



# ANTHROPOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE



The DEPLOYMENT and NEGLECT of AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY  
in the SECOND WORLD WAR



DAVID H. PRICE



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appear on the last printed page of this book.

*For Jack and Fernell with love,  
wonderful parents who taught me  
about patience, caring, and choices.*



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Non-doers were the ones who chose not to fight the Nazis in the only way they could have been fought; they were the ones who drew their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Jews and political prisoners being dragged through the streets; they were the ones who privately deplored the horror of it all—and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical of all means is the non-use of any means.

—SAUL ALINSKY (1971: 26)

Due to the war effort, many American anthropologists who have never before worked in the applied field are now bending all their energies in this direction. As a result, anthropologists are making rapid progress in the development of scientific methods for the application of the results to the practical problems of administration. . . . To state the matter bluntly for the sake of clarity, are practical social scientists to become technicians for hire to the highest bidder?

—LAURA THOMPSON (1944: 12)

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## PREFACE

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The concept of progress acts as a protective mechanism to shield us from the terrors of the future.

—FRANK HERBERT (1965: 321)

Warfare and anthropology have long intersected in two fundamental ways. This book examines the intersection that occurs when anthropologists contribute their professional knowledge and skills to further the military and intelligence endeavors of their nation at war. Another significant confluence occurs when anthropologists' fieldwork settings are shaped by wars that alter the worlds encountered by ethnographers. While frequently underacknowledged, ethnographic fieldwork has often occurred in the shadow of warfare.

In a style reminiscent of the carefully staged photography of Edward Curtis, many anthropologists have cropped out war's shadows from the ethnographic present of their writing, but some of America's finest ethnographers have placed these events in the foreground.<sup>1</sup> An early example of this occurred at the 1891 New Year, when the ethnologist James Mooney of the Bureau of American Ethnology arrived on the Sioux reservation just days after the U.S. Army slaughtered Sioux men, women, and children at Wounded Knee. The marching tunes of the Seventh Cavalry still hung in air, but Mooney worked outside this cadence as he studied acts of cultural resistance with a purpose divorced from conquest. Instead, Mooney's studies of the Ghost Dance acknowledged the context of military conquest in ways that honored and did not make vulnerable those he studied. The care he took shows the development of an anthropology that is conscious of its responsibility to those studied. Mooney studied the Ghost Dance as a legitimate religious formation, describing it with the same honor and respect other scholars used in treatises discussing the historical developments or sacraments of Christianity. An ethnographer with different sensibilities might have studied the Ghost Dance with aims to facilitate conquest rather than to honor the beliefs as part of a great tradition. Such a proto-PSYOP ethnographer could easily have

mined Ghost Dance beliefs for information of use to military strategists who wished to exploit beliefs of invulnerability. But Mooney chose to build a different anthropology, and for that choice his career suffered serious setbacks as he was subjected to congressional inquiries and administrative pressures within the bureau (Moses 1984).

Although few anthropologists have seriously examined their discipline's contributions to warfare, for over three decades anthropology's conscience has wrestled with its historical role as colonialism's handmaiden. The vital work of Kathleen Gough (1968, 1993), Talal Asad (1973), and others who have followed established historical links between the development of European and American anthropology and colonialist ventures around the globe have not only contextualized the political economy in which anthropologists have conducted fieldwork and developed theories to explain the worlds they have found. It has also examined ways that anthropological intelligence has been used to understand and subordinate other cultures.

Anthropologists are now adept at recognizing their discipline's historical ties to colonialism. And while there is an important anthropological literature that brings anthropological perspectives to the analysis of conflict and warfare (e.g., Ferguson 1995; Nordstrom 2004; Sluka 2000), there is a surprising lack of scholarly documentation and analysis of anthropology's contributions to the wars of the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup> It would be tempting to ascribe this silence to the relative recentness of these events, but anthropologists frequently discuss and analyze a wide range of other recent occurrences. The silence surrounding American anthropology in the Second World War is especially curious, given widely held feelings of honor and support for those American men and women who contributed to the fight against tyranny.

There is general awareness among contemporary anthropologists that many anthropologists served in wartime agencies, foremost among them the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Institute of Social Anthropology, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, War Relocation Authority, Military Intelligence Division, and Office of War Information, as well as the Smithsonian Institution's Ethnogeographic Board. Some wartime contributions are widely cited, but few American anthropologists understand the range of contributions American anthropologists made to the war effort.<sup>3</sup>

This lack of analysis has a number of residual effects. Chief among them is the possibility of a disciplinary miscalculation—an overestimation or underestimation of the significance of anthropological contributions to the Second World War. Without examinations of the specific contributions and outcomes of World

War Two anthropologists, we are left with nothing more than lists that account for wartime deployment. These lists reveal nothing about the implementations of wartime anthropology. After a half century of hearing applied anthropologists regularly complain that their recommendations are frequently ignored when they run counter to the paradigms or goals of employers, we need to critically examine the actual outcomes of these applied anthropological contributions to World War Two.

Today, most anthropologists consider their field's contributions to the war in the context of the noble fight against fascism, totalitarianism, and racial oppression. I share these views, but my reading of this history also leaves me with concerns over some of anthropology's contributions to this war. I accept that the Axis's fascists threatened humanity and needed to be defeated militarily, but I also have a growing discomfort with the ease with which some American anthropologists contemplated and engaged in tactics that would be judged unethical by contemporary standards. I remain troubled less by what this meant during World War Two than by what such decisions meant for postwar anthropologists working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military during the Cold War and in the present "war on terrorism." World War Two anthropology unleashed something dangerous that was not easily contained. While the fight against fascism and tyranny is perhaps the most noble and just of fights, the American wars that have followed have been far less noble and just. Now, some sixty years after the fact, the wartime applications of anthropology in the early 1940s continue to bedevil us in new and unforeseen contexts.

Because I write with the advantage of hindsight (along with the disadvantage of not having experienced the events directly), my purpose is not to criticize the choices made by anthropologists at that time. Under the rubrics of a historicist approach, it should be understood that these actors made their choices within a historical context that must be considered on its own terms. I do not question this, and if I only wanted to understand how and why these individual choices were made, that would be enough. But I also wish to examine the past from a presentist perspective, not to heap scorn and criticism on those who lived before us, but to better understand anthropology's present predicament and choices so that contemporary and future anthropologists can learn from this past.

Even George Stocking, historicism's most prolific proponent, admits "the historical utility of a strongly held present theoretical perspective" when attempting to build a present "productive synthetic interpretation" based on evaluations of past actions or interpretations (Stocking 1982: xvii).<sup>4</sup> If we cannot critically evaluate the actions and choices of past wartime anthropologists, then contem-

porary anthropology can hope for nothing more than to uncritically repeat past actions anew in similar and divergent contexts, without any hope of systemically repeating successes and avoiding failures.

Presentist concerns about anthropological contributions to warfare are informed by the activities of the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the current Iraq War, and the postwar development of ethical codes that disparage such combinations of science and warfare. It can, admittedly, be difficult not to let such concerns color interpretations of anthropologists' actions in World War Two (Price 2002c, 2003a). But such difficulties do not diminish the need to examine these past relationships and consider the past on its own terms, as well as from our own place in time, if for no other reason than to adjudicate current dilemmas and choices with a view to what can be learned from these events.

Like *Threatening Anthropology*, this book examines how political and economic forces at a particular moment in history affected the development of American anthropology. As with any ideological component of society, all scientific knowledge—including anthropological theory—is embedded within the political and economic systems of the society producing and consuming these theories and knowledge. This is not to argue that science is exactly like other ideological components of a society, such as beliefs about values, religion, mythology, patriotism, justice, or gender roles. The inherent structural demands of falsifiability of scientific ways of knowing offers the possibility that the science *could* eventually move beyond a historical moment's blind spots.

I do not argue that science—or, in the example described in this book, the social science of anthropology—is in any way free of the economic, technological, or political forces that exert their pull on knowledge systems. The formation and use of scientific knowledge is certainly determined by these forces, but this knowledge is not necessarily reducible to such formations. It is possible that science can identify truths beyond those mitigated by culture, although the weight and pull of a culture's time and place are significant.

I depart from commonplace postmodern critiques of science by not abandoning the possibility that science can provide hope for dealing with the seemingly insurmountable problems that face humankind. But I see this hope as being contingent on rigorous efforts to reveal ways that knowledge is filtered not only by the powers of political structures, but also by the very demographic, technological, economic, and resource-based features and political economy that support the development of specific social formations—social formations that include scientific systems.

I realize that such metanarratives are out of style with postmodern commit-

ments to maintaining a stiff “incredulity towards metanarratives” (Lyotard 1984: xxiv). But the contemporary fear of the metanarrative has left anthropology incapable of explaining—much less defending itself against—recurrent encroachments of military and intelligence agencies into its research. If anthropology is going to develop a critical perspective for dealing with these unexamined ongoing relationships, it will best do so using a theoretical perspective that allows it to examine these differing recurrent formations over times.

The ways that political and economic conditions influence anthropology have been far from uniform, and even a cursory look at the theoretical formations that occurred after the war were diverse, as some anthropologists undertook work that coalesced with the dominant political economies of power while others raged against these interests. But still, these forces transformed the discipline.

The social problems with science in the present era are not distinct from those found in the past. Many of these problems are found in the prevalence of junk science, as government policies muzzle scientific findings that clash with administration policies. Religious fundamentalists’ antiscientific views of the universe, for instance, lead to policies that prevent federal park rangers at the Grand Canyon from stating the known geological age of the canyon for fear of offending people (Agin 2006; PEER 2006). Other problems relate to the practice of forms of socially disengaged blind science in which the theories and products of scientific inquiry are created and implemented without consideration of their impact or ethical meaning. The failures of Nazi science, so dramatically described in the careful scholarship of Gretchen Schafft (2004), traveled down both of these damaged paths. Any hope of avoiding related catastrophic outcomes must be found in more ethically engaged scientific undertakings that disentangle political-economic blinders from findings and implementations (Nader 1996). There is no such thing as politically neutral science, and pretending otherwise will get us nowhere. The operations of science are not judged by imagined standards of apolitical neutrality; they are judged by theory-testing operations of *reliability* (ensuring that other scholars who repeat measures get similar results) and *validity* (establishing that conceptual variables are what are really being measured). What is needed is not depoliticized science but science that is ethically aware of and engaged in the political context in which it functions and is used.

Today’s new wave of militarism brings pressing reasons for anthropologists to critically evaluate the full range of anthropological contributions to World War Two. As the American Anthropological Association (AAA) again publishes CIA job advertisements in its official publications (Price 2005d), and as some anthropologists argue that we must join the Pentagon, CIA, and the Office of Homeland



Security as a continuation of our discipline's World War Two service, we must not gloss over the attractive and repulsive details of anthropologists' contributions to that seminal war. Anthropologists must move beyond a cursory understanding that Ruth Benedict described Japanese personality types and Margaret Mead studied food habits. Our memory gaps have political consequences. Anthropologists' ignorance of the range of anthropological contributions to the war is now being used in CIA and Pentagon recruitment campaigns. The last decade's removal of language from the AAA's ethics code prohibiting covert research cleared the way for American anthropologists to serve the CIA and other bureaucratic descendants of the OSS.

Over the past twenty years, I have been collecting records and recollections of anthropologists' contributions to the Second World War and the Cold War. My interest in World War Two has mainly been to establish an understanding of its events to better appreciate how they shaped anthropologists' contributions to military and intelligence operations in the Cold War. This is not a book I set out to write. Failing in my efforts to collapse a mountain of notes on American anthropologists and World War Two into a manageable introductory chapter providing vital context for my larger Cold War manuscript, I expanded this overview into an extended essay that ended in the surrender of this book. As such, this book can be seen as a sort of prequel to a forthcoming book on anthropological collaborations with the CIA and military agencies during the Cold War, as well as to my book on the effects of McCarthyism on American anthropology (Price 2004a).

I regret that the generation of anthropologists who used their disciplinary skills to fight the Second World War's battles against tyranny chose to remain mostly silent about so many of the specifics, leaving it to one who was born fifteen years after the armistice to write about American anthropologists' contributions to the Second World War. If they chose to remain mute on so many of the issues and circumstances discussed here, their choices leave it to this and future ages to untangle and evaluate these events.

.....

A FEW WORDS on the organizational structure of the book are in order. The book's narrative primarily follows various organizations or agencies that employed American anthropologists in the Second World War. Because Franz Boas's 1919 censure by the AAA raised fundamental questions about the propriety of using anthropology in the service of warfare, the book opens with a brief overview of anthropological contributions to World War One.

The two primary American professional anthropological associations, the AAA and the newly created Society for Applied Anthropology (SFAA), and academic programs on American college and university campuses are shown to have supported the nation's war needs. These uses of anthropology were not unique to the United States. A brief overview of some of the activities of Allied and Axis anthropologists during the war is presented to provide perspective on the ways that anthropologists contributed to the war in other nations.

The remainder of the book examines anthropological contributions to various government agencies. During the war, American anthropologists worked at dozens of such agencies under the administration of the U.S. Department of War, Department of Interior, and Department of State and the White House. Various chapters examine the duties performed by anthropologists working for the Institute of Human Relations, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Cross-Cultural Survey Project, the Smithsonian Institution's War Background Studies, the Ethnogeographic Board, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Institute of Social Anthropology. The anthropologists Henry Field, Phil-  
leo Nash, and Aleš Hrdlička advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the White House staff during the war. Field's research with the M Project found anthropology being used to estimate various relocation schemes for the refugees that would remain in the postwar period.

More than a dozen anthropologists worked for the War Relocation Authority, the Bureau of Sociological Research, and the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study. Anthropologists at the Office of War Information's Foreign Morale Analysis Division studied Japanese social structure to help American propaganda efforts better target Japanese cultural sensitivities and to make recommendations concerning the postwar future of Japan. Ruth Benedict, Clyde Kluckhohn, John Embree, Morris Opler, and others at the OWI are shown to have supported or ignored positions recognizing that the Japanese military and civilian authorities were preparing to surrender during the final months of the war.

The FBI's Special Intelligence Service (SIS) is shown to have used anthropologists to collect intelligence throughout Central America and South America, using archaeology as their cover for spying. These methods were a return to the tactics deployed by Samuel Lothrop, one of the archaeologists criticized by Franz Boas in 1919. An examination of anthropological contributions to the OSS finds anthropologists writing reports for its Research and Analysis Branch and working as analysts and field operatives in battle theaters in Africa and Asia.

The final chapter evaluates some of the ways that American anthropology began to readjust to the world emerging at the war's end. It reconsiders the range

of anthropological contributions to the war, and the ethical issues raised in the preface are reprised in light the specific details of American anthropology's contributions to the war. The importance of anthropologists' World War Two activities to anthropologists' decisions to contribute anthropology to the overt and covert battles of the Cold War is discussed.

### *Acknowledgments*

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I wrote this book while teaching alongside exceptional scholars who bring the life of the mind into that most endangered educational environment: the non-standardized small classroom. While we mostly labor in obscurity at the edge of the known academic world, my colleagues' battles to seize, retain, and use a rare environment that fosters free inquiry and academic freedom has an impact on all I write. I am honored to be part of a scholarly community with my friends Olivia Archibald, Les Bailey, Jeff Birkenstein, Rex Casillas, Steve Fulton, Bob Harvie, David Hlavsá, Russell Hollander, Victor Kogan, Dick Langill, Father Kilian Malvey, Joe Maillhot, Gloria Martin, Kathleen McKain, Stephen Mead, Rona Rubin, Brian Schiff, Norma Shelan, Katia Shkurkin, Donna Smith, Roger Snider, and Don Stout.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

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AAA	American Anthropological Association
AAUP	American Association of University Professors
ACLS	American Council of Learned Societies
APA	American Psychological Association
ASTP	Army Special Training Program
ASTP-FAL	Army Special Training Program, Foreign Area and Language
BAE	Bureau of American Ethnology
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
BSR	Bureau of Sociological Research
CAS	Community Analysis Section
CATS	Civil Affairs Training Schools
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAA	Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
COI	Coordinator of Information
EAEIB	East-Asiatic Economics Investigation Bureau
FAAA	Fellows of the American Anthropological Association
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMAD	Foreign Morale Analysis Division, Office of War Information
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
G-2	Military Intelligence Division, U.S. Army
HRAF	Human Relations Area File
IAR	Institute of Andean Research
IHR	Institute of Human Relations
IIAA	Institute of Inter-American Affairs
ILP	Intensive Language Program
ISA	Institute of Social Anthropology
JACL	Japanese American Citizens League
JERS	Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study
MID	Military Intelligence Division

NKL	Northern Kachin Levies
NRC	National Research Council
OFF	Office of Facts and Figures
OIA	Office of Indian Affairs
ONI	U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
PEER	Public Employees for Ethical Responsibility
R&A Branch	Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services
SFAA	Society for Applied Anthropology
SIS	Special Intelligence Service
SMRC	South Manchurian Railway Company
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SSD	Special Service Division
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
USSBS	U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
USO	United Service Organizations
USWDSSU	U.S. War Department Strategic Services Unit
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WRA	War Relocation Authority

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## CHAPTER ONE

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### American Anthropology and the War to End All Wars

Anthropologists lack a clear and sensible perception of their discipline. In the era of Boas, and under his influence, one might imagine that anthropology would resemble a secular religious order, above the rivalries and conflicts of nations and parties, and embracing an ethos of reverence for the separate and distinct cultures of peoples lacking literacy and power. In effect, anthropologists were to be their voice, and their protective mediators in a world whose market economy and whose imperialisms threatened to overrun them.

—MURRAY WAX (2002: 4)

As the First World War engulfed Europe, Americans were divided on the question of joining this foreign war. In 1916, American voters elected Woodrow Wilson to the presidency on an antiwar platform, only to watch him reverse his campaign promises by committing America to join the war. American opposition to the war was widespread, and new forms of political coercion were developed by the Wilson administration to silence critics of a war seen by dissenters as fought for business interests.

The Wilson administration's efforts to mold public opinion to support the First World War limited American political dissent. It was the First World War's tense political climate that gave rise to America's first formal conceptualization of principles of academic freedom. When the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) developed its first statement championing the rights and principles of academic freedom in 1915, it also limited the exercising of these rights to those with disciplinary expertise (see Price 2004a: 18–20). The historian James Cattell was fired from Columbia University during the war under charges of “disloyalty” after he publicly advocated that the war should only be fought with a voluntary army. Cattell believed that wars in democratic societies should be fought by those who supported the actions, not by one class pressed into action



by another. But the AAUP founder Arthur Lovejoy was uncomfortable using the newly (and weakly) delineated concept of academic freedom to allow professors to speak in opposition to the war. Instead, Lovejoy “felt professors who opposed American military actions should preserve silence during wartime” (Feuer 1979: 465).

Despite intense public pressure for academics to either support the war or remain silent, even from groups advocating for principles of academic freedom, the Columbia University anthropology professor Franz Boas openly spoke in opposition to American involvement in the war. On March 7, 1917, Boas publicly read a statement entitled “Preserving Our Ideas” expressing his disdain for the anti-intellectual campaigns supporting the war and degrading those opposed to the war.<sup>1</sup> Boas’s statement was made partially as a reaction to Columbia’s formation of a committee investigating reports of individual faculty members’ disloyalty, but it was also an expression of his feelings regarding America’s involvement in Europe’s war. Boas attacked the committee’s right to examine faculty scholarship and beliefs, and he criticized the American educational system’s promotion of nationalism. Boas believed that the first duties of scholars “are to humanity as a whole, and that, in a conflict of duties, our obligations to humanity are of higher value than those toward the nation; in other words, that patriotism must be subordinated to humanism” (Boas 1945 [1917]: 156).

In a climate where the White House, churches, business groups, and home-grown patriots were demanding militaristic unity—or, at least, silence—Boas’s proclamation that his academic obligations were “to humanity as a whole” was radical. Boas faulted the American educational system for so easily facilitating the rapid militarization of the American public, writing:

I believe that the purely emotional basis on which, the world over, patriotic feelings are instilled into the minds of children is one of the most serious faults in our educational systems, particularly when we compare these methods with the lukewarm attention that is given to the common interests of humanity. I dare say that if all nations cultivated the ideals of equal rights of all members of mankind by emotional means such as are now used to develop passionate patriotism, much of the mutual hatred, distrust, and disrespect would disappear. The kind of patriotism that we inculcate is intended to develop the notion that the members of each nation, and that the institutions of each nation, are superior to those of all others. Under this stimulus the fact that in each country, normally, people live comparatively comfortably under the conditions in which they have grown up is too often

translated by the citizens of that country into the idea that others who live under different conditions have a civilization or institutions of inferior value, and must feel unhappy until the benefits of his own mode of feeling, thinking, and living have been imposed upon them. I consider it one of the great objects worth striving for to counteract this faulty tendency. If it is not sufficient to train children to an intelligent understanding of the institutions and habits of their country, if these have to be strengthened emotionally by waving of flags and by singing of patriotic songs, then this emotional tendency should be supplemented by equally strong emotional means intended to cultivate respect for the love that foreigners have for their country, and designed to instill into the minds of the young respect for the common interests of humanity. I should prefer, however, to inculcate intelligence, love and respect for all human endeavor, wherever found, without trying to destroy the possibility of clear, intelligent thought by emphasizing the emotional side of patriotism. (Boas 1945 [1917]: 156–59)

Boas's anthropology and progressive political beliefs informed this critique, and while his critical interpretation of the cultural inculcation of patriotism can now be seen as a theoretical analysis of social superstructure, during the war such views were simply seen as subversive. When such views came from a German émigré, they could be seen as traitorous. This was a radicalized Boas who was shocked at how easily the American public had been led into a foreign war.

While Boas's words irritated Columbia's administration, they did not influence those in power, and once America entered the war, protests from academics like Boas were widely silenced. Some who spoke out found themselves unemployed. It only took a few such firings for others to learn to self-censure their criticisms if they did not want to join the ranks of the unemployed. In 1917, the Smithsonian's Bureau of American Ethnology (BAE) fired the ethnologist Leo J. Frachtenberg because of his personal opposition to America's involvement in the First World War. Charles Walcott fired Frachtenberg for "utterances derogatory to the Government of the United States" (Hyatt 1990: 128). Marshall Hyatt writes, "Shocked at the firing, Frachtenberg contacted Walcott immediately and begged for an appointment to clarify his position. He assured Walcott that he had made no statements derogatory toward the United States. He confessed only to 'grumbling against the rising cost of living and Congress' unwillingness to curb these rises,' but denied doing anything more serious" (Hyatt 1990: 128). Frachtenberg asked Walcott to reconsider his decision and not turn him out "penniless and jobless" (Hyatt 1990: 128).

Boas, James Mooney, and Elsie Parsons lobbied in support of Frachtenberg without success. He was not reinstated, despite the lack of evidence that Frachtenberg had broken any laws or specific employment policies.<sup>2</sup> Frachtenberg left anthropology after he was fired by the BAE; his next position was as a factory supervisor (Hyatt 1990: 129). Frachtenberg's firing, and Boas's own experiences with the limits on wartime academic freedom at Columbia, left a deep impression on Boas as he became "convinced that individual freedom no longer existed in America . . . [where] scientists and academics, blinded by patriotism, behaved irrationally" (Hyatt 1990: 129).

The war limited the speech and prospects of critics, and it brought new opportunities for anthropologists and other social scientist supporting the war. These new interactions between anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies established some new social-science applications. While the uses of anthropologists were limited in the First World War, many of these roles provided templates for the expanded role that the social sciences would contribute to the next world war.

Boas's position as a representative to the National Research Council (NRC) brought complications as the council began organizing scientists to contribute to the war effort in 1916. Given Boas's public statements in opposition to the war, "It is not surprising that when the Executive Committee of the Council decided to organize a Committee on Anthropology, they turned to William Holmes and his associate Aleš Hrdlička at the National Museum rather than to America's leading anthropologist" (Stocking 1968b: 287). This committee matched anthropologists' abilities with the needs of war.

### *Social Scientists and the War to End All Wars*

A wide variety of social scientists contributed to the war effort. The American Psychological Association (APA) oversaw the formation of a dozen committees harnessing the findings of psychology for the war, while the American Anthropological Association (AAA) remained much less directly committed to formally supporting the war (Leahey 1991: 226). The APA coordinated the construction, administration, and interpretation of intelligence tests used on the masses of drafted citizen soldiers who were to be sorted into groups of infantrymen and officers. These psychological tests were also "welcomed by eugenicists, eager to prove their point about racial intelligence differences with the help of data from the military. They received prompt and solicitous attention from psychologists, who announced, as scientific dogma, that black soldiers were inferior and that

there existed a mental hierarchy pegged to nationality: Anglo-Saxons were at the top while the unsavory representatives of recent immigrants groups languished far below” (Herman 1995: 65). These tests fostered the illusion that there was a scientific basis for the class-based methods of sorting military conscripts. In the postwar years, Boas and other anthropologists were still battling the peacetime domestic social damage leveled by these biased wartime tests.

The military draft also generated vast amounts of anthropometric data to be analyzed and abused by the Harvard-trained eugenicist Charles Benedict Davenport and others. Davenport’s 1919 *Defects Found in Drafted Men* (Davenport 1919b) and his government report *Army Anthropology* examined anthropometric data gathered from inductees. Davenport used the physical measurements of draftees to support his theories claiming a biological basis for social class. The Carnegie Institution published Davenport’s *Naval Officers, Their Heredity and Development* (1919a), which examined environmental and genetic influences in the formation of naval officers and conflated the advantages and attitudes of class with biological propensities. The Prudential Insurance Company published Frederick Hoffman’s analysis of induction data in *Army Anthropometry and Medical Rejection Statistics*. Hoffman also reported his findings to the Committee on Anthropology of the NRC.<sup>3</sup> British anthropologists conducted similar analysis of draftee measurements (Keith 1918).<sup>4</sup>

American social scientists worked for a variety of governmental war agencies, but all forms of analysis were not equally welcomed. Thorstein Veblen worked as an analyst at the wartime U.S. Food Administration until he was fired for his ardent recommendations that the government end its campaigns against the Industrial Workers of the World (Chomsky 1978: 17). At the National War Labor Board and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the sociologist William Ogburn developed new quantitative research techniques and wrote a series of publications that helped him secure a postwar academic position at Columbia University (Keen 1999:56).

European social scientists also used their professional skills to assist the war effort. In Britain, W. H. R Rivers and C. G. Seligman treated shell-shocked British soldiers (Fortes 1968: 160; Slobodin 1978). O. G. S. Crawford used his archaeological-photography skills to photograph and map battles and trenches at the front until he was eventually taken prisoner by the Germans (Crawford 1955). Some European social scientists generated wartime propaganda. L. T. Hobhouse wrote pro-war political analyses for the *Manchester Guardian*, while Émile Durkheim wrote propaganda pamphlets for the French government that were designed to convince the United States to join France in the war with Germany.

For Durkheim, the most immediate effect of the war was the death of his son and intellectual protégé, André. One of Durkheim's most promising students, Robert Hertz (later to become a significant intellectual influence on E. E. Evans-Pritchard), was killed by German machine guns while leading an attack on Marchéville as a second lieutenant in the French infantry (Needham 1979: 295). The war also killed a significant number of Durkheim's students who were part of the European lost generation that did not survive the war; Durkheim died in despair in late 1917. Most of the German sociologist Georg Simmel's students met a similar fate in the war, a fate that slowed the influence of his work in Germany, Europe, and the Americas.

The German Army Reserve Corps officer Max Weber wrote articles and position papers for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in which he argued that "the Great War was Germany's last chance to achieve imperial greatness and prevent 'the swamping of the entire world' by the decrees of Russian officials on the one hand and the conventions of Anglo-Saxon society on the other" (Ashley and Orenstein 1995: 266). Wilhelm Wundt and Max Scheler supported the German war effort by writing passionately anti-American and anti-British propaganda tracts (Coser 1968; Leahey 1991: 54). The specifics of some of these European social scientists' embracing of roles of public intellectuals advocating the militaristic policies of their governments suggests comparisons with contemporary intellectuals' work at the Council on Foreign Relations and other think tanks aligned with the geopolitical interests of the nation state.

German anthropologists took extensive measurements of soldiers held in prisoner of war camps. These initial studies were linguistic surveys, but soon the anthropologists Egon von Eickstedt, Paul Hambruch, Felix von Luschan, Rudolf Pösch, and Otto Reche began taking extensive anthropometric measurements of prisoners. Without consent, prisoners were subjected to various body measurements and were photographed in the nude or in seminude positions designed to identify specific national racial features. Andrew Evans argued that "practicing anthropology in the camps helped to reorient German anthropologists toward European subjects in ways that contributed significantly to the erosion of the categories at the heart of the liberal tradition" (Evans 2003: 201). That these measurements were taken among prisoners subjected to the demands of martial law, where all prisoners were categorically treated as enemy aliens, contributed to the development of a German racial analysis that "was a short step from a nationalism that coded Germany's enemies as non-European to a view of Europeans as racial others" (Evans 2003: 219).

A generation of future American anthropologists joined the war as soldiers,

and these experiences profoundly shaped lives and sometimes the later adoption of specific theoretical orientations. Leslie White's postwar studies in psychology, sociology, and anthropology grew directly from his efforts to find explanations for the devastation he saw and experienced during the war (Peace 2004).<sup>5</sup> Ralph Linton found a deep camaraderie among the men of the Army's Forty-Second "Rainbow Division." After the war, Linton analyzed these relationships in the scholarly publication "Totemism in the A.E.F." in *American Anthropologist*, where he contrasted the "pseudo-totemic complexes" he experienced as a member of the Rainbow Division with those found among "uncivilized peoples"—noting a sense of solidarity between the division's members and the growth of in-group recognition with the development of the use of the rainbow insignia (Linton 1924: 296–98). Linton observed, "It seems probable that both the A.E.F. complexes and primitive totemism are results of the same social and supernaturalistic tendencies. The differences in the working out of these tendencies can readily be accounted for by the differences in the framework to which they have attached themselves and in the cultural patterns which have shaped their expression" (Linton 1924: 299).

The war also disrupted opportunities for anthropological fieldwork across the globe. Bronislaw Malinowski's movements as an Austrian citizen were constrained by the Australian government, though they were not as limited as those of Fritz Graebner, who spent most of the war imprisoned in Australia, where he had been attending a conference when the war broke out.<sup>6</sup> Ronald Ley examined the possibility that Wolfgang Köhler's years of studying chimpanzees in the Canary Islands served as a front for Köhler's management of a German spy ring during the war, though Ley's suspicions and speculations remain unproved (c.f. Ley 1990; Pastore 1990). The German ethnologist Mermann Naumann was in Australia on a research trip when war was declared, and he was interned until 1919. While imprisoned, "He produced a comparison of the myths of Indo-European, Mongolian, Polynesian, and Hamito-Semitic peoples," as well as a comparative study of calendrical systems of the New and Old Worlds (Naumann 1968: 241).

### *Archaeologist Spies*

Anthropologists—or, more specifically, archaeologists—took on another significant role during the First World War, a role of more direct importance to battles and strategic plans, but one that Boas later argued threatened the legitimacy and trustworthiness of all anthropologists. This was the role of spy. These

archaeologist-spies were drawn from the ranks of archaeologists in both the Old World and the New World.

In the winter of 1913–14, the British subjects T. E. Lawrence and Leonard Woolley were working on the Palestine Exploration Fund's project designed to map the southern Negev region known as the "Wilderness of Zin." This fieldwork project produced two separate reports and two sets of maps. One map, indicating only scant geographic details, was provided to public Palestine Exploration Fund subscribers, while the other map, indicating details of topographic features of military importance, was secretly distributed to British military personnel (Silberman 1982: 192–94). Woolley traveled through southern Turkey examining the Germans' new railroad lines connecting Europe with the Middle East. But such movements in a war theater naturally garnered suspicions. German military intelligence was aware of Woolley's plans and thwarted the efforts to gather intelligence (Woolley 1962: 88–93).

At Port Said, Woolley directed a small network of spies. Woolley later provided accounts of his hunts for enemy agents in his memoir, sneaking spies and saboteurs up the Levantine coast to broadcast clandestine reports on German and Turkish troops. In one tale, his efforts to break up a nightly Morse code lamp-base signaling out to the Mediterranean found nothing more than a baby jiggling a lamp near a window as it received its nightly bath. Woolley once used two Trappist monks as spies after Turkey expelled them from the monastery near Antioch. Because the monks had taken vows of silence, Woolley "had to get a dispensation from the Pope to get two of these monks over to Port Said to report . . . on the geography of the neighborhood of Antioch" (Woolley 1962: 108).<sup>7</sup>

T. E. Lawrence excavated at the Syrian site of Carchemish for four years, and during the war, British intelligence recruited him to monitor Germany's advances on a railroad line linking Berlin with Baghdad. The line had the strategic importance of connecting Germany with the Arabian Gulf (via existing lines that connected Baghdad with Basra), allowing Germany to ship oil without passing through the Suez Canal. In 1914, Lawrence wrote to his mother that these excavations were "obviously only meant as red herrings, to give an archaeological color to a political job" (Brown 2003: 44; Tabachnick 1997).

On-the-ground geographic knowledge was highly valued in wartime intelligence circles. Gertrude Bell, the British explorer, feminist, and archaeologist, traveled throughout the Near East providing invaluable geographical information to the British Arab Bureau on the eve of the war. After the war began, "She was called out to Cairo to serve in the Arab Intelligence Bureau, where

her unrivaled knowledge of central Arabia proved exceedingly valuable” (Fagan 1979: 247).

The British were not the only nation using archaeologists as spies during the First World War (Dorwart 1979). The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) secretly trained and deployed a ring of American archaeologist-spies on missions to Central America. Over dinner and drinks at the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C., Charles Alexander Sheldon recruited Sylvanus Griswold Morley to covertly join the ONI. Morley was a well-respected scholar of Maya archaeology, with years of field experience in Central America.<sup>8</sup> Sheldon arranged for Morley to use his established position as a Carnegie Institution archaeologist as cover for a series of secret missions in which he searched for German U-boats along the Gulf of Mexico coastlines of Mexico, British Honduras, and Belize. Morley was not only receptive to this proposition; he provided Sheldon with the names of several anthropologists who would also use their anthropological credentials for similar missions (Harris and Sadler 2003: xv).

Ten American anthropologists have been identified as conducting espionage in Central America during the war: Arthur Carpenter (Sullivan 1989: 132), Thomas Gann (Sullivan 1989: 132), John Held (Sullivan 1989: 132), Samuel Lothrop (Harris and Sadler 2003; Price 2000; Sullivan 1989: 132), John Alden Mason (Harris and Sadler 2003; Price 2000), William Hubbs Mechling (Harris and Sadler 2003: xvii), Sylvanus Griswold Morley (Harris and Sadler 2003), Herbert J. Spinden (Sullivan 1989: 132), W. G. Farabee (Sullivan 1989: 241), and M. H. Saville (Sullivan 1989: 241).<sup>9</sup>

Morley traveled thousands of miles along the coasts of the Yucatan, Mosquito Coast, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Belize pretending to do archaeological field surveys while hunting for secret German submarine bases. The historians Charles Harris and Louis Sadler (2003: 38) estimated that Morley was “the best secret agent the United States produced during World War I.” They write, “In only ten months, Morley had become a skilled intelligence operative (he had recruited eight agents and eleven subagents, most of whom turned out to be first rate) and a first-rate analyst. . . . During his tenure as an ONI agent he wrote almost three dozen intelligence reports on a variety of topics, covering almost a thousand pages” (Harris and Sadler 2003: xxi). Morley recruited other archaeologists for similar clandestine missions. Chief among these other archaeologist-spies were Samuel J. Lothrop; John Alden Mason of the Field Museum of Natural History; Herbert J. Spinden, then working at the American Museum of Natural History; and William Hubbs Mechling (Harris and Sadler 2003: xvii).



These archaeologists primarily funded their espionage with salaries from the academic or research organizations to which they held affiliations. Thus, Spinden's American Museum of Natural History salary of \$2,200 provided for both his fieldwork and spying in Nicaragua, where "he kept an eye on the local Germans and also stimulated the output of mahogany, for airplane propellers" (Harris and Sadler 2003: 109). The Carnegie Institution continued to pay Morley's salary while he spied for the government. Quetzil Castañeda's exploration of the political agendas of the Carnegie Institution clarifies that such uses of foundation funding for covert government work were in keeping with Carnegie's understanding of "how science and scientists would contribute to the US government during war time" (Castañeda 2005: 37). The Carnegie Institution president Robert Woodward's pride in his organization's contributions to the war went so far that he was recorded in the minutes of a business meeting as saying, "Amongst other men who have been called from the Institution into the Government we have one man who is serving as a spy. He is an archaeologist, and archaeology puts up a very fine camouflage for that business" (quoted in Castañeda 2005: 48).

Morley and the ONI's other archaeologist-spies fabricated a web of lies to cloak their espionage during the war. Spinden's and Lothrop's snooping and questioning of locals raised so many suspicions in Tegucigalpa that "Morley went to great pains to stress the archaeological nature of his—and, by extension, their—activities. He therefore secured an appointment with the minister of foreign relations, Doctor Mariano Vázquez, to whom he ceremoniously presented his Carnegie credentials" (Harris and Sadler 2003: 84). Morley told Vázquez a series of lies and even wrote a flattering article for the government newspaper on the archaeological ruins at Copán. Morley later met with Honduran President Francisco Bertrand and secured from him a letter of introduction, which he used to further betray the trust of his hosts (Harris and Sadler 2003: 85).

By the war's end, Morley, Lothrop, Mason, Spinden, Mechling, and the other American archaeologist-spies returned to academic positions in the United States. These men were proud of their actions, which they viewed as patriotic service to defend their country in wartime. But not all anthropologists viewed using anthropology as a cover for espionage in such a positive light. Boas saw these actions as diminishing the validity and respectability of all future scientific researchers working abroad.

*Boas's Criticism: Scientists as Spies, Scientists as Prostitutes*

In 1917, Franz Boas heard rumors that J. Alden Mason and William H. Mechling had abused his willingness to write letters of introduction and support to create opportunities to conduct foreign espionage. Boas then asked Berthold Laufer, curator at the Field Museum of Natural History; Alfred Tozzer, Harvard anthropologist; and Plinny Goddard, American Museum of Natural History anthropologist what they knew about these allegations, but they were not forthcoming with details. Laufer eventually told Boas that Mason and Mechling had spied in Mexico and elsewhere in Central America, but Laufer asked Boas to not tell Manuel Gamio (a friend of Boas's and the head of the Mexican Directorate of Archaeological and Ethnological Studies) about their spying (Harris and Sadler 2003: 285–87). Boas was upset that he and his scientific reputation had been used to provide false credibility for this covert operation. He wrote to Gamio, telling what he knew of Mason's and Mechling's double dealings, but Gamio had already been apprised of this by Mason and Mechling (Castañeda 2003). For whatever reason—the most publicly proclaimed being that Boas had no wish to endanger the lives of these archaeologist-spies—Boas waited until after the war's end to denounce publicly the actions of these men.

Boas learned that, in addition to Mason and Mechling, Herbert J. Spinden and Sylvanus Morley had used their anthropological credentials as a cover for wartime spying south of the border. Boas pursued whatever information he could gather on these spies, and with time he learned the names of other anthropologist-spies.<sup>10</sup> Once the war ended, Boas made his concerns public, though even then he did so without identifying the anthropologists by name.

On December 20, 1919, the *Nation* published a letter by Boas under the heading, "Scientists as Spies." The letter complained that four American anthropologists had abused their professional research positions by conducting espionage in Central America during the First World War. Boas wrote:

In his war address to Congress, President Wilson dwelt at great length on the theory that only autocracies maintain spies; that these are not needed in democracies. At the time that the President made this statement, the Government of the United States had in its employ spies of an unknown number. I am not concerned here with the familiar discrepancies between the President's words and the actual facts, although we may perhaps have to accept his statement as meaning correctly that we live under an autocracy; that our democracy is a fiction. The point against which I wish to enter a

vigorous protest is that a number of men who follow science as their profession, men whom I refuse to designate any longer as scientists, have prostituted science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies.

A soldier whose business is murder as a fine art, a diplomat whose calling is based on deception and secretiveness, a politician whose very life consists in compromises with his conscience, a business man whose aim is personal profit within the limits allowed by a lenient law—such may be excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. They merely accept the code of morality to which modern society still conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his life is the service of truth. We all know scientists who in private life do not come up to the standard of truth-fulness, but who, nevertheless, would not consciously falsify the results of their researches. It is bad enough if we have to put up with these, because they reveal a lack of strength of character that is liable to distort the results of their work. A person, however, who uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance in his alleged researches in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to be classed as a scientist.

By accident, incontrovertible proof has come into my hands that at least four men who carry on anthropological work, while employed as government agents, introduced themselves to foreign governments as representatives of scientific institutions in the United States, and as sent out for the purpose of carrying on scientific research. They have not only shaken the belief in the truthfulness of science, but they have also done the greatest possible disservice to scientific inquiry. In consequence of their acts every nation will look with distrust upon the visiting foreign investigator who wants to do honest work, suspecting sinister designs. Such action has raised a new barrier against the development of international friendly cooperation. (Boas 1919)

This radical ethical critique showed the depth of Boas's anger, as well as his conception of science's role to serve society in peace and wartime. Boas's belief in the existence of pure science independent of the corrupting influence of a militarized and politicized nation-state fueled this attack more than his disapproval of American participation in the war, but his opposition to the war must have also influenced his critique. On a very practical level, Boas's critique that "every

nation will look with distrust upon the visiting foreign investigator who wants to do honest work, suspecting sinister designs” raised serious issues that still affect anthropologists conducting fieldwork in foreign settings.

Though Boas did not identify the four spies by name, ten days after its publication date his letter caused such a stir in the American anthropological community that a motion was presented at the annual meeting of the AAA to censure him. After some debate and discussion, the association’s Governing Council voted by a margin of twenty to ten to censure Boas, effectively removing him from the council and pressuring him to resign from the National Research Council (Stocking 1968b: 275–76). Leslie Spier later recalled that “the resolution was passed: apart from simply stating that Boas’ letter did not represent the view of the Association, passing it on to the National Research Council meant that Boas had to withdraw from the latter for the sake of peace” (Price 2001b: 11).

When the AAA’s Governing Council voted to censure Boas, it did not object to the accuracy or the facts of his complaint. Instead, the body wished to distance the association from Boas’s remarks and to punish him for using his professional position for political ends. However, the censure of Boas was itself a political act. George Stocking observed that the vote against Boas predominantly came from anthropologists with ties to Harvard University and Washington, D.C., outside the influence of Boas’s academic stronghold at Columbia University (Stocking 1968b).<sup>11</sup> According to Stocking, “Outraged patriotism was simply the trigger that released a flood of pent-up personal resentment and institutional antagonism” (Stocking 1968b: 292). Other factors such as anti-German and anti-Semitic sentiments and a strong sense of postwar jingoistic patriotism contributed to Boas’s censure (Hyatt 1990; Price 2001b).

Some scholars have recently questioned Boas’s motives for attacking these unnamed archaeologist-spies in his letter to the *Nation*. Harris and Sadler (2003: 287) claimed that “Boas invoked high moral principals, but there was a considerable element of self-interest involved. He stated that he could not allow even the shadow of suspicion to fall upon himself, for it would ruin the work he was doing in Mexico.” Likewise, David L. Browman claimed that

there were at least ten American anthropologists engaged in the activities that Boas called “spying,” two of whom were former students of Boas—not just the four noted in *The Nation*—whom were political opponents of Boas. Boas had known about these activities for three years or more, and had written many anthropologists complaining about them, to no avail, as most of the American anthropological community was actively involved in the

Allied cause. Boas had made his explicitly pro-German, anti-Allies (and many say as unpatriotic and anti-American) sentiments widely known beginning with published commentary as early as 1916. (Browman 2005)

Browman's characterization of Boas as holding "pro-German, anti-Allies" and "unpatriotic and anti-American" views misunderstood his opposition to America's entry into the war. Browman mistakenly argued that Boas's opposition to the war was based on nationalistic pro-German, anti-American, or unpatriotic views, but his complaint was much deeper than that: He viewed the European war as an unnecessary, brutal war fought for the economic gain of a minority, but his critique was also infused with his battle against the anti-German tendencies brewing in America.

The AAA's censure of Boas created a skirmish within the American anthropological community for a brief period, but the reverberations from this critical juncture continue to sound within American anthropology today. And while the censure shook Boas, it also marked the beginning of American anthropology's public debates about the propriety of mixing anthropology with military and intelligence operations. These debates have resurfaced in various forms during the American wars that have followed.

### *Contextualizing First World War Anthropology*

The First World War established new relationships between American anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies that would remain important, if not problematic, in the wars waged throughout the twentieth century. The First World War showed anthropologists to be able assets who were familiar with regions that were to become battlefronts or of strategic importance. Whether it was Woolley and Lawrence in the Near East or Mason and Morley in Central America, archaeological fieldwork provided a natural cover for spying in theaters of interest. But Boas's complaint complicated, if not the ease, then the meaning of these relationships.

When called, American and European anthropologists easily adapted to the needs of the war. Some anthropologists wrote propaganda, others quietly contributed geographic knowledge, and still others used physical anthropology's anthropometric measurements to aid in the bureaucratization of selecting which lives would be fit to serve the nation's warfare needs. Certainly, the contributions of American anthropologists to the First World War were less significant than those made during the Second World War—and, more significant, the academic

attention of focus was nowhere nearly as diverted by the questions raised during and after the First World War as it was during the Second World War, when notions of directed research peaked in ways that were not set aside at the war's end. But still, some elements of anthropology followed, and contributed to, the needs of the nation's political economy during the First World War as anthropologists contributed to the war effort.

Anthropologists' contributions to the First World War were not simply dress rehearsals for the contributions to be made in the Second World War. The limited contributions of anthropologists to World War One were mostly of a nature and scale different from those made by anthropologists in World War Two. But American anthropologists' reactions and contributions to the First World War influenced the next generation of anthropologists called on to contribute their professional skills in the subsequent world war. Perhaps the most significant outcome of anthropologists' involvements in World War One occurred *after* the war, when Boas was censured for criticizing "scientist spies." The threats presented by Nazism in the next war muted the sort of criticism of propagandistic brainwashing proffered by Boas in 1917. And beyond this silence, the Nazi threat found some American anthropologists mining their profession for propagandistic techniques to further the same sort of blind loyalty and trust degraded by Boas in his statement "Preserving Our Ideas."

Boas's criticism of scientist spies was remembered by many anthropologists serving in the Second World War, and for some these events raised residual feelings of unease as they responded to the call to join the war. As the anthropologist Jack Harris later recalled, he felt some conflict in 1942 about using his anthropological credentials as a cover to conduct espionage as an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agent in West Africa. Harris's conflict arose "because during my days at Columbia I was told by associates of Boas that he violently opposed using our scientific reputation as a cover for intelligence activities in war. He based this on an incident in which a student of his had been involved in World War One. However, our feelings were so strong, I felt that whatever capabilities I could lend to the war effort in this war against infamy, I was pleased to do so" (quoted in Edelman 1997: 11). Harris's hesitance to use anthropology as a cover for spying or to harness anthropology for the war was shared by other anthropologists. Memories of Boas's censure had an impact on some anthropologists' responses to the Second World War, but this hesitance was short-lived. Axis atrocities soon buried most such concerns.

While Boas's criticism and his resulting censure have become well-worn features of American anthropology's political and historical self-understanding,

there is perhaps more read into Boas's critique than appeared on that page of the *Nation*. It is important to recognize that Boas's criticism was limited in what it did and did not condemn. While his primary complaint was against the practice of lying to hosts about why supposed fieldworkers were present (scholars who "prostituted science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies"), Boas also felt that his personal, high modern view of pure science was violated by such duplicity. Boas implied in his *Nation* letter that he expected businessmen to "prostitute" themselves, but he considered science a more sacred undertaking. Boas believed that, for scientists, "the very essence of his life is the service of truth," though his antiwar sentiments and strong personal feelings opposing America's entry into this particular war also may have shaped the form of his criticism.

It is important to also consider what Boas's *Nation* critique did not argue. Boas did not argue that science must not be used for harm during times of warfare. He did not argue that using anthropological skills or knowledge for purposes of warfare was wrong. He did not argue that anthropologists should never work for military and intelligence agencies in any professional capacity. But Boas *did* lay the groundwork for other such criticisms to come in later wars: Laura Thompson would question the ethical propriety of anthropologists' selling their field to the highest bidder; Ralph Beals would question the propriety of anthropologists' conducting secret government research; and Eric Wolf and others would condemn those using anthropology in support of imperialist wars.

But while interpretations of Boas's denunciation of the mixing of anthropology and espionage vary, his charge and punishment have continued to stir interest in American anthropologists during the nation's wars throughout the twentieth century and twenty-first century. In 2005, the membership of the AAA overwhelmingly voted to support a referendum overturning the association's 1919 censure of Boas. Although it came more than eighty-five years after the fact, this gesture represented an ambiguous statement of contemporary anthropology's view of its past, present, and future relationships to the intelligence community. That the vote was a rout (1,245 supporting, 73 opposing) is clear, but the meaning of the vote is a mystery, and given the general reticence of the AAA's membership to forbid secret research in its official ethics code, it seems more likely to be a sentimental statement than an affirmation of the impropriety of mixing anthropology and espionage. The reasons for the association's reticence are complex, but they are partially rooted in the discipline's rarely examined contributions to the Second World War (Fluehr-Lobban 2005; Glenn 2004).

The AAA's resolution did "entirely repudiate" Boas's censure. It established

that the AAA accepts that “Boas believed that it was immoral for scientists to use their professional identity as a cover for governmental spying activities” and that “other such incidents of anthropologists as spies have been repudiated by this Association.”<sup>12</sup> But even as the AAA passed this motion, President George Bush’s “war on terror” found a chorus of AAA members calling for anthropologists to covertly contribute their skills to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies, and new funding opportunities secretly connected anthropology’s graduate students with intelligence agencies.<sup>13</sup>