CULTURES IN CONTACT

WORLD MIGRATIONS IN THE

SECOND MILLENNIUM

DIRK HOERDER

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Acknowledgments and Dedication

As a student I was fortunate to experience the fascinating 1960s and 1970s when new questions were asked, when the "underdogs" or "working classes" were placed in the center of attention. Like other eager young men I later realized that women had gotten lost in men's historiography. Throughout my academic career women in scholarship have persistently asked questions and improved my approaches to a gendered world, the women among my student assistants changed generic masculine language to gender-neutral wording without bothering to ask. Edward Said's critique of orientalism and the concept of imaginary ethnography as well as studies of how the West was viewed by Others have helped me to understand processes of knowledge production. I have benefited greatly from all of them.

I have read widely for this research, but my languages are limited to German, English, and French. Friends and colleagues have on occasion helped with Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Swedish, and Dutch. Scholars from some countries, who customarily provide English or French abstracts with their publications, have facilitated my access to other national discourses, as did my colleagues in the internationally cooperative Labor Migration Project. In particular, I am grateful to my colleagues at Duke University who provided a stimulating intellectual environment. Toronto colleagues—Canadians of Italian, Ukrainian, and other origins—welcomed me whenever I did research in that delightful city. My study of Canadian immigrant autobiographies has supplemented the global perspective taken here. I am indebted to my students at York University, the University of Toronto, and Duke University, for lively discussions, and to those in Bremen, who shared their own migratory experiences with me.

I am indebted to the University of Bremen for agreeing to a leave of absence and to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Canada Council who supported parts of it. Its scope notwithstanding, no major grants and research staff have supported the project—some of its limitations derive from the fact that it was a single-person undertaking. But no individual works in a void. Marion Schulz, Camilla Sledz, Gabriele Intemann, Deborah Allen, and others helped with the bibliographical searches. Paul Betz's and Irina Schmitt's copyediting and Annika McPherson's proofreading were a major help. Maps were prepared by Matthias Scheibner, Christa

Scheibner, and Carolyn King, graphs by Rolf Suabedissen. I could test my approaches by lectures at several North American and European universities and discuss my findings at the meetings of the Social Science History Association.

Differentiated arguments of studies cited often had to be reduced to a few lines. Dates, even in standard works, often varied slightly from one to the next. I have caught some such inconsistencies but others may have escaped my notice. Several colleagues read whole chapters or provided comments on my understanding of distant cultures and migration systems: Nancy Green and Jack Veugelers, Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Donna R. Gabaccia, Steve Hochstadt, and many others named in the annotations at appropriate places. Martin Klein, Sucheta Mazumdar, José Moya, Martin Franzback, Gabriele Scardellato, Robert E. Johnson, and Leslie Page Moch read particular chapters and saved me from many errors, as did two anonymous reviewers and the series editors. All of them have questioned assumptions, improved interpretations, and provided encouragement when the vast subject matter threatened to overwhelm me. I am deeply grateful to all of them—and take sole responsibility for any errors remaining.

In particular I am indebted to my wife, Christiane Harzig, an accomplished migration historian in her own right, for many stimulating discussions. Our daughter Anna usually bore my mental life in the past with patience. Once, after another lengthy trip to give papers and do research, she greeted me with that piercing look of hers. "If this continues, I am going to emigrate. (*Pause*) And I am going to write emigrant letters—*then* you have something to do research on. (*Another pause*) But I am going to copy parts of them from other emigrants' books. And (*intensification of the piercing look*) then you are lost!" I dedicate this book to both of them.

Contexts: An Introductory Note to Readers

Migration, once defined as a crossing of borders between states, is now understood as a social process and appears as a basic condition of human societies. It begins with departure out of parental households and ranges as far as transcontinental or trans-oceanic moves—a geographic scope that might be one and the same move of a man or a woman. On the other hand, marriage migration from one village to the next could involve more demands for adaptation than a move from a society to an ethnic enclave a continent away. Dislocation by famine or war could end in death, foraging nearby or afar, or in long-distance migration. In the medieval and early modern periods merchant travel, military service abroad, political exile, and student mobility could and did provide information for others who then migrated permanently. In this survey no restrictive definition of mobility and migration has been adopted, though distinctions are outlined.

The comprehensive approach chosen here—the connection of economic region, social world, polity, and family of departure via intervening inducements and obstacles to a recharting of life-courses after arrival—demands both analysis of the whole of the societies and of human agency of particular men and women. From the point of view of individuals, societies consist of regional economies and cultures and, after migration, of religious, craft, or ethnic networks. I have tried to indicate ranges of options voluntary migrants felt they had as well as the constraints faced by forced migrants.

As to numbers of migrants, it was impossible to aggregate "pluralist" and contradictory information into one set of data. Sometimes individuals were counted, sometimes heads of families; often statistics did not distinguish gross from net migration. States, or rather state administrators, had specific interests to inflate or deflate migration statistics and generally lacked adequate systems of collecting data. Some migrants avoided being counted; others were counted repeatedly; sometimes nonmigrants wanted to be counted. In a state-centered approach, units of counting vary in size from China to Luxembourg or, like the Habsburg Empire or the Southeast Asian states, changed boundaries over the course of history. I refer to estimates and to the revision of estimates, sometimes voicing skepticism of high estimates.

Any work of this scope, unless a synthesis in a few deft strokes, creates difficul-

ties in organization. I have opted for an integrated chronological, topical, and spatial perspective. To help readers interested in one particular region of the world or in one particular topic navigate their way through this study, references at the end of specific sections provide guidance to chapters or parts of chapters that continue the regional or topical discussions. For example, the migration history of Russia/the Soviet Union/the Commonwealth of Independent States begins as part of European urbanization and regional agricultural settlement (chap. 12), separates into a distinct system (chap. 13), then becomes one of several forced labor systems (chap. 17), and opens up again after 1989 (chap 19.9). Similarly, forced labor appears in the Mediterranean system of slavery; expands into Asian bondage, African human pawnship, and European indenture; continues into African slavery and Asian "coolie" labor; and extends into twentieth-century German, Russian, and Japanese forced labor. I have frequently pointed to similarities between migration processes in different cultures—reservoirs for cheap labor, for example, like Polish territories for the economy of Germany and Mexican people for the economy of the United States. Such comparisons are but heuristic devices to understand distant, "foreign," developments within familiar frameworks. They do not adequately reflect differences between specific migratory movements.

Conventional designations for pre–nineteenth-century states, like "France" and "Britain" or "India" and "China," impose statist concepts on diversities of regional cultures without even common languages. For lack of better terms, this study, too, has to rely on such defective terminology. Similarly, conventional designations for social regimes are misleading. Serfdom, for example, suggests sedentary ways of life under lordly control. How did enserfed families react when soil was exhausted, when children needed land, or when an epidemic killed off most of their neighbors? Were peasants not agents, if constrained ones, of their own lives? The same question has been asked about slaves in the Americas and about carters and boatmen in China. About one-half of the populations living at any particular time in history change residence by marriage migration. Many migrate to perceived opportunities and to shape their own and their children's lives—provided the emotional cost in ruptured relationships does not increase beyond expected material advantage. Quantifiers would have difficulties in approaching these multiple scales, but each and every migrant weighs his or her or the family's options and arrives at a sum total, a chart for their life-course decisions.

One colleague in migration research in exasperation reduced the data for his graphs and maps because otherwise they would have looked like a bowl of spaghetti. Human movement might as well be compared to the grains in a sack of rice. In a way, both spaghetti and sacks of rice would be easy to study; migrants, by contrast, have minds of their own and plans for their futures. Myriads of moves across space result from the will of men and women to fashion lives. The survival of forced migrants depended on their will to reconstruct their identities and attempt to regain some control over their values, emotions, and relationships. In contrast, throughout history rulers and administrators, plantation owners and capitalists, theorists

of race and population planners have reduced human mobility to schemes facilitating their policies and reduced women and men and children to human material. Their constructs were—and are—of pitiful simplicity when compared to the complex choices of a South American Native family faced with armed Spanish and Portuguese newcomers, or those of a Chinese peasant family with insufficient land, or those of a Turkish family caught up in twentieth-century labor migrations. In many of the grand schemes of states and political economies, grains of rice were treated with more care than human beings.

My own cultural world, the Euro–North American one, has shaped my perspective. It has helped me to transcend national histories and to integrate the multiple migrations of particular ethnic groups into the Atlantic Migration System. But as an attempt to provide a synthesis of migrations worldwide, of cultural interaction and conflict, the Atlantic perspective proved to be confining. It did not equip me to deal with cultural intricacies of the Indic World or the cultures of sub-Saharan Africa. In writing this book, I have changed terminologies and viewpoints from one draft to the next in order to move away from Atlanto-centric perspectives. I hope that this global approach will provoke further critical discussion, that my arguments will be expanded and revised by scholars whose background is culturally different.

Exploration of many cultures involves a great number of contrasting and conflicting perspectives (map 1.1). Where is east, where west? America is a western culture viewed from Europe, an eastern one viewed across the Pacific. Maps contain ambiguities, and cartography has been Eurocentric for centuries. According to Harley and Woodward, "Recognition of the ideological, religious, and symbolic aspects of maps, particularly when linked with a more traditional appreciation of maps for political and practical purposes, greatly enhances the claim that cartography can be regarded as a graphic language in its own right." Early maps have been called "imagined evocations of space"—but is a late-twentieth-century Western map of seventeenth-century Indian Ocean and East Asian trade that merely charts routes of European colonizer shipping more than a self-serving image, an instrument of power? And which chronology do we follow? When in the Latin Christian Era the year 2000 began, Coptic Christians still lived in 1716, and the Jewish world had entered they year 5760. The Tamil calendar pegs the count at 2029; the Buddhist one at 2543, the Sikh one at 301. Or should time be counted not by religions but by arrival in a territory? Then the first people in Australia might count the year 42,000.[1]

Who is the Other? Medieval "heretics" like twentieth-century C.E. "draft-dodgers" espouse different ethical principles, political beliefs, and emotional worlds than those with the power to define and to shape received discourse. An emigrant in one culture is an immigrant at the end of his or her voyage—and perhaps a vagrant in between. An innocuous statement, such as "the farmer sold his grain," may disguise family labor and migrations.

It is impossible to refashion the whole terminology, chronology, and conceptualization of migration, but I attempt to use it cautiously. Different human ways of living—whether in small groups (tribes), within limited cultural territories (ethnici-

ties), or in large entities (states, nations, empires), or of continental or transcontinental dimensions (civilizations)—are equally valid cultural expressions. Amerindian retreat is as much a migration as Euro-American expansion, and both are connected by power relations. National cultures, a very recent phenomenon in the history and material life of societies, are in constant evolution and transformation. "Race" and "color of skin" are social constructs whose connotations vary over time and across cultures; the White/Colored dichotomy posits that White is no color; designations like the "Indian" or "Negro problem" are White discursive strategies to hide the problem of White racism. Usage of terms also changes over time and from one culture to the other. "Whites" are also called Caucasians, but the peoples of the Caucasus region are not necessarily considered White in the present. Europeans and Americans of European origin think of themselves as White; the U.S. census defines the peoples of North Africa and southwestern Asia as White. On the other hand, Anglo-Saxon and Nordic racist thought of the late nineteenth century considered East Europeans, South Europeans, the Irish, and Jews not to be White. Such constructions are numerous, and there are as many shades of white as of any other color.

In this study, I deal with men and women leaving their homes or, to use a different emphasis, striking out into new directions. They lived under constructs of color and culture but wanted to evaluate losses, options, and chances according to their own terms of reference. I attempt to focus on their lives, cultural expressions, and initiatives, not merely on "streams," "flows," or "waves" of migrant masses.

1

Worlds in Motion, Cultures in Contact

Historians study men and, less so until recently, women who left archives rather than traces in the sand. Thus migrants have been shortchanged in historiography though human mobility, the agency of men and women, continuously changed societies and redefined parameters of action. My first goal is to describe and analyze migration from the local level to the continent-wide and global. My second goal is to discuss interaction resulting from migration. Warrior migrants aggressively destroy existing societies. Peasant and labor migrants aim at becoming part of the host societies. In intermediate stops and at the end of their journeys they have to earn their living and establish new communities. They fall in love and beget and give birth to children, fuse their cultural traditions with exigencies of the new surroundings, and develop new subsistence bases. Third, I focus on the self-changing societies into which migrants enter. They do not undermine stable cultures. In fact, societies throttled by stability face the departure of men and women who look for opportunities more challenging and promising for their life-courses.

1.1   People on the Move: Changes over Ten Centuries

This inquiry begins with a Mediterranean-outward approach and traces connections to East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Equally valid perspectives would start from China or the Gulf of Persia–Indic World. In Europe migrations of whole peoples—Visigoth, Teutonic, Slavic—ended in the eleventh century with permanent settlement, and gender relations probably changed at this time.[1] In Central Asia and Africa people's migrations continued for several more centuries. Historic migrations in other civilizations were summarized retrospectively when in the sixteenth century European colonizers began to trade with peoples along the coasts of all oceans. The colonizers' construct of a White versus Colored dichotomy between themselves and Others hid processes of ethnogenesis in which colonial creole peoples emerged. It assumed cultural hierarchies and posited racial superiorities where the dichotomy was one of power and the differences were cultural.

Onto such mixed peoples nineteenth-century Europe-centered gatekeepers im-

posed constructs of ethnoculturally homogeneous nations—though among Chinese sages concepts of superiority existed to which Japanese propagandists juxtaposed their people's valor. For centuries peoples from the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe interacted from the Levant to the South Seas. The cultures of the Indian Ocean or of the Americas, not yet named, influenced each other and changed over time. Mediterranean, Chinese, and Indian traders formed mixed societies along the coasts of the globe. Slaves were forced to migrate; peasant people migrated voluntarily. All intermarried or consorted with resident peoples. Genetically "pure" or culturally self-contained peoples are merely myths, and continuities from times immemorial are but ephemeral self-constructions of ethnic identities. Ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism, the catchwords of the 1990s, have been societal practice throughout history.

Migration, cultural interaction, and change have been constituent features of human life, of construction of societies, of commercial exchange. Views of the Self and the Other often were (and are) self-serving. The Central Asian and Islamic "Turks" were said to threaten Christian Europe at a time when Latin Christians destroyed the Byzantine Christian World and annihilated dissenters. When under seventeenth-century Islamic Ottoman rule different peoples and creeds coexisted, if only in hierarchical relationships, the Christian powers of the "Holy Roman Empire" and beyond destroyed one-third of West Central Europe's people in warfare over religious persuasions and power. In the present, when Third World refugees are said to flood industrialized societies, First World capital penetrates the remotest corners of the globe and uproots local people. Who is perceived as a stranger, as the Other, depends on power relationships, on contemporary gatekeepers and retrospective historiographers.

Five periods of migration and cultural change may be discerned. In the first, the multicivilizational Mediterranean and Black Sea World of Latin and Byzantine Christendom, of Sunni and Shiite Islam, and of Jewish communities included western Asia, southern Europe, and northern Africa. Caravan traders on trans-Saharan routes connected the world of the Eastern Mediterranean to Black Africa. Trans-Asian routes, interrupted by Mongol expansion at the end of the thirteenth century, were reestablished during the *pax mongolica.* The Mediterranean World's core shifted from the intercultural Alexandria-to-Constantinople crescent to Urban Italy in Latin Christendom. Transalpine Europe remained distant until the fifteenth century, though merchants traveled northward over the mountain passes and via fairs to Bruges in the Urban Netherlands. The endless feudal wars in the north, however, induced merchants from Urban Italy to explore a westward circum-Iberian route with their galleys. A separate northern "common market," the fourteenth-century Baltic-centered Hanseatic Federation, lost its position to the North Sea–oriented Dutch within a century. After 1500 trade and the commercial core shifted to the urban segments of the Atlantic seaboard, the Iberian and Dutch societies. In the eastern Mediterranean, the emerging Ottoman Empire realigned Muslim states, both Turkoman and Arab. Genoese merchants traded with Islamic Arab merchants and through them

with India. Trade zones surpassed state boundaries, while commercial links and the mobility of producers connected civilizations—but were also forces of conflict and competition.

The Mediterranean slave system brought Central Asian, North African, and Black African men and women to southern Europe and European ones to North Africa. Christian crusaders mobilized masses, but achieved no unity. Latin, Byzantine, Coptic, Nestorian, and other denominations interacted with the various Judaic, Islamic, Indic-Hinduist, and Buddhist East Asian denominations. Frankish settlers in Palestine converted to Arab-Islamic culture; Norman peoples settled along the Atlantic coast and in Sicily; peasant migrations made Central Europe a zone of interspersed Slavic and Germanic settlement. Towns and cities across the world depended on continuous in-migration to even maintain population levels. The fourteenth-century climatic change and plagues, in which one-third of the Eurasian peoples died, formed the major caesura; recovery of population size and previous levels of economic activity took a century and a half. In transalpine Europe, wars, struggles between ruling families and their political apparatuses, and doctrinal rigidity of religious gatekeepers influenced migratory patterns. Only after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 did a new state system and new migrations evolve.

By the fifteenth century, "Europe" became a concept, and Latin Christianity had externalized Others, Jews in particular. The Islamic World had been unified by the house of Osman from the Balkans and the Black Sea through its Anatolian core into North Africa and the Gulf of Hormuz. New bureaucratic rationalities competed with hereditary privileges in empires and religions. The Christian and Islamic civilizations' "time of troubles" from the 1570 to the 1650s dislocated men and women.[2] Throughout the period, the construction of Others in ethnic or religious terms amalgamated the many into larger categories, such as the Huns, Turks, Franks, and Germans. On a cognitive level this process provided simple recognizable structures for the perplexing multiplicity of peoples. On the level of social relations it provided boundaries and permitted in-group solidarity. On the level of power relationships it denigrated the Other.

A second period, beginning as early as the mid-fifteenth century, brought merchants and soldiers from the Western Mediterranean to societies of other large and elaborate civilizations. The societies of Western Africa had been part of Arab-Mediterranean trade and had developed their own patterns of migration and cultural exchange. The civilizations of the Americas were characterized by labor migrations and dislocation by war. In the Indic World the merchants of the trade emporia moved and settled from East Africa to Siam, from cities of the Gujarat to southern China. The arrival of Europeans, though involving at first only a trickle of migrants, overwhelmed populations in the Americas by pathogens and destruction, wrought havoc in African societies by the transatlantic slave trade, and established small coastal enclaves in Asia. Migration and settlement in Asia or Africa had as a corollary intermarriage, consorting, or rape. Children of mixed cultural background were born; new peoples came into being. After contact with the Europeans, peaceful migrations and

military conquest resulted in re-formation of peoples; modern peoples created and recreated themselves: Spanish-Italian-Native in Argentina, Dutch-African-English-Indian in the Cape Colony, and Native-Chinese-Other on the Malayan peninsula. In Europe, on the other hand, the Iberian states expelled Jews and Moriscos who reestablished their trade connections from North Africa and Amsterdam. The feudal orders discouraged commercial enterprise and physical labor.

An intercivilizational comparative approach to migrations suggests fundamental similarities. Across the globe administrators and mercenaries, clerics and pilgrims, merchants and traders, peasants and laborers, vagrants and marginal people moved, were sent to distant locations, or departed from adverse living conditions. Wherever rulers or religious leaders built palaces, fortifications, or temples and cathedrals, immigrant artisans and artists settled. Migrant laborers built roads and bridges in China and in the Andes. Architects of the Taj Mahal, the cathedral of Chartres, and Tenochtitlán needed skilled workmen from elsewhere, and women came to feed them. Regardless of culture, women dominated in the production of textiles and clothing, and service jobs were taken by migrating single women. Warrior segments of peoples penetrated into the territories of others, settled, killed, intermingled, and adjusted to the new social and natural environments. Such migrations involved a search for "frontiers" of opportunity; all—including the belatedly constructed prototype, the settlement of the North American West—also involved the expulsion of previously settled peoples. Frontier societies are characterized by the absence of political structures, of powerful capital and rigid class structures, and of corporatist domination. Opportunities to gain access to local resources were comparatively large. Each change in relative economic power engendered important migratory movements on all levels of social life.[3]

Within this global framework, migrations were unique to each society, depending on economic practices, social structures, and power relationships, as well as on the right to relocate, gender hierarchies, and children's position. Intersocietally they depended on investment strategies and exploitative relationships. Capital flows from the cores provided just the initial impetus. The newcomers traded and transported enslaved and temporarily indentured laborers in ever larger numbers to plantation economies. Labor created wealth depending on soil fertility, mineral resources, or climate. Profits from the labor of colonized populations or immigrant settlers were remitted to stockowners in the cores. These reverse transfers impoverished and mobilized laboring men and women in the peripheries and changed demand for labor in the metropoles.

Emigrants from Europe headed in two directions. The many from the peasant strata moved to colonies of agrarian settlement in temperate climates; the few with capital and power or their representatives moved to tropical territories. Self-serving assumptions that local populations, whether in the Caribbean or in Asia, would labor for the European foreigners came to naught, and European underclasses could not be mobilized easily for distant labor. Settlers in temperate zones chose to advance cost of

travel to laboring men and women who bound themselves to work off the debt. Plantation owners in the tropical economies chose to rely on labor bound into lifetime hereditary slavery by force. Religion and color of skin served as criteria to hierarchize and exploit people.

In a third period, industrialization and concentration of production in the Atlantic cores demanded a reallocation of labor from the agrarian to the urban sector. Artisans and skilled workers migrated with their families. Unskilled rural laboring people migrated to repetitive factory work. Imagined or real opportunities in Britain, the United States ("America"), European Russia, or the Germanies became more easily accessible by railroads and iron-hulled steamships. Those impoverished to a degree that they could not even afford low-cost ocean travel had to stay—or to move locally and intraregionally on foot. The producing classes of mercantilist states became the surplus populations of the new industrial order in liberal states, an internationally mobile proletariat. Migration in a Russo-Siberian System remained distinct to the end of the nineteenth century.

In Asia under colonialism, the Chinese trader diaspora connected with the foreigners' enclaves, and local populations either were mobilized against their will and transported to distant plantations or were immobilized to produce export crops locally. The first system of forced mass migration, African chattel slavery in the Americas, was replaced by a second system, contractual, often slavelike work of men and women from Asia. Like European serfs, African slaves and Asian coolies in day-to-day resistance and in reproductive culture from sundown to sunup strove for at least partially self-directed lives within the structural constraints. Indentured Asian laborers had some choice in deciding whether to return home, reindenture, or form independent immigrant communities. The internally diverse and well-organized Indian community in Southeast Africa's Natal, for example, was as much an immigrant community as comparable communities in North American cities.

In the nineteenth century, the separate colonial systems of particular states became an integrated imperial world order. Europe's fast-growing population spread across the world as settlers, and the capitalists of Europe jointly with their North American descendants established a tight grip on global resources. Whenever capital was to be made profitable, racialized and gendered laborers were recruited by experiment and calculation to tap the cheapest supply. The power relationship between classes and between core and colonies determined who was moved where or who had the possibility to move on his or her own initiative. High returns on capital were matched by low returns on labor. Color of skin other than White assigned people to low-paying, highly controlled work, as did female sex, caste, and class. For voluntary migrant workers, internationalized segments of labor markets provided options. East Elbian agricultural laborers, for example, chose between Berlin and Chicago, while South Indian Tamils did so between Ceylon, other Asian destinations, and East Africa. But they tended to move along specific migration paths and to rely on networks established by fellow villagers, fellow workers, or kinspeople abroad. The

Pacific Migration System began to supplement the Atlantic System until its slow-down by exclusion of Asians from North American states. This period lasted to 1914–18 in the Euro-American World and to 1937 in Asia.

The fourth period, the decades of the first half of the twentieth century, is characterized by vast refugee migrations in Europe, accelerated migrations in Asia, and stagnation of the Atlantic Migration System (but with initial steps toward a North and Central American Migration Region). During the Age of Bourgeois Revolution, political exiles and refugees crossed borders, and economically active burghers and educated citizens constructed folk cultures into national identities and demanded cultural homogenization, whether it be, for example, Magyarization or Americanization. People excluded from self-styled nations as minorities began to emigrate, and migrants to allegedly homogeneous cultures became aliens expected to acculturate. Adaptation, an interaction over generations, was enforced under the rule of democratic nationalism.

The two North American states, which closed their borders to Asian immigrants in the 1880s, took divergent approaches to East and South Europeans after 1917. The United States curtailed their immigration on grounds of racial inferiority, while Canada, still in search of immigrants, ranked East European families as sturdy agriculturalists. When economic power shifted from Western Europe to the United States, and when the unrestricted speculation ended in the depression of the 1930s, transatlantic migration fell to low levels. Within the United States a mass migration of African Americans from the southern sharecropping and plantation economies replenished the labor reservoir of the northern industrial sectors. French-Canadians moved to the northeast, Mexican *braceros* to the southwest.

In Europe and northern Asia, the Russo-Siberian System increasingly involved rural-to-urban migrations and under Stalinism forced labor. Nazi Germany imported forced laborers and resettled ethnic populations. After both wars, tens of millions of people fled or were expelled, in many instances reversing migratory directions of previous centuries.

Latin America as well as northern and sub-Saharan Africa, experienced internal rural-to-urban migrations. Caribbean inter-island migrations expanded northward to the cities of the United States and Canada. In Africa, still under colonial rule, self-mobilization increased. It was not the oft-cited economists' construct, the "invisible hand of the market," that reallocated labor, but rather the interests of families to monetize income, diversify economic activities, weigh new opportunities.

Within Asia, the contract labor system lasted to the 1930s. In China recruitment expanded from the southern to the northern provinces, while in India populations remained more sedentary, though interrural migrations and moves to mines and factories increased. Millions of Chinese peasants migrated to Manchuria, one of the large colonizing ventures on the northern frontier of agriculture. Japan began its imperialist expansion by sending colonists to Korea, Manchukuo, and China. The end of World War II and the independence of colonized lands also brought religious strife and mass flight.

Across their possessions, the colonizer powers had envisioned some type of Anglicization or Francoization. Conversion was temporarily achieved through "colonial auxiliaries," through merchant brokers like Indian passenger migrants or Overseas Chinese, and through the concept of one global British citizenship or culturally French *négritude.* But educational migrants from colonial elites to universities of the cores developed human and social capital that, combined with indigenous cultural resources, came to challenge and replace White administrators and rule. When power relationships changed, migratory directions reversed toward Europe. Independence often involved massive population shifts, in particular the flight of colonial auxiliaries, whether from Algeria, Burma, or Indonesia.

Finally, in the decades since the 1950s new patterns emerged: transpacific migration, return migration from former colonies, multiple labor migrations, and refugee generation as well as distinct regional labor migration systems in the developing world.

In the postcolonial period, Third World migrants entered the metropoles in increasing numbers. The internationalized non-White underclasses began to migrate into social spaces that internationalized white-colored middle classes had reserved for themselves. Monochrome White societies had changed into multicolored ones by the mid-1960s when European "mother countries" or "fatherlands" imposed restrictions—at a time when in North America racist immigration quotas were lifted. In the United States, Asian and Pacific Islander in-migration grew from 13 percent of the total during the 1960s to more than one half since the early eighties. In Canada, too, they eclipsed European-origin migrants. The transpacific moves occurred concomitant with larger internal South, Southeast, and East Asian migrations.

While the North American continent became part of both the Atlantic and Pacific economic spheres, the transatlantic migratory connection disintegrated. In its place, two separate south-north migration systems involved men and women from the Caribbean-Mexican region to North America and from the Mediterranean—once again including North Africa—to transalpine Europe. The rising economic power of oil-producing Arab states resulted in a third labor migration system of Egyptian and Palestinian migrant men, Southeast Asian women for domestic work, and experts from Europe and North America. In Asia, India and China experienced huge internal migrations. From the Southeast Asian economies, women decided to migrate to the service sectors of North America and the "Middle East," the British term for the cultures of the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf of Hormuz. Fast developing economies, for example on the Asian side of the Pacific Rim, attracted migrants. But Japan attempted to prevent immigration of men and women of other cultures, while European states sought to impede the acculturation of guest-worker immigrants.

At the turn to the twenty-first century, the division of the globe into a North Atlantic core (First World), a separate and formerly closed socialist region (Second World), and a peripheral Third World, is being replaced by a realignment of centers of investment and patterns of migration. New regional and intercontinental migration systems emerge that no longer resemble those of previous centuries.

These global migrations are unique in character but not new in kind. Medieval migrations encompassed the then-known world, colonial migrations much of the globe, and the proletarian free and bound mass migrations the whole globe. Late-twentieth-century migrations are distinguished from earlier ones by their absolute volume, if not necessarily by ratio of migrants per thousand of population. Rapid moves back and forth between societies of origin and receiving societies and tele-communication between movers and persisters enable migrants to function across cultural space, to obtain a transnational or transcultural social competence. The new migration systems result from disparities between capitalist and decolonized worlds and from migrant decision making in the context of internationalized segmented labor markets in structures of "global apartheid."[4]

The *longue durée* approach to migration challenges traditional interpretations. First, migration was ubiquitous and ever-present. Attention to institutions, politics, and settled cultures focused on residents, neglected migrants. Second, it illustrates how resident populations interact with migrants culturally, intermarry, or fight. Much of the migrants' input into cultures and social systems over time appears neither as "foreign" nor as deliberately constructed, since, once adopted, innovations become part of the Self and are considered indigenous. For the next generation they appear as local traditions.

1.2   Changing Paradigms and New Approaches

Into the 1960s, migration history in Europe and North America pursued an Atlanto-centric approach emphasizing the westward flow of agrarian settlers and neglecting moves of workers and of women, return migration and multiple crossings. The image of free migrations into a democratic society, the United States, fit the Euro-American worldview of the times. Transpacific and interperiphery moves, migration-inducing global power relationships, and migration-inducing global investment strategies received little attention, nor were a few early studies calling for new approaches or dealing with Asian contract labor and Latin American migrations better received. The substantial research on forced migrations from Africa remained separate as part of the history of slavery; seminal studies of migration in other continents, Latin America, for example, remained part of regional history. The study of human migrations was predominantly White history. No comparative approaches to migration history emerged.[5] As regards cultural interaction in receiving societies, the Chicago School of sociology's concepts of the early twentieth century and Milton Gordon's 1964 model of "assimilation" in the United States framed research. A revision of such monocultural models of society based on Anglo-French dualism in Canada and published in the late 1940s could not overcome the mainstream approaches.[6] Only in the mid-1990s did Anthony Richmond's new synthesis of theoretical perspectives and approaches provide a framework that would have been needed decades earlier to create a more nuanced and comprehensive approach to migration.[7]

A review of recent theoretical approaches in migration research, in particular of

nineteenth- and twentieth-century labor migration, revealed the inadequacy of *neo-classical economics* and historians' discussions of general push and pull factors. Both restrict themselves to geographic differences in supply and demand of labor and resources as indicated by variables on the macrolevel of societies, states, or regions.[8] The more informative economic microtheory differentiates between nominal, real, and expected wage levels as compared to standards of living.[9] Since most migrants arrive with little or no means and need immediate access to labor markets, job availability rather than wage differentials was the most important factor of attraction. Downswings of migration volume occur when recessions cut jobs—with a time lag due to information transmission and the need to reflect on and reconsider departure plans. A parallel macrolevel *political ideology approach* postulated the pull of the freedom of "America," even though frontier society opportunities existed throughout history. Again, only microlevel studies comparing constraints and opportunities in particular regions of origin with those in the particular receiving regions can yield results. Nineteenth-century political refugees chose among France, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States. Twentieth-century students from particular colonies chose particular universities of the metropoles.[10]

In the terminology of the *new economics of migration,* "families, households, or other culturally defined units of production, consumption and child-rearing are the appropriate units of analysis."[11] Migration provides access to scarce resources, such as jobs, wages, capital for small-scale business, and consumption choices. Migrants from peasant societies intend to enlarge landholdings or plan to increase their social standing in the society of origin by ostentatious consumption. When mechanization renders skills obsolete and undercuts the ability to feed families, skilled workers may migrate to distant economies that still rely on human skill. Women move because of better access to labor markets and less constraining gender roles. Increasingly marginal agrarian incomes may result in the reallocation of family labor: tending of farms is left to women and children, while seasonal or multi-annual labor migration is assigned to adult and adolescent males. Migration permits risk diversification since potentially poor harvests or underemployment may be balanced by wage income from abroad and poor wages by food production on the farm.

Segmented labor market theory explains mesolevel processes of insertion into host societies. Since migrant recruitment occurs through informal channels of friends or kin, informants provide access to jobs only within the segment known to them. Specific recruitment policies, too, are intended to fill labor shortages in undersupplied segments. Migrants concentrate in low-level segments of the labor market shunned by residents. In advanced industrial societies they also concentrate in well-paying and stable factory jobs if native-born workers object to conveyor belt routines. Conflict occurs when immigrant and resident workers compete for one segment of the labor market and differ in the price for their labor—in other words, when the newcomers undercut established wage scales. Conflict may also occur when migrants introduce innovation into stagnant sectors of the receiving society's economy.[12]

The *world systems approach* and *dependency theories,* which have mistakenly

posited a single Euro- or Atlantocentric model of capitalist development, analyze unequal power relationships. First, capital investments in colonial areas induce mobilization of plantation or mining labor by wage incentive, administrative compulsion, or military force. Second, the theory helps us understand the interrelatedness of migrations, as when Manchester's cloth manufacture competed with factories in New England, Bombay, and Łódź, and was connected to cotton plantations in the U.S. South, Egypt, and Uganda. All were destinations of labor migrants with different standards of living and wage levels. Third, global approaches avoid the limitations of bilateral migration studies by emphasizing multidirectional moves and returns. Fourth, world systems, viewed not as channeling investment (capital penetration) to lesser developed countries (LDCs) but as extracting capital out of less powerful states/economies by unequal terms of trade, help explain the present-day mass out-migration from those countries. The theory does not explain, however, who of a targeted reservoir of labor migrates or is selected by his or her community to migrate.[13]

Social and human capital approaches to migration link the microlevel of individuals and families to the mesolevel of economic regions and global migration options. Human agency as well as the larger context is reflected in new paradigms of migration and in sophisticated conceptualizations of parameters of mobility.

New Paradigms

In the 1960s, societal recognition of the validity of ethnic cultures, the impact of newly independent Third World countries, and economic growth in Asia resulted in changed immigration regulations and in new research. Canadian interdisciplinary approaches, U.S. social history of ethnicity, new countrywide studies in Europe, South Asian emigration research, and concepts of immigrant culture as well as of global capital transfers replaced the narrow emphasis on allegedly uprooted Europeans in North America. Studies of Asian contract labor emphasized community formation. Studies of migration in Africa under and after colonialism reassessed voluntary and involuntary mobility and reintroduced human agency into slave migrations. Migration studies, however, emerged as part of regional history rather than as a global approach to population mobility. A plurality of national scholarly discourses and a new multisided international research agenda emerged. In the Netherlands and Sweden, for example, multiethnic in-migration provided a stimulus to reconceptualization; in Natal and India a new self-awareness changed the image of passive coolies to active migrant men and immigrant families.[14]

With regard to the northern hemisphere, the notion of a one-way flow of agrarian settlers to an imagined "America" was expanded to the concept of two nineteenth-century intercontinental migration systems, the Russo-Siberian System and the System of the Atlantic Economies. Collaborative projects combined expertise on culture of origin and receiving culture.[15] The new paradigm incorporated the importance of internal European and North American migrations as well as the choice among three overseas destinations, Anglo-America, Latin America, or Europe (that

The Europe-Centered Perspective

The North-America-Centered Perspective

The Asia-Pacific-Centered Perspective

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1.1   Perspectives: Euro-, American-, Asian-Centeredness

is, returning home). The comparative approach to frontier societies and postmigration insertion reduced the postulated exceptionalism of the United States to one case of several. Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and—outside the Western Hemisphere—Siberia, Australia, and perhaps South Africa were frontier societies in the nineteenth century.[16]

Coolie migration and Asian exclusion were reconceptualized as an Asian and Pacific Migration System, expanding the focus with concepts of economic spheres, with studies of interaction of bound and free migrants, and with analyses of labor markets and racializations. Reasons for emigration in the sending regions of India and South China were analyzed: British-imposed taxation and landholding patterns, the caste system, traditional Indian merchant migrations; imperial Chinese maladministration and revolts, overpopulation and natural disasters as well as colonial penetration. Of particular innovative impact were studies of international labor demand and of the interaction between passengers and coolies, or free and unfree migrants, in receiving societies.[17]

The emphasis on the nineteenth-century industrializing (White) world was challenged by research on (Colored) interperiphery mobility. The vast majority of Asian contract laborers moved between colonial worlds. Internal migrations in Africa and Latin America depended on local conditions as well as on interference from the cores. Labor migration to plantation economies contrasted with migration in the service of imperial administrations. Again, similarities to other migrations emerged: centers of investment and income attracted laborers and servants; women moved more often in short-distance migrations, men over larger distances. Family formation after migration involved additional moves, whether a return to the place of origin, the sequential migration of partners, or joint migration after marriage.[18]

As regards class, labor historians influenced by the English New Left history of working-class culture and moral economies came to recognize the multiethnic or international composition of working-classes and reconceptualized the nineteenth-century proletarian mass migration.[19] Castles, Cohen, Sassen-Koob, and Potts pointed to changes in the distribution of labor between developed and lesser developed regions and to capital flows. Questioning the assumption of both liberal and Marxist economic theory that in capitalist economies free wage labor replaces any form of indenture, serfdom, or slavery, they suggest that forced and free labor continue to coexist, depending on which power relationships obtain and the state of development of the means of production ("labor regimes"). Guerin-Gonzales and Strikwerda among others have added studies of labor militancy among migrants in peripheral economies. As a result of worldwide movements of workers from a particular ethnic group, global diasporas of, for example, Chinese, Italians, Poles, and Palestinians have come into being.[20]

Research on ethnicity lost its antiquarian character resulting in self-laudatory histories of group achievements. Questions about the construction of nations and races surfaced after European countries received migrants from their former colonies and after scholars in the newly independent states began to approach the subject.

Attention-craving talking heads of the early 1990s blamed U.S. pluralism or Canadian multiculturalism for disuniting the societies; right-wing politicians in Europe garnered votes by demanding exclusion of non-White immigrants. In India local "sons of the soil" opposed immigrant settlers.[21] The numerous publications on national culture, on the Self and the Other, and "us" versus "aliens" cannot be reviewed here. Much of the antimigration argument still assumes nationality and the nation-state to be permanent determinants of collective identities while overlooking alternative models of identity formation and multiple identities in immigrant and multiethnic states of the past and present. The connections between ethnicity and nationalism have been best outlined by A. D. Smith in his continualist approach; of comparable value are the studies of the constructions of national consciousness and nationalism by Hobsbawm and Ranger.[22]

Gender-specific role assignment and access to migration options demand gendered research approaches. In the past, women had less access to resources to defray migration costs or were restrained from traveling on their own. Once in command of independent incomes, women developed migration chains of their own. The conceptualization of family economies by Tilly and Scott had a major impact on migration research, women scholars being at the forefront of incorporating the new theory. Simon and Brettell argue that structural constraints of world political economies result in shared experiences of immigrant women, regardless of their culture of origin. Sikh women, Colombian and Algerian domestics, Vietnamese and Turkish female laborers, Soviet Jewish women as part of family migrations, and, to take a final example, Portuguese women in Germany, Canada, or the United States share experiences of wage and unpaid labor, of family migration and re-formation, and of gender hierarchies. Female-first migrations from Southeast Asia into domestic service leave men and children to cope on their own and with the help of kin. When married women subsequently bring in their husbands, complex negotiations about gender hierarchies occur, since women are both breadwinners and guides to the ways of the receiving society.[23]

Generational aspects in processes of acculturation emerge from the experience unique to women of giving birth in a situation of potential or real cultural conflict. Under the social construction of child-rearing as women's sphere, the experience of the second-generation immigrants is patterned by women. Life-cycle research indicates that average age of marriage changes after migration, often inching upward, thus giving women more independence and both partners more time to accumulate savings. In some migrant contexts, freedom from parental constraints and dependence on land inheritance brought down marriage age. Household formation no longer depended on parental dowries or bride prices but rather on earning capacities and strategies of the two partners. Lastly, the care for old people, in particular for parents, was left to nonmigrating sisters or brothers. Migration increases the dependency ratio and thus social expenditures in regions of departure while reducing it in societies of arrival. Immigrant women's high participation rates in labor markets and the change in their life-cycles—due to having fewer children and living a con-

siderable geographic distance from elderly relatives—result in new attitudes toward the gender-specific division of labor and in new strategies of family formation in the second generation.

Parameters of Mobility and Migration

What distance has to be covered, what cultural boundaries have to be crossed, and what decisions have to be made to define a "move" as a "migration"? A woman, crossing parish boundaries to marry and become part of her husband's family—a process of insertion and acceptance—may be considered a migrant. Crossing of village boundaries in nineteenth-century settings involved complexities not found on international borders. Short-distance marriage migration, which—disregarding celibacy—involves half of the population, is part of societal patterns of mobility. A Swedish peasant, interviewed by a researcher, lamented that he had never left his village and had not seen the church whose steeple was visible in the distance—but added as an afterthought "except for my years in America." Income-generating migration across continents and oceans may lead from one small community of compatriots to another without noticeable change.

Conceptually, local moves are distinguished from migration within political borders or economic regions and from long-distance cross-border migration. However, cultural change or moves between economic regimes and stages rather than arbitrary political borders determine demands for adjustment of immigrants. A nineteenth-century Polish family crossing the border between the Russian and German empires remained within their ethnocultural context, whereas Polish men and women moving within Prussia from eastern, ethnically Polish territories to western mining areas did move into a different culture and from an agricultural-village economy to an industrial-urban one. Twelfth-century Arab merchants sailing from Hormuz to Southeast Asia found communities of other Arab merchants along the way, as did Chinese moving in the Southeast Asian diaspora. Geographical distance is relative. For migrant Italians around 1900, crossing the Atlantic to work seasonally in the Argentinean wheat harvest involved less mental and cultural distance, less change in work patterns, and less cost than a train ride across to Alps to the East Elbian wheat fields. Mental distances and mental maps have to be taken into account.

Migration has a beginning and an end. Permanent mobility constitutes a way of life in itself, itinerancy with the next destination in view, peregrination with an ulterior goal. Travels are temporary visits in a distant culture for specific purposes. Migration may occur in stages with stops along the route for lengthy periods of time. It may be circular, bringing migrants back to their homes. Absence may be limited seasonally to a few months each year, to a few years, or extend for working life. Emigration constitutes an intentionally permanent move that, however, may be followed by secondary or return migrations when conditions at the destination become unsatisfactory. European religious dissenters or Indian merchants of the diaspora moved again when opportunities declined. Migration may be unintentionally permanent

when migrants who plan to return "next year" finally die in the receiving society; or it may be involuntarily permanent when exiles may not return because of hostile, even life-threatening regimes "at home." Migration involves a continuum from travel to lifetime emigration.

Migration may be voluntary, coerced, or forced. Any decision to migrate is "free" only within both the macrolevel constraints in the society of origin and the legal limitations of receiving societies, and given the ability to defray the "opportunity cost" of the move. On the microlevel of individuals, migrants have been considered autonomous in taking the decision to leave, or have been assumed to act under ethnocultural or age-specific *Wanderlust,* or have been ranked on a scale that contrasts personalities ready to explore friendly expanses with others clinging to the known and traditional. Emphasizing individuals in local contexts, Samuel Baily compares out-migrations from different Italian villages with each other and the varying destinations chosen and presents a complex analysis of individual, family, and village economic factors influencing migrants' choices. Letter series and oral testimony show how families, spread across continents, keep relations intact and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of their moves in terms of both economic security and emotional benefits or losses. "Free" decisions are made within networks, information flows, and perceived socioeconomic options and constraints.[24]

Unfree migrations indicate particularly pronounced unequal power relationships. Forced migrations, whether African slavery or wartime labor in Europe, severely constrain the agency of captured men and women. Day-to-day resistance and flight occurred under threat of violent punishment or even of physical annihilation. Survival, however, depended on a re-creation of cultural specifics distinct from those of the masters.[25] Coerced migrations rigorously limit choice upon departure but permit some decision making upon arrival. Refugees, for example, attempt to choose a country of destination within the constraints of distance and admission regulations. They have to enter segmented labor markets in the receiving society to ensure survival unless permanent camp-existence or reliance on transfer payments is intended or politically enforced.

The study of migration and acculturation has to incorporate the different forms of mobility. Returning travelers, pilgrims, and soldiers provide information on destinations for migrants. Experience in voyaging facilitates migratory moves. Itinerancy, vagrancy, and seasonal mobility undercut notions of sedentary lives rooted in the land or localized traditions.

1.3   Migrants as Actors and a Systems Approach

On the basis of the new paradigms and the sophisticated approaches, I propose a human-centered approach to migration that includes the societal frame of reference. As agents of their own lives, men, women, and their children look not only for material security but for emotional-spiritual-intellectual security as well. Hermits excepted, few find the latter without the former. Thus, securing basic subsistence is

the first goal—with other medium-range goals in mind. The Florentine *catasto* (land register) distinguished between "heads" and "mouths"—and perhaps "hearts" might be added. What is acceptable at minimum depends on the reference group and the moment in history. Women and men migrate when conditions at potential destinations seem better to a degree that the opportunity costs—loss of relationships, fear of change and the unknown, the actual fare—are lower than hoped-for benefits. Departure decisions are made in the structural framework of political, social, and economic constraints of the society of origin as experienced in the particular home region. Who out of a large pool of potential migrants leaves is negotiated within the context of family economy, kin relations, sibling sequence, friendship ties—unless persons are exiled by institutions, ostracized by communities, or forced into flight by human-made or natural disasters.

One method of understanding particular cultural frames of reference is comparative research. First, culturally different immigrant groups may be compared to each other in gendered analyses on the levels of sociocultural and economic background, migration experiences, and acculturation processes. Second, societies of origin and of destination may be compared to each other as regards continuity as well as reorientation and disruption. Third, emigration needs to be compared to other options like internal migration. In all of these approaches, class, gender, and ethnicity are beginning to be integrated with demographic and life-cycle approaches in an overarching *systems approach.*

Migration Systems: A Comprehensive Theoretical Perspective

A comprehensive study of migration systems should address individual men's and women's departure, travel, and reinsertion, along with the multiple directions and different goals involved.[26] A migration system, on the level of empirical observation of geographical space, is a cluster of moves between a region of origin and a receiving region that continues over a period of time and is distinct from nonclustered multidirectional migrations. Gross and net quantity of migration flows, continuity over time, ratio per 1,000 population, may be measured on this level. On the macrolevel, migration systems connect two distinct societies, each characterized by degree of industrialization and urbanization, by political structures and current policies, by specific educational, value, and belief systems, by ethnic composition and demographic factors (age structure, marriage patterns, dependency ratio), and by traditions of internal, medium-distance, and long-distance migrations. On this level, general push-and-pull factors and statewide admission regulations are analyzed.

Decision making about migration occurs on a mesolevel of regional economies, where stagnation or growth and differential access to resources may diverge from statewide patterns. The regional socioeconomic frame influences life-chances and options for life-projects more directly than larger frameworks. On this level, motivations and migrant characteristics are analyzed. Likewise, insertion into the new society takes place on the mesolevel of particular regional settings, of particular labor

market segments, or, for children, of regional school systems. Interests, values, and customs are analyzed in this context.

On the microlevel of individual human capital, the propensity to migrate in psychological terms and the capabilities of acquiring social capital are actuated. Actual decisions are taken on the local level of kinship, village, and neighborhood economies. The many factors of mesolevel economics and social norms enter into individual decision making as subjectively weighed factors, meant to satisfy the material and nonmaterial interests of those who remain as well as of those who leave.[27]

Since, first and foremost, voluntary (and coerced) migrants have to be able to establish an economic base at the destination (survival economy), migration systems connect areas having a relative surplus of labor, skills, and capital or lack of resources (such as land) with areas with a relative demand for labor, skills, or resources. It is not, however, "objective" data on these factors but their reflection in the minds of migrants that explain decisions to move. At least some segments of the receiving area have to be internationalized and be connected via information flows to recruitment areas. Changes of the parameters, like higher wages or better working conditions, the mobilization of untapped labor resources, or changes of entry and retirement age may meet demand for jobs in the society of departure or for workers in the society of destination. Division of feudal landholdings, for example, may provide land resources and reduce among the landless the need to emigrate. At present the massive dislocation of people with little access to societal structures of decision making by infrastructural improvements occur at a rate of 10 million individuals a year according to World Bank estimates. Other solutions are available. Within existing power hierarchies such solutions are considered more costly by power elites than the migration alternative.[28]

Migration systems are self-regulating processes in the framework of macrolevel constraints and are flexible enough to react to individual interests, regional fluctuations in supply and demand, and larger economic cycles. Information flows may be started by active recruitment from the top down or come about by prior contacts from the bottom up. In classic labor and settlement migration systems, the information flow regulates quantity of arrivals; any recession or rise in land prices brings forth letters, oral information, or, in modern times, telecommunication, announcing to prospective migrants that chances are poor or, during phases of expansion, that economic insertion is easily possible. Where a particular state exerts domination over areas of labor supply, systems of forced labor in-migration may be established. Similarly, internally repressive states may become refugee-generating areas.

Acculturation and job searches are mediated by earlier immigrants, who congregate in ethnic communities. With social differentiation in the immigrant/ethnic communities, additional segments of the labor market or other resources are tapped; a labor market internal to the community develops. State governments, industrial sectors, or particular employers may influence the system by exit and entry regulations or active recruitment. Because of microlevel interests, macrolevel regulations may be circumvented by illegal or, from the viewpoint of migrants, clandestine migrations.

The initial entry into new surroundings is usually not a conscious move into a

framework of different societal institutions, into capitalist economic conditions, or into a polity of democratic character. Rather it is a move into one particular labor market segment, into one particular area with cheap land, into a society in which trade or other entrepreneurial options are larger than at the place of departure. Migrants' experiences in internationalized labor markets and internationally accessible agricultural land suggest that men and women function in similar work environments even if the surrounding culture differs. The initial period of settling in often demands quick adaptation, including the shedding of many old-country habits. Among rural immigrants in urban environments, a surprising loss of traditional customs has been brought about by the need to earn a living in industry. Only after such change by force of circumstance and after the establishment of an economic basis does the process of acculturation become self-determined; ethnic enclaves may cushion host-society pressures.[29]

Whether in urban or rural environments, the process of settling in—of acculturation—occurs on a very localized level by reliance on the labor power of a single person or a single family. Immigrant letters show that the establishment of a survival economy and its broadening precedes the extension of emotional ties. When friends or relatives are brought in by prepaid tickets, the first to arrive are those whose labor power is needed most. Wage-working males usually bring over other single men to strengthen the pool of persons with earning capacity in labor markets to which they have access. Women are brought in in small numbers, each to care for several men as a boarding-house keeper or cook. Single self-supporting women in domestic service bring over other women for whom they provide access to jobs and who thus can support themselves immediately. On farms, or, rather, on land that is to become agricultural, families settle because the division of labor in agriculture makes the presence of both sexes imperative (unless, of course, the division of labor is changed). Migration thus involves a trajectory from family economy and neighborhood networks via reliance on individual human capital in a variety of makeshift living circumstances to the reestablishment of social capital in long-term strategies of family formation and entry into networks that provide resource leverage.

The process of insertion into the receiving society reaches a new level when a viable basis of income-generation has been reached. Then children or, more rarely, elderly parents may be brought over to join the family and community. Immigrant parents structure local socioeconomic environments to achieve survival for themselves and better futures for their daughters and sons. In the process, immigrant societies emerge as ethnic enclaves or new social formations, and the departure and host societies are changed by loss or gain of human capital. The immediacy of the need for material survival implies that after temporary separation of spouses and parents from children by sequential migration, the reconstituted family has no "free" time for an adjustment of family relations, for reflection on new circumstances. Work and emotional relationships have to be resumed on the spot, have to function immediately. They cannot be re-created deliberately and slowly. A transfer of traditional gender

roles and child-parent relationships occurs with no questioning of the old-country practices at first. Changes are mandated by new exigencies and occur over time and involve self-directed adjustments in the new worlds.

The *systems approach to migration* thus combines analysis of the position of a society of origin in the global order, its structures, the regional specifics, selection and self-selection of migrants from a reservoir of potential leavers and persisters, the process of migration itself, and—within the receiving society's structures—the insertion into partly internationalized labor markets, the formation of ethnic enclaves or of transcultural networks, and the interaction with new social values and norms. Examples range from medieval journeymen migrations in Central Europe to migrations of industrial and service labor to oil-producing states since the 1970s, from the Atlantic Migration System to the Asian Migration System. Examples of self-regulation include the slowdown of migration during the Great Depression of the 1930s and of agriculturalists' migrations when land resources become scarce and expensive.

The analysis of the continuity of life-course planning is better suited to the interpretation of migration and acculturation than an emphasis on the disruptive aspects of cultural change. In this model, the political is reduced to a distant framework, though some scholars—Aristide Zolberg, for example—argue for a more determining role of the state. Blanket concepts like modernization theory or industrialization and urbanization as mobility-inducing factors have been abandoned as too vague or positively misleading. Even the concept of demographic transition and overpopulation as push factors, once considered statistically sound, have been reassessed in view of the fact that only a small percentage of all European migration was directed overseas.[30] The level on which individual life-courses and families interact with social systems is the mesolevel of regional economies, ethnic territories marked by particular dialects, communities of shared values, religions, and patterns of everyday life.[31]

The Mesolevel Approach to Migrant Decision Making

The mesolevel is the arena where potential migrants receive their socialization, have to come to terms with larger socioeconomic forces, and live, act, and feel as community and family members, where migrants act out aspirations and values and pursue customs or choose innovative strategies.[32] This level comprises, first, family economies as well as kin and friendship networks, in which information is digested, decisions are made, and the interests of group members are weighed and, ideally, are balanced. Such negotiating processes depend on power hierarchies between genders and generations. Their goal is not equilibrium or equal rights and benefits but rather a compromise between individual interests satisfying the local moral economy within the framework of socially allocated status and gendered and intergenerational power relations. Second, in regional economies potential migrants have to find a way to earn a living. There they look for jobs, expect to become independent of their families of birth, and, usually, establish their own families. Thus family strategies and regional

job markets are closely entwined. Family and individual goals are not restricted to purely economic income maximization but include a search for "independence" and human dignity within specific norms and values.[33]

Third, information flows concerning potential destinations connect mesolevel economic regions because earlier migrants act as informants. Historically, oral reports from insiders in a circle of acquaintances—letters from emigrant fellow-villagers or traveling traders—had a much more powerful effect on stimulating migration than recruitment by "outsiders" like government agents or labor recruiters. Realistic information through letters, however, was evaluated within the mental parameters of the culture of origin—for example, within an image of a mythical "America" or of other destinations.[34]

The concept of family economies, along with the inclusion of nonmeasurable emotional and spiritual factors in the negotiating process, avoids the reductionist approach to wage differentials and permits a comprehensive approach to decision-influencing factors. Family economies combine the income-generating capabilities of all family members with reproductive needs—such as care for dependants, whether children or elderly—and consumption patterns so as to achieve the best possible results according to traditional norms. Allocation of resources depends on the stage of the family life-cycle and individual life-courses as well as on gender and generational power hierarchies. The allocation of time, labor power, and the skills of all members has to be negotiated in terms of the maximization of benefits for each: of income or leisure, child-care or out-work, education or wagework for children, traditional networking or individualist separation from the community.[35]

Viewed from the bottom up, this *holistic material-emotional approach* considers individuals as making conscious choices about perceived opportunities. Decisions about life-courses, levels of subsistence, and aspirations for betterment involve a conglomerate of traditional cultural norms and practices, of actual emotional and spiritual needs, and of economic rationales. Immigrant women workers have wanted "bread and roses, too"—community beyond cash. A methodological problem results: loss of relationships, sadness, and homesickness, which involves childhood memories and network-deprivation (such as happiness and social contacts), cannot be measured by one scale as wages may be.

As to those who stay behind, the departure of beloved ones involves emotional loss: in the case of aging parents the absence of work-sharing younger family members; in the case of women and children increased workloads and often control by other male family or community members. Economic gains achieved by migrants and transferred back to the locality of origin influence status among neighbors. Loss of status may arise from working conditions or societal demands and different cultural norms in the host society that induce migrants, male or female, to transform themselves to a degree as to become unacceptable to fellow-villagers and nonmigrating kin. The estrangement is illustrated by families not recognizing their returning kin or by return migrants, disenchanted with "home," departing for a second time and permanently.

The intricate connection between economic and emotional factors is shown in the timing of decisions to leave. Both—economic slumps in material status at home or in the receiving society with the resulting decrease in earning opportunities and emotional "slumps" in family relations—influence the timing of departures. The macroeconomic aspect is well known: recessions in receiving countries are followed by a downturn of in-migration, whereas recessions in departure societies do not cause immediate upswings in out-migration because of emotional ties that bind. Similarly, changes in intrafamilial relationships—such as the death of a parent, especially a mother, or the arrival of a new parent by remarriage, especially a stepmother—cause increased out-migration. At a time when emotional relationships within a family unit have to be rearranged, latent migratory potential is actuated, and departure is easier.[36]

The *holistic material-emotional approach* also helps us understand acculturation processes. Migrants, whether moving for commercial, agricultural, or wagework purposes, have to come to terms with the receiving society to the degree that they can fulfill their goals. Quick insertion (assimilation), often demanded by receiving societies, may thus be in the interest of newcomers. A temporary loss of cultural self-expression is expected to lead to improved lifestyles. If, however, pursuit of future economic well-being becomes ever more costly in terms of loss of quality of life, goal achievement by migration may appear to be overpriced to the degree that benefits are negligible. Departures will be postponed; migrants will return; patterns of mobility may be adjusted.[37] After migration, the cultural and structural experiences of the region of origin serve as self-organizing concepts in migrant communities (*natio, Landsmannschaften*). Unequal power relationships, structural constraints, and the reorganization of networks are part of mesolevel activity.

On the experienced mesolevel, migrants develop both their human and their social capital and evaluate the emotional, material, and spiritual benefits accruing to themselves and their immediate kin in terms of projected life-courses. These life-course projects add up to local and global migrations over the centuries.

1

The Judeo-Christian-Islamic Mediterranean and Eurasian Worlds to the 1500s

The eleventh-century Afro-Eurasian world consisted of seven civilizations linked by traveling merchants and their clerks, carters, servants or slaves, and concubines or, less often, wives. Those of the "Americas"—a later designation—remained separate. The Chinese, Indic, Muslim, and Byzantine civilizations extended over large contiguous territories. While the fifth, Latin Christendom, clung to the western Mediterranean and peripheral transalpine Europe, the sixth, Jewish one had lost its original center in Judea but remained a culturally and economically vibrant diaspora. The seventh, the cultures of sub-Saharan Africa, was connected by trade routes (map 2.1). Merchants, intellectuals, and religious thinkers of the civilizations interacted, as did the little people along the trade routes spanning the globe and in the vast cultural borderlands in which civilizations overlapped (chap. 2.1–2).

In the Mediterranean world of northern Africa, southern Europe, and western Asia centered on the Mediterranean, several types of large-scale and long-distance migrations were specific to particular regions and periods. Slavery in the Mediterranean involved men and, over time, mainly women, from North Africa, West Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Norman raiders and state-builders from Scandinavia migrated southwestward to the shores of the Atlantic and as far as Sicily, southeastward to Slavic territories and Byzantium. The migrant men joined with local women to form new societies of mixed cultural background. Muslim armies established a sophisticated society with Jewish-Christian-Islamic transcultural centers on the Iberian Peninsula. Christian raiders, called crusaders, moved across central and southeastern Europe to Palestine, often accompanied by large numbers of women. Migration as well as crusading brought western European settlers and military personnel into the territories of Slavic peoples (chap. 2.3).

A perspective from the eastern core of the Eurasian World, from China or Southeast Asia, would emphasize other large-scale and long-distance migrations specific to regions and periods: Mongol expansion and state-building, Manchu penetration, southward settlement of Han Chinese, internal Hakka migrations, development of the Chinese diaspora into Southeast Asia. A perspective from South Asia would focus

2.1   Cultural Regions, 12th Century

on the vast commercial linkages along the coasts of the Indian Ocean, the cosmopolitan elites at courts, the Islam-Hindu interaction.

Other migrations of the Mediterranean World, similar across societies, continued from the eleventh to the sixteenth century and beyond. The upper levels of dynastic societies—cosmopolitan elites, itinerant administrators, and their uprooted mercenaries—traveled across the continent. At the bottom level, rural families migrated when land became scarce or were moved by lords according to economic interests or the exigencies of noble culture. The urban worlds of commerce and production attracted journeymen and maids from the adjoining countryside, and urban elites circulated between towns. Skilled craftsmen migrated over large distances to building and mining projects. Finally, large numbers of wayfarers roamed countrysides, and towns and pilgrims and clerics moved across Europe and as far as Jerusalem (chap. 3).

Across Asia and Europe the mid-fourteenth-century plagues severely depleted local populations, forced families to reassemble in viable communities, and created a caesura in population movements (chap. 2.4). By that time, warfaring Iberian Christians had expelled Muslims and persecuted Jews. Latin warfare against Byzantine Christendom became Catholic-Lutheran warfare after 1517 and generated large refu-

gee migrations. Doctrinal homogeneity demanded by the papal court led to flight or physical annihilation (chap. 4). In the eastern Mediterranean, the Muslim Ottoman Empire's multiethnic and multireligious society included both free and unfree migrations (chap. 5.1). The cultural and economic center of Europe shifted northward, in particular to the Urban Netherlands and their seaborne trade (chap. 5.2). The shift from eastern Mediterranean to Portuguese exploration of trade and slaving along the western Atlantic coast of Africa and of Spain across the Atlantic wrought havoc among settled peoples and opened new perspectives for migration (chap. 5.3).

2

Antecedents: Migration and Population Changes
in the Mediterranean-Asian Worlds

Two approaches, cultural and economic, help conceptualize peaceful or conflictual interaction in Mediterranean-Asian Worlds. According to Jerry H. Bentley, inter-civilizational contact led to "conversion," to cross-cultural exchange through voluntary association, through political, social, or economic pressure, or through assimilation. Janet Abu-Lughod has extended and differentiated the economic world-systems approach of Immanuel Wallerstein. With 1250, a period of "increased economic integration and cultural efflorescence," as a starting point, a global perspective permits an understanding of economic linkages, but regionalized approaches can do justice to distinct developments—for example, in the Islamic World of the Indian Ocean or the Animist World of pastoral and mining cultures in sub-Saharan Africa. Analyses based on commodity and capital flows need to be supplemented by examining the moves of men and women along the trade routes, of families or individuals to colonization projects, of enslaved, bound, or free laborers. Neither the conversion nor the world-systems approach fully integrates the world of dynastic or clerical politics or the decision making of common men and women.

The perspective taken here starts from distinct civilizations and economic systems, connected by webs of commerce and separated by cultural, often religious, practices. Systems evolve over long periods of time (*longue durée*), but the processes involved emerge from the myriad of decisions made by simple people within their short lifetimes. All such decisions depended on personal interests and power relationships between groups; all linked material and emotional interests as well as the economic and the ideological spheres. They were made in the framework of religious-cultural structures that explain the norms, values, and customs involved and of trading systems driven by merchant and consumer interests. Cultures and commerce influenced each other; the material, spiritual, and emotional aspects of everyday life influenced travel, migration, and processes of acculturation.

It has been assumed that shifts in culture and trade did not influence the life of rural men, women, and children, whether in the Euphrates or Rhone valleys. The mobility of the upper strata has been juxtaposed to village-bound peasants and urban underclasses. Such binary models of society cannot do justice to the relations be-

tween multiple social strata, the mobility between regions, and the creation of cultures. The worlds of material life, commerce, and worldwide financial transactions, to borrow from Braudel, have to be linked with negotiated emotional lives in families and in rural and urban neighborhoods.[1]

2.1   The Afro-Eurasian World

The Byzantine–Arabic–West Asian core of transcontinental trade, religious contact, and intellectual exchange comprised the region from Baghdad and Trebizond to the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea and to Constantinople, Cyprus, and Alexandria, with connections extending to the cities of Amalfi and Venice. Transalpine passes reached from Urban Italy into northern Europe; trans-Saharan caravan routes connected Black Africa; and eastern transoceanic human migration was "one of the enduring consequences of the harnessing of the monsoons."

Arab learning drew on Indic and Chinese knowledge. Science and philosophy were fostered in Abbasid Baghdad in the "House of Knowledge" (from the ninth to the eleventh century), in Cairo's "House of Science" established in 995, and in Umayyad Córdoba from the reign of 'Abd ar-Raḥmān III (r. 912–61). In Baghdad scholars had translated Greek, Syriac, Persian, and Sanskrit texts into Arabic. Hindu numerals and calculation methods, adopted in the Arab World, came to Europe via Venetian merchant houses and Iberian scholars. Aristotle's main work was preserved in Arabic only; Christian scholars arriving with the crusaders cooperated in translations from Arabic to Latin. Arab science included astronomy, medicine, optics, and chemistry. Research results were applied in healing, summarized in an encyclopedia of natural history, and used for new technologies. Westernized names of Arab scholars indicate their impact on Europe.

Arab culture and commerce as well as settlers from the desert peninsula and the arid northern littoral of the Persian Gulf reached "the little ports and fishing villages along the [East African] coast, and it was the continuing trickle of newcomers who, along with the visiting merchants, assured and reinforced the Islamic-mindedness of coastal society." For them East Africa was "a fertile, well-watered land of economic opportunity and a place of salvation from drought, famine, overpopulation, and war." Settlers from as far away as Tashkent reached Mogadishu (Muqdisho) in the thirteenth century, men "who quickly married into the local families or took slave concubines, thereby obliterating any tendencies toward racial separatism." On the Indic subcontinent immigrants of Turkish, Afghan, Persian, and Arab origin formed new elites and engaged in a long process of conversion and interaction with Hindu culture, to which rural populations remained faithful. New immigrants arrived about 1330, when the sultan decided to fill administrative and judicial positions with men from afar. Patronage and gifts attracted many including the famous traveler Abū 'Abd Allāh ibn Baṭṭūṭah.[2]

Commerce, according to Abu-Lughod, involved eight trading circuits, to which those of the Baltic–North Sea area and of the sub-Saharan region have to be added

2.2   Circuits of the 13th-Century World System

(map 2.2). Shifts in continental long-distance trade, changes in the relative impor-
tance of centers of production, and variations in power relationships affected the
amount of food available to small agrarian or artisanal producer families at the ex-
panding and contracting ends of the exchanges. When warfare between Hanseatic,
Danish, and pirate fleets in the Baltic Sea reduced fish exports from the famous mar-
kets of Scania (Skåne), the poor in a radius of a thousand kilometers (600 miles) saw
local herring prices increase up to tenfold. Changes in production and political dis-
ruptions in the South German cloth-producing towns by the early fifteenth century
increased demand for cotton and promoted "large increases in Syrian cotton cultiva-
tion." If resources became insufficient, some—if not all—members of a family had to
migrate. Other families expanded production and hired men and women from abroad.
Basic foods, like cereals and seasonings (such as salt and sugar), spread among the
common people living along the major trade routes and into valleys and hinterlands.
Foodways adapted, if slowly. Consumption of spices, a core element of the interconti-
nental trade, on the other hand, was limited to households of better-placed families.
The Slavic regions east of the Elbe and north of the Danube rivers were touched but
lightly by Mediterranean commerce until the Military Orders expelled from Pales-
tine migrated to the Baltic littoral. Trade networks extended as far east as Kiev.[3]

    Commercial activities and dynastic states interacted, of which three aspects
merit emphasis. First, merchants struggled to limit the acts of autocratic rulers, ad-
ministrators, or local lords, and to foster adherence to the *pacta sunt servanda* prin-
ciple. Trade could not be conducted without binding agreements. Second, warfare
among political rulers interrupted long-term interaction, drained resources, and in-

creased the traders' transaction costs. Third, rural and urban laboring populations had to be integrated into their respective political subsystems, so that massive resources did not have to be allocated for their control and repression.

In a sensitive discussion of terminology, concepts, and periodization, Abu-Lughod has argued that theoretical consistency cannot do justice to complex historical processes. Into the overarching economic approaches of Wallerstein, Weber, and Marx, she incorporated gradual changes and regionally differing developments. Demographic factors need to be considered, too. While population growth is a gradual process involving the reproductive activities of millions of actors of both sexes, population disasters, whether natural or men-made (rather than "man-made"), bring about cataclysmic change: the plagues of 1348–51, the transfer of Eurasian germs into the Americas after 1492, or the Thirty Years' War of 1618–48.

According to Abu-Lughod, linkages between the world trading centers led to a long-term slowdown in the development of less powerful and dependent segments. The rise of the West was an accumulation of profits from worldwide resources—derived from nature, labor, technology, and intellectual activity—rather than the result of superior achievement. Aggressive conquest and colonization made exchange relationships increasingly unequal; in long-distance trade, plunder replaced exchange.

Communication across the vast expanse from north Africa via the southern belt of the Eurasian continent to China rested on a shared understanding of the value of coins (whether gold, silver, or copper), on mercantile linguae francae (Italian, Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, and medieval variants of Latin and Mandarin Chinese), and on the exchange of ideas and the conversion of spiritual norms.

> Distances, as measured in time, were calculated in weeks and months at best, but it took years to traverse the entire circuit. And yet, goods were transferred, prices set, exchange rates agreed upon, contracts entered into, credit—on funds or on goods located elsewhere—extended, partnerships formed, and, obviously, records kept and agreements honored.

Along the routes, the many labored for their livelihood: hundreds of thousands of sailors and transport workers and the women who supported them or worked in agriculture, the numerous families of miners and artisans, and the masses of domestics and spinners who provided the productive labor and did the reproductive work in households and inns. World systems driven by capitalist accumulation and top-level economic interest (Wallerstein, Frank) but divided into distinct spheres by states, cultures, and mercantile trading circuits (Abu-Lughod) function as a result of the life-course decisions of myriads of individuals. Routes became cultural highways, spaces of synthesis and plural identities.[4]

2.2   Over Continents and Oceans: Cross-Cultural Encounters

A web of coastal shipping connected the Mediterranean and China, the African east coast, India, and the Southeast Asian islands. With the twelfth-century increase in

trade a network of transcontinental land routes, some dating from the Roman period, was reestablished or newly developed. Postmasters, merchants, clerks, and scholars of North African–Arab, Spanish-Jewish, or Italian-Christian background wrote intercontinental travel guides. Commodities, labor, and bullion were moved along these routes. They served political and cultural interchanges between empires as well as the spiritual quests of pilgrims, and they became the arenas where images of the Self and the Other developed (see maps 2.3 and 2.4).[5]

Along the trans-Asian "silk routes," travel, supported by numerous relay stations, was facilitated by the cosmopolitan attitudes of thirteenth-century Mongol rulers and by the *pax mongolorum* after Genghis Khan united the different realms.[6] In northern Africa—Ifriqiya was the Arabic name for Tunis—the trans-Saharan caravan routes to Timbuktu or Agadès expanded in response to the increased demand for gold; new wells were dug; and oases relay stations enlarged. Land-route travel was time-consuming. Camels, the ubiquitous means of transport and travel, could travel about 40 kilometers (25 miles) per day. They were vastly superior to oxen, more resilient and stronger than packhorses, and able to negotiate routes that no carts could travel.[7] In Europe, the Latin Church supported the expansion of routes and the building of hostels to encourage pilgrimages.

Around 900 C.E., ibn Khordādbeh, postmaster of the Arab province of al-Jibāl in Persia, compiled his eight-volume *Book of the Roads and Countries* as a guide for the postal system. He described roads and sea routes as far as Korea, giving detailed directions, distances, weather conditions, and road security. More than four centuries later, c.1335, the Florentine Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, operating out of the Genoese trading center of Kaffa, wrote a handbook for the China trade. His *Della Practica della Mercatura,* circulating in manuscript copies and printed in 1766, described the trip to Beijing with resting places and dangerous stretches and advised which food to carry, where to exchange money or to hire guides, and when to engage interpreters for Turkish dialects. He listed weights and measures used in Genoa, Tana, and Cathay, as well as the packing methods and the quality of the goods. A Catalan manual for trade in Africa was compiled and copied by those interested, and—informed by Jewish coreligionists and Arab scholars—Abraham Cresques mapped Africa in his *Catalan Atlas* of 1375.[8]

From 1160 to 1173, Benjamin, rabbi of Tudela in Aragon, set out to explore commercial possibilities, to take a census of Jewish people worldwide, and to find places of refuge for Spanish Jews in case of Muslim persecution. Via Rome, Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Damascus, he reached Baghdad's community of 40,000 Jews. On the island of Kish in the Gulf of Hormuz some 500 Jews and merchants from India, Persia, and Yemen exchanged silks and spices, cotton and hemp, foods and woods. Through Persia's Jewish communities of Isfahan and Shiraz, with more than 10,000 members each, Benjamin of Tudela traveled to the Malabar Coast of India, where Arab and Chinese merchants met. He continued to Ethiopia and Egypt and returned to Paris via Russia, Bohemia, and Germany.[9]

For commercial connections and cultural exchange, the Venetian Polo family

Legend:

- —— Land and river routes
- ······ Sea routes
- – – – Genoese routes
- - - - Venetian routes
- → → African travels of ibn Battuta
- Venetian territory
- Islamic territory
- Main area under Hanseatic commercial control
- Highly urbanized areas and Champagne fairs

2.3   Afro-Eurasian Trade Routes, 12th–15th Centuries I

2.4 Afro-Eurasian Trade Routes, 12th–15th Centuries II

Legend:
— Major routes
··· Sea routes
─·─ Grand canal
Routes of the elder Polos and Marco Polo 1221–95
Routes of ibn Battuta 1325–54
Routes of Cheng Ho 1405–33
Max. expansion of Mongol rule

provides an example. The brothers Nicolò and Maffeo voyaged to China from 1255 to 1266. On his return, Nicolò learned that his wife had died and that their son Marco had been raised by his sister, Flora. In 1271, accompanied by the seventeen-year-old Marco, the two brothers set out via Acre to Khanbalik, meaning "city of the king" (later Beijing). Mongol rulers had subdued Song China and established "a truly cosmopolitan society": soldiers and traders came from Central Asian peoples, and some of the administrators, merchants, missionaries, and diplomats were from Europe. Foreign religions were tolerated, and Muslim merchants resided in their own quarters in port towns. The thousand-mile Grand Canal, linking Kin-sai (later Hangzhou) to Beijing, was built—how many workers were mobilized? By the early 1300s, eastward journeys "were relatively commonplace, and the trade between East and West considerable." For the European imagination, Marco Polo, who returned only in 1295 via Java, Sumatra, India, and Arabia, remains the epitome of a traveler, although Jewish merchants and, even more so, their Arab counterparts covered greater distances and left a large body of travel narratives, the *rihla* literature.[10]

In a "fundamentally political campaign to establish alliances" with Mongol rulers, the popes from 1245 onward sent missionaries to strengthen the cultural dimension; other missionaries traveled to India and Southeast Asia. William of Rubrouck (Willem van Ruysbroeck), a Franciscan in the Mongols' cosmopolitan capital Qaraqorum (Karakorum) in 1253–55, met Alans (ancestors of modern Ossetians)—some 30,000 of whom served as armorers and bodyguards—Georgians, Armenians, Persians, Turks, as well as Chinese. He met Slavs, Hungarians and Greeks, Germans, Frenchmen, including a sculptor, and one or more Englishmen. Roman Catholics, Nestorians, and Buddhists lived in the capital and in Mongol-ruled China; Jews, Christian Armenians, and Muslims in Guangzhou (Canton), South China's main trading center. A few women were part of the migrations—for example, a wealthy Armenian lady and an Italian merchant's daughter.[11] A Chinese author described the intercultural patterns of living:

> By the time of the [Kublai Khan] the land within the Four Seas had become the territory of one family, civilization had spread everywhere, and no more barriers existed. For people in search of fame and wealth in north and south, a journey of a thousand *li* [about 600 kilometers] was like a trip next door, while a journey of ten thousand *li* constituted just a neighborly jaunt. Hence, among people of the Western Regions who served at court, or who studied in our south-land, many forgot the region of their birth, and took delight in living among our rivers and lakes. As they settled down in China for a long time, some became advanced in years, their families grew, and being far from home, they had no desire to be buried in their fatherland. Brotherhood among peoples has certainly reached a new plane.[12]

Under the Song dynasty (960–1279), Chinese merchants and missionaries in turn traveled westward; their sailors used the compass centuries before European mariners. They traded along the African coast from Somalia to Madagascar, and their

relations with local women resulted in what Teobaldo Filesi called "a fine crop of half-caste children." In the middle of the thirteenth century, a Uighurian monk of the Nestorian Church traveled via Baghdad and Constantinople to Armenia, Italy, Paris, and Germany. The high point of outward contacts was reached with the seven voyages of the grand eunuch Cheng Ho, starting in 1405, to India, Ceylon, and Aden. Chinese ships could accommodate up to 1,000 passengers with their provisions, and each of Cheng Ho's fleets carried 27,000 or more men. When the imperial court ordered a stop to the explorations in 1435, citing both costs and unwanted cultural imports, private ventures by merchants continued, and a Chinese diaspora emerged in Southeast Asia before the arrival of the Portuguese from the west.[13]

In North Africa during the mid-1250s, Islamic rulers in Tunis permitted Latin religious orders to open a school to teach Arabic to their itinerant preachers. Travelers, merchants, and missionaries came from Europe, while Ethiopian and other African envoys traveled to Venice. The Arab-Jewish geographer Ibrāhīm ibn Yaʿqūb in the mid-tenth century C.E. (or mid-fourth century Muslim Era [M.E.]) had journeyed around Europe from Ireland to Poland, and from Saxony to Sicily, and his report was cited for centuries thereafter. The legal scholar Abū ʿAbd Allāh ibn Baṭṭūṭah (1304–68), after voyaging to Anatolia, Arabia, and Asia, traveled to the sub-Saharan salt mines of Taghaza in 1351–54 C.E. En route in Sijilmasa, he lodged with a family whose kinsman he had met in China. Travel on the difficult desert stretch from Tasarahla (Bir al-Ksaib) to Walata was as well organized as on Mongol routes and Latin pilgrim roads. One man traveled ahead to find lodgings, and a group from Walata met the caravan with fresh supplies of water. At Gao (Kawkaw), a large city and former Songhai capital, ibn Baṭṭūṭah observed the usual salt exchange but also the exchange of cowry shells, suggesting that the trading network extended to the east coast. Like other traveling men, ibn Baṭṭūṭah, who married several times, was accompanied by a wife over long stretches of his trips and—following the customs of Chinese merchants—by slave girls on his way to China. While travel was considered dangerous and wearisome for men, his consorts also traveled when pregnant and gave birth to children en route.[14]

In the Mediterranean, the main centers of exchange were Islamic Alexandria and Byzantine Constantinople. The finery of the Byzantine court encouraged artisanal virtuosity and attracted immigrants. These highly skilled craftsmen were, in turn, called to distant cities and capitals. Venetians, Amalfians, Pisans, and Genoese lived in distinct quarters. Natural riches, highly developed urban production, and internal migration between cities made the Eastern Christian civilization self-sufficient. Nevertheless, its products and its position in the center of shipping routes made Constantinople by 1200 the hub of trading networks extending to Novgorod and Kiev, to Trebizond, and to Persia and Egypt. Genoese merchants used their colony in Kaffa on the Crimean Peninsula to wrest trade with Kievan Rus and Central Asian merchants from their Byzantine competitors. Via Samarkand they connected to Chinese merchants and carters (see chap. 7.1).[15]

Alexandria linked the Muslim World westward to Tunisia, Sicily, al-Andalus, and

onward to Atlantic Morocco, Seville, and Lisbon. The empires of Mali and Ghana sent caravans with gold and silver to Tunis. Northbound routes to Trebizond connected Arab and Asian traders. Eastward ones followed southern pilgrim routes into the Arab peninsula or those through Persia to Samarkand, the connecting point to Turkestan and to China. Via Shiraz and Kirman (Kermān), Alexandria's traders reached the Indic subcontinent. Indian merchants were particularly active in the islands of Southeast Asia. Arab and Indic merchants established quarters in Chinese port cities, and Jewish families from Persia and India traded cotton. The first Indian tea plantations supplied the increasing demand of China.[16]

The numerous travel accounts, their information and distortions, achieved lasting impact. Friar Odorico da Pordenone's account of his Asia-bound travels from 1324 to 1328 survived in about seventy manuscript copies; it was later printed, used as a source by Sir John Mandeville (1377), and reprinted in Richard Hakluyt's *Voyages* of 1589.[17] In their writings, the travelers' selections, categories, and prejudices transformed cultural contact into a published "imaginary ethnography," whereby observers could project preconceived notions onto Others and then report them as empirical evidence. The reported size of precious stones and of quantities of gold as well as accounts about nakedness and cannibalism among some distant peoples testify to the construction of the Other as the primitive, but with a penchant for the spectacular. Descriptions of distant peoples, who are both enormously rich as well as incredibly depraved, serve as invitations for civilizing "missions," which leave souls presumably saved, bodies dead, and riches in the hands of "explorer-missionaries."[18]

Within the Latin World, the *Guide du Pèlerin* for the route to Santiago de Compostela provides evidence for the juxtaposition of the Self and the Other. According to the author, probably a twelfth-century monk, the people in his fertile home province of Poitou were vigorous. In neighboring Bordelais, however, the speech was rough and the land desolate. Further removed, the inhabitants of Gascony, "light in words, talkative, mockers, debauchees, drunkards, gourmands, badly dressed in rags and unprovided with money," were not fully redeemed by their willingness to help pilgrims. Fredric Jameson has described such narration as a "process of transformation" whereby unexplored landscapes and their inhabitants are "worked over" until they can be "dissolved and assimilated by the older value systems" of the writers, be it those of Poitou, of the Bible, or of a Latin-European culture. The alien has to undergo a process of "neutralization," while the new and unknown has to be inserted into the frame of the known, into the cultural beliefs of observing traveler-writers and their readers. Such "neutralization" is not unidirectional, from the Latin West outward; accounts by travelers from the East attest to the universality of the process.[19]

Through this near-global network of commercial connections, a wide variety of luxury items and bulk goods (such as lumber and iron) were moved, slaves transported, and laborers mobilized. Foodstuffs like wheat and olive oil from northern Africa, wine from Syria, tuna from the Atlantic coast, sugar from Spain, Sicily, Syria and beyond, entered the European trading networks and influenced dietary habits. Horses, whether Arabian steeds or Turkestan ponies, were provided for the luxury

market, as were Persian Gulf pearls and Red Sea corals, dyes, and perfumes. Traders in Baghdad markets exchanged furs, honey, and wax from Russian territories; spices, gems, and iron from the Indic world; and gold and ivory from East Africa. Alexandrian artisans worked with Iberian lumber. Slave traders marketed East African men and women through Arab networks, Slavic or Turkish ones through the Italian enclaves on the Black Sea.[20] How many hands had handled a package of spices en route from the South Sea to a European household? How many women cooked and washed for the transport laborers in homes, inns, or caravan relays?

Guidebooks for intercontinental trade made "no reference to Europe, the exports of which were too few and too insignificant to deserve mention, though possibly some of them may have been included in the list for Byzantium." Viewed from wealthy economies, northern Europe appeared as undersupplied, even as depraved. To people in the Songhai Empire and Ghana, it was obvious that gold was always lacking north of the Sahara. Chinese merchants and travelers were appalled at European barbarism. From the eleventh century onward, however, merchants from Italian cities began to compete with Muslim and Jewish ones. They quickly adopted Jewish-Arab-Indic accounting techniques and maritime knowledge. Syrian merchants and pedlars who had traveled as far as France were replaced by Italians. Urban Italy provided an interface between Europe north of the Alps and the Arabic and Asian Worlds.[21]

From the eleventh to the sixteenth century, Latin Europe's position in the trade networks changed for several reasons.[22] Christian forces established themselves in the major cities of the Iberian Peninsula and reduced interaction with Islam, and Venice used the Fourth Crusade in 1204 to reduce the influence of Byzantine Christendom. When Mongol expansion temporarily severed overland trade to Asia, it continued as seaborne trade through Alexandria mediated by Arab merchants. A realignment of Muslim states, both Turkish and Arab, into the Ottoman Empire and Mamluk Egypt, changed power relations. The papal interdiction against trade with the Mamluks (1359) slowed down European trade with Asia, but many Christian merchants maintained their contacts. Constantinople, by then an impoverished and depopulated city, was captured by Ottoman troops in 1453 (see chap. 5.1).[23]

Commerce followed spatial patterns separate from political entities and divided Europe into four trade zones. "Urban Italy," that is, the cities of the northern Italian plain as well as Amalfi, Naples, and Palermo in the south, had control of the Mediterranean—albeit divided among themselves—and interacted with Byzantine and Arab merchants. Second, around the Baltic Sea, the loose federation of Hanseatic cities emerged between 1150 and 1250, controlled trade from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, and reached out to London and Novgorod and southward along the Rhine to Cologne. On Europe's western margin, London and the English Midlands began to enter the trading networks. The third zone consisted of a string of fairs from Urban Italy via Geneva and Lyon to Saint-Denis by the eleventh and Champagne by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and to Bruges and the emerging Urban Netherlands after the middle of the fourteenth century. Incessant fighting among dynasties—for example, the Hundred Years' War of 1338 to 1453—marginalized entire regions north

of the Alps for long periods of time because transaction costs for commerce became prohibitive. In the late fourteenth century, a fourth center, the merchant-capitalist houses of the Fugger and Welser families in Augsburg and Nuremberg (with about 20,000 inhabitants) extended their trade and credit network into Hungary and Spain. "These regions developed the most advanced marketing systems, low cost transportation and effective public administration." Such trade, which has been labeled "international" even though neither nations nor dynastic economies existed, linked the four zones into trans-European networks.[24]

The eleventh-century royal market in the city of Léon on the northern Iberian Peninsula illustrates the nature of local and trans-European mercantile interaction. Craftspeople and provisioners came from the neighboring townships, each of which specialized in a particular artisanal product or type of food. They sold their wares next to medium-distance traders bringing Toro wine, Zamora oil, salt from Castile, and cider from Asturia and jostled for space with long-distance merchants from Muslim Iberia and from Byzantium.[25] In the exchange between local, transregional, and intercontinental trade, credit practices evolved, and coins became known and accepted over large distances, with their denominations growing larger. Learning from Arab culture, Lombard and Jewish merchants replaced Roman numerals with figures that had been adapted by Arabs from Indic culture and developed a banking system that encompassed Europe. These new financial transactions signaled the advent of a different economy in Europe: the replacement of feudal rule and manorial agriculture by commercial capitalism.

2.3   Pre-Plague Migrations in Mediterranean and Transalpine Europe

From the tenth to the thirteenth century, seven major migrations in the Mediterranean World and transalpine Europe involved dispersal, colonization, or state-building.[26] Migrations of dispersal were 1) forced, as in the case of Mediterranean slavery, or 2) mainly voluntary, as in the case of Jews in this period. Jewish migration, which even in flight involved family units and a shared culture, created transcontinentally linked communities. Slaves, torn as individuals out of many cultures, recreated at best fragments of their cultures of origin. Migrations that involved state-building included—most significantly—3) the Islamic expansion into Sicily, southern Italy, and Spain; 4) Norman societies from Brittany via England to Sicily as well as eastward into Slavic territories; and 5) the warrior-pilgrims of the crusades turned settlers (1099–1187). Two more migrations involved colonization by 6) West Central Europeans in Slavic-settled territories east of the Elbe River in the ninth century and from about 1125 to c.1410 and by 7) Christian families from further north in the Iberian Peninsula (see map 2.5). In addition, incursions from the east, first by Magyars from the trans-Danubian plains in the tenth century and then by Mongols in the thirteenth century, left no permanent traces in West Central Europe except for images

2.5 Migrations of Dispersal, State-Building, and Colonization before 1347

of bloodthirsty eastern nomad horsemen. Mongols did destroy the Baghdad-centered Muslim culture, sacking the city in 1258 and 1393, but they could not conquer the Muslim Ottoman state in Anatolia.

Demography and inheritance practices contributed to migration for purposes of military aggression and expansion. Younger sons of the nobility, especially the lower nobility, were sent off to conquer new territories—thus ridding the home society of a particularly unruly element and families of competitors for inheritances. Accompanied by smaller or larger numbers of armed knights they "crusaded" in Palestine, the Iberian Peninsula, and Polish-Prussian territories; later they "conquered" the Aztec and Inca states. Younger sons and daughters of the peasantry colonized unsettled areas within their states or estates of origin or settled in the eastern marches and in Castile. Younger sons of merchants moved to distant shores to establish trade connections. None of these colonies and settlements lasted unless women were part of the move and the newcomers formed communities to replace soldier-migrants lording it over local populations.

Mediterranean Slavery

In the Mediterranean region, Islamic, Jewish, Byzantine, and Latin Christian peoples all practiced state slavery (administrative, military, or fiscal) and private slavery (productive, commercial, or domestic). Neither type was collective by ethnic group or color of skin. Rather, individuals were enslaved by raiders (as captives of wars) or as a result of poverty-induced sale by relatives or through self-sale. Captives could be ransomed. Thus European rulers freed sailors or officers captured in war by Muslims. They often relied on Jewish intermediaries because of their intercivilizational familial connections. The three major slave-trading routes extended from the German-Slavic borderlands, conquered by ninth-century German rulers, to Muslim Córdoba; from the Black Sea region to the Mediterranean; and from south Russia to Egypt in the thirteenth century.

By the eleventh century, "productive" slavery in agriculture, the crafts, or mining had come to an end in Mesopotamia, but in southern Italy, Sicily, and Spain, agricultural work, especially sugar cultivation, was still performed by enslaved men. State slavery, which continued in the Ottoman and Arab-Muslim World, most often involved military service. The professional slave soldiers of Muslim armies, especially in Almohad Morocco and Hafsid Tunis, were supplemented by Christian mercenaries drawn mainly from Spain. Starting in the ninth century, the Abbasid caliphate used Turkish slave mamluks (from the Arabic *mamlūk*, "to own," but in historical usage applied to white, that is, Turkish or Central Asian male slaves). In twelfth-century Egypt, armies consisted of free Berbers as cavalry, of Mamluk horsemen, and of Black Sudanese foot soldiers. By 1250 the Mamluks had risen to the status of a political class and formed the ruling slave oligarchy in Egypt and Syria for 250 years. Later, janissaries—elite troops levied from subdued populations—held elevated positions in the Ottoman Empire (see chap. 5.1). In Europe, municipalities or rulers filled

the treasury by renting state slaves as workers to private individuals (fiscal slavery). Domestic slavery continued in all of these societies.[27]

Catchment areas included the Caucasus region, Arab North Africa, sub-Saharan Black Africa, and any Christian-Muslim war zone. In the course of the struggle over the Iberian Peninsula, each power treated the other's territories as a reservoir of slaves. East European and Asian slaves from the areas between the Volga and Dnieper (Dnepr) Rivers[28] and from Central Asia, according to Verlinden, included seventy different ethnicities. Men and women of Greek-Byzantine, Caucasian and Crimean, Russian, Bulgarian, Gypsy, or Turkish background were traded as far as the Maghreb and Iberia. African slaves included "Blacks" from the East African coast and Central Africa as well as Berbers and Arabs. The Islamization of the Sudan and Guinea around 1100 connected these areas to the trade routes.[29] After the devastations of the plague, Slavic and Tatar peoples sold children into slavery to ensure their survival.

Genoese merchants, through their trading colony at Kaffa, controlled the slave trade in the eastern Mediterranean, while the East and Central African trade was in the hands of Arab merchants. Slaves were retailed in practically all ports of the Mediterranean. After the emergence of the Ottoman Empire, the eastern supply was used mainly within its borders, though small numbers of Slavic women continued to be traded through Adriatic ports. The North African supply system remained operative, but the volume of trade declined in the twelfth century. A new Atlantic system of slavery emerged after 1440, when Portuguese and, later, Spanish traders began to carry West African slaves to the Lisbon and Seville slave markets and introduced them into the labor regimes of the Atlantic plantation islands (see chap. 5.3).

In Europe, slave societies reached from the Iberian Peninsula via the Italian to the Balkan Peninsula. In Andalusia, the Muslim conquerors of the eighth century had introduced African slaves of many ethnicities as well as West Asian ones from as far away as Persia. They remained in bondage after the Christian conquest and were supplemented by captured Muslims and further, albeit reduced, imports from the North African slave markets. Christian armies resorted to mass enslavement of Muslims after the capture of the island of Majorca in 1229, during the captive-taking at Lucera in 1300, and after the fall of Granada in 1470–92. The case of Lucera, in the kingdom of Naples, furnishes an example of the willfulness and economic interest of rulers. In 1269 the city's Arab-Muslim population surrendered to Charles of Anjou. Intending to place a Christian colony in the town, the king invited people from Provence to settle. When for lack of financial or material support only a few families accepted the offer, Charles, in need of money and laborers, captured the Muslim townspeople in 1300. At first, he compelled them to work as agriculturists on royal domains; he then sold into slavery about 9,800 surviving men, women, and children.[30]

In terms of social integration and gender roles, the demise of productive slavery improved the lot of slave men. Rewards rather than threats of punishment were used as an inducement to work. Flight was uncommon, except on the part of free-moving sailor-slaves. In cities with uncontrolled hinterlands like Ragusa (Dubrovnik), half of the fugitives were male, even though men accounted for only 10 percent of the local

slave population. Male slaves in homes hardly did menial domestic work. Most were carefully selected, educated, and treated as sons or business partners. Many could do business on their own and accumulate property. Some, in particular in the Jewish diaspora, acted as agents in distant cities. Slaves were increasingly sought for household chores—for what society considered women's work. Thus slave status became feminized, and around 1300 women outnumbered men by two to one in slave markets. In 1460, 97 percent of Genoese slaves were female. Accordingly, prices paid for women were higher than those for men.

In Mediterranean commercial centers, varying over time, slaves accounted for 5 to 15 percent of the populations and formed a "vital section of the working population." Women, who often had to care for their dependent children, were considered more tractable than men. Control was exerted by curfews and by prohibitions against congregating. Forceful sexual exploitation by Christian masters, although canonically condemned and punishable, was frequent. In Ragusa, however, slave women could sue aggressors in the courts.[31]

Domestic slavery was specific to the evolution of urban economies and patrician lifestyles. Gender differentiation and "personalized" care changed labor from general domestic service to nursing and attending to a single person at a time. As a consequence, slaves held positions of trust and emotional attachment. They advanced from a marginal position to being an integrated part of family life. In wills, they could be manumitted or were bequeathed to other family members under provisions that prohibited sale. In the Jewish world, manumission implied full membership in the religious community and the right to marry. The conversion of slaves was common in the Cairo Jewish community and among Christian slave owners on the Iberian Peninsula.

As illustrated by Circassian or North African slave women in Genoa, where 5,000 slaves lived in a population estimated at 60,000 in 1380, "social integration" and "intercultural contact" often involved consensual concubinage with a male of the household. As a rule, children of such unions were adopted and endowed by the fathers. In Siena, fathers had to assume the cost of birth of their children by slave women. On the other hand, the semi-familial position notwithstanding, in the fifteenth century about 10 percent of the Genoese slave population was traded annually. In Ragusa, slaves were trained and then sold in Venice for higher prices. The presence of slaves was, "for the towns of the owners, a factor of diversity and enrichment."[32]

The Jewish Diaspora

By the eighth century, some 90 percent of the Jews who had been expelled from Judea in the Roman period lived in the Arab Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates (661–c.1100), where they could move freely. Baghdad became the religio-cultural center.[33] From forced and voluntary migrations a thriving diaspora emerged, an early globalization of one ethnoreligious group. The socioeconomic structures of the Arab states fostered urbanization of Jewish lifestyles. Jointly with Arabs, Jewish merchants became the

leading force in long-distance and intercontinental trade until Christian crusaders in Jerusalem and Mongol horsemen in Baghdad wrought havoc in their communities. Once the disintegrating eastern Arab empires no longer provided protection, the communities of the Iberian Peninsula became the core of the Jewish diaspora.[34]

Pluralist Muslim societies, in contrast to Latin Christendom, accorded religious minorities a position as "protected persons" who paid a special poll tax but otherwise were left to administer their own affairs. The dispersed Jewish communities achieved intra- as well as intercommunal cohesion by codification of Judaic law in the Mishnah, by recording the evolution of legal-religious doctrine in the Talmud, and by means of their common language. They migrated in family or neighborhood groups and thus, at their destinations, could form stable communities much faster than, for example, the temporary, single-gender merchant migrants from Urban Italy.[35] The rabbinical *responsa* literature gave advice about travel and about relations with host societies—about acculturation in modern terms. According to advice given in 1301, immigrants should "closely observe the established burghers" so that "their sons and daughters will behave like" the resident gentiles.[36]

Emanating from eleventh-century Cairo, Jewish and Arab merchant connections spanned the seas and reached Arabia, the East African coast, India, and China. The Radhanite community established itself in the southern ports of France and linked the trade of the Rhone River to Arab lands. Craftsmen migrated to expanding economies or circulated through Muslim villages as itinerant artisans. Others were transferred by the caliphate's authorities to where they were needed, while still others were forced to flee from mistreatment. The thriving Cairo community attracted the troubled and unfortunate in search of support. Scholars migrated across the Mediterranean World in search of learning or better positions or simply to earn a living. Women moved with their husbands or traveled on their own between segments of geographically extended families. They undertook pilgrimages and conducted business. Single immigrant men often married women from the host community to gain access to their social and economic relations. Sons were sent to distant relatives for training purposes, and families intent on extending their trade connections exchanged sons and daughters in "mercantile marriages" to form relationships of trust in the interlinked Jewish Mediterranean society.[37]

Under Muslim rule, Iberian Jewry had entered a "golden age" as early as the eighth century. But beginning in the mid-1140s, when the North African Almohads, styling themselves defenders of the purity of Islam, invaded and killed Jews and "impure" Muslims alike, thousands were forced to flee.[38] After these interruptions and the Christian advance from the north, the age of tolerance continued in Toledo, the central city of Castile, under Alfonso VI and VII (r. 1072–1157). A cooperation of scholars from the three religions and civilizations in Christian Toledo and Muslim Córdoba continued the learned traditions of Baghdad and provided translations of Greco-Arab philosophy into languages of the Western World. Jews recolonized depopulated areas as landowners, assumed leading positions at courts, and occasionally served as military commanders. Some anti-Semitic expressions notwithstanding, Jews were

offered protection in the kingdom of Aragon in 1247 and held an esteemed position in the Iberian multifaith societies until the mass rioting of 1348.[39]

In western Europe, Jews migrated during the tenth and eleventh centuries into the Rhine valley, where they established communities in Cologne, Mainz, and Frankfurt/Main. Jews from France migrated in small numbers to England after 1066. In the thirteenth century others moved into Poland and Lithuania, where a Polish prince granted them a charter in 1264. Here, too, Jewish migrants concentrated in towns, but they also participated in rural colonization and forest clearances. Among the Central European Ashkenazim, Yiddish (based on medieval German) replaced Hebrew in everyday transactions and became the transcontinental language of the lower classes. Feudalism forced Jewish families into small-town or urban economies by prohibiting them from owning land, though exceptions existed, especially in Slavic territories.

Jewish society supported neither a warrior group nor a sanctified, distinct clergy. Its power structure was based neither on land nor on physical prowess or military strength. Community self-organization facilitated reestablishment or adaptation in the course of migrations. Divided into a wealthy group of leaders, a middling section, and impoverished people at the bottom, communities also replicated socioeconomic hierarchies after each migration or flight. Family "networking" was part of everyday life and permitted long-distance connections without a political superstructure. This Mediterranean period was followed by the "dark ages" of persecution and murder across Europe (see chap. 4.2).[40]

Norman Societies

From the ninth to the twelfth century, Scandinavian "norsemen" migrated as "Viking" raiders[41] and "Norman" occupation forces southwestward to England and beyond and as "Varangians" or "Rus" southeastward via the Baltic Sea into eastern Europe (hence the name Russia). Norman nobles, some discontented with a reorganization of their home societies, settled as invaders and state-builders along the borders of Europe: in mid-tenth-century northwestern France ("Normandy"), in England and Wales after 1066, and in Sicily and southern Italy from 1103 to 1194. All imposed their rule over local populations and merged with or replaced local nobilities. Chain migrations of adventurers and settlers who intermarried locally and accepted local languages established new populations. As rulers they improved political structures by reforming traditional systems of taxation and administration and reducing the burdens of the peasantry.

From England, invaded by perhaps 6,000 warriors with their families, Norman culture penetrated into Wales and Ireland and reached the Scottish nobility. The introduction of primogeniture and the intermarriage of the conqueror families' younger sons and daughters with nonaristocratic families achieved a fusion of newcomer and native cultures.[42]

Sicily, under Muslim control from 827 on, was a Norman stopover along the way to the Holy Land until, in 1072, they took control, established the kingdom of Sicily,

and conquered southern Italy, then part of the Byzantine Empire. Byzantine, Arab-Islamic, and Scandinavian interaction and cultural conversion transformed local practices. Sicilian Muslims and Christians had lived intermingled. Contrary to papal orders, the new rulers did not convert Muslims, but they achieved partial Christianization through the extensive immigration of settlers. Palermo, with a population of 300,000, was home to Arabs and Berbers, Greeks and Lombards, Jews, Persians, Turks, and Black Africans. Foreign sailors and merchants resided in the city's "Slav Quarter." King Roger II forced Greek weavers and embroiderers to migrate to Palermo, where they introduced the cultivation of silk worms, which then spread to northern Italy.

Sicily's agriculture had benefited from Muslim improvements on Roman irrigation techniques through the application of Persian expertise. They introduced sugarcane cultivation from the Levant. When after 1150 the oppression of Muslims increased, many emigrated to North Africa. After the rebellion of 1222–24, some 16,000 were deported to Lucera in southern Italy.[43] Immigrants from French Normandy and Lombardy filled their places. Like Muslim Iberia, though on a smaller scale, Sicilian culture achieved a fusion of Islamic, Latin Christian, and Jewish elements, with additional input from Byzantine Christianity. The chancery was bilingual, conducting affairs in Arabic and Latin, with some documents drawn up in Greek. The courts of the Norman King Roger II (r. 1103–54) and of Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (r. 1212–50) were centers of intellectual exchange. Frederick, born of a Norman mother and a German father and educated in Sicily—then the Italian section of the "Holy Roman Empire"—founded the University of Naples and the medical school of Salerno. He married Constance of Aragon, who provided additional cultural input through her retinue of Aragonese knights, court ladies, and troubadours. The next dynasty however, the French Angevins, had different goals. To transform Sicily and Naples into the nucleus of a new and powerful Byzantine empire, they imposed harsh fiscal demands. Exploitation brought the coexistence of cultures, the *convivencia,* to a sudden stop. In a bloody conflict, erupting reportedly after some Angevin soldiers insulted a young married Sicilian woman, many of the French administrators were killed in 1282.[44]

Crusaders and "Frankish" Settlement in Palestine

Inspired by the Cluniac revival, more than a hundred groups of men and women voyaged as pilgrims to the Holy Land in the eleventh century.[45] The crusades proper (1096–1291) mobilized more and sometimes emptied entire villages. Who were the crusaders and in what numbers did they move across the continent? In the First Crusade of 1096–99, described as an "aimless mass migration . . . accompanied by pillage and anti-Semitic" acts, perhaps 42,000—or as many as 130,000 according to other sources—set out. In 1201 Venice contracted to ship 4,500 knights, 9,000 squires, and 20,000 foot soldiers. Papal envoys recruited children, shepherds, and others from Normandy and the Dutch provinces to the Rhine valley for the so-called popular crusades from 1212 to 1230. After their arrival in Palestine, the men and women who

came from the whole of western Europe were called "Franks" and thus homogenized by ascription.[46]

During the trip east, cultural interaction including conflict involved all social levels. The 100,000 men who are said to have sailed from Regensburg in southern Germany down the Danube passed through numerous cultures.[47] During the first crusade, some 30,000 warrior-pilgrims had to be fed and accommodated in Constantinople, where they met Italian merchants, Turkish sailors, and Russian traders. Antiforeigner riots repeatedly erupted. In 1204 Venice first used the crusading troops to sack Constantinople and thus rid itself of an economic rival; it then requested that the pope call on "the inhabitants of the West, of all ranks and both sexes" to repopulate the city.[48]

Some noblemen's wives and daughters joined the crusades and carried arms; tens of thousands of wives, nuns, servants, and prostitutes followed the treks. Many more were left behind. Widows of French pilgrims founded a convent, and English ones were assaulted by men who coveted the property of their deceased husbands. In intergenerational terms, younger sons and minor nobility from the overpopulated feudal system hoped to acquire income and wealth. Chronicles of the time reveal particular cultural constructions of sexuality and gender roles as well as of sexuality and the Other. During the siege of Antioch in 1097–98, the city's Muslim defenders expelled the male Christian inhabitants as potential allies of the invaders but offered protection for the women and children left behind. On the Christian side, thousands of women accompanying the besieging army were sent away, not for their protection but because of the spiritual leaders' deep aversion to sexuality. Military defeats were attributed to sexual licentiousness. Arab and Turkish soldiers were portrayed as lusting after (beautiful) Christian women, but a distinctly irritated Christian chronicler had to note that Latin soldiers lusted after Byzantine women and, for that matter, boys.[49]

As the Venetian sacking of Constantinople indicates, crusades were fueled by motives other than religious ones. For example, the Military Orders, once protective organizations for pilgrims, became corporate military establishments. They accumulated fabulous riches, at first by bequests, then through regular incomes, and finally by seizing lands of the "infidels." Some of the orders initiated a process of ethnicization; thus the multiethnic Teutonic Order "Germanized" itself and no longer admitted men of other backgrounds.[50]

In 1099 Jerusalem was overwhelmed and sacked by Christian warriors. They massacred Muslims, torched the synagogue where the city's entire Jewish population had taken refuge, and expelled their non-Latin coreligionists. To revitalize the city, King Baldwin I (r. 1100–1118) encouraged survivors to stay and invited Maronite Syrian Christians, "with their wives and children, flocks and herds, and all their households" from villages across the Jordan. They were not granted equal status with conquering Christians. To repopulate the countryside, settlers arrived from southern France and, in smaller numbers, from the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, a total of about 140,000 in a resident population of perhaps half a million.[51]

The crusader states from 1099 to 1187 accommodated diverse cultures in a hierarchy of power and status. Some scholars see this "as evidence of the creation of a Franco-Syrian nation" and emphasize intermarriage and friendly relations. Others stress conflict and suggest that intermarriage meant that male victors took women as spoils of war. In municipal courts, a Frankish magistrate sat with two Frankish and four Syrian jurors. Interaction between the cultures increased 1) when the warrior-pilgrims and their children adopted local lifestyles; 2) when second-generation, locally born Christian ethnics began to outnumber the immigrants; and 3) when learned clerics delved into Arab knowledge to create a new intercultural scholarship based on Arab transmission of lost Greek texts. Interaction and acculturation could also increase the potential for conflict, as when Europeans modified their weapons to incorporate Arab and Turkish methods of warfare. The diversity and quantity of newcomers, some of whom came from as far as Norway and Russia, caused Jerusalem's native-born inhabitants to complain about the "strangers."[52]

The Latin bishop of Acre castigated second- and third-generation Franks for acculturating. They indulged, so he wrote, "in baths, fine clothes, sex and magical practices, which they find more important than fighting. Furthermore, they make alliance with the Arabs, accept their ideas, and are soft and effeminate." A chronicler of the kingdom of Jerusalem noted that a mere three decades after arrival of the Franks, "God turned the West into the East; for we who were easterners are now become Orientals: he who was a Roman or a Frank has become in this land a Galilean or a Palestinian, he who was from Rheims or Chartres has been made into a Tyrian or Antiochene." For the newcomers, the process of orientalization meant to aspire to a higher culture than their own culture of origin.[53]

A brief glance at Muslim pilgrims in Mecca reveals throngs of people as diverse as those in Jerusalem. "Turks of Azerbaijan walked with Malinke of the Western Sudan, Berbers of the Atlas with Indians of Gujerat . . . the adherents of the four main legal schools, plus Shi'is, Zaydis, 'Ibadis, and other sectarians, prayed together." Ibn Baṭṭūṭah spent three years in Mecca, as a scholar-sojourner or pilgrim-in-residence, living off alms and with the support of learned patrons.[54]

With the success of Turkish armies and rulers from Kurdistan under Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Yusūf ibn Ayyūb (Saladin) and their reconquest of Jerusalem in 1187, Christian military men and entrepreneurs left for new frontiers. The Orders first relocated to Mediterranean islands, then either to Iberia or to the Baltic for expansionist crusades against Muslims or Slavic and Baltic peoples. Italian merchant-entrepreneurs, who supplied most of Europe with sugar produced by slave labor, relocated their plantations first to Cyprus, Crete, and Aegean islands, and, after the successful twelfth-century Iberian crusades, to Andalusia. Transit trade and "residence in the Holy Land brought European men [and women] into contact with Oriental produce and dramatically increased demand for spices, scented woods, dyes, silk and porcelain in France and Italy," from which the greater part of the immigrants came. The mass itinerancy of the crusades and the high rates of return among survivors caused a "demonstration effect" that spread their new food habits at home. "In a sense, the East invaded Europe

through the stomach." The introduction of spices and condiments, such as lemon, sugar, syrup, sherbet, coffee, jasmine, and saffron, "altered the aristocratic—and later popular—cuisine of Western Europe dramatically." Medicinal drugs, including camphor, laudanum, balm, aloe, and alum, were imported. As crusades and missionary activities decreased and immigration came to an end, the Turko-Muslim rulers kept the Holy City open to Christian pilgrimages (see chap. 3.4).[55]

Muslims in al-Andalus

Muslim merchants had traded in Europe for centuries: Syrians regularly attended French fairs, and a Pisan monk complained about "Turks and Lybians and Parths and Chaldeans" at Italian markets. Muslim slaves were part of all southern European societies, and free Muslims had formed communities along the northern littoral of the Mediterranean. The geographic proximity of Europe and North Africa is striking. Sicily reaches further south than the northern coast of Tunis, and only a narrow strait separates the Iberian Peninsula from Morocco. From the eighth to the sixteenth century, Muslims ruled several Mediterranean islands, enclaves on the sea's northern shores, and in three larger territories of Europe. From the Volga to Crimea, the thirteenth-century incursions of Mongol peoples left Muslim populations behind. In the Balkans, Turkoman Muslims settled under Ottoman rule in the fourteenth century (chap. 5.1). In al-Andalus in the Iberian Peninsula, Muslim rule extended from 711 C.E. (92 M.E.) to the eleventh century and in Granada to 1492 (897), and Muslims lived under Christian rulers until their expulsion in 1614.[56]

Enjoined by the Koran to respect adherence to the other monotheistic "religions of the Book" (Bible and Talmud), Muslims coexisted with Jews and Christians. Scholars of the three faiths cooperated closely, and merchants adhering to the different faiths did business with each other. In periods of conflict, however, mass conversions could be forced on conquered populations, as in the case of the late Byzantine Empire. In peacetime, voluntary conversion did take place, as in the area from Syria to Mesopotamia. Arab conquest—aside from the ravages of war—left local populations intact.

In 711 and 712 (92 and 93), Muslim armies, totaling 25,000 men, invaded the Iberian Peninsula and defeated the Christianized Visigothic forces. Resident Jews, who had been subjected to forced baptism from 612 on, welcomed the Muslims as liberators, and some Christian lords joined forces with them. Jews opened the gates of Granada and Toledo to the armies, which in accordance with Islamic law saved the inhabitants from plunder and death. Of the 300,000 prisoners taken, one-tenth belonged to the caliph and were marched to Damascus by land. Intermittent fighting with Christians and struggles between Muslim sects brought other armies and large numbers of mercenary Berbers to al-Andalus in subsequent centuries.[57]

Christians fled or migrated northward to Christian lands, from Catalonia to neighboring Valencia, or to the islands of Majorca, Sicily, and Sardinia, or as far as Greece. Muslim soldiers settled down: at first, Berbers mainly in mountainous areas,

Arabs mainly in the cities. The 12,000 "Syrian" soldiers of 742 (124) were assigned vacated lands according to regional origin: those from Damascus in Elvira (Granada); Jordanian men in the district of Rayya (Málaga); those from Palestine in Sidonia (Medina Sidonia); those from Hamus in Seville; those from Qasnarin in Jaén; those from Egypt in Beja; and the remainder in Todmir (Murcia). Among the newcomers, conflicts about the spoils divided early from later arriving ones, and migrants of common ethnicity formed generational cohorts based on time of arrival. In times of peace, Islamic migrants came as urban craftsmen or transplanted their highly developed agricultural techniques. With the exception of minor Norman settlements along the lower Guadalquivir River, little immigration of other peoples occurred. By 1100 (c.500), Muslims outnumbered Christians because of immigration, conversion, and natural growth. Thereafter, the balance reversed owing to warfare and immigration of Christians from the north.[58]

A process of conquest and peaceful intermingling created a mosaic of ethnoreligious groups. The newcomers—Libyans, Syrians, Persians, and Copts from Egypt as well as slave soldiers—came to be called *moros* (Moors), a term derived from the Roman *mauro* for inhabitants of Mauritania. In Christian usage the term implied inferior social status. Jews lived in self-contained communities. The mixed ethnoreligious groups were called *mozárabes*, Christians living under Muslim rule, and *mudéjars*, Muslims living under Christian rule. *Moriscos* were converts from Islam to Christianity and their descendants; *muladís* converts from Christianity to Islam. All usually lived in distinct neighborhoods, practiced their religions, and organized their administrative and legal procedures according to their own traditions. Either from conviction or because of economic considerations, Christians converted to Islam. Converts did not have to pay the poll tax imposed on non-Muslim peoples, but they were often derided as *renegados* (traitors) by their former coreligionists. Over time these terms have served to marginalize groups as well as to distinguish them for analytical purposes.[59]

Dynastic and religious conflict continued between and within religions. Conquered Muslims were enserfed by Christian lords or sent into domestic slavery, as were Christians during Muslim advances. Imported slaves might convert after conquest to gain freedom. Sub-Saharan Black slave bodyguards were labeled as "dumb ones" because they did not speak Arabic. (Similarly, Slavic people called their German neighbors *nemec*, "mute," because they could not talk to them.) Like other Muslim rulers, 'Abd ar-Raḥmān III (r. 912–961; 300–350) developed a nonethnic administration, the *clientela* of some 15,000 persons, with slaves from the Black Sea region as well as purchased Frankish, German, Lombard, and Calabrian children. Once they were educated, they staffed high civil and military posts or served as harem eunuchs and palace guards.[60]

Because of well-developed connections to other Islamic lands, because of revolt and fighting, and because of raids by Christian or Muslim forces, there were numerous voluntary, compelled, and forced migrations. When a more intolerant version of Islam became predominant, many *mozárabes* fled to Christian-ruled areas north of

the Douro (Duero) and the Ebro. After an uprising, 15,000 *muladís* with their families were expelled[61] and left for Fez (Fès), Alexandria, and eastern Mediterranean islands. When construction workers were needed in Fez, several thousand peasant families from al-Andalus augmented the number of local craftsmen. Although of the same religion, they practiced a different culture and lived in separate quarters, each centered on a mosque.

Córdoba, as capital of the Umayyad dynasty, housed a population of perhaps 500,000 by the tenth century.[62] It was home to schools of medicine, mathematics, philosophy, and poetry, rivaling Baghdad and Byzantium as a center of learning and literature. Among the scholars invited to teach at the university, bi- or multilingualism was the rule. On the material level, the basis for interchange and accumulation of knowledge was the production of paper, a technology that had been developed in China, carried to Samarkand, and adopted in Arab Mesopotamia by the 750s. Migrating craftsmen had spread the technology to Cairo. Córdoba's large paper mills supplied other parts of Europe with the expensive commodity by the twelfth century. Printing, known in tenth-century Egypt, did not spread to Europe; it only served to disseminate knowledge after it was reinvented by Gutenberg in the mid-fifteenth century.

About 13,000 weavers, many of them North African immigrants, plied their trade in Córdoba, and a leather industry, working fine "cordovan" and "moroccan" materials, earned high renown at European courts. Musicians and slave women from the East came to play and sing at the court. Slaves of Slavic origin alone numbered 14,000. Craftsmen from Byzantium decorated the interiors of mosques and the royal palace. Streets were paved and some were illuminated at night by torches. The building and ornamental styles of immigrant Byzantine, Arab, and North African craftsmen combined with those of local artisans to form the Hispano-Muslim architectural tradition.[63]

Intermarriage between religions and ethnicities involved all strata. Women of the palace, including sultans' wives and mothers, came from many ethnicities, among them Basques and Visigoths. Many were educated and some wrote poetry at a time when women in the rest of Europe could hardly aspire to learn to read and write. In the early period of conquest, when the invaders' sex ratio was imbalanced, Muslim soldiers had to look for local wives if they wanted to marry. Perhaps the erotic implications of the Other, the exotic, contributed to the integration of peoples. If contemporary reports did not merely reflect ascription and envy, men from the south considered blond northern women attractive while northerners had a liking for women with dark hair. The sources do not reveal women's preferences. By 1100 differences between groups had decreased, but relative concentration of particular groups varied widely across the peninsula. Most third-generation immigrants were bilingual, whether of Arab or Spanish-Christian origin, and a creole language, a spoken Romance dialect written with Arab script, developed.[64]

Muslim Iberia was an "urban" society in 1000 C.E. compared not only to Christian Iberia, with its single city of León, but also to the rest of Europe. Thereafter, as Muslim power, lifestyles, and high culture began to decline, Christian crusading armies started to attack. On the ideological battleground, Christian scholars describe this warfare as *reconquista* (reconquest). The pre-Muslim population, however, had consisted of Visigothic rulers and a population mix of Visigoths, earlier Roman invaders and their slaves, imported slaves, and the native peoples. The postconquest population may have stood at six to seven million before the plagues (Harvey), with over one million Muslims, perhaps 300,000 Jews, and perhaps 300,000 Muslims and *mozárabes* in Granada.[65]

The two centuries of conquest were characterized by both atrocious warfare and tolerant coexistence. Toledo fell as early as 1085 (478); Córdoba and Seville as late as 1236 (633) and 1248 (646). Christian victory in the decisive battle of Tolosa in 1212 (609) brought an intensification of religious exclusiveness and a new dogmatism in the construction of the Other. Rather than being resettled or sold into slavery, a large number of Muslims were slaughtered on the insistence of churchmen. Islamic men from among the Berber peoples, called on to support Muslim rulers, fought Jews and Christians and, in a new spirit of intolerance, also their urbane Arab coreligionists.[66] Men of the Latin Church forced conversion and slavery on Muslims and broke agreements in the name of their faith, but, as yet, they had not achieved control. For example, Alfonso VI of Castile, *el rey de los dos cultos* (the king of the two faiths), granted liberty, the right to property, legal self-administration, protection from new taxation, and freedom of worship to Muslims, including Christian converts.[67]

At the court of Alfonso the Wise in twelfth-century Toledo, translations from Arabic and Greek into Hebrew and Latin were undertaken. This cultural mediation, the "Renaissance of the twelfth century," is exemplified by the career of the leading Muslim scholar, ibn Rushd (c.1126–98), often known by his Westernized name Averroës, who became master of the Christian scholars. The cooperation was continued as Latin-language Christian/Arabic/Jewish–inspired scholarship in the realm of the Plantagenet kings of England from the mid-twelfth to the thirteenth century. Adelard of Bath had lived in Toledo and had translated Al-Khwarizmi's astronomical and trigonometric tables into Latin, a work continued in England by Robert of Chester with a translation of his algebra.[68]

In Granada, which remained an independent Islamic state from 1238 until 1492 (636 to 897), many of the remaining Christians sought refuge in the mountains, fled to the north, or—viewed as potential supporters of Christian invaders—were transported to North Africa. In reverse direction, Muslims filtered southward from Christian societies to practice their religion without restraints, and Granada flourished under this influx of competent agricultural and craft families. The resulting gradual Arabicization of the intercultural society involved abandoning the local Romance

language and a "positive affirmation of identity: to dress, eat, sleep, wash, speak, sing, pray, and be, in quite distinctive ways."[69]

The Christian armies were as multiethnic as the Muslim ones, consisting of Castilians, Aragonese, Leonese, Galicians, Asturians, Navarrese, and Basques, as well as of Franks, Germans, and Italians. Some came as mercenaries, others from conviction—but all in search of plunder. As in all Mediterranean "crusading," they invaded societies rich both in agricultural and urban craftsmanship and introduced militarization as well as the vagabondage and mendicancy of soldiers without employment.[70] Immediately after conquest, Muslim populations were expelled or sold into slavery if they had resisted. Others left for North Africa. The "immense" transfers of population from conquered cities, like Jaén, Córdoba, and Seville, depleted urban crafts and unskilled labor. While many North African Muslim rulers did not welcome these refugees, who were different in culture and custom, Moroccan and Tunisian towns saw great economic benefits from the influx of artisans. In some towns, the refugees' descendants continued their special industries in the twentieth century.

Muslims who surrendered to Christian armies could pursue their callings and pay taxes as subjects. Following Muslim examples, the *leyes de moros* offered protection as long as religion was not practiced in public. Even under duress, some stayed and lived unobtrusive lives because their skills were in demand. Treatment varied by social and political status. Muslim dignitaries and learned men might receive permission to stay and move freely. When Valencia was taken in 1238, the Muslim ruler and nobility received safe conduct. Most of the free Muslim population and their slaves decided to remain and became the only Islamic group in Christian Spain to continue the use of Arabic. Contravening Church policies, some Christian nobles encouraged Muslim immigration and the creation of new settlements to overcome shortages of rural labor and to tap the skills of Muslim craftsmen.[71] Though revolts against the new rulers occurred, most Muslims (*mudéjars*) remaining elsewhere adapted language, customs, and religious practices to a "new Islam" in which the Koran was translated into the vernacular. "Islamic Spain in the mid-thirteenth century . . . emerges as . . . a number of strongly differentiated groups, each with a distinct past and without institutions, even religious ones, which would have enabled them to envisage united action." For them, "survival was no mean achievement."[72]

To settle the frontier, vacated or not, Christians moved southward and mingled with the remaining Muslims, Mozarabs, and Jews in "kaleidoscopic variations at different times and in different areas." Christian society became as differentiated as Muslim society had been. To repopulate their territories rulers granted favors to settlers, a "whirlwind of liberties,"[73] as MacKay called it: tax exemption; exemption from levies and special dues; marriage-like cohabitation without the blessings of the Church—provided the woman had not been captured by force. Consequently, feudal bondage, typical of northwestern Europe, did not emerge at this time. French and Flemish settlers arrived, as did the Hospitallers' Order after it had been chased out of Palestine. By the fourteenth century all had become one population. In Portugal, Christian settlement reached the Tagus (Tejo) River in the second half of the twelfth

century and the Algarve in the thirteenth. At first, this migration relieved population pressures in the north, but later the frontier opportunities came to be seen by administrators as an unwelcome population drain. Immigrants also filled towns. About 24,000 men, women, and children moved to Seville after the flight of its previous inhabitants, which included the loss of about 16,000 highly skilled handloom weavers who had produced brocades, muslins, and velvets. Merchants, especially Italian ones, were settled in privileged positions as *francos* in suburbs (see chap. 5.3). Others, the Genoese in particular, invested in land.[74]

Intra-Christian cultural exchange increased when Santiago de Compostela became one of the three main pilgrim destinations (chap. 3.4), but interfaith hostility resulted in the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 (chap. 4.2) and of the Moriscos in 1609–14 (chap. 4.1). New population change was brought about by slave imports from sub-Saharan Africa and by sizable emigrations to the Americas (chap. 5.3).

Settlement in the "Wendish" Slavic Territories

Another agrarian frontier emerged in the northeast of Europe from the ninth to thirteenth century and, according to a nineteenth-century interpretation, attracted "Germans" into thinly settled Slavic lands. Migrations were more complex, however, as was the ethnic composition of the migrants. On the level of power, the interests of the Latin Church and the so-called Holy Roman Empire combined to send missionaries and military commanders eastward. Large-scale revolts of Slavic peoples of the region in 983 and 1066 prevented a consolidation of rule. On the level of migrants and their culture, the east-west moves included many ethnicities and the Flemish from the North Sea coast in particular. At first, Flemish settlers were recruited to drain bogs in much of the northern German lands. In a second phase, German and Flemish settlers moved further east into areas between the Elbe and Oder Rivers in the ninth century. The migrants came to be summarily called "Germans" and the many resident Slavic groups "Wends." Contemporaries, aware of cultural borderlands and interaction in the region, named the northeastern, immigrant-founded German-language towns of the Hanseatic League the "Wendish quarter."[75]

The growing agrarian population of the many Germanic ethnic groups could find subsistence by internal colonization or migration into towns until the early twelfth century. From mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century, several factors attracted men and women of many strata into East Central Europe. Slavic rulers struggling with neighboring ones appealed for military help to German lords. Colonizing activities of the Cistercians reached these territories. Apart from the early phases, the emperors of the Central European "Holy Roman Empire" were involved only marginally—they were busy in the Italian peninsula and Sicily, then lost power in the latter thirteenth century. The main actors were the military men expelled from the Holy Land. The Teutonic Knights, a German-language order only after 1198, relocated first to Venice and then to Transylvania. "Teutonic" in name and membership, the Order was trans-European in practice with regulations drafted according to Sicilian models under the

influence of Emperor Frederick II of 1226. The Polish duke Conrad of Masovia invited them to fight against the "Saracens of the North," the Baltic peoples. Armed with a papal decree in addition to swords, it subdued the Baltic Prussians (1231–88) and established an expansionist (immigrant) military regime. In another twist of the construction of ethnicities, territories, and states, the later state of Prussia and the label "Prussians" for Germans thus derive from a people of Baltic ethnicity. The Knights ruled for a century until defeated at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410. Later, unpaid mercenaries sold the Order's remaining possessions to the Polish king.[76]

From the 1150s to the 1340s, settlers in the northeastern territories came from areas of origin that stretched from Brittany to the lands along the Elbe River; among them were "Gallici" and Flemish, Saxons and other Germanic ethnicities. In the northeast they moved into bogs and other lands difficult to cultivate or into lands settled by Baltic and Slavic agriculturalists under the rule of the Order. At first, migrants came from densely populated Rhenish and Flemish areas. The latter, experts in draining lowlands, were usually settled under their own *ius flandricum* and were joined by Hollanders and Zeelanders. Danes migrated under the political alliance between rulers of Mecklenburg and the Nordic states.[77]

In the northeast, immigrant families—often with many children whose labor was needed for clearance, drainage, and other work—settled the Wendish areas, which much later became part of eastern Germany, and then moved into Polish and, finally, Lithuanian territories. In the center, newcomers moved into western parts of Hungary; in the south, Austrian territories were settled. Further southeast, Transylvania was colonized by men and women from the Moselle area, from Luxembourg, Flanders, and Lower Saxony. Their statute of 1224 privileged them as the "Saxon Nation of Hungary." Along the Danube, the designations "Saxon" or "Swabian" (rather than "German") became the generic names for immigrants from the west. Except for deaths incurred during warfare, local populations remained intact, and over time newcomers and resident inhabitants mixed. Some migrant groups established closed colonies, like those in Transylvania, where each ethnic group restricted itself to endogamous marriage. To the present day, the Slavic Sorbs of Lusatia (the Lausitz) remain as a separate ethnic group among German or Germanized peoples.[78]

Under commissions from local or conquering rulers, locators recruited, guided, and settled migrants in return for territories or rights over the peasants. Thousands of villages and hundreds of towns were founded. Attractive positions secured by contract induced landless sons of peasants with their wives and children to come and servile families to flee their lords. The privileged position is comparable to settlement processes on the Iberian frontier. Over time, new and old settlers became indistinguishable. Meanwhile, artisans and traders, merchants, and patricians moved into existing towns or founded new ones, like Riga in 1201. They introduced variants of Germanic urban law, often falsely labeled generically as *ius teutonicum.* Rather than of imperial significance or German character, it was territorial law tailored to mercantile and patrician needs, most commonly following that of the city of Magde-

burg. This migration was supported by the Wendish cities of the Hanseatic League, in particular the young town of Lübeck, itself founded only in 1158 by Rhenish and Westphalian migrants. The urban migrants were granted the status of free persons by local rulers who needed nonservile, revenue-producing citizens because serfs produced only for their lords. Urban political structures, long-distance trade, and artisanal production followed customs of German towns and German became the urban and commercial lingua franca. This process separated the inserted urban populations from both local peasants and long-settled nobles.[79]

The Polish, Bohemian, and Hungarian territorial states remained separate political entities; only Hungary temporarily belonged to the "Holy Roman Empire." After the migrations, predominantly German-settled areas reached beyond the Oder River to Riga in the northeast. Bohemia and Moravia remained Czech, and Lower Austria became a German ethnic territory. But most areas, including those west of the Oder, had mixed populations. In both Poland-Lithuania and Russia, town populations were "islands" of German-speaking burghers of West and West Central European background. Thus, in most of East Central Europe, rural and urban populations, as well as lords and peasants, were ethnically different. The migrations had reflected population growth. The poor harvests of the early fourteenth century and the mid-century plagues depleted the reservoir of migrants, and the movement came to a sudden stop when the European population collapsed and large colonized areas reverted to wasteland.

2.4   Population Growth and Decline

Agricultural expansion and population increase occurred in parallel. Rapid population growth, which began in tenth-century northern Italy and shortly after in central, western, and northern Europe, peaked in the "long" century from 1150/1200 to 1300. While population tripled in these regions, it grew more slowly in eastern Europe. Family-reconstitution approaches show migration, at least over short distances, to be ubiquitous.[80] Europe's population accounted for about one-seventh of the world total and engaged in the large outward-bound migrations of crusaders and of settlers to Iberian, southern French, and eastern territories.[81] Among nonmigrating populations, increasing density augmented endemic strife between peasants and nobles. The latter opposed clearances in order to preserve their hunting privileges; peasants in need of arable land gradually pushed the forests back.

The thirteenth-century expansion of commerce resulted in urban growth. On average, 7–8 percent of the European population lived in cities, a much higher share of which were in Urban Europe—Northern Italy, the Netherlands, and Muslim al-Andalus—with lower rates in northern and eastern Europe. By 1300 twenty-two Italian communities counted more than 20,000 inhabitants, while in transalpine Europe only Paris, London, Cologne, and Prague did so. By 1600 the two Mediterranean peninsulas—the Italian and the Iberian—"supported over 17 percent of their total population in cities of at least 5,000 inhabitants." Because of disease and unsani-

tary living conditions, cities could not reproduce their own populations, creating an "urban graveyard effect," and thus were dependent on constant in-migration. The growth of cities meant the growth of migration.[82]

Young women moving to service positions accounted for a large percentage of this rural-to-urban migration, which often was circular because many returned to the countryside to marry and rear children (see chap. 3.3). Recent research indicates that couples exerted some control, either legitimate or illegitimate, over their reproductive capacity. Across different cultures, for example, breast-feeding played an important role in spacing births and assuring survival of infants.[83] In general, patterns of family formation, rather than mortality crises, were the centerpiece of demographic developments. Between leaving the family of birth and forming a family for procreation, a stage of mobility placed adolescents and young adults in other families in service or training positions. Consequently, the age of marriage increased.

One can discern four different patterns of family formation and thus four patterns of demand for land and jobs by the next generation. The first two can be found in eastern Europe (roughly in the area of Orthodox Christianity) and northwestern Europe: late marriages (the average age for women being between twenty-three and twenty-seven years, and higher for men), widespread celibacy, and dependent, single, live-in work by young adults. In northwestern Europe, marriages were contracted only after subsistence was assured, whether with a dowry or with inherited land. This model of nuclear families was supplemented by a third pattern, a southern one, of stem families in which one son married, becoming the head of a more extended household (southern France, southern Germany, and the *zadruga* in Croatia). A fourth pattern of nuclear families with early marriage predominated in southern Spain and southern Italy. Reduction of the number of children seems to have followed real-wage indices with a delay of one generation. Gendered patterns of migration emerged from higher death rates of women in the age group between twenty and forty because of childbirth and hard work. Their low position improved in the thirteenth century, and they increasingly participated in pilgrimages when adoration of the Virgin Mary began. Women's position and their ability to migrate deteriorated as a result of the "growing patrilinearity of inheritance practices in Italy and France" and the slow ousting of women from artisanal trades.[84]

After three centuries of population growth and consequent mobility, the climate deteriorated during the so-called Little Ice Age, approximately from 1300 to 1500. In the winters of 1303 and 1306–7 the Baltic Sea froze over, and populations that had expanded into hilly and mountainous areas suffered from the cold. The wet years of 1315–16 and after brought on famine and dysentery. The seed-yield ratio for major food crops declined by more than 50 percent. Hunger induced large cityward migrations in search of stored grain or other foods, but concentrations of people increased the spread of contagious diseases. In Bruges during a few months in 1316, 3,000 men, women, and children died. Mortality rates were lower where distribution networks for agrarian produce were better.[85]

Famine in a one year often brought food shortages in following years, whether

Figure 2.1   Estimated European Populations, 700–1800

due to the consumption of seed grain or to a weakening that reduced the capability for field labor. Severe undernourishment or inadequate diets cause lack of motivation and general passivity—the "laziness" that lords ascribed to their peasantry. Any famine or its threat sent people to regions better off or presumed to be so. Hunger hit all family members, and thus all had to move. Permanent malnutrition, on the other hand, reduced the ability to decide to move and to act on such decisions.[86]

In this unstable situation, the plagues hit. Carried by rats and fleas, the epidemic arrived from Asia in Crimea and the Levant in 1346 and 1347, or, according to other interpretations, it was endemic in local rodent populations and erupted when famine had weakened immune systems. It carried away on average about one-third of the western European population in 1348–49—in dry regions fewer, in some as much as 50 percent. Further epidemics caused the loss of another 20 percent by 1385, and a few more percent in the next decades (measured by death rates not adjusted for births). In much of Europe, hilly and other marginal regions, as well as entire villages, were deserted for a century or longer. Survivors migrated to re-form population clusters and viable economic units. Lords tried to relocate their subjects or to attract replacements so as to secure income at least from part of their holdings. Between 1400 and 1460 the population remained stable. The dryer areas, Spain and Asia Minor in particular, were less affected, which laid the population basis for the expansion of future Habsburg Spain and the Ottoman Empire (fig. 2.1).[87]

Several major changes caused a restructuring of power relationships, patterns of migration, and economic interaction. The impact of the plagues was felt in the whole

of Eurasia. It disrupted Chinese society and economy in 1325, then again in 1345. When the Mongol Empire collapsed and the tolerant Mongol rulers and their dependant peoples departed from China, some Eastern Christians left with them. Others blended into Chinese society. After 1368 the new Ming dynasty further reduced foreign contacts. At the same time, trade routes were disrupted by the nomadic invasions of Mongols from Asia into Europe under Timur the Lame (1336–1405) and of Berber peoples into Arab coastal regions. The Byzantine civilization, weakened by the Venetian attack of 1204, faced the emerging Turko-Muslim Ottoman Empire. Throughout the period, European populations were, or had to be mobile for many reasons (chap. 3). The increasingly doctrinaire Latin Church forced non-Christians as well as dissenting Christians to flee (chap. 4). The emergence of the Ottoman Empire in the southeast and the Atlantic forays of the Portuguese and of Habsburg Spain in the southwest brought about new forms of migration (chap. 5). Common people had to react to the economic, political, and religio-ideological developments in shaping their lives. Those who wanted to move could face encouragement from above or had to overcome restrictions placed on them by the powerful.