposes demands on the mind throughout life. This is the case during the entire sweep of childhood and adolescence as the individual grows into the mature form; it is especially pronounced during periods of accelerated growth, such as infancy and early adolescence, in which rapid changes in size and shape are accompanied by the emergence of revolutionary new capabilities. In the developmental context, the body is a fount of impulses and emerging capacities to be managed, self-regulated, and integrated into the self-representation. The corporeal body anchors self-representation and consciousness in somatic experience.

As a corollary, our approach to psychoanalytic developmental theory acknowledges the role of biologically based ego capacities as well as biologically based drives, emerging at variable rates and degrees in the mind. We believe these exist in nascent form at birth as part of the genetic blueprint. However, potentials are affected immediately by interaction with the caregiving environment, are readily recruited into conflict, and can be seriously compromised by intrusions from trauma and other circumstances that overwhelm the ego (Weil, 1970).

In regard to the ego, our interest focuses on the transformations in mental organization as these unfold serially, replacing one another as new capacities come on line, mature, are co-opted to serve new purposes, and/or fade in importance through disuse or natural obsolescence; new organizations, although momentous and noncontinuous, are porous to infiltration or eruption of earlier modes of thinking, feeling, and functioning should circumstances require or reward it. The emergence of capacities and vicissitudes of the drives are biologically determined, but also highly susceptible to psychological and environmental factors. For example, latency is rapidly shrinking in the contemporary world in which digital media,