

In from the Cold

LATIN AMERICA'S NEW ENCOUNTER

WITH THE COLD WAR



Edited by

Gilbert M. Joseph

and Daniela Spenser

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Duke University Press Durham & London 2008

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞

Designed by Erin Kirk New

Typeset in Minion by Keystone Typesetting, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data appear on the
last printed page of this book.

This book was published with the assistance
of the Frederick W. Hilles Publication Fund of Yale University.

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Preface

The challenge of writing a more multilayered and multivocal history of the Latin American Cold War, one that would synthesize new approaches and interpretations from the field of diplomacy and foreign relations with new work by social and cultural historians of Latin America, is what motivated this volume. When we began planning the project in 2000, the timing could not have been better, for Cold War scholars were now the beneficiaries of an avalanche of new documentation that had become accessible in the United States, the former Soviet bloc, and Latin America itself.

To bring this project to fruition, we realized that a far-flung collaboration was essential. It began between us and our home institutions—the Council on Latin American and Iberian Studies at Yale University and the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS) in Mexico City. As plans began to emerge for an international conference, “México, América Central y el Caribe durante la Guerra Fría,” which would assess new documentary sources and conceptualizations of the Latin American Cold War within a global context, we enlisted the partnership of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars in Washington, through its director, Christian Ostermann, and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations (SRE), through the director of its Acervo Histórico Diplomático, Mercedes de Vega. Our first debts therefore spring from this unique four-way international collaboration encompassing academics and archivists, think tanks and state agencies, which produced a stimulating three-day conference at the Foreign Relations Ministry in November 2002 and ultimately gave rise to a Spanish volume, *Espejos de la guerra fría: México, América Central y el Caribe*, ed. Daniela Spenser (Mexico City: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2004). We gratefully acknowledge the efforts of CIESAS’s former director Rafael Loyola Díaz, and those of Gustav Ranis, former director of Yale’s MacMillan Center for

International and Area Studies, without whose financial and moral support the conference and Spanish volume would have been much more difficult. The 2002 conference received the lion's share of its funding from Yale University, through its Latin American and Iberian Council, then directed by Gil Joseph and assistant chair Beatriz Riefkohl. The dialogue between new sources and interpretations that distinguished the Mexico City conference would not have been possible without the unstinting support of Christian Ostermann of the CWHP. Throughout 2000 and 2001, Christian made available new Eastern European documents and financed research in Mexican archives, all of which generated materials that found their way into several of the papers and enlivened our discussions. In making the conference's local arrangements, Daniela Spenser received invaluable logistical support from Mercedes de Vega and her staff at the Archive of the Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry; moreover, the ministry's former vice minister for Latin America, Gustavo Iruegas, generously joined Mercedes as host of the event. Obviously, we are also tremendously indebted to the broad array of colleagues who shared ideas and insights at the Mexico City conference that enriched this volume—particularly Adolfo Gilly, Friedrich Katz, Lorenzo Meyer, Jürgen Buchenau, Jorge Alonso, Barry Carr, and Kate Doyle.

The present volume includes refocused and expanded versions of several of the papers that appeared in the *Espejos* collection (for which we are grateful to the original publishers), as well as several essays commissioned expressly for this occasion. It seeks to grapple with broader Cold War debates involving the region and the international conflict, in an effort to bring Latin America more meaningfully and centrally into Cold War studies: too often the region has been marginalized from that literature, apart from a preoccupation with a few high-profile events, personalities, and coups. The collection also showcases a healthy sample of newer work on the culture, representation, and memory of the Latin American Cold War; includes a state-of-the-art inventory of new sources of documentation; and speculates about where future research on the Latin American Cold War should go.

Like the 2004 Spanish volume, this collection's strengths remain Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, but several essays give more comparative attention to the Southern Cone and other parts of Latin America, and one focuses on Cold War struggles among Mexican and Chicano workers in post-1945 California. (Readers may be interested in knowing about a companion volume, also based on a Yale conference and forthcoming from Duke University Press's American Encounters/Global Interactions series. Edited by Greg Grandin and Gil Joseph, *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence*

during *Latin America's Long Cold War* focuses extensively on the post-1945 period as part of a broader examination of revolution and counterrevolution throughout the twentieth century. *A Century of Revolution* includes chapters on countries such as Chile, Peru, and El Salvador and Nicaragua, which are not featured in the present volume.)

Some final acknowledgments are in order regarding the preparation of this volume. We are grateful to Frances Bourne and Amanda Levinson for ably translating two of the contributions from Spanish, and to Yale's Latin American Council for helping to cover these and other costs connected with the manuscript. Ruth DeGolia, Christopher Dampier, Christina Li, Evan Joiner, Sydney Frey, Sarah Morrill, and Alejandro Peña García provided timely research and clerical assistance as the manuscript moved toward completion. We also want to acknowledge Duke's two anonymous readers for their particularly detailed and helpful reviews. Last, it gives us great pleasure to thank our editor at Duke, Valerie Millholland, for the encouragement she has bestowed at every phase of this journey. She has been with us in New Haven and Mexico City and provided good counsel and therapy at many moments in between.

Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser

Part I

**NEW APPROACHES, DEBATES,
AND SOURCES**

What We Now Know and Should Know

*Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully
into Cold War Studies*

Few periods in Latin America's history have been as violent, turbulent, and, some would argue, transformative as the half century that ran roughly from the end of World War II to the mid-1990s and constituted the Latin American Cold War. This is because, as in other regions of the global South, Latin America's Cold War experience was rarely cold.¹ Indeed, one has to go back to the nineteenth-century wars of independence to find comparably protracted and far-flung episodes of mass mobilization, revolutionary upheaval, and counter-insurgent reprisal; yet the international linkages, organizational capacities, and technologies of death and surveillance at work in the late twentieth century render this earlier cycle of violence almost quaint by comparison. Gabriel García Márquez graphically evoked this "outsized" and "unbridled reality" in his 1982 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, conjuring up the apocalyptic events of the 1970s and early 1980s that turned Central America and the Southern Cone into late-century killing fields and challenged him to develop a new literary genre—"magical realism"—to assimilate the period's mind-boggling occurrences and "render our lives believable."² Since 1971, when his colleague the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda had received his Nobel Prize, García Márquez reflected, "we have not had a moment's rest":

There have been five wars and seventeen military coups; there emerged a diabolical dictator [Guatemala's Efraín Ríos Montt] who is carrying out in God's name the first Latin American genocide of our time. In the meantime, twenty million Latin American children died before the age of one—more than have been born in Europe since 1970. Those missing because of repression number nearly one hundred and twenty thousand, which is as if no one could account for all the inhabitants of Uppsala. Numerous women arrested while pregnant have given birth in Argentine prisons, yet nobody knows the whereabouts and identity of their children. . . . Because they tried

to change this state of things, nearly two hundred thousand have lost their lives in three small and stubborn countries . . . Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. If this had happened in the United States, the corresponding figure would be that of one million six hundred thousand violent deaths in four years. One million people have fled Chile, a country with a tradition of hospitality—that is, ten percent of its population. Uruguay, a tiny nation of two and a half million inhabitants which considered itself the continent's most civilized country, has lost to exile one out of every five citizens. Since 1979, the civil war in El Salvador has produced almost one refugee every twenty minutes.³

How do we account for such cataclysmic violence? To be sure, the Latin American past is littered with alternating cycles of social reform and intense conservative reaction, in which the influence, aid, and intervention of imperial powers have figured prominently. Even so, the dynamics of the Latin American Cold War are embedded in a particularly ferocious dialectic linking reformist and revolutionary projects for social change and national development and the excessive counterrevolutionary responses they triggered in the years following World War II. This dialectic, which shaped regional life in the late twentieth century and conditioned the region's prospects for the new millennium, played out in overlapping and interdependent domestic and international fields of political and social power.⁴ At a macro level, the Cold War was a struggle between superpowers over shifting geopolitical stakes and “mass utopias,” ideological visions of how society and its benefits should be organized.⁵ But what ultimately gave the Cold War in Latin America its heat—what Greg Grandin terms its “transcendental force”—was the “politicization and internationalization of everyday life.” On a variety of fronts across several decades, Latin American elites and popular classes participated in local and national political contests over land, labor, and the control of markets and natural resources that rarely escaped the powerful undertow of the larger conflict. At certain junctures (most notably the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the strategy of international armed struggle that it supported in the 1960s and 1970s, or the transnationalized anti-Communist crusade of the 1970s and 1980s), these struggles and the leftist and rightist ideologies that fueled them transcended national borders and powerfully influenced the relationship between the superpowers themselves.⁶ The result was an “international civil war” that not only pitted the United States against the Soviet Union and “capitalism” against “Communism” but, at the national and grassroots levels, opposed different views of the shape that social citizenship would take.⁷ As local conflicts throughout Latin America

(some of which had extensive antecedents, issuing as they did from the social contradictions of capitalist development) were subsumed in the intensely polarizing global struggle, opposition movements, like the governments they opposed, received inspiration and material support from afar. Not infrequently, Latin American states used a Cold War rationale, generated outside the region, to wage war against their citizens, to gain or perpetuate power, and to create or justify authoritarian military regimes. In the process, the stakes rose precipitously, and the potential for violence and terror escalated to an almost inconceivable scale. A scene from CNN's documentary series on the Cold War starkly and eerily illustrates this point. "I saw these weird weapons," a Cuban campesino reminisces, referring to the ballistic missiles that rolled by his modest shack one morning in the fall of 1962. "I said to my friend Pablo, 'Pablo, how powerful are these weird weapons?' and he answered 'these are nuclear missiles.' So I thought, 'oh, really powerful.' And they just put them here [he points to his field], right out in the open."⁸

Happily, the missiles were never launched, and ultimately, thirty years later, the Cold War wound down in its final, most brutal theaters, with the negotiation of the Central American Peace Accords terminating civil wars in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador in the early to mid-1990s. But can we really say that the Latin American Cold War has "ended"? Certainly, it endures in the tortured context of U.S.-Cuban relations and is intensely alive in Miami's "Little Havana," where an increasingly frail Fidel Castro has haunted diasporic Cubans for nearly fifty years. Although the comparable graying of the exile community has slightly diminished its zeal and transformed the monolithic stridency that once defined it, there is little question that it remains a force in state and national politics, and in the United States' unswerving opposition to normalizing relations with the hemisphere's last (albeit considerably tempered) Communist regime.⁹ Certainly the Cold War is still palpable in Central America, the Southern Cone, the Andean nations, and even Mexico, as relatives of the victims of terror continue to protest past atrocities, exhume graves, and actively press legal claims against the perpetrators. Although the results of these legal actions are, at best, mixed, with most individuals from the former security forces continuing to enjoy immunity, some signal gains have been registered, and in the process, the cultural fabric of these societies and the manner in which the past is collectively remembered have been substantially changed.¹⁰

Finally, apart from the bubbling up of local episodes of extrajudicial violence that frequently map onto the fault lines and frustrations of recent Cold War pasts (e.g., lynchings that continue to plague countries like Guatemala and

Nicaragua), there is a larger question that should be raised about the Cold War's conclusion, or at least regarding continuities of power: is the United States essentially waging a new version of the conflict under another name? Over a century ago, in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt told the U.S. Congress that "chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation," namely, "however reluctantly," the United States. Indeed, one might argue that over the past century, the United States has repeatedly intervened to protect its southern neighbors from foreign and evil empires and ensure that the "ties of civilized society"—as Washington defined them—remained firm. With talk of "benevolent hegemony" (and even of a "benevolent U.S. empire") once again explicitly on the agenda,¹¹ and with the Bush administration having already demonstrated its preemptive resolve to contend globally to guarantee not only U.S. interests but its prescriptions for global civilization as well—" (constrained) free elections, (selective) free markets and (U.S.-dominated) international security"¹²—are we not embarked on another dichotomizing rendition of cold war? In this incarnation, "democracy promotion" ("dempro" to practitioners and Bush administration insiders) has become something of a cottage industry,¹³ and there is a new "axis of evil," comprising drug lords, terrorists, failed states, and rogue regimes and movements. The members of this network (which include some holdovers from the last conflict, such as Castro and the Sandinistas) can be constructed as broadly or narrowly as circumstances dictate—just as Communism was.

Indeed, at certain moments, as when Vladimir Putin's Russia approved a deal to send fighter planes to Hugo Chávez's Venezuela in July 2006, one experiences an eerie sense of *déjà vu*—which raises a host of questions. Are Russia and the United States once again moving into potentially ominous opposing alliances? Ultimately, how different is Putin's brand of authoritarian *realpolitik* from that of his Soviet predecessors?¹⁴ And what of continuities in U.S. attitudes and practice? This would not be surprising, given that Latin America—particularly Central America in the 1980s—seems to have played a defining role in the genesis of the foreign policy of the current generation of New Right activists, and that several key Latin Americanists in the Bush administration previously advised Presidents Reagan and Bush (the father) on Nicaragua and El Salvador a generation ago. Ultimately, is Chávez's "Bolivarianism" a more affluent and hemispherically influential version of the "Tercerismo" ("Third Way" strategy) of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas of the 1980s, who were similarly led to purchase weapons from Russia following an earlier campaign by the U.S. government to pre-

vent American and Western defense contractors from selling arms to them?¹⁵ To what extent have the end of the Cold War and the lifting of the onus of Communism allowed social justice issues to rise to the top of inter-American relations where nations such as Venezuela or Evo Morales's Bolivia are concerned?

This volume, which represents a collaboration among eleven North American, Latin American, and European historians, anthropologists, and political scientists, all students of the Latin American Cold War, does not pretend to present a "new history" of that struggle. Such claims are made too frequently these days, almost as frequently as new caches of documents are discovered, reclaimed, or declassified in Washington, the former Eastern bloc, or elsewhere, and "the truth can now be known." Rather, what this volume aspires to contribute is an intellectual "rapprochement" with the Cold War in Latin America. This reen-counter with the conflict identifies new sources of documentation (see particularly the essay by Blanton) and suggests how they might alter prevailing paradigms of interpretation, particularly where questions of international real-politik, the ideology of Cold War states, and the "Latin Americanization" and "transnationalization" of the conflict are concerned. For example, the essays in part II shed important new light on the projection of Soviet, Cuban, and Argentine power and the ideologies that underwrote the strategies of each of these nations. In part III, the essays by Fein, Zolov, and Bachelor further our understanding of the motivation and capacity of the Mexican state to skillfully balance between the superpower contenders.¹⁶ At the same time, the collection also seeks to delve more deeply into what was actually being fought over in the Latin American Cold War among grassroots populations (including Chicanos in the U.S. Southwest). In the process, especially in part III, contributors focus on everyday contests over culture and representation that brought Cold War states, elite establishments, and culture industries into play with local populations.

Readers will note this collection features a strong emphasis on Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; there is less coverage of South America, and certain high-profile Cold War arenas—for example, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, Bolivia—do not receive explicit treatment. Probably no single volume can adequately cover the gamut of multiform engagements that constituted the Latin American Cold War; we have sought to feature instructive and absorbing cases representing mainland and circum-Caribbean areas, and to include Brazil as well as Spanish America. Perhaps the two major South American nations, Brazil and Argentina, are treated in essays by Langland and Armony that have conceptual and substantive reach across national borders. The vol-

ume's overarching essays, by Joseph, Blanton, and Spenser, treat the region as a whole and also suggest arguments and methods that apply to nations that do not receive monographic attention. Finally, the strong emphasis on Mexico is meant to address important lacunas in the literature on the Latin American Cold War. The Mexican case not only points up oft-ignored, highly ambivalent relationships between Cold War allies but also showcases pivotal cultural and social issues, thereby moving the narrative away from its prevailing emphasis on diplomatic confrontation and military intervention. That Mexico's experience has thus far received so little treatment in Cold War studies is astonishing: not only is Mexico (with Brazil) one of Latin America's two "middle powers," but it is the southern neighbor of the hemisphere's Cold War hegemon.

One of the abiding goals of this project is to foment a more sustained dialogue between foreign relations (or diplomatic) historians of the Cold War—particularly those who work on Latin America—who have largely been preoccupied with grand strategy and the determinants of U.S. policy, and those who approach the conflict from the standpoint of the periphery, often "from below," using the tools of area studies, social and cultural history, and cultural studies. Sadly, although foreign relations historians and Latin Americanists should share fraternal relations, they have more often been, in the words of one diplomatic historian, "polyglot distant cousin[s]." ¹⁷ Most of this volume's contributors have worked across the methodological, interpretive, and linguistic divides that have until now separated these fields, and their essays portend a more vital cross-fertilization of them.

*The Cold War and Latin America: Perspectives from
Foreign Relations History*

No field of foreign relations history is as well studied as the Cold War. ¹⁸ Initially, attention focused on the conflict's early phases (i.e., from the mid-1940s through the 1960s), but in recent years, foreign relations historians have ranged beyond staples such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War (which have constituted veritable cottage industries in the U.S. diplomatic field) to concentrate on the later phases of the conflict. In the process, they are more systematically engaging the Cold War in its peripheries in the global South. ¹⁹ The current boom in Cold War studies is not really surprising. The end of the conflict paved the way for greater access to the records of the former Soviet Union, its satellites in Eastern Europe, and those of the People's Republic of China. Increasingly, key documents from the era have also become more accessible in the United States,

Mexico, the Southern Cone, Central America, and, to a lesser extent, Cuba.²⁰ Moreover, the sudden implosion of the Soviet Union and the resounding cries of victory by the West triggered a wave of euphoria among some U.S. diplomatic and political historians that immediately prompted them—and others who resisted such triumphalism—to reassess the origins, the variegated trajectory, and denouement of the conflict. It also brought a number of Western and Eastern European scholars, and increasingly Asian historians, into the debate.²¹

And based on production in the field's journal of record, *Diplomatic History*, the appearance since 1999 of several new specialist journals, and the continuing vitality of the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the National Security Archive of George Washington University, interest in the global conflict shows no sign of abating.²² Scholars continue to debate—often quite heatedly—the causes, strategies, ideologies, flash points, turning points, and legacies of the global conflict, in addition to contending in their assessments of the Cold War's endgame.

For their part, diplomatic historians of Latin America have scrutinized the strategic stakes of the United States and the Soviet Union in Cuba, Central America, and the Caribbean; debated the psychology and personal style of Fidel Castro; sought to gauge the ebb, flow, and relative autonomy of his relationship with the Soviets, and the consequences for Cuban and Soviet intervention abroad; and examined U.S. policies to contain that intervention. But, in the words of Mark Gilderhus, the senior foreign relations scholar charged with taking stock of this field, the Latin Americanist literature, despite some impressive pieces of work, remains “fragmented,” “dominated by the monograph, narrowly focused, and largely dependent upon the records of the United States.”²³ Greg Grandin, a historian of Guatemalan social movements who recently produced a major study of the Guatemalan Cold War that attempts a provocative new synthesis of the broader Latin American conflict, independently supports Gilderhus's 1995 assessment, chiding diplomatic historians for their myopic concerns:

Poets may see the world in a grain of sand . . . but only diplomatic historians could reduce the Latin American Cold War to a Cuban beach. The Cold War radically transformed Latin America, yet historians of U.S. policy toward the region inevitably focus on the period's most rousing events. These episodes more often than not have to do with Cuba—the 1959 Revolution, the Bay of Pigs, the Missile Crisis, and plots to murder Fidel Castro. Yet just as Fidel eventually made it off the beach and into the mountains, the time has come for U.S. historians to assess the Latin American Cold

War from [another] vantage point, one less preoccupied with what motivated United States policymakers and more concerned with identifying what was being fought over in Latin America itself.²⁴

No doubt these critiques account in part for the fact that the region has rarely been incorporated into the great historiographic debates about the character of the Cold War and remains disproportionately underrepresented in journals specializing in the conflict.²⁵

But this is not the only reason. For many years (indeed, through the mid-1990s at least) Cold War debates centered excessively on the *origins* of the conflict—effectively on *who was to blame*—and, of course, the U.S.–Soviet rivalry began in terms of the postwar settlement in Europe. The Cold War then spread, first to East and Southeast Asia, then to Latin America and roughly simultaneously to the Middle East, and finally to Africa. While foreign relations scholars disagree vehemently on which side was the *fuerza motriz* of the Cold War, they may be said to have reached a baseline consensus on the conflict's broader contours. It is useful to establish this broader understanding at the outset, since the second half of this essay (and, more implicitly, the volume as a whole) engages it from a rather different perspective, that of newer approaches to Latin American political, social, and cultural history.

Diplomatic historians concur that the Cold War was a complex phenomenon that turned on the rivalry of two powerful states, each a “rookie superpower,” each possessing a universalizing ideology and a distinct system of political economy. The rivalry between them led to the division of Germany and Europe, an intense, often violent competition in the southern peripheries, and a strategic arms race. Although the belligerents were careful not to engage in direct hostilities with each other, they consistently eschewed serious negotiation of their disputes—in effect seeking a diplomacy based on their own terms. The conflict took place in the wake of World War II, when an unsettled international system conjured up unprecedented threats and opportunities for the leaders of many nations, but especially for those of the United States and the Soviet Union. As Melvyn Leffler has put it: “Interpreting those threats and opportunities through ideological lenses, cultural traditions, and cognitive habits of mind, American and Russian officials had the incentive and the power to pursue their strategic and economic goals in ways that accorded with their understanding of national interest and their ideological predilections. Their actions triggered reactions in a spiraling model of distrust and recrimination. Meanwhile, other governments (and parties and groups within those nations) sought to exploit the rivalry to enhance their own interests.”²⁶

Finally, the consensus holds, one of the belligerents, the United States, was far more powerful and wealthy throughout and enjoyed a political-economic system that was vastly more productive, flexible, and technologically responsive. "The wonder," Leffler observes, is that the other side imploded without precipitating a major conflict."²⁷

Intellectual historians of foreign relations have contributed important insights into the intensely ideological character of this "abnormal" war. This was no ordinary state conflict, and geopolitical analysis does not suffice to explain the cruel and brutal form it took, especially in the global South. Indeed, geopolitics may enrich our understanding of the military-political domain of the global conflict, but it has little to say about the ideological-cultural realm. The irony of the Cold War was that it represented, in the words of Anders Stephanson, "an extreme polarity organized around total annihilation of the opponent in a period of ostensible peace."²⁸ Before 1963, annihilation *literally* seemed a distinct possibility. Thereafter, neither side appeared to require or seriously risked the actual destruction of the other. In theory, each could have gone on indefinitely without having to change its system as a result of the other's existence (the "long peace," as John Lewis Gaddis terms it),²⁹ since open conflict was deterred by the nuclear reality of "mutually assured destruction" and effectively displaced and managed on the so-called Third World periphery. Yet in another sense, the Cold War remained systemic and total. It was waged in fiercely doctrinal terms as an "invasion" or delegitimization of the other's social order, replete with a demonology of the other and a mythology of one's own eternal virtues. No doubt, argues Stephanson, the rigid *territorialization* of systems, beginning in 1947 in Europe, only intensified the mutually exclusive ideological aspect of the war, propelling it into its most primitive forms. This intensification of ideology assisted in securing, in different ways and contexts, each side's socio-economic systems in the two halves of Europe and in spheres of influence such as Latin America.³⁰ Yet in whatever context, the domestic social order could never be taken for granted: repression of internal dissent was axiomatic; redbaiting and worse in the United States and Mexico; wholesale purges in the Soviet Union; ethnocide in the western highlands and northern jungles of Guatemala. The Cold War therefore cannot be reduced in its origins or development to notions of geopolitics and strategy.

Unfortunately, for too long the great debates in Cold War literature were often reductionist and disproportionately preoccupied with geopolitics and grand strategy. Such "realist" staples fueled paradigms of explanation that have contended over the last fifty years with other master narratives emphasizing the

logic of U.S. economic domination.³¹ Since many area studies scholars may not be familiar with these venerable paradigms, they are worth glossing here. First there was the “orthodoxy” of the 1950s and early 1960s, driven by officials of the U.S. government, which saw a paranoid style of Stalinist expansionism as forcing the pace of world events.³² This gave way in the 1960s and 1970s to a New Left “revisionism,” which proved most compelling during the Vietnam War. This paradigm viewed inexorable U.S. economic drives, interwoven with a muscular liberal capitalist ideology, as mostly responsible for the character of the global struggle between East and West.

New Left revisionism, in turn, was displaced by a self-proclaimed school of “postrevisionism,” which held sway from the late 1970s through the middle 1990s.³³ This current of interpretation, galvanized by a series of seminal writings by John Gaddis, trumpeted a new synthesis in Cold War studies.³⁴ While recognizing the structural patterns of the world economy, it stressed the dynamics of the postwar international system, which, in combination with the exigencies of U.S. domestic politics, best accounted for the behavior of Washington and Moscow. Unlike the “revisionists”—who argued that “American policy merely fitted the Soviet problem into a much larger context,” that of sustaining and reforming world capitalism, whose “specific needs” shaped the United States’ “global role”³⁵—Gaddis contended that American officials were not seeking economic hegemony. Rather, constrained by partisan and bureaucratic politics at home and obsessed with attending to global power balances, they sought to contain the imperial drives of the Communist bloc. In the process, Gaddis acknowledged (and here he was influenced by European scholars) that the United States established its own empire. Yet unlike its Soviet counterpart, it was an empire of liberty and diversity, an “empire of invitation,”³⁶ called into existence by America’s allies in Western Europe and elsewhere who embraced the promise of liberal democracy.

In his earlier writings of the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddis was not overly preoccupied with apportioning blame. He judged the Soviet Union to be primarily responsible for the Cold War, arguing that “Stalin’s paranoia, together with the bureaucracy of institutionalized suspicion with which he surrounded himself,” made agreement futile—but Gaddis devoted relatively little attention to the matter of blame.³⁷ It is therefore striking that in his more recent, post–Cold War statements, especially his highly influential book *We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War* (1997),³⁸ he essentially jettisons postrevisionism and harks back to the orthodoxy of America’s early cold warriors. Gaddis finds in the plethora of new documents from Russian, East European, and Chinese archives clear-cut sub-

stantiation that the Soviets not only started the Cold War but determined its trajectory.³⁹ For Gaddis, “the ‘new history’ is bringing us back to an old answer,”⁴⁰ namely, that the Cold War was determined by the authoritarian cast of Soviet government and the revolutionary romanticism of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which inspired both the Kremlin’s leaders and their international clients from Mao to Castro.⁴¹ For Gaddis, the *central* significance of the Cold War now becomes the abiding role of the United States (and its allies) in resisting and defeating this ferocious brand of authoritarianism. Indeed, in his presidential address to the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1993, he called on his colleagues to join him “at the center of that debate.”⁴²

Other diplomatic historians, certainly the revisionists but also a number of Gaddis’s former postrevisionist colleagues, have read the new sources somewhat differently. Melvyn Leffler referred to *We Now Know* as “in many ways . . . the scholarly diplomatic counterpart of Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History*” and warned that “master narratives will soon be outdated if they are too influenced by contemporary fashions [that is, triumphalism].” He added that what struck him about the new documentation and resulting scholarship was “the extent to which [it] leaves itself open to diverse conclusions.”⁴³ In his view, a close reading of the new materials “suggests more nuanced conclusions”:

The Cold War was not a simple case of Soviet expansionism and American reaction. Realpolitik held sway in the Kremlin. Ideology played an important role in shaping their perceptions, but Soviet leaders were not focused on promoting worldwide revolution. They were concerned mostly with configurations of power, with protecting their country’s immediate periphery, ensuring its security, and preserving their rule. Governing a land devastated by two world wars, they feared a resurgence of German and Japanese strength. They felt threatened by a United States that alone among the combatants emerged from the war wealthier and armed with the atomic bomb. Soviet officials did not have preconceived plans to make Eastern Europe communist, to support the Chinese communists, or to wage war in Korea. Soviet clients [e.g., Ulbricht and Honecker’s East Germany, Mao’s China, Castro’s Cuba], moreover, could and did act in pursuit of their own interests, sometimes goading the Kremlin into involvements it did not want.⁴⁴

Thus, like Gaddis, Leffler believes the newly accessible documents afford much greater insight into how foreign policy was made in the Communist world. Unlike Gaddis, however, Leffler’s reading of the new materials suggests that Soviet actions were less reflexive, and more contingent, than previously imagined. (For a particularly apposite example of this, see Spenser’s essay in this

volume on the 1962 Caribbean crisis and its consequences for the projection of Soviet power.) Still, according to Leffler, likely nothing the United States might have done would have eased Soviet suspicions, at least in the early years of the Cold War. In actuality, American policies only exacerbated the anxieties of the Warsaw bloc, thereby fueling the arms race and the extension of the conflict into the Third World. "Rather than congratulate themselves on the Cold War's outcome," Leffler concludes, "Americans must confront the negative as well as the positive consequences of U.S. actions and inquire much more searchingly into the implications of their nation's foreign policies."⁴⁵

The current moment of documentary revelation is clearly fraught with pitfalls as well as promise. Are the sources dribbling out in such piecemeal fashion that they produce incomplete impressions that must constantly be revised? Will they be read in Rorschach fashion, as historians seek in them the confirmation of existing views? For a number of Eastern European and U.S. scholars, the new documentation from the Communist world seems only to further their preoccupation with Soviet culpability and bipolar confrontation, while minimizing the relevance of North-South contexts. Will the new evidence merely provide new ammunition to refight old battles? Michael Hogan, who recently concluded an innovative tenure as editor of *Diplomatic History*, worries that the new evidence from Communist archives will become a "strait jacket" for historians of foreign relations, "locking them into well-established categories of analysis when they might be exploring new directions and asking new questions."⁴⁶ In his essay in this volume, Seth Fein echoes this view, warning against "fetishizing the declassification of new documents," whose production and consumption are overdetermined by the prevailing Cold War master narratives.⁴⁷

Hogan's and Fein's concerns about the hegemony of established categories are borne out when we examine more closely the scholarship by U.S. diplomatic historians on the Cold War in Latin America.⁴⁸ Although this regional body of work has rarely informed the Great Debate, it has certainly been inspired by its contending paradigms. Not surprisingly, radical revisionist narratives have dominated writing on Latin America. Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the New Left history of William Appleman Williams and his students was complemented and updated by neo-Marxian dependency theory and world systems analysis, both of which were heavily indebted to Latin American and African thinkers. The fit seemed appropriate. Latin America had suffered colonial and neocolonial structural inequality since the early modern era: After centuries of Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule and a briefer period of British hegemony, the United States practiced new forms of imperial domination as the world's pre-

eminent capitalist power. Moreover, during the Cold War, Latin America represented something of an “Achilles’ heel in the hard armor of U.S. virtue”: even the most triumphal Cold War scholars were hard pressed to explain away U.S. actions that brought about the toppling of popularly elected regimes and contributed to the murder and torture of hundreds of thousands of people.⁴⁹ It is hardly surprising, therefore, that, aided by the increased declassification of U.S. security documents, there has been a steady stream of monographs critiquing U.S. involvement in Latin America from the late 1940s to the 1990s—even as some synthesizers of the larger conflict have declared an unshakable faith in American righteousness and exceptionalism. New Left scholarship and dependency theory came together most forcefully in Walter LaFeber’s *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. Appearing in 1984, as Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador had become the Cold War’s final killing fields, the volume highlighted the contradiction created by a U.S. development model that generated chronic poverty and insurgency and a regional diplomacy that enforced political stability at tremendous human cost.⁵⁰

More recently, in a mammoth, meticulously documented, and powerfully written critique of U.S. policy toward Central America from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (particularly support for Nicaragua’s anti-Sandinista Contras and El Salvador’s military-backed governments), William LeoGrande argues that where the isthmus was concerned, both the Carter and the Reagan administrations participated in the completion of the debate on Vietnam. Drawing on a trove of documents declassified in the wake of the investigation by the U.S. Congress into the Iran-Contra scandal, LeoGrande shows how conservatives attempted to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam and liberals desperately sought to avoid repeating its mistakes. Unfortunately absent from the tome’s almost eight hundred pages of policy analysis is a nuanced understanding of the internal (much less grassroots) dynamics of contention that intersected with U.S. and Soviet-Cuban involvement.⁵¹

This is not to say that the ascendancy of a “triumphal realism” has not registered an impact on the foreign relations literature on the Latin American Cold War. A number of admirably researched histories of Cold War interventions have obsessively debated the “motivations” of U.S. policymakers in a seeming attempt to distinguish the well-meaning intent of government actors from the more horrific consequences of U.S. actions.⁵² While not inattentive to economic interests, historical-structural inequalities, and long-running traditions of imperial hubris and racism, these scholars have often ultimately chosen to focus on the political culture, climate of heightened fear, and international

exigencies of the Cold War to explain away a series of “tragic U.S. mistakes.” Thus, after substantial critique, Stephen Rabe concludes his recent study of JFK and Communist revolution in Latin America in the following manner: “Kennedy brought high ideals and noble purposes to his Latin American policy. Ironically, however, his unwavering determination to wage Cold War . . . led him and his administration ultimately to compromise and even mutilate those grand goals for the Western Hemisphere.”⁵³ Similarly, Robert Pastor and others have ascribed democratic motives to Eisenhower amid the human tragedy wrought by the CIA-orchestrated 1954 coup in Guatemala.⁵⁴ Interestingly, the cognitive dissonance between the liberal democratic values that America claims to defend and the terrible consequences of its policies in the Third World even bedeviled the doyen of New Left revisionism, William Appleman Williams. Throughout his writings, Williams “always seemed to feel that the United States could, if only it just would, abandon its imperialist career and go into a more modest business.”⁵⁵

It is, of course, less surprising that John Gaddis takes this tack in *We Now Know*, in his own brief discussion of the U.S.-engineered overthrow of the reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz. Deeming U.S. policy a mistake, “a massive overreaction” at a moment fraught with anti-Communist hysteria, he then goes a step further, writing the episode off as a response to “a minor irritant,” one that “did little to alter the course of events inside Guatemala,” where Arbenz’s “Quixotic” regime “had made so many enemies . . . that it probably would not have lasted in any event.”⁵⁶

Reassessing the Latin American Cold War from Within

Gaddis’s bullet verdict on Guatemala, invoking as it does the correlation of domestic forces underwriting the 1954 Guatemalan coup, provides the entry point for the second half of this essay. I want to take discussion of the Latin American Cold War in a different direction, beyond—or better *beneath*—the great diplomatic debates that have particularly stunted the region’s Cold War historiography. Marc Bloch wrote in *The Historian’s Craft* that “to be excited by the same dispute, even on opposing sides, is still to be alike. This common stamp . . . is what makes a generation.”⁵⁷ A veritable obsession with first causes, with blame, and with the motives and roles of U.S. policymakers has served to join New Left historians and realists at the hip and until only recently preempted other intellectual agendas for examining the Latin American Cold War. In this sense, this volume represents an attempt to bring its study “in from the cold,”

that is, to transcend frayed, dichotomizing paradigms of interpretation that themselves appear to be artifacts of the conflict. My fellow contributors and I would be the last to argue that the state and its agents do not play a preponderant role in the history of the Latin American Cold War.⁵⁸ But the manner in which foreign relations historians have assessed the conflict in terms of national interest, state policy, and the broad imperatives of the international economy has often *marginalized human subjects*, particularly women and members of the poorer and middle sectors (e.g., peasants, workers, intellectuals, students, and religious workers of different ideological stripes, indigenous and ethnic groups), ignoring a serious examination of their social and cultural identities and political agency. At times, it has seemed as if the region's Cold War historiography served only to illustrate Thucydides' classic (eminently *realist*) maxim: "Large nations do what they wish, while small nations accept what they must."⁵⁹

The prevailing diplomatic literature on the Latin American Cold War has also largely neglected other political-cultural realms—we might call them transnational "contact zones"—in which the state's power is deployed (and contested) through a series of representations, symbolic systems, and new technologies involving agents that transcend the state: business and communication networks, culture industries, educational institutions, and philanthropic foundations, to name but a few. Several of this volume's contributors focus on these sites of transnational encounter—for example, the electronic and print media (Fein and Langland); forms of popular culture, leisure, and consumption (Fein, Bachelor, Pitti, Langland, and McAllister); riots and public demonstrations (Zolov and Pitti); revolutionary and counterinsurgent aid missions (Gleijeses and Armony)—which throw subtle, foreign-local dimensions of Cold War power relationships, as well as critical interstate collaborations, into sharp relief. Several of these essays mark out a broader understanding of political history as "integrative" history that blends material and cultural levels of analysis.⁶⁰ They acknowledge that Cold War history should be properly fixed on the exercise of power, but appreciate that power does not flow only from the policies and interventions of states; it also works through language and symbolic systems and manifests itself in identities and everyday practices.⁶¹

I hasten to emphasize that while the scholarship gathered in this book represents a relatively new approach to the Cold War in Latin America, it draws from and builds on some exciting new developments in the larger field of foreign relations history. For many years, the gatekeepers of the diplomatic field practiced a strategy of *containment* on those who would introduce newer forms of social and cultural history, purporting to welcome arguments based on these

new approaches but then “demonstrating why older conceptual frameworks remain more persuasive.” Happily, over the course of the past decade or so, an increasing number of foreign relations historians have moved away from a narrow preoccupation with institutional political and economic history and built a compelling justification for the usefulness of cultural, gendered, ethno-racial, visual, and deconstructionist approaches to the study of empire and the Cold War.⁶² This corpus of work has sought to establish a concern with culture and ideology at the center of the inquiry and, to varying degrees, to connect the realm of elite policymaking with that of everyday experience.⁶³ It has breathed new life into Cold War studies and extended the horizons of foreign relations history, a field that even many of its practitioners had begun to refer to as a hidebound, increasingly irrelevant discipline. Some of the present volume’s contributors have previously played a role in this boundary shift,⁶⁴ and the essays in the second part of the collection contribute to it.

While this burgeoning new literature is admirably heterogeneous in its interdisciplinarity, it owes its greatest debts to the latest currents in American studies and cultural studies, particularly critical studies of gender and postcoloniality. Much of this new work in foreign relations history focuses on the representational machines of American empire—particularly the technologies and discourses that conveyed empire to audiences back home.⁶⁵ While the present volume has much to say about imperial enterprises of representation (and the Pitti essay focuses explicitly on the domestic reception of Cold War events and symbols), it is more concerned with representation as an integral dimension of Cold War encounters at the Latin American grassroots. Thus particular attention is given to a materially grounded, processual analysis of U.S. and other foreign interaction with local polities, societies, and cultures.⁶⁶ The manner in which Cold War encounters reciprocally shaped imperial cultures at home, although implicit or secondary in some of the essays, is not a central concern here.

In shifting the conceptual focus of the Latin American Cold War to the international struggle’s “periphery”—especially its grassroots—and to the intersection of culture and power, we hope to constructively engage with mainstream diplomatic historians of the regional conflict. If only to accomplish their core objectives of identifying the relevant interests and actors involved, and explaining the determinants and consequences of policy, these scholars should take note of newer work on the region’s social and cultural history that has been produced over the past decade or so. Interestingly, one of John Gaddis’s central arguments in *We Now Know* is that New Left historians have refused to come to terms with

the “strong base of popular support, confirmed repeatedly,” that supported the American presence in Western Europe and Asia and kept friendly governments in power. The same criticism might also be leveled at those who underestimate the level of support for anti-Communist authoritarianism in Latin America—among middle sectors, workers, campesinos, Christians, men and women—and adduce terror to be the only compelling reason for the existence of late-twentieth-century counterinsurgent regimes in Central America and the Southern Cone. Any adequate history of the global Cold War, Gaddis concludes and we would concur, must therefore also be a social and cultural history, one that takes seriously the actions, identities, and beliefs of ordinary people, as well as of elites.⁶⁷

Such a social and cultural history of the Latin American Cold War would contribute to the oft-declared yet never achieved synthesis sought by several leading foreign relations scholars. It would scrutinize the abstract claims of relevant but insufficient paradigms like dependency and world systems theory with on-the-ground studies of hard-fought battles involving state and society over economic exploitation, national inclusion, and the meaning of citizenship. At the same time, it would force us to come to a more rigorous understanding of just what we mean by the term “Cold War.” For historians and social scientists of Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century, the term has been used as a kind of “shorthand to describe either direct U.S. or Cuban [or Soviet] intervention in Latin American politics, or the collateral damage from super-power conflict.”⁶⁸ What has been lacking is a framework for understanding the *grassroots* dynamics and meanings of the Latin American Cold War, one that would enable us to better integrate the conflict’s domestic and foreign dimensions. This is obviously a far-flung assignment given the diversity of the region and the duration of the Cold War. Even in suggesting the potential of such an approach, I can only paint in broad strokes here.

Recent work by a variety of social and labor historians has examined the region’s brief but tumultuous “democratic spring” in the years immediately following World War II. The war had spurred the economic growth and facilitated the political mobilization of Latin American societies. Although only indirectly associated with the Allied effort, large numbers of people, especially among the lower and middle classes, were affected by the democratic discourse and ideological fervor that inspired the struggle against fascism. Nationalist wartime propaganda, crafted in collaboration with Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, promoted democratic values and freedoms, often invoking strong, popular liberal traditions in Latin American

politics and culture that went back to the independence struggles of the early nineteenth century.⁶⁹ Miners, factory workers, and some campesinos organized, joined unions (or bid for greater union independence in nations, like Mexico, where the labor movement was closely controlled by the state), mounted strikes of unprecedented militancy, supported new democratic parties, and injected strength into existing Communist, socialist, and radical movements. In some places (e.g., Mexico, El Salvador, Chile), such Old Left formations had galvanized local rebellions and popular struggles in the 1920s and 1930s, which had been targeted by repressive, typically oligarchical states during virulent Red Scares that some scholars now refer as the “first Cold War.”⁷⁰ Now, in the aftermath of World War II, validated by antifascist patriotism and frequently neglected by Moscow, many of the region’s Communist parties sought to consolidate their wartime strategy of allying with other “progressive” sectors of society in nationalist, popular movements to break the power of the so-called feudal landed class.

In a real sense, then, Latin America had much in common with Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, India, China, Southeast Asia, and Japan, where the years linking the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War constituted an effervescent and critical conjuncture. The pioneers in the study of this period for Latin America, Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, assembled a team of scholars to flesh out these themes across the continent.⁷¹ Despite local variation, in case after case, they found “a forward march by democracy, the Left, and labor,” but also “a shift in the nature of political discourse and ideology.” Democracy took on a pronounced *social* flavor, coming to mean “a commitment to popular, more particularly working-class participation in politics, and social and economic improvements for the poorer sections of the population.”⁷² In both Communist and non-Communist sectors of the Left, democracy increasingly became identified with development and state welfarism, typically structured around nationalist strategies of import substitution industrialization (ISI).

According to the new scholarship, the postwar democratic spring and its undoing fell out in two phases. Its all-too-brief consolidation took place anywhere from 1944 through 1946, depending on the country. Throughout the hemisphere, dictatorships fell, popular forces were mobilized, and elections with a relatively high level of participation were held. For the first time, an array of reformist populist parties (some with roots going back to the 1920s) articulated the political, social, and economic demands of the urban middle class and the working class (though less frequently those of the peasantry).

We should not minimize the diversity and contentiousness that characterized these popular movements and coalitions—in Peru, for example, the APRA and the Communist Party occasionally attacked each other more fiercely than they did the oligarchs.⁷³ Peronism in Argentina embodied a constant tension between impulses of reform and reaction, with its leadership, once in power, striving mightily “to contain the heretical challenge it had unleashed.”⁷⁴ But, as a host of recent local and sectoral studies of populist and popular front arrangements demonstrate, this did not preclude these reform movements and coalitions from tapping into and raising popular expectations of state-administered economic justice and national inclusion.⁷⁵

At first the United States lent encouragement to this democratic effervescence, which prompted regional economic and military elites temporarily to acquiesce to popular demands for democratization of their societies. These were the years when Fidel Castro quoted Tom Paine and Thomas Jefferson rather than Lenin (just as Ho Chi Minh cited passages from the Declaration of Independence).⁷⁶ The well-reported anecdote that, as a twelve-year-old, Fidel sent FDR a letter congratulating him on his victory earlier in the decade (and also asking him for a ten-dollar bill!) similarly accentuates the importance the New Deal state had as a model for would-be Latin American reformers.⁷⁷

The denouement of this postwar democratic spring played out in most cases during 1946 and 1947 and was completed almost everywhere by 1948—with the notable exception of Guatemala, where spring endured for ten years, until the 1954 coup. Most everywhere else, organized labor was reined in by the state and militants were purged; Communist parties were outlawed and suffered severe repression; populist reform parties lost their dynamism or moved to the right; and the democratic advance was largely contained, if not reversed. The window of democratic opportunity for political and social change, which had cracked open at the end of the war, had essentially been slammed shut by 1948 as the Cold War gathered force.⁷⁸

In a careful analysis that seeks to integrate domestic and international variables, Bethell, Roxborough, and their collaborators persuasively argue that “the attack on labor and the left, especially the Communist left, was . . . *overdetermined*.”⁷⁹ They remind us not to minimize the strength of Latin America’s authoritarian tradition, which—like its multistranded popular liberal tradition so much in evidence during the democratic spring—also had deep historical roots and was now harnessed to support the power of the threatened dominant classes, not least the landed class. The emerging Cold War reinforced a domestic anti-Communism that went back decades and was ingrained in the military,

the Catholic hierarchy, and segments of the middle class—*independent* of U.S. prompting.⁸⁰ While the United States essentially neglected Latin America, its gaze fixed on Europe during the first years of the Cold War, it would still be a “mistake to underestimate its importance.”⁸¹ World War II had cemented a century-long process of U.S. ascendance in the hemisphere. U.S. intelligence realistically discounted the Soviet threat to the region in the mid-1940s, and little U.S. military or economic aid came into Latin America in the late 1940s. Nevertheless, operating through its embassy officials, the FBI, the American Federation of Labor, and, after 1947, the newly created CIA, the United States carefully monitored the region’s *internal* front, applying a range of economic and political pressures on governments and unions. The popular democratic movements that Washington had validated in the middle of the decade were discouraged by 1947. “Latin America is in the throes of a social revolution,” observed a worried State Department official, and Washington would take increasingly graduated measures to contain and then reverse it.⁸²

To conclude their analysis of how both national and international agendas came together to seal the fate of social democracy in the late 1940s, Bethell and Roxborough examine the *perception* that regional elites had of the new international economic order, and its consequences for Latin American political economy. The United States had quickly made it clear that there would be no Marshall Plan for its “good neighbors”: compared with the \$19 billion in foreign aid sent to Western Europe from 1945 to 1950, only \$400 million flowed to Latin America—less than 2 percent of total U.S. aid.⁸³ Latin America’s ruling elites had no recourse but to seek private foreign capital to underwrite their nations’ costly ISI initiatives. The attraction of such capital hinged on the creation of a proper investment climate, one shaped by political stability; a commitment to liberal, capitalist development; the marginalization of the Left; and the curtailment of independent currents in the unions. Thus the reversal of the democratic spring by ruling elites was regarded to be a “necessary precondition” for the region’s “participation in the unprecedented expansion of the international economy, in which the United States played the dominant role.”⁸⁴

In his important study of Cold War Guatemala, *The Last Colonial Massacre*, Greg Grandin analyzes the belated, violent overthrow of Guatemala’s Ten Years of Spring, the outlier in this historical watershed of the rise and fall of an extremely diverse, popularly driven social democracy. The heart of the book is Grandin’s ability to evoke the shifting struggles of indigenous Guatemalan campesinos, mostly Q’eqchi’ Mayan peasants and plantation workers from the coffee-producing region of Alta Verapaz. Drawing on local archives and many

hours of oral testimonies, he shows how these Mayans first responded to the democratic promise of the Arévalo-Arbenz revolution and its expanded vision of economic rights, agrarian reform, and claims to citizenship. Tracing local struggles back to the 1920s (and rooting their determinants in the mid-nineteenth century), Grandin attempts to convey how political action and political ideas defined people's lives, and "how the frustration and ultimate destruction of their ideals affected not only those few who survived but a wider [Cold War] history."⁸⁵ In the face of triumphalist arguments that one of Communism's worst sins was its dissolution of the self into an all-encompassing and tyrannical system of belief—such that Communism became fascism's totalitarian twin, inimical to the autonomous individual that stands at the center of liberal democracy—Grandin suggests that it was political action associated with Guatemala's home-grown Communist Party (the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) that produced a more pronounced sense of the self, an "insurgent individuality."⁸⁶ It was this insurgent individuality that struggled against, and succeeded in at least loosening, the chains of hierarchy and extreme exploitation that traditionally bound Guatemalan society together. But this notion of the self always existed "in relation to more encumbered social and cultural identities," such as family, community, and race. Grandin argues that the strength and threat of Latin America's Old Left, represented here by the PGT, was its ability through political action to bridge "the fault lines of modernity, linking nation and world, community and state, and self and society."⁸⁷ Thus, its class-based, male, modernist, urban bias notwithstanding, the PGT, which exerted a powerful influence on Arbenz's revolutionary coalition, was driven by particular grievances and diverse identities. Struggles in the countryside, especially over access to land and an end to forced, uncompensated labor, stretched the party's rhetorical frame of modernizing Marxist social democracy to encompass the multitude of experiences and subjectivities on the ground. The PGT's founder Humberto Alvarado alluded to this tension and his party's bridging mission when he wrote: "To be universal, one has to be from somewhere."⁸⁸

After the 1954 coup, reform strategies divided. A new generation of vanguardist revolutionaries dismissed the PGT's attempt to usher in progressive capitalism as misguided, in view of U.S. intervention, and irrelevant, in the wake of the Cuban revolution. Banned and persecuted by the state, but still influential nationally and in its highland centers of strength, the PGT ultimately allied with these New Left rebels. It did so grudgingly, regarding armed resistance more as a pressure tactic than a viable means of taking state power. (Here, as elsewhere, regional Communist parties and Cuban-inspired vanguards mostly disagreed

on this point.) Grandin shows that many of the PGT's leaders, along with other nationalist reformers, still hoped to remake Guatemalan social democracy. That dream was extinguished early in 1966 with the kidnapping, torture, and execution of close to thirty PGT and other non-Communist reformers by a U.S.-trained elite counterinsurgency unit. With the PGT obliterated, Grandin chronicles at the grassroots level the transition from Guatemala's Old Left to the New, and the conversion of political repression into a new and particularly intense form of state terror that peaked in the Scorched Earth campaign of the early 1980s.⁸⁹

The second major contribution of Grandin's new volume is precisely the intimate account it provides of this counterinsurgent regime and its social and political consequences. Ruling elites not only continued to turn *outward* to the hemisphere's Cold War hegemon, the United States, which had multiple reasons for supporting the status quo. They also reached *downward* to local power holders able to mobilize an often popular but terribly savage anti-Communism among campesinos, members of the urban poor and middle sectors. Not only did members of these popular sectors occasionally nurture personal rivalries and other discontents with the increasingly indigenous leftist insurgency; the counterrevolution was also "powered by subterranean currents of status anxiety, race hatred, and fear of social liberalization, which for men could mean a loss of prerogative and for women a loss of protection."⁹⁰ Significantly, Grandin shows that, in the main, the fight against Guatemala's burgeoning revolutionary challenge was directed not by those "at society's commanding heights" but by middle-class ideologues, often anti-Communist Catholic students who fancied themselves in the vanguard of a worldwide movement of the Right. With the assistance of the CIA, "these students affected an insurgent internationalism exuberant in tone and content, communicating with other anti-communist movements not only throughout Latin America but in Asia as well, and promoted the 'salvation' of Guatemala as merely the 'first step' in liberating Latin America from Communism. It was this impassioned middle sector that functioned as a broker between the upper echelons, both domestic and foreign, of reaction and the street thugs and paramilitary forces responsible for some of the worst acts of counterinsurgency."⁹¹

In Latin America, as other recent work by scholars such as Robert Holden, Martha Huggins, Marguerite Feitlowitz, Peter Kornbluh, Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez, Ariel Armony, Sergio Aguayo, Leslie Gill, and Juan Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagan, and Manuel Garretón shows, counterinsurgency became the well-honed, high-tech art of counterrevolution.⁹² The formidable power of

counterinsurgent regimes resided in a deadly combination of “rational, precise counterinsurgent tactics”—typically imported from the United States, Israel, South Africa, France, and, as Armony’s chapter in this collection documents, Argentina—and “more furious (local) sentiments and aesthetics.”⁹³ Thus the Southern Cone’s premier and highly centralized national intelligence agencies—Argentina’s SIDE, Chile’s DINA, and Brazil’s SNI—were all funded and trained by the United States. Not only did they collaborate in surgically precise efforts to track down and eliminate “leading subversives” across national boundaries (*Operación Condor*),⁹⁴ but like the security apparatuses in Guatemala and El Salvador, they worked closely with local death squads to disappear, torture, and murder thousands of their own nationals, adopting brutal tactics that have elicited comparisons with those of European fascism. The practices and discourse of the ruling Argentine military junta during its “dirty war” underscore this synthesis of rationality and atavism: the junta employed free-market economists (“los Chicago Boys”) and Madison Avenue publicists to “bring Argentina into the twentieth century”; simultaneously it orchestrated a vicious anti-Semitic campaign against the nation’s Jews, proclaiming Freud and Einstein, along with Marx, to be three principal enemies in a “Third World War” between “dialectical materialism and [its own brand of] ideological humanism.”⁹⁵

Although most U.S. diplomatic personnel throughout the continent may have sincerely believed, or at least went on record to state, that there was a clear difference between their aims and actions and the worst excesses of local security forces, the powerful glimpses afforded by recently declassified documents suggest a far murkier situation.⁹⁶ For example, the National Security Archive has revealed that as early as 1968, Viron Vaky, then second-in-command at the embassy in Guatemala City, was unnerved by the manner in which his subordinates had come to justify repression: “After all hasn’t man been a savage from the beginning of time so let us not be too queasy about terror. I have literally heard this from our people.” Filled with remorse, Vaky bluntly admitted: “We *have* condoned counter-terror; we may even in effect have encouraged or blessed it.”⁹⁷ This certainly squares with the CIA’s “Psy Ops” campaign before the coup it sponsored against Arbenz in 1954, in which one agent instructed that appeals and arguments be directed to the “heart, the stomach, and the liver”—that is, to people’s fears rather than their reason.⁹⁸ Moreover, it resonates with Henry Kissinger’s and the CIA’s strategy, on the eve of another coup it backed in Chile in 1973, to “discredit Salvador Allende’s parliamentary solution as unworkable” and “make the [Chilean] economy scream.”⁹⁹ It is hardly surprising, then, that decades of repetition have not reduced the appeal of the old Latin American joke

"Why are there no coups d'état in the United States? Because there is no U.S. embassy there."¹⁰⁰ At the end of the day, it is hard to argue with Grandin's verdict that "counterrevolutionary terror was inextricably tied to empire. . . . That Washington was not solely responsible for the coups and atrocities carried out by their [Latin American allies], and at times had no involvement in them at all, matters less than the fact that it did little to discourage them."¹⁰¹

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, new research suggests, Latin American military regimes applied "best counterinsurgent practices," perfected by the Americans in Vietnam, the French in Algeria and Indochina, and the British in Northern Ireland, to check Latin America's New Left revolutionary movements.¹⁰² "Following the success of the Cuban rural insurgency, militaries quickly learned not only to terrorize the population to dry up guerrilla support but to incorporate it into new ideological and political structures of authority."¹⁰³ Occasionally, in their pursuit of a new moral order, counterinsurgent regimes appeared to borrow from and even mimic the discourse and practice of the guerrillas: in Guatemala, the counterrevolutionary PACS, or civil patrols, were modeled on the insurgents' own organizational patterns; Argentine junta leader General Jorge Videla spoke of his mission as nothing less than a "profound transformation of consciousness."¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile the destabilization of leftist governments and movements, psychological operations, and civic action programs—all of which crystallized in the 1980s in an emerging counterinsurgency doctrine known as "low-intensity conflict"—were flexibly deployed by U.S.-supported military forces as circumstances warranted, most notably in Nicaragua and El Salvador.¹⁰⁵

The Right's success in the final stages of the Latin American Cold War can also be attributed, at least in part, to its ability to address—and co-opt—some of the frustrated popular demands that had driven so many to reformers and revolutionaries in the first place. Guatemala's PACS were repressive and helped to consolidate military rule, but they also entailed local development initiatives, some of which furthered the interests of indigenous actors at the expense of Ladino elites. Indeed, since the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s, military and civilian regimes on the right had attached some level of tepid social and agrarian reform to the imperatives of counterinsurgency. In the Southern Cone, the Brazilian and Chilean military regimes attempted to steal the Left's thunder by implementing their own programs of moderate social reform, cultural renovation, and folk nationalism; in Uruguay, the military promoted a species of welfareism (targeting the humble families of its own recruits) in a society that had witnessed the collapse of one of Latin America's most venerable welfare states.¹⁰⁶

But ultimately, much recent scholarship suggests, it was the fusion of rational

counterinsurgent technologies with a brutal brand of local repression that enabled right-wing regimes in Guatemala, other parts of Central America, and much of South America's Southern Cone to destroy "the ideological and political challenge set loose in the years following WWII."¹⁰⁷ Grandin, for example, argues compellingly that Cold War terror silenced demands for economic justice, hollowed out the egalitarian content from postwar democracy, severed alliances between reforming elites and popular classes, and used repression to reduce powerful collective movements to individual survival strategies. Where the last point is concerned, he invokes Elaine Scarry's argument that the widespread use of torture "literally had the effect of 'unmaking' people's worlds," for victims were forced to choose between endless, excruciating pain and giving up the political comrades and networks that had sustained them.¹⁰⁸ All things considered, Grandin argues, Cold War terror powerfully transformed Latin America, discrediting collective, egalitarian notions of social democracy ("the vision of a social and historical commons") and paving the way for an "age of astringent neoliberalism," which promoted a different version of democracy tied exclusively to personal freedom and access to the market.¹⁰⁹ Thus, he would contend, Latin America's "transition to democracy" did not come with the eclipse of the Cold War's counterinsurgent military regimes; rather, they themselves brokered the transition, and their brutal "success" made Latin America's post-Cold War, radical free-market policies possible.

Of course, neoliberalism and the destruction of social democratic solidarities were not exclusively the product of brutal counterinsurgent states. In certain places (e.g., Bolivia) the Left imploded in relatively unthreatening circumstances; in other societies (e.g., Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador), nationalistic, welfare-oriented ISI regimes were dismantled without recourse to the kind of severe repression and terror that distinguished the Southern Cone and much of Central America. Perhaps most importantly, the limitations of the ISI model itself, coupled with the excessive levels of corruption that characterized the regimes that implemented it, produced a monumental debt crisis that rendered nationalist development strategies virtually indefensible against the pressures of financial markets, international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, and Washington's increasingly strident neoliberal agenda to privatize industries, defang labor codes, and reduce social services. While Grandin accepts such caveats, he subordinates them in his analysis to "unrelenting repression."¹¹⁰

While the origins of neoliberalism may be open to debate, it is difficult to argue with the verdict of a new generation of Latin American social and labor historiography that the most significant targets of the Latin American Cold War

were the liberal-left alignments of the late forties and early fifties, heterogeneous popular coalitions that creatively combined aspects of liberalism and socialism at society's grassroots, and typically built on earlier struggles in the 1920s and 1930s. This Latin Americanist literature runs counter to some other recent contributions to global Cold War studies that attack left alliances and popular fronts with gusto.¹¹¹

It also calls into question recent high-profile studies by the political scientist Jorge Castañeda and the anthropologist David Stoll. In the wake of the failed vanguardist projects that played out from the 1960s through the early 1990s, these social scientists have indicted the Cuban-inspired revolutionary road for interrupting what had been a still-viable evolutionary social democracy. They argue that the radicalization of Latin American politics after 1960 was a disastrous turn taken by romantic elite intellectuals turned absolutist revolutionaries, one that reaped a whirlwind of repression. They suggest that now that the Cold War is over and the vanguardist bubble has burst, the Left, broadly defined (and pruned of a troublesome Marxism), can get back on the right track and lead the current democratic renewal throughout the hemisphere.¹¹²

Was the political terror that swept Latin America beginning in the 1960s primarily the result of a wrong turn by a New Left vanguard run amok, or was it more the manifestation of a fundamental political contradiction? Grandin's work poses this contradiction most starkly: the grassroots promise of a social democratic option was effectively—and brutally—snuffed out by an international Cold War alliance that deployed new strategies and technologies to beat back *any* egalitarian effort at reform, resulting in the spiraling polarization and radicalization that came to define the international Cold War. In this sense, it was Guatemala's failed social democratic revolution, rather than Cuba's successful Marxist revolution, that really "set the pace of much of Latin American Cold War politics."¹¹³ But does his argument apply best to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Southern Cone examples (Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay) of counterinsurgent ferocity, of politics in extremis?¹¹⁴ If so, how do we conceptualize Cold War struggles in countries where the dialectic between episodes of popular mobilization and reaction had rather different watersheds and valences and often seems more chaotic (e.g., Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela)? And what of Mexico, where for decades a somewhat less brutal U.S.–Mexican Cold War alliance was mediated through, and substantially muted by, the intensely nationalistic filter of the PRI's formidable political and cultural apparatus, in close partnership with the establishment media and culture industries? (Here, see the contributions to this volume by Zolov, Fein, and Bachelor.)¹¹⁵

Definitive answers to these questions no doubt require much more research by Latin American historians on the critical period of the 1960s to the 1990s, particularly where the mobilization, demobilization, and shifting consciousness of left and counterinsurgent supporters are concerned.¹¹⁶ Over the course of the last decade, as people have felt less constrained to tell their stories, as truth commissions have reported and documents have seeped out (see particularly the essay by Blanton)—in short, as *a horizon of life* has replaced one of death in the former killing fields and streets of Central America and the Southern Cone—a variety of fine-grained studies have emerged. They constitute early attempts to reconstruct the social histories and memories of the followers of both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements, as well as of men and women on the margins and in the interstices of both. These studies attend to complex local processes in workplaces, communities, and households whereby ideologies were mediated and appropriated.¹¹⁷ They also shed light on the transformation of old left/populist formations into newer incarnations of the Left and populism. More often than not, these studies contain surprises that muddy the master narratives. They suggest that just as workers, peasants, the urban poor, and women were not mere creatures of populist and popular-front arrangements at midcentury, so they were also not passive instruments in the hands of vanguard intellectuals or counterinsurgent states later on. They draw our attention to more autonomous and creative uses of socialist ideas by the grassroots Left than model-building social scientists will allow. In some cases, the very durability of guerrilla movements had much to do with appeals to more latent but venerable traditions of popular liberalism or to radical, communally driven forms of democracy, *under cover* of more standard Marxist-Leninist discourse.¹¹⁸ Finally this new scholarship, especially on Guatemala and the Southern Cone, gives us greater insight into how people remember and come to grips with the telling of episodes of collective violence and trauma, and how the protagonists in culture wars over memory use this arena to shape the political and cultural future.¹¹⁹ Thus, here, as in the recent scholarship on the rise and fall of postwar democracies in the 1940s and 1950s, new social and cultural histories are graphically demonstrating the tenuousness of global assessments of the Cold War—realist and revisionist alike. From Olympian heights, these master narratives seek to generalize about late-twentieth-century superpower conflict over world-historical ideas of how society should be ordered. Unfortunately, too often they occlude the human beings caught up in the messy process of history. Perhaps an attempt to reconstruct and contextualize their complex stories is where a truly “new history” of the Latin American Cold War should begin.

Notes

I am particularly indebted to Greg Grandin for a variety of insights that helped shape the arguments of this essay, to my coeditor Daniela Spenser for her patient and thoughtful readings of several drafts, and to Duke University Press's two anonymous readers for their constructive critiques and bibliographic suggestions.

1. The phrase "Cold War" is generally attributed to George Orwell, who used it in 1945 to describe the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe following the defeat of Nazi Germany. For a recent global synthesis, which effectively evokes the heat of the conflict in the global South, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

2. García Márquez, "The Solitude of Latin America (Nobel Lecture, 1982)," in *Gabriel García Márquez and the Powers of Fiction*, ed. Julio Ortega and Claudia Elliott (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), esp. 81.

3. Since 9/11 and the U.S. retaliation in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has almost become fashionable in European and American circles, left and right alike, to feel a twinge of nostalgia for the Cold War—when James Bond and his adversaries at least played by some set of rules. For a depiction of Cold War protocol and the adversarial ties that influenced spy-masters, see Robert DeNiro's recent acclaimed film *The Good Shepherd* (2006). James Buchan has written: "Those were the days: political caution and circumspection, the survival (as if in ice) of old institutions and manners, history so slow you could even become tired of it." Buchan, "The Superpowers' Balance Sheet," *Guardian*, January 28, 2006. In Latin America and other parts of the global South, where the Cold War was so much hotter, residents would be less prone to engage in such nostalgia.

4. I am grateful to Greg Grandin and Arno J. Mayer for this dialectic of revolution and counterrevolution in twentieth-century Latin America. See Grandin's *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), which draws provocatively on Mayer's model for understanding European cycles of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence, elaborated in *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Grandin and I use this dialectic to structure our new collection, *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming). For deft analyses of overlapping and interdependent international and domestic fields of power, see Westad, *The Global Cold War*; and Jonathan Haslem, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide* (New York: Verso, 2005). Another synoptic study, which provocatively relates the contradictions of capitalist development and ensuing revolutionary transformations in the global South to the phasing of geopolitical conflict during the Cold War, is Richard Saull, *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power and Social Revolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2001); also see Saull, "El lugar

del sur global en la conceptualización de la guerra fría: Desarrollo capitalista, revolución social y conflicto geopolítico,” in *Especios de la guerra fría: México, América Central y el Caribe*, ed. Daniela Spenser (Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2004), 31–66.

5. In 1967, David Horowitz aptly observed: “The very term cold war may be a misleading description, for unlike its prototype, this war has no centrality in terms of geopolitical space. . . . Its contested areas are themselves shifting and non-delimitable.” Horowitz, ed., *Containment and Revolution: Western Policy towards Social Revolution, 1917 to Vietnam* (London: Anthony Blond, 1967), 9.

6. See, for example, the essays in this collection by Spenser and Gleijeses on the international dimensions of Cuba’s Marxist revolution, and also Armony’s contribution on Argentina’s understudied hemispheric crusade against Communism. Such cases underscore the arguments of scholars such as Saull (*Rethinking Theory and History*) and Grandin (*The Last Colonial Massacre*) that the texture of the Latin American Cold War emerged out of widening processes of social conflict in the global South—processes that should not be subordinated to the grand strategies or machinations of the superpowers.

7. Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*, 17.

8. CNN Cold War documentary, cited in Greg Grandin, “Living in Revolutionary Time: Coming to Terms with the Violence of Latin America’s Long Cold War,” in Grandin and Joseph, *A Century of Revolution*.

9. See, for example, Abby Goodnough, “Letter from Miami: Florida’s Zeal against Castro Is Losing Heat,” *New York Times*, July 6, 2005.

10. See, for example, Larry Rohter, “After 30 Years, Argentina’s Dictatorship Stands Trial,” *New York Times*, August 20, 2006; Rohter, “Argentine Ruling Revives Cases of ‘Dirty War’ Victims,” *New York Times*, July 15, 2005; Ginger Thompson, “Mexico Opens Files Related to ‘71 Killings,” *New York Times*, February 13, 2005; James C. McKinley Jr., “Mexican Judge Throws Out Genocide Charge,” *New York Times*, July 27, 2005; McKinley, “Mexican Report Cites Leaders for ‘Dirty War,’” *New York Times*, December 23, 2006; “Colombia Unearthing Plight of Its ‘Disappeared’: Families of Victims of Right-Wing Militias Come Forward,” *New York Times*, August 10, 2005; Larry Rohter, “Chile’s Leader Attacks Amnesty for Pinochet-Era Crimes,” *New York Times*, December 24, 2006; and Blanton’s essay in this volume.

11. The neoconservative commentator Charles Krauthammer brought the term “empire” “out of the closet” (his words) in 2002; also see the writings of *Wall Street Journal* editor Max Boot: for example, “The Case for American Empire: The Most Realistic Response to Terrorism Is for America to Embrace Its Imperial Role,” *Weekly Standard*, October 15, 2001; and *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002). For an earlier statement, see Robert Kagan, “Benevolent Empire,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 111 (summer 1998): 24–36; for a more recent forum that rehabilitates the concept, see “Imperialistics”/“Kill the Empire! (Or Not),” *New York Times Book Review*, July 25, 2004, esp. 11–13, 23. In a similar vein, see Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004). For discussions of the

“new imperial discourse,” see Fred Rosen, “Introductory Essay,” in “Empire and Dissent,” special issue, *NACLA Report on the Americas* 39, no. 2 (September–October 2005): 4–7; Alan Knight, “Empire, Hegemony and Globalization in the Americas,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 39, no. 2 (September–October 2005): 8–12; and Greg Grandin, “Imperial Overstretch,” *Harper’s Magazine*, December 2004, 89–93.

12. Rosen, “Introductory Essay,” 4; also see Luis Fernando Ayerbe, *Los Estados Unidos y la América Latina: La construcción de la hegemonía* (Havana: Casa de las Americas, 2001), esp. 292, for a similar rendition of the severely qualified values and “benefits” that the United States has bestowed on Latin America since World War II. For an incisive critique of the promotion and perils of U.S. “liberal imperialism” in the Caribbean Basin over the past century, see Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), esp. 267–80.

13. See, for example, Simon Romero, “Venezuela Groups Get U.S. Aid amid Meddling Charges,” *New York Times*, November 9, 2006. For the first substantial treatment of this Bush-administration phenomenon, which includes a diversity of views by U.S. and Latin American scholars, journalists, activists, and democracy promotion practitioners, see “In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Intervention in the Americas Today,” ed. Jonah Gindin and Kirsten Weld, special issue, *NACLA Report on the Americas* 40, no. 1 (January–February 2007). For a darkly humorous documentary film on the marketing of America’s “brand” of democracy in Bolivia, see Rachel Boynton’s *Our Brand Is Crisis* (2005).

14. Not for nothing have Russianists like Stephen F. Cohen begun to speak ominously of a “new Cold War” in U.S.–Russian relations. See Cohen’s “The New American Cold War,” in *The Nation*, July 17, 2006.

15. See, for example, “Deal Approved to Send Russian Jets and Helicopters to Venezuela,” *New York Times*, July 28, 2006. Chávez’s highly publicized catching and expulsion of U.S. diplomats as “spies,” and the alarm that is registered in Washington every time Chávez or one of his diplomats visits a “terrorist regime” (e.g., Iran and Syria), also trigger memories of analogous choreographies during the Cold War. Indeed, in August 2006 the *New York Times* referred to “unsubstantiated claims” among Chavista opponents that “Mr. Chávez wants eventually to replay the Cuban missile crisis.” “Venezuela Boasts of Catching 4 U.S. Spies; Embassy Denies It,” *New York Times*, August 20, 2006; Simon Romero, “Venezuela, Tired of U.S. Influence, Strengthens Its Relationships in the Middle East,” *New York Times*, August 21, 2006 (quotation on A7); cf. David Sanger and Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Strategy: Cold War Echo,” *New York Times*, April 30, 2006. On the Central American roots of New Right foreign policy, see Greg Grandin, *Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006).

16. Regarding the balancing act of the Mexican state, also see Lorenzo Meyer, “La guerra fría en el mundo periférico: El caso del régimen autoritario mexicano. La utilidad del anticomunismo discreto,” and Jürgen Buchenau, “Por una guerra fría más templada: México entre el cambio revolucionario y la reacción estadounidense en Guatemala y

Cuba,” both in Spenser, *Especjos de la guerra fría*, 95–117 and 119–49, respectively; and Kate Doyle, “The Quiet Americans: U.S. Policy in Mexico during the Cold War,” paper presented at the conference “México, América Central y el Caribe durante la guerra fría,” Mexico City, November 2002.

17. Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States–Latin American Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 621–36, quote on 625. Friedman puts most of the blame on diplomatic historians, who have been slow to learn the relevant languages and use foreign archives. For an even more admonishing statement, by a past president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, which warns diplomatic historians to “internationalize” their scholarship before much of their field is “usurped” by area studies, cultural studies, postcolonial studies, and American studies scholars, see Michael J. Hogan, “The ‘Next Big Thing’: The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age,” *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 1 (January 2004): 1–21.

18. Indeed, Hogan, in “The ‘Next Big Thing,’” laments that the field of U.S. foreign relations history and its flagship journal, *Diplomatic History*, have become “so narrowly focused on the Cold War” that some of the best diplomatic history research on imperialism, comparative and international history, and other themes is now published elsewhere (20).

19. In this regard, the most significant contributions to date are Westad’s award-winning synthesis *The Global Cold War*, which like this volume interrogates the rather U.S. and Eurocentric notion of Cold War “peripheries,” and Piero Gleijeses’s *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

20. For the opening up of new caches of documents in Latin America and the Eastern bloc, see Blanton’s contribution and Spenser’s concluding chapter, respectively. The excitement generated by the bulk declassification of U.S. records that took place during the Clinton administration was tempered recently by revelations that the CIA, U.S. military and intelligence, and other federal agencies have secretly been withdrawing from public access and at times reclassifying tens of thousands of pages of National Archives and Records Administration materials—documents these agencies felt had been improperly released. The disclosures have unleashed a firestorm of criticism from historians and other researchers, who contend that rather than constituting a threat to national security, these materials—some of which are more than fifty years old—were sequestered because they were embarrassing to the agencies in question. As this volume went into production, historians and scholars were awaiting the results of a government audit of the process of reclassification by the Information Security Oversight Office. See *New York Times*, 21 February 2006, <http://nytimes.com/2006/02/21/politics/21reclassify.html>; and Bruce Craig, “Historians Expose Government Reclassification Effort,” *Perspectives: News-magazine of the American Historical Association* 44, no. 4 (April 2006): 29–30.

21. On these scholarly trends, see Melvyn P. Leffler, “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold

War Reopened,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July–August 1996): 120–35; and Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know?’” *American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 501–24.

22. The new journals for Cold War specialists are the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, inaugurated by the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies in 1999; *Cold War History*, produced by the London School of Economics’ Cold War Studies Centre and first published in 2000; and *American Communist History*, sponsored by the Historians of American Communism, which began operations in 2002. The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), founded at the Smithsonian Institution’s Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington in 1991, has actively supported the dissemination of historical materials as governments on all sides of the Cold War have made such material available, and has become one of the major forums for new scholarly debates about the conflict. In addition to holding regular seminars and maintaining an award-winning website, the CWIHP publishes articles, documents, and correspondence in its *Bulletin* and sponsors a book series. The National Security Archive at George Washington University has become the main conduit for ferreting out and circulating new archival sources, particularly declassified materials.

23. Mark T. Gilderhus, “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.–Latin American Relations since the Second World War,” in *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 424–61 (quotation on 424); originally published in *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 429–52.

24. Grandin, “Off the Beach: The United States, Latin America, and the Cold War,” in *A Companion to Post-1945 America*, ed. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (New York: Blackwell, 2002), 426–45 (quotation on 426). The fortieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis has fomented a new cycle of foreign relations literature that has brought Cuba into the context of a broader, multisided “Caribbean Crisis” that transcends thirteen days of brinkmanship by the world’s superpowers. For example, in addition to Spenser’s essay in this volume, see Adolfo Gilly, “A la luz del relámpago: Cuba en octubre,” in Spenser, *Espejos de la guerra fría*, 215–45, and the National Security Archive’s fortieth-anniversary web page at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsachiv/nsa/cuba-mis-crisis/index.htm>. Also see the papers from the panel (“Putting Cuba into the Cuban Missile Crisis”) organized by Peter Kornbluh and James G. Blight for the Latin American Studies Association’s March 2003 meeting. The session focused on Cuban agency and placed events in a context of U.S.–Cuban hostility going back years; and see Blight’s and Kornbluh’s earlier volume *Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Re-examined* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

25. One is struck by the virtual absence of Latin America in new specialist journals like *Cold War History* and the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, even as coverage of other regions of the global South (e.g., South Asia and the Middle East) has increased. The flag-

ship journal for foreign relations history, *Diplomatic History*, has done a bit better, but Latin America still remains grossly underrepresented in the journal's offerings on the Cold War.

26. Leffler, "Bringing It Together: The Parts and the Whole," in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 43–63 (quotation on 56–57). Westad's collection is particularly helpful in articulating the scholarly consensus on the Cold War's broad contours; also see Hogan, *America in the World*.

27. Leffler, "Bringing It Together," 57. New scholarship on the Cold War's denouement has proliferated of late. See, for example, the special issue "Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 2 (spring 2005), which was preceded by a useful survey article by Jeremy Suri, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4, no. 4 (fall 2002): 60–92. Also see Olav Njolstad, ed., *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, eds., *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005); and the final two chapters ("Actors" and "The Triumph of Hope") in John Gaddis's recent interpretive synthesis *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).

28. Anders Stephanson, "Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors," *Diplomatic History* 17 (spring 1993): 285–95 (quotation on 293).

29. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10 (spring 1986): 99–142; later reprinted as the final chapter in Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Though see Gaddis's latest synthesis, *The Cold War*, which stresses the agency of "visionaries" such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who set about "sabotaging" the East–West stalemate by exploiting Soviet weaknesses and asserting the West's strengths.

30. Stephanson, "Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors," 294–95.

31. The following historiographic discussion draws on a broad literature, especially the essays in the Westad and Hogan collections cited earlier; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Interpretive Wars over the Cold War, 1945–1960," in *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890–1993*, ed. Gordon Martel (New York: Routledge, 1994), 106–24; Leffler, "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations," *Diplomatic History* 19 (spring 1995): 173–96; and Robert Buzzanco, "What Happened to the New Left? Toward a Radical Reading of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 23 (fall 1999): 575–608.

32. See especially George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

33. For a discussion of the long-running debates between "revisionists" and their "realist" and "postrevisionist" critics, see Paul M. Buhle and Edward Rice-Maximin,