




# COLD WAR ANTHROPOLOGY




THE CIA,  
THE PENTAGON,  
AND THE GROWTH  
OF DUAL USE  
ANTHROPOLOGY

DAVID H. PRICE




COLD WAR ANTHROPOLOGY



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*David H. Price*



# COLD WAR ANTHROPOLOGY



THE CIA,  
THE PENTAGON,  
AND THE GROWTH  
OF DUAL USE  
ANTHROPOLOGY

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**FOR MIDGE** WITH LOVE, SQUALOR,  
AND THANKS FOR HAVING THE STAMINA TO SO  
OFTEN APPEAR INTERESTED ENOUGH THROUGHOUT  
THE YEARS OF ONGOING UPDATES ON THIS  
SEEMINGLY ENDLESS PROJECT.

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Anthropology since its inception has contained a dual but contradictory heritage. On the one hand, it derives from a humanistic tradition of concern with people. On the other hand, anthropology is a discipline developed alongside and within the growth of the colonial and imperial powers. By what they have studied (and what they have not studied) anthropologists have assisted in, or at least acquiesced to, the goals of imperialist policy.

RADICAL CAUCUS OF THE AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION | 1969



Anthropologists who study South Pacific cargo cults have come to expect and receive research grants as much as Melanesians expect to receive cargo.

TERRENCE BELL | 1989



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The analytic branch of the CIA is given to tweedy, pipe-smoking intellectuals who work much as if they were doing research back in the universities whence many of them came. It probably has more Ph.Ds than any other area of government and more than many colleges. Their expertise ranges from anthropology to zoology. Yet, for all that, they can be wrong.

STANSFIELD TURNER | former director of Central Intelligence, 1985



## PREFACE

This book considers some of the ways that military and intelligence agencies quietly shaped the development of anthropology in the United States during the first three decades of the Cold War. Whether hidden or open secrets, these interactions transformed anthropology's development in ways that continue to influence the discipline today. This is an anthropological consideration of anthropology; studying up in ways I hope help the discipline reconsider its inevitable engagements with the world it studies (Nader 1972).

In many of the early Cold War interfaces connecting anthropology and military-intelligence agencies documented here, the anthropologists producing research of interest to governmental agencies pursued questions of genuine interest to themselves and their discipline. Sometimes gentle nudges of available funding opportunities helped anthropologists choose one particular element of a larger topic over another; in other instances anthropologists independently pursued their own intellectual interests, producing work that was only later of interest or of use to military or intelligence agencies. In some instances anthropologists recurrently produced work of no value to, or opposing policies of, these agencies. Anthropological research was sometimes directly commissioned to meet the needs of, or answer specific questions of, military and intelligence agencies, while other times sponsorship occurred without funded anthropologists' knowledge.

Laura Nader argues that one of anthropology's fundamental jobs is to provide context: to enlarge the scope of study beyond particular instances and encompass larger contexts of power, mapping power's influence on the creation

and uses of social meanings. Understanding power involves studying the economic and social systems from which power relations arise. Given the military-industrial complex's dominance in postwar America, anthropologists might well expect to find the explanatory systems of our culture to be embedded in and reflecting these larger elements of militarization in ways that do not appear obvious to participants. Cultures frequently integrate, generally without critical reflection, core features of their base economic systems into widely shared ideological features of a society. Most generally these are seen as naturally occurring features of a culture, often ethnocentrically assumed to be views shared by any society. Among pastoral peoples this may mean that religious systems integrate metaphors of gods as shepherds (who shall not want), pristine despotic hydraulic states worshipping their chief bureaucratic administrators as god-kings, or capitalists constructing versions of a Jesus whose Sermon on the Mount somehow supports the cruelties of laissez-faire capitalism. Such ideological integrations of a society's economic foundations are common subjects of anthropological inquiry, though the disciplinary histories of the last half century have seldom consistently focused on political economy as a primary force shaping the theory and practice of anthropology.

Anthropologists, sociologists, and some disciplinary historians study the interplay between political economy and the production and consumption of anthropological knowledge. Since Karl Mannheim's (1936) observations on the sociology of knowledge systems, there has been broad acceptance of such links. Thomas Patterson's *Social History of Anthropology in the United States* (2003) connects political and economic impacts on the development of the discipline. Anthropologists like June Nash, Eric Wolf, Gerald Berreman, Kathleen Gough, or Sidney Mintz direct attention to the political and economic forces shaping field research or the selection of research topics (whether peasants or geopolitical regions) (Berreman 1981; Gough 1968; Mintz 1985; Nash 2007: 3; Jorgensen and Wolf 1970). Eric Ross's *Malthus Factor* (1998b) brilliantly shows how the development of demographic theory from the age of Malthus to the Cold War was inherently linked to the political economy of the age. In different ways, William Roseberry's essay "The Unbearable Lightness of Anthropology" (1996) and Marvin Harris's *Theories of Culture in Postmodern Times* (1998) challenged anthropologists to connect postmodernism's explicit neglect of the importance of political economy with broader disciplinary political disengagements. Critiques of colonialism's impact on anthropology by Asad (1973), Gough (1968), and others dominated discourse in the 1970s and significantly shaped anthropology's understanding of its role in political and economic-colonial formations.

Yet, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Pentagon, and facets of American militarism marked political crises from Project Camelot to the Thai Affair, anthropologists' scholarly attempts to put the agency back in the Central Intelligence Agency have been episodic and fleeting. Joseph Jorgensen and Eric Wolf's (1970) essay, "Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand," provided a framework and sketched enough details to launch the serious academic pursuit of such questions, yet the academic pursuit of documenting such disciplinary interactions remained largely ignored.

I have gone to great lengths to base this narrative and analysis on documents that meet standards of academic research, striving to provide citations for each piece of this puzzle—which both limits and strengthens what can be said of these relationships; in several instances I have excluded discussion of apparent connections with intelligence agencies because of the limited availability of supporting documents. This book is not an exhaustive study of these relationships; it provides a framework for further work and a sample of these pervasive mutually beneficial interactions. I made extensive use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to file hundreds of requests with the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense, and other agencies, requesting documents on anthropologists and organizations where anthropologists worked during the Cold War. I have also drawn heavily on governmental and private archival sources, as well as previously published materials. While FOIA allowed me to access tens of thousands of remarkable documents from the CIA and other agencies, the CIA continues to guard much of its history and usually complies with FOIA requests in the most limited way, resisting intrusions into its institutional history. Yet even with this resistance, it is possible to document specific incidents and infer general patterns from the sample of available documents.<sup>1</sup>

While portions of my research for this book began during the early post-Cold War years, the emergence of the post-9/11 security state significantly and inevitably shaped my analysis of past and present interactions between anthropologists and military-intelligence organizations, just as my historical analysis of post-9/11 developments was influenced by my historical research on past intelligence agency abuses (see, e.g., Price 2004a). In struggling to add political context to our historical consideration of the development of Cold War anthropology, I hope to have sufficiently complicated the narrative by stressing the dual use nature of this history: showing that anthropologists often pursued questions of their own design, for their own reasons, while operating in specific historical contexts where the overarching military-industrial university complex

had its own interest in the knowledge generated from these inquiries. The dual use dynamics of these relationships are of central interest to this book.

For some readers, writing about the CIA raises questions of conspiracies, but I find no hidden forces at work here any larger than those directing capitalism itself. As social forces of significant breadth and power, and playing important roles in supporting America's militarized economy, the Pentagon and the CIA can be difficult to write about in ways that do not make them out to be totalizing forces that explain everything, and thereby nothing, at the same time. While some may misinterpret my focus on the importance of these military and intelligence elements, exaggerating their significance to the exclusion of other social features, my focus on these militarized elements of midcentury American political economy is as central to this work as Richard Lee's (1979) focus on !Kung San hunting and collecting, June Nash's (1979b) focus on Bolivian mining labor relations, or Roy Rappaport's (1984) focus on Tsembaga Maring horticulture and feasting cycles. Anthropological analysis of systems of knowledge production (even its own) needs to contextualize the worlds in which this knowledge exists. As Steve Fuller argues in his intellectual biography of Thomas Kuhn, "Part of the critical mission of the sociology of knowledge . . . is to get people to realize that their thought stands in some systemic relationship to taken-for-granted social conditions" (2000: 232). And while the Cold War's national security state was not the only force acting on anthropology during this period, it is the subject of this book—and a force with significant power in midcentury America—and it thus receives a lot of attention here.

### *Dual Use Anthropology*

The phrase "dual use" appearing in the book's title is borrowed from the physical sciences, which have long worried about the symbiotic relationships between the "pure" and "applied" sciences, relationships in which academic theoretical developments are transformed into commercial products or military applications. Dual use science became a central feature of experimental natural sciences during the twentieth century. This transformation shaped branches of physics, chemistry, biology, and medicine, and scientists from these and other fields increasingly came to surrender concerns about the applied uses of the knowledge they produced as being part of the natural order of things if they were to be able to do their work. As physics moved from answering questions with mathematics, pen and paper, and simple apparatus, to requiring the manufacture of massive, expensive machinery built not by a dozen scientists but by hundreds or

thousands of scientists, to plumb secrets of the subatomic realm, it needed sponsors whose uses of such knowledge were fundamentally different from those of pure knowledge and discovery. With the increased weaponization of physics, such funds came to flow from militarized sources with such frequency that the silence surrounding such occurrences became a common feature of the discipline's milieu.

The dynamics of these processes and the outcomes of this dual use nature of scientific advancements are well known, and the general understanding that “pure science” has both “nonpractical” and “applied” uses has widespread acceptance in American society. During the second half of the twentieth century, this dynamic became a thematic element of Americans' shared beliefs in scientific progress. The tragedy of Robert Oppenheimer's slow comprehension that he and his colleagues would be excluded from decision-making processes concerning how their weapons would be used became part of the American dual use narrative. Most scientists understand that the knowledge they produce enters a universe in which they likely have no control over how this knowledge is used; some of this awareness comes from the legal conditions governing the labs where they work, conditions in which employers often own the intellectual rights to the fruits of their labors, but these dynamics go far beyond such legal concerns.

For decades the phrase “dual use research” has described the militarized applications of basic science research, at times describing scientific breakthroughs that have both commercial and military applications, such as developments in global positioning satellites that led to both precision weapons targeting systems and commercial dashboard navigation systems for family cars. Debates over dual use science often focus on biomedical breakthroughs that simultaneously hold the potential both for cures and for the development of devastating weapons. Such potential applications often mix “pure science” research with commercial or military dual uses in ways that confound or mix understandings of “defensive” and “offensive” uses of biomedical knowledge (Miller and Selgelid 2008). Approaches to such biological research are far from uniform. Some groups of scientists, like the Cambridge Working Group, raise public concerns posed by research into viruses and other transmittable diseases; others, like members of Scientists for Science, advocate for the right to continue such research (Greenfieldboyce 2014).<sup>2</sup> But even with these disputes, this awareness of the dual use potential of such work helps focus and clarify the fundamental issues of these debates.

Dual use research programs significantly altered the trajectories of twentieth-century physics, and the payouts for commercial interests and the



weapons-industrial complex have been so sizable that the U.S. government supports massive funding programs for supercolliders and other large expenditures that appear to have no direct applications to weapons work. But if past performance is any predictor of future uses, either applications or new frontiers of adaptable useful knowledge will follow. David Kaiser (2002) argues that many of the expensive large physics projects with no apparent military applications, such as supercolliders, functionally create a surplus of physicists who can assist military projects as needed.

The dynamics governing the direction of the knowledge flow of dual use research appear to often favor transfers of knowledge from pure to applied research projects, but a close examination of interplays between theory and application finds any determinative statements far too simplistic to account for the feedback between theory and application. Notions of “applied” and “pure” science are constructions that, although useful, have limitations. In 1976, Stewart Brand asked Gregory Bateson about the roots of his cybernetic research. Bateson explained that his initial interest in developing cybernetic theories of cultural systems came not out of abstract, nonapplied theoretical musings but from applied military research. Bateson’s interest in cybernetic feedback in cultural systems was, ironically, itself propagated by an instance of reverse feedback insofar as his abstract theoretical interest came from concrete problems arising from designing self-guiding missile systems. In a move reversing what might appear to be general trends of dual use information flow, Bateson took applied military knowledge and transferred it into the basis of a theoretical abstraction analyzing biological and cultural systems.

Distinctions between “applied” and “pure” research shift over time. Sometimes the abstractions of theoretical or pure research follow from applied problems; other times theoretical developments lead to applied innovations in ways that diminish the utility of these distinctions. The physical sciences long ago acknowledged the dual use nature of their discoveries: assuming that discoveries or inventions made with one intention necessarily were open to other, at times often militarized, uses. Some scientific developments like radar, the Internet, GPS navigation systems, walkie-talkies, jet propulsion engines, night vision, and digital photography were initially introduced as military applications and later took on dual civilian uses; in other cases, what were initially either commercial or “pure research” scientific discoveries took on military applications, such as the discovery that altimeters could become detonation triggers, or the chain of theoretical physics discoveries that led to the design and use of atomic weapons.

Field research projects in other disciplines have also brought dual uses linked to the Cold War's national security state. Michael Lewis's analysis of the Pacific Ocean Biological Survey (POBS), a U.S.-financed ornithological study in India in the 1960s involving ornithologist, Office of Strategic Services (OSS) alumnus, and Smithsonian director S. Dillon Ripley, shows a project that provided scientists and American intelligence agencies with the data they separately sought: the ornithologists gained important data on migratory bird patterns, and the Defense Department gained vital knowledge it sought for a biological weapons program. Lewis found the survey was not simply a "cover" operation but instead "exactly what it was purported to be—an attempt to determine what diseases birds of the central Pacific naturally carried, and to determine bird migration patterns in that region. And it is also clear that POBS was connected to the US biological warfare programme" (Lewis 2002: 2326). The project was directed from the army's Biological Warfare Center at Fort Detrick, with plans (apparently never enacted) to test biological agents to monitor disbursement patterns. As Lewis observed, "Studying the transmission of biological pathogens by birds for defensive purposes is only a hair's-breadth from turning that information to an offensive purpose" (2326).

American anthropology has been slow to acknowledge the extent to which it is embedded in dual use processes, preferring to imagine itself as somehow independent not only from the militarized political economy in which it is embedded but also from the traceable uses to which American academic geographic knowledge has been put. The Second World War and the Cold War years that followed were an unacknowledged watershed for dual use anthropological developments. During the war, cultural anthropologists worked as spies, educators, cultural liaison officers, language and culture instructors, and strategic analysts. Not only did anthropological linguists prove their worth in learning and teaching the languages needed for waging the war, but their research into language training made fundamental breakthroughs in language teaching techniques; one dual use of these developments was that pocket foreign language phrase books, based on model sentences with inserted vocabulary words, became the basis of Berlitz's commercial foreign language pocketbook series (D. H. Price 2008a: 76–77). Physical anthropologists contributed forensic skills to body identifications and were in demand to assist in anthropometric designs of uniforms and new war-fighting machines. Diverse technological innovations (from developments of isotope-based absolute dating techniques to adaptations of radar and new forms of aerial stenographic photography) derived from advancements pushed forward during the Second World War.

While it is seldom acknowledged, many anthropological projects during the Cold War occurred within political contexts in which the American government had counterinsurgent (or, occasionally, insurgent) desires for studied populations. Counterinsurgency encompasses various practices designed to subdue uprisings or other challenges to governments. Some forms of counterinsurgency rely on what political scientist Joseph Nye (2005) termed “hard power”; others draw on soft power. Hard power uses military or paramilitary force and other forms of violence to attack insurgents; soft power uses co-option and corrosion to win favor among insurgents. Whether anthropologists provided cultural information to military or intelligence agencies or assisted in the implementation of international aid programs to stabilize foreign regimes, this book finds that they played many roles linked to counterinsurgency operations—at times undertaking these roles while pursuing their own research projects.

In part, cultural anthropology’s self-conception as a discipline generally removed from the processes of dual use science arose from how so many of its practitioners appeared to remain in control of their disciplinary means of production. While grants or other funds that allow anthropologists to spend months or years in the field make life easier, self-financed ethnography or the production of social theory still occurred with relatively meager funds. Most anthropologists do not need to work in expensive teams and do not rely on cyclotrons or particle accelerators; at its most basic, ethnography needs time, people, libraries, theory, reflection, and colleagues.

Although archaeologists routinely work on large, multiyear, coordinated, expensive research projects, relatively few cultural anthropological research projects during the postwar period had high-budget needs similar to those spawning the expansion of dual use trends in chemistry or physics. Few cultural anthropological research designs required significant material support beyond the basic essentials of travel funds, pencils, paper, pith helmet, mosquito nettings, and portable typewriters. Early Cold War anthropology projects rarely required expensive equipment or brought together numerous scholars working on a single project.

Government-financed language programs, like the Army Special Training Language Program or Title VI-funded basic language acquisition, gave scholars the academic skills needed for field research, but these programs lacked mechanisms of coercive focus that could automatically capture funded scholars for some sort of later state purpose. Some postwar projects hired unprecedented large teams of anthropologists to undertake forms of coordinated fieldwork projects. Some of these were governmental programs like the Coordinated Investi-

gation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA, funded by the U.S. Navy); others were largely funded by private foundations with ties to U.S. political policy like the Ford Foundation's Modjokuto Project—run out of MIT's CIA-linked Center for International Studies.

Because so much of anthropology's postcolonial history all but ignores interactions between anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies, I worry that my focus on these direct and indirect relationships risks creating its own distortions by creating the impression that an overwhelming majority of anthropological research directly fed military and intelligence apparatus. This was not the case. I assume that the majority of anthropological research had no direct military or intelligence applications, though the indirect ways these programs informed military and civilian agencies about regional knowledge were often significant, and the desires of these agencies routinely shaped the funding of anthropologists' research.

These dual use relationships also nurtured dual personalities among some anthropologists who attempted to balance disciplinary and state interests.<sup>3</sup> The postwar years leave records of anthropologists seeking funding opportunities directly and indirectly linked to Cold War projects through patterns reminiscent of Talal Asad's depiction of Bronislaw Malinowski as a "reluctant imperialist" (1973: 41–69). Although Malinowski at least partially understood the potential negative impacts of such funding relationships, beyond the rare dissent of soon-to-be-disciplinary outsider Jerome Rauch (1955), there was little public consideration of such impacts until the mid-1960s. These silences birthed schisms within anthropologists, like Julian Steward, who developed stripped-down Marxian materialist ecological models while campaigning for Cold War area study funds, even while training a new generation of scholars whose work more directly drew on Marx. There were schisms within archaeologists and cultural anthropologists exploring the rise of pristine state formations using theories of Karl Wittfogel, a Red-baiting anticommunist, whose own dual personality openly quoted and used Marx's writings with impunity while he informed on Marxist colleges and students to the FBI and the tribunals of McCarthyism (D. H. Price 2008c). Other dual personality traits developed as anthropologists like Clyde Kluckhohn and Clifford Geertz worked on projects with direct or indirect connections to the CIA or the Pentagon, even as they omitted such links from the textual descriptions they thinly constructed.

Even during the early days of the Cold War, some anthropologists were critical of encroachments of American Cold War politics into anthropological practice. Elizabeth Bacon, John Embree, and Jerome Rauch voiced insightful critiques

of the sort familiar to contemporary anthropologists. Their work and other examples of early critical analysis can inform contemporary anthropologists seeking alternatives to military-linked anthropological prospects in a world increasingly seeking to draw on anthropological analysis for post-9/11 military, intelligence, and security projects.

One lesson I learned by studying the work of Cold War anthropologists is that individual anthropologists' beliefs that they were engaged in apolitical or politically neutral work had little bearing on the political context or nature of their work. Instead, these scientists' claims of neutrality often meant they had unexamined alignments with the predominating political forces, which went unnoted because they occurred without friction. But as Marvin Harris argued in *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* almost half a century ago, "Ethical and political neutrality in the realm of social-science research is a limiting condition which cannot be approached by a posture of indifference. Neither the researcher who preaches the partisanship of science, nor [he or she] who professes complete political apathy, is to be trusted. Naturally, we demand that the scientific ethic—fidelity to data—must be the foundation of all research. But we must also demand that scientific research be oriented by explicit hypotheses, whose political and moral consequences in both an active and passive sense are understood and rendered explicit by the researcher" (1968: 222). Extending this observation to this project, I find that my own political and ethical orientations align with my academic critiques of the CIA and the Pentagon as organizations threatening rather than protecting democratic movements at home and abroad, though during the two decades of this research, my political and ethical views themselves have been transformed by the act of historical research. But, as Harris argues, regardless of declared or undeclared ethical or political positions, it is the fidelity to the data by which research is judged, as should the moral and political consequences (both active and passive) derived from the seeds we sow.

### *Situating This Book*

This is the final book in a trilogy chronicling interactions between American anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies. The first volume (chronologically, though not published in this order), *Anthropological Intelligence* (2008a), detailed how American anthropologists contributed their disciplinary knowledge to meet the military and intelligence needs of the Second World War. The second volume, *Threatening Anthropology* (2004b), explored how loyalty hearings and the FBI's surveillance of American anthropologists during

the McCarthy period limited the discipline's theory and practice—deadening what might have been critical theoretical developments and discouraging applied forms of activist anthropology tied to issues of social justice and equality.

This final volume connects elements of these earlier books; whereas *Threatening Anthropology* told the story of victims of the national security state's persecution of anthropologists who questioned the justice or rationality of America's Cold War era political economy, this volume analyzes how Cold War anthropologists' work at times aligned with the interests of rich and powerful agencies, such as the CIA or the Pentagon. This volume connects with the exploration in *Anthropological Intelligence* of how the needs of World War II transformed anthropology in ways that would later take on new meanings during the Cold War. Few Americans who came to see anthropological contributions to military or intelligence agencies while fighting fascism and totalitarianism during the Second World War critically stopped to reconsider the impacts of extending such relationships into the Cold War.

This book traces a historical arc connecting transformations in anthropologists' support for military and intelligence activities during the Second World War to the widespread condemnation of anthropological contributions to American military and intelligence campaigns in the American wars in Southeast Asia. This spans a complex historical period marked by cultural revolutions, startling revelations of FBI and CIA illegal activities, secret wars, cynical neocolonial governmental programs, and increasing awareness of anthropology's historical connections to colonialism. In less than three decades the discipline shifted from a near-total alignment supporting global militarization efforts, to widespread radical or liberal opposition to American foreign policy and resistance to anthropological collaborations with military and intelligence agencies. This was a profound realignment of intellectual orientations to the state.

*Cold War Anthropology* focuses on how shifts in the Cold War's political economy provided anthropology with rich opportunities to undertake well-funded research of interest to anthropologists, while providing this new national security state with general and specific knowledge. Once-secret documents now show funding programs and strategies that were used to shape the work of scholars conducting international research. Many Americans continued to interpret early Cold War political developments with views linked closely to the world of the previous war. Occupations and other postwar programs found anthropologists continuing to use many of the skills developed during the last war, now in a world pursuing new political goals. The postwar reorganization of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) anticipated new funding opportunities.

Area study centers and other postwar regroupings of social scientists studying questions of interest to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and intelligence organizations broadly impacted postwar anthropologists.

Anthropologists and military or intelligence agencies interacted through four distinct types of relationships: as witting-direct, witting-indirect, unwitting-direct, and unwitting-indirect participants (D. H. Price 2002: 17). After the war, many anthropologists transformed elements of their wartime service into governmental research, policy, development, or intelligence work. Some developed careers at the Department of State or the CIA. Some of the work involved seamless applications of wartime work, adapted to shifts in the postwar world.

Investigative reporting and congressional hearings identified several CIA-linked social science research projects financed by CIA funding fronts. Press reports from 1967 revealed the Asia Foundation as a CIA funding front, and the Asia Foundation's relationship with the AAA is examined. The Human Ecology Fund is also examined as a CIA front that financed and harvested anthropological research of interest to the CIA.

One way that anthropologists' fieldwork intersected with intelligence agencies was through their writings being accessed without their knowledge; in other instances, cultural anthropologists and archaeologists used fieldwork as a cover for espionage. I examine one instance in which a CIA agent received anthropological funding and was sent to the field under the guise of conducting anthropological research.

In several cases, anthropologists or research groups used military-linked funds for basic research, producing knowledge that had national security uses. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) subcontracted army area handbooks and used the funds from this work to finance basic theoretical research of interest to HRAF anthropologists. American University's Special Operations Research Office (SORO) and Counterinsurgency Information and Analysis Center (CINFAC) wrote counterinsurgency reports drawing on anthropological writings. One SORO program, Project Camelot, significantly impacted the AAA, and records from Ralph Beals's post-Camelot inquiries into military and intelligence interactions with anthropologists provide significant new information detailing how the CIA sought assistance and information from anthropologists during the early Cold War.

After leaked documents revealed that American anthropologists were undertaking counterinsurgency work in Thailand, several anthropologists became embroiled in public clashes within the AAA over the political and ethical propriety of such work. Anthropological research for the RAND Corporation

on Vietnam and anthropologists' contributions to USAID, ARPA, and AACT counterinsurgency projects in Thailand show increased uses of anthropological knowledge for counterinsurgency. The fallout from the Thai Affair pressed the AAA to adopt its first ethics code, prohibiting secret research, orienting anthropological research toward the interests of research subjects, and requiring new levels of disclosure. The AAA's focus on ethical issues raised by anthropological contributions to military and intelligence projects identified some of the disciplinary problems with military uses of anthropology, yet many of the core questions about the dual use nature of anthropological research remain unanswered within the discipline today.



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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When I began publishing work on anthropologists and the Cold War and was not sure whether to do a single book spanning the materials covered in this volume, *Threatening Anthropology*, and *Anthropological Intelligence*, three wise women (Nina Glick-Schiller, Janice Harper, and Laura Nader) independently told me to break the stories up into separate volumes and to lead with the McCarthy story. Janice Harper explicitly told me that anthropologists love stories in which we are victims (McCarthyism) but won't like being shown as "collaborators." I had no idea it would take me two decades of largely unfunded, but highly rewarding, research to document this story.

The influences for this project are broad, but the seeds for these volumes were planted three decades ago when I was an undergraduate reading the work of June Nash, Laura Nader, Delmos Jones, Joseph Jorgenson, Gerry Berreman, Eric Wolf, and others on how powerful forces and organizations like the CIA and the Pentagon have directed anthropological inquiries. My graduate work with Marvin Harris strengthened my writing and focused my attention on political-economic forces shaping the worlds in which anthropological knowledge was produced and consumed. My years as a pre-Internet human-Google working as Marvin's research assistant in his largely abandoned campus office found me surrounded by his old 1960s and early 1970s issues of the *American Anthropological Association Fellows Newsletter*, reading accounts of some of the history recorded here. Though Marvin Harris and Marshall Sahlins famously clashed over significant epistemological differences, and even with my clear links to Harris, Sahlins has encouraged me and supported my efforts to document these past connections between anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies.

My friendship and work with Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair and writing for *CounterPunch* strengthened my writing voice, and helped me connect what are often misunderstood as separate academic and political worlds. Nina Glick-Schiller was the first editor to take my political historical work seriously enough to get me into print without dampening my critique; her encouragement and support helped me continue to work on a topic that most editors found intriguing but were hesitant to publish (see Price 1998). I am deeply grateful for the editorial guidance and friendship provided by Gustaaf Houtman, who

helped me publish post-9/11 critiques of militarized social science in the Royal Anthropological Institute's *Anthropology Today* during a period when it was difficult to publish such work in the U.S. When I experienced difficulties publishing a report documenting the AAA's 1951 covert relationship with the CIA described in chapter 3 in the *American Anthropologist* (after three split reviews questioning the wisdom of exploring such matters in public), AAA president Louise Lamphere convened a panel at the association's 2000 business meeting (late in the evening, after the infamous Darkness in El Dorado public airing of grievances) to discuss these findings. Without Louise's support and Laura Nader's encouragement, I might have chosen to abandon a topic that was impossible to find research grants to sponsor, and nearly impossible to publish on when I started and returned to working in the Middle East. Roberto González's detailed comments on the manuscript helped me better focus elements of my argument. Karen Jaskar's librarian sensitivities wisely convinced me to not hyphenate "dual use" in the title, or elsewhere, to avert future searching and cataloging catastrophes. I am indebted to Jack Stauder for generously giving me a treasure trove of documents and artifacts from his years in the AAA's Radical Caucus and Anthropologists for Radical Political Action.

This book was not funded by traditional research grants. The failures to secure research grants early on in this project led me, without regrets, to finance this research by other means. Many of the archival trips were added on to invited speaking engagements at universities (American University, Berkeley, Brown, Chicago, Columbia, UC Irvine, George Mason, University of New Mexico, Syracuse, Yale, etc.) or academic conferences, or I used small funds from Saint Martin's University: a teaching excellence award cash prize, two one-semester sabbaticals (in the last twenty years), and some sparse faculty development funds. Funds for some FOIA processing were provided by the Institute for the Advancement of Journalistic Clarity. My dear friends Cathy Wilson and David Patton hosted me at their home during many archival trips to Washington, DC. Ken Wissoker's guidance and support at Duke University Press have been invaluable in helping all three of these volumes come into print. I am deeply grateful to all the scholars who hosted my campus talks or helped publish my work, at times weathering criticisms and setbacks for bringing these critiques directly to the environments where they work.

I have been researching this book for two decades. Earlier versions of some of the historical episodes recounted here have appeared in different forms: *Anthropology Today* published earlier analyses of the Human Ecology Fund (D. H. Price 2007b, 2007c) and the M-VICO System (D. H. Price 2012b). I published

a chapter exploring anthropological responses to American military actions in Southeast Asia as part of a School for Advanced Research seminar volume (D. H. Price 2011b). I also published an early analysis of CIA-AAA interactions (D. H. Price 2003a), although documents I discovered later reshaped significant portions of that analysis.

Among the many other colleagues and friends who played important roles in shaping the production and form of this work during the past decades are David Aberle, Philip Agee, John Allison, David Altheide, Thomas Anson, Olivia Archibald, Julian Assange, Alan Bain, Sindre Bangstad, Russ Bernard, Gerry Berreman, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, Catherine Besteman, Andy Bickford, Jeff Birkenstein, Father Bix, Karen Brodtkin, Brenda Chalfin, Noam Chomsky, Harold Conklin, Lorraine Copeland, Dalia Corkrum, Jonathan Dentler, Dale Depweg, Sigmund Diamond, Jim Faris, Greg Feldman, Brian Ferguson, Les Field, Sverker Finnström, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Maximilian Forte, Kerry Fosher, Andre Gunder Frank, Charles Frantz, Irina Gendelman, Deborah Gewertz, McGuire Gibson, Aaron Goings, Jonathan Graubart, Linda Green, Hugh Gusterson, Erik Harms, Chris Hebdon, Alan Howard, Jean Jackson, Bea Jauregui, Barbara Rose Johnston, Adrian Resa Jones, Linda Jones, John Kelly, Chun Kyung-soo, Roger Lancaster, Robert Lawless, Richard Lee, Sara Leone, Robert Leopold, Kanhong Lin, Thomas Love, Catherine Lutz, Andrew Lyons, Harriet Lyons, Jon Marks, Ray McGovern, Brian McKenna, Father Kilian Malvey, Erika Manthey, Stephen X. Mead, David Miller, Sidney Mintz, Bill Mitchell, Sean Mitchell, John Moore, Laura Nader, Steve Niva, Greg Orvis, Mark Papworth, Bill Peace, Glenn Petersen, Jack Price, Milo Price, Nora Price, Steve Reyna, Eric Ross, Mike Salovesh, Schuyler Schild, Robert Scott, Daniel Segal, Michael Seltzer, Gerry Sider, Duane Smith, Molly Smith, Roger Snider, Lawrence Guy Straus, George Stocking, Ida Susser, David Vine, Eric Wakin, Jeremy Walton, and Teresa Winstead.

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## ABBREVIATIONS


AAA American Anthropological Association  
AACT Academic Advisory Council for Thailand  
ACLS American Council of Learned Societies  
AFME American Friends of the Middle East  
AFOSR Air Force Office of Scientific Research  
AID Agency for International Development (see also USAID)  
AIFLD American Institute for Free Labor Development  
AIR American Institute for Research  
ALS Army Language School  
APRA Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil  
ARD Accelerated Rural Development (Thai government project)  
ARO Army Research Office  
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Administration  
ARVN Army of the Republic of [South] Vietnam  
ASA Afghan Student Association  
CENIS Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
CFA Committee for Free Asia (later became Asia Foundation)  
CIA Central Intelligence Agency  
CIMA Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology  
CINFAC Counterinsurgency Information and Analysis Center (part of SORO)  
COINTELPRO Counter Intelligence Program (FBI domestic counterinsurgency program, 1956–1971)  
CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support  
CRESS Center for Research in Social Systems  
DCI Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)  
DOD Department of Defense  
DSB Defense Science Board  
ECA Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan)  
ERP European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)  
FARGC Foreign Area Research Coordinating Group (also called FAR)  
FASD Foreign Area Studies Division (a division of SORO)  
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FISEE Fund for International Social and Economic Education  
FMAD Foreign Morale Analysis Division  
FOA Foreign Operations Administration  
FOIA Freedom of Information Act  
FSI Foreign Service Institute  
FULRO Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees  
GVN Government of [South] Vietnam  
HEF Human Ecology Fund  
HRAF Human Relations Area Files  
HRIP Harvard Refugee Interview Project  
ICA International Cooperation Agency  
IDA Institute for Defense Analysis  
IAAA Institute of Inter-American Affairs  
IFIS Institute for Intercultural Studies  
IHR Institute of Human Relations  
IPR Institute of Pacific Relations  
MSA Mutual Security Agency  
MSUG Michigan State University Group  
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics  
NAS National Academy of Sciences  
NFSS National Foundation on Social Science  
NIMH National Institute of Mental Health  
NLF National Liberation Front (Vietnam)  
NRC National Research Council  
NSA National Security Agency  
NSC National Security Council  
NSF National Science Foundation  
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence  
ONR Office of Naval Research  
OPC Office of Policy Coordination  
OPS Office of Public Safety  
OSRD Office of Scientific Research and Development  
OSS Office of Strategic Services  
OWI Office of War Information  
POBS Pacific Ocean Biological Survey  
PPR Principles of Professional Responsibility  
PSB Psychological Strategy Board  
RACP Remote Area Conflict Program (an ARPA program)


RAND Research ANd Development (RAND Corporation)  
 RCC Research in Contemporary Cultures  
 RRC Russian Research Center (Harvard University)  
 SEADAG Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group  
 SI Secret Intelligence Branch, Office of Strategic Services  
 SIHE Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology  
 SIL Summer Institute of Linguistics  
 SMC Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam  
 SORO Special Operations Research Office, American University  
 SPARE Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics  
 SRI Stanford Research Institute  
 SSRC Social Science Research Council  
 SSU Strategic Services Unit  
 STEM U.S. Special Technical and Economic Mission  
 TCA Technical Cooperation Administration  
 UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
 URPE Union of Radical Political Economy  
 USAID U.S. Agency for International Development  
 USIA U.S. Information Agency  
 USIS U.S. Information Service  
 USOM U.S. Operation Mission  
 WAHRAF Washington Area Human Relations Area Files



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**PART I COLD WAR POLITICAL-ECONOMIC  
DISCIPLINARY FORMATIONS**



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The CIA, after all, is nothing more than the secret police of American capitalism, plugging up leaks in the political dam night and day so that shareholders of US companies operating in poor countries can continue enjoying the rip-off.

PHILIP AGEE | ex-CIA agent, 1975



## ONE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE

The end of the Second World War left the United States in a unique position among the victors. Not only was it the only nation on earth possessing a new weapon capable of instantly leveling entire cities, but the lack of damage to its industrial home front gave America the exclusive economic opportunities befitting a global conqueror.

The United States entered an era of economic prosperity the likes of which the world had never seen. With an expanding global economic system, and much of the world slowly recovering from the war, America found itself with what George Kennan secretly described as a nation holding “about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. . . . In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity. . . . To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. . . . We should cease to talk about vague and . . . unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratizations” (1948: 121–22). Kennan understood that U.S. foreign policy could not seriously support efforts to improve human rights, raising standards of living and introducing democratic reforms, though he underestimated the importance of the need to “talk about” these vague and unreal objectives as tools of domestic and international propaganda. Kennan’s cynicism was

matched by the inability of many U.S. social scientists of the era to acknowledge that such self-serving motivations lay at the base of many Cold War American foreign policies and programs linked to American academics.

The war's end brought uncertainty for American intelligence agencies. Under President Truman's Executive Order 9621, the OSS disbanded on October 1, 1945, and the agency's functions were reassigned to the Department of State and the War Department. Had President Roosevelt lived to the postwar period, the OSS may have remained a permanent agency, but OSS director William Donovan lacked Truman's support. Truman's fiscal approach to government envisioned a smaller postwar military and intelligence apparatus, and he initially opposed expanded postwar intelligence functions.<sup>1</sup>

Before the war, the United States had no permanent agency devoted to international intelligence. When Truman disbanded the OSS, 1,362 of its Research and Analysis Branch personnel were reassigned to the Department of State's Interim Research and Intelligence Service, and another 9,028 of OSS Operations personnel (such as covert action) were transferred to the War Department (Troy 1981: 303; 313–14). The OSS's Research and Analysis Branch was renamed the Interim Research and Intelligence Service and placed under the leadership of Alfred McCormack.<sup>2</sup> When OSS's Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch and Counterespionage (X2) Branch were relocated to the War Department, they became the new Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Three months later, in January 1946, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group which took over the responsibilities, and many of the personnel, of the War Department's SSU. All of this shifting, realigning, and relocating of intelligence personnel was short-lived. The permanent restructuring and relocation of both the analysis and the covert action functions of American international intelligence shifted to a new centralized agency in the summer of 1947, when Truman signed the National Security Act on July 26, establishing the Central Intelligence Agency.

During the 664 days between the dissolution of the OSS and the creation of the CIA, American intelligence personnel continued many of the types of tasks undertaken by OSS during the war, though there was greater institutional disarray, with less intense focus than had existed under a culture of total warfare.<sup>3</sup> Had Truman stuck with his initial decision to divide intelligence analysis and operations into two separate governmental agencies (analysis at State, operations at the War Department), the practices and uses of American intelligence might have developed in profoundly different ways than occurred during the Cold War. Combining analysis with operations structurally fated the CIA to a

history of covert action and episodes of cooking analysis to meet the desires of operations and presidents.

When the National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA, the American military and intelligence apparatus was reorganized with the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), and the June 12, 1948, NSC Directive of Special Projects (NSC 10/2) authorized the CIA to undertake covert action and intelligence operations. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 later provided budgetary authority to the agency and authorization to undertake domestic and international activities.

During the CIA's early years, its employees' work was divided between the Intelligence Division (Office of Collection and Dissemination; Office of Reports and Estimates) and the Operations Division (Office of Operations; Office of Special Operations). The CIA sought to become the eyes, ears, and mind of America. It envisioned itself as an elite body harnessing the intellectual power of its citizens to gather information. The CIA's charter authorized no domestic or international law enforcement authority; instead, the agency was charged with the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to national security. The CIA was administered by the executive branch, with a bureaucracy providing oversight by a group known as the Forty Committee, which could authorize CIA covert operations in consultation with the executive branch. The looseness of its charge allowed the agency to undertake a wide range of operations with no oversight outside of the executive branch.

From the CIA's earliest days, its analysts monitored postwar, postcolonial shifts in global power. As postwar independence movements reshaped global relations, CIA analysts considered how these shifts would pit American anticolonialist historical values against America's emerging role as a global superpower.

### *“The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security”*

The CIA's confidential report *The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security* (1948) described the global setting in which the anthropological field research of the second half of the twentieth century would transpire (CIA 1948). Most anthropologists undertook this fieldwork without reference to the dynamics described in this report, yet these dynamics shaped the funding of particular research questions and geographic areas. The report stated the agency's understanding of the problems facing the postwar world,

where shifting power relations presented threats and opportunities to the new American superpower:

The growth of nationalism in colonial areas, which has already succeeded in breaking up a large part of the European colonial system and in creating a series of new, nationalistic states in the Near and Far East, has major implications for US security, particularly in terms of possible world conflict with the USSR. This shift of the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens the probable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access to vital bases and raw materials in these areas in event of war. Should the recently liberated and current emergent states become oriented toward the USSR, US military and economic security would be seriously threatened. (CIA 1948: 1)

The report identified upcoming dominant Cold War dynamics, as the United States and the Soviet Union would spend trillions of dollars in the next four decades struggling over postcolonial loyalties around the globe. The key elements to future strategies were the collapse of European colonialism, growing native nationalism, the likelihood of Soviet efforts to capture clients in these new states, the presence of (cheap) raw materials needed for U.S. economic growth, and envisioned conflicts with the Soviet Union over control of these nations and resources.

The CIA observed that the postwar collapse of existing European and Japanese colonialism in Asia and Africa fueled “the release of bottled-up nationalist activities,” and it conceded the “further disintegration” of global European colonial holdings was “inevitable” (CIA 1948: 1). It stressed the economic impact of anticolonial movements, lamenting that “no longer can the Western Powers rely on large areas of Asia and Africa as assured sources of raw materials, markets, and military bases” (2). Capturing the “good will” of nations achieving their independence was vital, and a failure to do so would result in antagonism toward the United States and a loss of vital clients (3).

At this moment in history, the CIA could have positioned itself to side with the liberation of people of the world who were ruled and taxed without direct representation, but agency analysts instead framed this primarily as a proxy struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that “the gravest danger to the US is that friction engendered by these issues may drive the so-called colonial bloc into alignment with the USSR” (CIA 1948: 2). The CIA explained native nationalist liberation movements as deriving from a mixture of historical, social, political, and economic forces, and it identified the five primary causes as increased awareness of stratification, colonial powers’ discrimi-

natory treatment of subject populations, the “deep-seated racial hostility of native populations,” the global spread of Western values favoring independence and nationalism, and “the meteoric rise of Japan, whose defeats of the European powers in the Russo-Japanese War and especially World War II punctured the myth of white superiority” (5).

The CIA noted the neocolonial control of the British in Egypt, the French in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the Italians in Libya and mentioned burgeoning independence movements in Indonesia, Madagascar, and Nigeria. It understood that “states like India and Egypt have already brought colonial issues into the UN and may be expected increasingly to take the leadership in attempting to hasten in this and other ways the liberation of remaining colonial areas” (CIA 1948: 7).

Even in 1948, the CIA recognized the role that foreign aid and promises of technical assistance and modernization could play in courting would-be independent nations. As explained in its report, “The economic nationalism of the underdeveloped nations conflicts sharply with US trade objectives and these countries tend to resent US economic dominance. On the other hand, they urgently need external assistance in their economic development, and the US is at present the only nation able to supply it. The desire for US loans and private investment will have some effect in tempering the antagonism of these states toward US policies” (CIA 1948: 8). Under the direction of Cold War economists and strategists like Walt Rostow, Max Millikan, and Allen Dulles, aid later became a powerful soft power component of American international policy.

The CIA viewed coming colonial collapses as “inevitable” and predicted these developments would favor the Soviet Union (CIA 1948: 9). The agency was concerned about the Soviet alignment with international liberation movements. Without addressing Leninist critiques of imperialism, the CIA observed the Soviets were “giving active support through agitators, propaganda, and local Communist parties to the nationalist movements throughout the colonial world” (9). The agency acknowledged the USSR held advantages over the United States because

as a non-colonial power, the USSR is in the fortunate position of being able to champion the colonial cause unreservedly and thereby bid for the good will of colonial and former colonial areas. Its condemnation of racial discrimination pleases native nationalists and tends to exclude the USSR from the racial animosity of East toward West. The Communists have sought to infiltrate the nationalist parties in the dependent and formerly dependent areas and have been, as in Burma,



Indonesia, and Indochina, among the most vocal agitators for independence. The Soviet Union has found the World Federation of Trade Unions an effective weapon for penetrating the growing labor movements in Asia and Africa and for turning them against the colonial powers. (9)

Nationalism was expected to have increasing importance for poor nations undergoing rapid transformations, and the CIA believed that cultural differences between colonizers and the colonized would increase antagonism in historic colonial regions like Indochina, Indonesia, and North Africa (10).

The CIA identified opportunities for American interests given that newly independent nations would need help from “the great powers for protection and assistance” in the new “power vacuum” (CIA 1948: 11). Establishing the “good will” of the leaders and peoples of these countries would be key, and the report noted that American racial segregationist policies allowed the Soviets to portray the United States as a bigoted nation.

The report identified five impacts that the collapse of the global colonial system would have on U.S. security. First, colonial liberation would economically weaken America’s European allies, which would diminish access to cheap minerals and other natural resources and strategic military outposts. Second, political upheaval could leave the United States with reduced access to these same resources. Because of this threat, the CIA insisted that “the growing US list of strategic and critical materials — many of which like tin and rubber are available largely in colonial and former colonial areas — illustrates the dependence of the US upon these areas. The US has heretofore been able to count upon the availability of such bases and materials in the colonial dependencies of friendly powers; but the new nations arising in these areas, jealous of their sovereignty, may well be reluctant to lend such assistance to the US” (CIA 1948: 12). Third, if the Soviet Union established close relationships with new nations in Asia, such relationships would undermine U.S. interests. Fourth, the CIA recognized dangers for American interests if the United States was identified as supporting colonial powers. Finally, the Soviet Union was expected to create unrest in colonial regions and to exploit any resulting upheaval to its political advantage (12–13).

The agency concluded it was vital for the United States to generate goodwill in these new nations. It recommended that the United States temper its support for European allies engaged in colonial control of foreign lands in order to not be identified with colonialism. The CIA predicted colonialism would become a losing venture for Europe and that “attempts at forcible retention of critical

colonial areas in the face of growing nationalist pressure may actually weaken rather than strengthen the colonial powers” (CIA 1948: 13).<sup>4</sup>

It is worth speculating on what lost strands of U.S. intelligence analysis favoring postcolonial independence might have developed in an alternate universe where Truman left the OSS’s former intelligence and operations branches disarticulated into the State Department and War Department, but in a world where intelligence and operations were conjoined, and Kennan’s Cold War game plan aggressively guided American policy, such developments were not to be. As a result, CIA reports questioning the wisdom of aligning American interests with colonial powers were destined to be ignored and overwritten by emerging hegemonic Cold War desires.

### *Seeing Like a CIA*

From its beginnings, the CIA established links with academia. These earliest links exploited connections with academics with wartime OSS service who returned to university positions after the war. An article in the CIA’s journal *Studies in Intelligence* noted that “close ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and American colleges and universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 1947” (Cook 1983: 33). Given the connections of OSS personnel to Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and other elite universities, it was natural that “a disproportionate number of the new recruits came from the same schools. Similarly, professors who had joined the Agency often turned to their former colleagues still on campuses for consultation and assistance. This ‘old boy’ system was quite productive in providing new employees in the professional ranks. Thus, there was an early linkage between the Agency and the Ivy League, or similar schools” (Cook, 34; Jeffreys-Jones 1985).

In 1951, the CIA launched its University Associates Program, which secretly connected the agency with university professors on fifty U.S. campuses. Select universities became “consultant-contacts who would receive a nominal fee for spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of interest to the Agency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment” (Cook 1983: 34). But the CIA’s recruitment techniques narrowed rather than expanded its views. In 1954, the Doolittle Commission Report found the CIA’s close link to World War II networks hampered its development, and that the heavy use of elite universities for recruitment limited the agency’s potential. It recommended that the CIA fire some of its OSS-era employees and expand its campus

recruitment efforts to a broader variety of university campuses (Doolittle et al. 1954: 25).<sup>5</sup>

The CIA secretly groomed campus contacts, known within the agency as “P-Sources” (professor sources) (Cook 1983; Price 2011f). P-Sources, who had high value within the agency, sometimes provided debriefings after travel to foreign nations and at other times wrote papers relating to their academic expertise. The number of these P-Sources is unknown, but William Corson, a historian and a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, estimated that by the mid-1970s as many as five thousand academics were cooperating with the CIA on at least a part-time basis (Corson 1977: 312). During the early 1950s, professional organizations like the American Anthropological Association at times secretly, or unwittingly, worked with the CIA, providing it with membership lists and lists of area specialists (see chapters 3 and 7).

The agency sometimes secretly drew on groups of academics possessing desired knowledge to supplement its understanding of issues. One such group, known as the Princeton Consultants, was established in early 1951 and was tasked with complementing the work of the CIA’s newly established Office of National Estimates. The original group consisted of eight scholars who were paid a modest stipend and met in Princeton with CIA personnel four times a year to discuss specific problems of interest to the agency, bringing outside views and broader approaches to problems (Steury 1994: 111; see CIA 1959b: 2). The group, which grew in size, continued to meet in Princeton for decades (CIA 1959a; see table 1.1).

When the existence of the Princeton Consultants became public in the 1970s, members Cyril Black and Klaus Knorr “denied any relationship between the National Intelligence Estimates and the CIA’s covert activities” (Cavanagh 1980). Black’s and Knorr’s denials were in one sense true given that most of their work was aligned with making projections for the Office of National Estimates and the improbability that they had access to details about covert actions. However, as Cavanagh (1980) noted, Calvin Hoover’s memoirs suggest some of the work provided by the Princeton Consultants was consistent with the preparatory work undertaken in plotting the CIA’s 1953 Iranian coup.

In 1963, the CIA’s 100 Universities Program sought to improve the agency’s public image and to boost campus recruitments by expanding its presence on American campuses (see CIA 1963c). Former CIA case officer John Stockwell described the agency’s Foreign Resources Division as its “*domestic* covert operations division,” linking CIA case officers with professors and students at “every major campus in the nation. They work with professors, using aliases on

TABLE 1.1. Listing of the CIA's Princeton Consultants

NAME	INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION	CITATION
Norman Armour	Former ambassador	(Steury 1994: 110)
Hamilton Fish Armstrong	<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	(Montague 1992: 135; CIA 1959b)
Samuel Bemis	Yale University	(Steury 1994: 110)
James Billington	Princeton University, History	(Cavanagh 1980)
Richard Bissell	CIA, Deputy Director of Plans	(Steury 1994: 110)
Cyril Black	Princeton University, Soviet Studies	(Cavanagh 1980; CIA 1959b)
Robert Bowie	Harvard, International Studies	(Cavanagh 1980)
Vannevar Bush	OSRD, NACA	(Montague 1992: 135)
Burton Fahs	Director of Humanities, Rockefeller Foundation	(Steury 1994: 110; Montague 1992: 136)
Gordon Gray	Secretary of the Army/ national security adviser	(Steury 1994: 110)
Joseph Grew	Former ambassador	(Steury 1994: 110)
Caryl P. Haskins	Carnegie Inst., director	(Cavanagh 1980)
Barklie Henry	New York businessman	(Montague 1992: 136; Steury 1994: 110)
Calvin Hoover	Duke, Soviet Economics	(Cavanagh 1980; CIA 1959b)
William H. Jackson	CIA, Deputy Director	(Steury 1994: 110)
George Kennan	Career, Foreign Service etc.	(Montague 1992: 135)
Klaus Knorr	Princeton University, Strategic Studies	(Cavanagh 1980; CIA 1959b)
William Langer	Harvard, History	(Steury 1994: 110)
George A. Lincoln		(CIA 1959b)
Harold F. Linder	Chair, Export-Import Bank, Asst. Sec of State	(Cavanagh 1980)
Max Millikan	MIT, International Studies, Econ	(Steury 1994: 110)
Philip Mosely	Columbia University	(Steury 1994: 110; CIA 1959b)
Lucian Pye	MIT, Political Science	(Cavanagh 1980)
Raymond Sontag	UC Berkeley, European History	(Steury 1994: 110)
Alexander Standing		(Montague 1992: 136)
Joseph Strayer	Princeton, Medieval history	(Steury 1994: 110; CIA 1959b)
T. Cuyler Young Sr.	Princeton, Near East studies	(Steury 1994: 110)

various programs. Their activities include building files on students whom the professors help them target” (Stockwell 1991: 102–3).

### *Curating Knowledge and Intelligence at the CIA*

As part of its effort to monitor and control international developments, the early CIA collected and curated global knowledge. The agency envisioned that even the almost random collection of knowledge could eventually, if organized and retrievable, later be used in intelligence capacities. The scope of its approach to collecting disarticulated bits of knowledge is shown in Jane Schnell’s classified article “Snapshots at Random” (1961), which described a CIA collection known as the “Graphic Register.” This was the agency archive of photographs collected from all over the world showing routine features and elements of physical culture. These photographs were cataloged and analyzed for use at some unknown date in CIA operations.

Schnell encouraged CIA employees planning future trips to “some less well frequented place” to contact agency personnel maintaining the Register to see if it was interested in providing them with film and a camera (Schnell 1961: 17). The CIA wanted almost any image from abroad. Schnell wrote, “The fact that an object may have been photographed previously by no means disqualifies it: changes, or the absence of changes, in it over a period of years or of weeks may be important. And changes aside, it is amazing how many pictures of the same object can be taken without telling the whole story” (18).

The scale of Schnell’s project revealed core CIA conceits from this period, as if the unguided particularist collection of at-the-time meaningless information could inevitably lead to useful breakthroughs later. The CIA believed that if enough information was collected from enough angles, American intelligence could develop a comprehensive view of the world it sought to control. No mundane event or artifact was too insignificant for collection. According to Schnell:

If a new gas storage tank is being built in the city where you are stationed and you drive past it going to work every day, why not photograph it once a week or once a month? The photos will tell how long it takes to build it, what types of materials and methods of construction are used, and how much gas storage capacity is being added. Maybe you don’t know what a gas storage tank looks like, and all you see is a big tank being built. Take a picture of it anyway; obviously it is built to store something. What you don’t know about it the analyst will. That is what he is an analyst for, but he can’t analyze it if you don’t get him the pictures. (1961: 18–19)

This project was an emblematic representation of the CIA's midcentury project: it was well funded, global, brash, panoptical, without borders or limits. It was funded despite the unlikelihood that it would ever produce much useful intelligence, and working under conditions of secrecy removed normal general expectations of outcomes or accountability.

Other Cold War intelligence agencies also established massive collections they imagined could be of use at some hypothetical future date. While enrolled in a spycraft lock-picking class, former British M15 counterintelligence agent Peter Wright encountered a massive cellar room with thousands of keys, meticulously cataloged and arranged on walls. His instructor told the class that M15 made it a practice to secretly collect key imprints "of offices, hotels, or private houses . . . all over Britain." The instructor's explanation for the collection was simply that "you never know when you might need a key again" (Wright 1988: 51). In *The File* (1998), Timothy Garton Ash described the East German intelligence agency, Stassi's, massive collection of personal items (including underwear and other articles of clothing) that might be of use at some unknown future date if Stassi needed to use tracking dogs to locate the owner of the stolen item. These items were processed and placed in plastic bags, then sorted and stored in Stassi's immense, efficient archival filing system for unknown future uses. Edward Snowden's more recent disclosures of rampant National Security Agency (NSA) electronic monitoring establish that the agency collected previously unfathomable amounts of data on billions of people on the assumption the information might be of use at some future date (Greenwald 2014; Price 2013c).

Intelligence agencies' vast collections of (immediately) useless objects illustrate institutional commitments to establishing stores of intangibly useful resources that *might* have intelligence uses at unforeseen future times. A powerful national security state collecting unlimited numbers of obscure, useless snapshots with no conceivable direct applications thought nothing of supporting area study centers (teaching a spectrum of languages, which ranged from having obvious to nonexistent security applications), and a broad range of nonapplied anthropological research grants without direct applications to intelligence work. Academics might well collect needed bits of unconnected knowledge that CIA analysts could later use for tasks yet to be determined.

But this rapid growth in intelligence activities also brought unease as President Eisenhower (1961) raised awareness of the "danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite." The secret report, titled "Conclusions and Recommendations of the President's Committee on

Information Activities Abroad” (CIAA 1960), more commonly known as “The Sprague Report,” captured the unease, philosophical position, and growing reliance on academics as the CIA embarked on a new phase of the Cold War. The report described the agency’s use of U.S. labor unions to establish relationships with labor union movements in communist countries and noted political gains from open academic exchange programs funded by public or private means (CIAA 1960: 53–54, 65). Academic exchanges were acknowledged as important Cold War weapons that needed funding because “in our exchange programs we must outdo the Sino-Soviet Bloc in selection of leaders and students with leadership potential, quality of programs offered, and treatment accorded visitors” (78).

George Ecklund’s secret article “Guns or Butter Problems of the Cold War” unapologetically noted that “the world now spends about \$135 billion annually on the war industry, roughly as much as the entire income of the poorer half of mankind. The United States spends a little more than a third of the total, the USSR about a third, and the rest of the world a little less than a third” (1965: 1–2). Ecklund described the negative impacts of such high levels of military spending on the Soviet economy and the problems this presented for the Soviets’ ability to spend funds on human needs at home and on those they hoped to influence in international technical assistance programs. He projected that such continued levels of military spending would be devastating to economic growth for the Soviet Union.

Ecklund did not consider whether American runaway military spending would establish *domestic* crippling economic deficits or direct federal spending priorities away from national health care, mass transit infrastructure, education, and other programs. Instead, Ecklund asked and answered questions in ways that ignored what these developments meant for the homeland while stressing the anticipated devastating impact on the Soviet system.

### *The Fourth Estate Reveals Ongoing Patterns of CIA Lawlessness*

The decade between 1966 and 1976 brought numerous journalistic exposés that revealed CIA involvement in widespread covert and illegal activities. White House and congressional investigations followed, as did startling revelations by disillusioned former CIA agents. Both mainstream and alternative newspapers and magazines played crucial roles in uncovering these activities. Many Americans viewed these secret programs as undermining the possibility of American democracy. These revelations shocked the public and pushed Congress to pass

legislation limiting specific practices and establishing increased congressional oversight of the CIA through the Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974.

The CIA used dummy foundations known as funding fronts to provide the appearance of neutral funds for scholars conducting research of interest to the agency. Early public revelations about these fronts financing academic research and travel were made by Sol Stern in *Ramparts* magazine in 1967. Stern discovered this CIA connection as a result of Representative Wright Patman's 1964 congressional hearings investigating the impacts of nonprofits on American political processes (U.S. Congress 1964). Patman's subcommittee investigated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) documents of various groups and uncovered anomalies in the records of several foundations. When Patman inquired about irregularities in the Kaplan Fund's records, Mitchell Rogovin, assistant to the IRS commissioner, privately told him that the fund was a CIA front, used to finance programs of interest to the agency, an arrangement that was confirmed by the CIA representative Patman contacted. Patman identified eight nonprofits that had financially supported the Kaplan Fund while it was operating as a CIA conduit: the Gotham Foundation, the Michigan Fund, the Andrew Hamilton Fund, the Borden Trust, the Price Fund, the Edsel Fund, the Beacon Fund, and the Kentfield Fund (U.S. Congress 1964: 191; Hailey 1964). Patman publicly revealed these CIA-Kaplan connections after the CIA refused to comply with his requests for information about these relationships (U.S. Congress 1964: 191).

After Patman's revelations, several newspapers condemned these practices. The *New York Times* called for the end of CIA funding fronts, arguing that they allowed "the Communists and the cynical everywhere to charge that American scholars, scientists, and writers going abroad on grants from foundations are cover agents or spies for C.I.A. All scholars — especially those involved in East-West exchanges — will suffer if the integrity of their research is thus made suspect" (NYT 1964: 28). On September 7, 1964, the *Pittsburgh Post Gazette & Sun* wrote that "the CIA's intrusion into policy-making, its reported defiance of higher executive authority on occasion and its secret operations in the domestic field are enough to make citizens wary of its role in a democracy" (reproduced in U.S. Congress 1964: Exhibit 48). Because Patman did not further pursue CIA wrongdoing (Pearson 1967), even with such concerns over unlawful interference in domestic activities, there were no further investigations into the agency's use of these fronts until three years later, when Sol Stern published his exposé in *Ramparts*. Stern's article established that the CIA secretly had provided the National Student Association with \$1.6 million since 1959, during a period in which the association was experiencing funding difficulties.



Starting with information from 1964 news reports on Wright Patman's hearings, Stern used Patman's discoveries and identified more CIA funding fronts, conduits, and recipients. Stern determined that the CIA had used fronts identified by Patman to fund the National Student Association and to manipulate policies within the association. He learned that, in 1965, the CIA had approached the president of a "prominent New England foundation" requesting access to the foundation's list of funded organizations. After viewing the list, CIA agents explained that they would like to use the foundation to support some already funded and new organizations of interest to the CIA, so that they could "channel CIA money into the foundation without it ever being traced back to the CIA. They said they were very skilled at these manipulations" (Stern 1967: 31). This foundation's board rejected the CIA's proposal, but other foundations accepted CIA funds and passed them along to unwitting individuals and programs.

One *Ramparts* reporter found that when he tracked down CIA front foundation addresses, he "usually found himself in a law office where no one was willing to talk about the Funds" (Stern 1967: 31). Stern traced CIA funds passing through several intermediary foundations (e.g., the J. Frederick Brown Foundation and the Independence Foundation) that were themselves funded by CIA fronts (31), with other money coming from the CIA-linked Rabb, Kaplan, Farfield, San Jacinto Foundation, Independence, Tower, and Price Funds and eventually reaching the National Student Association with no visible links to the CIA (32).

Stern's report had a significant impact on the public. *Ramparts* purchased large ads in the *New York Times* announcing the piece, and there were widespread reactions to the story. Art Buchwald (1967) wrote a humorous piece, spinning ridiculous CIA cover stories, including one in which the CIA had accidentally funded the National Student Association, thinking it was giving money to the National Security Agency. While numerous editorials on these fronts criticized the CIA, Thomas Braden published "I'm Glad the CIA Is 'Immoral'" (1967) in the *Saturday Evening Post*, describing his role in passing CIA funds to the American Federation of Labor to bolster anticommunist unions in Europe. Braden disclosed that CIA funding had helped the Boston Symphony Orchestra, the International Committee of Women, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom advance against the forces of international communism. He bragged about the CIA secretly using Jay Lovestone, the former leader of the Communist Party USA and an anticommunist, to subvert communist advances in French labor struggles. Carl Rowan, former director of the U.S. Information Service (USIS), claimed in his syndicated column that the National Student Associa-