

## PLAYING POLITICS WITH HISTORY

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**Playing Politics with History: The Bundestag Inquiries into East Germany**

*Andrew H. Beattie*

# PLAYING POLITICS WITH HISTORY

The Bundestag Inquiries into East Germany



Andrew H. Beattie



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*To my parents, Margaret and James*



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## PREFACE



As an exchange student in Potsdam in the late 1990s, I was confronted for the first time with the complicated reality of postcommunist eastern Germany. The legacy of East German state socialism and the question of how to handle it were everywhere, not least in the presence of communist-era buildings and memorials, in the renovation boom transforming the city and particularly its patrician Wilhelmine villas after decades of neglect, or, more problematically, in a campaign to reconstruct the old Hohenzollern city palace, as also proposed in Berlin. The human and intellectual legacy left behind by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was even more fascinating, especially as expressed in the complex identities and allegiances of my fellow students and new friends. Generally in their late teens during the upheaval of 1989–90, they were surely among the “winners” of the democratic transformation. Worlds had opened for them that had been denied their parents, not least in new opportunities to travel and to immerse themselves, for example, in Spanish, Irish, or even Australian language and culture. Yet they could not but be affected by the devastating collapse of the East German economy that cast many of their parents into premature retirement, work-creation schemes, or unemployment, and plunged many of their home towns into a deep and lasting crisis.

Above all, their political homelessness and their strident identification as *Ossies* (easterners) were striking. They were at once attracted and repelled by the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), as the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) had remodeled itself in 1990; and they were generally left cold by the other parties, which they associated with the West. They were under no illusions about the political reality of the former regime, but clung firmly to memories and mementos of happy childhoods under state socialism, long before successful nostalgic films such as *Goodbye Lenin!* or *Sonnenallee*, and without the commoditization of East German identity in the form of the Berlin *Ampelmännchen* (pedestrian

traffic-light figure) that had already become the stuff of souvenir shops. They displayed considerable discomfort under the dominant western gaze on the East German past and present; indeed, the uneven dynamics of the unification process appeared to be more important for their current identities than their actual experiences in the GDR.

One seemingly trivial episode alerted me particularly to the fragility, contestability, and potential, if unintended significance of every representation of the past in this highly charged context. In a casual conversation about eastern regions and regionalism, a friend told me that the eastern states (*Bundesländer*) had not existed in the GDR. The implication was that they were a western creation and lacked authenticity and legitimacy. Only later did I learn that the states had in fact been re-created after the Second World War, only to be dissolved in 1952 as part of the communist push toward centralization, and that in July 1990 the democratized East German parliament had voted for their reestablishment. My friend's statement was barely half true, but no less powerful for that.

This incident and the Potsdam experience more generally led me eventually to explore the postunification politics of Germany's postwar history. How did unified Germany handle the legacy of the East German regime? How and why did it attempt to develop a new understanding of its national past after the end of the Cold War? How did interpretations of history and the lessons drawn from the past inform approaches to contemporary politics, and vice versa? And how did the ongoing struggle to cope with the older, burdensome legacy of the Nazi regime and the crimes it committed inform, and how was it itself affected by, efforts to address a further difficult past?

In pursuing these questions and completing this book, I have incurred many debts that I gratefully acknowledge here. Particular thanks are due to Konrad Jarausch, who encouraged me to pursue not only the topic but also the publisher. Assistance in the research process was received from numerous quarters. Financial aid came in the form of an Australian Postgraduate Award and a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service. The bulk of archival research was conducted at the Deutscher Bundestag Parlamentsarchiv in Bonn, and the Matthias Domaschk Archiv (Robert Havemann Gesellschaft) in Berlin. My thanks are due to the dedicated staff at both archives, as well as at the Bundestag Press Office and the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) in Bonn, and the Archiv Demokratischer Sozialismus (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung) and the Stiftung Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur in Berlin. My research benefited greatly from meeting and interviewing members of the commissions of inquiry. The encouragement they gave to my endeavors and

their preparedness to discuss the inquiries and broader issues testify to the strength of their commitment to the inquiries' mission. They will undoubtedly disagree with some of my assessments, but I owe them particular thanks.

At the University of Sydney, I would like to thank the staff of the history and germanic studies departments, above all Dirk Moses, for encouragement, critique, and inspiration, and Ben Tipton. I am also grateful for the support of colleagues and friends at the Institute for International Studies at the University of Technology, Sydney. My thanks are also due to my friends in Potsdam, who opened my eyes to the experience of living in East Germany before and during unification, and to Marion Berghahn, Ann Przyzycki and Melissa Spinelli for their highly professional guidance. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, who have been more than supportive at every step of the way, and my wife Melanie, to whom I owe a huge debt of gratitude for only occasionally doubting that the book would ever be finished.

The referencing conventions used in this book require a brief explanation. The main sources are the multivolume published materials of the Bundestag's two commissions of inquiry.<sup>1</sup> All references to the published materials of the first commission are given in the endnotes in the form: Roman numeral volume number: Arabic numeral page number. For example, I: 8ff. Subsequent references to the same volume within an endnote omit the volume number. References to the materials of the second inquiry use the same system, but are italicized. For example, *II: 230*.

## Note

1. Deutscher Bundestag, ed., *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland"* (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), IX vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1995); Deutscher Bundestag, ed., *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozess der deutschen Einheit"* (13. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), VIII vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1999).

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS



B90	Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)
BZ	<i>Berliner Zeitung</i>
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union)
CDUD	Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSU	Christian-Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union)
DBD	Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany (Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands)
DBPa	Deutscher Bundestag Parlamentsarchiv
FAZ	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>
FDP	Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)
FR	<i>Frankfurter Rundschau</i>
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
KPD	Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands)
LDPD	Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands)
MDA	Matthias Domaschk Archiv

ND	<i>Neues Deutschland</i>
NDPD	National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
NS	National Socialism; Nazism (National Sozialismus)
NSDAP	Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei)
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus)
SBZ	Soviet Occupation Zone (Sowjetische Besatzungszone)
SED	Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands)
SMAD	Soviet Military Administration in Germany (Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland)
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
SZ	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>
TAZ	<i>Die Tageszeitung</i>
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



# INTRODUCTION



At the final public hearing of the German Bundestag's first commission of inquiry into the East German past, held in the Reichstag building in Berlin in May 1994, East German author and dissident Jürgen Fuchs gave a bitter assessment of unified Germany's handling of East German history:

When I heard the many clever thoughts here yesterday, which have been addressed in academic seminars for a long time already and definitely will continue to be with new diploma theses, doctoral dissertations, professorial dissertations and ground-breaking publications in reputable publishing houses and journals, progressive and critical, questioning and answering, provocative and explanatory, I suddenly realised that we are lost....

Perhaps it is unavoidable that historians have the last word. But we are still here, we contemporaries. Just a little patience will be needed until the last dissection and last categorization, evaluation and disempowerment....

Here today we all know what is to be done. We know it very well, so very well! And therefore my little polemic, in all modesty, my sadness, too, and also the certainty, which actually should only be said by-the-by, that we are lost in the moment—namely now—that things are getting better with us, apparently. Today, others are writing our biographies, relaxed and academically focused. That is good, but bitter as well.<sup>1</sup>

Fuchs's biting commentary on the emotionless and abstract scholarly handling of East German history reveals the central issues that dominated public debate after the collapse of the East German dictatorship in 1989–90: the questions of eastern autonomy and ownership of the East German past and its interpretation and historicization. Fuchs also railed against the West German left-liberal intelligentsia's alleged softness on communism and touched on the comparability of the German Democratic Republic and National Socialism and the place that antifascism and East German opposition hold in Germany's historical memory. Underlying his position on each of these issues was a desire not only that memory of the commu-

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Notes for this section begin on page 14.

nist regime—its victims, supporters, and fellow travelers—be kept alive, but that it remain a source of moral outrage and political mobilization, that it not be left just to historians while others returned to “business as usual.”

By no means can East German history be said to have been left to the historians. In fact, it is widely recognized that Germany made an exceptionally thorough attempt to come to terms with its communist past after 1989–90. It is also well known that the precedent of the Nazi legacy and the context of unification distinguished the German case from other post-authoritarian or postdictatorial settings.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, these two factors contributed to the thoroughness of the search for accountability for regime crimes in two powerful ways. First, in addition to a desire for justice, the reckoning with the GDR past was motivated to a considerable extent by the perceived inadequacies of the two postwar German states’ handling of Nazism. To be sure, some liberals and socialists insisted that past omissions should not be used to justify a hypocritically tough reckoning with the GDR. Yet for many of the moderate Left, as well as for conservatives and eastern former dissidents, the relative lateness and half-heartedness in facing up to Nazism served as a warning against making similar errors in relation to communism.<sup>3</sup> Second, the extensive reckoning with East German communism was enabled in large part by the GDR’s accession to the western Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Unification completed the transition from dictatorship to democracy and created an extraordinary degree of political stability. The subsequent reckoning process could draw on an enormous range of institutional, material, and human resources provided, in essence, by the old Federal Republic.<sup>4</sup>

Yet the postunification and post-Nazi contexts also had other, less salubrious effects on the debate about the history and legacy of East Germany, which are less well understood. Crucially, both served to prevent a discussion of the GDR *qua* GDR.<sup>5</sup> Interpretations of previous efforts to “come to terms” with the Nazi past over-determined discussion about how to confront the communist legacy. Most commentators acknowledged the differences—which indeed perhaps outweighed the similarities—between the post-1945 and post-1989 situations, but basic affinities were frequently assumed.<sup>6</sup> The handling of the East German past was even more deeply intertwined with the older, yet ongoing process of dealing with Nazism. Indeed, the Nazi past was ever present in debates about the GDR, for instance in the revival of totalitarianist theories and in numerous postulated comparisons of, and continuities between the two regimes. A major aim of this book is to explore the interaction between these two pasts.<sup>7</sup>

The influence of unification was even greater than that of the Nazi legacy. For all the stability and resources unification provided, its effects were highly ambiguous. Superficially at least, it appeared to have created



ideal preconditions for a reckoning with the GDR. One commentator even suggested that—given the ease with which discredited institutions and individuals could be replaced by untainted western substitutes—postcommunist transitional justice in Germany was being pursued in “laboratory conditions.”<sup>8</sup> However, as A. James McAdams argues, “The matter of the FRG’s competence to sit in judgment on the GDR’s affairs” was “implicitly at the heart of nearly every controversy over the FRG’s attempt to come to grips with the record of a second dictatorship in German history.”<sup>9</sup> The problems included the question of whether Federal German or GDR legal standards should be applied when prosecuting crimes committed in the East, and the (for some grating) fact that in many instances western judges, employers, and bureaucrats were presiding over the fate of easterners.<sup>10</sup> Specifically eastern desires for a thorough accounting with past repression, complicity, accommodation, and responsibility, and for meaningful renewal of institutions, personnel, and political culture were confronted with a well-established institutional and procedural apparatus. Media sensationalism over Stasi collaborators in every sector of eastern society further contributed to the creation of an environment charged with moral superiority and seeming “colonization.”<sup>11</sup>

In this context, it became easy for former representatives of the communist regime to claim that they were the victims of western “victor’s justice.”<sup>12</sup> Such claims were largely unfounded but had considerable influence. The latter is reflected in numerous scholarly portrayals of the reckoning with the East German past as a postunification or western-driven or -dominated phenomenon.<sup>13</sup> Yet the vigorous reckoning with the communist past should not be seen as the result of unification or as western victor’s justice.<sup>14</sup> It had been a key preoccupation of eastern civil-rights movements and was on the political agenda since late 1989, when unification was still a hazy, distant prospect.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the victors over the dictatorship of the Socialist Unity Party in Germany were primarily the GDR opposition and wider populace, and the West only at one remove. If one can speak of victor’s justice at all, then it was the justice of those eastern victors as much as of western anticommunists. Thanks to their combined desire for accountability, unified Germany pursued an unrivalled and largely unwavering, if not uncontested, course of postdictatorial justice.<sup>16</sup> A second major aim of this book is to highlight the agency and examine the contributions of easterners—dissidents and others—to that process. They were no means merely “on the side-lines,” and nor can one speak simplistically of the western “expropriation” of East German history.<sup>17</sup>

Unification’s impact went far beyond providing stability and resources on the one hand and prompting pernicious claims of victor’s justice on the other. It fundamentally altered the terms of debate and even the ostensible

goals of the reckoning process (and consequently the expectations and evaluations of it). A sense of growing alienation between easterners and westerners following unification itself became a major preoccupation. To a considerable extent, the goal shifted from justice and accountability to the “inner unity” of the nation.<sup>18</sup> This was held to require, first, that East German history be placed in a national context and, second, that easterners and westerners develop a common understanding of their divided past and their difficult, if unified present. Like the Nazi legacy, unification thus hindered a discussion of the GDR qua GDR. Indeed, many debates that ostensibly addressed East Germany in fact revolved around multiple German pasts.

However, one should not exaggerate the significance of East-West issues. Much of the literature assumes that the geographical—formerly geopolitical—divide was of paramount importance.<sup>19</sup> To a considerable extent, this reflects the reality of postunification discourse: the East-West cleavage frequently obscured, or was conflated with intra-eastern and intra-western matters.<sup>20</sup> Yet internal eastern and western disagreements over various topics continued and should not be overlooked. A third goal of this study is to disentangle the various levels of debate and lines of division that rarely simply coincided with the former border. In addition to exploring the diverse roles and perspectives of easterners, as mentioned above, I also hope to provide a more differentiated picture of the roles and views of westerners, whose entrenched political divisions and ongoing ideological disputes had a major, but under-acknowledged impact on the handling of multiple German pasts after 1989–90.

While the exceptional vigor and propitious yet difficult circumstances of Germany’s attempt to work through its postwar history are reasonably well known, its ideological and political aspects have been rather neglected.<sup>21</sup> Some commentators overlook the central role of western anticommunism or suggest overly hastily that Cold War-era politics and ideologies simply disappeared in 1989–90.<sup>22</sup> In part, such tendencies are due to the widespread use of the vocabulary of “working through” or “coming to terms with” the past, which obscures as much as it sheds light on the processes it describes. As has been remarked frequently, these terms are highly malleable, ambiguous, and loaded.<sup>23</sup> It is essential to examine how they are used, what assumptions they rest on, and what is at stake. The scholarly literature cannot afford to accept historical actors’ language at face value, and must also look to the political motivations, intentions, and interests involved. It is not sufficient to consider or be satisfied that a discussion of the past took place or even to analyze how it was pursued; one must also ask to what ends.<sup>24</sup> This book seeks to keep that question in the foreground and thus to recognize that the postunification handling of the

East German past was never only about justice, truth, trust, or reconciliation, but also about power and ideology.

All of the above applies not just to the handling of postunification Germany's multiple pasts in general, but also to the two parliamentary inquiries that constitute the specific subject of this study. In March 1992, the German Federal Parliament, the *Deutscher Bundestag*, established a commission of inquiry (*Enquete-Kommission*) titled "Working through the History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany." It was succeeded in 1995 by a second commission, "Overcoming the Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in the Process of German Unity" that ran until 1998. These inquiries are indicative not only of the thoroughness of Germany's reckoning with the GDR, but also of its many difficulties and complexities, including the fact that more was at issue than just the East German past, not least as a result of the superimposition of East-West issues on debates about the GDR.

This book is not the first study of the commissions, but it is the first based on extensive historical research. Some earlier analysts seem not even to have examined the inquiries' terms of reference or their findings, but rely exclusively on previous scholarship and isolated media reports.<sup>25</sup> Others draw on the commissions' terms of reference, prominent *Bundestag* debates, and/or the inquiries' reports.<sup>26</sup> Some authors draw on their impressions of individual commission hearings.<sup>27</sup> Other authors have gone to more effort still. Ralf K. Wüstenberg and A. James McAdams rely on interviews with commissioners and inquiry staff and consider the published protocols of some hearings.<sup>28</sup> This study is the first to draw on a wide range of all of these sources, as well as on the many expertise papers and reports the inquiries commissioned, their internal records such as minutes of in-camera meetings, and German press coverage. It is therefore in a position not only to correct a number of factual errors in sections of the literature, but also to offer new insights into the inquiries' aims, processes, and achievements.

In addition to limited primary research, another problem with some of the extant literature is its reliance upon, indeed its uncritical acceptance of, the selective or tendentious statements or literature produced by individual commissioners. Numerous authors fail to interrogate the relationship between participants' statements of intent or claims of achievement on the one hand and what was actually practiced or produced on the other.<sup>29</sup> The accounts of commissioners and inquiry staff, who dominate the German language literature, display varying degrees of detachment and divergent assessments. They range from uncritical endorsement of the inquiries' work,<sup>30</sup> across more reflective attempts to evaluate their achievements and shortcomings,<sup>31</sup> to complete condemnation.<sup>32</sup> Even authors in the second

category lack sufficient distance to appraise critically their own role, and the assessments of each group are laced with self-justification or political or personal bias.<sup>33</sup> Precisely for that reason, they are an essential source of information and opinion about the inquiries, but must be treated with caution.

Whether due to limited research, uncritical acceptance of participants' statements, or the particular questions asked of the inquiries, much of the existing literature is selective in its presentation of the commissions. The second inquiry is often ignored altogether or no more than named.<sup>34</sup> Numerous authors declare what the (singular) goal of the first inquiry was or what its two goals were; others make similarly strong and inaccurate statements about what it never intended to do. Such claims frequently appear to read backwards from (interpretations of) the inquiry's approach, results, or reception, to its aims, the multiplicity of which goes unrecognized.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, there is a tendency in the literature to isolate particular parts of the inquiries' work and declare them to be the whole. Moreover, a rather static picture emerges that does not do justice to changing developments from the initial proposal for an inquiry in 1991 through to the end of the second commission's work in 1998, or even from the first inquiry's establishment through to the delivery of its 1994 report. As a result, the contingent, tentative, and rather experimental character of the endeavor has not been sufficiently captured, nor have important internal developments. I hope to offer a more comprehensive, historical account and to highlight the diversity, complexity, and the often contradictory nature of the inquiries' aims, work, and achievements.

The existing literature approaches the commissions from a number of different perspectives, each of which has merits and limitations. Not least among the latter is the application of evaluative criteria that are only partly applicable. A number of authors examine the commissions' handling of particular historical topics, such as the East German churches or state-society relations. They assess the inquiries' investigations and conclusions against scholarly criteria, but thus overlook the hybrid scholarly political nature of the enterprise.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, McAdams' approach of evaluating the inquiries' findings on the basis of the extent to which they took GDR history seriously is intuitively appealing and ostensibly convincing.<sup>37</sup> Yet it ignores the fact that—at least for the anticommunist majority on the commissions—the aim was never just to understand the GDR and its citizens, but to judge it against explicitly liberal-democratic criteria.<sup>38</sup> Substantively, too, such approaches generally overlook the extent to which both the Nazi past and West German history became implicated, the latter well beyond the reappraisal of *Deutschlandpolitik* (West German policy toward the GDR) that McAdams analyzes.<sup>39</sup>

Other scholars focus on the inquiries as instruments of reconciliation, often to the neglect of other issues. Jennifer Yoder, for example, considers the commissions' popular appeal and their contribution to Germany's "inner unity," but her analysis ignores the commissions' further goals.<sup>40</sup> Excessive attention to the East-West divide obscures other aspects of the commissions' work and leads, not infrequently, to their mutual conflation. Some commentators, for instance, fail to see a real or potential conflict between addressing the experiences of "ordinary" East Germans in the pursuit of national integration on the one hand and those of the immediate victims of the communist regime in the name of justice on the other; occasionally, emphasis on the need to integrate "ordinary" easterners leads to the virtual denial of the authentic eastern-ness of victims' or dissidents' experiences.<sup>41</sup> Much of the literature also—uncritically and misleadingly—perpetuates or remains excessively agnostic over claims of western victor's justice; it gives insufficient weight to the considerable eastern input into the inquiries and minimizes the difficulties they faced as Federal Republican institutions with western participation.<sup>42</sup> Inadequate complexity and inappropriate criteria also plague the few (rather unsystematic and often unsympathetic) comparisons of the inquiries with "truth commissions" established in other postauthoritarian settings.<sup>43</sup>

The Bundestag commissions are rightly seen as an instrument of transitional justice, yet their significance goes far beyond that. The inquiries have been characterized as "a form of didactic public history" (by Charles Maier), an official public "history lesson" (by Timothy Garton Ash), and an effort toward "moral justice" (by McAdams).<sup>44</sup> Such terms go some way to reflecting commissioners' desire to undertake a systematic, differentiated examination of the structures of power and oppression and thus to shift the focus of public discussion from the Stasi to the SED. Yet more was at issue than (just) factual or moral questions about easterners' behavior under (or western behavior toward) the communist regime.<sup>45</sup> Much of the literature accepts at face value the public-enlightenment aspect propagated by commissioners and the importance of moral values and notions of "truth" in working through the past.<sup>46</sup> The rhetoric (eastern) commissioners adopted reflected the language and the communicative style of politics developed in eastern bloc dissident milieus as a counterpoint to the communist regimes' complete domination and distortion of the language of power and interests.<sup>47</sup> However, a focus on questions of integrity, morality, and truth relating to individual or group behavior *within* (or toward) the GDR does not engage with the even more important question of the legitimacy of the GDR (or the FRG or unification).<sup>48</sup>

Indeed, fundamental questions about politics and power warrant more attention than they have received. The commissions provided a forum for

the contestation of the legitimacy of the two postwar states and of unification and they made significant contributions to broader debates about the identity of unified Germany and its constituent political camps. The role of party politics and ideology and the historical narratives that supported these are surprisingly under examined. McAdams, to be sure, highlights the partisan nature of debate about *Deutschlandpolitik*, for example, but barely considers the ideological context of this dispute; similarly, his discussion of the first inquiry's treatment of the East German churches or the wider population does not reveal what was at stake politically or ideologically.<sup>49</sup> Neither he nor Anne Sa'adah considers competing historical narratives or how these related to wider discourses of German politics and identity.<sup>50</sup> Wüstenberg, in turn, is aware of issues of unification and national identity that were implicated in debates about the GDR, but his focus on reconciliation leads him away from considering partisan competition over the past.<sup>51</sup> Partisanship, however, was a central organizing feature of the historical narratives presented to and by the commissions, and not just an unwanted or inappropriate intrusion or shortcoming as depicted by some commentators and participants.<sup>52</sup> Broader issues of public memory and in particular the role of the Nazi past in the commissions' work similarly warrant more attention. The inquiries were influenced considerably by attitudes toward the past and present handling of the Nazi legacy. In turn, they had a not inconsiderable impact on the latter. While some of these various dimensions have been recognized by some scholars, they have not yet been synthesized into a coherent overall analysis.<sup>53</sup>

To do justice to the full scope of the inquiries' work and to better understand their historical development and overall significance, sharper analytical parameters are required than *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with, overcoming, or mastering the past) and *Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung* (working through the past). In recent years, a shift in the direction of a more rigorous examination of the politics of dealing with the past has been evident in the literature on Germany's handling of the Nazi legacy. For too long debate largely exhausted itself in the competing claims of Left and Right over the insufficiencies or adequacy respectively of West Germany's efforts to face up to German complicity in Nazi crimes. Advocacy and critique largely substituted for analysis, and the debate was loaded with moral claims, emotional excitement, and psychoanalytic jargon.<sup>54</sup> Since the 1990s, however, alternatives have been put forward to the widely criticized vocabulary of coming to terms with and working through the past.<sup>55</sup> In an influential study of amnesty and integration in the Adenauer era, Norbert Frei introduced the concept of *Vergangenheitspolitik* that encompasses the set of state policies that address specific legacies of the past, including the punishment of (or granting of amnesties to)

offenders through the criminal courts, the disqualification (or reintegration) of compromised representatives of the former regime, and the payment (or denial) of compensation to its victims and the restitution of their property (or rejection thereof).<sup>56</sup> While Frei's study is important above all for its empirical research and interpretative conclusions, his notion of *Vergangenheitspolitik* (policy toward the past) has been adopted by numerous researchers.<sup>57</sup>

Other terms have been put forward. Inspired by French research into collective memory, Peter Reichel introduced the notion of *Erinnerungspolitik* (memory politics) in his examination of controversies surrounding various "sites of memory" (both physical and immaterial) relating to the Nazi past.<sup>58</sup> Finally, in an examination of West German remembrance of the East German uprising on 17 June 1953 that the communist authorities put down with the help of Soviet tanks and that the Federal Republic subsequently established as the Day of German Unity, Edgar Wolfrum advocated the notion of *Geschichtspolitik* (history politics), which he applies to the study—in a democratic society—of the symbolic uses of history for the purpose of national identity formation.<sup>59</sup>

Rather than seeing them as rivals or focusing on their individual shortcomings, these concepts can—in modified form—complement each other to provide a multifaceted theoretical framework that encompasses judicial, legislative, and political measures as well as public debate, political rhetoric, and symbolic politics, thus allowing a more complete analysis of the handling of the East German past since 1990.<sup>60</sup> This study utilizes the notion of *policies for the past* to designate state policies of retribution, recompense, and reconciliation. *History politics*—or playing politics with history—is understood as the contestation of political legitimacy with respect to history. Finally, *commemorative politics* (which I prefer to the less precise "memory politics") refers more specifically to public ceremonies and memorials. All three played a role, albeit to varying degrees, in the Bundestag's commissions of inquiry.

These concepts are preferable to *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and *Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung*, even as the latter have undergone more rigorous attempts at definition and elaboration. Their emphasis on politics and policies highlights the contingent nature of decisions about the handling of the legacy of the past and provokes questions about competing interests and positions. This is an important advance on the literature on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and indeed the burgeoning literature on "memory," which even at its most subtle frequently remains fixated on dichotomous questions of the success/failure, advantages/disadvantages, and pursuit/non-pursuit of certain strategies or indeed the entire endeavor.<sup>61</sup> A further reason for adopting the triumvirate is that they do not limit the past in

question to dictatorial or negatively viewed pasts, as *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and *Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung* invariably are taken to. Numerous definitions of the latter terms assume that the past in question is regarded as a burden, and that the aim is to prevent its repetition.<sup>62</sup> Such an approach begs what surely should be one of the central questions to be pursued, namely, how the past is interpreted and assessed by different actors. After all, some people may not view it exclusively in negative terms and may even see positive elements that are worth maintaining. By defining *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* or *Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung* as dealing with a negatively viewed past, those who hold such views are either excluded from the picture or labeled a priori as being opposed to the enterprise. In postunification Germany, such an approach is unproductive, because no one opposed the goal of working through the East German past; even the Party of Democratic Socialism objected merely to how it was being pursued. Rather than focusing on a past that by definition is at best problematic, it should be recognized that it is possible to develop policies and to conduct politics with pasts—or aspects of the past—that are viewed positively, such as resistance to dictatorship.<sup>63</sup> In the postunification German case, this applied in the view of the majority not just to the anticommunist opposition, but also by and large to West German history; the PDS, on the other hand, saw positive dimensions to East German history. A genuinely analytical approach cannot itself define the past in negative terms; instead, it must keep open the central question of precisely how the past is evaluated by social actors.<sup>64</sup>

This book is divided into two parts. Chapters 1 and 2 address the establishment of the commission of inquiry and the subsequent development of the inquiries' work. They highlight the multiplicity of the aims of the enterprise and the varying extent to which those aims were pursued: initial plans for the development of policies for the past gave way to an almost exclusive concentration on a discursive elaboration of history. The latter is then examined in the subsequent chapters. As I argue in chapter 1, a sense in 1991 that the unification project and the reckoning with the communist regime were stalling led to the widespread belief—shared by eastern former dissidents and western politicians alike—that something more had to be done. Precisely what was unclear, but they hoped that a parliamentary inquiry would provide a systematic, critical, but differentiated examination of the GDR in contrast to the rather hysterical and haphazard public debate already underway. It was also widely felt that easterners and westerners would only achieve a happier union when they better understood each other's pasts. Indeed, working through the East German past was seen as an "all-German task" and an essential prerequisite for the "inner unity" of the nation, the promotion of which became



one of the inquiries' major goals. Yet the commissions' work was marked by tensions over the extent to which West German history should be included in the examination, as well as by doubts about whether, as national bodies with western participants, they did not hinder autonomous eastern deliberation of the past.

In fact, the general desire for a thorough examination of the GDR and for practical responses to its legacy in the present merged with continuing ideological disputes between East and West but also within each of these. Chapter 2 shows how the politics of Germany's postwar history came to predominate, effectively marginalizing the search for practical responses to the consequences of the East German regime as well as efforts toward either intra-eastern or national reconciliation. In the end, the commissions had little direct impact on policies for the past, and engaged above all in the contestation of political legitimacy with reference to history. This contestation sought to delineate acceptable or legitimate interpretations of the past and political options in the present, and to develop the historical consciousness and national identity of the recently unified nation. I thus agree with the assessment of commissioner Manfred Wilke that the inquiries' primary significance was "as an instrument of the parliamentary history politics" of reunified Germany.<sup>65</sup>

The contestation of Germany's postwar history in and around the commissions of inquiry constituted the ideological continuation of the Cold War after its historical end, contrary to depictions of the latter's immediate obsolescence. Ostensibly, the foremost issues—discussed in chapter 3—were the questions of the legitimacy of the East German state and responsibility for the dictatorship. Here, as elsewhere, the East-West divide was less important than partisan divisions. An overwhelming majority—consisting of Christian Democrats, Free Democrats, Social Democrats, and members of Alliance 90/The Greens—insisted on the fundamental political illegitimacy of the GDR and advocated the commemoration of the victims of, and the opposition against the SED dictatorship. In contrast, Democratic Socialists defended the GDR's legitimacy even as they acknowledged its flaws. In a sense, anticommunists were writing victor's history or meting out victor's justice against communism and the PDS; but the victors, importantly, were easterners as well as westerners. Questions remain, however, over the extent to which eastern dissidents' legitimate desire for a moral and political accounting with the former regime was co-opted and instrumentalized by conservative western interests.<sup>66</sup> Irrespective of the answer, the commissions' central role in the posthumous delegitimization of the GDR must be emphasized.<sup>67</sup>

Yet even more was at stake than questions of responsibility for, and the political legitimacy of the GDR. As chapter 4 shows, the commissions

were also a site of debate about the history and future of socialism, an aspect almost totally missing from previous accounts.<sup>68</sup> Western conservatives sought to discredit not only the former communist regime and its representatives, but also its ideological pillars. They used the inquiry to expound on the evils of socialist ideology generally, rather than merely its manifestation in the GDR. Their wide-ranging condemnation targeted not just the PDS, but also sections of the former East German opposition and the West German Left, whose traditions were to be tainted by association. There were thus “losers” on the western side as well. In response, Social Democrats and a number of eastern former dissidents felt compelled to defend themselves, revealing a lingering sympathy for socialist ideals and traditions. Together with Democratic Socialists, they urged differentiation in contrast with the conservative governing coalition’s outright condemnation.<sup>69</sup>

Conservatives also sought to score ideological points with the postwar history of coming to terms with the Nazi past. Whereas antifascism had always been among the GDR’s strongest sources of legitimacy and constituted its (and the PDS’s) most powerful ideological weapon against the Federal Republic, chapter 5 shows how Christian Democrats and Free Democrats used the commissions to demolish the GDR’s reputation as an antifascist state. Where possible, they also pointed to the FRG’s relatively successful efforts to face up to the Nazi past. They thus sought not only to destroy any remaining legitimacy the GDR might possess, but also to neutralize antifascism as a source of critique of the Federal Republic, again not only from the eastern but also from the western Left.

Seeking to take their ideological victory one step further, conservatives and Cold War liberals attempted to reassert the totalitarian paradigm and reinstate an “antitotalitarian consensus” for reunified Germany, as discussed in chapter 6. They thus seemingly rejected the western Left’s traditional insistence on the singularity of Nazi crimes and their centrality for contemporary German politics and identity. However, the German reckoning with communism did not lead to the Nazi past being forgotten or marginalized, as some feared in the wake of unification.<sup>70</sup> Indeed, a central aspect of that encounter—and of the work of the commissions of inquiry in particular—consisted precisely in condemning the GDR by association with Nazism or, from the standpoint of the PDS, in insisting on the noble antifascist foundation of the East German state. The Nazi past, and in particular the break with it, had been so central to the legitimization strategies of the two postwar states that discussing their legitimacy was seemingly impossible without referring to Nazism. The imputation of continuities with the Third Reich remained the most devastating argument against either state.<sup>71</sup>

Political, ideological, and identitarian questions were thus of central importance to the commissions of inquiry. The latter therefore need to be understood not just as instruments of transitional justice, but also in the context of wider debates about “what’s left” after the collapse of communism and an even broader set of discussions about the renegotiation of German identities in the postunification era.<sup>72</sup> Alongside the debate about whether Bonn should remain, or Berlin should become the seat of the federal government and parliament, the inquiries provided a postunification substitute for a debate about the past and future of the country that had not occurred during the unification process itself.<sup>73</sup> It is therefore by no means true that “nothing was at stake,” as one commentator has concluded from the fact that the inquiries did not offer amnesties to representatives of the communist regime.<sup>74</sup> In fact, a great deal was at stake: as Konrad H. Jarausch argues, the controversies over GDR history—to which one must also add other German pasts—constituted “an intellectual contest over the identity of the united Germany.”<sup>75</sup> Commentators who express their disappointment about the lack of “surprises” generated by the commissions’ investigation similarly overlook their role as a vehicle for the redefinition of the German polity and its constituent partisan traditions.<sup>76</sup> In such a process, a combination of continuity and change was always more likely than radical breaks.

How and to what ends unified Germany’s political and intellectual elite evaluated and utilized its postwar history in the decade after unification are the central questions to be asked of the inquiries. Western conservatives used the GDR past as a political weapon against the eastern and western Left, while eastern dissidents continued a moralizing discourse about complicity and accommodation. In effect, both sought to delegitimize the entire history of the GDR (aside from the opposition to the regime, which they lionized) and its defenders in the present. In response, both the moderate and radical Left sought to defuse the communist past as a political and moral weapon through the historicization of the GDR; that is, by examining it on its own terms and contextualizing it historically. Where western and eastern anticommunists sought to maintain the rage against those who had supported or sympathized with communism, Social Democrats and Democratic Socialists called for differentiation and sobriety, and rejected the “overkill” of the dead GDR.<sup>77</sup> Yet they also played politics with history. For many liberals, Social Democrats, and some Democratic Socialists too, the victory of parliamentary democracy over single-party dictatorship was certainly to be celebrated; but they were also concerned to rescue progressive aspects of German political and intellectual traditions and to fight a rearguard action against conservatives’ total condemnation. Conservatives and Cold War liberals, by contrast, sought

to establish the inner unity of the nation on the basis of an antitotalitarian consensus founded on the complete rejection of everything for which the GDR had stood and on the acceptance of the Federal Republic as the only legitimate German state. The handling of the East German past thus both reflected and reinforced the fundamental asymmetries of unification as well as the inherited ideological positions of the Cold War era. It would be unrealistic to expect this to have been otherwise. Yet the choices and preferences of the diverse actors involved warrant detailed consideration. As ever, the historical process was more open, complex, and ambiguous than it often appears in retrospect.

## Notes

1. I: 695, 696, 701.
2. See for instance Timothy Garton Ash, *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in the 1990s* (London, 2000), 294–314; A. James McAdams, *Judging the Past in Unified Germany* (Cambridge, 2001), 1–6; Noel Calhoun, *Dilemmas of Justice in Eastern Europe's Democratic Transitions* (New York, 2004), 51.
3. Cf. Jürgen K. A. Thomaneck and Bill Niven, *Dividing and Uniting Germany* (London, 2000), 86.
4. Cf. Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, 1997), 312f.; Christoph Kleßmann, *Zeitgeschichte in Deutschland nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts* (Essen, 1998), 22; Anne Sa'adah, *Germany's Second Chance: Trust, Justice and Democratization* (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 8; Ulrich Herbert, "Drei deutsche Vergangenheiten: Über den Umgang mit der deutschen Zeitgeschichte," in *Doppelte Zeitgeschichte: Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen 1945–1990*, eds. Arnd Bauerkämper, Martin Sabrow, and Bernd Stöver (Bonn, 1999), 386; Bernd Faulenbach, "Die Auseinandersetzung mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit in vergleichender Perspektive," in *Auf den Kehrthaußen der Geschichte? Der Umgang mit der sozialistischen Vergangenheit*, eds. Isabelle de Kegel and Robert Maier (Hannover, 1999), 23ff.; Jennifer A. Yoder, "Truth without Reconciliation: An Appraisal of the Enquete Commission on the SED Dictatorship in Germany," *German Politics* 8, no. 3 (1999): 64; Corey Ross, *The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR* (London, 2002), 183.
5. Cf. Konrad H. Jarausch, "Die DDR denken: Narrative Strukturen und analytische Strategien," *Berliner Debatte Initial* 4–5 (1995): 11f.; Herbert, "Drei deutsche Vergangenheiten," 387f.; Sa'adah, *Germany's Second Chance*, 107.
6. Cf. Friso Wielenga, "Schatten der deutschen Geschichte: Der Umgang mit der Nazi- und DDR-Vergangenheit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Deutschland Archiv* 27, no. 10 (1994): 1058–73; Claus Offe, *Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience* (Cambridge, 1996); Bernd Faulenbach, "Die Auseinandersetzung mit der doppelten Vergangenheit im Deutschen Bundestag," in *Grenzen der Vereinigung: Die geteilte Vergangenheit im geeinten Deutschland*, ed. Martin Sabrow (Leipzig, 1999); Jeffrey K. Olick, *In the House of the Hangman: The Agonies of German Defeat, 1943–49* (Chicago, 2005).

7. For brief discussions on the connections between debates about the Nazi and GDR pasts, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "A Double Burden: The Politics of the Past and German Identity," in *Ten Years of German Unification: Transfer, Transformation, Incorporation?* eds. Jörn Leonhard and Lothar Funk (Birmingham, 2002); Bill Niven, *Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich* (London, 2002), 2–7, 41–61.
8. Mary Albion, "Project on Justice in Times of Transition: Report of the Project's Inaugural Meeting," in *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes*, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington, 1995), vol. I, 48. Offe similarly—if hypothetically rather than empirically—suggests that Germany constitutes the "most favourable case" for a thorough or at least well-managed process of coming to terms with the past, *Varieties of Transition*, 86f.
9. McAdams, *Judging the Past*, 5f., 9.
10. See Inge Markovits, *Imperfect Justice: An East-West German Diary* (Oxford, 1995).
11. Cf. Edgar Wolfrum, *Geschichte als Waffe: Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Wiedervereinigung* (Göttingen, 2002), 136; Wolfgang Dümcke and Fritz Vilmar, *Kolonialisierung der DDR: Kritische Analysen und Alternativen des Einigungsprozesses* (Münster, 1996); Erhard Blankenburg, "The Purge of Lawyers after the Breakdown of the East German Communist Regime," *Law and Social Inquiry* 20, no. 1 (1995): 223–43; Paul Cooke, *Representing East Germany since Unification: From Colonization to Nostalgia* (Oxford, 2005), 1–20.
12. For a democratic-socialist rejection of the reckoning with the past as emanating from the West, see Ludwig Elm, *Nach Hitler, Nach Honecker: Zum Streit der Deutschen um die eigene Vergangenheit* (Berlin, 1991), 15.
13. Such erroneous portrayals are found throughout the literature. See Blankenburg, "The Purge of Lawyers," 243; Christhard Hoffmann, "One Nation—Which Past? Historiography and German Identities in the 1990s," *German Politics and Society* 15, no. 2 (1997): 4; Jonathan Grix, "1989 Revisited: Getting to the Bottom of the GDR's Demise," *German Politics* 6, no. 2 (1997): 193; Molly Andrews, "The Politics of Forgiveness," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 13, no. 1 (1999): 121; Daphne Berdahl, *Where the World Ended: Re-unification and Identity in the German Borderland* (Berkeley, 1999); Molly Andrews, "Grand National Narratives and the Project of Truth Commissions: A Comparative Analysis," *Media, Culture and Society* 25 (2003): 50ff.; Pol O'Dochartaigh, *Germany since 1945* (Basingstoke, 2004), 231ff.; Franz Oswald, "Negotiating Identities: The Party of Democratic Socialism between East German Regionalism, German National Identity and European Integration," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 50, no. 1 (2004): 75–85; Geoff Eley, "The Unease of History: Settling Accounts with the East German Past," *History Workshop Journal* 57 (2004): 175–201.
14. Cf. Bernd Faulenbach, "Die Arbeit der Enquete-Kommissionen und die Geschichtsdebatte in Deutschland seit 1989," in *The GDR and its History: Rückblick und Revision, Die DDR im Spiegel der Enquete-Kommissionen* (German Monitor 49), ed. Peter Barker (Amsterdam, 2000); Thomaneck and Niven, *Dividing and Uniting Germany*, 85; Hasko Zimmer in collaboration with Katja Flesser and Julia Volmer, *Der Buchenwald-Konflikt: Zum Streit um Geschichte und Erinnerung im Kontext der deutschen Vereinigung* (Münster, 1999).
15. See Petra Bock, *Vergangenheitspolitik im Systemwechsel: Die Politik der Aufklärung, Strafverfolgung, Disqualifizierung und Wiedergutmachung im letzten Jahr der DDR* (Berlin, 2000).
16. Cf. McAdams, *Judging the Past*, 6; Sa'adah, *Germany's Second Chance*, 101. A discussion in 1994–95 about drawing a line under the past had little impact. See Sa'adah, *Germany's Second Chance*, 177. Serious wavering amongst the main political parties returned only in 2000 when the process began to affect western politicians. See McAdams, *Judging the Past*, 179–84; O'Dochartaigh, *Germany since 1945*, 231f.; Horst-Alfred Heinrich, "Geschichtspolitische Akteure im Umgang mit der Stasi: Eine Einleitung," in *Geschichts-*

- politik: *Wer sind ihre Akteure, wer ihre Rezipienten?* eds. Claudia Fröhlich and Heinrich (Wiesbaden, 2004).
17. The former phrase is used by Yoder, "Truth without Reconciliation," 77. The latter by Amelie Kutter, "Geschichtspolitische Ausgrenzungen in der Vereinigungspolitik: Das Beispiel der Enquete-Kommission," in *Die DDR war anders: Eine kritische Würdigung ihrer sozialkulturellen Einrichtungen*, eds. Stefan Bollinger and Fritz Villmar (Berlin, 2002), 49. Cooke equivocates on the latter's appropriateness, *Representing East Germany*, 46.
  18. Cf. Jutta Vergau, *Aufarbeitung von Vergangenheit vor und nach 1989: Eine Analyse des Umgangs mit den historischen Hypothesen totalitärer Diktaturen in Deutschland* (Marburg, 2000), 179f.; Helga A. Welsh, "When Discourse Trumps Policy: Transitional Justice in Unified Germany," *German Politics* 15, no. 2 (2006): 147f.
  19. Yoder, "Truth without Reconciliation," esp. 73; Andrews, "The Politics of Forgiveness," 113, 121; Andrews, "Grand National Narratives," esp. 49.
  20. Cf. Friso Wielenga, *Schatten deutscher Geschichte: Der Umgang mit dem Nationalsozialismus und der DDR-Vergangenheit in der Bundesrepublik* (Vierow bei Greifswald, 1995), 72f. Generally on the nature of the transition associated with unification, see Wade Jacoby, *Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany* (Ithaca, 2000); Leonhard and Funk, *Ten Years of German Unification*. For an early example of intra-western discussion, see Cora Stephan, ed., *Wir Kollaborateure: Der Westen und die deutschen Vergangenheiten* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1992).
  21. Ideology and symbolic politics are largely absent from Helmut König, Michael Kohlstruck, and Andreas Wöll, eds., *Vergangenheitsbewältigung am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Leviathan 18) (Opladen, 1998). Ideology and the politics of public memory are remarkably missing from McAdams, *Judging the Past*. Ralf K. Wüstenberg focuses more on efforts to prevent the "repression" and "distortion" of the past, than on the political contestation of historical interpretations and legitimacy, *Die politische Dimension der Versöhnung: Eine theologische Studie zum Umgang mit Schuld nach den Systemumbrüchen in Südafrika und Deutschland* (Gütersloh, 2004), 328. For a brief discussion of the ideological stakes of historical approaches to the GDR, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "The German Democratic Republic as History in United Germany: Reflections on Public Debate and Academic Controversy," *German Politics and Society* 15, no. 2 (1997): 33–48. Paul Cooke recognizes the importance of debates about the GDR for legitimizing unification, but treats official politics of memory merely as a source of perceptions of colonization and thus as a foil for exploring "postcolonial" cultural responses, *Representing East Germany*, 27–53.
  22. See for example John Torpey, "Coming to Terms with the Communist Past: East Germany in Comparative Perspective," *German Politics* 2, no. 3 (1993): 425; Robert G. Moeller, "What Has 'Coming to Terms with the Past' Meant in Post-World War II Germany?" *Central European History* 35, no. 2 (2002): 230; Niven, *Facing the Nazi Past*, 6.
  23. Theodor W. Adorno noted in the late 1950s that behind much talk about "working through the past" actually stood a desire to draw a final line under it, "Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit," *Gesammelte Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), vol. 10, no. 2, 555. Cf. A. Dirk Moses, "Coming to Terms with the Past in Comparative Perspective: Germany and Australia," *Aboriginal History* 25 (2001): 91–115; Peter Dudek, "'Vergangenheitsbewältigung': Zur Problematik eines umstrittenen Begriffs," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 42, no. 1–2 (1992): 44–53.
  24. Cf. Rudi G. Teitel, *Transitional Justice* (Oxford, 2000), 88; Lutz-Dieter Behrendt, "Mittel und Methoden der Vergangenheitsbewältigung," in *Auf den Kehrthausen der Geschichte?* eds. de Kegel and Maier.
  25. Andrews, "The Politics of Forgiveness," 110; Maryam Kamali, "Accountability for

- Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 40 (2001): 116ff.
26. For instance, Calhoun, *Dilemmas of Justice*; Cooke, *Representing East Germany*, 34–41.
  27. Sa'adah, *Germany's Second Chance*, 185; Yoder, "Truth without Reconciliation," 72; Wüstenberg, *Die politische Dimension*, 343.
  28. See Wüstenberg, *Die politische Dimension*, 337–44, and especially the footnotes on 292ff., 325–47, 381–85, 390f., 403, 407, 410, 417f., 428; McAdams, *Judging the Past*, 96–101, 105–8, 110–14, 119–21, and the footnotes on 210ff.
  29. Andrews, "Grand National Narratives," 50f.; Stefan Berger, *The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800* (Providence, 1997), 254f.; Paul Betts, "Germany, International Justice and the Twentieth Century," *History and Memory* 17 (2005): 67f.; Calhoun, *Dilemmas of Justice*, 88f.
  30. In roughly chronological order: Rainer Eppelmann, "Fünf Jahre deutsche Einheit," *Deutschland Archiv* 28, no. 9 (1995): 897f.; Peter Maser, "Auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit: Anmerkungen zur neuen Enquete-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestages," in *Unrecht überwinden – SED-Diktatur und Widerstand*, Gerhard Finn, Frank Hagemann, Maser, Helmut Müller-Enbergs, Günther Wagenlehner, and Hermann Wentker (Sankt Augustin, 1996); Marlies Jansen, "Enquete-Kommission," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit*, eds. Werner Weidenfeld and Karl-Rudolf Korte (Frankfurt am Main, 1996); Marlies Jansen, "Enquete-Kommission," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999*, eds. Werner Weidenfeld and Karl-Rudolf Korte (Frankfurt am Main, 1999); Rita Süßmuth, "Auf dem Weg zur inneren Einheit Deutschlands – der Beitrag des Deutschen Bundestages," in *Eine deutsche Zwischenbilanz: Standpunkte zum Umgang mit unserer Vergangenheit*, eds. Süßmuth and Bernward Baule (Munich, 1997); Hermann Weber, "Rewriting the History of the German Democratic Republic: The Work of the Commission of Inquiry," in *Rewriting the German Past: History and Identity in the New Germany*, eds. Reinhard Alter and Peter Monteath (Atlantic Highlands, 1997); Hartmut Koschyk, "Die Beseitigung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur und die Frage der inneren Einheit," in *Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands: Festschrift zum 20jährigen Bestehen der Gesellschaft für Deutschlandforschung*, eds. Karl Eckart, Jens Hacker, and Siegfried Mampel (Berlin, 1998); Manfred Wilke, "Die deutsche Einheit und die Geschichtspolitik des Bundestages," in *Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands*, eds. Eckart, Hacker, and Mampel; Dirk Hansen, "Zur Arbeit der Enquetekommission des Deutschen Bundestages 'Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozess der deutschen Einheit,'" *Deutsche Studien* 139–40 (1998): 380–402; Dorothee Wilms, "Begründung, Entstehung und Zielsetzung der Enquete-Kommission 1992–1994 im Deutschen Bundestag," in *The GDR and its History*, ed. Barker; Rainer Eppelmann, "Die Enquete-Kommissionen zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur," in *Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung*, eds. Eppelmann, Bernd Faulenbach, and Ulrich Mählert (Paderborn, 2003).
  31. Herbert Wolf, "Sine ira et studio??? Standpunkt zum Abschluß der Arbeit der Enquete-Kommission," in *Ansichten zur Geschichte der DDR IV*, eds. Dietmar Keller, Hans Modrow, and Wolf (Bonn, 1994); Dirk Hansen, "Befreiung durch Erinnerung: Zur Arbeit der Enquete-Kommission 'Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland' des Deutschen Bundestages," *Deutsche Studien* 125 (1995): 71–81; Manfred Wilke, "Der Historiker und die Politik: Alexander Fischer als Sachverständiges Mitglied der Bundestags-Enquete-Kommission 'Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland,'" in *Wandel durch Beständigkeit: Studien zur deutschen und internationalen Politik: Jens Hacker zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. Karl G. Kick, Stephan Weingarz, and Ulrich Bartosch (Berlin, 1998); Faulenbach, "Die Auseinandersetzung mit der doppelten Vergangenheit"; Faulenbach, "Die Arbeit."