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men such as to enable him to evaluate such comments or identify the alleged questionable associates. Too, pointed out [REDACTED], he had received sufficient information which

On May 24, 1955 [REDACTED]

Connecticut, was interviewed by Special Agent [REDACTED] at which time she advised that she had worked for [REDACTED]

David H. Price

during 1954.

In her Identification and Personnel Data Form, previously described, the applicant notes [REDACTED]

Threatening Anthropology

Further advised that [REDACTED]
7 the subject [REDACTED]

McCarthyism and the FBI's Surveillance
of Activist Anthropologists

[REDACTED] the subject spends all of her time writing [REDACTED]

Subject attended professional [REDACTED]

meetings where [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was present.

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THREATENING ANTHROPOLOGY

THREATENING

ANTHROPOLOGY

McCarthyism and

the FBI's Surveillance

of Activist Anthropologists

DAVID H. PRICE

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FOR MY CHILDREN MILO AND NORA

*May they share the insight, courage, and conviction
of conscience of Bernhard, Earle, Richard, Jack, Mary,
Melville, Gene, Morris, Kathleen, Philleo, and the
many brave others whose stories are recounted here*

The widespread revulsion inspired even now, and perhaps forever, by the word *Communism* is a sane response to the cruelties and stupidities of the dictators of the USSR, who called themselves, hey presto, *Communists*, just as Hitler called himself, hey presto, a *Christian*.

To the children of the Great Depression, however, it still seems a mild shame to outlaw from polite thought, because of the crimes of tyrants, a word that in the beginning described for us nothing more than a possibly reasonable alternative to the Wall Street crapshoot.

Yes, and the word *Socialist* was the second S in *USSR*, so good-bye, *Socialism* along with *Communism*, good-bye to the soul of Eugene Debs of Terre Haute, Indiana, where the moonlight's shining bright along the Wabash.

—KURT VONNEGUT

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PREFACE

In this book I examine how the Cold War shaped the development of American anthropology. I use archival documents, correspondence, oral histories, published sources, and over thirty thousand pages of FBI and other government documents released under the Freedom of Information Act to document how the repressive postwar McCarthy era shaped and dulled what might have been a significant and vital anthropological critique of race, class, and the inadequacies of global capitalism.

While the primary subjects of this book are anthropologists, the basic description of the methods used to repress social activism reaches beyond the academically pigeonholed field of anthropology and beyond the time frame under consideration. The congressmen and senators who badgered witnesses at loyalty hearings and the college and university administrators who scrutinized their faculty for signs of thought crimes or activist inclinations did not care about anthropology *per se* but rather about begirding, discrediting, and disarming agitating social activists. Much the same story could be (or has been) told about American social workers, artists, playwrights, writers, historians, sociologists, longshoremen, essayists, cartoonists, physicists, actors, labor activists, educators, and psychologists. Anthropology's paradigmatic commitment to equality and relativism did make some of its practitioners easily visible targets, but the ac-

counts of these attacks are relevant to all who are interested in the form and function of repression in stifling a needed movement for social justice.

It might seem that anthropology naturally attracts an inherently subversive element insofar as its notions of cultural relativism and enculturation critically undermine the principles and practices of nationalism or patriotism. But this is not the case. Many prominent anthropologists have supported conservative mainstream academic and governmental policies and programs, and some were comfortable being FBI informers. The repressive atmosphere of the post–World War II period redefined anthropologists’ notions of public anthropology and provided positive reinforcements for anthropologists willing to think and act in “acceptable” ways (see Nader 1997a; Price 2002d).

A number of American anthropologists were Communist and Socialist activists.¹ That the discipline of American anthropology has deep connections to Communist and Socialist organizations should not be surprising to anyone who knows much about anthropology, Socialism, or Communism—but we are now in an era where people increasingly know little about anthropology and Marxism. False notions that Communists or Socialists were antidemocratic, inherently un-American or unpatriotic, cloud our understanding of the past. But as Lester Rodney—a journalist who campaigned for baseball’s integration in the 1930s—recently noted, most Communist Party members were law-abiding patriots. Rodney questions the ability of present analysts to comprehend the motivations and beliefs of mid-century Communists without the smug historical baggage of the post–Cold War era by asking:

are there any historians out there to say straight out that American Communists, despite their sins, were patriots who advocated something more humane than corporate capitalism for this land of ours and fought hard and effectively for social justice in the meanwhile?

Yes, they were starry-eyed over the emergence of the world’s first nation to proclaim itself socialist and place people above profits, and yes, they were lamentably slow to accept the reality that Stalinism had butchered the socialist dream. But when “liberal anticommunists” were doing diddly about the shame of raw racial discrimination, it was Communists who exposed the Scottsboro rape frameup, who put their bodies where their mouths were, going South to work for black rights, who with the black newspapers launched the campaign that ended the apartheid ban in our national pastime, who did the indispensable on-the-ground organizing in the creation of industrial unionism. (Rodney 2001:24)

Most American Communists and Socialists working as activists for social justice during the 1940s and 1950s *were* patriots advocating for something

more humane than what capitalism had provided. In this book I examine the extent to which anthropologist activists *regardless* of their party affiliations became enemies of the state *because* they effectively challenged the economic and social order.

Writing about the Communist Party is still difficult. After publishing her fine book, *Many Are the Crimes*, Cold War historian Ellen Schrecker was pummeled from both the left and right for her analysis of political repression during the McCarthy period. She was criticized by those on the right (e.g., Weisberg 1999) who complained that she hadn't grasped that the Soviets' influence on the American Communist Party had discredited all that its members were striving to accomplish, while some on the left felt her stance on party links to the Soviet Union slighted party members and their efforts.

McCarthyism limited anthropologists' free academic inquiry by targeting, stigmatizing, and penalizing those working for racial, gender, ethnic, or economic equality. As red-baiting witch-hunts spread, a generation of social scientists learned to not overtly think under the rubrics of Marxist critique, while many in the discipline learned to ignore anthropology's natural, and ethically required, activist roles. In part, this book chronicles how McCarthyism helped mid-century American anthropology lose its way from a path charted by activist anthropologists who strove to establish a more threatening anthropology than survives today.

A few brief words on the book's organization are in order here. After opening with a brief overview of themes vital to an understanding of the Cold War and the political economy of mid-century American anthropology, in each of the chapters that follow I discuss some aspect of the public and private interactions between American anthropologists, McCarthyism, and J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, and I follow both chronological and thematic elements of this dark history. The first chapters use FBI documents and archival materials to examine how Melville Jacobs, Richard Morgan, and Morris Swadesh came to be attacked by localized loyalty boards and how the American Anthropological Association failed to offer meaningful assistance to these members whose rights to academic freedom were under attack.

In the following chapters I examine the congressional hearings subpoenaing Gene Weltfish, Bernhard Stern, Jack Harris, and Mary Shepardson, as well as the FBI background materials relating to these cases. While each of these episodes have key differences, those under attack shared common bonds of isolation because all were left to fend for themselves with no support from professional organizations or peers. The American Anthropological Association's abandonment of these scholars helped support a prevailing

environment of isolation and fear that spread through academic and activist communities.

In chapter 9 I examine the methods used by the FBI throughout the Cold War to investigate anthropologists and others they deemed subversive. The FBI records of several anthropologists establish the methods and mindset of the FBI as it undertook extensive and expensive investigations of those they believed to be radical activists working for racial equality. The FBI investigations of anthropologists with apparent ties to Socialist or Communist organizations or parties are examined, with special consideration given to the numerous instances where such individuals were identified but never called before local or national loyalty or security boards.

The FBI's intrusive surveillance of liberal or moderate anthropologists such as Oscar Lewis, Margaret Mead, Philleo Nash, Ashley Montagu, Vilhjalmar Stefansson, Cora Du Bois and others establishes the extent to which America's secret police meddled in the academic and private lives of intellectuals who promoted racial equality and internationalist perspectives. I conclude the book with a brief consideration of but a few instances from the 1960s that indicate that these FBI suppressive tactics did not end in the 1950s.

My decision to conclude the book with a consideration of the early 1960s is largely one of logistical convenience and does not imply a significant break from what came next.² In fact, what we know about the FBI's intrusion in the lives of American activists for issues of racial and social justice indicates that the organization has continued to persecute, harass, frame-up, and attempt to murder³ numerous loyal Americans devoted to resisting the inherent inequalities of American life. We can only expect an increase in these violations of law and civil liberties as the American presidency and Congress press further onward with their ill-defined war on terrorism—thus linking the activists of our age to those from this hidden past. To defend ourselves in the present we must build oases of knowledgeable hope in what Sigmund Diamond (1992: 285) called the “desert of organized forgetting,” and learn from these past well-funded and well-organized attacks on activists fighting for a better world.

Acknowledgments

During the first years of this research the late sociologist and historian Sigmund Diamond generously gave me valuable information, insight, and encouragement. A decade and a half of conversations and arguments with Marvin Harris helped me consider the infrastructural features of McCarthyism's witch-hunt. Marvin offered generous advice, insights, and recommendations throughout this project; I only wish he were around so we could argue about

the final product. Laura Nader—who is in many ways the embodied moral conscience of post-Boasian American anthropology—helped me in ways too numerous to catalog, but most significantly her body of scholarly work provided a firm foundation for the ethic of this book. Her encouragement and advocacy helped bring this project into print. Nina Glick Schiller helped publish early seeds of this project and has continued to encourage me to focus my analysis; she also helped me delay infuriating an otherwise potentially sympathetic audience by segmenting my analysis of Cold War anthropology into two separate book projects (the second book examines anthropology's willing interactions with military and intelligence organizations). William Peace was a regular sounding board and a good friend throughout the writing of this book. He generously shared information and consistently warned me against being too blunt and strident, although I as often as not agreed he was right but ignored his sage advice. Eric Ross offered encouragement and good advice in helping me to remain focused on the key points of this project. Through years of mountaineering treks in the Olympic mountain range Thomas Anson patiently listened and argued through different arguments appearing in this book. Donna Smith's comments added important depth to the final manuscript. Several of my elected representatives helped me with Freedom of Information Act appeals; most helpful in these endeavors were Congresswoman Jolene Unsoeld, Congressman Brian Baird, and Senator Patty Murray. I would also like to thank the numerous elder anthropologists who allowed me to interview them about McCarthyism, the Communist Party, and the American Anthropological Association, many of whom agreed to do so under conditions of anonymity.

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A NOTE ON REFERENCES

The format for citations of documents released by the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act follows that used in the FBI's central filing system. A citation such as "WFO100-354492-3:3" indicates FBI file number 100-354492-3, page 3. The letter abbreviation refers to the location of the file; e.g., "WFO" indicates "Washington Field Office," or FBI headquarters. (Other location abbreviations used are listed at the opening of the bibliography.) The first series of numbers—in the example, 100—indicates a "domestic security" file entry; "65" indicates "espionage"; "67" indicates "personnel matters," and so forth. For more on the FBI's central records classification codes, see Buitrago and Immerman 1981; Theoharis 1994. Some variations on this citation format are found in this book—for example, the letters "A" or "X" at times appear in citations, and page number citations are frequently missing. These and other variations only reflect my rendering of the exact FBI notations appearing on the cited files. I provide dates and page numbers where available, and do not attempt to interject this data where it is missing on the FBI files. Occasionally files from other federal agencies (such as the Department of Energy and the CIA) are cited using the archival formats of these agencies.

A list of archival and manuscript sources used also appears at the start of the bibliography, along with the abbreviation used for each source. Cita-

tions in the text are keyed to this list. In-text citations also include the location code information used by the individual archive or manuscript holder. For example, “MJ: 120, 52” indicates the “Melville Jacobs Papers, Special Collections, University of Washington”; “120” indicates box number, and “52” indicates folder 52. Correspondence and papers from other collections follow internally consistent formats used by specific archives or manuscript collections.

Periodical publications frequently cited are also indicated by abbreviations in the text keyed to this list in the bibliography. Those with no specific volume information appear as abbreviation and date. Those with additional facts of publication include such information in the cite; for example, “AAANB 1948 2(5): 72–73” indicates volume 2, number 5, pp. 72–73, of the 1948 *News Bulletin* of the AAA.

Personal correspondence is indicated in the text only, for example, “Doe to Price 12/1/99” indicates letter to the author from Doe on date given. Finally, interviews are also referenced directly in the text using a format such as “Peresypkin interview with Price 8/12/01.”

CHAPTER 1

A Running Start at the Cold War:

Time, Place, and Outcomes

Since historical memory is one of the weapons against abuse and power, there is no question why those who have power create a “desert of organized forgetting.” But why should those who have been the victims sometimes act as if they, too, had forgotten?—Sigmund Diamond

At first glance it might seem odd that anthropologists were among those citizens who were dragged through the shameful disarray of security and loyalty hearings of post–World War II America. American anthropology never had its “Hollywood Ten,” although many more than ten of its practitioners were persecuted by congressional hearings and by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI. But the very premise of anthropology—with its commitment to cultural relativism and the inherent worth of all cultures—made it a natural target for these attacks. The nature of these attacks clarifies much about the real issues of McCarthyism and about the promise of what anthropology offered public policy makers regarding issues of racial, gender, and economic equality. Anthropology’s radical view of racial equality made anthropolo-

2 Threatening Anthropology

gists obvious targets; and some anthropologists' ties to Communist, Socialist, and other progressive activist organizations made them easy targets.

The formative roots of McCarthyism are much more complicated than Richard Nixon rooting around the pumpkin patch; the entrance of the Soviet Union into the global arms race; or even the creation of a host of secret national security policies after the war. The appearance of McCarthyism was more of a mutant resurrection than it was a new birth *sui generis*. What came to be known as McCarthyism was part of a long, ignoble American tradition of repressing the rights of free association, inquiry, and advocacy of those who would threaten the status quo of America's stratified political economic system. Despite a general lack of proof of consistent ties to Communist organizations, the anthropologists who were paraded before various public, private, local, state, and national loyalty hearings shared the fundamental trait of progressive social activism.

The most common activities drawing the attention of anti-Communist crusaders included participation in public education programs, public advocacy, social activism, and protests, but the basic concerns of these actions were issues of racial equality. Throughout the twentieth century, American anthropologists argued against racial discrimination and against the biological basis of the notion of race. It is to the credit of the discipline that anthropologists during this period aggressively combated the racial prejudice permeating American society. In the end, these public actions mattered more than the presence or absence of demonstrable ties to Communism. Under these loyalty witch-hunts, Communists, Socialists, and liberal Democrats were equally recognized as a threat to the postwar status quo (and they *were* real threats to the systems of social and economic inequality they wished to demolish) and this threat provided the justification for persecution. McCarthyism's public spectacles transformed the development of anthropological theory, limiting both the questions anthropologists asked and the answers they found.

The seeds of the Cold War were firmly planted during the last days of World War II. America's entry into the war brought the application of anthropological methods and skills to the service of warfare at previously unseen levels. John Cooper (1947) estimated that over half of America's anthropologists contributed to the war effort. During the war, anthropologists found themselves doing everything from using their anthropological credentials as a cover for espionage (Madden 1999; Price 2000b; Price 2002b); conducting national character studies for organizations such as the Office of War Information (Doob 1947; Winkler 1978), the Office of Strategic Services, and the Ethnogeographic Board (Bennett 1947; Price 1998a; Leighton 1949:223–25; Mead 1941; Winks 1987); compiling important war-effort data;

undertaking dangerous cloak-and-dagger operations for the Office of Strategic Services (Chalou 1992; Coon 1980; Price 1998d); and assisting in the detention of Japanese Americans for the War Relocation Authority (Suzuki 1981; Drinnon 1987). The full range and scope of anthropological war work is too varied to recount here, but it is important to recognize that as the majority of the American public became immersed in America's war effort, anthropologists from all fields and theoretical orientations also joined in. These activities brought the FBI into their lives when background investigations were needed for sensitive war work.

In the mid-1940s few Americans could comprehend the brutal reign of domestic fear that soon followed. In 1945 anthropologist Ruth Landes wrote a piece for the *Nation* describing the morale and functioning of Washington's wartime bureaucracies. Commenting on Congressman Dies's loyalty committee, Landes lightly observed that "so little self-esteem is allowed indeed to many federal officers that they look to sources like the lists of the old Dies committee for assurance that they still matter. Only last year a Washington official showed me proudly a copy of testimony filed with the Dies committee about his alleged subversive opinions" (1945:365). By the end of the decade the consequences of such testimony before the Dies committee were severe, and such jesting and boasting became a thing of the past.

At the war's end most anthropologists returned to college and university campuses. But new fears and a new military industrial complex radically transformed these anthropologists and the universities to which they returned (Lowen 1997). These changes affected the world to be studied and the experiences of those who studied it, and the domestic political developments of this period cast shadows of distrust and jingoistic simplicity over all of American academia, thus limiting the nature of anthropological inquiry for decades to come.

The GI Bill of Rights brought the most significant postwar impact on American anthropology: it allayed an economic crisis, rewarded the war's victors, and set new standards of education for a generation of Americans. The GI bill created students—*lots* of students—thereby opening colleges and universities to a new generation. Under the GI bill any veteran of the armed services with an honorable discharge was eligible to receive enough financial assistance to cover the expenses of a college education. The record level of first-generation college attendance was a vital element in the coming retooling of America's workforce and class structure as the children of America's proletariat entered the halls of academia previously reserved for members of America's elite class (Murphy 1976:5).

As a result anthropology classes swelled, not just with a new breed of anthropology majors but with future engineers, chemists, teachers, histori-

4 Threatening Anthropology

ans, and other students needing to fulfill social science requirements. As the GI bill brought this mass of new bodies to campuses, however, it also negatively affected the opportunities for other individuals to work and study in America's universities: in all, 7.8 million World War II veterans used the GI bill's educational benefits and 2.2 million students flooded the country's two-year and four-year colleges and universities, thereby displacing a generation of women who had entered academia during the war (Bennett 1996:242). As a generation of male vets was welcomed into the classroom, a generation of women was all but excluded (Rossiter 1995:27).

The GI bill expanded the career opportunities for archaeologists and cultural, physical, and linguistic anthropologists (Patterson 1999:161–64). This new generation of anthropologists had grown up during the Great Depression, with many coming from families with ties to labor, Communist, and Socialist movements. They not only brought their political experiences and viewpoints with them but in many cases it was these experiences themselves that led them to the field of anthropology in the first place.

Walking on Eggshells: Postwar Reorganization of the American Anthropological Association

While American anthropology departments were poised to swell with this generation of bright new students, its oldest professional organization, the American Anthropological Association (AAA), was about to self-destruct by spinning into a half-dozen different scientific societies. In spring of 1945 a Temporary Organizing Committee was established, consisting of Homer Barnett (Chair), Julian Steward, John Provine, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Frank Roberts (Frantz 1974:9). The dynamics of this reorganization weakened the association's ability to protect anthropologists facing McCarthyism's attacks. The reorganization was in part brought on because of subfield factionalism (as archaeologists and cultural, physical, and linguistic anthropologists had already created specialty associations) and the concerns held by the growing departments at the universities of Chicago, Michigan, and Berkeley, which were separated geographically from the increasing power base of the eastern corridor. Attempts to coordinate the reorganization of the association were complicated by numerous factors: the status of nonprofessional anthropologists, the impact of such a reorganization on a dozen regional and specialty associations, and the question of what was to be done with "professionals" not trained in anthropology.

In the end it was the obvious financial benefits for all that brought the AAA together for the reorganization. It was clear that the new wealth of funds available to researchers in the postwar and coming Cold War world could en-

rich anthropologists *if* they had an organized body both to represent them and to lobby for their inclusion in the coming funding feast. The prime concern of the reorganized AAA was to “mobilize the profession” to a position advantageous for funding (RAAA: “Committee of Nine Report,” 3/9/46). Julian Steward helped bring various factions together for the reorganization by arguing that in a competitive funding environment “it is better to mobilize all anthropologists rather than just a section of them. The point of view that anthropology stands for is well known but it will be better in the final pay-off when the money is allotted if anthropology has made a case for itself” (RAAA: “Committee of Nine Report,” 3/9/46). As the AAA’s membership grew, diverse research interests created new pressures on the association. These pressures led to a postwar reorganization that ceded increased centralized power to the president and the executive board. The prerevised AAA constitution did not afford the executive board much authority to act on behalf of the general membership throughout the year, without the authorized approval of the rank and file at the annual meeting.

The Cold War brought a stunning variety of governmental agencies—and lots of money—to support anthropological research of interest to the new national security state. There was funding to study the languages and cultures of remote places that would potentially become the staging ground of the Cold War’s many battles. Some of these agencies predated the war (e.g., the National Research Council, Office of Naval Intelligence) and were simply reinvigorated by this flood of cash and redirected with new purpose, but many others came into being in the postwar world (e.g., the National Science Foundation, Fulbright, and National Institutes for Mental Health) (Vincent 1990:292–96). There was also a postwar boom of private-foundation funding for anthropological research, although even these funds were not immune from the politics of Cold War interests (Saunders 1999; Ross 1999). After some conflicts over specific articulations of the AAA’s reorganization, the promise of large amounts of funding—much of it conditional on the Cold War—was the glue that bound the association together.

The reorganized bylaws of the AAA charged the executive board to pursue funding opportunities for association members by specifying that “officers were obligated to maintain records of professional anthropologists, to serve as a clearinghouse for professional and scientific anthropological matters, to publish a bulletin for Fellows on activities of professional interest, to hold referenda on urgent matters, and to establish liaison with other scientific organizations and institutions” (Frantz 1974:12). The CIA covertly contributed to the maintenance of these rosters in the postwar and early Cold War period, and it was during this time that the FBI opened its file on the AAA (Frantz 1974:7; Price 2000a, 2003a).¹

As the fragile coalitions comprising the reorganized AAA were hesitant to enter the frays of controversy, the newly reconstituted AAA was in a position weakened by its inability to defend the academic freedom of anthropologists suffering the attacks of McCarthyism. The surviving correspondence of the AAA finds members concerned that the association keep its distance from controversies involving AAA members. For example, in 1949, after the Committee on Scientific Freedom was formed, Harry Hoijer wrote to President Irving Hallowell with his concern that the committee would overstep the duties of the association by protesting the firing of accused Communists (RAAA: HH/IH 7/20/49). Similarly, as we will see, after Richard Morgan was fired from the Ohio State Museum under circumstances suggesting that his rights to academic freedom had been violated, Emil Haury wrote to President Shapiro that it was his "conviction . . . that our Association is a professional one and that we must proceed with the greatest caution in involving either the Board or the membership in matters lying outside of this area. Morgan's difficulty should be handled by the American Civil Liberties Union or by the American Association of University Professors although I am somewhat doubtful if Museum personnel falls within the scope of the latter organization" (RAAA: EH/HS 9/16/48). Such views were widespread. But in practice the ACLU assisted primarily non-Communist professors under attack, and at times it even privately cooperated with various loyalty boards and secretly turned over materials that had been given to them in confidence by Marxists, while the American Association for University Professors (AAUP) was weak and ineffectual in its defense of professors attacked as Communists (Salisbury 1984; Schrecker 1986:308–32). Some members of the AAA board and the association at large believed that if the accused individuals were Communists then they were probably getting their just desserts.

The association's executive board worked hard not to be distracted by McCarthy's intrusions into the terrain of academic freedom. It instead focused its energies on capturing the fruits of the Cold War economy for its membership. By ignoring these attacks, many of its members were rewarded through the increased availability of funding for this newly legitimized branch of the social sciences. Such were the benefits to be accrued by the academy in the Cold War economy.

The Postwar Economy

America entered World War II in a state of economic instability and uncertainty. But as the economies of Europe and Asia lay in ruins at the war's end, the United States, without substantial damage to its home front, emerged as the single most powerful economy in the world. But even with the spoils

of a global victory, the immediate postwar domestic economic picture was dominated by a looming state of economic uncertainty. Although the mid-1950s to 1960s would find America in an unprecedented economic boom, the war had not so much solved America's fundamental economic problems as it had simply delayed the necessity of coming to grips with market capitalism's requisite peaks, valleys, and market collapses. Although Roosevelt had restructured Depression-era tax codes and nationalized large portions of the American economy, the war shifted the focus of such nationalization efforts to the all-consuming focus of warfare. The war economy brought new governmental programs that resisted adapting to the postwar era. The postwar 1940s were a period of crucial decision making for American policy makers committed to the economic programs of a now permanent war-based economy (Melman 1974). The armistice could have led to a rapid transformation from a nation preparing for offensive maneuvers across the globe to a scaled-back War Department focusing instead on defense, transforming the war-based economy to one producing goods for public need rather than publicly subsidized munitions and weapons of surveillance and mass destruction. But without open discussion the American economy continued on the established path of arms spending that had solidified the country and economy during the war, thereby augmenting a highly subsidized military industrial economy that did not provide a solution to the problems of the Depression so much as it delayed the need for finding a solution.

President Truman's, and later Eisenhower's, concern that the Depression could return provided some of the motivation for establishing the new make-work programs of the Cold War economy. By the time President Eisenhower warned of the dangers of the nation's military industrial complex, it was too late. The strategy of financing bombs over butter had been undertaken and many of those who questioned this strategy were easily construed as enemies of the state. American financier Bernard Baruch's speechwriter, Herbert Bayard, coined the term "Cold War" in 1947, and Walter Lippmann's *The Cold War* placed the phrase in wider circulation. In the Cold War's earliest days, policy makers outlined the roles and strategies of the conflict, and the conversion to a peacetime war-based economy was swiftly implemented without public debate or consent: those who questioned the need for this economic shift were often dragged before the loyalty and security hearings of McCarthyism.

The smoke and mirrors easing this shift to a military economy were finely crafted and the government's accounting system categorized expenditures in such a way that the extent of America's military spending was (and is) not easy to divine. The end result was that America's national security state devoured ever-increasing amounts of money yet public awareness of the costs

associated with this economic shift steadily decreased until most citizens came to believe that the debts achieved by the time the Soviet Union collapsed were the result of domestic social programs and not the military industrial complex's special forms of corporate welfare (Vidal 1988).

The 1947 National Security Act set in motion a number of policies and dynamics designed to maintain a position of American economic and political dominance. With the work of articulate strategists such as George Kennan, America developed domestic and international strategies for dealing with those who would argue that the best hope for peace lay in peace rather than in perpetual war. Kennan argued this best in his secret 1948 State Department document known as "Policy Planning Study 23," where he argued that the United States should protect the interests of America's ruling elite through a policy designed to perpetuate the global imbalance of resources and power. He wrote: "We have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population . . . In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity . . . To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives . . . We should cease to talk about vague and . . . unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratizations" (1948:121–22).

Similarly, the adoption of National Security Council directive sixty eight, known widely as NSC-68, launched American foreign and domestic policy on an escalating arms race with the Soviet Union and built what would become the NATO alliance, while frightening the U.S. public by exaggerating the threat of the Soviet Union to the American way of life (Gaddis 1993; May 1993). Kennan and other Cold War policy strategists rationalized America's commitment to a military-based economy in which the public funding programs of the New Deal could be transformed into programs benefiting war industrialists, and an aggressive stance could be justified by the need to protect America's position as the wealthy victor of the world war.

The uncertainty of the postwar economy and the ascendancy of Soviet power in Europe brought a new national paranoia and concern for a creeping international red menace. As the Iron Curtain divided Europe and the Soviets maneuvered to stand toe to toe with Western technological advances, U.S. foreign policy engaged its former allies as opponents in arms races, space races, and humanitarian aid races as they fought each other using proxy nations as battlefields of contention for the hearts and minds of the world at home and abroad. From this perspective the Cold War can be seen as the

twentieth century's unacknowledged third world war: raging for over fifty years, and claiming over six million lives in America's proxy and direct military engagements in the nations of the world from Afghanistan to Zaire (see Stockwell 1991:81).

On the American home front there was a lack of public understanding of the economic costs of living in a state of perpetual warfare, wherein peace was a vital stage of war. This constant state of military escalation required that the American public not consider military spending as optional, and those who spoke out about the absurdity of this situation were to be seen as deviant. Thus, in 1946 the FBI reported with contempt the predictions of Communist George Hickerson (father of anthropologist Harold Hickerson) that in the near future "a large American Army will be raised for only one purpose and that was to be the instrument in an aggressive American imperialism, bound on a course of world domination" (WFO100-354492-3:3).²

As America's military budget exponentially increased, so did its defense against those who pointed out the needs of domestic and international equality. Anthropologists had long studied such structural protectionist ideological regulatory systems, although they were much more comfortable describing the intricate patterns of social alienation and accusations of witchcraft among the Azande, Navajo, or Ndembu than they were establishing such relationships at home. But the mechanisms of identifying scapegoats for punishment in times of crises or change were remarkably similar in both exotic and local occurrences (see Harner 1973; Harris 1974; Hill 1995).

McCarthyism helped divide Americans into oversimplified categories of "loyal followers" and "enemies of state." All those who did not consent to support a gamut of policies ranging from an arms policy of mutually assured destruction to America's mid-century bigoted system of racial, gender, and economic stratification were fair game for the unchecked scrutiny of loyalty tribunals. But the magic of McCarthyism hid from view the essential fact that protest, dissent, and Socialist and Communist activism all had long, rich American traditions that could not easily be enveloped under the dismissive heading of foreign threat.

The Foundations of American Marxism

The roots of Communism and anti-Communism run deep in America. Historian Michael Heale argues that throughout the nineteenth century popular visions of America's violent revolutionary past, coupled with the American ideological commitments to equality and the influx of refugees and political outcasts, made the United States a natural home for a variety of revolution-

aries. From the earliest nationalization, sedition, and alien acts of 1798 to the expulsion of immigrants during the Palmer raids and the mid-century Hatch Act (barring Communists from federal employment) there have been persistent baseless claims that radicalism was an imported phenomenon rather than derived indigenously from America's economic and social conditions. Even America's early labor actions in the 1850s were interpreted as linked to foreign ideas, as if standing up for a fair wage was somehow un-American. These efforts to organize the working poor "were thus immediately branded as both socialistic and foreign inspired, incompatible with the American philosophy of equal rights and equality of opportunity" (Heale 1990:16).

By the 1880s the abhorrent economic and social conditions of the Industrial Revolution fostered a widespread militant domestic labor movement. From its earliest moments the American labor movement was unsure of its commitment to activism directed at specific short-term piecemeal improvements, or of its devotion to establishing more radical changes in America's capitalist system. This division can be seen in the late nineteenth century's pronounced division between trade union Socialism and anti-Socialist trade unionists. Even among the trade-union Socialists there was great factionalism, as divergent forces birthed such diverse parties as the Socialist Labor Party, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist Party of America, and even the Christian Socialists. When Columbia University professor Daniel DeLeon began to lead the Socialist Labor Party (SLP) in 1890 there were new possibilities for the development of a uniquely American form of socialism. The late nineteenth century found the United States open to the consideration of new radical alternatives: in 1892 Populist presidential candidate James B. Weaver received over a million votes (and 8.5 percent of the popular vote) running on a platform that would have nationalized the railroads and other holdings of the era's robber-baron capitalist elites. Eugene Debs formed the American Railway Union in 1893 and, the following year, President Cleveland called out troops to suppress the strike against the Pullman Car Company. In 1898, Debs formed the Social Democratic Party and, three years later, joined forces with Morris Hillquit to form the Socialist Party of America (SPA).

In 1905, after a quarter century of consistent factionalism among American Socialists, a new effort to form "one big union" dedicated to fight for Socialist goals emerged with the formation of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The IWW was formed through cooperative efforts of William D. (Big Bill) Haywood (Western Federation of Miners), Eugene Debs (SPA), and Daniel DeLeon (SLP), although this alliance was short-lived. DeLeon was ousted in 1908 when the IWW shifted to a more anarcho-

syndicalist approach to direct action. Four years later, Debs received 897,011 votes in his run for the presidency (5.9 percent of the popular vote) (Draper 1957:41).

The U.S. labor movement remained a diverse conglomeration of Socialist, Communist, and anarcho-syndicalist groups. The actions of these groups earned extensive workplace reforms including worker safety rights, labor standards, shortened work-day and work-week standards, and child labor laws. The widespread acceptance of Marxist views could be seen in the broad spectrum of American writers as diverse as Sherwood Anderson, Upton Sinclair, Sinclair Lewis, and Jack London, all of whom helped to propagate Socialist views among their readers.

After 1918, the Bolshevik revolution changed the way American Socialists and Communists envisioned the possibility of revolutionary change at home. Many Russian American Socialists left America for Russia and, as reports from John Reed, Anna Louise Strong, and others began to bring the revolution home to many Americans, the fear spread across America of the possibility of such revolutions developing elsewhere. By March 19, 1919, when the Third Communist International declared a new era of world communist revolution, there were already two Communist parties in America, the largest of which, the Communist Party of America (CPA), was estimated to have had 24,000 members, while the Communist Labor Party (CLP) had some 10,000. In 1921, the CPA and CLP merged under the guidance of the Comintern into one party, which in 1929 came to be known as CPUSA. After raids and crackdowns during the first “red scares” of 1919 and 1922 (in which J. Edgar Hoover’s career was given a dramatic jump start), the party went underground to operate through the formation of secret cells, a tactic taken because party membership was illegal for foreign nationals, although it remained legal for American citizens. The Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation increasingly infiltrated and disrupted party activities. As the Depression made obvious the many problems of market capitalism, the Communist Party’s membership blossomed.

In the early 1930s the Communist Party opposed Roosevelt’s New Deal as mere reformist meddling in an economic system needing revolution. In 1935, Bulgarian George Dimitrov used his leadership at the Seventh Congress of Communist International to launch the Popular Front movement. The Popular Front was an adaptive, expansionist strategy helping Communists foster common cause with American liberal groups sharing their opposition to fascism. Suddenly the Communist Party became boosters of Roosevelt and his New Deal and there was a concomitant renaissance of Communist intellectualism across America. Labor unions (notably the Congress of

Industrial Organizations (CIO) which is estimated to have had significant Communist influence in its highly effective leadership), literary organizations, Hollywood, scientific federations, and professional associations all had prominent party members among their rank and file. Academics and intellectuals in metropolitan areas joined the party in large numbers.

In the 1930s, when the Communist Party organized rallies in support of the Scottsboro Boys,³ Communism became increasingly associated with activism for racial equality (Heale 1990:105). During the 1940s and 1950s, the Communist Party became involved in a number of legal cases involving black Americans. In many instances it was the Communists' commitment to progressive activism that drew anthropologists into the party because of its stated commitment to racial equality.

The high point of the American Communist Party's membership reached about eighty thousand during the Depression. But the gains made through the Popular Front movement disintegrated with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939. As American intellectuals felt betrayed by the Nazi alliance they left the party in droves, and the FBI pursued American Communists at new levels. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the USSR returned to its support of Roosevelt and, on America's entry into the war, formed alliances with the United States and the Allied forces against the common enemy of Germany. Once America entered the war, the requisite security clearance investigations allowed the FBI to collect innumerable dossiers on American citizens with reported past ties either to the party or to hundreds of groups classified as Front groups by the attorney general's office. These wartime security clearance investigations formed the basis of much of the FBI's McCarthy-era investigations.

In 1944, Earl Browder reorganized the CPUSA as the Communist Political Association, but Stalin purged Browder in 1945 and the party returned to its old name. After the war, the party tried to reestablish ties with the left wing of the Democratic Party (Starobin 1972). Some have argued that the Communist Party members' support of Henry Wallace and his Progressive Party's campaign for the presidency helped fuel (through motives of political vengeance more than ideological grounding) the Democrats' anti-Communist policies. Harvey Klehr, John Haynes, and Fridrikh Firsov suggest that "the failure of the Wallace campaign (it garnered only 2.3 percent of the national vote), however, left anti-Communists in firm control of the Democratic party and American liberalism. CIO leaders such as Philip Murray and Walter Reuther, deeply angered by the Communist role in the Wallace effort, drove Communists and Communist-dominated unions out of the labor federation, destroying what had been one of the CPUSA's chief

sources of strength” (1995:12). On campuses across the United States in the 1950s, professors who had supported the Wallace campaign found that such associations damaged their careers because they were interpreted as signs of links to Communism (Diamond 1992; Schrecker 1986).

The American Inquisitions: Torment by Committees

The red scares of the 1940s and 1950s have in some revealing ways been condensed in what remains of America’s popular memory. First, almost two decades of disparate episodes of red-baiting have come to be incorrectly recalled as limited to the early 1950s. Second, most Americans conceptualize these attacks as being primarily on individuals with links to Communist organizations, rather than with groups advocating racial equality, arms reduction, or the progressive labor movement. Third, the wide range of public loyalty hearings is simply associated with what is imagined as the isolated ranting of Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin.

While the term “McCarthyism” usefully describes a variety of attacks on the American left, these practices predated and lasted well beyond Senator McCarthy’s political reign. I adopt the term McCarthyism to describe events and red-baiting tactics used to harass and intimidate individuals even while recognizing that such antidemocratic, antilabor, and antiequality practices both predate and postdate McCarthy, but I use this term out of the recognition that it has come to generally describe these tactics.

The postwar McCarthy loyalty hearings had their roots in the 1939 Hatch Act that barred Communists from working for the federal government. On June 28, 1940, the Smith Act made it a crime for any individual to advocate the violent overthrow of the U.S. government, or to belong to any organization that advocated such an overthrow. In 1941, the Dies Committee of the U.S. Congress was charged with the task of identifying un-American activities linked with Communist organizations. Congressman Dies subsequently maneuvered to give his committee permanent status under the name of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (known colloquially as HUAC, an acronym that, as one of its hostile witnesses told me, should be pronounced as if one is preparing to “hawk one massive green loogie”).

In June 1940, Attorney General Jackson created the Custodial Detention Program empowering the FBI to compile lists of American citizens and resident aliens believed to be affiliated with subversive organizations.⁴ With this, the FBI’s budget jumped from \$8.7 million in 1940 to \$14.7 million the following year (see Theoharis 1999:4–5, 2002:11–12) as the organization was given broad powers to conduct break-ins, tap wires, and use confidential in-

formants to gather hearsay statements pertaining to the beliefs and actions of a wide range of Americans.⁵ As we will see, anthropologists were frequently added to custodial detention lists.

In July 1943 (Theoharis 1999:21), Attorney General Francis Biddle instructed the FBI to discontinue its Custodial Detention Program. But after the Amerasia Foundation scandal broke in 1945, in which classified Office of Strategic Services (OSS) documents were published and leaked to the Soviet Union, there was a growing public distrust of any individual in the intelligence community who had links to Communism (see Klehr and Radosh 1996). In March 1946, Attorney General Tom C. Clark enacted the FBI's secret Security Index Program, which empowered the FBI to compile and maintain lists of Americans and aliens to be detained during a period of national crisis.

In March 1945, less than a month after Stalin's "Two Camps" speech declared that a peaceful coexistence with capitalism would be impossible, electorally defeated Winston Churchill spoke of the "Iron Curtain" and the "Sinews of Peace" in Fulton, Missouri, at Westminster College. Stimulated by such discourse, the war's end brought a new current of anti-Communism to America. Anti-Communism became such a part of the postwar world that Republicans adopted the slogan "Communism or Republicanism" for their 1946 elections. Across the United States, federal and state legislative assemblies held hearings in the late 1940s to investigate the private politics of citizens suspected of holding Communistic beliefs.

Hoover's FBI: History and Practices

The FBI was the law enforcement agency that most prominently investigated and persecuted Americans suspected to have ties to Marxist organizations during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1924 J. Edgar Hoover became the director of what was then the Bureau of Investigation, and he ran the agency as his personal fiefdom until his death in 1972. As one of the most powerful Americans of the twentieth century, Hoover ran the FBI for almost fifty years with little interference or oversight from presidents, Congress, or the judiciary.

The FBI infiltrated and monitored the Communist Party in America from its inception. As one anthropologist (a former member of the Communist Party) told me, "we used to say, there are 50,000 members of the CPUSA . . . and only 25,000 of them are FBI Agents" (although this anthropologist also added that the party knew this and used their labor by putting them to work). When the Communist Party of America was formed in May 1921, the FBI assigned Special Agent K-97 (Francis A. Morrow, under the party name "Comrade Day") to join the party as its eyes and ears. By rapidly advancing to

the important post of district committee secretary Day fed the FBI invaluable information, including reports on party membership, structure, and secret codes used by members and leaders (Draper 1957:366–37). In 1922 Day was sent to the underground national convention. The FBI planned to raid the convention and arrest all in attendance, but the security measures taken by party officials prevented the bureau from locating the site of the convention until after it had adjourned.

From these earliest days of the party, the FBI infiltrated, monitored, instigated, and subverted the legal (until declared otherwise by the 1940 Smith Act) activities of the Communist Party. The FBI spent a fortune spying on formal and informal meetings, gaining access to party records, documents, and intelligence of all sorts. It hounded effectively, although it only crudely understood what it studied, making no distinctions about why American citizens or foreign nationals chose the way of Socialism or Communism: to the FBI they were all commie dupes.

J. Edgar Hoover was a law unto himself. At mid-century Hoover's FBI was well respected—and, more important, feared—across America. Hoover worked hard to foster an image of the FBI and his G-men as clever, honest, brave, and always victorious through dogged determination. He created a public image of himself as a straight-edged, uncompromising vigilante protecting truth, justice, and his American dream. The private Hoover, however, had little to do with the public projection of Hoover the bureau chief. The public Hoover was a no-nonsense, by-the-book, God-fearing patriot, while the private Hoover was a sophisticated blackmailer who abused his privileges as FBI director to control politicians, celebrities, and public figures. Whether this meant using his secret files on presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy, or Johnson's extramarital exploits, or his damaging information on members of Congress, Hoover privately created public policy by threatening the exposure of unflattering materials (Summers 1993; Theoharis 1991).⁶ Hoover both cohabitated and vacationed with FBI Assistant Director Clyde Tolson for almost fifty years in what is sometimes interpreted as a homosexual relationship (Summers 1993, cf. Leopold et al. 1994; Theoharis 1995), a fact that would not be worthy of mention had Hoover not used his knowledge of others' sexual proclivities as a source of blackmail.

Hoover considered himself above the law. He considered the Bill of Rights to be a nuisance, and he trained his agents to conduct wiretaps or black-bag operations (breaking into homes or offices to look for "evidence") without the use of warrants (Marro 1982; Theoharis 1999:22; cf. Rosenfeld 1999). Although Congress enacted legislation in 1934 that prohibited the use of wiretaps by law enforcement agencies, the FBI ignored these injunctions. Eventually, the 1939 Supreme Court ruling of *Nardone v. the United States* held that

this ban did indeed apply to the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies. But the FBI ignored these bans and for decades thereafter conducted wiretaps without court authorization (Edwardson 1999).

Hoover's bigotry was apparent in his administration of the FBI. No Jews, blacks, Hispanics, or Catholics were allowed to be bureau agents until the 1940s (Sullivan 1979:49). Hoover openly said that "there will never be a Negro Special Agent as long as I am Director of the FBI" (quoted in Sullivan 1979:268). Aside from the five menial, personal servants that Hoover claimed he "made special agents to keep them from being drafted" in World War II, the few blacks in the bureau in the 1960s under Hoover's directorship were hired due to pressures brought by the Justice Department (Powers 1987:323–24; see also Summers 1993:56–60). Hoover's dislike of minorities was amplified in his distrust of civil rights organizations. He was "concerned with black civil rights organizations almost exclusively in terms of their potential as targets for Communist infiltration. His condescending attitude toward black intelligence and judgment made him inclined to see these organizations as easy prey for the skilled propagandists and agitators of the Communist party" (Powers 1987:324).

Hoover's former assistant director of Domestic Intelligence, William C. Sullivan, admitted that much of the FBI's supposed crime-sleuthing abilities were hyped beyond their actual capacity. For example, the reported abilities of the FBI's crime laboratory were pure hyperbole: "The laboratory, described in an FBI publicity booklet as 'the greatest law enforcement laboratory in the world,' is the highlight of the public tour of FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. Over the years, millions of tourists have listened, awestruck, to glowing descriptions of the lab's capabilities and activities. Unfortunately, descriptions are nothing but a show-business spiel. The FBI Laboratory is in fact a real-life counterpart of the busy workroom of the Wizard of Oz—all illusion. Even the famous laboratory files were maintained for show. They look impressive, but they were really incomplete and outdated" (Sullivan 1979:95). The FBI's bureaucratic culture taught agents to at times falsify reports and evidence as a means of incriminating individuals they believed to be criminals. Former agent M. Wesley Swearingen reports how he was instructed to manufacture informants for reports. Once, prior to an annual inspection, his FBI supervisor called him into his office and told him to "develop some information for the forthcoming inspection" by FBI headquarters. Swearingen replied that this would be "no problem, knowing that I could fake my way through the task. Many agents took names from grave markers in the cemetery or names from the telephone book to refer to as potential informants in memos. I used names of janitors, bartenders, and newspaper delivery men to open informant files just before the inspection.

After the inspectors left town, I closed the files until next year. This was standard practice for most agents” (1995:54).

A combination of blind ambition and bureaucratic pressure to find or create evidence fitting the FBI’s intransigent world view led the organization to routinely falsify reports and collect dossiers on individuals and groups that it (or often, J. Edgar Hoover) deemed to be subversive or somehow divergent from the American way of life. Needless to say, this knowledge should engender an attitude of caution when relying on any FBI documents—in this book or elsewhere.

Historian and sociologist Sigmund Diamond used the Freedom of Information Act to establish that Hoover’s FBI infiltrated over fifty American college campuses in the 1950s (Diamond 1992). The FBI saw the prospect of free inquiry by intellectuals as a threat to national security and the American way of life (Fisher 1986), and the organization used a variety of methods and techniques to gather information on the opinions and actions of anthropologists and other professors it considered left-leaning. Among the FBI’s methods of spying on the anthropologists documented in this book are wiretaps; rummaging through trash cans at subjects’ homes or offices; monitoring the license plates of cars parked at meetings of interest; interviewing students, neighbors, colleagues, and supervisors of subjects; mail surveillance and mail opening operations; and tailing operations. These were the standard techniques used by the FBI in the 1940s and 1950s to spy on American citizens accused of subversive activities, and it may be decades until we learn the extent to which these unconstitutional practices are being used against Americans today.

After a group of unknown individuals called the Citizens Committee to Investigate the FBI broke into the Media, Pennsylvania, Resident Agency FBI office in 1971 and stole and distributed top-secret FBI documents, the world learned of the FBI’s extensive domestic counterintelligence program known as COINTELPRO that had infiltrated and sabotaged left-wing political groups in America for years (Churchill and Wall 1990:xi). The stolen documents revealed that the FBI had used agent provocateurs, assassins, and an assortment of illegal and underhanded tricks to attack members of the American left. The FBI used COINTELPRO to target Communists, Socialists, racial integrationist groups, women’s groups, the Black Panthers, the American Indian movement, and mainstream racial minority political candidates. Under COINTELPRO the FBI practiced warfare against democratic Americans struggling to change their own society. Tactics included death threats, poison-pen letters, smear campaigns, instigating violent attacks on activists, evidence-planting operations, suppressing the release of records that would clear accused activists, false arrests, and planting false stories in

the press—all for the political gain of the FBI and the right-wing conservative political agenda they protected (Churchill and Wall 1990). The FBI used COINTELPRO to frame numerous black activists like Geronimo Pratt, who spent twenty-seven years in prison before being cleared by the courts in 1997 (Olsen 2000). As the scope of the FBI's illegal activities became known in the Church hearings, rules regulating the organization were adopted and the domestic surveillance of law-abiding American citizens was curtailed. The brief curtailment of these actions, however, was swept aside by a frightened Congress in the months following the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Those few scholars who dared to criticize Hoover or the FBI found themselves to be targets of FBI investigations. In one instance, the FBI undertook an extensive (and expensive) campaign of surveillance and harassment directed against University of Colorado sociologist Howard Higman and his family after Higman had made a passing remark deriding Hoover to a student. The student (former Miss America, Marilyn Van Derbur) contacted the FBI, who decided it needed “to meet some of these academic punks in their own backyards” and began a prolonged campaign dedicated to hounding and harassing the offending professor (Summers 1993:174; Higman 1998:27–84). After playwright (and later, anthropology instructor) Donald Freed ridiculed, in his Broadway play *Inquest*, Hoover's role in the arrest and prosecution of the Rosenbergs, FBI agents saw to it that Freed lost his job—after which they attempted to provoke members of the Black Panthers to murder him (Swearingen 1995:116).

Academic Freedom and the Pall of Orthodoxy

As the FBI and the loyalty and security hearings investigated the politics of anthropologists and other professors, clear messages were sent concerning the inadvisability of research or extramural public work advocating for issues of social justice or equal rights (Holmes 1989). The principle of academic freedom holds that individuals must have the protected right to pursue academic enquiries independent of the political or economic controversies or consequences derived from their work. This most sacrosanct of academic principles—the very notion that knowledge must be pursued without fear of reprisal—is a product of the transformations of universities in the early twentieth century.

As Neil Hamilton's work clarifies, there are two components of academic freedom in America: constitutional academic freedom and professional academic freedom. Hamilton writes: “The two doctrines address similar goals about the importance of free inquiry and speech in the university, but each has different legal roots, and each presents different opportunities and con-

straints to address the goals. Constitutional academic freedom is rooted in the First and Fourteenth Amendments and prohibits government attempts to control or direct the university or those affiliated with it regarding either (1) the content of their speech or discourse; or (2) the determination of who may teach. Professional academic freedom is an employment law concept developed by the AAUP rooted in concerns over lay interference by boards of trustees and administrators in professors' research, teaching, intramural and extramural utterances" (1995:193). Historically, academic freedom has been promoted by academic professional associations and affirmed by the judiciary—but only weakly supported when the controversies of a given age draw in teachers, lecturers, instructors, or professors (McCormick 1989; Melby and Smith 1953; Meranto et al. 1985). Supreme Court Justice Brennan, in the majority decision in *Keyishian v. Board of Regents* (1967), affirmed the central importance of academic freedom when he wrote, "Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom" (*Keyishian v. Board of Regents* 385 U.S. 589). The loyalty hearings of the 1940s and 1950s and the FBI's investigations brought just such a pall, although it fell beyond the classroom into the private lives and politics of activist anthropologists.

The AAUP was the body primarily responsible for the codification of principles of academic freedom in America, and the reassertion and reformulation of these principles appears tied to American military actions. In 1915, with the onset of World War I, the AAUP produced a weakly written policy that championed the principles of academic freedom but tied the judgment of appropriate views to a discipline-based peer review concept. In 1940, as Europe raged in war, the AAUP produced a simple, clear, and powerful statement concerning the rights of academic freedom, writing: "Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning." The weak link of the AAUP's 1940—and present—statement is its insistence that along with the rights of academic freedom come inherent "responsibilities." Thus the AAUP offered academic freedom to "responsible" faculty who agreed to "at all times be accurate," "exercise appropriate restraint," and "show respect for others." In 1970 these "responsibilities" came to include the need of faculty "to foster and defend the academic freedom of students and colleagues" (AAUP 2001:133–34).

While the stipulations that professors have the responsibility to strive for accuracy is paramount to any academic endeavor, and while each of the identified "responsibilities" appears reasonable under principles of collegiality,

the notion that freedom is contingent on social definitions of “responsibilities” illuminates the AAUP’s view that academic freedom is an allotted privilege, not a fundamental right, available only to those who act and think in a “responsible” manner. The requirement of “responsibilities” clarified that academics are only leased the alienable right of academic freedom under the condition that they agree to problematically undefined standards of “responsibilities.”

As shown by the cases of Gene Weltfish, Bernhard Stern, Melville Jacobs, and others discussed in this volume, interpretations of these “responsibilities” were subjugated by a given era’s sense of crisis. Thus outspoken pacifists in times of war, activists fighting for economic equality, scientists measuring American racism, and Cold War American Communists were judged as irresponsible and ineligible for the same protections of academic freedom afforded to their colleagues whose views are aligned with the status quo (Rogin 1967; Horne 1986).

On March 25, 1949, the regents of the University of California required all employees to sign an anti-Communist loyalty oath. This decision was in part a reaction to the then recent anti-Communist hearings at the University of Washington (see chapter 2), but the California oath generated national repercussions. Initially, most faculty strongly opposed the regents’ demand for loyalty declarations, with a majority of faculty calling for the oath to be rescinded. During the 1949–1950 academic year, professors refusing to sign the oath were paid but were not issued letters of appointment—thus explicitly undermining the notion of tenure. The following year the regents declared that all who did not sign the oath would be fired. On March 22, 1950, the faculty voted 1,154 to 136 (with 33 abstentions) to abolish the loyalty oath. At the same time it endorsed by a similar margin (1,025 in favor, 268 opposed, 30 abstentions) its own faculty-generated anti-Communist statement in a move designed to assure the regents that academic freedom rather than Communism was the reason for opposing the loyalty oath (Schrecker 1986:119).⁷

Thirty professors were fired from the University of California system as a result of the loyalty oath. Because they were not demonstrable Communists but were considered to be “men and women of principle fired for their stand on principle,” numerous civil libertarians denounced the oath, although many of these fair-weather civil libertarians were not in principle opposed to firing actual Communists (see Schrecker 1986:117).

Outside of the academy revelations of several Soviet spy rings brought the notion of a “Communist threat” to the American public’s imagination. While a number of Soviet espionage arrests had occurred in Canada in the postwar period, such arrests did not occur in the United States until March

1949 when Soviet citizen Valentine Gubitchev and Justice Department employee Judith Coplon were arrested on espionage charges. America's fears multiplied as the power of the atomic bomb spread beyond the proprietary domain of the United States. The following year brought the nuclear espionage arrests of Klaus Fuchs in London, as well as David Greenglass, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, Abraham Brothman, and Miriam Moskowitz in the United States. In 1952 Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean defected from the British Foreign Ministry to the USSR. Soon after CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith announced that Soviet agents had penetrated every American intelligence organization, including the CIA, President Eisenhower secretly authorized the U-2 spy plane to fly over the Soviet Union. Once the Rosenbergs were executed in 1953, America entered a new era of fear and distrust.

It was the Democrats who unleashed the power of loyalty witch-hunts on mid-century America—although it would be the Republicans who by terror and innuendo developed these trials into a true art form of the absurdist inquisition. With the Truman Doctrine, America embarked on a commitment of fighting Communism both at home and abroad. President Truman planted and fertilized the seeds of McCarthy's rise to prominence and reckless power by requiring all federal employees to sign loyalty oaths proclaiming whether or not they had ever belonged to any of the organizations deemed subversive by the Attorney General. Truman initially intended that these loyalty oaths would be used to monitor security aspects of federal employment, but the recklessness with which loyalty hearings were conducted led to the destruction of hundreds of careers (Bernstein 1989).

In February 1949 congressmen Karl Mundt and Richard Nixon introduced the Mundt-Nixon Bill requiring the registration of all American Communists. That summer, just three days after the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb, Pope Pius XII excommunicated all Communists. The 1950 Internal Security Act (aka the McCarran Act) was a Cold War legislative watershed strengthening the federal government's ability (largely through the FBI) to persecute individuals in the name of national security. The act created a Subversive Activities Control Board endowed with the discretionary power to divine which educational or political organizations were un-American. The McCarran Act created mechanisms for the arrest and "custodial detention" without trials of "radicals" during times of national crisis, empowered the State Department to limit passports and rights of travel for suspected radicals, and allowed for the arrest and deportation of foreign radicals.

Joseph McCarthy was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1946. It was not until February 1950 that he made his first public accusations against a vast Communist conspiracy, wildly claiming that 205 Communists had infiltrated the

State Department. It did not matter that his later testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations failed to identify a single “card-carrying” member of the Communist Party. His power and appeal were tied to his ability to generate fear and intrigue, not to the establishment of any factual connections to Communism (Oshinsky 1983).

McCarthy used his position as the chairman of the Government Committee on Operations of the Senate and his membership on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to parade hundreds of witnesses accused of having links to the Communist Party or to front organizations. By 1953 McCarthy’s ever-widening scope of recklessness came to include persons and agencies of real power and, as he strayed from the more vulnerable targets of the liberal and radical left, his power and appeal quickly dissipated. He veered so far off course in 1954 that he began accusing members of the army and the CIA of being part of the Communist conspiracy, and he even claimed that President Eisenhower was soft on Communism. Senator McCarthy’s fall from power was even quicker than his rise, with a 67 to 22 senatorial censure vote in 1954.

In McCarthy’s heyday the theatrics of anti-Communism were always more important than the findings. The media recorded his posturing innuendos without focusing on the damage caused by such hasty behavior. When on February 9, 1950, McCarthy waved his sheets of paper before the Wheeling, West Virginia, Republican Women’s Club, the press uncritically reported the event as if it were news, and in the years that followed they sold newspapers as accomplices to his theatrics of shame and fear. When his list of names dropped from 205 to 57 the following day, it mattered little as long as the drama of accusations and charges sold papers and advertisements for toothpaste. The melodramatic success of the McCarthy and McCarran hearings paved the way for the passage of the 1954 Communist Control Act, which further restricted the rights of individuals in Communist organizations both real and imagined.

Hiram Bingham in his five-year role as chairman of the Federal Loyalty Review Board developed important repressive policies and procedures that were further refined by senators McCarthy, McCarran, and others.⁸ Bingham used the attorney general’s list of subversive organizations to hound American progressives from all walks of life, and his FBI file indicates he coordinated his efforts with the FBI to harass American progressives employed in the federal government (WFO62-82273-672). Although HUAC was not disbanded until 1975 (Criley 1990:77), the Smith Act (of 1940) was overturned by a Supreme Court ruling in 1957, which made it once again legal to belong to the Communist Party. By then, however, news of Khrushchev’s 1956 revelations about Stalin along with the ravages of McCarthyism had reduced the

membership of the CPUSA to fewer than 25,000. Whatever threat the party had ever represented to the American status quo was gone.

The Nature of McCarthyism

The forms and functions of the 1940s and 1950s loyalty and security hearings need to be considered here. Although forms varied somewhat depending on time and place, these hearings were commonly staged with witnesses parading before boards of elected or nonelected officials asking questions designed to insinuate that the subject was disloyal to the United States. The legal standing of these local, state, or national hearings was often questionable and the legal protections afforded witnesses varied greatly. Frequently the questions asked were not intended to be answered so much as they were meant to imply high levels of unspecified guilt.

The ritualized nature of these hearings did not escape the notice of anthropologists and sociologists. In 1956 sociologist Harold Garfinkel described “status degradation ceremonies” in which structured ceremonies are used to shame and denounce persons in otherwise good social standing in order to reduce their social stature. The subjects of the degradation process are systematically represented as frauds that have misrepresented themselves, and they are thus systematically reduced in stature to take on a downgraded social status marked with stigma. These ceremonies transform the individual identities diminishing the basic trust afforded to other members of a society. Garfinkel observed that all societies have degradation ceremonies of some type, noting that “only in societies that are completely demoralized, will an observer be unable to find such ceremonies, since only in total anomic are the conditions of degradation ceremonies lacking” (1956:420).

Victor Navasky observed that there are obvious applications of Garfinkel’s theory of degradation ceremonies for the loyalty and security hearings of the 1940s and 1950s. He states: “Their job was not to legislate or even to discover subversives (that had already been done by the intelligence agencies and their informants) so much as it was to stigmatize” (1980:319). Thus, under Garfinkel’s rubrics HUAC’s badgering of witnesses served to “effect the ritual destruction of the person denounced” and helped to foster social solidarity among those who were not the subject/victims of these ceremonies (1956:421).

Steven Spitzer recognized that a social notion of deviance “emerges from and reflects the ongoing development of economic forces (of the infrastructure)” and that superstructure functions to manage and regulate members of society, particularly “problem populations” (1980:179). One of the strengths of Spitzer’s theory is that by focusing on general principles rather than spe-

cific acts, we can account for cross-cultural instances of deviance. Spitzer theorized that actions and beliefs supporting a society's mode of production are construed as nondeviant, while those that threaten the development and free functioning of its economic sector become deviants. Thus, in an economy that is dominated by productive forces requiring intense focus in a demanding, high-stress environment, drugs (e.g., coffee, cigarettes) that help employees focus on the labor requirements of a demanding workplace will be selected for, as well as those (e.g., alcohol) that allow for a controlled distancing of unwinding. However, those (e.g., LSD, marijuana) that foster responses of hyperindividualism or apathy will be deemed deviant. Likewise, in a society based on intense ethnic, gender, economic, and racial segregation, individuals who advocate the abolition of such systems of stratification will also be seen as deviant.

To the credit of the field, anthropologists were among Senator McCarthy's suspects from the very beginning of his witch-hunt. Just hours after his Wheeling, West Virginia, speech McCarthy confided to journalists that chief among the names on his list of 205 known communists "was a professor of anthropology, a woman" (Reeves 1982:235). Although McCarthy did not further identify this anthropologist, the controversy surrounding the publication of Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish's (1943) *Races of Mankind* made both women likely contenders. When Weltfish was later subpoenaed to appear before McCarthy he made no secret of the contempt he held for her, Benedict, and their work demonstrating that northern blacks had higher IQs than southern whites (see chapter 6).

Most hearings allowed witnesses to be accompanied by members of legal counsel, who usually had little function other than to advise their clients, under the protection of the Fifth (and occasionally First) Amendment, to avoid answering questions. These committees at times used professional witnesses, or FBI informants, who made careers out of producing lists of citizens allegedly involved in Communist Party activities. As Victor Navasky (1980) observed, prominent among these informer types were reluctant informers, unfriendly informers, enthusiastic informers, informed and philosophical informers, uninformed informers, truth-telling informers, combative informers, denigrating informers, noisy informers, comic informers, husband-and-wife informers, informers-by-dispensation, and even resister informers. Philosopher Barrows Dunham understood that HUAC gained its strength through fear and that the committee "lived on names. The more names they had, the more hearings they could have, the more people they could drag to the pillory before the public to spread the terror. They lived on names until they ran out of names, and then they died of inanition" (quoted in Schultz and Schultz 1989:131). Although the informers gave the commit-

tees their strength and power, it was the Cold War's national security state that incubated the conditions for terror.

This witch-hunt was based on the premise that Marxism, Communism, and Socialism represented fundamental threats to the American way of life. But the "American way of life" in the 1940s and 1950s was predicated on a fundamental stratification of race, gender, class, and wealth. While American Marxists and non-Marxists challenged this structural system of prescribed inequality, the conservative forces of government, industry, and bureaucratic power demonized those who fought for a society of equal rights, equal worth, and equal opportunity. Although the various red hunters of Congress, the Senate, and assorted school boards made much of the Communist Party's commitment to revolution by any means, many members of the party were nothing more than committed localized activists who joined a group promoting progressive change.

The most important functional outcomes of these hearings were that they helped terrify and divide the American left. The bonds that had been formed during the Popular Front period were severed as many liberal Democrats redefined themselves as anti-Communist, or even anti-anti-Communist, while others became silent in the climate of fear. Some on the left objected to McCarthy's tactics more than they did to his assault on the rights of free thought and free association. For some Americans, like playwright Lillian Hellman, this brought divisions among those on the left that were not easily repaired. It made naked the fickle nature of freedom of belief in America, while it exaggerated the idea of the harm brought by those with Communist affiliations. As Hellman wrote years later: "I am still angry that the anti-Communist writers' and intellectuals' reason for disagreeing with McCarthy was too often his crude methods . . . Such people would have the right to say that I, and many like me, took too long to see what was going on in the Soviet Union. But whatever our mistakes, I do not believe we did our country any harm. And I think they did" (1976:154–55).

Beyond the National Lawyers Guild, most civil rights and civil liberties organizations such as the ACLU did little to assist Communists under attack by HUAC or other boards. The ACLU was generally squeamish when it came to defending Communists in the 1940s and 1950s, and it regularly tried to determine if clients accused of party membership were falsely accused before taking their cases. Perhaps the most disturbing revelation about the ACLU is that its board member and lead general council (1929–1955), Morris Ernst, carried on a secret correspondence with J. Edgar Hoover in which Ernst "sent Hoover and Nichols scores of confidential letters written to him by friends and associates" (Salisbury 1984:579). Ernst purged party members from the ACLU and prevented it from defending Communists. These were harsh de-

cisions, as Ernst and the ACLU “drove the veteran Communist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn off its board, declared war on fellow travelers and approved a resolution that put party members beyond the pale. They were deprived of A.C.L.U. support or sympathy because, in effect, they were part of a foreign conspiracy. The line was drawn exactly” (Salisbury 1984: 577). It is tragic that this was the organization that the executive board of the American Anthropological Association thought would defend the rights of anthropologists accused of Communist connections. But an organization that would not tolerate Communists in its own ranks could hardly champion the rights of academic freedom of anthropologists attacked by the agents of McCarthyism.

Party Bogeymen

There are heated and prolonged debates among contemporary scholars of the Cold War concerning the nature of the relationship between individual American Communists and the Soviet Union’s control over the central party’s apparatus. The early post-Cold War period produced a flurry of books by right-wing scholars using previously unavailable materials from the KGB, CIA, FBI, and other agencies to argue that McCarthy and other fanatics of the 1950s were correct in their view that American Communists were working for a secret global network of Communists. There are variations in these works but the basic approach can best be seen in Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov’s *The Secret World of American Communism* (1995), where files from the KGB’s archives are used to argue that the actions of CPUSA were carefully orchestrated from Moscow. These documents suggest to Klehr et al. that all party members acted at the beck and call of Soviet masters. While Klehr’s archival work sheds important light on contacts between American and Soviet Communism, the files can also be interpreted in ways less conspiratorial (e.g., Navasky 2001). The documents examined by Klehr et al. suggest a far less successful and centrally powerful Soviet-based party than is claimed by most red-baiting McCarthyist cold warriors of the 1940s and 1950s. Instead of an effective foreign-organized political machine, we find a weak, frequently ignored, and poorly funded apparatus that accomplished little of note at the beck and call of Moscow. Most of the activist successes of the party were based on efforts of American progressives not Muscovite controllers.

Because a few American Communists were involved in espionage, the likes of Klehr, Haynes, Firsov, and others impugn the motivations and actions of all of the party’s rank and file. Such accusations make for convenient historical justifications for the widespread attacks on individual lives and progressive civil rights work, but they have little to do with the histori-