NATIONAL MANHOOD

Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men

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Imagined Fraternity of White Men

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For Elsa Sophia Ross (b. 1998)

and

in memory of Lora Romero (1960–1998)

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Preface

This book describes the formulation and historicizes specific negotiations of something I'm calling "national manhood," an ideology that has worked powerfully since the Constitutional era to link a fraternal articulation of white manhood to civic identity. I study the historical moment when the abstracting identity of white manhood—abstracting in the sense that it works to relocate men's affiliations away from more locally conceived identities—comes into focus as a supraclass ideal for guaranteeing national unity. Then I analyze examples of national manhood's ideological generalization, the processes through which individual "white" men assume the privileges and burdens of national imperatives, and how middle-class professionalization takes over and is authorized by the management of those imperatives.

National Manhood unpacks some of the consequences of the apparent democratization achieved through the ideological extension of "white manhood." This is a democratic expansion evidenced, the story goes, in the quickly evolving "universalization" of white manhood suffrage, a preliminary expansion across class divides that served as the precondition for suffrage extension first across the white-black divide, and then across the male-female divide. My argument turns our attention instead toward the antidemocratic structure of national manhood, and particularly two of its key entailments: first, that the process of identifying with national manhood blocks white men from being able efficiently to identify socioeconomic inequality as structural rather than individual failure, thereby conditioning them for market and professional competition; second and more importantly, that it entails a series of affective foreclosures that block those men's more heterogeneous democratic identifications and energies.

In this process national manhood substitutes itself for nascently radical, local democratic practices, energies, and imaginings, not re-placing local manhoods so much as enlisting them for and orienting them toward a unified, homogenous national ideal. I will be arguing in a variety of ways that this symbolic interarticulation of race, gen-der, and nation cripples and haunts the U.S. democratic imaginary. National manhood erects an abstracting, atomizing circuitry that charges white men for market competition in the name of national unity. White men are promised relief from the anxieties of economic competition in the warm emotional space of civic fraternal sameness, of "brother moderation." But over and over national manhood's com-petitive individualism and hollowing logic of representivity vitiates the anticipated pleasures of fraternal exchange. As I repeatedly dis-covered, white men seem able to achieve the equalitarian reassurance of unmediated brotherhood only with dead or imagined men. The in-ability of civic fraternity actually to deliver on its affective promises emphasizes how the benefits of national manhood come at signifi-cant human cost to its others—the white women, Indians, blacks, primitives, poor, foreigners, and savages through which white man-hood defines and supplements itself—and to white men.

We are not much in the habit of thinking about the implications of the Articles of Confederation or the variety of citizen's commit-tees and out-of-door political actions preceding the Constitutional Convention for what they might tell us about alternative democratic possibilities for the United States. My own approach to the subject of national manhood reframes this so-called "crisis" era in just that way, as proliferating with signs of radical democratic energies, imag-inings, and practices. Doing so enables me to attend to the ways that the ideology of national manhood effectively trains, curtails, and/or shuts them down. This ideology takes its start, I argue in chapter 1, in an important moment in U.S. history, when the Constitutional plan for unifying the confederated states holds out a reformulation of man-hood—purified, unified, "vigorous," brotherly, national manhood—as a corrective to a whole range of frictions and anxieties men were experiencing as a result of postwar political, economic, and social dis-location. I contend that many men of the lower and middling classes were not as threatened by postwar political frictions—for instance, in emerging face-to-face democratic negotiations and actions—as they were by the costs entailed in the United States' rapid transition into a market economy. Indeed, those democratic practices offered ave-

nues for addressing socioeconomic inequalities. But these various anxieties became undifferentiated through the powerfully conglomerating rhetoric of "crisis" and "fragmentation" deployed by the Constitution's defenders, which successfully attached political struggle to other very real apprehensions and difficulties men were experiencing in an accelerating market economy, and (at least partly tied to that) in familial order. The Federalists' explicit call for a reinvigorated, unified manhood exemplified in the body of a national executive—the president—promised relief for the "crisis" of household *and* civic order in a newly conceptualized, nationally unified fraternity. In the transition from Confederation to Constitution, U.S. democratic possibility became conditioned by presidentialism's powerfully homogenizing masculine ideal, one loaded up with unnecessarily rigid longings for self-sameness and self-subordination in the name of "unity."

While I'm not arguing that the passage of the Constitution documents men's wholesale subscription to the ideal of national manhood, I am arguing that its passage evidences at least in part the appeal of that ideal, and that in subsequent years we can trace the gradual cultural articulation of its symbolic arguments and inchoate logic. It is important to draw out the difference between the appeal of national manhood and its actual functional cultural installation, to emphasize the way that "white" men's learning to identify with national manhood also entailed an uneven, lengthy, continuing process of social—and even democratic—disidentification. For instance, we might hold up the first act of naturalization (1790) which identified free white men as potential citizens against the fact that free black men were not fully disenfranchised in the various states (North and South) until the mid-1830s—the era of "universal" white manhood suffrage. To emphasize the historical development of this process, I elaborate my arguments chronologically, concentrating on the period from the 1780s to the 1850s.

After charting the ideological coordination of nation, manhood, and whiteness during the early Federal period in chapter 1, I trace the transition from national manhood's articulation as a political ideal to its alignment of geographic and psychic territories. Here, through readings of the Lewis and Clark Expedition and a novel by John Neal, I concentrate on the way that one of national manhood's supplementary logics—the Indian—helped not only to authorize national expansion through territorial incorporation, but even more importantly to reterritorialize national stresses and economic inequality

as individual responsibility. Chapter 2 also marks a transition in my argument's focus, where I move from outlining exceptional models pointing the way toward national manhood to examining its psychic recodification in individual men and then its inculcation as cultural logic. Chapters 3 and 4 study the polygenesis debate and early gynecology as examples of the way middle-class professionalization takes up the imperatives of national manhood, offering scientific documentation, institutional force, and career status for its proliferating investments in civic management. Chapter 5 then examines a variety of fraternal expressions (in essays, fraternal order ritual, professional friendships, and fiction) to detail another important dynamic: national manhood's functional melancholy. In the afterword, I return to the question of presidentialism, asking through a reading of a Poe story and two 1997 summer blockbuster movies what this ideal embodiment of national manhood means for the practice of democracy in the United States both then and now.

The structure of national manhood provides us an important key for understanding the referential power of white manhood. It also helps us understand how democratic energy is blocked and rerouted in the early nation as well as today. The political psychology of capitalist citizenship that I outline in *National Manhood* has powerfully conditioned individual lives, class logic, professional development, and civic practice in the United States. This ideology trained and continues to train citizens—and not just white male ones—to conceptualize U.S. democracy through antidemocratic modes. Imagining and building alternative possibilities for personal identity, socioeconomic structure, and political practice in the United States will mean confronting more than the individual expressions, local practices, and corporate structures of white male privilege. As *National Manhood* emphasizes, it will mean countering the affective foreclosures of heterogeneous democracy entailed by the fraternally homogenizing logic of national manhood.

ticular, my chair at UK, David Durant, has been actively supportive of my work on this project. For all his help, his ongoing interest in seeing me finish, and his constant good cheer I cannot thank him enough.

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I came to love the work of research and writing more than ever in this book for the places it felt more like community than solitary enterprise. My arguments have benefited enormously from conversations and writing exchanges with many people. I thank valuable interlocutors: Phil Lapsansky, Denise Larrabee, Mary Ann Hines, and Jim Green of the Library Company of Philadelphia, and Karen D. Stevens at the Academy of Natural Sciences, for source leads, informative conversations, and back-up eyes; Paula Garrett, David Mazel, Mary Katherine Politz, and Leonard Vraniak, former students who helped me think through some of these ideas in a graduate seminar at LSU; my colleagues in the Social Theory collective at UK, especially Jack Forbes, Fon Gordon, JoEllen Green Kaiser, David Kaiser, Wolfgang Natter, Ted Schatzki, Rich Schein, Paul Taylor, and Ron Witte; and especially Jerry Martin, who has been listening patiently and encouraging my work on this book in important ways from beginning to end.

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Introduction: Naked Nature

Although we cannot control what happens to a perception before we become aware of it, we can retroactively revise the value which it assumes for us at a conscious level. We can look at an object a second time, through different representational parameters, and painstakingly reverse the processes through which we have arrogated to ourselves what does not belong to us, or displaced onto another what we do not want to recognize in ourselves. Although such a reviewing can have only a very limited efficacy, and must be repeated with each new visual perception, it is a necessary step in the coming of a subject to an ethical or a non-violent relation to the other. —KAJA SILVERMAN, *Threshold* 3

In 1855, Herman Melville published "Benito Cereno," a story about a Massachusetts captain at sea off the coast of Chile who encounters a slave ship. Melville's story was based on historical events: a slave uprising on the Spanish ship *Tryal*, intercepted and finally foiled by the U.S. captain Amasa Delano in 1805, and the 1839 slave revolt on board the Spanish schooner *Amistad*. Backdating the setting of his story to 1799, and naming the Spanish ship *San Dominick*, Melville links slave rebellion to questions of democratic order and revolutions for national independence at the outset.[1]

In Melville's handling, the story is centrally a mystery, in which Delano (and the reader along with him) is the detective. The action begins on a shadowy and gray day. Delano spots and boards an unmarked ship to offer assistance, speculating that they are in some kind of trouble. Evidently he is right, but the Spanish captain Benito Cereno evades Captain Delano's requests for specific information

about that trouble, and his behavior is otherwise strangely elusive. He seems uneager to receive Delano's help, and keeps retreating from Delano to his cabin, accompanied by his ever-faithful personal slave, Babo. Delano remains on board to await supplies from his own ship and to negotiate an agreeable financial settlement for those supplies. Puzzled and a little unnerved by the odd, reclusive behavior of the captain of the *San Dominick*, Delano mentally questions the efficacy of Cereno's command and decides to have him relieved of it at the first possible opportunity. But this idea is only temporarily reassuring. Cereno's continuing evasiveness and unfriendliness thoroughly rattle Delano's own customary "genial" ease, a discomfort that increases as Cereno repeatedly denies Delano the fraternal exchange he seeks, in what Delano terms a "privileged spot"—that is, sequestered away from any of their social inferiors. Unable to find the authority he expects in a "brother captain" and unable to imagine it lodged elsewhere, Delano remains uncertain and uncomfortable throughout the duration of his stay on the ship.

In an earlier study of this text, I became fascinated by a particular, seemingly minor moment in the plot. Just at the point in Melville's "Benito Cereno" when Delano is both completely baffled and almost totally frustrated by his experiences on board the *San Dominick* and particularly by his inability to gain Cereno's confidence, he spots "a pleasant sort of sunny sight; quite sociable too." This sight, unlike others before it, calms the nervous Massachusetts captain as it reconfirms his sense of universal right-order:

> His attention had been drawn to a slumbering negress, partly disclosed through the lace-work of some rigging. . . . Sprawling at her lapped breasts was her wide-awake fawn, stark naked, its black little body half lifted from the deck, crosswise on its dam's . . .
>
> There's naked nature, now; pure tenderness and love, thought Captain Delano, well pleased. (73)

He is provoked by this sight "to remark the other negresses more particularly than before," finding himself similarly "gratified by their manners." His musings over the women's ability to evidence both domestic gentleness and savage animalism culminate in an inward exclamation: "Ah! . . . these perhaps are some of the very women whom Mungo Park saw in Africa, and gave such a noble account of." As the narrator observes, "these natural sights somehow insensibly deepened [Delano's] confidence and ease."

In the midst of his worries that he's about to be ambushed, how does looking at a partially unclothed, enslaved African woman and her naked baby make Delano feel "well pleased"? Pleased about what? (Their *manners!*) How does thinking about sharing the sight of these well-mannered women with Mungo Park compensate for his discomfort with Benito Cereno? How does this odd concatenation of gazing at otherness ("naked nature") and imagining fraternal sameness (with an internationally acclaimed colonial explorer) stabilize Delano's sense of self, his "confidence and ease"? Though it goes by quickly, it's a moment worth pausing over. This moment indexes Delano's experience of himself as a man who commands: a "brother captain," a scientifically rational man, a philanthropic man, a white man. Delano enjoys the anthropological dissymmetry of looking on the African woman with her child because it fills out and confirms his whiteness and his manhood. The securing of this identity comes for Delano not just through the slave's unclothed "blackness" but also through her femaleness, her (apparent) mannerly passivity, her "natural" maternal performance, her seeming availability not just to him but also to another commanding man. In the powerful fraternal sensation Delano gets from viewing the slave woman "as if not at all" observed by her—where his subjectivity is occluded and hers is on display—he is able to regain a sense of rational command over a situation where he increasingly fears he has none.

"Benito Cereno" delineates a crisis in masculine subjectivity through the contrast between Delano's ongoing discomfort and this brief reprieve, and more particularly, a crisis in the intersubjective fraternity of white manhood. Delano finds this "sociable" moment with Mungo Park because he is near-desperately seeking one with Cereno and not getting it. That the Massachusetts shipper does not seek the company of the other people on board the ship (sailors and slaves) tells us something important about Delano's (American, democratic) notion of brotherhood. That he finds fraternal recourse in the "objective" exercise of a fantasy of shared ethnological ruminations on African women with the British explorer Mungo Park tells us something important too.[2] From this, we can see how Delano's "republican" subjectivity is consolidated through a triangular structure, in imagined affiliation with other men who have power over groups of people—the power to objectify, to identify, to manage.[3] Those powers collate discourses of science, legality, and property (personalty and realty) to certify a select, commanding, and specifically raced, masculine identity.

"Benito Cereno" highlights the practical efficiency of that identity structure at the same time as it underscores its affective failure. The story forces us to see the brutal (in)adequacy of white men's command. When Babo's lunge for Cereno reveals the slave rebellion to Delano and his men, the force first of avarice (or capital) and then law intervenes to restore "right order."[4] For Delano, these events serve to restore and confirm his "genial" optimism—like the "blue sea and the blue sky," Delano is prepared to turn over a new leaf. But Benito Cereno continues to bewail how the two men misunderstood each other so crucially that day on the ship: "You were with me all day; stood with me, sat with me, talked with me, looked at me, ate with me, drank with me; and yet, your last act was to clutch for a monster, not only an innocent man, but the most pitiable of all men" (115). The interruption of power is not as traumatic, Benito Cereno implies, as the interruption of fraternity, of that "privileged spot" where commanding men can be rightfully recognized and known by like-minded/bodied/propertied men. In "Benito Cereno," we see that brotherly space emerge only in the moment of Delano's happy musings over the African woman and her child in the imagined company of Mungo Park.

That scene offers a suggestive commentary on the promises and failures of white manhood—both as an "individual" identity position and a fraternal contract—in the early United States. The critique it sketches is thin but tantalizing, and so in this volume I have worked to unpack the broader cultural logic it suggests, a logic I describe as "national manhood." I have taken my cue loosely from Melville, studying the early national and antebellum period (1780s to 1850s)— from the era in which Melville set the story to that when he published it. I follow his story's lead in considering how white manhood came to be articulated in the early nation through multiple categories of national and civic identity, scientific standpoint, management, and fraternity. These are categories I will discuss below, treating these component aspects in some detail before summarizing the aims of my study.

National Identity

In *The Word in Black and White*, I characterized the Anglo-colonial recourse to "race," a strategy for hierarchically organizing diverse human beings, as being rooted in "an uncommon need"—which, I

argued, sprang diversely from the epistemological and theological displacements of the Copernican revolution, colonial exploration, and the growth of a capitalist/mercantile economy. Responding specifically to Winthrop Jordan's and Edmund Morgan's contentions that the institution of lifelong slavery for African and African-descended peoples was either an "unthinking decision," or a "paradox" arising from various political and economic needs of the British colonial ruling elite, I asserted then that "it may be quite true that economic possibilities and social demands gave impetus to racial persecution and enslavement. But it was a cultivated and deep-seated sense of European (*cum* 'white') superiority that suggested African slavery as a 'natural' solution to Anglo-European economic woes" (12). As Theodore Allen's recent work compellingly establishes, though, the question I glossed over in that moment is the one that most demands our analysis if we are to understand the forces driving the racial categorization and racist institutions that emerged in that period and that we live in versions of today. Europeans did *not* at that point, as my formulation there implied, identify themselves *collectively* as a superior racial group (nor do they now, as a variety of recent events evidence). Rather, Europeans then identified themselves in a variety of aristocratic, trade, religious, ethnic, military, and protonationalist ways, not as "European," and not necessarily or primarily as "white," if white at all.[5] Nor did their various experiences of colonial life in America, or their experience of the Revolution, work to draw them into a seamless, common sense of identity. So the question we must ask, as Allen insists, is how and why these various—and often mutually antagonistic—groups of people came to identify themselves together, under the rubric of a new, abstract, overarching, and even counterperceptual, category of "whiteness"?[6] And to extend Allen's formulation of the question for the purposes of my study, under what conditions was "whiteness" attached to national identity and then middle-class professional formation?

   Allen's work is part of a recent and growing body of critical studies that examine the historical construction of whiteness in politically, culturally, and economically specific contexts. For instance, David Roediger has recently analyzed the emergence of the white working class, beginning in the post-Revolutionary period, arguing that "working class formation and the systematic development of a sense of whiteness went hand in hand for the U.S. white working class" (*Wages* 8). This coordination of class identity with "whiteness" grew out of

revolutionary ideals that created powerful fears about states of dependence: "the white working class, disciplined and made anxious by the fear of dependency, began during its formation to construct an image of the Black population as 'other'—as embodying the pre-industrial, erotic, careless style of life the white worker hated and longed for" (14).

Indeed, historians, sociologists, and philosophers concerned with historical manifestations of race/racism have similarly isolated the Revolution and its aftermath as the period when racial consciousness, and specifically whiteness, became more generally important as an identity category. Some, like Michael Goldfield, and Benjamin Ringer and Elinor Lawless, have located the intensifying appeal of whiteness in the late 1780s, in the Constitutional era. Though the South Carolinian attempt to add the adjective "white" to the Constitution was defeated, that adjective was appended to the nation's first naturalization law with no protest from Congress.[7] As Ringer and Lawless summarize, the only change was to gender the clause specifying the identity of eligible citizens as "free white persons," specifying that "*he* shall have resided for the term of one year at least" (U.S. Public Statutes at Large 1:103; quoted in Ringer and Lawless, 110; emphasis added). White *manhood* was thereby specified as the legal criteria of civic entitlement, attaching the "manly confidence" idealized by defenders of the Constitution to the abstractly unifying category of "whiteness."[8]

In this study, my aim is to analyze white manhood not so much in the range of its local formulations (such as white urban working-class manhood, or white patrician manhood), but in its broader symbolic attachment to national identity and civic organization. Adapting "white manhood" as the marker for civic unity worked as an apparently democratizing extension of civic entitlement. It worked symbolically and legally to bring men together in an abstract but increasingly functional community that diverted their attention from differences between them—differences which had come alarmingly into focus in the post-Revolutionary era. Men whose interests had been temporarily unified in wartime were increasingly encountering fellowmen not as citizen but competitor in an unstable, rapidly changing, postwar market economy. The national need to cultivate "sameness" was threatened by the differences structured not only through the variety of ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds of the colonial population, and the regional, colonial, and state affiliations that they had come to enjoy, but by the very market economy that supposedly ensured the nation's health. Thus we might think of the Constitutional

"crisis" (as I argue in chapter 1) as an ideological transition that reworked the identification of the citizen: a move to consolidate a "sameness" abstract but compelling enough to take operative priority over differences that threatened the construction of national unity without jeopardizing the economic system it prioritized.

"White manhood" was a useful category for inventing national unity because it abstracted men's interests out of local issues and identities in an appeal to a nationally shared "nature." Its efficacy may also have followed from the way whiteness addressed capitalism's internal ambivalence: it simultaneously confirmed market logic (as a property that advantaged some) and seemingly defied it (in allocating "common" property). Former colonials of European descent, increasingly competitors in the market and political economies, could share collectively the exclusive property of "whiteness"[9]—a category that subordinated European national and colonial/state identifications as it "democratically" wedded men to the new United States. "Whiteness" became an "American" property, certified, as Crèvecoeur so richly and suggestively summarized, "in the broad lap of our great Alma Mater" (70). This grant or transition in identity (from local to abstract) was both "natural and common" (91). White men "recognized" this "natural and common" whiteness together as Americans, an identity they economically (and genocidally) wrested from, and imagined they held "in common" with, Native American men (a dynamic I explore in chapter 2).

Scientific Standpoint

Crèvecoeur also provides us with a clear diagram of the scientific standpoint increasingly adopted for the articulation of white manhood, the (occluded) Enlightenment vantage. When the happy and industrious Farmer James recounts his visit to Charlestown, he contrasts the decadent prosperity of the planter class to the oppression of the black slaves who supply white wealth: "the chosen race eat, drink and live happy, while the unfortunate one grubs up the ground, raises indigo, or husks the rice, exposed to a sun full as scorching as their native one, without the support of good food, without the cordials of any cheering liquor. This great contrast has often afforded me subjects of the most afflicting meditation" (169). His ensuing meditation provides an instance of what Forrest Robinson characterizes as "bad faith": the wiggly ethical standpoint of whiteness. Farmer James

appeals to "Nature" as the ultimate arbiter of slavery's depraved foundations: "Oh Nature, where art thou? Are not these blacks thy children as well as we?" (169). Continuing in this argument, that slavery creates *unnatural* human relations, James ruminates on the doubled "burden of Nature," that afflicts enslaved black men when they father children, "a fatal present": "they are not permitted to partake of those ineffable sensations with which Nature inspires the hearts of fathers and mothers; they must repel them all. . . . Their paternal fondness is embittered by considering that if their children live, they must be slaves like themselves" (169). Having raised the emotional relationship dearest to his own heart—of fatherhood—James excoriates Southern planters for violating this sacred bond of Nature: "so inexperienced am I in this mode of life that were I to be possessed of a plantation, and my slaves treated in general as they are here, never could I rest in peace" (179).

Of course, he has already revealed to his readers that he does own slaves, and here he suddenly, apologetically seems to realize the sticky logical spot he is in. Identifying himself regionally now rather than individually, he assures readers that though "we have slaves likewise in the north . . . how different their lot, how different their situation, in every possible respect. They enjoy as much liberty as their masters [a remarkable assertion if ever there was one]; they are as well clad and well fed; in health and sickness they are tenderly taken care of; they live under the same roof and are, truly speaking, a part of our families" (171). He continues in a long (and ironically familiar, to those who have read Southern slave-apologist literature) catalogue of the advantages enjoyed by northern slaves: they "are not obliged to work more than white people"; they are "allowed to visit their wives"; they are "fat, healthy and hearty"; they "think themselves happier than many of the lower class of whites."

Obviously uncomfortable with ending his argument there, James turns from this difficult practical defense toward a more abstractly philosophical consideration of slavery: "Whence this astonishing right, or rather this barbarous custom . . . ?" he queries. "Is there, then, no superintending power who conducts the moral operations of the world as well as the physical? The same sublime hand which guides the planets round the sun with so much exactness . . . doth it abandon mankind to all the errors, the follies, and the miseries, which their most frantic rage and their most dangerous vices and passions produce?" (173). In categories ever more abstracted away from

the specific question of his own personal culpability in a "violation of nature," James now orates on "the history of the earth" and in a fascinating twist of logic enabled by a universalistic, scientific perspective, is able actually to conclude that it is the very *cruelty of Nature* that creates slavery, allowing white Americans—barbarously or benignly—to enslave black Africans:

> In the moments of our philanthropy, we often talk of an indulgent nature, a kind parent, who for the benefit of mankind has taken singular pains to vary the genera of plants, fruits, grains, and the different productions of the earth and has spread peculiar blessings in each climate. This is undoubtedly an object of contemplation which calls forth our warmest gratitude; for so singularly benevolent have those paternal intentions been, that where barrenness of soil or severity of climate prevail, there she has implanted in the heart of man sentiments which overbalance every misery. . . . Yet if we attentively view this globe, will it not appear rather a place of punishment than delight? . . . Famine, diseases, elementary convulsions, human feuds, dissensions, etc., are the produce of every climate. (175)

From the objective and disembodied space of the universalist standpoint, here defined in Hobbesian terms, we are able to see, as James outlines it, "the frigid sterility of the north . . . the parched lands of the torrid zone . . . the poisonous soil of the equator." We see the ubiquitous depravity of humankind, how "[a]lmost everywhere, liberty so natural to mankind is refused, or rather enjoyed but by their tyrants; the word slave is the appellation of every rank who adore as a divinity a being worse than themselves" (176). His "general review of human nature" thus confirms indeed that all men are slaves, that slavery is but relative; that human tyranny and the practice of slavery are ordained *by* Nature. And Nature here is something that can be objectively recorded by impartial observers but not challenged. From the vantage of this general, scientific review it is impossible to find a willful agent, let alone hold him responsible for anything. Ethical recognition (there is a slave) is neatly shorn from social imperative (all men are created equal).

And just so, when he next relates his encounter with the caged and mangled slave, we see James walk away without rendering assistance, to dine with the planter who punished the slave with this brutal death sentence. It is *James's* "oppression" that is put on display at the

close of the chapter, his enlightened philosophical anguish over the scientifically illustrated principles of "nature" offered for the reader's sympathy. Similarly "oppressed with the reflections that this shocking spectacle afforded," the reader is encouraged to share James's scientifically conditioned ethical standpoint, a standpoint from which the object observed is radically distant and divided from the observing subject, at once symbol for a "universal" condition shared by all, and radically "other." This is the vantage Abdul JanMohamed has described as "privileged stasis," where slavery can be decried and its privileges accepted in the same moment (or, in Farmer James's case, at the same meal).

The disembodied, objective, and universalized standpoint offered by Enlightenment science became useful for consolidating a perspective for "white" manhood. In the abstract space from which he conducts the global and historical survey of climate and human behavior, James himself is not present as an embodied agent: he remains personally (and ultimately, morally) outside the scope of his survey. Farmer James as a specific actor purchasing and managing slaves disappears in his universal and historical review. It is precisely this disappearance of his personal agency that authorizes his scientific authority. Standing above and apart from history, James accesses the godlike, dissymmetrical vantage of the objective recorder, whose face cannot be looked upon. The vantage of the Enlightenment scientific philosopher correlates neatly with the attitude of modern racism, which Collette Guillaumin describes as an occulted standpoint. Distinguishing between the autoreferential racism of aristocracy, and the altero-referential racism of modern democracies, Guillaumin summarizes the latter as follows:

> A fundamental trait of such a system is the occultation of the Self, of which people have no spontaneous awareness; there is no sense of belonging to a specific group, so the group itself always remains outside the frame of reference, is never referred to as a group. This can be seen clearly in the everyday ways in which groups are designated. . . . What conclusion can we draw from the fact that 'Christian' and 'white' are still used mainly adjectivally, whereas Black, Jew . . . and Asiatic have become nouns, if not that the dominant groups have escaped the process of substantivization which has befallen those whom they dominate? (50–51)

The occulted space of subject/authority formed the precise grounds for civic definition in the Constitution, as Eva Cherniavsky notes:

"[t]he particularized, or embodied, subject remains as such unrepresentable; the subject's specificity is precisely what is voided in his accession to the status of citizen" (9).

The famous defender of the proposed Constitution, Publius, claimed the occulted agency and rational vantage of the Enlightenment scientist/philosopher as a compensatory standpoint for American men. This was a space where men overlooked their own differences as they trained their focus on *other* "bodies," as, for instance, when Madison tacitly invites citizen-men to stand in the rationally authoritative space of the scientific diagnostician in approving the Constitution:

> A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse; and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger; after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend . . . They are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with proper and timely relief, so far from being desperate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. . . .
>
> Such a patient, and in such a situation is America at this moment. (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 184–85)

The recognizing, diagnosing, and managing of "difference" (the differences of democracy's Others) promised white men a unifying standpoint for national identity. This rationalist model promised men an experience of citizenship as fraternity in the abstracted space of universalizing authority over others.

Managing Sameness and Difference

The federal plan offered men a reassuring unity in the brotherly exercise of rational, managerial authority. But the precondition for the white man's authorization as a civic manager would be his ability to model the ideal of national unity in his own person: to train his own self-difference into a rationally ordered singularity. In this way, the new fraternal modeling of white manhood would accumulate imperatives for self-management and -regimentation. Perhaps nowhere are these imperatives more starkly outlined than in Benjamin Rush's 1798 essay "Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic." His tensely balanced model for educating American boys suggests the impossibility of the national demands being loaded into its manly civic ideal.

In his seemingly inexhaustible and contradictory list of what republican boys must learn to exemplify and perform, we can see this emerging civic mandate for "self" control; we can see how national political and economic concerns are handed off onto individual men, with the demand that they "learn" how to internalize and balance incompatible and even antagonistic claims as an expression of their "own" personal civic responsibility. The sheer length of this (excerpted) passage suggests the obsessive energies and expanding scope of national manhood's project for territorializing individual men:

> Let our pupil be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property. Let him be taught to love his family, but let him be taught, at the same time, that he must forsake, and even forget them, when the welfare of his country requires it. He must watch for the state, as if its liberties depended upon his vigilance alone, but he must do this in such a manner as not to defraud his creditors, or neglect his family. He must love private life, but he must decline no station, however public or responsible it may be. . . . He must love popularity, but he must despise it when set in competition with the dictates of his judgment or the real interest of his country. He must love character, and have a due sense of injuries, but he must be taught to appeal only to the laws of the state, to defend the one, and punish the other. . . . He must avoid neutrality in all questions that divide the state, but he must shun the rage and acrimony of party spirit. He must be taught to love his fellow creatures in every part of the world, but he must cherish with a more intense and peculiar affection, the citizens of Pennsylvania and of the United States.[10] . . . He must be taught to amass wealth, but it must be only to encrease [sic] his power of contributing to the wants and demands of state. He must be indulged occasionally in amusements, but he must be taught that study and business should be his principal pursuits in life. Above all he must love life, and endeavor to acquire as many of its conveniences as possible by industry and economy, but he must be taught that this life "is not his own," when the safety of his country requires it. ("Of the Mode" 90)

Rush's plan works structurally to reroute anxieties about national unity and sameness into the psychological interior of the American boy/man, who must equalize the contradictory demands of self, family, market, and national interests *in his own person*. National concerns for the reassuring experiences of unity and sameness are

educationally recodified as the territory of national manhood, the white man's self-management of the "differences" loaded into him.

One might suppose that the appeal of this strenuous education for national manhood would lie in its fraternal bonds. Yet Rush reveals the inability of the fraternal contract to deliver on its affective promise. Indeed, he depicts emotional relations between boys-in-training as an actual *threat* to the purity of national manhood: "I cannot help bearing a testimony . . . against the custom, which prevails in some parts of America . . . of crowding boys together under one roof for the purposes of education. . . . The vices of young people are generally learned from each other. The vices of adults seldom infect them. By separating them from each other, therefore, in their hours of relaxation from study, we secure their morals from a principal source of corruption, while we improve their manners, by subjecting them to those restraints which the differences of age and sex, naturally produce in private families" ("Of the Mode" 92). Rush's goal, he shortly reveals, is to "convert men into republican machines," something that "must be done if we expect them to perform their parts properly, in the great machine of the government of the state" (92). But the sameness schooled by this mechanical/national manhood must be experienced only in the state of abstraction: these boys learn to "relax" not in the arena of fraternity but of the heterosexualizing family (more on this in chapter 4). Rush's "republican machines" are primed for competition, where the "individual" is called to the fore on behalf of national interest—an individual specimen of American manhood unfettered by the arguably contradictory (democratic?) impulses of fraternal bonds. National unity would not find its guarantee in fraternal bodies, then, except in the most ritualized, abstracted forms.[11] Instead, it will emerge as a condition of the citizen's mass-produced, radically individualized self, his tribute to national "sameness" rendered through his successful self-discipline.

After the passage of the Constitution, the nation began forming and reforming institutional devices for policing men who failed in their national self-discipline. Such individuals were exteriorized from the civic body as alien—figured in terms of effeminacy, sedition, insanity, and criminality (and these are precisely the categories to which Delano turns to manage his anxieties over the uncertain welcome of Don Benito). In his study of the centrality of penal reform to the articulation of U.S. democracy in the early Republic, Thomas Dumm notes that new standards for "uniform legal punishment underscored and supported a uniform model of behavior, so that there was less and

less psychic space . . . for the development and nurturance of variety. U.S. citizens would have one dimension in which they could develop" (137).[12] But following in the narrow track of self-discipline promised a certain compensation in authority, an authority generated in the regimen and from within the standpoint of Enlightenment science. What Robyn Wiegman has termed the "universal disembodiment attending white masculinity" (67) became carte blanche for American men's title to civic management. The imperatives of national manhood thus created a two-order domain for management: American men were to internalize rational principles of (phobia-inducing) self-management as a precondition of authority for their (counterphobic) management of others. The occulted space of the managing "expert" became a democratic as well as a career ideal: a professional manhood.

The abstracting whiteness that expanded suffrage rights to "all" white men thus worked hand in hand (and however counterintuitively) *with* class stratification. Increasingly for the emerging middle classes, competitive mastery was defined in terms of professional expertise in civic, market, or social management. In his important study of "the culture of professionalism," Burton Bledstein characterizes the emergence of middle-class professional culture in the nineteenth century as an attempt "to eliminate wasteful competition and to establish universal standards for moral and civil behavior": middle-class professionals aimed to be "the world's organizer" (27). Professionalism would soon—and still does—function as a class/corporate enterprise of occluded authority (I develop this argument in chapters 3 and 4). National manhood's mandate to manage difference—in the name of social and political "unity" and for the sake of a national economy— underwrites middle-class professionalism and white-collar management, which generate scientific rationales for the organization and supervision of the national economy, and the civic, public, and private arenas.[13]

Through the emerging professional practices promising ever more precise aims for management (populations, bodies, business, workers, economy), civic actors consolidated more narrowly functional partnerships and imagined community that drove the formation of the middle classes. This was, in other words, a cultural shift that drew on the political psychology of national manhood to consolidate a more exclusive practice of it. Important work on middle-class women's history, literature, and culture has emphasized the extent to which women were active in the public sphere.[14] It seems equally important

to keep in mind the competing ways that social sciences and medicine granted certain men access to and authority over the "woman's sphere." Jacques Donzelot has characterized the management of the "private" as a bourgeois technology; it is worth considering how this "technology" emerges in the United States in a complex series of cultural moves that work—at least in part—to consolidate the domain of middle-class manhood. In an era where women were testing new theories of public action, voice, and power, one way to reconsider the professional management of the "private" sphere by professional men is to understand it—at least in part—as a countermove to women's power on behalf of white manhood. Emerging sciences like gynecology, along with other sciences like the "American school" of ethnology (polygenesis and racial categorization), and, more generally, anthropological and social sciences, exemplified and exercised white manhood as an intellectual, professional, and social discipline. This exercise came over and against an ever-expanding arena of Otherness: women, nonwhites, the primitive/poor, the insane, criminals, laborers. Professional manhood diversified and formally articulated national manhood's investment in management logic on behalf of its own gender, racial, and class advantage.

My arguments in *National Manhood* suggest that we rethink the emergence of professional disciplines as one important aspect of an ongoing, national reorganization (and reenlistment) of manhood. The materials I study here suggest that, in the early national period, masculine aggression is symbolically reorganized under the banner of whiteness. This reorganization routes class, regional, ethnic, religious, and political rivalries away from dissensions manifested in such events as Shays's, Fries's, and the Whiskey rebellions, and toward market competition. National manhood provides a new ideological framing for interactions between men and for expressions of more locally organized ideologies of manhood,[15] seemingly guaranteeing that aggressive behavior will lead to the health (and wealth), rather than the fragmentation of nation. It trains men, as part of their civic, fraternal grant, to internalize national imperatives for "unity" and "sameness," recodifying national politics as individual psychology and/or responsibility. And its logic finds particular expression in the professional middle classes. Thus white manhood would come to work corporately on behalf of nation. But the question arises: how well does the democratic fraternity of national manhood work for *men?*

Privileged Spot

In this project, I examine national manhood not only for its ideo-
logical structure and material effects, but also as an affective space,
for men individually and in groups. On board the *San Dominick,*
Delano is almost perpetually in a state of "fidgety panic" (252); it is
as if Cereno's reception of the Massachusetts captain, enigmatically
alternating between iciness and warmth, throws Delano's own sense
of self-command into crisis. Though he wants to regard Cereno as a
"brother captain," he cannot rest until Cereno evidences a similar re-
gard for him. When that recognition is not apparently forthcoming,
Delano muses on the possibility that Cereno is an impostor seeking
to take over his ship. Alternately, he justifies his desire to take over
Cereno's. The brotherhood of command is in tense balance through-
out this tale, always at risk of being lost between the clashing impera-
tives of fraternity and competition, brotherhood and self-interest.

As we see when Delano reveals the practical nature of his desire to
speak alone with Cereno, his interest in finding an exclusive space of
"fraternal reserve" is both material and emotional. He wants not just
a financial but also an affectionate return on his offer to provision the
ship. This privileged spot of white male mutuality is a stable and re-
assuring space only in Delano's imagining; its actual space is wracked
by anxiety, by the tensions of white manhood's countervailing invest-
ments in equality and inequality (I detail this subject more generally
in chapter 5). Indeed, a reading of white manhood guided by "Benito
Cereno," would indicate that this abstracted identity is structurally
unbalanced, anxiety-making at its foundation.[16]

We can better understand where this anxiety comes from if we
make a list of the binaries governing Rush's plan for programming the
republican machine. Rush's explicit terms look something like this:

<div align="center">

Nation/Individual

Sameness/Difference

Fraternity/Competition

</div>

The national manhood that Rush maps depends structurally on par-
ticular "white" men to integrate all these categories, behaviorally
and/or psychologically. The national investment in emergent capi-
talism made the yoking of the categories in this first list necessary.
Indeed, the nation's economy depended, as Rush recognizes, on the
practical prioritization of the secondary categories. The nation would

be made strong by citizens who are well-conditioned for the market: industrious, competitive, individualistic.

It is also helpful to factor in the unconscious imperatives guiding Rush's plan, which might look something like this:

> Unity/Fragmentation
> Patriotism/Sedition
> Equality/Inequality
> Health/Disease

However commonplace both these sets of terms now seem, I have listed them here to emphasize how uncomfortably the secondary terms line up across the two lists; structurally, they create real instability. It is not just that the secondary terms (on the right side) of both sets come into practical and symbolic conflict with the primary terms (on the left), but also that the secondary terms from the first list—Individual, Difference, Competition—are tied structurally and symbolically to the secondary terms in the second list—Fragmentation, Sedition, Inequality, Disease—and for that reason are bound to produce anxieties in their routine enactment, both culturally and within "white" men. Ideally, the unstable secondary category would be conditioned through its attachment to symbolic structures of brotherhood—politically through suffrage, and more concretely in emerging party politics, in volunteer associations and fraternalism, and in emerging private corporate structures. All of these structures, though, are susceptible to producing more anxiety than they offset, in their invocation of intergroup competition and intragroup hierarchy.

More certainly and practically, the abstract identity of white/ national manhood gains its structural stability in altero-referentiality. The "naked nature" moment in "Benito Cereno" outlines how Delano in fact achieves "brotherhood" only through altero-referentiality: denied the ritual forms of brotherly acceptance ("hospitality") by Cereno, Delano structures that emotionally reassuring space imaginatively by looking on and categorizing that African woman and her baby, finding his "brother" only by emptying another person and mythologizing her as his (their) "Other." This moment in "Benito Cereno" encourages readers to think about how, for national manhood as well as for professional, middle-class, managerial manhood, the commanding Self seeks stability (finds its supplement) through imagined and actual excavations of multiple others.

The altero-referential articulation of white/national manhood in

the early United States depended on many others, their very mul-
tiplicity hard to keep simultaneously in focus: the "black" body (as
a material/symbolic supplement for whiteness); the "Indian" body
(as a material/symbolic supplement for Nation—and capitalism); the
"woman" body (as a material/symbolic supplement for individualistic
manhood); the "primitive" body—a category that can intersect with
all three above as well as poor white male immigrants, criminals,
etcetera—(as a material/symbolic supplement for progress). Though
gynecology, the sciences of racial categorization, and Egyptology, ter-
ritorial expansion, and fraternalism now all seem to be mostly unre-
lated cultural projects, my analysis in *National Manhood* encourages
us to see them as genealogically linked to the articulation of capi-
talist citizenship. If national manhood "hailed" white men into an
impossible discipline of self-division, the altero-referentiality of that
standpoint provided a safety valve: they could reach for a sense of
self-sameness through fraternal and managerial projections of self-
division/fragmentation onto democracy's Others.

It is in just this way that Delano projects both his desire for loving
recognition from Cereno and his confused, helpless anger at its denial
onto the African women ("unsophisticated as leopardesses; loving as
doves," 268). It is the fact that he must circuit the recognition he
craves in this way that clues us into what does and doesn't work
about white manhood in "Benito Cereno." It would be impossible to
say at the end of the tale, with Babo's head on a pike in the piazza and
the proceeds of the sale of the remaining slaves in Delano's trust, that
white manhood had failed in its material, legal, and political aims. But
the fraternity of white manhood reveals its human inadequacy, not
only in its profound dismissal of the personhood and life of the man
Delano had sworn he could never call a slave (57), but in the absolute
failure of the "brother captain[s]" to connect in any meaningful way.
Despite their attempts, they are unable to achieve the fraternal space
each of them believes they are promised by the privilege of their per-
son, their command. Their conversation, at the end of the story, ends
in death-gathering silence. Their brotherhood is shadowed over by
"[t]he negro," their Other; their attempt to satisfy their own desire for
human connectedness is haunted by the very human, affective fore-
closures that structure their privileged spot. The abstracting appeal
of "white" manhood seems to work—it does certainly for Delano—
on the promise of material privilege combined with privileged asso-
ciation. But in practice, it seems hardly to satisfy the latter condition

even when it pays on the former. The communal space of national manhood seems unable to deliver on its fraternal promise—though it may be the very dynamic set up between its partial payments on those promises and its ultimate emotional inadequacy that keeps "white" men reaching for it.

Brothers, Husbands, Fathers, Sons

In his massive study of "the idea of fraternity in America," Wilson Carey McWilliams notes that the concept is one that has received little scholarly attention. *National Manhood* suggests, though, that fraternity is *difficult* to study, and is so because the idea works in the United States as an always-remote abstraction rather than as an embodied practice. Certainly that seems to be true in Rush's plan for national education, where embodied fraternity—boys associating—is presented as an actual danger to the national good. Neither my claim nor Rush's is commonsense within a culture that structures fraternal space in every arena from national government to national pastimes. But it is important to my study to read beyond the promises to patterns that emerge in the actual details. Doing so means realizing that what men are symbolically promised by national/white manhood is almost never what they get: a space where men can step out of competitive, hierarchically ordered relations and experience rich emotional mutuality of fraternal sameness.

It is worth paying careful attention to the symbols for difference that emerge within the logic of national manhood's "sameness." For instance, we can look at the way calls to fraternity in the early nation frequently rely on images that invoke relations not of male-male sameness, but male-female differences and relations between men and women that function in turn to *differentiate* men. A key image invoked in the *Federalist Papers* is the relation not of men to each other as brothers, but to their *wives*, as husbands. Before the Revolution, such images as Paul Revere's famous cartoon against the tea tax, "The Able Doctor, or America Swallowing the Bitter Draught," relied on an invocation of patriotism as chivalric protectiveness. In contrast to the British men, dressed in wigs and finery, who symbolically rape the vulnerable woman America, American men will stand in a protective, rather than exploitive relation, presumably too in plainer (more "manly," less foppish) clothes.

This implied contrast is drawn explicitly a year after the Consti-

tution's ratification, by Royall Tyler. Though his play, *The Contrast,* advertises itself in its prologue as an American portrait of equality ("[w]here proud titles of 'My Lord! Your Grace!' / To humble *Mr.* and plain *Sir* give place"), the play itself, however, depicts not fraternal equality, but characterological rank ordering, sorting out "real" men from the dross. "The Contrast" between men (apparently after the Revolution as before) is drawn most emphatically in its comparison of how Billy Dimple, an elite "gentleman," and Colonel Manly, a Revolutionary War veteran, treat *women.* Billy Dimple is stringing numerous women along, variously for their looks or their money. Colonel Manly, as his name contrastively signals, is straightforward, aboveboard, honorable: a protector, not an exploiter of women. We know that because of his proud relation to "my late soldiers[,] my family" (1122). For Henry Manly (as for John Jay, whose sentiments in *Federalist* No. 2 he echoes), the "brother[hood of] soldiers" provides the model for national homosocial *and* romantic heterosexual relations, where citizens, like soldiers and spouses, are "united by a similarity of language, sentiment, manners, common interest, and common consent in one grand mutual league of protection" (1116).

Though this relation is posited as one of equality, it is figured as benign hierarchy, a model of "representation" founded on an ideal of sameness that is vertically ordered. Manly is in the city to petition Congress for funds for "*my* brave old soldiers" (emphasis added) who were wounded in battle. Because he acts in a heroically protective relation to the men who served beneath him in command, the audience is encouraged to see him as a good husband for Maria, who is unhappily engaged to the foppish Dimple. Indeed, Manly explicitly defines romance as a protective relation in a conversation with Dimple: "in our young country, where there is no such thing as gallantry, when a gentleman speaks of love to a lady, whether he mentions marriage or not, she ought to conclude either that he meant to insult her or that his intentions are the most serious and honorable" (1117–18). His ability to assume such responsibility marks him as the ideal type for American men, at the same time that it embodies him as America's representative, standing, honorably, for the Good of the Whole.

Curiously, though, this representative man has no equal in the play. None of the men the audience sees, besides Manly, served in the Revolution (Manly's patriotic waiter-who-will-not-be-taken-for-a-"servant"/"nagur," Jonathan, stayed home behind his father and brothers to take care of his mother; see 1105–6). Only one such encounter between Manly and an "equal" is implied: the day he enters

New York, he declines his sister's invitation to dinner becaues he is "engaged to dine with the Spanish ambassador," to whom he was introduced by "an old brother officer." (Though Manly expects only "freezing . . . compliment" from the ambassador, he was pleasantly surprised by his "true old Castillian frankness" and "friendly manner" and accepts his invitation for that reason [1104]). The *audience* sees neither the "brother officer" nor the ambassador; indeed, one of the laments of the play is for the loss of the spirit of patriotic brotherhood in the (effeminate) scramble for "luxury." Though the "brothers" remember each other (as Manly notes, "[f]riendships made in adversity are lasting" [1122]), brotherhood seems in danger of being forgotten, and forgotten by American men.

How could American men forget brotherhood? Though the play directs us to blame this on a growing fascination with European manners and consumer goods (an admiration figured as both unmanly and unpatriotic), the play's structure would seem to suggest something different. The play itself reveals that there are no practical grounds for experiencing brotherhood in the post-Revolutionary United States. In *The Contrast*, the training ground for brotherhood was the Revolutionary battlefield, now a fading memory. The field of civic engagement seems unlikely to provide Manly the equal he deserves—there are no men with whom Manly might forge civic brotherhood in the form of friendship, only men whose silly notions his role is to correct. Instead, his emotional relations will be channeled into his marriage with Maria as he learns to "mind the main chance"—that is, to engage in competitive economic relations in order to support his family.

This play then offers a blueprint for American manliness that would seemingly assuage Rush's worries: Manly's primary affective bond, after his nation and his geographically scattered "brother officer[s]" and "brother soldiers," will be defined in immediate exercise of his marital protectorate. Benignly ordered vertical relations, modeled on the relation of husband to wife, serve finally to justify the general relation of men to men in this play, of American "manliness" (I say more about this in chapter 1). Rather than representing this ideal American man in a field of equals, Tyler casts him as an isolated figure in a hierarchical field. Strikingly, the rigid hierarchy of the military, the social contract of marriage, and the new, sentimental family provide ideological glosses for the antifraternal function of the market—they are each "corporate" bodies founded not in equality but in hierarchy and submission.

If the "husband" was a figure invoked as a "Manly" positive cate-

gory for equality-among-representatives, the father/son relation was ambivalently marked as a model for (in)equality in the early national period. Commentators like Burrows and Wallace, and Jay Fliegel- man have carefully detailed how Revolutionary rhetoric mobilized powerful images of children rejecting bad parents, substituting more sentimental, equalitarian images and practices in the early nation. But as Michael Paul Rogin has observed, this revolutionary libera- tion from "parental domination" was not enough to ensure national unity after the war was over, "and, in the symbolism of the founders, the parents returned" (*Fathers* 34). I am less interested in the psycho- social implications of this "return"—which Rogin has impressively outlined—than in the meaning of that reinstallation to the symbolic construction of white manhood. Rather than conceptualizing (equal- izing) friendships between men as a model for democracy, national manhood embodied democracy *in* the competitive, self-subordinating individual. As Rush's plan for national education helpfully outlines, American men learned economically to balance competing demands *inside* their person: they learned when to subordinate their "own" individual desire to the national power, when "to defend the one, and punish the other" (90).

In national manhood, civic identification *split* men, requiring them to manage "their" competing desires not through a paradigm of equal- ity but rank-order: to "master" themselves.[17] Identification was di- rected not equilaterally, then, but *vertically*, toward the more power- ful "interest" that overruled "individual" desire—nationally toward abstracted and idealized founding fathers, economically toward com- manding men. Thus, though citizens "stood" symbolically in the same structural relation to nation as fathers did to their family and hus- bands did to their wives, citizen-men's experience of that relation was not from the vantage of the father but of the *son:* national man- hood was symbolically and structurally oedipalized. Carroll Smith- Rosenberg has commented on the oddity of early national iconog- raphy, where key figures for America are powerful women and citizens are represented as infants, or miniaturized men (see "Dis-Covering," 870–73). National manhood promised its citizen/representatives the right to stand for (the authority of) the F/father, but it effectively left them in the space of the son, vulnerable and anxious (more on this in chapter 2).