



SAVING THE SECURITY STATE

EXCEPTIONAL CITIZENS IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA

INDERPAL GREWAL

**SAVING THE
SECURITY STATE**

NEXT WAVE New Directions in Women's Studies
A series edited by Inderpal Grewal, Caren Kaplan, and Robyn Wiegman

SAVING THE SECURITY STATE

Exceptional Citizens in Twenty-First-Century America

INDERPAL GREWAL

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Airport confiscated knives. Image courtesy of the artist.

No project achieves “hegemony” as a completed project. It is a process, not a state of being. No victories are permanent or final. Hegemony has constantly to be “worked on,” maintained, renewed, and revised. Excluded social forces, whose consent has not been won, whose interests have not been taken into account, form the basis of counter-movements, resistance, alternative strategies and visions . . . and the struggle over a hegemonic system starts anew. They constitute what Raymond Williams called “the emergent” — and are the reason why history is never closed but maintains an open horizon towards the future. —**STUART HALL**, “The Neoliberal Revolution”

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I had thought this was going to be a short book. I had written an essay on “Security moms” and thought that I would just expand that into a few other directions and write a long essay on the topic of gender and security. But it turned out I had a lot to say and explore about US imperial power in the new century. Trained as a postcolonial studies scholar, but one who had become interested in the relation between postcolonial politics and transnational epistemologies and analytics, I thought US empire could be examined through a transnational lens that could critique the geopolitics of exceptionalism. Instead of a long essay, it’s now a book that took almost a decade to write.

I’ve been fortunate over the years to have been part of many new paradigms that have come to decenter imperial knowledges and the racial and gendered hierarchies that prevented academic research on communities and identities resulting from colonial and imperial power. From colonial discourse analysis, to transnational feminist cultural studies, and then to critical security studies, examinations of racialized empire and militarism, and cultural politics—all these fields have been critical to the methods and subjects of my research. I’ve been privileged to work with colleagues and students who have changed fields and methods, though many of us still believe that there is more to be done. Many of these scholars are first- or second-generation immigrants, and scholars who have become diasporic, who have brought studies of European and American imperialisms to new directions through their critiques. The Cold War demarcations of areas, of North and South, are being undercut through a variety of practices of research and knowledge making. There is

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My thanks also to Steve Bell for permission to use his brilliant and evocative cartoon.

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INTRODUCTION. Exceptional Citizens?
Saving and Surveilling in Advanced Neoliberal Times

If you see something, say something.
—Sign created and sponsored by the
Department of Homeland Security after 9/11

You see a girl who could do anything.
He sees a girl he can force to do anything.
STOPSEXTRAFFICKINGINTL.COM
—Sign at Tennessee rest stop, starting 2014

How might we theorize a state that sponsors and displays both of these signs?¹ One asks individuals to be responsible for surveillance and to work for the security of state and empire. The other asks them to surveil fellow travelers to rescue victims of “trafficking.”² This book argues that these two seemingly divergent modes of participation reveal the intertwining and co-construction of citizen-subjects of welfare and militarization in the context of American imperial power within a neoliberal era. These two modes of power—surveillance and saving—in this new century construct citizens as securitized subjects within the United States, producing “exceptional citizens” who work to save the “exceptional nation.” What I call the “advanced” phase of neoliberalism has made visible insecurities concerning the waning power of the US global empire that results in protests, some progressive and some revanchist, by these exceptional citizens.

The United States, under both neoliberal and imperial policies, can be understood through the “state effect” of appearing as a security state, operating through securitization as a mode of power over its populations. Its liberalism has long been contested because of its history of what Patrick Wolfe called settler colonialism and the continuing legacy of racism.³ It cannot be seen as a welfare or a liberal state because its remit has turned to maintaining state security in the context of ongoing wars.⁴ By using terms such as “securitization” and “security state,” I show how constructs of security have come to dominate everyday life in the US imperial state.⁵ Relations are changing between the state and its citizens: between individuals, communities, and families; and between the state, corporations, and individuals.⁶ A state of security as permanent emergency and endless war has become the hegemonic logic of governance of this neoliberal security state. Security has become the rationale for militarized cultures of surveillance and protection that lead to insecurities, threats and fears, which work at material, affective and embodied levels. Security is also a cause and effect not just of the relations of the United States with the world, but also of neoliberal policies that have contributed to the inequalities that create insecurity throughout the world, including in the United States itself.⁷ In response to these insecurities of the new century, private individuals who see themselves as normative citizens become empowered to take responsibility for maintaining the imperial security state.⁸ These individuals, produced as responsible and self-improving and thus products of neoliberal self-empowerment regimes, hope to repair the effects of imperial and neoliberal policies and thereby save the security state. Yet however much they try, their attempts often end in failure, thus producing more insecurity. This shuttle between security and insecurity marks the exceptional citizens of the US security state.

Neoliberal policies were implemented during the 1970s in the so-called developing world—that is, the regions formerly colonized by Europe—by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which demanded that countries in debt from the rise in the price of oil in the 1970s repay their debts by slashing their welfare budgets. Many countries had to comply, and it was often the case that the cuts came from reducing welfare to the poorest of inhabitants. Called “The Washington Consensus,” these policies were later jointly championed by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, and led to similar reductions to welfare in both countries. These policies included greater belief in the work of the market to address all social issues, the reduction of welfare, the privatization of public goods, and the language of efficiency and productivity in

everyday life. David Harvey describes neoliberalism as the acceptance of the idea that “human well-being can be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade.”⁹ While Harvey’s emphasis lies on the market logics that are important for neoliberal policies, Nikolas Rose calls the production of an entrepreneurial self an important feature of “advanced liberalism.”¹⁰ Following Michel Foucault’s theorization of the crisis of the liberal state and economism at the end of the twentieth century, Rose argues that the self-making, self-marketing, and self-improving subject is characteristic of this new phase in Western liberal democracies that are unable (or unwilling) to provide welfare to all. While considering the impact of economic policies across the globe as described by Harvey, I rely on Rose’s analysis to suggest that neoliberalism also altered subjectivities; the exceptional American citizen trying to save the security state is the product of the self-empowerment regime that is central to neoliberalism in the United States.

While David Harvey, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri argue that neoliberalism is a global phenomenon, others note that it manifests in specific localized/national or transnational projects.¹¹ For instance, John and Jean Comaroff suggest the specificity of what they call “millennial capitalism” in South Africa is one example of neoliberalism being globally connected, but also having particular regional specificities.¹² Following this focus on specificities, I argue in this book that the specificity of American neoliberalism is connected to its military projects, the emergence of its Christian and humanitarian citizenship, and the rearticulation of its exceptionalism.

While theories of neoliberalism have suggested the ideologies that construct neoliberal policies were fashioned by international organizations and economists in the United States, each region and state has come to have its own history of neoliberalism, with particular impacts and differences. After many decades, we see an “advanced stage” that is also specific to each location, a stage that becomes the result of how neoliberalism manifested itself in its particularities. This “advanced” stage captures how decades of neoliberal policies have altered the social and created problems that we see across the world. In the United States, neoliberalism’s “advanced” stage appears in a context that is not just economic, but incorporates both capitalism’s and liberalism’s late modern forms. Thus it includes wars without end, environmental and social insecurities, proliferating racial and gendered differences generated by the conjoining of militarism and capitalism. It is also manifest in the naturalization of the neoliberal individual as exceptional

citizen, one who is shaped not simply by capitalism but also by a variety of social and political formations and affiliations that construct individuals, communities, nationalisms. The shift to an “advanced” form becomes visible in the emergence of contradictions and protests to neoliberalism, as well as the management of these by neoliberal subjects, militarized power, and authority. Protests find openings and possibilities in the contradictions between transnational capital and the imperial state; between neoliberal polices and imperial state powers; and between neoliberal and securitized citizen-subjects within the complex history of American exceptionalism.

Protests are not limited to the United States either. They are also globally disparate, as neoliberal policies and divergent histories contribute differentially to particular regional and national politics and powers. Just as neoliberal policies are nationally and culturally specific, protests are also specific—though globally they can collaborate, sustain each other, or clash. Not all protests take the form of a particular racial or class formation nor a religious, gendered, sexual, or racial identity. Not all are progressive, and they can be revolutionary or revanchist in heterogeneous ways, catalyzed by local and transnational events and connections, and many shift over time according to the stresses and possibilities that protestors encounter.

Protests in the United States come from concerns over waning empire, loss of racial sovereignty among whites, and economic issues as well as social movements based on race, gender, and sexuality. Imperial wars have led to declines in US global power, and neoliberal policies have shifted power from state to private individuals (including private corporations) and created economic inequalities. “Exceptional citizens” are a result of such declines. Naturalized as entrepreneurial and aspirational but also fearful and insecure, they believe that they can do more than the state and save the empire and the world. Yet they are concerned about everyday safety and security and thus turn to the security state for protection. These citizens, insecure and imperial, wish to access and maintain the privileges of whiteness to become exceptional and sovereign. Those who pass for white, or try to do so,¹³ seek a strong military state yet are historically suspicious about state power. They thus both collaborate and come into conflict with the state in the work of surveillance and security.

In the United States, these decades of neoliberal policies have altered the state and its relation to people, resulting in changes in the nature of political sovereignty. While some scholars argue that neoliberalism has waned,¹⁴ this book argues that, on the contrary, a more “advanced” stage enables

its contradictions to be resolved by neoliberal and militarized means, that is, through the work of securitized, exceptional citizens. As contradictions have emerged between imperial state power and deeply unequal individuals, states, and cities, what becomes visible are the myriad insecurities that individuals must manage in order to become normative, exceptional citizens of the US empire. “Advanced neoliberalism” marks both the specificities of this stage of neoliberalism in this new century as well as its shifting mode of power in so-called advanced liberal democracies.¹⁵ If neoliberalism’s characteristics include self-responsible and self-improving citizens and the move from welfare to security, the characteristics of its advanced form include the emergence and management of protests as well as the visibility of insecurities of imperial power. Divisions between public and private become difficult to sustain, as sovereignty is claimed by white male power and privilege, and as corporations carry out the work of the military and as nongovernmental organizations take over the welfare function of the state. These changes have weakened ties between states and citizens that were enabled by welfare, so that the security state becomes a means to connect citizens to the state through militarization,¹⁶ a project that often goes awry, or leads to consequences that create further insecurity. To manage protests, subjects are securitized in neoliberal ways—that is, made fearful through mediated panics about external threats from immigrants and terrorists as the causes of insecurity—and they take responsibility for security. These insecurities continue to try to repress the rebellious consequences of neoliberal policies, as much as they continue to generate its insurrections.

Such citizen-subjects who work to save the security state comprise individuals (or corporate entities) acting as both agents and vehicles of humanitarian welfare and surveillance, hoping to reassert the legitimacy of the United States as a model of a liberal, capitalist democracy. These entities undertake this work as imperial subjects: first, in deciding who should be improved, in claiming to make these improvements, and in making others into subjects of neoliberal empire; and second, in enabling and incorporating the practices of security through surveillance into the changing norms of family, consumer, and citizen. Transnational corporations are also increasingly claiming their own sovereignty, as they become endowed with some of the sovereign rights of citizens.¹⁷ In addition, because a small transnational capitalist class also often governs corporations, the alliances of transnational corporations go beyond the United States. Neoliberalism’s transnational scope produces contradictions, banality, and crises.

Since the US empire is not new, neither are its imperial subjects—including its white, masculine sovereignties—nor its militarisms.¹⁸ US surveillance regimes can trace a history from nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperial projects in the Philippines.¹⁹ Yet some subjects and modes of what has come to be called “securitization” by the neoliberal state are shifting because the endless war on terror, the failures of US invasions in the Middle East, and a changing politics of race, class, sexuality and religion have produced moral panics as well as economic precarities, adding to histories of racialization and expulsion from citizenship. There are concerns about American power and security, as well as protests against the reduction of welfare and the security state from what is seen as a past of plenty and prosperity, even if this was not uniformly available to all citizens or even available for long periods of time.²⁰ The resolution of these tensions and contradictions emerges as humanitarianisms and exceptional citizens struggle to save the security state.

In this book, I examine the contradictions of neoliberal empire in the United States through several securitized subjects: the “security mom” who works to privatize state security within the heteronormative and white middle-class family through parental and community surveillance; the “humanitarian,” often white but including others aspiring to exceptionalism, who makes individual and consumer choices about who should get welfare and who should not in the hope that individual efforts can remedy the depredations of globalization and American racial/colonial histories; the “security feminist” who takes on the work of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as a project of gendered empowerment to protect the security state; and the “shooter” who embodies the white, male exceptional citizen to whom sovereignty is dispersed so that he can use violence in the protection of the American empire. These figures are often struggling, tragic, or violent, and have become normative citizen-subjects of the United States as a neoliberal, imperial, security state.²¹

American Exceptionalism and Postcolonial Theories

For many who live in the United States and outside it, the history of the United States and of its geopolitics (as well as its expansion in North America) is not about claims of civilizational superiority or moral authority. Many in the United States and around the world have few illusions about the moral claims made by the US nation-state. They have long challenged its legitimacy as a proponent of freedom and democracy given its history of wars and colonialism, of being a racial settler state, and of supporting violent dictatorships

in Latin America during the Cold War. More recently, many in the United States seem concerned with its waning power, and with the insecurities engendered by such loss.²² Their concern is that the United States has lost the stature that enabled its claim of geopolitical and national exceptionalism after the Cold War.

Postcolonial theories of the state emphasize the differential power of European and American states that make claims to normative notions of liberal democracy. They critique the ability of Europe and North America to adjudicate which states are “failed” and which are successful, which are “civilized” and which are not, which are modern and which are traditional.²³ Postcolonial theories also emphasize differences between European or US imperial states and postcolonial states, even as a transnational analysis can break down the grounds of hierarchical (rather than cultural or historical) difference, especially undercutting claims of superiority and hierarchy made on behalf of the “West.” Postcolonial theory has needed theories of transnationalism to examine how the making of empire within and outside are connected, and to reveal the contradictions and emptiness of claims of liberal equality in the United States.²⁴

Jean and John Comaroff argue that we need a “Theory from the South,” deterritorializing the concept of the “south” away from the regional demarcation of the “Global South” to understand the forms of capitalism and state power that we see globally. Recognition of the “South,” its forms of power, and governance that are now the norm, decenters the norm of the modern, liberal Western state and its assertions of liberal democracy.²⁵ Such theories suggest that the United States and other Western countries are now following the forms of state, governance, and authority that prevail in the regions where imperial projects and policies in tandem with neoliberal capitalism have been implemented for over four decades. For it is in the Global South where emergent nationalisms, militancies, and violence appeared in the late twentieth century. “Terrorism” against the state, as many insurgencies were called, also emerged in several regions of the Global South (i.e., India, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Peru, Indonesia, Israel, and the Philippines), providing laws and security expertise for counterinsurgency campaigns by states.²⁶ The Global South was the laboratory of the wars against state power,²⁷ as well as the site for the implementation of neoliberal policies. But it was not only the Global South that became the laboratory of neoliberalism, but also many regions within the United States and Europe, where elites could extract profits while reducing welfare or use race to extract labor and profits. These were regions where the imperial state and the racial state were operating in

conjoined ways producing what appeared as a security state for many minority populations.

While the notion of the “South” can highlight the connections between state practices within and outside US borders, it is nevertheless important to make some distinctions between the United States and regions outside it, as much as it is important to reveal the racialized discrepancies between US geopolitics and national politics. Geopolitics can be a site where contradictions of US power have become visible. As an imperial state, the United States and its inequities reveal it to be—as Achille Mbembe suggests of the postcolony—banal in its production of violence and inequalities as well as in the limits of its liberalism and welfare.²⁸ While the United States is different in its constant claim of superiority and power, it is similar to so many other global regions in its insecurity and burgeoning inequalities. Thus, the US nation-state can be understood as unexceptional despite its claims of national exceptionalism since, like so many states in the Global South, it has emerged as a security state rather than a liberal, welfare state with regard to its own populations. There are, however, limits to this equivalence. The insurgencies in the Global South, even if they were called “militancies” or “terrorism,” did not have the impact that was the result of what was called terrorism in the empire. The US imperial state is different in scale and in the nature of its exceptionalism, rather than exceptional or superior from the postcolonial state. Its difference is that it claims the right to use violence globally while producing itself as normative and liberal, despite its waning power globally and its illiberalism within. Despite this difference, however, it also now seems unable to control geopolitics, or to assert itself as morally superior, or to gain legitimacy by providing welfare to its own populations.

The claim of American exceptionalism has been based on both a history of national formation within an anti-imperial teleology, and the imperial power to use violence.²⁹ Making visible this ideology requires consideration both of the historical construction of national exceptionalism and of the political concepts of sovereignty and the modern state. Amy Kaplan has argued that the idea of American exceptionalism has been understood as a claim to anti-colonial origins that erases viewing the United States as empire. She suggests that exceptionalism is a denial that produces America as a self-generating and autonomous nation-state that leaves out the ways that a history of American empire and imperialism has continuities with European colonialism.³⁰ As Jasbir Puar argues, Kaplan’s critique of exceptionalism engages usefully with an understanding of the geopolitics of sexuality and American exceptionalism through the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. These

theories of the state and sovereignty as exception lay bare the violence of the state that is racial, gendered, and sexualized.³¹ Such an engagement can usefully examine how United States as empire comes to appear as uniquely progressive by absorbing social movements such as those by US-based LGBT communities to create an emergent homonationalism.³²

It is not just in the making of nationalism, but in what has been ideologically constructed as a security state that we can diagnose the contradictions of the claim of US exceptionalism. In previous work, I have argued that it is in the juxtaposition of necropolitics and geopolitics, the “interrelation between the sovereign right to kill and the right to rescue” that constitutes modes of state power at the end of the twentieth century.³³ This juxtaposition has particular salience for American exceptionalism. The United States has acted as a globally sovereign actor, able to suspend international law while insisting it applies only to Other (non-European, for the most part) nations, groups, or individuals. Conservative arguments supporting America’s national exceptionalism rely on ideas of Western liberalism and humanism as superior characteristics of the United States,³⁴ or on the ideology of a nation of migrants, class mobility, and the “American dream.” At the same time, critical scholarly studies have examined American exceptionalism as national fantasy,³⁵ where national exceptionalism enables war and violence. All of these approaches render liberalism as either strategic or a mode of power, as the US empire that calls itself a liberal democracy is able to wage war and to violate the sovereignty of other states, setting itself up as moral arbiter and police as well as proponent of freedom, democracy, and the capitalist “American Dream.”³⁶

Theories of US exceptionalism also have considered the problems of divergent effects of such claims. In a book of essays published in 1997, Seymour Martin Lipset argued that American exceptionalism stemmed from Alexis de Tocqueville’s conceptualization of America, and from the position of the United States as a country born out of revolution. According to Lipset, the characteristics of US exceptionalism include liberty, egalitarianism, individuality, populism, and laissez-faire capitalism.³⁷ Yet he argued that the antielitist, populist, and individualist aspects of this exceptionalism can lead to problems of populism, some of which have become visible over the decades and in the new century. As he very presciently observed, while elite forms of power continue to shape policy, populist elements continue to challenge notions of liberal democracy creating forms of violence that undercut US geopolitical clout.

Both elites and nonelites have become concerned with America’s waning power, though for different agendas and reasons. David Bromwich has

argued that US exceptionalism has changed, becoming much more about the claim of being “the greatest country in the world,” defending peace and democracy globally, but also being unaccountable to anyone. He believes that exceptionalism has led to moral decline.³⁸ While there are many who would contest the claim of the United States to the moral high ground that Bromwich’s critique implicitly relies upon, his challenge that the claim of exceptionalism is a moral hazard that produces a lack of accountability is useful. It helps in understanding the US mode of empire as including a moral aspect. This moral aspect appears in the will to rescue, to save, to become humanitarians, or to wage “just war.” It is this aspect that continues to be powerful in producing securitized subjects who wish to become global humanitarians, even when faced with the impacts of the neoliberal policies and wars of the United States. It is also a “moral” aspect that has been absorbed into the formation of the neoliberal entrepreneurial subject within what Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi have called a “moral economy.”³⁹ This moral striving leads exceptional citizens to continue to strive to improve themselves and others, even though such efforts may appear to be empty or futile.

Surveilling, Securitization, and the Security State

Over the last few years, journalists have revealed the extent to which the US state surveilled its citizens, especially those, such as Muslims, who are now figured as racialized national security threats.⁴⁰ This surveillance exists alongside continuing racial profiling of South Asian Muslims and those of Middle Eastern descent, as well as Latinos and African Americans; such profiling has become a method of crime and “terror” prevention.⁴¹ Corporations also participate in surveillance by gathering consumer data, producing profiles, and predicting consumer behavior and habits.⁴² Consumer data as well as political behavior and actions online that become political data are commodities that are for sale, increasing the likelihood of more surveillance by digital technology companies.⁴³ There is often a close relation between corporations and state security projects, as states and corporations work on surveillance either in partnership, separately, or even antagonistically. In addition, because neoliberalism often blurs divisions between public and private entities, corporations are increasingly endowed with the rights of persons. Entities and groups that claim to be outside of the state, such as NGOs, can both depend on the state and claim to be outside of it.⁴⁴ One widely noted example of the collaboration between public and private entities is the US government’s privatization of state security through its use of private corpo-

rations in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁵ It is this fuzziness between public and private power through which sovereignty is shared, making some persons more secure because of power given to them and some insecure (or even targets of racial violence) because of the power exercised by these non-state sovereignties. Both race and gender are key determinants of sovereignty or lack thereof, as race emerges to enable white citizens to governmentalize security, leading to criminalizing nonwhite groups in old and new ways.⁴⁶ New technologies of profiling emerge within legal, material, and political domains that engage with the political economy of security and insecurity.

Neoliberalism relies on racial, religious, and gender exclusions as much as did liberalism. Dispersing sovereignty to particular authoritarian white masculinities and, to a lesser extent, femininities,⁴⁷ these racialized and gendered subjects feel empowered and responsible in emergent ways in this century. Some are empowered by a sovereignty given to them to claim historically racialized white power for groups not always seen as white, while others bring together race and gender to create new imperial feminisms. While some forms of racialized exclusions (such as immigration laws) seem to continue, Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians are more visibly racialized as dangerous Others who are left out even from becoming neoliberal citizens.⁴⁸ African Americans, Latinos, and Native peoples continue to be targets of a carceral state that is also part of the security state.⁴⁹ White, imperial sovereignties constitute the “soft” and “hard power” of military force, sometimes as humanitarianism and other times as police.⁵⁰ In particular, what is visible in the new century is that this “soft power” is inextricable from the “hard power” of the military. Military and consumer technologies have long been codependent, and military technologies continue to reformulate everyday life in new ways.⁵¹ In particular, what is called the “carceral state” is constructed through military technologies to enact forms of racialized power.⁵² Racial profiling and consumer profiling are both enabled by new technologies that allow public and private organizations to collect personal data.⁵³ State welfare agencies, banks, and retail companies all use digital technologies to collect biometric, location, DNA, consumption, Internet, and face-recognition data. Data-mining tools grow ever more sophisticated and fine tuned, though it is unclear whether they can achieve the sophisticated profiling their marketers claim.⁵⁴

In the context of twenty-first-century US empire, what Armand Mattelart calls “the techno-security paradigm” is focused on “terrorism,” a deliberately vague concept that allows violence and is not accountable to liberal constitutional ideals. Mattelart argues that the war on terror was mobilized by

collaborations among “the entire information and technology complex.”⁵⁵ Shadowy government agencies and private corporations wage “network-centric” cyberwar,⁵⁶ using information technology to create geopolitical advantage, with the support of nontechnological mechanisms such as state antiterror laws that enforce and popularize surveillance and secrecy technologies. The state and its exceptional subjects use these new technologies to mobilize racialized and Orientalist ideologies.⁵⁷

In the name of enhancing personal and state security, the US government, the technology industry, and other corporations manage and proliferate risks and fears to create ever more surveillance. Internet and communication technology growth is fueled by the promise of accurate and effective profiling—and this is part of the long history of all technology. Caren Kaplan has shown how air-power technology industries have long relied on such claims of “precision bombing” while naming their targets as “collateral damage.”⁵⁸ When the “profile” of a consumer, criminal, citizen, or terrorist is dynamic—created out of shifting information flows and racialized notions of security and fear—it is nothing but aporetic. Profiling does not work through accuracy but rather through its broad racial effects that are terroristic; that is, profiling itself produces terror for those it catches in its security net, and those it catches are a broad group identified by religious, gendered, and racial characteristics produced by histories of racialized imperialism. In the continued use of race and colonial regimes of Orientalism, new surveillance technologies rely on older racial and colonial ideologies embedded in Western visual histories.

One result of these twenty-first-century US surveillance practices is that the term “security” has come to index heterogeneous and unstable state, social, and economic powers, through blurred distinctions between individuals, corporations, the state, public entities, and private entities. It is precisely the transfer of technology from military to ordinary, everyday life that enables the duplicity of the term “security” for the state and for individuals; this creates the state effect of fluidity between individual, personal ideas of home, safety, and protection, as well as between those interests and national threats and state security. Security traffics in the dynamism of affect across family, home, safety and national security, in which differences can be highlighted or dissolved at different times and places.

Security can refer to welfare and militarization, and to safety and violence. It can refer to individual and biological processes of welfare and biopolitics that in the US context are based on biometrics, pathologization of new racial formations, old and new Orientalisms, and widespread surveillance. These

neoliberal securitizations have, since the 1970s, supported what some scholars argue is an authoritarian populism that criminalizes on the basis of race, class, gender and religion.⁵⁹ But it can also refer to the demands made on the state for safety and protection that it cannot ensure, and which it often refuses to ensure. Security works affectively through the promise of the safety of home and of nation, but also enables the powers of protection claimed by patriarchies, fraternities, and nationalisms that work through violence. Security enables a promise of welfare that the state cannot fulfill, not because it is unable to but because its neoliberal alliances prevent it from doing so. This means that neoliberalisms alter the relations between citizens, nations, and states by shifting power and sovereignty to corporations and individuals at national and transnational scales. Such shifts create problems of state legitimacy, and have come to produce protests and frictions that mark the era of advanced liberalism.

Citizenship

US imperial insecurities within advanced neoliberalism mean that citizenship itself has shifted, as rights have been replaced by humanitarianism, and social security by state security. Citizenship becomes especially fraught for many protesting the impacts of war and inequality, especially those who will not or cannot pass for white or who are able to access its privileges and are not seen as normative Americans. Sherene Razack argues that Muslims have been cast out from US liberal citizenship through their racialization.⁶⁰ I would qualify this argument by saying that they are cast out not from liberal citizenship, but from neoliberal citizenship. What is foreclosed for Muslims in the decade since 9/11 in the contemporary United States is even the opportunity to become the exception, neoliberal economic citizen-subject of rational, flexible, and self-making practices, who makes proper investments in oneself through productive consumption and who takes responsibility for saving the security state.

In my last book, *Transnational America*, I argued that citizenship is no longer tied to liberal rights, but has become defined through technological, consumerist, and transnational modes. I rejected the notion of “global citizenship” (for its history of Western travel and empire), and showed the multiple notions of “belonging” as citizenship, suggesting that when differential mobilities shape the lives of millions around the world, our relations to place and identity become unstable and malleable.⁶¹ In this book, I continue the discussion of the shift in liberal citizenship, arguing that under neoliberalism,

rights shift as well, especially in relation to sovereignty and identity. Citizens' rights have changed as the work of welfare moves to corporations and NGOs, dissolving some ties between people and the state. These rights have become replaced by charity and privatized giving, even as the demands for welfare continue.⁶² Yet rights and citizenship continue to be important, especially given the burgeoning numbers of stateless people in the new century and especially since fewer people can claim them.

Security has moved from the protection from adversities through welfare and state support to militarized security, aggrandizing the powers of the state. Yet demands for welfare and state support continue from those who see themselves as entitled exceptional citizens, though these may not be demands for rights but for special access to entitlements over others. As neoliberalism has become deeply entrenched, more and more of the population has been enlisted for humanitarian work, and more and more institutions have come to support it. In the process, poor women, children, people of color, and immigrants find it increasingly difficult to access their rights (not just to welfare but also to proper wages and protections). Yet in the phase of advanced neoliberalism, protests for rights become instead a rationale for authority and repression. Such repressions occur not just by the state but also through disparate sovereignties created by race, religion, class, and gender. This terrain of citizenship in the US security state is formed by exclusions created by new laws against terrorism, denial of citizenship to many millions, including the incarcerated, immigrants, and migrants who are Muslim or Latino, threats by powerful white neoconservative activists, and violence by antigovernment vigilantes, as well as vigorous social movements that protest violence and dispossession. What continue are also the demands for expertise and labor from the global economy and transnational corporations, though these have come to also generate protests from working-class communities in the United States. As the United States continues to wage imperial war and extract profits, populations from those targeted regions demand asylum, but most are denied entry because of opposition from groups identifying as white who scapegoat immigrants and refugees as they realize the repercussions of the waning geopolitical power of the United States.

Two seemingly contradictory ideas emerge in this new citizenship configuration: first, neoliberal authority is based on the reconfiguration of citizen-subjects by the use of state security apparatuses such as police, militarized cultures of surveillance, and carceral public and private institutions; and second, sovereignty is both devolved and still tied to the state. Yet this situation is not paradoxical. Because the notion of sovereignty has been long shared

by state and citizen through the long history of the Westphalian state,⁶³ these notions of citizenship are not altogether new, though the globalizations of the twentieth century—those that have disempowered working classes in the United States or produced large migrations—have created new tensions. Thomas Ilgen argues that “global forces, both political and economic, pry open states and their societies in ways that complicate the task of national governance and reduce its effectiveness,” resulting in a “multilayered structure of governance.”⁶⁴ While Ilgen is correct in this analysis that the state has not always had a monopoly on sovereignty, his claim that these forces also “enable sub-national authorities to govern more responsibly and effectively” does not apply to many countries in the world where authoritarian regimes repress their citizens in numerous ways.⁶⁵ Brenda Chalfin, for instance, has shown that in the case of neoliberal Ghana, state sovereignty is both segmented and enhanced, and Aihwa Ong has argued for the “graduated sovereignty” available under flexible neoliberal capitalism. Ong suggests that Asian political sovereignty is both specific and flexible, in a trajectory quite different from that in the United States.⁶⁶

In another approach to the dispersal of sovereignty, Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat delink the assumed connection between sovereignty and territory, showing each of these as constructs of the state.⁶⁷ Their research is useful to my project, since they examine sovereignty as exercised through violence over bodies, rather than simply by control over territories. Finn and Stepputat point out that European state violence was not exceptional, as Carl Schmitt suggests, and they claim that “colonial sovereignty remained a naked version of modern sovereign power,”⁶⁸ as Achille Mbembe has also argued.⁶⁹ They suggest that postcolonial sovereignty—expressed in the Global South by many states—is consequently “fragile, eroding and contested,”⁷⁰ in part because other sovereignties have emerged, including the “economic citizenship” that Saskia Sassen suggests is linked to “global economic actors.”⁷¹ Although Hansen and Stepputat’s analysis focuses on postcolonial states, rather than on the colonial ones, their insights into violence are also applicable to the United States in its national politics, suggesting that the US empire is not exceptional, having some residues from European colonial histories, including its Orientalisms and racial formations.

Their analysis of the British colonial context also applies to US empire, as territory becomes spectacle while sovereign power is exercised through threats and violence in distant regions where the United States has waged wars in pursuit of capital or geopolitical power. In US history, sovereignty has not been given to all citizens, because of the history of race, patriarchy,

settler colonialism, and slavery; it has been a central aspect of white power, captured by populist and authoritarian elements in US culture, such as those males claiming whiteness who have been given the ability to use violence for control of nonwhite bodies. This white racial sovereignty continues to have power over other groups in the new century; for instance, the ability of white males to amass weapons and to use them with impunity is protected by interpretations of the Second Amendment of the US Constitution. What we can conclude is that both neoliberalism and the war on terror have added emergent characteristics to this dispersal of sovereignty as it constructs the exceptional citizens of the United States in this new century.

The Security State

Scholars suggest that the US welfare state peaked by the 1970s and that economic stagnation proliferated in North America and Western European countries by the 1980s.⁷² How much this decline can be attributed to neoliberal policies is an important question. While some scholars suggest that neoliberalism is all powerful and has the ability to incorporate into its logic all sorts of differences and oppositions, others argue that neoliberalism's power is waning and power is shifting to other security projects. In his analysis of the relation between security and sexuality, Paul Amar argues that neoliberal governance has reduced the Global North's power and that governance is now being replaced by a humanitarian project of human security.⁷³ Amar reveals how powerful states construct human security laboratories around sexualized and gendered subjects who need saving or who wish to do the saving. This gendering and sexualizing of insecurity asks for a more textured analysis of the relation between neoliberalism, militarized security, and the politics of protest around sexuality and gender. While Amar is correct in his claim about reduced superpower exceptionalism, I argue that US neoliberalism in this advanced phase is being *enabled* (not replaced) by humanitarian governance, since it is precisely through the production of insecurity at individual and state scales that US neoliberalism requires humanitarian governance. To counter protests created by insecurities, twenty-first-century US humanitarian governance requires security through policing and military intervention, as well as the support of its exceptional citizens. Following Amar's focus on security and authority, I consider that the twenty-first-century US security state becomes visible as a set of racialized, classed, religious, and gendered institutions that use authority and violence to wage war and use neoliberal policies to benefit privileged groups. The state thus comes to appear—as the

state effect theories suggest—as empire not just through military or global policing but also through “soft power,” exercised transnationally by particular sets of subjects and processes that gain traction because of histories of white racial, masculinized sovereignty.⁷⁴

The contemporary proliferation of authoritarianism, technologized mass surveillance, counterinsurgency policing, and militarization of everyday life has produced a security state that is quite different from the declaration of state emergency referred to as the “state of security,” which authorizes the state to declare war and to use violence in the name of protection.⁷⁵ Scholarly work on the security state follows three main approaches. In one approach—relying on Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams’s reading of Karl Marx, Louis Althusser, and Antonio Gramsci—the state is controlled by the hegemonic capitalist ruling class, predominantly white in Europe and North America. In their seminal book on neoliberalism’s emergence in Britain of the 1970s, Stuart Hall et al. argue that the neoliberal state tends toward an authoritarian populism.⁷⁶ Public/private collaboration on behalf of capital require police, creating an authoritarianism that relies on racism, masculinity, and patriarchy even as it allows some groups of women, especially those considered white, to be empowered. This approach is extremely useful in understanding the legacies of racism, gender, sexuality, and class. However, it does not distinguish between different capitalist classes, nor does it explain how contemporary imperial states work geopolitically to adjudicate the states labeled “failed” or “developing.” Theories of hegemony and neoliberalism also need to be modified (as Hall later did)⁷⁷ toward inclusion of postcolonial, feminist, and race theorists who focus on the gendered and racialized nature of these elites and states formed under colonialism as well as the ways that capitalist oligarchies are also patriarchies.

In a feminist approach to the security state, Iris Marion Young, for instance, argues that the security state has a “patriarchal logic”: “The role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience,” and they, then, come to “occupy a subordinate status like that of women in the patriarchal household.” She sees the security state as having “a more authoritarian and paternalistic state power, which gets its support partly from the unity a threat produces and our gratitude for protection,” while “it legitimates authoritarian power over citizens internally” and “justifies aggressive war outside.”⁷⁸ Young separates “dominative masculinity” from “protective masculinity,” arguing against Carole Pateman’s more essentialized and heteronormative versions of women and of patriarchy that sees all women as belonging to the

private sphere of the patriarchal family.⁷⁹ Yet, Young's analysis of a Hobbesian Leviathan-like security state, while useful in the analysis of the production of fear and insecurity, leaves out the geopolitics of differentiating states. It also disregards gender as intersectional, leaving aside the ways that notions of dominative and protective masculinity are differentiated *also* by race in the United States. In a geopolitical context, differential state trajectories and aspirations separate the colonial state from the postcolonial as well as the imperial state from the states that it controls and invades. Furthermore, the relation between colonialism and capitalism produces different sorts of masculinities and patriarchies, based on culture and histories of empire.

Understanding such hegemonic masculinities as articulated with race, religion, and class reveals the security state and its patriarchal authority as contingent and shifting, and its relation with global capital as transnational. Scholars deploying the second scholarly approach to the security state use Michel Foucault's theory of governmentality and state effect, theorizing securitization as incorporating state subjects in the governance project. For Foucault, security is a mode of liberal power. Colin Gordon has argued that for Foucault, even liberalism becomes an "effective practice of security" that is the "political method" of modern governmental rationality.⁸⁰ For Foucault, the state is made up of diverse governance practices, many of which go awry or do not reach their goals. Furthermore, Foucault theorizes the state as a "state effect," due to its heterogeneity and diversity of practices. This "state effect" approach accounts for the ways that security and insecurity concerns produce the state as a node of power, which is both feared and desired. As Thomas Biebricher and Frieder Vogelmann argue, Foucault's focus on governmentality explains how the state comes to be perceived in a particular way in a given period, "under what conditions, and in what form the state began to be projected, programmed, and developed . . . at what moment it became an object of knowledge and analysis . . . at what point it began to be called for, desired, coveted, feared, rejected, loved and hated."⁸¹ While Foucault does not contend with state imperial projects, theories of governmentality have become useful in the context of neoliberal empire. For instance, Miguel de Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet suggest that security has been governmentalized and encompasses not simply military defense but also new political, economic, and social spaces and processes.⁸²

The contemporary neoliberal state requires a Foucauldian, Gramscian, critical race, and feminist approach, which explains the forms of equality, elitism, and power that have become visible—especially the making of patriarchal oligarchs (a masculinized and classed project) and powerful white

masculinities, including the “homonationalisms” that Jasbir Puar has critiqued.⁸³ Many scholars—especially those studying race, gender, sexuality and empire through cultural practices or local social movements—are attentive to power and inequality. For instance, Hugh Gusterson and Catherine Besteman reveal that the emphasis on security has enabled power and wealth to be concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest Americans, leading to economic and political precariousness and the loss of civil liberties for many.⁸⁴ Jennifer Terry shows how war becomes governmentalized in medical research through war funding and war injuries.⁸⁵ What is especially useful about the Foucauldian approach is that it helps to understand how such inequalities make subjects who do not belong to ruling classes but who governmentalize the state and its powers. Foucault’s idea of “state effect” also critiques the positivism in international relations literature, and allows an examination of geopolitics as a mediated and technologized project through which the state can become both alien and exceptional. It explains how the United States can be seen simultaneously as a waning empire and an exceptional power.

A third approach to the security state comes from international relations scholars who see “state security” as national security in realist terms. National security in this formulation becomes a matter of military and diplomatic geopolitics, with emphasis on the Weberian model of the state as having a monopoly on violence. More recently, scholars have critiqued this approach as too narrow and needing to be modified by adding cultural, economic, and social factors.⁸⁶ It remains powerful, however, among those who work in government, diplomacy, and media, as well as in many academic institutions. Some of these critics emphasize the importance of those nonstate and transnational actors who are often ignored in the international relations literature.

Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat argue that international relations scholars have produced a normative idea of the state that is increasingly out of touch with the kinds of dispersed sovereignty and governance regimes that currently operate beyond the state.⁸⁷ The dominant international relations notion of nation-states as bounded and territorialized entities has also come under critique. Joseph Nye argues that power is dispersed, divided among military, economic, transnational and non-state actors, and while the US is still dominant in military power, economic power is multipolar and diffused across many different actors. He argues for a new concept of US power that is “smart” because it is focused not on domination but on using “soft power” to set agendas that benefit the United States. He advocates that the United States take a paternal role, offering ideas and directions to attract