

THE
CHINA
READER



SIXTH EDITION

RISING POWER

EDITED BY
DAVID SHAMBAUGH

The China Reader

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF *THE CHINA READER*

- The China Reader: The Reform Era*, Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, co-editors (1999)
The China Reader: People's China, David Milton, Nancy Milton, Franz Schurmann, co-editors (1974)
The China Reader: Communist China, Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, co-editors (1967)
The China Reader: Republican China, Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, co-editors (1967)
The China Reader: Imperial China, Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, co-editors (1967)

Previous Books by David Shambaugh

- China's Future* (2016)
China Goes Global: The Partial Power (2013)
China's Communist Party: Atrophy & Adaptation (2008)
The Odyssey of China's Imperial Art Treasures (2005, with Jeannette Shambaugh Elliott)
Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (2002)
China and Europe, 1949–1995 (1996)
Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990 (1991)
The Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang's Provincial Career (1984)

Previous Edited Volumes by David Shambaugh

- Tangled Titans: The United States and China* (2012)
Charting China's Future: Domestic and International Challenges (2011)
China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies, and Prospects (2008, with Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong)
International Relations of Asia (2008 and 2014, with Michael Yahuda)
China Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan, and the United States (2007, with Robert F. Ash and Seiichiro Takagi)
Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (2005)
Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations (2001, with Ramon H. Myers and Michel C. Oksenberg)
The Modern Chinese State (2000)
Is China Unstable? (2000)
The China Reader: The Reform Era (1999, with Orville Schell)
China's Military Faces the Future (1999, with James Lilley)
Contemporary Taiwan (1998)
China's Military in Transition (1997, with Richard H. Yang)
Greater China: The Next Superpower? (1995)
Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (1995)
Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (1994, with Thomas W. Robinson)
American Studies of Contemporary China (1993)

The China Reader

RISEING POWER

David Shambaugh

EDITOR

Sixth Edition

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Shambaugh, David L., editor of compilation.

Title: The China reader : rising power / David Shambaugh.

Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2015. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2015025438 | ISBN 978-0-19-939707-5 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 978-0-19-939708-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: China—Politics and government—2002- | China—Economic conditions—2000- | China—Social conditions—2000- | China—Foreign relations—21st century. | China—Foreign economic relations—21st century.

Classification: LCC DS779.4 .C464 2015 | DDC 951.06/1—dc23 LC record available at <http://lcn.loc.gov/2015025438>

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed by Sheridan, USA

Dedicated to Orville Schell

CONTENTS

Preface [xv](#)

Introduction [1](#)

The Complexities of a Rising China [1](#)
David Shambaugh

RISING CHINA

Editorial Introduction [5](#)

I. *Viewing China's Rise: Alternative Perspectives* [8](#)

The Eight Differences That Define China [8](#)
Martin Jacques

China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status [20](#)
Zheng Bijian

China's Unpeaceful Rise [23](#)
John J. Mearsheimer

The Illusion of Chinese Power [26](#)
David Shambaugh

POLITICS

Editorial Introduction [34](#)

I. *Elite Politics* [40](#)

Elite Politics: The Struggle for Normality [40](#)
Joseph Fewsmith

II. *Dissent* 51

Charter '08 51

Anonymous

For Freedom, Justice, and Love: My Closing Statement to the Court 56

Xu Zhiyong

III. *Ideology* 65

Achieving New Victory for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 65

Hu Jintao

Ideology in China: Confucius Makes a Comeback—You Can't Keep a Good Sage Down 68

The Economist

Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere 70

General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

IV. *The Future of the CCP* 74

Making Party Building More Scientific in All Respects 74

Hu Jintao

Speech on the 65th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress [Excerpts] 79

Xi Jinping

Is CCP Rule Fragile or Resilient? 84

Minxin Pei

No "Jasmine" for China 93

Bruce J. Dickson

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Editorial Introduction 100

I. *Building an Economic Superpower* 102

China: Economy—Overview 102

Central Intelligence Agency

Economic Growth From High-Speed to High-Quality 104

Barry J. Naughton

Accelerating the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy and the Change of the Growth Model 117

Hu Jintao

II. *State Capacity and Governance* 121

China's Governance Crisis 121

Minxin Pei

III. *Going Global* 128

China and the Global Economy 128

Justin Yifu Lin

Are China's Multinational Corporations Really Multinational? 139

David Shambaugh

RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

Editorial Introduction 143

I. *Environment and Climate Change* 144

China's Environmental Crisis 144

Beina Xu

China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 147

Information Office of the State Council

II. *Energy Challenges* 152

China's Search for a New Energy Strategy 152

Damien Ma

SOCIETY

Editorial Introduction 156

I. *Rich and Poor* 159

China's Post-Socialist Inequality 159

Martin King Whyte

II. *Demography and Gender* 165

China's Population Destiny: The Looming Crisis 165

Wang Feng

Gender Equality and Women's Development in China 169

Information Office of the State Council

III. *Nationalism and Identity* 171

The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism 171

Jean-Pierre Cabestan

IV. *Religion* 187

The Upsurge of Religion in China 187

Richard Madsen

V. *Youth* 196

Angry Youth 196

Evan Osnos

VI. *Urban and Rural* 205

Driven to Protest: China's Rural Unrest 205

Lianjiang Li

Building the (China) Dream 210

The Economist

VII. *Ethnic Tensions* 226

The Roots of China's Ethnic Conflicts 226

Yan Sun

LAW, RIGHTS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Editorial Introduction 233

I. *Progress and Limits in the Rule of Law* 237

The Rule of Law: Pushing the Limits of Party Rule 237

Jamie Horsley

II. *Corruption and Crime* 248

Fighting Corruption: A Difficult Challenge for Chinese Leaders 248

Minxin Pei

Murder Mysteries 262

The Economist

III. *Human Rights* 263

World Human Rights Report 2014: China 263
Human Rights Watch

IV. *Civil Society* 269

Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier 269
The Economist

Citizen Contention and Campus Calm: The Paradox of Chinese
 Civil Society 274
Elizabeth J. Perry

MEDIA AND CULTURE

Editorial Introduction 281

I. *The Mainstream Media* 283

Civil Society and Media in China 283
Rachel Murphy

Media Censorship in China 290
Beina Xu

II. *The Internet and Social Media* 294

China's Internet: A Giant Cage 294
The Economist

III. *The Intelligentsia* 296

China's Beleaguered Intellectuals 296
Merle Goldman

IV. *Soft Power* 303

Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China 303
Hu Jintao

China's Soft Power Deficit 305
Joseph S. Nye

THE MILITARY AND SECURITY

Editorial Introduction 307

I. *China's Security Calculus* 309

Work Together to Maintain World Peace and Security 309

Xi Jinping

II. *Modernizing the Military* 312

Modernizing China's Military, 1997–2012 312

Richard A. Bitzinger

III. *The Internal Security State* 324

China Rethinks Unrest 324

Murray Scot Tanner

China's Security State: The Truncheon Budget 335

The Economist

IV. *Global Security* 336

China's Roles in Global Security 336

David Shambaugh

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Editorial Introduction 345

I. *China Views the World* 351

China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds
Its Way 351

Wang Jisi

Coping with a Conflicted China 357

David Shambaugh

II. *The Asian Neighborhood* 368

China's Role in Asia: Attractive or Assertive? 368

Phillip C. Saunders

Fruitful Results and Broad Prospects: A Review of Twenty Years
of China-ASEAN Relations 384

Zhang Jiujuan

China and Central Asia	389
<i>Valérie Niquet</i>	

III. *The United States and China* 395

The China-US Relationship Goes Global	395
<i>Kenneth Lieberthal</i>	
Agenda for a New Great Power Relationship	402
<i>Wu Xinbo</i>	

IV. *Russia and Europe* 410

Russia and China: The Ambivalent Embrace	410
<i>Andrew Kuchins</i>	
China and Europe: Opportunities or Dangers?	416
<i>Odd Arne Westad</i>	

V. *The Global South* 422

China and the Developing World	422
<i>Peter Ferdinand</i>	
China's Africa Strategy	428
<i>Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick</i>	
Assessing China's Impact in Latin America	434
<i>David Shambaugh</i>	
The BRICS and China's Aspiration for the New "International Order"	439
<i>Yun Sun</i>	

VI. *Global Governance* 440

Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?	440
<i>Robert B. Zoellick</i>	
China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum	445
<i>Michael Fullilove</i>	

“GREATER” CHINA

Editorial Introduction	459
------------------------	-----

I. *Hong Kong and Taiwan* 460

Enriching the Practice of “One Country, Two Systems” and Advancing China's Reunification	460
<i>Hu Jintao</i>	

Political City: Democracy in Hong Kong 462

The Economist

China and Taiwan 464

Richard C. Bush

CHINA FACES THE FUTURE

Editorial Introduction: Whither China? 473

I. *Muddle Through, Adaptation, or the End of Dynasty?* 475

Peaceful Development and the Chinese Dream
of National Rejuvenation 475

Wang Yi

Unruly Stability: Why China's Regime Has Staying Power 486

Andrew G. Walder

A Rising China Needs a New National Story 492

Orville Schell and John Delury

China at the Tipping Point? Foreseeing the Unforeseeable 494

Andrew J. Nathan

About the Editor 499

About the Contributors 501

Index 509

PREFACE

This new edition of *the China Reader* is the sixth in a series that has chronicled China's turbulent and dramatic evolution since the eighteenth century. The first three volumes were co-edited by Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell and were published together as a set in 1967, covering China's tumultuous modern history up to that point in time: *Imperial China: The Decline of the Last Dynasty and the Origins of Modern China, the 18th and 19th Centuries*; *Republican China: Nationalism, War, and the Rise of Communism 1911–1949*; *Communist China: Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation, 1949 to the Present*.¹ The third volume covered the first fifteen years of “Communist China” (as it was then known), but it came out in 1967 just after the momentous Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution erupted the previous year. The fourth volume was published in 1974 and covered the first phase (1966–1972) of the Cultural Revolution period (which, according to official Chinese communist historiography, lasted until 1976). Volume 4 was co-edited by Franz Schurmann, David Milton, and Nancy Milton and was entitled *People's China: Social Experimentation, Politics, Entry on to the World Scene, 1966–1972*.² These four volumes were all staples for those entering Chinese Studies in the 1970s, and they were very popular with the public—providing important insights into the closed world of the People's Republic of China at that time.

A full twenty-five years passed before Orville Schell kindly approached me about co-editing a fifth volume in the series, covering the late-Mao and post-Mao period. It was a real pleasure to collaborate with Orville on that volume, *The China Reader: The Reform Era*, which was published in 1999.³ It was during this period that China embarked on Deng Xiaoping's path of “reform and opening” (改革与开放), and thus Volume 5 chronicled the many twists-and-turns of the period, from the twilight of the Maoist era in the mid-1970s through the early reform years of the 1980s, the traumatic political events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and into the late-Deng era before his passing in 1997.

This collaboration cemented a long personal and professional friendship between us. Orville's perceptive insights and beautiful prose as a writer on modern China have benefitted unknown numbers of readers of his many publications over the years. Orville is that rare combination of scholar, journalist, essayist, public intellectual, educator, policy analyst, and advocate—in each of these roles he has constantly challenged conventional wisdom, entertained and educated others through his writings, contributed to on-the-ground work of non-governmental organizations in China, and participated in high-level foreign policy deliberations in the United States and other nations. His perspectives and activities have not always made him popular with the government authorities in Beijing or Washington, but his moral and scholarly integrity has always driven him to “speak truth to power.” Given these many contributions to the field of China Studies, his instrumental pioneering role in *The China Reader* series, and all he has taught me about China, I admiringly and gratefully dedicate this volume to Orville Schell.

This sixth volume (6.0) in the series picks up chronologically where the fifth left off—in 1997—and brings the China story forward through 2014. It is during this nearly two-decade period that China has truly emerged as a *Rising Power* in the world (hence the subtitle to this edition). The following Introduction provides an overview of some of the impressive aspects of this historic process, to help guide readers through the subsequent selections in the book (which are ordered according to subject categories).

Through all six editions to date, *The China Reader* series has thus sought to chronicle China's convoluted evolution over a long period of time; when read in sequence and together, readers are provided with the flow of events that have shaped modern and contemporary Chinese history. Such a temporal perspective is also an interesting window into the *zeitgeist* of the time. That is, foreign analyses of China (just like those in China) are colored by certain paradigms or perspectives that are prevalent at a given time. These interpretive prisms may change over time, and therefore *The China Reader* series offers historical insights into the evolution of Western Sinology since the 1960s. Another distinguishing feature has been that the editors have consistently sought to mix together sources *from* China (primary sources) with sources published *about* China (secondary sources) written by Western scholars. This mixture has provided readers two perspectives. First, it offers a sense of China's own official and unofficial narratives: party propaganda, official documents, dissident manifestos, and literature. Even if propagandistic, it is important to know the *lingua franca* of Chinese official ideology (意识形态), terminology (提法), and slogans (口号). Secondly, it offers readers some of the best in Sinology—analyses written by scholars, journalists, and think tank analysts in the West.

As editor, in this volume (as in all previous ones in the series) I have tried to cast a wide net in the selections to be included. Not only did they need to span the seventeen years (1997–2014) since Volume 5, but they also needed to take full account of the broad spectrum of important issues concerning China internally and externally. In making these selections I have done my best to be as representative and comprehensive as possible—yet, inevitably, editorial decisions had to be made and many illustrative documents could not be included for reasons of space. In most cases, the selections appear as they did in the original—although in some cases they have been excerpted or edited down for style or length.

The following pages plunge into depth and details about China's development in many facets. To be certain, China's rise is far from over and there will be many dimensions of this incredible story to be told in future editions of *The China Reader*.

David Shambaugh

NOTES

1. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (eds.), *The China Reader: Imperial China* (New York: Random House, 1967); Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (eds.), *The China Reader: Republican China* (New York: Random House, 1967); Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (eds.), *The China Reader: Communist China* (New York: Random House, 1967).
2. Franz Schurmann, David Milton, Nancy Milton (eds.), *The China Reader: People's China* (New York: Random House, 1974).
3. Orville Schell and David Shambaugh (eds.), *The China Reader: The Reform Era* (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1999).

The China Reader

INTRODUCTION

The Complexities of a Rising China

David Shambaugh

“China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.” It has been two centuries since Napoléon Bonaparte made his prophetic prediction, but it is now being realized. World history has never witnessed a nation modernize as comprehensively or rise to world power status as rapidly as has China since the 1970s. Even China’s three previous “rises” (Qin-Han, Sui-Tang, Ming-Qing) were nowhere near as time-compressed or as thoroughgoing as this most recent phase.¹ This edition of *The China Reader* is about that transformation.

China’s mega-economy has skyrocketed to being the second largest in the world, with a total gross domestic product (GDP) of \$9.24 trillion and accounting for 15 percent of global growth in 2014. It is now the world’s largest trading nation, is the largest consumer of energy, holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves (\$3.7 trillion), has had the world’s highest annual growth rate for three decades (8.4 percent), and now has the world’s second largest military budget and largest internal security budget. China is the world’s largest producer of many goods,

earning it the moniker as the “world’s workshop” and producing a plethora of goods for consumers worldwide. The physical transformation of the country has been extraordinary to witness, with infrastructure development unparalleled in human history: by the end of 2012 China had a rail network of 97,000 kilometers (including 16,000 kilometers of high-speed rail) and a national highway network of 90,000 kilometers (the longest in the world). Modern cities featuring futuristic architecture have literally risen across the country. I have personally witnessed this transformation, visiting or living in China every year since 1979.

In the process of China’s dramatic growth over the past three-plus decades, more than 200 million citizens have emerged from absolute poverty, with only 6.1 percent of the population still living below the poverty line. China’s per capita income has now reached approximately \$6,800 in nominal terms, but nearly \$11,850 in PPP (purchasing-power-parity) equivalent dollars (2014).² As the society has become generally more wealthy, some have become extremely well off—China

now boasts the world's largest number of millionaires and second largest group of billionaires in the world.

Many other indicators illustrate China's ascent. It has an impressive space program that intends to put people on the moon by the 2020s, the world's largest museums (the Palace Museum and National Museum in Beijing), the world's largest hydroelectric dam (the Three Gorges), the world's largest military, the world's largest population, the world's largest number of gold medal winners in the Beijing and London Olympic Games, and many other global "firsts."

In 2014 the Chinese navy put its first aircraft carrier to sea (more are being planned), while a 2015 military White Paper officially stated China's goal of "building itself into a maritime power," boldly proclaiming that "the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned."³ Part of the rationale for building a global naval presence has to do with the fact that China's commerce has gone global, establishing a presence all around the planet. China's outbound investment now ranks third worldwide and is growing rapidly, as its companies are establishing factories from Brazil to Bulgaria and from Kenya to Kentucky. Chinese entrepreneurs and workers have also scattered out across the world, occasionally requiring rescue (as in 2013 when 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated out of Libya and 2015 when 1,000 were rescued from Yemen). China's global merchandise trade and dependence on imported energy and raw materials is another reason that it believes a global naval capability is required. No less than 120 nations (out of 194) count China as their largest trading partner.

China's diplomacy has also developed as China has risen. Over the past forty years China has traveled a path from a nation isolated from the international community to one thoroughly integrated into it. Today the People's Republic enjoys diplomatic relations with 175 countries, is a member of more than 150 international organizations, and is party to more than 300 multilateral treaties. It receives a large number of visiting foreign dignitaries every year, and its own leaders travel the world regularly. It enjoys the trappings of being a major world power—being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and participant in all major international summits—although its

diplomatic behavior often remains reticent and its diplomatic influence limited.

But China's rise has been about more than impressive statistics, diplomatic presence, and hard-power projection. It is important not only to conceive of China's rise in "vertical" terms—its upward trajectory—but also in what might be described as "horizontal" terms. That is, the modernization process has had numerous collateral side-effects on different aspects of Chinese society, its Asian neighbors, and the world more broadly. As in previous editions of *The China Reader*, this volume casts a broad net and intentionally covers these horizontal manifestations of China's rise—in politics, governance, social welfare, culture, intellectual life, media, social inequality, gender, demography, religion, national identity, rural and urban life, ethnicity, law and human rights, civil society, military and security, and China's roles in the world. During the seventeen-year period covered in this edition, China has passed through three distinct leadership periods—Jiang Zemin (1997–2002), Hu Jintao (2002–2012), and Xi Jinping (2012–). Each sub-period has had its own distinct characteristics and complexities. In each subsequent section, readers are exposed to these diverse elements that lurk beneath the surface of China's impressive rise. The horizontal side-effects are as significant as the impressive vertical aspects of China's rise.

Part of China's rise has also been a psychological state, whereby average Chinese citizens have been able to have ambitions and realize personal dreams that were unimaginable during the stultifying first thirty years that the Communist Party ruled the People's Republic of China.⁴ China's current leader, Xi Jinping, has taken the concept of personal dreams to a national level by proclaiming the "Chinese Dream" (of national rejuvenation). Of course, the ambition to strengthen and rebuild China into a great power is not new—this has been the *leitmotif* of every Chinese leader since the Self-Strengthening Movement of the late-Qing Dynasty.⁵ But today, with all of China's impressive achievements, Chinese citizens are rightfully more proud and nationalistic than ever—although this nationalism is sometimes expressed in xenophobic and hubristic outbursts against those imperialist powers that injured China during its "century of shame and humiliation" (百年国耻).

Thus, measured in many ways, China's rise to global power has been *the* most important development in world affairs in the early twenty-first century. This *zeitgeist* has produced a plethora of "China rise" books being published during the intervening years since the last edition of *The China Reader*.⁶ Some observers are notably, even effusively, optimistic that China, in the words of one writer, will "rule the world."⁷ Others, myself included, are much more cautious and circumspect; these observers see multiple weaknesses and fault lines in both China's domestic and international capacities.⁸

The future reality of China's rise probably lies somewhere in between these two diverse paradigms: China will be both strong and weak at the same time. How can this be? While it may not be cognitively comfortable for many analysts, it is likely to be the reality. Some dimensions of China—such as its growing military power and its sheer economic heft—auger well for its continued rise as a world power. China will continue to upgrade its intellectual capital and technological base, although it remains an open question as to whether both are capable of making the full transition to a globally cutting-edge innovative society and economy. China also has much untapped "soft power," if the government and Communist Party permits its citizens to create more freely.⁹ Its growing global footprint is only going to increase. Beijing is also expected to play an ever-increasing diplomatic role in global governance.

Yet, at the same time, China remains a mass of tangled contradictions, uncertainty, and potential instability. Its Leninist political system remains repressive and anachronistic. Its demographic transition to an aging society is already underway, with significant implications for economic productivity. Various distortions caused by state intervention, debt, and corrupt practices plague the economy. China's toxic environment taxes human health and compromises sustainable development. Massive internal migration strains governments and urban institutions. Incidents of mass social unrest now total about 200,000 per year, while its peripheral regions of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong remain restive. Taiwan also remains outside the grip of Beijing, despite the significant linkages established in recent years. Externally, as China has risen, its ties with other countries have become both deeper and more fraught simultaneously.

Managing its external relations, particularly with its neighbors in Asia and with the United States, will be an ongoing challenge for Beijing in the years ahead. The increasingly competitive dynamics of US-China relations have led many pundits to opine about the so-called Thucydides' Trap. According to research by Professor Graham Allison of Harvard, in the vast majority of "power transitions" throughout modern history (in eleven of fifteen cases since 1500), predominant powers have not been able to peacefully accommodate rising powers and rising powers have not been able to coexist in the order dominated by the existing hegemonic power—with war frequently resulting (preemptively launched either by the challenging or by the dominant power).¹⁰ Many American scholars are skeptical and pessimistic that the Thucydides' Trap can be successfully managed, and they thus anticipate an increasingly acute "security dilemma" and zero-sum contest for primacy between China and the United States—centered in East Asia but possibly becoming global—which they argue will very likely result in war between the two powers.¹¹ Others are more sanguine that the inevitable strategic tensions can be successfully managed, if certain reciprocal steps are taken by each side.¹² This will be the great geostrategic challenge of the twenty-first century.

Thus, the destabilizing collateral effects of China's continued rise are considerable. Yet, in many areas, China will continue to impress the world with its successes. In other areas, it will likely "muddle through" and effectively manage its challenges—as flexible adaptability and incremental experimentalism have been the secrets of China's accomplishments to date. Yet, in other domains, China may stumble as it experiences the inevitable stresses of transitioning from a developing country with 1.4 billion people to a more modern nation or encounters difficulties in its foreign relations. These three pathways—continued growth, muddling through, or unstable regression—are all possibilities for China in the years ahead (and they are not mutually exclusive!).¹³ We will have to await the next edition of *The China Reader* in ten or fifteen years' time to see how it all plays out. Only one thing is certain: China will continue to be one of the most intriguing stories of our era and in human history.

NOTES

1. See Wang Gungwu, "The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications," *China: An International Journal*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Sept. 2004), pp. 311–322.
2. The World Bank, "GDP Per Capita in 2014," available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.
3. Information Office of the State Council, *China's Military Strategy* (May 2015).
4. This is so well captured in Evan Osnos, *Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2014).
5. This is best captured in Orville Schell and John Delury, *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 2014).
6. See, for example, Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin, 2012); James Kynge, *China Shakes the World: The Rise of a Hungry Nation* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006); Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.), *The Rise of China* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Charles Horner, *Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009); C. Fred Bergsten et al., *China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008); Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.), *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); David Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
7. Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (London: Penguin, 2012). In a similar vein see Arvind Subramanian, *Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics, 2011); Michael Pillsbury, *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2015).
8. See David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jonathan Fenby, *Will China Dominate the 21st Century?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014); Mel Gurtov, *Will This Be China's Century? A Skeptic's View* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013); Regina M. Abrami, William C. Kirby, and F. Warren McFarlan, *Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2014); Thomas J. Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2015); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Josef Joffe, *The Myth of America's Decline* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014); Ho-fung Hung, *The China Boom: Why China Will Not Rule the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
9. See David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect," *Foreign Affairs* (July–August 2015).
10. Graham Allison, "Avoiding Thucydides' Trap," *Financial Times*, August 22, 2012.
11. See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).
12. See Thomas J. Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2015); Hugh White, *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); James Steinberg and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Geoff A. Dyer, *The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China—and How America Can Win* (New York: Vintage, 2014); David Shambaugh (ed.), *Tangled Titans: The United States and China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); Henry M. Paulson, *Dealing with China: An Insider Unmasks the New Economic Superpower* (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2015).
13. I explore these possible future trajectories in *China's Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).

RISING CHINA

Editorial Introduction

Conceptualizing the rise of China brings to mind the ancient Indian fable of the three blind men feeling an elephant: each touched a different part of the beast and thus derived vastly different impressions of what it was. Such is the case among scholars and analysts today when they try to comprehend the rise of China and predict its future impact on the world. Vastly different perspectives are offered, and they compete with each other in the public sphere. While distinctly different (some even diametrically opposed), they all offer important insights and most hold elements of truth. China and its rise are such complicated phenomena that observers need to entertain multiple perspectives—even if all of their arguments are not persuasive.

Such is the case with the four selections in this section. They have been selected not only because they have been written by influential writers and observers of China, but also because of the stark differences in perspectives and argumentation.

Martin Jacques is a well-known public intellectual and writer in England. His book *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and Birth of a New Global Order* has drawn widespread acclaim around the world (and has been translated into multiple languages). As the title and subtitle suggest, Jacques offers the controversial argument that the Western-dominated world of the past two centuries is drawing to a close and a new global era is dawning with China (and other non-Western states) at the center.

This selection, which is drawn from the second edition of his book, summarizes eight features that distinguish China as a rising power and will likely characterize the new global order that Jacques envisions. A key aspect of Jacques' argument is that there are multiple pathways to development, modernity, and global order—and that China's modernization and its vision for the international system are distinctive and need to be understood and appreciated on their own terms (rather than imposing Western standards and measures of evaluation). His eight elements are valuable perspectives and correctives as they evaluate China on its own terms. Chinese are not always as persuasive in interpreting their country and its aspirations, whereas Jacques has dug deeply

into the Chinese psyche and puts aside Western metrics of measurement. Yet he comes to his own conclusions about the trajectories and paths that China is likely to follow. Jacques sees deep cultural continuities connecting China's ancient past and its future. How do Chinese view the role of the state in its relations with society? He describes China as a "civilization-state" but also sees other distinguishing features of the Chinese state—such as meritocracy and adaptability. One of Jacques' more interesting insights concerns the roles of race and ethnicity in determining China's identities (plural). Geography and demography are also determining features for how China operates internally and externally. In terms of China's relations with its neighbors and the world, Jacques envisions a return to a "tribute system" of sorts. The return of China as a great power in Asia and on the world stage will be transformational, Jacques argues—not only because of the size of China, but because of its different traditions and discomfort with the way the West has structured international relations. He, in fact, sees China's rise and future global impact as extremely disruptive. On this point, Jacques is at variance with Chinese commentators (although most of his analysis is shared by the Chinese government and commentariat). He doesn't quite predict a "clash of civilizations," as did Samuel Huntington several years ago, but Jacques does envision major fault lines emerging between Chinese and Western preferences for global order.

The second selection in this section is written by a leading Chinese intellectual-official (although it was written for a Western audience and published in the pages of the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*). Zheng Bijian has been a senior official and advisor to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for several decades. Most of his career was spent working as a Marxist theoretician and official in the CCP propaganda system. Now retired, beginning around 2000 Zheng became very interested in how China's rise was being interpreted outside of China. Like almost all Chinese he felt that China was being misinterpreted in the West and in Asia as a threatening and disruptive force in world affairs. Zheng (and other Chinese) wonder: why won't others believe us when we say that China's rise will be benign? So he set out to try and correct these perceived misunderstandings. The result was Zheng's "theory" of China's "peaceful rise" (和平崛起). Zheng coined this concept in a speech in late 2003, and he intended it as a direct rebuttal to what Chinese commentators identified as the "China threat theory" (中国威胁论) that was prevalent in the West and parts of Asia. Zheng based his idea on a reading of history—the history of other rising powers. He found that most rising powers had not, in fact, risen peacefully—but, he argued, China was different.

Zheng's views are extrapolated in this selection. First, Zheng argues that China is weighed down by a huge population and relative poverty. While still relatively poor, Zheng nevertheless notes the dramatic progress of China's development over the past quarter-century. But Zheng argues that China's developmental path has a very long road ahead and its modernization is far from accomplished. He notes that it will not be until 2050 when China can be accurately described as a "modernized, medium-level developed country." He also describes a series of particular challenges that China will need to overcome if it is to reach this level of development. Externally, Zheng argues that China is nothing but an opportunity for the world. It is, he argues, certainly not a threat to the world. Zheng states categorically: "China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs."

The third selection in this section takes direct aim at this claim by Zheng (it is also a longstanding claim by the Chinese government dating to the 1970s). In it, University of Chicago professor of political science John J. Mearsheimer stakes out the opposite position. Titled "China's Unpeaceful Rise," the author examines the issue of China as a rising power from the perspective of history and international relations theory.

Elaborated at great length in his influential book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer does not treat China as a unique case. Why, he assumes, should China not behave as have all other rising powers or great powers? Note that his view is the polar opposite of Martin Jacques' as well as Zheng Bijian's. In Mearsheimer's analysis there are "iron laws" (or at least repetitive patterns) of history and international relations: "My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region." His view is, of course, deeply rooted in the international relations theory of "Realism," which holds that all states live in an anarchical world and thus pursue policies and take actions intended to ensure survival. This survivalist instinct leads them to compete with each other and, in his words, "The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system." Why should China be any different from this age-old pattern of great powers? Why would China not follow this pattern and seek hegemony (regional first, global second)? What are the implications for China's neighbors in Asia and for the current global hegemon (the United States)? Based on his theory and analysis, not surprisingly, Mearsheimer sees major trouble on the horizon: an inevitable clash (war) between the United States and China—*unless* the United States undertakes pre-emptive action to restrain China's rise. For him, this is not a choice that Washington faces—it is an *imperative* that it must undertake in order to maintain American primacy and hegemony. It is also not a choice for the United States because it is *inevitable*—that is what great powers have always done: brook no tolerance of a "peer competitor." Mearsheimer thus sees calamity on the horizon, an eventuality that he terms the "tragedy of great power politics."

The fourth and final selection in this section takes yet another and different perspective on China's rise. Written by this observer, it questions some of the assumptions upon which all three of the previous analyses are based. I do not question the fact that China is rising as a world power—this is empirically indisputable. But I do question the *degree* to which China can be considered a global great power today. Over time China may well acquire most or all the attributes of the United States (the world's only true global power today) and hence, when that day arrives, we can say that China has "arrived" as a global great power. But I argue in this selection, as well as in my book *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*, that this day is a very long way away—and that when examined carefully, many dimensions of China's presumed international strength are in fact not very strong. China, in my view, continues to be characterized by far more weaknesses than strengths—which is why I term it a "partial power." Some elements of China's power profile are weak while others are simply incomplete. Over time, *if* China continues to develop anywhere near the pace it has shown since the 1980s, many of its present weaknesses will be overcome. But this is a "Big If." The world (and China itself) has grown accustomed to the dramatic growth and development of the past three decades; thus it should not *ipso facto* be assumed that such a trajectory will continue indefinitely. At the time of this book's publication (2016), China's growth rate had slowed to less than 7 percent with many economists predicting it would slow further until it levels off near 3 percent around 2020. In addition to slowing growth, China is beset by countless internal (and growing external) problems of significant magnitude. The remainder of this volume explores these in considerable detail.

Thus this selection cautions against overestimating China's current capabilities and potential as a world power. It not only questions China's capabilities, but importantly examines its power as defined by *influence*. Decades of social scientists have argued

that real power is not the mere possession of instruments of power (financial, cultural, political, military, etc.), but it is rather the conversion of those assets and use of those instruments to influence other actors or situations. Here, at present, I find China to be a “partial power” at best. In the selection that follows, I inventory a variety of indices of Chinese capabilities and assess just how strong they really are on a global basis. As is explained, I conclude that China is certainly a rising power and probably the world’s second leading power on aggregate after the United States—but I also argue that, depending on the category, China’s power and influence on the world stage is actually closer to that of other “middle powers”—Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, or even India. Overall it must be quickly said that China’s *aggregate* power exceeds any one of these middle powers, but in individual categories (soft power, innovation, military technologies, telecommunications, and many other categories) China lags behind these other countries, which are setting global standards in various spheres.

Taken together, the four selections in this section offer readers a real diversity of views about China’s status as a rising power. None deny that China is a rising power. But all disagree about the residual strengths of China’s existing power, its potential development, and its intentions on how to exercise its power in the world. In these regards, assessing China is not dissimilar from the three blind Indians feeling the elephant.

I. VIEWING CHINA’S RISE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The Eight Differences That Define China*

Martin Jacques

Broadly speaking, there have been two kinds of Western responses to the rise of China. The first sees China more or less solely in economic terms. We might call this the “economic wow factor.” People are incredulous about the growth figures. They are in awe of what those growth figures might mean for China’s position in the world. Any undue concern about their implications, moreover, is calmed by the belief that China is steadily becoming more like us, possessed of the accoutrements—from markets and stock exchanges to cars and private homes—of a modern Western society. This response is guilty of underestimating what the rise of China represents. It is a victim of tunnel vision and represents a failure of imagination. Economic change, fundamental

as it may be, can only be part of the picture. This view, blind as it is to the importance of politics and culture, rests on an underlying assumption that China, by virtue of its economic transformation, will, in effect, become Western. Consciously or unconsciously, it chimes with Fukuyama’s “end of history” view: that since 1989 the world has been converging on Western liberal democracy. The other response, in contrast, is persistently skeptical about the rise of China, always expecting it to end in crisis and failure. In the light of Maoism, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the suppression of the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, the argument runs, it is impossible for China to sustain its transformation without fundamental political change: unless it adopts the Western model, it will fail. The first view holds that China will automatically become Western, the second does not: but both share the belief that for China to succeed, it must, in effect, become Western.

* This selection is drawn from Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (London: Penguin Books, revised second edition, 2012), 561–583.

My view is predicated on a very different approach. It does not accept that the “Western way” is the only viable model. In arguing this, it should be borne in mind that the West has seen off every major challenge it has faced, culminating in the defeat after 1989 of its greatest adversary, Soviet Communism. It has a formidable track record of growth and innovation, which is why it has proved such a dynamic force over such a long period of time. Unlike stark either/or alternatives of the great ideological era between 1917 and 1989, however, the choices are now more nuanced. The East Asian examples of modernization have all drawn from the Western experience, including China’s post-1978 transformation. But to suggest that this is the key to East Asia’s success or even amounts to the main story is wrong. The reason for China’s transformation (like those of the other East Asian countries, commencing with Japan) has been the way it has succeeded in combining what it has learnt from the West, and also its East Asian neighbors, with its own history and culture, thereby tapping and releasing its native sources of dynamism. We have moved from the era of either/or to one characterized by hybridity.

Central is the contention that, far from there being a single modernity, there will in fact be many. Until around 1970 modernity was, with the exception of Japan, an exclusively Western phenomenon. But over the last half-century we have witnessed the emergence of quite new modernities, drawing on those of the West but ultimately dependent for their success on their ability to mobilize, build upon and transform the indigenous. These new modernities are no less original for their hybridity; indeed, their originality lies partly in their possession of this characteristic. Nor will hybridity remain an exclusively Asian or non-Western condition: in the face of the growing success of East Asian societies, the West will be obliged to learn from and incorporate some of their insights and features. In a limited way this is already the case, with the West, for example, employing some of the innovations developed by the Japanese system of manufacturing—although, given that these are very much rooted in Japanese culture, often with somewhat less success. A central question concerns which elements of the Western model are indispensable and which

are optional. Clearly, all successful examples of economic transformation currently on offer are based upon a capitalist model of development, although their economic institutions and policies, not to mention their politics and culture, display very wide variations. However, the proposition that the inheritance must, as a precondition for success, include Enlightenment principles such as Western-style rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a certain kind of representative government is by no means proven. Japan, which is at least as advanced as its counterparts in the West, is not based on the principles of the Enlightenment, nor does it embrace Western-style democracy, even though, since the early 1950s, largely for reasons of political convenience, it has routinely been seen as doing so by the West. And even if China moves in the direction of more representative government and a more independent judiciary, as it probably will in the long term, it will surely do so in very much its own way, based on its own history and traditions, which will owe little or nothing to any Western inheritance.

The desire to measure China primarily, sometimes even exclusively, in terms of Western yardsticks, while understandable, is flawed. At best it expresses a relatively innocent narrow-mindedness; at worst it reflects an overweening Western hubris, a belief that the Western experience is universal in all matters of importance. This can easily become an excuse for not bothering to understand or respect the wisdom and specificities of other cultures, histories and traditions. The problem, as Paul A. Cohen has pointed out, is that the Western mentality—nurtured and shaped by its long-term ascendancy—far from being imbued with a cosmopolitan outlook as one might expect, is in fact highly parochial, believing in its own universalism; or, to put it another way, its own rectitude and eternal relevance.¹ If we already have the answers, and these are universally applicable, then there is little or nothing to learn from anyone else. While the West remained relatively unchallenged, as it has been for the best part of two centuries, the price of such arrogance has overwhelmingly been paid by others, as they were obliged to take heed of Western demands; but when the West comes under serious challenge, as it increasingly will from China and others, then such a parochial mentality will only serve

to increase its vulnerability, weakening its ability to learn from others and to change accordingly.

The problem with interpreting and evaluating China solely or mainly in terms of the Western lexicon of experience is that, by definition, it excludes all that is specific to China: in short, what makes China what it is. The only things that are seen to matter are those that China shares with the West. China's history and culture are dismissed as a blind alley or merely a preparation for becoming Western, the hors d'oeuvres before the Western feast. Such an approach is not only demeaning to China and other non-Western cultures; it also largely misses the point. By seeing China in terms of the West, it refuses to recognize or acknowledge China's own originality and, furthermore, how China's difference might change the nature of the world in which we live. Since the eighties and nineties, the heyday of the "globalization as Westernization" era, when the Asian tigers, including China, were widely interpreted in these terms, there has been a dawning realization that such a huge country embodying such a rich history and civilization cannot be so summarily dismissed. We should not exaggerate—the Western consensus still sees history as a one-way ticket to Westernization—but one can detect the beginnings of a new Western consciousness, albeit still weak and fragile, which is more humble and realistic. As China grows increasingly powerful—while remaining determinedly different—the West will be forced, however reluctantly, to confront the nature and meaning of that difference. Understanding China will be one of the great challenges of the twenty-first century.

What then will be the key characteristics of Chinese modernity? They are eight in all, which for the deeply superstitious Chinese happens to be a lucky number. In exploring these characteristics, we must consider both the internal features of China's modernity and, given China's global importance, how these might impact upon and structure its global outlook and relations.

First, China is not really a nation-state in the traditional sense of the term but a civilization-state. True, it describes itself as a nation-state, but China's acquiescence in the status of nation-state was a consequence of its growing weakness in the face of the Western powers from the late nineteenth century.

The Chinese reluctantly acknowledged that China had to adapt to the world rather than insisting, in an increasingly utopian and hopeless mission, that the rest of the world should adapt to it. That cannot hide the underlying reality, however, that China is not a conventional nation-state. A century might seem a long time, but not for a society that consciously thinks of itself as several millennia old. Most of what China is today—its social relations and customs, its ways of being, its sense of superiority, its belief in the state, its commitment to unity—are products of Chinese civilization rather than its recent incarnation as a nation-state. On the surface it may seem like a nation-state, but its geological formation is that of a civilization-state.

It might be objected that China has changed so much during the period of its accommodation to the status of nation-state that these lines of continuity have been broken and largely erased. There was the inability of the imperial state (and, indeed, Confucianism) to modernize, culminating in its demise in the 1911 Revolution; the failure of the Nationalist government to modernize China, unify the country, or defeat the occupying powers (notably Japan), leading to its overthrow in the 1949 Revolution; the Maoist period, which sought to sweep away much of imperial China, from Confucius and traditional dress to the old patterns of land tenure and the established social hierarchies; followed by the reform period, the rapid decline of agriculture, the rise of industry, and the growing assertion of capitalist social relations. Each of these periods represents a major disjuncture in Chinese history. Yet much of what previously characterized China remains strikingly true and evident today. The country still has almost the same borders that it acquired at the maximum extent of the Qing empire in the late eighteenth century. The state remains as pivotal in society and as sacrosanct as it was in imperial times. Confucius, its great architect, is in the process of experiencing a revival and his precepts still, in important measure, inform the way China thinks and behaves. Although there are important differences between the Confucian and Communist eras, there are also strong similarities. This is not to deny that China has changed in fundamental ways, but rather to stress that China is also marked by powerful lines of continuity—that, to use a scientific analogy, its

DNA remains intact. This is a country, moreover, which lives in and with its past to a greater extent than any other: that past casts a huge shadow over its present such that, tormented by its failure to either modernize or unify, the Chinese for long lived in a state of perpetual regret and anguish. But as China now finally circumnavigates its way beyond the “century of humiliation” and successfully concludes its 150-year project of modernization, it will increasingly search for inspiration, nourishment, and parallels in that past. As it once again becomes the center of the world, it will luxuriate in its history and feel that justice has finally been done, that it is restoring its rightful position and status in the world.²

When China was down, it was obliged to live according to the terms set by others. It had no alternative. That is why it reconciled itself to being a nation-state, even if it never really believed this to be the case. It was a compromise borne of expediency and necessity. But as China arrives at modernity and emerges as the most powerful country in the world, it will no longer be bound by such constraints and will increasingly be in a position to set its own terms and conditions. It will feel free to be what it thinks it is and act according to its history and instincts, which are those of a civilization-state.

Second, China, in its relationship with East Asia, is increasingly likely to be influenced by the legacy of the tributary-state, rather than nation-state, system. The tributary-state system lasted for thousands of years and only finally came to an end at the conclusion of the nineteenth century. Even then, it was not entirely extinguished but continued—as a matter of habit and custom, the product of an enduring history—in a submerged form beneath the newly dominant Westphalian system. Up to a point, then, it never completely disappeared, even when China was a far less important actor in East Asia than it had been prior to the mid nineteenth century. The fact that the tributary-state system prevailed for so long means that it is deeply ingrained in the way that both China and East Asian states think about their relationship. As a consequence, any fundamental change in the position of China in the region, and therefore the nature of relations between China and its neighboring states, could well see a reversion to elements of a more tributary-type relationship,

albeit in a new and modernized form. The tributary system was undermined by the emergence of the European powers, together with Japan, as the dominant presence in the region, and by the remorseless decline of China. The European powers have long since exited the region; their successor power, the United States, is now a declining force; and Japan is rapidly being overshadowed by China. Meanwhile, China is swiftly resuming its position as the fulcrum of the East Asian economy. In other words, the conditions that gave rise to the dominance of the nation-state system in East Asia are crumbling, while at the same time we are witnessing the restoration of a defining feature of the tributary-state system.

The tributary-state system was characterized by the enormous inequality that existed between China on the one hand and its neighboring states on the other, together with a mutual belief in the superiority of Chinese culture. John K. Fairbank suggests in *The Chinese World Order* that: “If its belief in Chinese superiority persists, it seems likely that the country will seek its future role by looking closely at its own history.”³ Given that the idea of Chinese superiority remains firmly in place, China’s growing economic strength, combined with its enormous population, could return the region to a state of affairs which carries echoes of the past. China is in the process of becoming once more the most important market for virtually every single East Asian country. Nor is the huge and growing imbalance in power between China and all the other states, which historically is entirely familiar, necessarily one that other states in the region will balk at or seek to resist, with the possible exception of Japan; indeed, all bar Japan have largely sought to move closer to China during the course of its rise rather than hedge with the United States against it. This is partly based on the habit and experience of history and partly on an accommodation with what these countries view as an inevitable and irresistible process. The rise of China and a return to something bearing some of the features of the tributary-state system will not necessarily be distinguished by instability; on the contrary, the tributary-state system was highly stable, rooted as it was in China’s dominance and a mainly unchallenged hierarchical pattern of relationships. It would be quite wrong, however, to see any return to a tributary-style

relationship as a simple rerun of the past—with, for example, the presidents and prime ministers of neighboring states making ritualized trips to Beijing bearing gifts in recognition of the greatness of the Chinese president and the superiority of the latter-day Celestial Kingdom. Rather it is likely to be defined by an acceptance that East Asia is essentially a Chinese-centric order; that it embodies an implicit hierarchy in which China's position of ascendancy is duly acknowledged; and that there is an implicit recognition and acceptance of Chinese superiority.

To what extent will such tributary influences be confined to East Asia? Could it conceivably find echoes in other parts of the world? There is, of course, no tradition of a tributary-state system elsewhere: it was only present in East Asia. That, however, was when the Middle Kingdom regarded the world as more or less coterminous with East Asia. If China should approach other parts of the world with a not too dissimilar mindset, and its power is sufficiently overwhelming, could the same kind of hierarchical system be repeated elsewhere? Could there even be something akin to a global tributary system? The most obvious objection is that the tributary system in the majority of cases embraced countries like Korea, Vietnam, and Japan with which China had a strong cultural affinity. This is not true of any other part of the world. The sphere to which even an extremely diluted version of the tribute system is least likely to extend is the West, by which, in this context, I mean the United States and Europe. The only possible long-term candidates, in this context, might be the weaker countries of southern and eastern Europe. But in the great majority of countries, both Europe and North America enjoy too much power. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that it was Europe which forced China, against its wishes, to forsake the tributary system in favor of the Westphalian system in the first place. It is not inconceivable, however, that in the long run Australia and New Zealand might enter into some elements of a tributary relationship with China given their relative proximity to it and their growing dependence on the Chinese economy. A tributary dimension might also re-emerge in China's relations with Central Asia. It would not be difficult to imagine echoes of the tributary system being found in China's relationship with

Africa, given the enormous imbalance of power between them; perhaps, though less likely, in Latin America also, and South Asia, though not India. In each case, the key features would be China's overweening power, the dependency of countries in a multitude of ways on China, especially trade and finance, and an implicit acceptance of the virtues, if not the actual superiority, of Chinese civilization. But geographical distance in the case of Africa and Latin America, for example, will be a big barrier, while cultural and ethnic difference in all these instances will prove a major obstacle and a source of considerable resentment.

Third, there is the distinctively Chinese attitude towards race and ethnicity. The Han Chinese believe themselves to be a single race, even though this is clearly not the case. What has shaped this view is the extraordinarily long history of Chinese civilization, which has enabled a lengthy process of melding and fusing of countless different races. The sacrosanct and inviolable nature of Chinese unity is underpinned by the idea that the Han Chinese are all of one race, with even the non-Han Chinese being described in terms of separate nationalities rather than races. There is, furthermore, a powerful body of opinion in China that believes in polygenism and holds that the origins of the Chinese are discrete and unconnected with that of other branches of humankind. In other words, the notion of China and Chinese civilization is bolstered by a widespread belief that the difference between the Chinese and other peoples is not simply cultural or historical but also biological. The non-negotiable nature of the Chinese state's attitude towards race is eloquently illustrated by its approach towards the "lost territories" and the belief that Hong Kong and Taiwan are inseparable from China because their populations are Chinese: any idea that there might be a distinct Taiwanese identity is summarily dismissed. The Chinese attitude towards race and what constitutes being Chinese is diametrically opposed to that of other highly populous nations such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, and the United States, which explicitly recognize their multiracial and multiethnic character and, in varying degrees, celebrate that fact.

It would be wrong to describe the Chinese attitude towards race as an ideological position, because it is simply too old and too deeply

rooted in Chinese history for that to be the case. Certainly it went through a profound change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but its antecedents lie deep in the long history of Chinese civilization. Nor is the attitude towards race and identity reducible to the Chinese state or government: rather, it is ingrained in the Chinese psyche. To give one contemporary illustration: support for the return of Taiwan amongst the Chinese people is, if anything, even stronger than it is at a governmental level. Given this, any democratically elected government—admittedly, a most unlikely occurrence in the next twenty years—will almost certainly be more nativist and essentialist in its attitude towards Chinese identity than the present Communist government, which, by virtue of its lack of electoral accountability, enjoys a greater independence from popular prejudices. Nor should we anticipate any significant change in Chinese attitudes on race and ethnicity. It is true that they may have been accentuated by centuries of relative isolation from the rest of the world and China's growing integration may, as a consequence, help to weaken prejudices based on the ignorance of isolation, but the fundamental roots of Chinese attitudes will remain untouched. In fact, rather than being confined to a particular period of history, China's isolation is fundamental to understanding what I have described as the Middle Kingdom mentality. China saw itself as above, beyond, separate from, and superior to the rest of the world. "Isolation," in this sense, was integral to the Chinese world-view, even during the periods, like the Song dynasty or early Ming, when China was not isolationist in policy and outlook. It helps to explain why, for example, China has had such a different attitude from the major European states towards those who settled in other lands. Europeans viewed their settlers and colonizers as an integral part of the national civilizing mission and as still belonging to the homeland; the imperial dynasty, on the other hand, viewed those who departed the Middle Kingdom with relative and continuing indifference, as if leaving China was a step down and outside civilization. This point provides us with a way of understanding the terms on which China's growing integration with the rest of the world in the twenty-first century will take place. China is fast joining the world but, true to its history, it will also remain

somewhat aloof, ensconced in a hierarchical view of humanity, its sense of superiority resting on a combination of cultural and racial hubris.

Fourth, China operates, and will continue to operate, on a quite different continental-sized canvas to other nation-states. There are four other states that might be described as continental in scale. The United States has a surface area only marginally smaller than that of China, but with a population only a quarter of the size. Australia is a continent in its own right, with a surface area around 80 percent of China's, yet its population is a meager 21 million, less than that of Malaysia or Taiwan, with the vast majority living around its coastal perimeter. Brazil has a surface area of around 90 percent of China's, but a much smaller population of 185 million. Perhaps the nearest parallel to China is India, with a population of equivalent size, but a surface area only a third of that of China's. Thus, although China shares certain similarities with each of these countries, its particular combination of population size and surface area is unique; Chinese modernity will come continental-sized, in terms of *both* population and physical size. This has fundamental implications not only for the way in which China has worked in the past but also for how it will work in the future. A continental-sized country is an utterly different kind of proposition to a conventional nation-state unless its population is tiny like Australia's, or it started off life as a settler-colony—as in the case of United States and Australia, which were essentially European transplants—with the homogeneity this implies. When a country is as huge as China in both physical scale and population, it is characterized by great diversity and, in certain respects, can be thought of as, in effect, a combination of several, even many, different countries. This is not to detract from the point made throughout this book about the centripetal forces that hold China together, but rather serves to make this unity an even more extraordinary phenomenon. We are dealing with a state that is at one and the same time a country and a continent—in other words, which is both national and multinational—and which therefore must be governed, at one and the same time, according to the imperatives of both a country and a multiplicity of countries.

For these reasons, among others, the Chinese state operates in an atypical way in comparison

with conventional nation-states. The feedback loops, for example, are different. What might seem a logical consequence of a government action in an ordinary nation-state may not follow at all in China. In a country of such huge scale, furthermore, the government can conduct an experiment in one city or province without it being introduced elsewhere, which is what happened with Deng Xiaoping's reforms, even though they could hardly have been more fundamental or far-reaching in their effect. It is possible, in this context, to imagine democratic reforms being introduced in one relatively advanced province or municipality—Zhejiang or Shanghai, for example—but not others. The civilization-state embraces the concept of “one civilization, many systems,” which was introduced to the wider world in 1997 with the handover of Hong Kong to China under the formula “one country, two systems”; but the idea of systemic differences within China's borders, in fact, has a very long history. It is conventional wisdom in the West that China should become “democratic” in the West's own image. The democratic systems that we associate with the West, however, have never taken root on anything like such a vast scale as China, with the single exception of India; indeed, apart from India, the only vaguely comparable example is that of a multinational institution like the European Union, and this has remained determinedly undemocratic in its constitution and *modus operandi*. One day China may well move, in its own fashion, towards what might be described as a Chinese-style democracy, but Western calls that it should adopt a Western-style democracy, more or less forthwith, glibly ignore the huge differences that exist between a vast continental-sized civilization-state like China and the far smaller Western nation-states (not to mention the obvious truth that China is far less developed). The fact that China's true European counterpart, the European Union, is similarly without democracy only serves to reinforce the point.

Fifth, the nature of the Chinese polity is highly specific. Unlike the Western experience, in particular that of Europe, the imperial dynasty was neither obliged, nor required, nor indeed desired to share power with other competing institutions or interest groups, such as the Church or the merchant class. China has not had organized religion in

the manner of the West during the last millennium, while its merchants, for their part, instead of seeking to promote their interests by means of a collective voice, have sought favor through individual supplication. The state did not, either in its imperial or Communist form, share power with anyone else: it presided over society, supreme and unchallenged. The Confucian ethos that informed and shaped it for some two millennia did not require the state to be accountable to the people, but instead insisted on its loyalty to the moral precepts of Confucianism. The imperial bureaucracy, admission to which represented the highest possible achievement for anyone outside the dynastic circle, was schooled in Confucian morality and ethics. The efficacy of this system was evident for all to see: for many centuries Chinese statecraft had no peers in terms of efficiency, competence or its ability to undertake enormous public projects. There was just one exception to the absence of any form of popular accountability: in the event of severe popular unrest and disillusionment it was deemed that the mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn and legitimacy lay on the side of the people rather than the incumbent emperor. Apart from this *in extremis* scenario, the people have never enjoyed sovereignty: even after the fall of the imperial system, the dynastic state was replaced not by Western-style popular sovereignty but by state sovereignty.

Little has changed with Communist rule since 1949. Popular accountability in a recognizable Western form has remained absent. During the Maoist period, the legitimacy of the state was expressed in terms of a new class system in which the workers and peasants were pronounced as the new rulers; during the reform period this has partly been superseded by a *de facto* results-based compact between the state and the people, in which the state is required to deliver economic growth and rising living standards. As testament to the historical continuity of the Chinese state, the same key elements continue to define the nature of the Chinese polity. There is the continuing absence of any form of popular accountability, with no sign or evidence that this is likely to change—apart from the election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive, which may be introduced in 2017, and the present election of half its Legislative Council. Notwithstanding the convulsive changes over the last century, following the fall of the

imperial state, with Nationalist government, warlordism, partial colonization, the Maoist state and the present reform period, the state remains venerated, above society, possessed of great prestige, regarded as the embodiment of what China is, and the guarantor of the country's stability and unity. It is the quintessence of China in a way that is not true of any Western society, or arguably any other society in the world. Given its remarkable historical endurance—at least two millennia, arguably much longer—this characteristic must be seen as part of China's genetic structure. The legitimacy of the Chinese state, profound and deeply rooted, does not depend on an electoral mandate; indeed, even if universal suffrage was to be introduced, the taproots of the state's legitimacy would still lie in the country's millennial foundations. And herein lies the nub of the matter: the legitimacy of the Chinese state rests on the fact that it is seen by the people as the representative and embodiment of Chinese civilization and the civilization-state. It is this which explains the exceptional legitimacy enjoyed by the state in the eyes of the Chinese.

The Chinese state remains a highly competent institution, probably superior to any other state-tradition in the world and likely to exercise a powerful influence on the rest of the world in the future. It has shown itself to be capable not only of extraordinary continuity but also remarkable reinvention. The period since 1949 has seen this happen twice, initially in the form of the Maoist state, with the Communist Party providing the embryo of the new state while acting to restore China's unity, followed by the renewal and revitalization of the state during the reform era, leading to the economic transformation of the country. In the absence of any formal mechanism of popular accountability, it is reasonable to surmise that something like the Mandate of Heaven still operates: should the present experiment go seriously wrong—culminating, for example, in escalating social unrest as a result of widening inequalities, or a serious threat to the country's unity—then the hand of history might come to rest on the Communist Party's shoulder and its time be called.

Sixth, Chinese modernity, like other East Asian modernities, is distinguished by the speed of the country's transformation. It combines, in a way quite different from the Western experience of modernity, the past and the future at one and

the same time in the present. I describe the Asian tigers as time-compression societies. Habituated to rapid change, they are instinctively more at ease with the new and the future than is the case in the West, especially Europe. They embrace the new in the same way that a child approaches a computer or a Nintendo games console, with confidence and expectancy—in contrast to European societies, which are more wary, even fearful, of the new, in the manner of an adult presented with an unfamiliar technological gadget. The reason is that East Asian societies have not been obliged to pass through all the various sequential stages of development—and their accompanying technological phases—that have been typical of Europe and North America, so the collective mind is less filled and formatted by older ways of doing things. China's version of modernity, however, by virtue of the country's size, must also be seen as distinct from those of other East Asian societies. While countries like Taiwan and South Korea took around thirty years to move from being largely rural to becoming overwhelmingly urban, around half of China's population still live in the countryside over three decades after 1978, and the figure will still be around one-third in 2025. This makes China's passage to modernity not only more protracted than that of its neighbors but also more complex, with various stages of development continuing to coexist over many decades as a result of the persistence of a large rural sector. This is reflected in the often sharp divergence in living standards between different provinces. This juxtaposition of different levels of economic development serves to accentuate the importance and impact of the past, the countryside providing a continuous feedback loop from history. It makes China, a country already deeply engaged with its own past, even more aware of its history.

Seventh, since 1949 China has been ruled by a Communist regime. Paradoxically, perhaps the two most significant dates of the last half-century embody what are seemingly entirely contradictory events: 1989, marking the collapse of European Communism and the demise of the Soviet bloc; and 1978, signalling not only the beginning of the most remarkable economic transformation in history but also one presided over by a Communist Party. The first represents the end of a momentous era, the second the beginning of what will probably prove to be an even more remarkable one.

Given the opprobrium attaching to Communism in the West, especially after 1989, it is not surprising that this has greatly colored Western attitudes towards the Chinese Communist Party, especially as the Tiananmen Square suppression occurred in the same year as the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, following the events of 1989, the Western consensus held, quite mistakenly, that the Chinese Communist Party was also doomed to fail. Western attitudes towards China continue to be highly influenced by the fact that it is ruled by a Communist Party; the stain seems likely to persist for a long time to come, if not indefinitely. In the light of recent Chinese experience, however, Communism must be viewed in a more pluralistic manner than was previously the case: the fact is that the Chinese Communist Party is very different from its Soviet counterpart. Prior to the 1917 October Revolution, support for the Soviet Communist Party was always overwhelmingly concentrated in the cities where only a tiny minority of the population lived: in contrast, it enjoyed little backing in the countryside where the vast majority lived. As a result, the Soviet Communist Party never had widespread popular backing, which is why it became so dependent on authoritarian and coercive forms of rule after 1917. The case of the Chinese Communist Party was almost exactly the opposite. Support for it was overwhelmingly concentrated in the countryside, where the great majority lived, while it enjoyed little backing in the cities, especially compared with the Nationalists. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party enjoyed considerable popular support, unlike the Soviet Party. This was why, when Communist rule reached its nadir after the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao, the Party had the self-confidence and intellectual resources to undertake a fundamental change of direction and pursue an entirely different strategy. It displayed a flexibility and pragmatism which was alien to the Soviet Communist Party. Only an organization that has deep popular roots can think and act in this kind of way. In contrast, when the Soviet Party under Gorbachev finally opted for a different strategy, it was already too late and, moreover, the approach chosen was to result in the disintegration and implosion of the country.

The longer-term future of the Chinese Communist Party remains unclear: conceivably

it might metamorphose into something different (which to some extent it already has), to the point of even changing its name. Whatever the longer term may hold, the Chinese Communist Party, in presiding over the transformation of the country, will leave a profound imprint on Chinese modernity and also on the wider world. It has created and re-created the modern Chinese state; it reunited China after a century of disunity; it played a critical role in the defeat of Japanese colonialism; and it invented and managed the strategy that has finally given China the promise, after a century or more of decline, of restoring its status and power in the world to something resembling the days of the Middle Kingdom. In so doing, it has also succeeded in reconnecting China to its history, to Confucianism and its dynastic heyday. Arguably all great historical transformations involve such a reconnection with the past if they are to be successful. The affinities between the Communist conception of the state and the Confucian, as outlined earlier, are particularly striking in this respect. Given that Confucian principles had reigned for two millennia, the Chinese Communist Party, in order to prevail, needed, amongst other things, to find a way, at least in part, of reinventing and re-creating those principles.

Eighth, China will, for several decades to come, combine the characteristics of both a developed and a developing country. This will be a unique condition for one of the major global powers and stems from the fact that China's modernization will be a protracted process because of the country's size: in conventional terms, China's transformation is that of a continent, with continental-style disparities, rather than that of a country. The result is a modernity tempered by and interacting with relative rural backwardness, and such a state of bifurcation will have numerous economic, political, and cultural consequences. Chinese modernity cannot, and will not be able to, ignore the fact that a large segment of the country will continue to live in what is, in effect, a different historical period. We have already mentioned how this will bring China face-to-face with its own past for several decades to come. But it also has implications for how China will see its own interests and its relationship with other countries. Of necessity, it will regard itself as both a developing and

a developed country, with the interests of both. This will find expression in many areas, including the debate over China's responsibilities concerning climate change. Over time, of course, the weight of the developing section of the economy, and the number of people that are employed in or dependent upon it, will decline, and China will increasingly behave as a developed country rather than a combination of the two. But for the next 25 years, perhaps even half a century, it will continue to display the interests and characteristics of both, an outlook which is likely to be reinforced by the sense of grievance that China feels about its "century of humiliation" at the hands of Japan and the Western powers, especially its experience of colonization. China, in fact, will be the first great power that comes from the "wrong" side of the great divide in the world during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, a creature of the colonized rather than the colonizers, the losers rather than the winners. This experience, and the outlook it has engendered, will be an integral part of the Chinese mentality in the era of modernity, and will strongly influence its behavior as a global power.

A broader point can be made in this context. If the twentieth century world was shaped by the developed countries, then that of the twenty-first century is likely to be molded by the developing countries, especially the largest ones. This has significant historical implications. There have been many suggestions as to what constituted the most important event of the twentieth century: three of the most oft-cited candidates are the 1917 October Revolution, 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 1945 and the defeat of fascism. Such choices are always influenced by contemporary circumstances; in the last decade of the last century, 1989 seemed an obvious choice, just as 1917 did in the first half of the century. Now we have come to the end of the first decade of the new century, another, rarely mentioned, candidate presents itself in the strongest possible terms. The rise of the developing world was only made possible by the end of colonialism. For the non-industrial world, the colonial era overwhelmingly served to block the possibility of their industrialization. The imperial powers had no interest in allowing competition for their own industries from their colonies. That does not mean that the effects of

colonialism were entirely negative, though in some cases, notably that of Africa, they surely were. In East Asia, Japanese colonialism in the case of Korea and Taiwan, and Western colonialism in the instance of Hong Kong and the treaty ports, did at least demonstrate the possibilities offered by industrialization, and thereby helped to plant some of the seeds of their subsequent transformation. The end of colonialism, however, was a precondition for what we are now witnessing, the growth of multiple modernities and a world in which the new modernities are likely to prove at some point decisive. With hindsight, the defeat of colonialism between 1945 and the mid-1960s, the significance of which has been greatly underestimated in the West for obvious reasons, must rate as one of the great landmarks of the last century, perhaps the greatest.

In the light of these eight characteristics, it is clear that Chinese modernity will be very different from Western modernity, and that China will transform the world far more fundamentally than any other new global power in the last two centuries. This prospect, however, has been consistently downplayed. The Chinese, for their part, have wisely chosen to play a very long game, constantly seeking to reassure the rest of the world that China's rise will change relatively little. The West, on the other hand, having been in the global driving seat for so long, finds it impossible to imagine or comprehend a world in which this is no longer the case. Moreover, it is in the nature of vested interests—which is what the West is, the United States especially—not to admit, even to themselves, that the world stands on the edge of a global upheaval, the consequence of which will be to greatly reduce their position and influence in the world. China is the elephant in the room that no one is quite willing to recognize. As a result, an extraordinary shift in the balance of global power is taking place *sotto voce*, almost by stealth, except one would be hard-pressed to argue that any kind of deceit was involved either on the part of China or the United States. The contrast with previous comparable changes, for example the rise of Germany prior to 1914, the emergence of Japan in the interwar period, and the challenge of the Soviet Union, especially after 1945, is stark. Even though none carried anything like the ultimate significance of China's emergence, the threat

that each offered at the time was exaggerated and magnified, rather than downplayed, as in the case of China. The nearest parallel to China's ascent, in terms of material significance, was that of the United States, and this was marked by a similar sense of stealth, though this was mainly because it was the fortunate beneficiary of two world wars, which in both cases it joined rather late, that had the effect of greatly accelerating its rise in relation to an impoverished and indebted Western Europe. Even the rise of the US, however, must be regarded as a relatively mild phenomenon compared to that of China.

So far, China has appeared an outsider patiently and loyally seeking to become an insider. As a rising power, it has been obliged to converge with and adapt to the existing international norms, and in particular to defer to and mollify the present superpower, the United States, since the latter's cooperation and tacit support have been preconditions for China's wider acceptance. China has struggled long and hard since 1978 to become an accepted member of the international community with the privileges and advantages that this confers. In devoting its energies to economic growth, it came to the conclusion that it could not afford for its attention and resources to be diverted towards what, at its present stage of development, it rightly deemed to be non-essential ends. In exercising such restraint and self-discipline, the Deng and post-Deng leaderships have demonstrated remarkable perspicacity, never losing sight of the long-term objective, never allowing themselves to be distracted by short-term considerations. The economic and technological demands of globalization, meanwhile, like the political imperatives just described, have similarly obliged China to replicate and converge in order to meet established international standards and adapt to existing norms. China's passage to modernity, in other words, has also set in motion powerful convergent forces as the country has sought to learn from more advanced countries, compete successfully in global markets, attract foreign capital, assimilate the disciplines of stock exchanges and capital markets, and acquire the latest technology. The fact that an increasing number of issues, most notably climate change, require global solutions with participation from all nations, especially the very largest, is acting as a further force for convergence.

Convergence, however, is only one side of the picture. Increasingly the rise of China will be characterized by the opposite: powerful countervailing pressures that push towards divergence from the established norms. In a multitude of ways, China does not conform to the present conventions of the developed world and the global polity. As a civilization-state masquerading in the guise of a nation-state, its underlying nature and identity will increasingly assert itself. The present Westphalian system of international relations in East Asia is likely to be steadily superseded by something that carries echoes of the tributary system. A nation that comprises one-fifth of the world's population is already in the process of transforming the workings of the global economy and its structure of power. A country that regards itself, for historical, cultural and racial reasons, as the greatest civilization on earth will, as a leading global power, clearly in time require and expect a major reordering of global relationships. A people that suffered at the expense of European and Japanese imperialism will never see the world in the same way as those peoples that were its exponents and beneficiaries. A state that has never shared power with any other class, group, or institution, which has never been subject to popular sovereignty, which operates on a continental scale and which, to this day, is suffused with a Confucian outlook, albeit in a distinctive and modernized Communist form, stands in sharp contrast to the credo that informs Western states and which has hitherto dominated the global community. While the West has been shaped by the Declaration of [American] Independence in 1776, the French Revolution in 1789, the British Industrial Revolution, the two world wars, the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the collapse of Communism in 1989, for China the great historical monuments are mostly very different: 221 BC and the beginnings of modern China; dynasties such as the Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing; the Opium Wars; the 1911 Revolution; Japanese colonization between 1931 and 1945; the 1949 Revolution; and the 1978 reforms. The different historical furniture betrays a different history. China, then, if convergent, is also manifestly divergent. While the rise of China since 1978 has been characterized by the predominance of convergent tendencies, well exemplified by China's current desire to reassure the world that it is a

“responsible power,” the divergent tendencies will in due course come to predominate as China grows more wealthy, self-confident, and powerful. But all this lies in the future; for the next twenty years or so, as China continues its modernization, it will probably remain for the most part a status-quo power.

There are two powerful forces that will serve to promote the steady reconfiguration of the world on China's terms. The fact that China is so huge means that it exercises a gravitational pull on every other nation. The nearest parallel is the United States, but the latter is on a much smaller scale. Size will enable China to set the terms of its relationships with other countries: hitherto that has been limited by China's level of development, but its gravitational power will grow exponentially in the future. China's mass will oblige the rest of the world largely to acquiesce in China's way of doing things. Moreover China's size, combined with its remorseless transformation, means that time is constantly on its side. It can afford to wait in the knowledge that the passage of time is steadily reconfiguring the world in its favor. Take its relationship with Japan: on the assumption that China's rapid growth continues, Japan will ultimately be obliged to accept China's leadership of East Asia. The same can be said, albeit less starkly, of China's relationship with the United States and Europe. With the rise of China, indeed, time itself takes on a new and different meaning: time-scales, in one sense at least, are elongated. We have become used to thinking in terms of the converse: the ever-shortening sense of time. The template for this is provided by the United States, a country with a brief history, a short memory, and a constant predilection for remaking itself. China is the opposite. It is possessed of a 5,000-year history and an extremely long memory; unsurprisingly it conceives of the future in terms of protracted time-scales. As a result, it is blessed with the virtue of patience, confident in the belief that history is on its side. If that has been the Chinese mentality since time immemorial, in the twenty-first century that belief will surely come to fruition.

So how will China act as a great power, once it is no longer confined to the straitjacket of modernization? It would be wrong to assume that it will behave like the West; that cannot be discounted, but history suggests something different. While Europe, and subsequently the United States, have

been aggressive and expansionist, their tentacles reaching all over the world, China's expansion has been limited to its continent and although, in the era of globalization, that is changing and will continue to change, there is little reason to presume that it will be a West 2.0. China will become a great global hegemon, but it is likely to exercise that power in new and distinctive ways that are congruent with its history and culture. Many in the West are concerned about the absence of Western-style democracy in China, but over the last thirty years the country has become significantly more transparent and its leadership more accountable. This process is likely to continue and at some point result in a much bigger political transformation, though any democratic evolution is likely to take a markedly different form from that of the West. For the foreseeable future, however, given the success of the period since 1978, there is unlikely to be any great change. The greatest concern about China as a global power lies elsewhere, namely its deeply rooted superiority complex. How that will structure and influence Chinese behavior and its attitudes towards the rest of the world remains to be seen, but it is clear that something so entrenched will not dissolve or disappear. If the calling card of the West has often been aggression and conquest, China's will be its overweening sense of superiority and the hierarchical mentality this has engendered.

The arrival of China as a major power marks the end of Western universalism. Western norms, values, and institutions will increasingly find themselves competing with those of China. The decline of Western universalism, however, is not solely a product of China's rise, because the latter is part of a much wider phenomenon—an increasingly multipolar economic world and the proliferation of diverse modernities. The rise of competing modernities heralds a quite new world in which, perhaps, no hemisphere or country will have quite the same kind of prestige, legitimacy or overwhelming force that the West has enjoyed over the last two centuries; instead, different countries and cultures will compete for legitimacy and influence. The Western world is coming to an end; the new world, at least for the foreseeable future, will not be Chinese in the way that the previous one was Western. China, however, will enjoy a growing global hegemony and in time is likely to become, by far, the most dominant country in the world.

NOTES

1. Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 95.
2. Yan Xuetong, "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10:26 (2001), pp. 33–34.
3. John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 62.

CHINA'S "PEACEFUL RISE" TO GREAT-POWER STATUS*

Zheng Bijian

China's rapid development has attracted world-wide attention in recent years. The implications of various aspects of China's rise, from its expanding influence and military muscle to its growing demand for energy supplies, are being heatedly debated in the international community as well as within China. Correctly understanding China's achievements and its path toward greater development is thus crucial.

Getting the Facts Straight

Since starting to open up and reform its economy in 1978, China has averaged 9.4 percent annual GDP growth, one of the highest growth rates in the world. In 1978, it accounted for less than one percent of the world economy, and its total foreign trade was worth \$20.6 billion. Today, it accounts for four percent of the world economy and has foreign trade worth \$851 billion—the third-largest national total in the world. China has also attracted hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign investment and more than a trillion dollars of domestic nonpublic investment. A dozen years ago, China barely had mobile telecommunications services. Now it claims more than 300 million mobile-phone subscribers, more than any other nation. As of June 2004, nearly 100 million people there had access to the Internet.

Indeed, China has achieved the goal it set for itself in 1978: it has significantly improved the well-being of its people, although its development has often been narrow and uneven. The last 27 years of reform and growth have also shown the world the magnitude of China's labor force, creativity, and purchasing power; its commitment to development; and its degree of national cohesion. Once all of its potential is mobilized, its contribution to the world as an engine of growth will be unprecedented.

One should not, however, lose sight of the other side of the coin. Economic growth alone does not provide a full picture of a country's development. China has a population of 1.3 billion. Any small difficulty in its economic or social development, spread over this vast group, could become a huge problem. And China's population has not yet peaked; it is not projected to decline until it reaches 1.5 billion in 2030. Moreover, China's economy is still just one-seventh the size of the United States' and one-third the size of Japan's. In per capita terms, China remains a low-income developing country, ranked roughly 100th in the world. Its impact on the world economy is still limited.

The formidable development challenges still facing China stem from the constraints it faces in pulling its population out of poverty. The scarcity of natural resources available to support such a huge population—especially energy, raw materials, and water—is increasingly an obstacle, especially when the efficiency of use and the rate of recycling of those materials are low. China's per capita water resources are one-fourth of the amount of the world average, and its per capita area of cultivatable farmland is 40 percent of the

* This article first appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (2005). Copyright by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved.

world average. China's oil, natural gas, copper, and aluminum resources in per capita terms amount to 8.3 percent, 4.1 percent, 25.5 percent, and 9.7 percent of the respective world averages.

Setting the Priorities

For the next few decades, the Chinese nation will be preoccupied with securing a more comfortable and decent life for its people. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in 1978, the Chinese leadership has concentrated on economic development. Through its achievements so far, China has blazed a new strategic path that suits its national conditions while conforming to the tides of history. This path toward modernization can be called "the development path to a peaceful rise." Some emerging powers in modern history have plundered other countries' resources through invasion, colonization, expansion, or even large-scale wars of aggression. China's emergence thus far has been driven by capital, technology, and resources acquired through peaceful means.

The most significant strategic choice the Chinese have made was to embrace economic globalization rather than detach themselves from it. In the late 1970s, when the new technological revolution and a new wave of economic globalization were unfolding with great momentum, Beijing grasped the trend and reversed the erroneous practices of the Cultural Revolution. On the basis of the judgment that China's development would depend on its place in an open world, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders decided to seize the historic opportunity and shift the focus of their work to economic development. They carried out reforms meant to open up and foster domestic markets and tap into international ones. They implemented the household contracting system in rural areas and opened up 14 coastal cities, thus ushering in a period of economic takeoff.

In the 1990s, China once again confronted a strategic choice, due to the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent struggle between the forces for and against globalization. China's decision to participate in economic globalization was facing a serious challenge. But by carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of economic

openness and drawing lessons from recent history, Beijing decided to open up China even more by joining the World Trade Organization and deepening economic reform at home.

China has based its modernization process mainly on its domestic resources. It has relied on ideological and institutional innovations and on industrial restructuring. By exploring the growing domestic market and transferring the huge personal savings of its citizens into investment, China has infused its economy with new momentum. Its citizens' capacities are being upgraded and its technological progress expedited. Even while attempting to learn from and absorb useful products from other societies, including those of the advanced capitalist countries, China has maintained its independence and self-reliance.

In pursuing the goal of rising in peace, the Chinese leadership has strived for improving China's relations with all the nations of the world. Despite the ups and downs in US-Chinese relations over the years, as well as other dramatic changes in international politics, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing has stuck to the belief that there are more opportunities than challenges for China in today's international environment.

The Road Ahead

According to China's strategic plans, it will take another 45 years—until 2050—before it can be called a modernized, medium-level developed country. China will face three big challenges before it gets there. As described above, China's shortage of resources poses the first problem. The second is environmental: pollution, waste, and a low rate of recycling together present a major obstacle to sustainable development. The third is a lack of coordination between economic and social development.

This last challenge is reflected in a series of tensions Beijing must confront: between high GDP growth and social progress, between upgrading technology and increasing job opportunities, between keeping development momentum in the coastal areas and speeding up development in the interior, between fostering urbanization and nurturing agricultural areas, between narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor and maintaining economic vitality and efficiency, between

attracting more foreign investment and enhancing the competitiveness of indigenous enterprises, between deepening reform and preserving social stability, between opening domestic markets and solidifying independence, between promoting market-oriented competition and taking care of disadvantaged people. To cope with these dilemmas successfully, a number of well-coordinated policies are needed to foster development that is both faster and more balanced.

The policies the Chinese government has been carrying out, and will continue to carry out, in the face of these three great challenges can be summarized as three grand strategies—or “three transcendences.”

The first strategy is to transcend the old model of industrialization and to advance a new one. The old industrialization was characterized by rivalry for resources in bloody wars and by high investment, high consumption of energy, and high pollution. Were China to follow this path, it would harm both others and itself. China is instead determined to forge a new path of industrialization based on technology, economic efficiency, low consumption of natural resources relative to the size of its population, low environmental pollution, and the optimal allocation of human resources. The Chinese government is trying to find new ways to reduce the percentage of the country's imported energy sources and to rely more on China's own. The objective is to build a “society of thrift.”

The second strategy is to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge, as well as the Cold War mentality that defined international relations along ideological lines. China will not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War. Instead, China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world.

The third strategy is to transcend outdated modes of social control and to construct a harmonious socialist society. The functions of the Chinese government have been gradually transformed, with self-governance supplementing state administration. China is strengthening its

democratic institutions and the rule of law and trying to build a stable society based on a spiritual civilization. A great number of ideological and moral-education programs have been launched.

Several dynamic forces are noticeable in the carrying out of the three strategies. For example, there are numerous clusters of vigorously developing cities in the coastal areas of eastern and southern China, and similar clusters are emerging in the central and western regions. They constitute the main engines of growth, are the major manufacturing and trading centers, and absorb surplus rural labor. They also have high productivity, advanced culture, and accumulated international experience that the rest of China can emulate and learn from. The expansion of China's middle-income strata and the growing need for international markets come mainly from these regions.

China's surplus of rural workers, who have strong aspirations to escape poverty, is another force that is pushing Chinese society into industrial civilization. About ten million rural Chinese migrate to urban areas each year in an orderly and protected way. They both provide Chinese cities with new productivity and new markets and help end the backwardness of rural areas. Innovations in science and technology and culture are also driving China toward modernization and prosperity in the twenty-first century.

The Chinese government has set up targets for development for the next fifty years. This period is divided into three stages. In the first stage—2000 to 2010—total GDP is to be doubled. In the second stage, ending in 2020, total GDP is to be doubled again, at which point China's per capita GDP is expected to reach \$3,000. In the third, from 2020 to 2050, China will continue to advance until it becomes a prosperous, democratic, and civilized socialist country. By that time, China will have shaken off underdevelopment and will be on a par with the middle rung of advanced nations. It can then claim to have succeeded in achieving a “peaceful rise.”

Impact on the World

China's peaceful rise will further open its economy so that its population can serve as a growing market for the rest of the world, thus providing increased opportunities for—rather than posing

a threat to—the international community. A few figures illustrate China's current contribution to global trade: in 2004, China's imports from members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations increased by 33.1 percent, from Japan by 27.3 percent, from India by 80 percent, from the European Union by 28 percent, and from the United States by 31.9 percent. China is not the only power that seeks a peaceful rise. China's economic integration into East Asia has contributed to the shaping of an East Asian community that may rise in peace as a whole. And it would not be in China's interest to exclude the United States from the process. In fact, Beijing wants Washington to play a positive

role in the region's security as well as economic affairs. The beginning of the twenty-first century is seeing a number of countries rising through different means, while following different models, and at different paces. At the same time, the developed countries are further developing themselves. This is a trend to be welcomed.

China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs. It advocates a new international political and economic order, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations. China's development depends on world peace—a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.

CHINA'S UNPEACEFUL RISE*

John J. Mearsheimer

Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China's neighbors—including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam—will join with the United States to contain China's power.

To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how other states in the system will react to them. That theory must be logically sound and it must account for the past behavior of rising great powers.

My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. This theory, which helps explain US foreign policy since the country's founding, also has implications for future relations between China and the United States.

The Contest for Power

According to my understanding of international politics, survival is a state's most important goal, because a state cannot pursue any other goals if it does not survive. The basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.

The international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means that they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany's or Japan's intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.

In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if

* This article was originally published in *Current History*, Vol. 105, No. 690 (April 2006).

trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is powerful enough to contemplate a fight with Washington. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system.

What exactly does it mean to be a hegemon in the modern world? It is almost impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony, because it is too hard to project and sustain power around the globe and onto the territory of distant great powers. The best outcome that a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon, and thus dominate one's own geographical area. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere since the late 1800s. Although the United States is clearly the most powerful state on the planet today, it is not a global hegemon.

States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: they seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemonies do not want peers. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several great powers, so that these states will compete with each other and be unable to focus on them. In sum, my theory says that the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world.

The American Hegemon

A brief look at the history of American foreign policy illustrates the explanatory power of this theory. When the United States won its independence from Britain in 1783, it was a small and weak country comprised of thirteen states strung along the Atlantic seaboard. The new country was surrounded by the British and Spanish empires and much of the territory between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River was controlled by hostile Native American tribes. It was a dangerous, threat-filled environment.

Over the course of the next 115 years American policymakers of all stripes worked assiduously to turn the United States into a regional hegemon. They expanded America's boundaries from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans as part of a policy commonly referred to as "Manifest Destiny." The United States fought wars against Mexico and various Native American tribes and took huge chunks of land from them. The nation became an expansionist power of the first order. As Senator Henry Cabot Lodge put it, the United States had a "record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century."

American policy makers in that century were not just concerned with turning the United States into a powerful territorial state. They were also determined to push the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere and make it clear to them that they were not welcome back. This policy, known as the Monroe Doctrine, was laid out for the first time in 1823 by President James Monroe in his annual message to Congress. By 1898, the last European empire in the Americas had collapsed and the United States had become the first regional hegemon in modern history.

However, a great power's work is not done once it achieves regional hegemony. It then must make sure that no other great power follows suit and dominates its area of the world. During the twentieth century, there were four great powers that had the capability to make a run at regional hegemony: Imperial Germany (1900–1918), Imperial Japan (1931–1945), Nazi Germany (1933–1945), and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (1945–1989). Not surprisingly, each tried to match what the United States had achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century.

How did the United States react? In each case, it played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemonies. The United States entered World War I in April 1917 when Imperial Germany looked like it would win the war and rule Europe. American troops played a critical role in tipping the balance against the Kaiserreich, which collapsed in November 1918. In the early 1940s, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt went to great lengths to maneuver the United States into World War II to thwart Japan's ambitions in Asia and especially Germany's ambitions in Europe. During the war the United States helped destroy

both Axis powers. And after 1945, American policy makers made certain that Germany and Japan remained militarily weak. Finally, during the Cold War, the United States steadfastly worked to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Eurasia, and in the late 1980s helped relegate its empire to the scrap heap of history.

Shortly after the Cold War ended, the first Bush administration's "Defense Guidance" of 1992, which was leaked to the press, boldly stated that the United States was now the most powerful state in the world by far and it planned to remain in that exalted position. In other words, the United States would not tolerate a peer competitor.

That same message was repeated in the famous "National Security Strategy" issued by the second Bush administration in October 2002. There was much criticism of this document, especially its claims about "preemptive war." But hardly a word of protest was raised about the assertion that the United States should check rising powers and maintain its commanding position in the global balance of power.

The bottom line is that the United States—for sound strategic reasons—worked hard for more than a century to gain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. After achieving regional dominance, it has gone to great lengths to prevent other great powers from controlling either Asia or Europe.

What are the implications of America's past behavior for the rise of China? In short, how is China likely to behave as it grows more powerful? And how are the United States and the other states in Asia likely to react to a mighty China?

Predicting China's Future

China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that China will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring

countries, much the way the United States makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back.

An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s.

These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbors, just as the United States prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. What state in its right mind would want other powerful states located in its region? Most Chinese surely remember what happened in the past century when Japan was powerful and China was weak. In the anarchic world of international politics, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi.

Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept US military forces operating in its backyard? American policy makers, after all, become apoplectic when other great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forces are invariably seen as a potential threat to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China feel safe with US forces deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would not China's security be better served by pushing the American military out of Asia?

Why should we expect China to act any differently from how the United States did? Is Beijing more principled than Washington? More ethical? Less nationalistic? Less concerned about survival? China is none of these things, of course, which is why it is likely to imitate the United States and attempt to become a regional hegemon.

Trouble Ahead

It is clear from the historical record how American policy makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The United States does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated in the

twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world's only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, America is likely to behave toward China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

China's neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent the Chinese from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even

China joined forces with the United States to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Finally, given Taiwan's strategic importance for controlling the sea lanes in East Asia, it is hard to imagine the United States, as well as Japan, allowing China to control that large island. In fact, Taiwan is likely to be an important player in the anti-China balancing coalition, which is certain to infuriate China and fuel the security competition between Beijing and Washington.

The picture I have painted of what is likely to happen if China continues its rise is not a pretty one. I actually find it categorically depressing and wish that I could tell a more optimistic story about the future. But the fact is that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business, and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. That is the tragedy of great power politics.

THE ILLUSION OF CHINESE POWER^{*}

David Shambaugh

Conventional wisdom has it that the China juggernaut is unstoppable and that the world must adjust to the reality of the Asian giant as a—perhaps *the*—major global power. A mini-industry of “China rise” prognosticators has emerged over the past decade, all painting a picture of a twenty-first-century world in which China is a dominant actor. This belief is understandable and widespread—but wrong.

Recall that not so long ago, in the 1980s, similar forecasts were made about Japan being “No. 1” and joining the elite club of great powers—before it sank into a three-decade stagnation and was shown to be a single-dimensional power (economic) that did not have a broader foundation of national attributes to fall back on. Before that it was the Soviet Union that was said to be a global superpower (an assumption over which the Cold War was waged for a half century), only for

it to collapse almost overnight in 1991. The post-mortem on the USSR similarly revealed that it had been a largely single-dimensional power (military) that had atrophied from within for decades. In the wake of the Cold War, some pundits posited that the expanded and strengthened European Union would emerge as a new global power and pole in the international system based on its geographical heft, history, and cultural soft power—only for the EU reveal its internal divisions and to prove itself impotent and incompetent as a global actor. Europe too was exposed as a single-dimensional power (economic). So, when it comes to China today, a little sobriety and skepticism are justified.

Certainly China is the world's most important rising power—far exceeding the capacities of India, Brazil and South Africa—and in some categories it has already surpassed the capabilities of other “middle powers” like Russia, Japan, Britain, Germany, and France. By many measures and in the eyes of many observers, China is now the world's undisputed second leading power after the United

^{*} This article was originally published in *The National Interest*, No. 132 (July–August 2014).

States, and in some categories it has already overtaken America. China certainly possesses many of the trappings of a global power: the world's largest population, a large continental land mass, the world's second-largest economy, the world's largest foreign-exchange reserves, the world's second-largest military budget and largest standing armed forces, a manned space program, an aircraft carrier, the world's largest museum, the world's largest hydroelectric dam, the world's largest national expressway network, and the world's best high-speed rail system. China is the world's leading trading nation, the world's largest consumer of energy, the world's largest greenhouse-gas emitter, the world's second-largest recipient and third-largest originator of foreign direct investment, and the world's largest producer of many goods.

Capabilities, however, are but one measure of national and international power—and not the most important one. Generations of social scientists have determined that a more significant indicator of power is *influence*—the ability to shape events and the actions of others. As the late political scientist Robert Dahl famously observed: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Capabilities that are not converted into actions toward achieving certain ends are not worth much. Their existence may have an impressive or deterrent effect, but it is the ability to influence the actions of another or the outcome of an event that matters. There are, of course, various means by which nations use their capabilities to influence the actions of others and the course of events: attraction, persuasion, co-optation, coercion, remuneration, inducement, or the threat or use of force. Power and its exercise are therefore intrinsically relational: the use of these and other instruments toward others in order to influence a situation to one's own benefit.

When we look at China's presence and behavior on the world stage today, we need to look beyond its superficially impressive capabilities and ask: Is China actually *influencing* the actions of others and the trajectory of international affairs in various domains? The short answer is: not very much, if at all. In very few domains can it be concluded that China is truly influencing others, setting global standards or shaping global trends. Nor is it actively trying to solve global problems.

China is a self-preoccupied and passive power, whose reflex is to shy away from challenges and hide when international crises erupt. The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Syria are only the most recent examples of Beijing's passivity.

Moreover, when China's capabilities are carefully examined, they are not so strong. Many indicators are quantitatively impressive, but they are not qualitatively so. It is the lack of qualitative power that translates into China's lack of real influence. The Chinese have the proverb *wai ying, nei ruan*: strong on the outside, soft on the inside. This is an apt characterization of China today. Scratch beneath the surface of the many impressive statistics about China and one discovers pervasive weaknesses, important impediments, and a soft foundation on which to become a global power. China may be a twenty-first-century paper tiger.

This can be seen in five broad areas: China's international diplomacy, military capabilities, cultural presence, economic power, and the domestic elements that underpin China's global posture. Let's examine each in turn.

In formal respects, China's diplomacy has truly gone global. Over the past forty years China has traveled a path from a nation isolated from the international community to one integrated into it. Today, Beijing enjoys diplomatic relations with 175 countries, is a member of more than 150 international organizations, and is party to more than three hundred multilateral treaties. It receives far more visiting foreign dignitaries every year than any other nation, and its own leaders travel the world regularly.

Despite this integration into the international community and Beijing's active diplomacy, the diplomatic sphere is a realm where China's position as a “partial power” is apparent. On the one hand, it enjoys the symbols of being a major world power. It's a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a member of the G-20 and other key global bodies, and a participant in all major international summits. On the other hand, Chinese officials still remain remarkably reactive and passive in these venues and on many global challenges. China does not lead. It does not shape international diplomacy, drive other nations' policies, forge global consensus, put together coalitions, or solve problems. Beijing is not actively

involved in trying to solve *any* major global problem; rather, it is a passive and often-reluctant participant in multilateral efforts organized by others (usually the United States).

Being a global power requires getting in the middle of disputes, bringing parties together, forging coalitions and consensus, and—yes—using pressure when necessary. Beijing prefers to sit on the sidelines and simply call for nations to solve their problems through “peaceful means” and to find “win-win solutions.” Such hollow invocations are hardly conducive to problem solving. Beijing also has a complete allergy to coercive measures and only goes along with UN Security Council sanctions when it is clear that not doing so would leave Beijing isolated and negatively impact China’s international image. This is not the behavior of a global leader.

Instead, Beijing’s high-level diplomacy is really a kind of theatrical show, more symbolism than substance. It is intended primarily to enhance the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy among domestic audiences by showing Chinese leaders hobnobbing with the world’s elite, while signaling to the international community that the country has returned to great-power status after several centuries of impotence. As such, the Chinese government goes to extraordinary lengths to meticulously stage-manage its leaders’ interactions with their foreign counterparts. Substantively, though, Chinese diplomacy remains remarkably risk-averse and guided by narrow national interests. Beijing usually takes a lowest-common-denominator approach, adopting the safest and least controversial position and waiting to see the positions of other governments before revealing its own.

The notable exception to this general passivity concerns China’s own neuralgic and narrowly defined interests: Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, human rights, and its contested territorial claims. On these issues Beijing is hypervigilant and diplomatically forceful, but its attempts to defend these interests are often clumsy and wind up being counterproductive to its image and its goals. Other than protecting these narrow national interests, though, Chinese diplomacy remains extremely passive for a state of its size and importance.

When it comes to global governance, which entails contributing to the common good proportionate to a nation’s aggregate capabilities, Beijing’s

behavior generally parallels the passivity and narrow-mindedness of the rest of its diplomacy. China does contribute to—and should be given credit for—some contributions to global governance: UN peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, counterterrorism measures in Central Asia, overseas development assistance in Africa, nonproliferation of nuclear materials, stemming public health pandemics, disaster relief, and combating international crime. In these areas Beijing deserves credit. However, China could and should do much more; it still “punches well below its weight” by not contributing proportionately to its aggregate size, wealth, or potential influence. The world should expect and demand more from China.

Why is China’s global-governance diplomacy so constrained? There are three main reasons. First, there exists deep skepticism inside of China about the liberal premises and basic concept of global governance, seeing it as the latest “trap” laid by the West (primarily the United States) to “bleed” China by getting it involved in crises and places where it does not have a direct national interest—thus diverting its resources and restraining its rise. Second, Chinese citizens would criticize their government for allocating resources abroad when poverty and other pressing challenges still exist at home. Third, China has a kind of “transactional” approach to expending effort, especially when it involves money. This grows out of Chinese commercial culture but extends into many other realms of Chinese behavior. The Chinese want to know exactly what they will get back from a certain investment and when. Thus, the whole premise of philanthropy and contributing selflessly to common public goods is alien to the thinking of many Chinese.

As a result, in the realm of diplomacy—bilateral, multilateral, and global governance—Beijing still demonstrates a distinct passivity and reluctance to get involved. It is far from being the “responsible stakeholder” that Robert Zoellick called for in 2005. Chinese diplomacy remains narrowly self-interested, and Beijing’s involvement in global governance is minimalist and tactical, not normative or strategic. The real business of Chinese diplomacy is, in fact, business. Examine the composition of the Chinese president’s or premier’s delegations abroad and one finds large

numbers of corporate CEOs—in search of energy supplies, natural resources, trade and investment opportunities. Such mercantilist diplomacy does not earn Beijing international respect—and is, in fact, beginning to generate increasing criticisms and blowback around the world (most notably in Africa and Latin America).

China's military capabilities are another area where it is a partial power—increasingly a regional power, but by no means a global power. China is not able to project power outside of its Asian neighborhood (other than through its inter-continental ballistic missiles, space program, and cyberwarfare capacities), and even within Asia its power-projection capacities remain limited (although growing). It is not at all certain that China could project military power on its periphery out to five hundred nautical miles (such as in its East or South China Sea disputes) and *sustain* it long enough to prevail in a conflict. Its military forces are not battle-tested, having not fought a war since 1979.

To be sure, China's military modernization has been advancing steadily for twenty-five years. It now has the world's second-largest military budget (\$131.6 billion in the 2014 official budget), largest standing armed forces, scores of new advanced weapons, a navy that is sailing further and further out into the western Pacific Ocean and occasionally into the Indian Ocean, and a modest retrofitted aircraft carrier. So China's military is no pushover. It is certainly capable of defending its homeland, and could likely now wage a successful conflict over Taiwan (absent a fast and full American intervention). China is also perceived to be a regional military power in Asia and thus is altering the balance of power in the region, but Chinese military forces still possess no conventional global power-projection capabilities. China has no bases abroad, no long-range logistics or communications lines, and rudimentary global satellite coverage. The navy is still primarily a coastal littoral force, the air force has no long-range strike ability or proven stealth capacity, and the ground forces are not configured for rapid deployment.

Moreover, strategically, China can be described as a “lonely power”—lacking close friends and possessing no allies or functional alliances. Even in China's closest relationship today (with Russia),

elements of distrust and historical suspicions percolate beneath the surface of seemingly harmonious state-to-state relations. Not a single other nation looks to Beijing for its security and protection—thus demonstrating a distinct lack of strategic influence as a major power. Quite to the contrary, other countries in Asia are seeking to bolster their defense ties with the United States and improve their coordination with each other—precisely because of the uncertainty and possible threat they perceive from China.

Turning from hard power to soft power, how does China stack up as a global cultural power? Not well. No other societies are taking their cultural cues from China, no other countries are seeking to copy the Chinese political system, and—while admirable—its economic system is not replicable elsewhere. Despite the enormous efforts and resources the Chinese government has poured into trying to build its soft power and improve its international image since 2008, China continues to have a mixed-to-negative global reputation. Surveys of public opinion reveal that everywhere in the world perceptions of China are mixed, declining and increasingly fraught with problems.

China is not a magnet for others to emulate—culturally, socially, economically, or politically. The problem for China in all four realms is that it is *sui generis*. China lacks universal appeal beyond its borders or ethnic Chinese communities. Largely because of China's cultural, economic, social and political uniqueness, its global soft-power appeal remains weak to nonexistent.

China's cultural products—art, film, literature, music, education—are still relatively unknown outside of China and do not set global cultural trends. As admirable as China's economic development is, it is the product of a unique combination of features (competitive economies of scale, Soviet-style state planning, individual entrepreneurship, a large and disciplined workforce, a large research-and-development establishment, and massive foreign investment). Even if a “China model” exists (which is debatable), it is not exportable, as this combination of growth factors exists nowhere else. China's political system is similarly an eclectic amalgam of Leninist Communism, Asian authoritarianism, Confucian traditionalism, and a strong internal-security state. Its distinctiveness cannot be

replicated—there are no other states trying to do so, nor does one find foreigners seeking political asylum or citizenship in the PRC.

What about China's economic power? This is the one area where one would expect China to be a global power and trendsetter—yet China's impact is much more shallow than anticipated. As in other areas, it is quantitatively impressive but qualitatively weak. China is the world's largest trading nation, but its exports are generally low-end consumer goods; its products have poor international brand recognition; only a handful of its multinational corporations are operating successfully abroad; the total stock of its overseas direct investment (ODI) ranks only seventeenth internationally; and China's overseas aid programs are a fraction of the size of those of the United States, European Union, Japan, or the World Bank.

When evaluated qualitatively instead of quantitatively, China's global economic profile is not very impressive. It remains a processing-and-assembly economy—not a creative and inventive one. Most of the goods that are assembled or produced in China for export are intellectually created elsewhere. China's rampant theft of intellectual property and its government programs to spur “indigenous innovation” (which pour billions into domestic research and development every year) are clear admissions of its failure to create. This may, and likely will, change over time—but to date China is not setting global standards in hardly any technology or product line (or in the natural sciences, medical sciences, social sciences or humanities). Similarly, China only has two universities in the top hundred worldwide, according to the *Times Higher Education* World University Rankings for 2013–2014.

If China is to spur innovation, it will, of course, have to invest more in research-and-development funding. According to the National Science Foundation, in 2009 China spent only 1.7 percent of its GDP on research and development, compared with 2.9 percent in the United States, 2.8 percent in Germany and over 3.3 percent in Japan. The “research intensity” of China's research-and-development spending does not even rank it in the top twenty nations globally, as an estimated 80 percent is spent on product development, and only 5 percent on basic research. China's lack of Nobel Prizes

is also a telling indication. Between 1949 and 2010, 584 Nobel Prizes were awarded. Ethnic Chinese won ten of these (eight in the sciences), but eight of the ten worked outside of China. The two exceptions were the Dalai Lama's 2010 Nobel Peace Prize and Mo Yan's 2011 prize for literature. Citations in professional journals are another indicator. In the world's most cited articles (across all academic disciplines), Chinese scholars account for only 4 percent—whereas Americans account for 49 percent.

As a result of China's chronic “innovation deficit,” the nation is now mired in the infamous “middle-income trap.” The only way out of the trap is through innovation—as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan previously proved. And this requires much more than government investment in research and development—it requires an educational system premised on critical thinking and freedom of exploration. This, in turn, requires a political system that is relatively open and democratic and does not permit censorship or “no-go zones” in research. Students and intellectuals must be rewarded—not persecuted or penalized—for challenging conventional wisdom and making mistakes. Until this occurs, China will be forever caught in the middle-income trap—assembling and producing but not creating and inventing.

Seen in this light, China's trade juggernaut is much weaker than it appears on the surface. Similar weaknesses are evident in China's ODI. Despite the high government priority for Chinese firms to “go out” into the world, so far China's foreign investment remains quite small. As noted above, its total stock of ODI barely places China in the top twenty globally, although its annual outflows are growing rapidly and now rank third in the world (\$88.2 billion in 2012). Yet this remains only one-fourth of American ODI in the same year.

More significantly, as in other areas of China's global profile, one needs to delve beyond the quantitative statistics to ask qualitative questions: Where does it go, and is it real investment? The overseas destinations and composition of Chinese ODI have been shifting rapidly since 2011, but a large percentage remains portfolio funds flowing into locales like the British Virgin Islands and Grand Cayman Islands (which ranked as the second and third leading recipient destinations in 2011). Thus, some of this

is not foreign investment per se—it is really money being parked abroad in safe havens. This is not only true for China's government and companies, but also for individual assets. The 2014 annual *Blue Book on Chinese International Migration*, compiled by the Center for China & Globalization, recently reported that since 1990 a total of 9.3 million Chinese had emigrated abroad, taking 2.8 trillion renminbi (\$46 billion in US dollars) with them. This is not a new development, but has been a growing trend over the past decade. When a nation's economic elites leave in such large numbers and are so anxious to secure their personal financial savings abroad, it speaks volumes about their (lack of) confidence in their own domestic political and economic systems.

Recently, though, China's ODI profile and geographic footprint have been changing. China is ramping-up its investments and purchases across Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the United States. Chinese buyers are snatching up all kinds of assets—residential and commercial properties, factories, industrial parks, research-and-development facilities, farms, forests, mines, oil and gas fields, and various other resources. Chinese corporations are aggressively merging with or acquiring foreign companies. Individual Chinese have also been buying large amounts of valuable art on the international auction market. Thus, the profile of Chinese outbound investment is rapidly changing, but its impact remains uncertain.

What about Chinese multinational corporations? How competitive are they abroad? As in other categories, there is much more weakness than strength. On the surface, judging from the Fortune Global 500 rankings, Chinese companies now rank second only to American multinationals. But these rankings are calculated on the basis of total revenue and profit—not *where* a company makes its money. When examining the Chinese companies on the 2013 list, it is quickly apparent that relatively few even operate abroad and only a handful earn more than half their revenues overseas. So these are not truly *multinational* corporations, but rather domestic corporate actors.

Many firms may aspire to go global, but thus far those that have tried have not fared particularly well. There have been more failures than

success stories among aspiring Chinese multinationals. Chinese mergers and acquisitions often have stumbled because China's corporate leaders did not do their due diligence beforehand or because of the clash of corporate cultures. By all accounts, the major weakness of Chinese multinationals is human resources—particularly management. There are precious few multilingual and multicultural managers, and Chinese companies do not generally hire foreigners with such skills for upper-level management (Huawei and Haier are exceptions to the rule). Chinese companies and their management have frequently displayed an inability to escape their own national corporate culture and business practices. Because of their preference for hierarchy and clearly defined workplace roles, Chinese tend not to adapt well to “flatter” management structures that prize decentralization and individual initiative. These proclivities have resulted in repeated culture clashes in Chinese mergers with Western companies. Chinese companies have also demonstrated difficulties adapting to foreign legal, regulatory, tax, and political environments. Transparency and corporate governance are not attributes normally associated with Chinese companies—whose decision-making processes are usually opaque, business practices are frequently corrupt, and accounting procedures are often fraudulent. Many Chinese companies have been found to have filed fraudulent information with securities regulators in the United States prior to their IPOs.

The lack of Chinese corporate competitiveness is also evident when it comes to international brands. Only a handful of Chinese companies have been able to establish a brand presence abroad: Tsingtao beer, Haier white goods, Huawei telecoms, Air China, Geely automobiles, and a handful of others. But not a single Chinese company ranks among the *Business Week/Interbrand* Top 100 global brands.

Other measures of China's domestic capacities also do not indicate very high or positive global rankings. In 2014, Freedom House ranked China as tied for 183rd out of 197 countries for freedom of the press. Since 2002, the World Bank's composite Worldwide Governance Indicators have consistently ranked China in the thirtieth percentile for

political stability and control of corruption, fiftieth percentile for government effectiveness, fortieth percentile for regulatory quality and rule of law, and below the tenth percentile for accountability. The World Economic Forum ranked China only twenty-ninth globally on its composite Global Competitiveness Index in 2013, along with sixty-eighth for corruption and fifty-fourth for business ethics. Transparency International ranked China even lower (eightieth) in its 2013 international corruption index. In virtually all these estimates and categories, China has *deteriorated* over the past decade. By these and other measures, it is clear that China's global presence and reputation is mixed at best. In many categories China finds itself clustered together with the least well-performing and least respected countries in the world.

The 2013 United Nations Human Development Report further illustrates that despite the considerable and admirable socioeconomic progress China has made since the 1980s, the nation remains very much a developing country. The PRC ranks 101st in the overall index, out of 187 countries surveyed. The average per capita income is now nearly \$8,000 in purchasing-power-parity (PPP) terms, yet 13.1 percent of the population still lives on under \$1.25 per day. In life expectancy, infant mortality, health-care provision, educational quality, and inequality, China still lags well behind industrialized nations. Its environmental contamination and pollution are the worst in the world and are contributing to rapidly rising cancer rates. Despite recent government efforts to expand primary and catastrophic healthcare delivery and insurance, most Chinese still face great uncertainties when illness strikes. Its Gini coefficient (which measures income inequality, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality) is now nearly 0.5, among the highest in the world. China's primary and secondary schools are producing world-class test results, but the university system still lags well behind global leaders.

These observations are not meant to belittle China's miraculous developmental accomplishments over the past three decades—they are simply further reminders that China is nowhere near the top of the global tables in many categories of development.

This is a snapshot of China today. Ten or twenty years from now China's global position may well improve in all of these categories and it may be operating on a global basis similar to the United States', but for now China is a partial global power at best. Yet one should not simply assume that China's growth trajectory will continue unabated. It could, but there are also two other possibilities—stagnation and retrogression.

Many China watchers are coming to the conclusion that the country is reaching a tipping point on multiple fronts. Aggregate growth is leveling off (owing to rising costs of production and declining comparative advantages) and the government is struggling to maintain the 7 percent annual growth rates deemed necessary to maintain reasonably full employment, absorb new entrants into the workforce and sustain social stability. Try as it may, the government has been unable to accomplish its announced shift from an export- and investment-driven economy to one based on increased domestic consumption and an innovative "knowledge economy." Production is not appreciably moving up the value chain and technological ladder, and the grip of the middle-income trap is setting in (and could become an indefinite condition). Local debt is soaring and many subnational governmental authorities teeter on the brink of insolvency. Social inequalities are getting increasingly acute, corruption is rampant in both state and society, frustrations abound in every social sector, the rich are fleeing the country in increasing numbers, the middle class is stagnating, and the political system remains ossified and repressive. Meanwhile, the country is not undertaking the political and legal reforms needed to spur the next phase of growth because they would directly impinge on the monopoly power of the CCP.

Several Sinologists now argue that the CCP itself is the principal impediment to future growth and development in China. The Party is an increasingly insecure, sclerotic, and fragile institution that has become paralyzed since 2008. Part of the reason for the paralysis was the leadership transition in 2012 and the factional struggle leading up to it (including the Bo Xilai affair), but it also had to do with the growing unrest around

the country (particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang). There have been other contributing factors to the party's retrenchment and repression over the past five years, including fears generated by the Arab Spring, but we have not seen forward movement in political reform since the leadership transition and Xi Jinping's consolidation of power. To the contrary, the political crackdown has intensified since Xi took office. Even the vaunted Third Plenum of November 2013, which was heralded

as a reformist breakthrough, has so far proved to be more hype than reality.

This is the potentially toxic cocktail that many China watchers see gripping the country today. It is a sobering and daunting set of challenges for the people and government of China to tackle. Thus, observers should not blindly assume that China's future will exhibit the dynamism of the past thirty years, or that its path to global-power status will necessarily continue.

POLITICS

Editorial Introduction

During the time that China has been rising on the world stage over the past two decades its politics and political system have also continued to evolve. It is true that they have not evolved or changed anywhere near as much as the other sectors considered in this volume. Indeed, some would argue that they have not changed *at all*—after all, China remains an authoritarian state with power concentrated in the single ruling party (CCP) that has little tolerance for dissent and attempts to control most aspects of political and civic life. But during the period of time covered in this edition of *The China Reader*, Chinese politics and the political system have continued to evolve and change.

Generally speaking, this evolution passed through two broad phases. The first (1998–2008) was throughout the remaining rule of Jiang Zemin (Jiang entered office in 1989 and stepped down at the 16th CCP Congress in November 2002) and into the first seven years of his successor Hu Jintao's reign until 2009. The second phase includes the last three years of Hu Jintao's rule (he stepped down at the 18th CCP Congress in 2012) and into Xi Jinping's period in office (2012–).

Jiang Zemin's early years as China's leader were characterized by the harsh post-Tiananmen political repression and economic retrenchment. But beginning in the mid-1990s the Jiang leadership began to embark on a series of reforms. On the economic front these were led by Premier Zhu Rongji; in the political domain they were led by Jiang's senior advisor Wang Huning and Politburo Standing Committee member Zeng Qinghong. They launched a considerable number of political reforms, albeit within the one-party system.

These reforms were aimed at strengthening the Party through reforming it. The reforms were phased in over the next decade; almost all of them derived from the CCP's careful study of the causes of collapse of the Soviet Union and other former communist states. The importance of this post-mortem analysis undertaken by the CCP cannot be overstated—as China's leaders believed that if they did not learn the correct lessons of the collapse of communist parties elsewhere, they could be next.¹

There were multiple lessons learned, but one of the key ones was that the Party had to be proactive in reforming itself. Stasis was seen as a sure recipe for demise. In the Chinese view, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had become rigid, ossified, old, overly bureaucratic, ideologically dogmatic, and isolated in the world. Among the many other “lessons learned” from the Soviet and East European collapses, were included the need to:

- Place priority on economic, material, and social development;
- Make Marxist-Leninist ideology flexible and adaptable to national conditions;
- Combat corruption and strengthen Party discipline;
- Rotate, retire, and change leading personnel in the Party, government, and military at all levels;
- Promote “inner-party democracy” and “extra-party consultation”;
- Reform and reinvigorate local Party branches;
- Improve cadre competence, recruitment, and training;
- Guard against Western subversion and “peaceful evolution”;
- Pay attention to a range of social development problems;
- Treat ethnic minorities and intellectuals well;
- Pursue a foreign policy of openness and integration into the international community.

Many of these conclusions and reforms were reflected in the *Decision on the Enhancement of the Party's Governing Capacity* adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Party Congress in September 2004.

While Zeng Qinghong (who had risen to the Politburo Standing Committee) was the main mastermind behind these political reforms, President and CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin must also be recognized as a political reformer for backing these initiatives. In retrospect, when compared with his successors Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, Jiang appears to be a very reformist leader (something that was not anticipated when he came to power and did not really begin to manifest itself until after Deng Xiaoping died in 1997). Jiang also personally put forward the “Important Thought of the Three Represents” (三个代表重要思想)—the concept that the CCP should represent (1) “advanced social productive forces”; (2) “China’s advanced culture”; (3) “the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people.” While seemingly obscure ideological orthodoxy, Jiang’s first “represent” opened the door to recruiting members of China’s growing private sector entrepreneurial (capitalist) class into the Party. The second “represent” began a new emphasis on cultural development and soft power, while the third “represent” signaled a broadening of the mass base of the Party.

When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as Party and state leader in 2002, he inherited this reformist agenda. He also inherited Zeng Qinghong and many other Jiang loyalists in the leadership. Jiang had successfully managed to “stack the Politburo” with his acolytes at the Sixteenth Party Congress that year, and even continued to hold the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission for another two years until 2004. As a result of this inheritance, Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao (both of whom were not tied to Jiang Zemin) were very constrained in what they could do. Besides, neither Hu nor Wen had the gravitas of their predecessors. So they smartly continued to implement the Jiang political agenda and the Zhu Rongji economic agenda. The former was confirmed, as noted above, at the Fourth Plenum in September 2004, and they continued through 2008. Hu did add some new initiatives of his own—most notably the “Socialist Harmonious Society” program (社会主义和谐社会) and the “Scientific Development Concept” (科学发展观).

The former was meant to address the widening income gap and rising social inequalities in Chinese society (which had become far more acute as a result of Jiang Zemin's emphasis on coastal development), while the latter was a catch-all term for the more efficient use of resources.

These political policies all continued through Hu Jintao's first term. Although Hu was viewed by many in China and abroad as a cautious *apparatchik* with a bland persona (in contrast to Jiang Zemin's flamboyant style), he nonetheless continued China on this politically reformist course begun under Jiang (Jiang was also alive and watchful behind the scenes). But at the Seventeenth CCP Congress in 2008 Zeng Qinghong retired, and beginning the very next year the CCP began a deep political retrenchment, halting most of the political reforms, and reverted to old-style harsh and repressive rule. The reasons for the retrenchment had to do with far more than Zeng's retirement. The "Arab Spring" and "Jasmine Revolution" had erupted across the Middle East, overthrowing autocratic ruling parties and promising development of democracy—and the CCP was fearful of a contagion effect. Inside of China, major ethnic uprisings in Tibet in March 2008 and in Xinjiang during the summer of 2009 further rattled the Chinese leadership. On October 1, 2009, the sixtieth anniversary of the People's Republic was to be celebrated with an impressively orchestrated military parade in central Beijing, but the leadership feared its disruption by "terrorist" elements.

As a result, for all these reasons, the CCP leadership hunkered down, dramatically strengthened their domestic controls, and unleashed a wave of repression on civil society, Tibet and Xinjiang, and the media. The internal security and propaganda apparatuses were beneficiaries of the crackdown (in 2013 it was revealed at the National People's Congress that the internal security budget actually *exceeded* that of the military's budget!). This repression was the worst witnessed in China since the early 1990s in the aftermath of the June 4, 1989, Incident. The clampdown continued through the end of Hu Jintao's term in 2012 (at the Eighteenth CCP Congress) and into the Xi Jinping era. In fact, it *intensified* under Xi's new rule—reflecting a deep *insecurity* on the part of the CCP leadership.

From 2009 to the present (2015) virtually all of the aforementioned political reforms have either been halted or diluted—with the exception of two. The first is the continuation of cadre training programs throughout the Party and state apparatus—all cadres (of which there are 45 million in China) are required to spend the equivalent of three months every three years in a Party School (of which there are nearly 1,900 nationwide) or Administration Academy learning new skills of "governance" (执政). This is a very good requirement and program that other countries would do well to emulate. The second initiative that has continued, indeed intensified significantly under Xi Jinping, are efforts to combat corruption. Since Xi came to power he has unleashed an unprecedented purge of corrupt officials in the Party, state, and military. So, these reforms continue and are real. Others continue but are really a sham—such as the "extra-party consultation" between the CCP and the eight so-called democratic parties in China. Essentially, however, political reform in China stalled badly after 2009, and it is unclear if it will resume.

Thus the period examined in this section reflects a pattern that has been noticeable in Chinese politics throughout the post-Mao era: a repetitive loosening-tightening dynamic, known as the "*fàng-shou* cycle" (放-收周期). The length of each phase of political loosening (*fàng*) and tightening (*shou*) has varied since the late-1970s. During this period we see a fairly prolonged period of relaxation (roughly 1998–2008) followed by a tightening of political life in China (2009–).

The following selections were chosen to illustrate these broad political trends. They are divided into four sub-sections: Elite Politics; Dissent; Ideology; and The Future of the CCP.

The first selection is written by Boston University political scientist Joseph Fewsmith, a leading expert on Chinese politics at the “elite” (i.e., leadership) level as well as intellectual trends in China. Fewsmith’s contribution focuses on the changes in elite politics. He begins with the important observation that elite politics have become much more stable, predictable, and regularized in the post-Mao era—which, particularly during the Cultural Revolution decade, were anything but stable and predictable. Factionalism has permeated elite politics throughout its history, and it has remained even in the post-Mao and post-Deng eras. Fewsmith provides a careful tracing of the evolution of elite politics since Mao, but particularly in the post-Tiananmen (1989) period. He illustrates how recruitment into the elite, operation of the elite, and retirement from the elite is now far better institutionalized and regularized. Procedures have been implemented that now mandate everything from promotion criteria to Politburo operating procedures. Despite these advancements, Fewsmith describes this as a “quasi-formalized system,” due to the continuing informality and unpredictability that still characterizes elite politics. Fewsmith concludes that this as a “reasonably stable situation that can exist for a prolonged period of time.”

The next sub-section of entries focuses on political dissent in China. Readers must recognize that political and other forms of organized dissent in China are severely restricted and is ruthlessly repressed. The key word here is *organized*. There is scope for individual acts of dissent or protest—usually on microblogs or in face-to-face personal conversations—but even individual acts *in public* will land the person in detention. China’s jails are filled with political prisoners. The two selections in this section are examples of attempts to *organize* groups in protest.

The first is the text of *Charter ’08*. The document was so named to parallel *Charter ’77* (written that year by a group of Czech dissidents). It was intentionally published on December 10, 2008, on the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Initially, it had about 300 individuals who endorsed it, but subsequently once it was put online more than 10,000 people inside and outside of China associated their names with the Charter. One of the principal drafters of the document was veteran dissident Liu Xiaobo, who was sentenced to an eleven-year prison sentence in Liaoning Province for “subversion of state power.” Liu was subsequently awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize—an act that outraged the Chinese government. *Charter ’08* is a broad-gauged and inspiring manifesto that calls for nineteen specific changes in China—including separation of powers, an independent judiciary, legislative democracy, freedom of association and expression, freedom of religion, establishment of a federal republic, direct election of public officials, and other elements associated with Western democratic systems.

The second document is the closing statement of Xu Zhiyong at the end of his trial in the No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court on January 22, 2014. In fact, Xu was only permitted to read a few minutes of his statement before the presiding judge intervened and ordered him removed from the courtroom. Xu was sentenced to four years in prison for “gathering a crowd to disturb public order,” a charge stemming from his involvement in the New Citizens Movement (a grassroots movement to advocate for basic rights and citizen involvement in civic affairs). Xu was a practicing lawyer with a law degree from prestigious Peking University. Only 41 years old at the time of his sentencing, Xu was twice elected as an independent delegate to the district People’s Congress in western Beijing (Haidian). He worked tirelessly as an advocate and lawyer

for the dispossessed, most notably migrant families (his statement speaks eloquently on this issue) and official corruption. The sad irony of Xu being a defendant's attorney but being prosecuted by China's legal authorities speaks volumes about the rule *by* law rather than rule *of* law in China. Xu himself ruefully reflected on this as he was taken from the courtroom by guards: "The court today has completely destroyed what remained of respect for rule of law in China." Xu's sentencing and imprisonment were denounced by governments and human rights groups around the world.

The third sub-section segues to the role of ideology in China today. These selections are included to represent three different interpretations of this issue.

The first is an excerpt from outgoing Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao at the Eighteenth CCP Congress in 2012. It provides a boilerplate explanation of what the CCP describes as its most central feature: "socialism with Chinese characteristics." It is an excellent example of the jargon-laden prose that populates discourse inside the CCP, and it reveals clearly how the Party seeks to justify itself in terms of Marxism-Leninism.

The second selection is drawn from *The Economist* magazine, written by its team of excellent China-based correspondents. It is interesting because it concerns the regime's recent promotion of Confucius and Confucian thought in society. This is ironic as the communist regime spent much of its existence attacking and trying to eradicate Confucius (551–479 B.C.) and his legacy. Finding that it was not so easy to destroy something so deeply embedded in China's DNA, the regime has turned 180 degrees and now venerates the ancient sage and his teachings. One reason to do so, China watchers argue, is that the regime's own ideology (as seen in the previous selection) is so vapid and hollow that it fails to resonate or inspire society (even in the Party itself). It is also the case that many of the teachings of Confucius dovetail with the current preferences of the CCP for order, obedience, authority, hierarchy, and benevolence. Thus—like many dynasties before it—the Communist Party today reaches back more than 2000 years to re-legitimize itself by cloaking its message in Confucian garb.

The third selection is very revealing of the Chinese Communist Party's assessment of the ideological weaknesses it is experiencing inside the Party and in society, and it further illustrates the paranoia the CCP has towards all forms of Western political influence. It is a high-level secret document issued by the CCP Central Committee (中发) and circulated throughout the Party system nationwide (but leaked outside of China) in 2013. Known as [Central] Document No. 9, it catalogs numerous threats to the Party's ideological dominance and steps to be taken to strengthen it. The document paints a picture of a ruling party under assault from within and without—an extremely insecure, paranoid, and unconfident party acting defensively to fend off perceived threats to its continued rule and existence. This document stands in stark contrast to the upbeat but turgid prose of Hu Jintao's speech, but it is far more revealing about the actual way that the CCP sees its rule and potential threats to it.

The final section in the Politics section looks to the future of the CCP. It contains four selections—two by Chinese leaders and two by leading American experts.

The first is another excerpt from Hu Jintao's speech to the Eighteenth Party Congress. This one focuses on what the CCP describes as "Party building" (党建). Again, it is couched in "Party-speak"—which is, in itself, an illustration of the kinds of narrative theater and dissembling that occurs in inner-Party communications. Marxists have their own lexicon—much of it propagandistic (宣传). But Hu's speech is also interesting for other reasons. On the one hand, it contains interesting admissions concerning the challenges the Party thinks it faces, that is, "[T]he whole Party is confronted with increasingly grave dangers of lacking in drive, incompetence, being out