

# **The Fall of the Athenian Empire**

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# The Fall of the Athenian Empire

DONALD KAGAN



*Cornell University Press*

ITHACA AND LONDON

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First published 1987 by Cornell University Press  
First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 1991

Printed in the United States of America

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Kagan, Donald.  
The fall of the Athenian Empire.

Bibliography: p.  
Includes index.

1. Greece—History—Peloponnesian War, 431–404 B.C.
2. Athens (Greece)—History. I. Title.  
DF229.37-K34 1987 938'.05 86-32946  
ISBN-13: 978-0-8014-9984-5 (pbk : alk. paper)

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Paperback printing 1 0 9 8 7 6 5

*For Bob and Fred, the best of sons*



# Preface

This is the last volume of a history of the Peloponnesian War. It treats the period from the destruction of Athens' Sicilian expedition in September of 413 to the Athenian surrender in the spring of 404. Thucydides' history of the war is incomplete, and the eighth book, which breaks off abruptly in the year 411/10, is thought to be unfinished, and unpolished as well. In spite of the incompleteness of his account, his description and interpretation of the war inspire and shape this volume, as they have my earlier ones. The first volume attempted to evaluate his view of the causes and origins of the war as he expresses it in 1.23 and 1.88. The second one examined his assessment of Pericles' strategy in 2.65. The third one addressed his judgment of the Sicilian expedition set forth in the same passage and his estimate of the career of Nicias presented in 7.86.

Thucydides' judgment of the last part of the war appears in 2.65.12–13, at the end of his long eulogy of Pericles and his policies:

Yet after their defeat in Sicily, where they lost most of their fleet as well as the rest of their force, and faction had already broken out in Athens, they nevertheless held out for ten more years,<sup>1</sup> not only against their previous enemies and the Sicilians who joined them and most of their allies, who

<sup>1</sup>The figure given in the MSS is three years. For a defense of the emendation to ten, see *Thucydide, La guerre du péloponnèse*, II, ed. and trans. J. de Romilly (Paris, 1962), 101. A. W. Gomme (*HCT* II, 196–197) reviews the various other suggestions that have been put forth, which include keeping the three or emending it to five or eight, the last of which Gomme prefers. For our purposes here, the correct reading is not important, for no one doubts that Thucydides marvels at the Athenians' ability to hold out so long or that he attributes their defeat, in part at least, to internal strife.

rebelled against them, but also later against Cyrus, son of the Great King, who provided money to the Peloponnesians for a navy. Nor did they give in until they destroyed themselves by falling upon one another because of private quarrels.

This passage implies that even after the disaster in Sicily and the new problems it caused, Athens might still have avoided defeat but for internal dissension. A study of the last decade of the war enables us to evaluate Thucydides' interpretation of the reasons for Athens' defeat and the destruction of the Athenian Empire. It also makes possible an examination and evaluation of the performance of the Athenian democracy as it faced its most serious challenge.

For the course of the war, after Thucydides' account breaks off in 411, we rely directly on several ancient writers, only one of whom was contemporary with the events he described, and none of whom approached the genius of Thucydides. Modern historians of the classical period like to follow, when they can, the narrative historical account that they judge to be the most reliable, and they tend to prefer it to other evidence from sources that they consider less trustworthy. Whatever its merits in general, this practice is unwise for the period between 411 and 404 B.C. Of the extant writers of narrative accounts, Xenophon alone was a contemporary, and his *Hellenica* presents a continuous description of the events of that time. It is natural, therefore, that modern historians should at first have preferred his *Hellenica* to the abbreviated, derivative, and much later account of Diodorus and to the brief, selective biographies of Plutarch, which were aimed at providing moral lessons and were written even later.

The discovery of the papyrus containing the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* in 1906, however, changed the situation drastically. Although its author is unknown, the work seems to have been a detailed and careful continuation of Thucydides' history. As G. L. Barber notes, "the papyrus indicates a strict chronological arrangement by summers and winters, competent criticism and analysis of motives, a first-hand knowledge of the topography of Asia Minor, and certain details found in no other work on the period."<sup>2</sup> Several studies have found the superiority of the Oxyrhynchus historian's work over Xenophon's *Hellenica* to be most striking in the accounts of naval battles, but there has been a growing tendency to prefer the papyrus version to that of

<sup>2</sup>G. L. Barber, "Oxyrhynchus, The Historian from," *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1970), 766.



Xenophon.<sup>3</sup> Since it is clear that the Oxyrhynchus historian was used by Ephorus, the most important source for Diodorus in our period, the credibility of Diodorus' account has grown at the expense of Xenophon's.<sup>4</sup> That does not mean, however, that we should merely reverse the traditional practice and always follow the Diodoran account when it disagrees with Xenophon. Neither source is full enough or reliable enough to deserve preference *prima facie*.

Nor can we ignore the contributions of Plutarch in trying to construct a reliable account of what happened. Although he lived half a millennium after the war, Plutarch had a splendid library of works, many of them lost to us, capable of illuminating the course of events. He knew comedies by lost poets of the fifth century such as Telecleides, Phrynichus, Eupolis, Archippus, and Plato Comicus, histories by Thucydides' contemporaries Philistus and Hellanicus as well as his continuators Ephorus and Theopompus. He had access to contemporary inscribed documents; he could see with his own eyes many paintings and sculptures of the fifth century. We may derive a reasonable idea of his value from one of his own accounts of his method: "Those deeds which Thucydides and Philistus have set forth . . . I have run over briefly, and with no unnecessary detail, in order to escape the reputation of utter carelessness and sloth; but those details which have escaped most writers, and which others have mentioned casually, or which are found on ancient votive offerings or in public decrees, these I have tried to collect, not massing together useless material of research, but handing on such as furthers the appreciation of character and temperament."<sup>5</sup> In pursuing his own purposes he has provided us with precious and authentic information available nowhere else; we ignore him at our peril.

These three authors—Xenophon, Diodorus, and Plutarch—are all important, but none is dominant. Where their accounts disagree, we have no way, *a priori*, to know whom to follow. In each case, we must keep an open mind and resolve discrepancies by using all the evidence and the best judgment we can muster. Wherever possible, I have explained the reasons for my preference in the notes, but sometimes my judgments rest on nothing more solid than my best understanding

<sup>3</sup>For references and discussion, see P. A. Rahe, "Lysander and the Spartan Settlement, 407–403 B.C." (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1977), vi–ix.

<sup>4</sup>I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967), 20–22.

<sup>5</sup>*Nic.*, 1.5, translated by B. Perrin.

of each situation. Inevitably, that will seem arbitrary in some cases, but the nature of the evidence about the quality of the sources permits no greater consistency. Introducing and following any general rule would surely lead to more errors than the application of independent judgment in each case.

One further question of method deserves attention. More than one able and sympathetic critic of my earlier volumes has been troubled by my practice of comparing what took place with what might have happened had individuals or peoples taken different actions and by my penchant for the subjunctive mood, or what is sometimes called “counterfactual history.” To my mind, no one who aims to write a history rather than a chronicle can avoid discussing what might have happened; the only question is how explicitly one reveals what one is doing. A major difference between historians and chroniclers is that historians interpret what they recount, that is, they make judgments about it. There is no way that the historian can judge that one action or policy was wise or foolish without saying, or implying, that it was better or worse than some other that might have been employed, which is, after all, “counterfactual history.” No doubt my method has been influenced by the great historian whom I have been studying for three decades, who engages in this practice very frequently and more openly than most. Let two examples suffice. In his explanation of the great length of the Greeks’ siege of Troy, Thucydides says: “But if they had taken with them an abundant supply of food, and . . . had carried on the war continuously, *they would easily have prevailed in battle and taken the city.*”<sup>6</sup> Again, in the conclusion to his summation and judgment of Pericles’ career, he says: “Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that time for his own forecast that *Athens might quite easily have triumphed* in this war over the Peloponnesians alone.”<sup>7</sup> I believe that there are important advantages in such explicitness: it puts the reader on notice that the statement in question is a judgment, an interpretation, rather than a fact, and it helps avoid the excessive power of the *fait accompli*, making clear that what really occurred was not the inevitable outcome of superhuman forces but the result of decisions by human beings and suggesting that both the decisions and their outcomes could well have

<sup>6</sup>1.11.2. To avoid prejudicing the question, I have not used my own translation but that of C. F. Smith in the Loeb edition, which is reliable and attempts to stay closer to the text than most. The Greek in the emphasized portion reads: ῥαδίως ἂν μάχη κρατούντες εἶλον.

<sup>7</sup>2.65.13: πάνυ ἂν ῥαδίως περιγενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν.

been different. In this volume of my history of the war, I shall continue to be explicit in making such judgments.

The reader will easily see my continued debt to many scholars living and dead. Among the latter I must again single out the brilliant George Grote, father of the study of ancient Greek history as we know it today, and Georg Busolt, whose history is a model of learning, thoroughness, care, and dispassionate judgment. Among my contemporaries I must pay tribute to Antony Andrewes, whose magnificent final volume is a fitting capstone to the great monument that his collaborators on *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, A. W. Gomme and K. J. Dover, have created. I have also been aided greatly by P. J. Rhodes' impressive *Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia*, and I have learned much about Persia from D. M. Lewis' *Sparta and Persia*.

I am grateful to George Goold, John R. Hale, Paul A. Rahe, and Barry S. Strauss for criticizing all or part of my manuscript. Thanks are also due to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to Yale University for supporting my research.

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# Abbreviations and Short Titles

<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>ATL</i>	B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, <i>The Athenian Tribute Lists</i>
Beloch, <i>AP</i>	K. J. Beloch, <i>Die Attische Politik seit Perikles</i>
Beloch, <i>GG</i>	K. J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> , 2d ed.
Bloedow, <i>Alcibiades</i>	E. F. Bloedow, <i>Alcibiades Reexamined</i>
<i>BSA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the British School at Athens</i>
Busolt, <i>GG</i>	G. Busolt, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i>
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
<i>CP</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
Davies, <i>APF</i>	J. K. Davies, <i>Athenian Propertied Families</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i>
Fornara, <i>Generals</i>	C. Fornara, <i>The Athenian Board of Generals</i>
<i>GHI</i>	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i>
Glitz and Cohen, <i>HG</i>	G. Glitz and R. Cohen, <i>Histoire grecque</i>
Grote	George Grote, <i>A History of Greece</i>
Hatzfeld, <i>Alcibiade</i>	J. Hatzfeld, <i>Alcibiade, Etude sur l'histoire d'Athènes à la fin du V<sup>e</sup> siècle</i>
<i>HCT</i>	A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, <i>A Historical Commentary on Thucydides</i>
Henderson, <i>Great War</i>	B. W. Henderson, <i>The Great War between Athens and Sparta</i>
Hignett, <i>HAC</i>	C. Hignett, <i>A History of the Athenian Constitution</i>

<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
Kagan, <i>Archidamian War</i>	D. Kagan, <i>The Archidamian War</i>
Kagan, <i>Outbreak</i>	D. Kagan, <i>The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War</i>
Kagan, <i>Peace of Nicias</i>	D. Kagan, <i>The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition</i>
<i>LAC</i>	<i>L'Antiquité Classique</i>
Lewis, <i>Sparta and Persia</i>	D. M. Lewis, <i>Sparta and Persia</i>
Meiggs, <i>Athenian Empire</i>	R. Meiggs, <i>The Athenian Empire</i>
Meyer, <i>Forsch.</i>	E. Meyer, <i>Forschungen zur alten Geschichte</i>
Meyer, <i>GdA</i>	E. Meyer, <i>Geschichte des Altertums</i>
<i>PCPS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>PW</i>	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, <i>Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
<i>RH</i>	<i>Revue Historique</i>
Rhodes, <i>Commentary</i>	P. J. Rhodes, <i>A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia</i>
<i>Riv. fil.</i>	<i>Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica</i>
<i>SCI</i>	<i>Scripta Classica Israelica</i>
Ste. Croix, <i>Origins</i>	G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, <i>The Origins of the Peloponnesian War</i>
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

# The Fall of the Athenian Empire



# 1. After the Sicilian Disaster

The Athenian attack on Sicily, launched with such great expectations, ended in total failure. Nicias surrendered the pitiful remnants of his army to the Syracusans in mid-September of 413, so news of the defeat could not have reached Athens much before the end of the month.<sup>1</sup> An ancient story says that the first report came from a foreigner who arrived at a barber shop in the Piraeus. Assuming that the Athenians had already heard of the disaster, he began talking about the details. The barber ran to Athens with the news, but no one would believe him. He was thought to be a fabricator and trouble-maker and was put to the rack before witnesses arrived to confirm the story.<sup>2</sup> We need not believe such tales, but the picture they paint of general incredulity is surely right. Thucydides tells us that even when the very soldiers who had managed to escape from Sicily reported the extent of the disaster, they were for a long time disbelieved.<sup>3</sup>

When finally the truth could not be denied, the Athenians responded first in anger and then in fear. First, they lashed out at the politicians who had proposed and argued for the Sicilian expedition (Thucydides bitterly remarks, “as if they had not voted for it themselves”); they

<sup>1</sup>For the chronology, see Busolt, *GG* III:2, 684.

<sup>2</sup>Plut. *Nic.* 30; Athenaeus (9.407) tells the tale of the comic parodist Hegemon whose play so delighted the Athenians that they laughed even on the day when the news of the Sicilian disaster came to them in the theater. “No one left the theater, even though almost everyone had lost relatives. So they wept secretly and did not get up to leave so that their grief at the calamity might not be revealed to the spectators from other cities.”

<sup>3</sup>8.1.1. All references are to Thucydides unless otherwise indicated.

were furious with the seers who had predicted success. Next, they grieved over the men lost in Sicily. Finally, they feared for their own safety when they calculated their own losses and the enemy's gains. They expected that the Peloponnesians, joined by their new allies in Sicily, would sail directly for the Piraeus and attack Athens by land and sea, joined by Athens' allies, who would now surely rebel.<sup>4</sup>

In the panic of the moment, they exaggerated the enemy's capacity to take effective action, but they had good reason for concern over the condition of Athens and its ability to carry on the war. The most obvious problem was manpower.<sup>5</sup> At the start of the war, the Athenians had 13,000 citizen hoplites of fighting age and another 16,000 for garrison duty, of whom about 8,000 were citizens above and below the age for battle and 8,000 were metics. There were 1,200 cavalrymen and 1,600 bowmen; the number of thetes available for service as rowers and marines was between 20,000 and 25,000.<sup>6</sup> The plague appears to have killed about a third of the population and to have crippled and disabled still others.<sup>7</sup> These losses could have been only partially replaced by the time of the Sicilian disaster, which probably killed at least 3,000 hoplites and 9,000 thetes as well as thousands of metics.<sup>8</sup> When account is taken of other casualties suffered between 431 and the autumn of 413, it is reasonable to believe that in 413 the Athenians may have been reduced to no more than 9,000 adult male citizens of the hoplite class of all ages; perhaps 11,000 thetes; and 3,000 metics,—a stunning reduction in the number of men available to fight the war.<sup>9</sup>

At least 216 triremes, of which 160 were Athenian, had been lost in Sicily, and no more than about 100, in different stages of disrepair, were still in the docks at Piraeus.<sup>10</sup> They would be hard-pressed to

<sup>4</sup>8.1.2

<sup>5</sup>The following discussion of manpower and population owes much to the excellent analysis of Barry S. Strauss in his "Division and Conquest, Athens, 403–386 B.C." (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1979), Chap. 2. Other useful accounts are those of Busolt (GG III:2, 1400, with n. 5), Meyer (*Forsch.* II, 149–195), A. W. Gomme (*The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* [Chicago, 1967]), K. J. Beloch (*Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* [Leipzig, 1885]), and A. H. M. Jones (*Athenian Democracy* [Oxford, 1969], 161–180).

<sup>6</sup>2.13.8; for the numbers of metics and thetes, see Strauss, "Division and Conquest."

<sup>7</sup>3.87.3; 2.49.7–8; Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 71.

<sup>8</sup>Such are the very plausible estimates of Busolt (GG III:2, 1400).

<sup>9</sup>These estimates derive from the figures given above and from the arguments in Strauss, "Division and Conquest," 72–91.

<sup>10</sup>Busolt, GG III:2, 1400–1401; 1401, n. 1.

find crews, even unskilled and inexperienced ones, from the available thetes. Perhaps as serious a problem was the lack of money to repair the ships, build new ones, and pay their crews. Thucydides' statement that the Athenians "saw no money in the treasury" is probably rhetorical.<sup>11</sup> But from the approximately 5,000 talents available in the public treasury in 431 (excluding the 1,000 talents set aside for extreme emergency "in case the enemy should attack the city with a fleet"<sup>12</sup>), surely fewer than 500 talents remained in 413.<sup>13</sup> Nor could Athens hope to replenish its funds with increased income from the empire. The defeat in Sicily would likely cause rebellions that would reduce tribute payments and increase expenses by requiring expeditions to subdue the uprisings.

At the same time, the domestic economy of Athens was badly hurt. The Spartan fort at Decelea wore the Athenians down financially as well as physically and psychologically. They lost more than 20,000 slaves, they were prevented from working their silver mines, their capacity to use any of their farmland was reduced, and their houses in the country were stripped and stolen by the Boeotians along with any cattle and pack animals that could not be removed to Euboea for safekeeping. They had to import what they needed by a longer route, which increased its cost, and they had to support an armed force needed to guard the walls night and day.<sup>14</sup> Deprived of their means of livelihood, more citizens were compelled to crowd into the city. The increased demand for and the higher cost of importing food and other necessities could not fail to drive up prices. This put a further strain on the public treasury, for the state somehow had to support the needy widows and orphans created by the war.<sup>15</sup>

The propertied classes also suffered from the misfortunes of war. They, too, were compelled to abandon the farms that provided their income, and their houses were vandalized by the marauding Boeotians. We have some clues to the strain they felt. The trierarchy, a public service that the wealthier Athenians performed in turn, required the

<sup>11</sup>8.1.2.

<sup>12</sup>2.24.1.

<sup>13</sup>The authors of *ATL* (III, 358) say: "It is evident that in 414 the reserve fund in the treasury of Athena and of the Other Gods must have been once more reduced to the low figure of 422." The figure they give for the year 422 is 444 talents (III, 344, n. 94).

<sup>14</sup>7.27.3-28.2; Kagan, *Peace of Nicias*, 291-292.

<sup>15</sup>The best discussion of Athens' economic difficulties at this time is that of Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1404-1408.

men appointed trierarchs not only to command a warship but also to fit it out and even to supplement the pay of its rowers. Until the Sicilian expedition, one trierarch had always been appointed for each ship, but soon after the disaster the syntrierarchy was introduced, allowing two men to share the expense.<sup>16</sup> By the end of the war, and perhaps as early as 413, a similar sharing was introduced for the liturgy that provided choruses for dramatic performances.<sup>17</sup> Men of sufficient wealth to perform basic military and religious services for the state were clearly in short supply, so there was little help to be expected from the imposition of the direct war tax, the *eisphora*. We can be sure of only one such levy, in 428, which raised 200 talents, apparently as much as could be collected.<sup>18</sup> The *eisphora* may have been levied again in the years before 425 and, perhaps, also to send reinforcements to Sicily.<sup>19</sup> After the fortification of Decelea, the thorough devastation of Attica, and the Sicilian disaster, the imposition of a direct tax on the reduced fortunes of the Athenian middle and upper classes would have paid for few costs of the war at great expense to morale. The Athenians appear not to have resorted to it again until the very last years of the war, after the emergency reserve fund had been exhausted.<sup>20</sup>

Apart from the shortage of men, ships, and money, Athens also lacked leadership, both military and political. The Sicilian expedition had carried off Athens' most experienced and ablest generals: Demosthenes, Lamachus, Nicias, and Eurymedon. None of the other four generals in 413/12 whose names we know appears to have held a previous command. Alcibiades was in exile in Sparta, the men on whom Athens had relied to command its forces on land and sea were gone, and no one of comparable experience and demonstrated ability was at hand.

The vacuum in political leadership was just as great. Athens' leading politician, Nicias, was dead; Alcibiades and Hyperbolus were in exile; and the demagogues who had supported the Sicilian venture were in

<sup>16</sup>For the responsibilities and expenses of the trierarchy, see 6.31.3; Lysias 32.24; M. Amit, *Athens and the Sea* (Brussels, 1965), 103–115; and J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships, 900–322 B.C.* (Cambridge, 1968), 260–263. For the date of the introduction of the syntrierarchy, see B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (Berkeley, 1975), 70–72.

<sup>17</sup>Scholion to Aristoph., *Frogs* 404; Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1405, n. 1.

<sup>18</sup>3.19.1; Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 144–145.

<sup>19</sup>Such are the suggestions of R. Thomsen, *Eisphora* (Copenhagen, 1964), 172–175.

<sup>20</sup>I accept the argument of Beloch, *AP*, 66 endorsed by Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1407, n. 1. Cf., however, Thomsen, *Eisphora*, 175.



disrepute. In these circumstances, the Athenians invented a new device to provide guidance and stability to their government. They voted "to elect a board of older men to serve as *probouloi*, offering advice and proposing legislation, concerning current problems as the situation may require."<sup>21</sup> There were ten *probouloi*, one from each tribe, and their minimum age was probably forty.<sup>22</sup> Their powers and responsibilities are unclear and were probably never precisely defined. If Thucydides' language is taken most literally and legalistically, they apparently had the power to present a bill to the assembly, thereby replacing the council in this primary function. Some scholars have taken this view of the *probouloi* controlling or replacing the council.<sup>23</sup> But another idea is that the *probouloi* worked together with the council and were really "a sub-committee of the larger body."<sup>24</sup> Others would give them even greater powers, including those of the Prytanies to call meetings of the council and to set its agenda and control the administration of funds, especially in regard to the preparation of the fleet.<sup>25</sup> Belief in these broader powers is not securely based, resting on interpretations of passages in Aristophanes.<sup>26</sup> No one doubts, however, that their unique status, the unusually high minimum age for the office, the fact of their election, their unlimited term of office, and the very vagueness and generality of their commission gave the *probouloi* unprecedented influence and power.

The election of *probouloi* changed the character and function of Athens' normal democratic constitution. Aristotle, moreover, regarded the institution of *probouloi* as an oligarchic element in any constitution.<sup>27</sup> Some scholars, therefore, influenced also by the knowledge that the *probouloi* played a role in the introduction of the oligarchic constitution of the Four Hundred in 411, believe that their election in 413 was already a movement toward oligarchy.<sup>28</sup> There is, however, no reason

<sup>21</sup>This is my translation and interpretation of 8.1.3: καὶ ἀρχὴν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἐλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ἦ προβουλευσούντων.

<sup>22</sup>For ancient sources, see Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1409, n. 1. Modern discussions of the *probouloi* are F. D. Smith, *Athenian Political Commissions* (Chicago, 1920), 32–41; and H. Schaefer, *PW* XLV (1957), 1222–1231.

<sup>23</sup>P. Cloché speaks of control (*REG* XXXV [1922], 279) and G. Glotz of replacement (*HG* II, 708).

<sup>24</sup>R. A. De Laix, *Probouleusis at Athens* (Berkeley, Calif., 1973), 32.

<sup>25</sup>Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1409–1410.

<sup>26</sup>*Lysis*. 410–610, 980–1012.

<sup>27</sup>*Pol.* 1298b, 1299b, 1322b, 1323a.

<sup>28</sup>Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1410–1412; Beloch, *AP*, 65; Hignett, *HAC*, 169.

to believe that the *probouloi* were in any way favorable to oligarchy in 413. The commission was created in a thoroughly democratic way, no doubt by a vote of the assembly, as many special commissions had been created in the past. Because the members were chosen during a great emergency and given unusually great powers, they were not simply appointed by a decree of the assembly but had to stand for election, one per tribe, like magistrates and generals. Unlike the introduction of the oligarchy of 411, no violence or procedural irregularities accompanied the creation of the board of *probouloi*. Unlike the true oligarchs of 411, the *probouloi* faithfully and effectively carried on the war against Sparta. They never took a step hostile to the democracy until the coup of 411. Their acquiescence then by no means impugns their fundamental loyalty to democracy, as we shall see.<sup>29</sup>

We know the names of only two *probouloi*: Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Sophocles, of the deme Colonus, the great tragic poet.<sup>30</sup> But those two *probouloi* give us an idea of the political color of the commission and of the political climate at Athens when they were appointed. Hagnon was born no later than 470, for he was a general alongside Pericles during the Samian campaign of 440; thus he was probably more than sixty years old when he was elected *proboulos* in 413. In 438/37 he played an important role in defending Pericles against his political enemies and in the next year was sent to found the colony of Amphipolis. He led campaigns in the Chalcidice in 430 and 429. He was still active as late as 421 as a signer of the Peace of Nicias and then the Athenian treaty with Sparta.<sup>31</sup>

Sophocles was probably born in 497/96, so he was well into his eighties when elected *proboulos*. He was *Hellenotamias* in 443/42 and general in 441/40. By 413 he had been winning prizes for tragedy for more than half a century and was one of the most famous and revered men in Greece.<sup>32</sup> Like Hagnon, he had been associated and worked with Pericles.<sup>33</sup> Both *probouloi* were wealthy, experienced, aged, and

<sup>29</sup>See Chapter Six.

<sup>30</sup>Hagnon is established as *proboulos* and father of Theramenes by the evidence of Lysias (12.65) and Xenophon (2.3.30). All references to Xenophon are to the *Hellenica* unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>31</sup>Davies, *APF*, 227–228.

<sup>32</sup>For the date of his birth, see *Marmor Parium* 56 and 54 (*FGrH*, II, 239, 1000–1001). For his place as *Hellenotamias*, see *ATL* II, List 12, line 36. For the generalship, see Androtion *FGrH* III, 324, Fr. 38.

<sup>33</sup>V. Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford, 1954), 117–140; Kagan, *Outbreak*, 149–153, 175–177.

certainly, in the context of 413, conservative. But their association with Pericles guaranteed that they were neither oligarchs nor enemies of the democracy. After Sicily there was no Pericles, no Nicias, to provide the prudent, cautious, moderate leadership that now was wanted, so, in effect, Periclean moderation was put into commission. It is revealing of the state of Athenian politics that the Athenians believed they must seek such qualities in an earlier generation, that men in their prime could not be found or trusted to provide it. The coming years would show that reckless demagoguery had not been permanently eclipsed, that oligarchic plots were not creations of the Athenian imagination, so the attempt to find moderate democratic leadership was both poignant and prudent.

Thucydides approved of the Athenian behavior in this crisis, although not without an epigrammatic slap at the ways of democracy: "In the terror of the moment, as is the way of the *demos*, they were ready to do everything with discipline."<sup>34</sup> In fact, the behavior of the Athenian democracy in this crisis seems remarkably Periclean. Pericles, when he feared that passion would interfere with policy in the first year of the war, had used his unmatched personal authority to limit the democracy temporarily by preventing the meeting of assemblies.<sup>35</sup> Now the Athenian assembly, acting in a thoroughly Periclean spirit—determined, practical, restrained, prudent, and economical—voluntarily placed a limit on itself by giving unprecedented powers to a board of respected and trusted moderates in his tradition. "They decided, so far as the situation permitted, not to give in but instead to prepare a fleet, obtaining timber and money wherever they could, to see to the security of their alliance, especially Euboea, and to reduce public expenditures."<sup>36</sup>

The *probouloi* acted quickly to put this spirit into effect. They gathered timber to build ships, and this was possible because they were once again on good terms with the king of Macedonia, their main source of naval timber.<sup>37</sup> They built a fort at Sunium to help protect

<sup>34</sup>8.1.4.

<sup>35</sup>2.22.1; Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 55–56.

<sup>36</sup>8.1.3.

<sup>37</sup>For Macedon as a source of Athenian naval timber, see *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 71 (with Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 314, n. 28); *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 105 = *GHI*, 91, And. 2.11; and Xen., 6.1.11. King Perdiccas, whose relations with Athens had been unstable, was once again allied with the Athenians in 414 (7.9) and died some time between then and 410 when his successor Archelaus is recorded as fighting alongside them at Pydna (Diod. 13.49.1). In 413/12, therefore, Athens could readily get timber from Macedon.

the grain ships that had to pass by while the Spartan garrison at Decelea blocked the normal route from Euboea. They abandoned the fort in Laconia, which had produced disappointing results and was a drain on the treasury, for as Thucydides remarks, "if they judged any expenditure useless they curtailed it in the interests of economy." Most especially, the Athenians in the time of the *probouloi* kept a close watch over their allies "so that they might not revolt from them."<sup>38</sup>

At the same time, they introduced a major change in the manner of collecting revenue from the empire. They abandoned the collection of tribute on the basis of assessments imposed by the Athenians on each allied city; instead, they imposed on the allies a 5 percent duty on all goods imported or exported by sea.<sup>39</sup> One reason for the change was the hope of increasing revenue. The tribute from 418 to 414 has been estimated at 900 talents annually. To equal that figure with the new tax would require an annual value of the seaborne traffic in the empire of 18,000 talents.<sup>40</sup> We cannot tell whether such a figure would be easily achieved, but we may view the problem in another way. The Athenians may have made the change not in the hope of collecting more money than they were already getting but more than they might expect to get from the old system under the new circumstances. After all, they were fearing and expecting defections, some, presumably, from those allies most heavily assessed. The shift in the nature of the tax could mean a shift in how heavily each state was taxed and also which citizens within each state bore the burden. We do not know how the several subject states raised the money to pay their tribute; probably practices varied. Very likely, real property was the basis for internal taxation to provide funds for paying the tribute, at least to some degree. The new tax would shift the burden to those engaged in commerce, who may have been burdened less, or not at all, in the past. Thus new sources of revenue might be tapped. Perhaps, also, subjects engaged in commerce, who benefited so greatly from the advantages of the empire, might be less reluctant to pay taxes and better disposed to Athens. Tax relief for the landed citizens, presumably more restive, might reduce the pressures for rebellion as well as increase Athenian revenue.

In the absence of better evidence, all of this is only speculation, but

<sup>38</sup>8.4.

<sup>39</sup>7.28.4. The change was probably made in the autumn of 413 (*HCT* IV, 402), just when the *probouloi* were elected (Smith, *Athenian Political Commissions*, 39).

<sup>40</sup>*HCT* IV, 408.

we have reason to believe that at least some Athenians in these years were thinking of novel and daring ways to bind the allies more closely to Athens. Early in 411 Aristophanes presented the comedy *Lysistrata*, and in one scene he portrays an argument between the heroine and one of the *probouloi*.<sup>41</sup> Pressed to explain her plan for ending the war and untangling Greece's troubles, she offers a skein of wool as a metaphor for Athens.

Consider the City as fleece, recently shorn. The first step is Cleansing: Scrub it in a public bath, and remove all corruption, offal and sheepdip.

Next, to the couch for scutching and Plucking: Cudgel the leeches and similar vermin loose with a club, then pick the prickles and cockleburrs out. As for the clots—those lumps that clump and cluster in knots and snarls to snag important posts—you comb these out, twist off their heads, and discard.

Next, to raise the City's nap, you card the citizens together in a single basket of common weal and general welfare. Fold in our loyal Resident Aliens, all Foreigners of proven and tested friendship, and any Disenfranchised Debtors. Combine these closely with the rest. Lastly, cull the colonies settled by our own people: these are nothing but flocks of wool from the city's fleece, scattered throughout the world. So gather home these far-flung flocks, amalgamate them with the others.

Then, drawing this blend of stable fibers into one fine staple, you spin a mighty bobbin of yarn—and weave, without bias or seam, a cloak to clothe the City of Athens.<sup>42</sup>

Although it is always difficult to see through the humor of Aristophanes to any factual historical references that may lie behind them, we may agree with those scholars who believe that there is at least a kernel of fact in the comedy of this passage.<sup>43</sup> The joke, at least in part, lies in the extended metaphor that compares the wool fleece with

<sup>41</sup>For the date, see B. B. Rogers, *Lysistrata* (London, 1911), x. Whether the play was performed at the Lenaea or the City Dionysia is not known.

<sup>42</sup>*Lys.* 573–586. I have used the lively and effective translation of Douglass Parker (*Lysistrata*, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1964, 44–45), who identifies the “clumps” as the oligarchic political clubs (91). For the same interpretation see also J. van Leeuwen, *Lysistrata* (Leyden, 1903), 86–87; and Rogers, *Lysistrata*, 72. Andrewes (*HCT* V, 189) believes that the reference is not to oligarchical clubs but more generally to “the professional politicians who monopolize office and evade military service.” The clumps, or as Andrewes calls them, tangles, “represents men who bind themselves together for the sake of office,” not necessarily oligarchs or conspirators.

<sup>43</sup>Probably the strongest attack on the use of Aristophanes as a source of historical information is a well-known article by A. W. Gomme (*CR* LII [1938], 97–109). For a vigorous statement of the other view as well as a cautionary argument as to how the comedies should be used, see Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 231–244, 355–376.

Athenian policy. But the humor is both timely and enhanced if we assume that there really were contemporary Athenians who advocated a generous policy of extending Athenian citizenship to many heretofore excluded. Busolt suggested: "In the necessity of the time there were also voices audible that recommended reinforcing the citizenry not merely by the admission of resident aliens and well-disposed foreigners [presumably non-Ionian members of the Athenian alliance] but also to unite into a commonwealth the cities considered to be Athenian colonies, *i.e.*, the Ionians and the islanders of Ionian speech, by conferring on them citizen rights with Athens."<sup>44</sup>

Perhaps the replacement of the hated tribute by customs duties within the empire was a step in such a direction.<sup>45</sup> But even if that were so, no proposal to share Athenian citizenship was passed, if any was formally proposed. The Greek city-state was too traditional an institution, too closely tied to ideas of common descent and blood relationships, to extend citizenship readily outside its own ranks. Solon, Peisistratus, and Cleisthenes had enrolled new citizens far in the past, but the trend in the fifth century was away from such generosity. Pericles' law of 451 had narrowed the definition of Athenian citizenship to include only those with two citizen parents.<sup>46</sup> The material and psychological benefits that come with imperial power had not made the Athenians more eager to share their advantages since that time. In any case, the year 413 was not the time to try the experiment. The gesture of offering such unusual concessions immediately after the disaster in Sicily, when the Greek world expected the imminent downfall of Athens, would have appeared to be a sign of weakness and would have encouraged rebellion.<sup>47</sup>

Whatever the attitude of Athens' subjects and allies may have been before the Sicilian disaster, however, there can be little doubt of their attitude by 413.<sup>48</sup> "The subjects of the Athenians were ready to rebel against them even beyond their power."<sup>49</sup> Within a year major places

<sup>44</sup>Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1414. Meyer (*GdA* IV, 12) and Beloch (*AP*, 67) hold the same view.

<sup>45</sup>Such is Beloch's suggestion (*AP*, 67).

<sup>46</sup>See Kagan, *Outbreak*, 103-104.

<sup>47</sup>Busolt, *GG* III:2, 1414.

<sup>48</sup>Even Thucydides' harshest critic says "that the mass of the citizens in the allied or subject states were loyal to Athens throughout the whole period of the empire, *until the final collapse of the Ionian War* . . ." (G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *Historia* III [1954-1955], 16, emphasis added).

<sup>49</sup>8.2.2.

such as Euboea, Chios, Lesbos, Rhodes, Miletus, and Ephesus had revolted. The success of these rebellions and the encouragement of others, however, required effective support from outside the empire, and its chief source must be the Spartan alliance and especially its hegemonal city.

Thucydides tells us that immediately after the Athenian defeat in Sicily, the Spartans were full of hope and eager to pursue the war to a successful conclusion. He also reveals that Spartan war aims were no longer what they had been. The Spartans calculated that after the overthrow of Athens "they themselves would safely hold the hegemony of all Greece."<sup>50</sup> It is often true that in war the appetite grows with the eating, and in 413 there must have been Spartans whose goals had changed from freeing the Greeks to dominating them. There had been a core of men holding such ambitions at least as early as 475.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, we may believe that Sparta's victory at Mantinea, the establishment of a permanent fort at Decelea, and the Athenian defeat in Sicily had swollen the number of Spartans who hoped that "they would enjoy great wealth, Sparta would become greater and more powerful, and the houses of the private citizens would receive a great increase in their prosperity."<sup>52</sup>

The growth of this aggressive and ambitious faction in Sparta resulted not only from military success but also from the war's acceleration of trends that were changing the character of Spartan society. The most visible evidence of these trends was the continuing decline in the number of full Spartan citizens. There were some 5,000 Spartan hoplites at Plataea but only about 1,000 a little more than a century later at Leuctra, this in a land that, according to Aristotle, was able to support 1,500 cavalrymen and 30,000 hoplites.<sup>53</sup> This decrease, in part, must reflect a declining birthrate, for the Spartan social and economic system encouraged its citizens to limit the size of their families. Full Spartan citizenship and the honor that went with it depended on the citizen's capacity to provide his share to the common mess. For this purpose each Spartiate was given a public grant of land, but some of the time, at least, this public land did not produce enough to provide the needed portion for the common meals. The more children a Spartan had, the more intense the problem, and the Spartans employed a wide

<sup>50</sup>8.2.4.

<sup>51</sup>Diod. 11.50; Kagan, *Outbreak*, 51–52; Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 170.

<sup>52</sup>Diod. 11.50.

<sup>53</sup>*Pol.* 1270a 29–32.

variety of devices to reduce family size including late marriage, polyandry, and pederasty.<sup>54</sup> The Spartan state passed a variety of laws to reverse the population trend, for its interest was to have the largest number of citizen-hoplites possible.<sup>55</sup> But the attempt failed. Spartiates continued to limit the number of their offspring and to seek to acquire as much private land as possible to supplement the public grant. The Spartan constitution had been created to produce a warrior class of equals (*bomoioi*) adequate to defend its land and people, to fix the devotion of that class to the goal of achieving military glory and honor in the service of the state, and to be free from economic need and economic interests. Ironically, it led to a shortage of manpower, a continuing hunger for wealth, and a growing inequality.

Even as the number of Spartiates decreased, however, the proportion of free men in Laconia who were not Spartiates increased. As early as 421 there were 1,000 *neodamodeis*, helots who fought in the Spartan army and were given their freedom and a piece of land as a reward; by 396 there were at least 2,000.<sup>56</sup> It seems possible that they and their offspring could hope to achieve Spartiate status, for the title implies some kind of citizen status.<sup>57</sup> Another such group were the *hypomeiones*, or "inferiors." The *hypomeiones* are mentioned in only one ancient source early in the fourth century.<sup>58</sup> But there is no reason to doubt that they existed during the Peloponnesian War. They seem chiefly to have been men born to the Spartiate class, brought up through the Spartan system of education, and otherwise eligible for Spartan citizenship but whose poverty prevented them from contributing their share to the common meals. As a result, they were excluded from citizenship, respect and honor.<sup>59</sup> Still other free men outside the body of Spartiates were called *mothakes*. Some of them seem to have been the illegitimate sons of Spartiate men and helot women, but it is likely that others were Spartan-born on both sides but too poor to contribute to the common meals, that is, *hypomeiones*. They would, however, have gone through the

<sup>54</sup>A. Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (London, 1969), 305–306; P. Cartledge, *PCPS XXVII* (1981), 17–38.

<sup>55</sup>For a summary of Sparta's attempts to stimulate procreation, see P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London, 1979), 309–311.

<sup>56</sup>5.49.1; Xen. 4.3.2.

<sup>57</sup>U. Kahrstedt, *Griechisches Staatsrecht* (Göttingen, 1922), vol. 1, 46ff. See also the discussion by P. Oliva, *Sparta and Her Social Problems* (Amsterdam and Prague, 1971), 166–170.

<sup>58</sup>Xen. 3.3.6.

<sup>59</sup>Oliva, *Sparta*, 177–178; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 313–315.



Spartan training and would have been elected to a common mess, their portion contributed by a wealthier Spartan patron.<sup>60</sup> Among those *mothakes* known to us are three men who played a significant role in the Peloponnesian War, the military commanders Gylippus, Callicratidas, and Lysander. That these men of inferior origins could reach positions of such honor and eminence meant that others could hope to do the same, if only they could acquire enough wealth to gain the economic basis for admission to a mess and to full citizenship. The best hope for that was through military conquest. The destruction of the Athenian Empire in the Aegean offered the opportunity for the acquisition of wealth for the victorious Spartans and honor for their leaders. Men who lacked the means for citizenship could hope to gain it through warfare. Men like Gylippus and Lysander, who already held citizenship but whose position of honor and respect was clouded by inferior origins, could hope to improve their status by victory in war. All of these men would provide powerful pressure for a more forward and aggressive policy than was normal for Sparta.

Nor did the drive for "the hegemony of all Greece" lack support in higher Spartan circles. The faction that had been eager to break the Peace of Nicias since 421, that had favored sending help to the Syracusans and fortifying Decelea, must have been riding high after the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily. Agis, still bearing the glory and influence given him by his victory at Mantinea, was at Decelea, enjoying powers unusual even for a Spartan king and eager to increase his reputation and power by pursuing the expected collapse of the Athenian Empire under his leadership.<sup>61</sup>

Those Spartans who traditionally had opposed adventures outside the Peloponnesus, had favored the Peace of Nicias, and had resisted sending help to Sicily and setting up a fort in Attica were certainly less prominent in 413. The pacific King Pleistoanax found his already weak position further undermined by the condemnation and exile of his brother for cowardice at the battle of Mantinea.<sup>62</sup> So he was in no position to provide effective leadership with the cautious policy he favored, especially after Mantinea and Sicily. Yet he and those who agreed with him, normally the dominant element in Sparta, had even

<sup>60</sup>The most important contribution to the above account is the article of D. Lotze, (*Historia* XI [1962], 427-435). Other useful discussions are Oliva, *Sparta*, 174-177; and Toynbee, *Problems*, 345, n. 3.

<sup>61</sup>For the powers and influence of Agis at this time, see 8.5.1-4 and *HCT* V, 12.

<sup>62</sup>5.72.1; Kagan, *Peace of Nicias*, 126-128.

more reason than ever to oppose an aggressive resumption of the war. Athens still held Pylos and Cythera, from which the Athenians could foment trouble among the helots. The presence of growing numbers of *neodamodeis* and *hypomeiones*, although armed to fight in the Spartan cause, must have been the source of great disquiet. Early in the fourth century, Xenophon describes such men as unable to conceal their eagerness "to eat the Spartans raw."<sup>63</sup> No more than fifteen years earlier the danger they presented would not have escaped any Spartan who cared to look. The rise in the influence of Agis and the aggressive men around him would have provided even more reason to fear an undertaking that would move Spartan and Peloponnesian armies far from home and whose success would strengthen their power even more. Although not in a position to prevent vigorous prosecution of the war in 413, the friends of a cautious and peaceful policy could be expected to cause trouble if the expected easy victory did not come quickly.

The aggressive group faced practical problems at once. Building ships would require money, but manning them would cost even more. Raising rebellions in the Aegean and the Hellespont, supporting them against the Athenians, and facing the Athenians in naval battles would require large fleets that might need to stay at sea for long periods, and their sailors would have to be paid. Sparta itself was in no position to provide the necessary forces. The Spartans had few ships and little or no money. They had relied in the past on their allies for both, but the war had done terrible things to the economic strength of the most important allies. Thucydides tells us that Sparta's allies were "jointly enthusiastic" to be rid of the great hardships of the war, "even more than they had been before."<sup>64</sup> But some at least seem to have been less eager than others. The Corinthians stalled when the Spartans proposed to sail from the Isthmus to help the Chians launch their rebellion, asking for a delay until after the Isthmian games.<sup>65</sup>

Even when Sparta's allies from the Greek mainland were zealous, moreover, they were not able to provide the amount of naval power needed to defeat Athens. When the Spartans prepared for the war in the Aegean, they established a quota of ships to be built by each of their allies: 25 for themselves and the same number for the Boeotians; 15 for the Corinthians and the same number for the Locrians and

<sup>63</sup> 3.3.6.

<sup>64</sup> 8.2.1.

<sup>65</sup> 8.9.

Phocians together; 10 for the consortium of Arcadia, Pellene, and Sicyon; and another 10 for the team of Megara, Troezen, Epidaurus, and Hermione.<sup>66</sup> The total aimed at was 100 triremes, a number not adequate to achieve supremacy over the Athenians. But there is reason to doubt that even that quota was achieved. In the spring of 412, only 39 ships were ready to begin the campaign.<sup>67</sup> For the rest of the war at sea there were apparently very few ships sent from Sparta's mainland allies and, even then, only rarely.<sup>68</sup>

The Spartans also put great hope in their Sicilian allies, thinking "they would probably come at the beginning of spring with the great naval force they had already been forced to acquire."<sup>69</sup> In this respect, too, the Spartan hopes proved to be excessive. Thucydides tells us of only 20 ships from Syracuse and 2 from Selinus that joined the Spartan fleet in 412.<sup>70</sup> Xenophon reports that these 22 ships were joined by 5 more from Syracuse, which arrived in 409 in time to help in the defense of Ephesus.<sup>71</sup> The paucity of the Sicilian contribution to Sparta's campaigns in the Aegean and Hellespont may well have been related to troubles at home. A democratic revolution at Syracuse undercut the position of Hermocrates, the greatest champion of Spartan interests and of a forward policy.<sup>72</sup> He was exiled and killed in an attempt to return to power, and his democratic opponents were clearly not interested in vigorous support for a Spartan war far from home after the threat from Athens was gone. In 409, moreover, Carthage launched a major campaign to conquer Greek Sicily, which fully occupied the Sicilians for the rest of the century.<sup>73</sup> The Spartans could not have

<sup>66</sup>8.3.2.

<sup>67</sup>8.7; of them only twenty-one were hauled over the causeway from the Corinthian to the Saronic Gulf whence they could sail into the Aegean (8.8.4, 10.2).

<sup>68</sup>Thucydides mentions five Corinthian, one Megarian, and one Hermionian ship that Astyochus took to Miletus (8.33.1); he tells of five from Corinth, two from Ambracia, two from Boeotia, and one each from Leucas and Pellene captured by the Athenians at Cynossema (8.106.3). Xenophon tells of a naval expedition to the Hellespont in 410 led by Clearchus consisting of fifteen ships manned by "Megarians and other allies" (1.1.36). Diodorus mentions the Boeotians as holding the left wing at the battle of Arginusae in 406, but he gives no figures. These seem to be the only references to the participation of Sparta's mainland allies in the naval war after 413.

<sup>69</sup>8.2.3.

<sup>70</sup>8.26.1. Diodorus (13.34.4 and 63.1) puts the number of Syracusan ships at 35, making no mention of Selinuntians, but Xenophon (*Xen.* 1.2.8) confirms the Syracusan figure at twenty. Presumably, they were the same forces that fought at Cynossema and Cyzicus (8.104–106; *Xen.* 1.2.8).

<sup>71</sup>1.2.8.

<sup>72</sup>Diod. 13.34.6, 39.4, 63, 75.2–9; *Xen.* 1.1.27–31, 3.13.

foreseen these events, but their experience in the Archidamian War might have made them wary. In 431 they had asked their allies in Sicily and Italy for 500 ships and received none.<sup>74</sup> To expect a vast reinforcement, far from Sicily and after the Athenian assault had been shattered and there was no more danger, would, in any case, have been unrealistic.

The Spartans and their allies thus had no prospect of acquiring sufficient ships or funds from their own resources. Realistic hopes of defeating Athens, even after the Sicilian disaster, depended on the possibility of obtaining support from the only source rich enough to produce success, the treasury of the Persian Empire. To gain Persian support, however, the Spartans would have to come to terms with the Great King, and that promised to be no easy task. They took great pride in their reputation as leaders of the Greek resistance to Persia, which dated from the sixth century.<sup>75</sup> In fact, they had entered the war proclaiming the slogan "Freedom for the Greeks."<sup>76</sup> The Persians, however, would certainly demand at least the recovery of their dominion over the Greeks of Asia Minor in return for support of the Spartan war against Athens. It would be difficult for most Spartans to accept the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks as the price of a Persian alliance. The conservative faction was sure to attack such a bargain as dishonorable, but even aggressive Spartans might be reluctant to undo the glory obtained by the Greeks under Spartan leadership by freeing their fellow Greeks from Persian rule. Moreover, the more rapacious among them wanted revenues from the Greek cities diverted from Athens not to Persia but to Sparta. Negotiations for the necessary Persian aid would be delicate, and success was by no means certain.

In 413 there was good reason to think that the Persians might be willing to join in the war against Athens. The growth of the Athenian Empire had come at Persia's expense, driving the Persians from the Aegean Sea and the Hellespontine waterways and depriving the Great King of the Greek cities of Asia Minor and the revenues they produced. Probably more serious than the financial loss was the blow to the pride of the Achaemenid monarchs, each of whom styled himself "Great

<sup>73</sup>Diod. 13.54.

<sup>74</sup>2.7.2.

<sup>75</sup>Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 62–63.

<sup>76</sup>1.124.3; 1.139.3; 2.8.4; 3.32.2, 63.3; 4.85.1, 86.1.

King, King of Kings, King of peoples with many kinds of men, King on this great earth far and wide, etc.”<sup>77</sup>

Even after the Peace of Callias had put a formal end to the war between Athens and Persia at mid-century, hostilities continued, sporadically and at a lower level, in what one scholar has called a “Cold War.”<sup>78</sup> The Persians appear to have violated the peace by supporting rebellions against Athens in Caria, Lycia, Mysia, and the Hellespontine area, and the Athenian penetration beyond the treaty line into the Black Sea appears to have been a counterviolation.

In any case, the behavior of the Persian satrap Pissuthnes in 440 was certainly an act of hostility toward Athens. He made an alliance with the Samian rebels and held an Athenian garrison hostage on their behalf.<sup>79</sup> No doubt Pissuthnes was an especially powerful and independent satrap, as his later rebellion would show.<sup>80</sup> But there is no reason to think he was acting against the royal will. The report that a Phoenician fleet was moving against the Athenians on Samos was convincing enough to make Pericles take sixty ships from the blockading force and sail toward Caria to head it off. Although it never appeared in the Aegean, it may have been intended merely to draw Athenian attention and weaken the effort at Samos.<sup>81</sup> The movement of the fleet would clearly indicate official approval of the satrap’s action. In any case, Pissuthnes’ behavior was neither disowned nor punished.

It was probably soon after the suppression of the Samian rebellion,

<sup>77</sup>For this form of the royal title, see Lewis (*Sparta and Persia*, 78). The Persian kings may even have felt a religious injunction to regain the coastal regions of their empire in Asia Minor; for S. K. Eddy (*CP LXVIII* [1973], 247) the Persian king’s “right to rule all Asia rested on no less a sanction than the will of Ahura Mazda himself.”

<sup>78</sup>Eddy, *CP LXVIII* (1973), 241–258; Lewis (*Sparta and Persia*, 59–61) challenges some of Eddy’s interpretations, arguing, in general, that the evidence for Atheno-Persian conflict is pushed too hard, but he does not deny the reality of some such conflict.

<sup>79</sup>1.115.4–5. Diodorus says that the 700 mercenaries the Samian rebels raised were a gift from Pissuthnes (12.27.3), and there is no reason to doubt, at least, that they were raised with the satrap’s permission, with due respect to Lewis (*Sparta and Persia*, 59, n. 65).

<sup>80</sup>Ctesias 52. He was also of royal blood, the grandson of Darius I (Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 55 and 80).

<sup>81</sup>Such is the suggestion of Eddy (*CP LXVIII* [1973], 250). Lewis (*Sparta and Persia*, 59–60) believes there was no Persian fleet, but Diodorus (12.27.5) and Plutarch (*Per.* 26.1) flatly state otherwise. Even if these later sources are unreliable, the undoubted fact that Pericles believed in the fleet’s reality should weigh more heavily than Lewis’ doubts about a “tight” timetable for mobilizing the Phoenician navy. If there was such a fleet, we can, in Lewis’ words, “hardly acquit the King of complicity.”

perhaps in 437, that Pericles led his famous expedition into the Black Sea to demonstrate Athenian power in the region and, perhaps, to warn the Persians not to repeat the indiscretion of Pissuthnes.<sup>82</sup> Probably no such warning was needed in the 430s, for the failure of the Spartan alliance to support the Samians and the Athenian victory were enough to indicate that the power of Athens in the Aegean was still too strong to challenge in peacetime. Nor should we forget that the coast of Asia Minor was a very small part of the concerns of the Great King, who had troubles and responsibilities all over a vast empire. The perspective in Susa or Persepolis was very different from that in Athens, Sparta, or even Sardis and Dascylium, where Persia's westernmost satraps had their palaces.

The outbreak of a major war in Greece in 431, however, presented the Persians with another occasion to annoy the Athenians. In the spring of 430 factional strife at Colophon gave Pissuthnes the opportunity to intervene again. He sent a subordinate, Itamenes, with some non-Greek troops from the vicinity; Itamenes took the city, driving the friends of Athens into exile at Notium. There, factional quarrels broke out again, one side obtaining mercenary soliders from Pissuthnes. At last the Athenian general Paches arrived, defeated the mercenary army and the pro-Persian faction, established an Athenian colony at Notium, and restored the friends of Athens to control of Colophon.<sup>83</sup> The behavior of the Persian satrap persuaded anti-Athenian exiles from Ionia and Lesbos that Pissuthnes was ready to join the Spartans in the war against Athens, but they were unable to convince the timid Spartan admiral Alcidas to seize a coastal town as a base for a general Ionian revolt.<sup>84</sup> Pissuthnes appears also to have supported rebellions against Athens in Caria some time between 430 and 425, and the Athenians may have retaliated by levying tribute from towns under Persian control on the Black Sea.<sup>85</sup>

Late in 425 the Athenians received striking evidence of the danger to them posed by Persia. One of their generals intercepted Artaphernes, a Persian envoy from the Great King of Sparta. At Athens his letters were translated and read, clearly revealing diplomatic negotiations. The Great king did not know what the Spartans wanted.

<sup>82</sup>For the date and purpose of the expedition, see Kagan, *Outbreak*, 387–389; cf., however, Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 60, n. 70.

<sup>83</sup>3.34.

<sup>84</sup>3.31.

<sup>85</sup>Eddy, *CP* LXVIII (1973), 255–256.

"Though many envoys had come to him, they did not say the same things. If they wanted to say anything that was clear they should send men to him in the company of the Persian messenger."<sup>86</sup> Whatever the problems of communication may have been, there can be no doubt of what the Spartans wanted. As early as 430 they had sent a mission to the Great King to see if "they might persuade him to provide them money and join with them in the war."<sup>87</sup> There were evidently more missions in the interim, but what must have alarmed the Athenians in 425 was the discovery that the Persian king now took the initiative.

We can only speculate about the Persian motives. Perhaps the news of the totally unforeseen Athenian success at Pylos and Sphacteria was responsible. We should remember that all of the Greeks expected Athens to yield after a few years of resistance at most. Little that happened before 425 would have brought that assumption into question, so there was no reason for the Persians to intervene. They could hope that the Spartans would do their work for them, that in due course the Greek cities of Asia Minor would be conquered without much effort. The Spartan surrender at Sphacteria changed all that. The shock destroyed Spartan confidence, allowed the Athenians to raise the tribute and solve their financial problems, and encouraged expectations of a helot rebellion, defections from the Spartan alliance, and an Athenian victory.<sup>88</sup> Darius might fear not only the reaffirmation of Persian exclusion from the Aegean and the Hellespont but even more attacks from a victorious, strengthened, and emboldened Athens.

For the Athenians, the new Persian initiative was alarming. All that had been accomplished by their miraculous success at Sphacteria could be undone if Persia placed its wealth and naval power at the disposal of the Spartans. They therefore sent Artaphernes back to Ephesus on a trireme in the company of some Athenian envoys to the Great King. We are not told the intent of their mission, but it seems likely that they at least meant to improve relations with Persia and prevent an agreement between Persia and the Spartan alliance. Whatever their purpose, it was not achieved, for at Ephesus they learned that King Artaxerxes had died, so they returned to Athens.<sup>89</sup>

Thucydides mentions no further negotiations, but in 391 the orator Andocides spoke of a treaty negotiated by his uncle Epilycus "estab-

<sup>86</sup> 4.50.2.

<sup>87</sup> 2.67.1.

<sup>88</sup> 4.40-41; Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 248-251.

<sup>89</sup> 4.50.3.

lishing friendship forever" with the king of Persia.<sup>90</sup> Athenian orators are notorious for their distortion and even invention of historical information to suit their needs, and Andocides is equally guilty.<sup>91</sup> The evidence of inscriptions, however, lends considerable support to the historicity of the treaty of Epilycus. A fourth-century copy of a fifth-century decree honors a certain Heracleides for his role in helping to negotiate a treaty with the Persian king. Although establishing the probable date and content of the treaty requires an ingenious combination of epigraphical restoration and interpretation, one distinguished epigrapher and historian is confident enough to say: "Few things are more certain in fifth-century history than that the decree honours Heraclides of Clazomenae for helping an Athenian embassy on which Andocides' uncle Epilycus, a member of the Boule, served to negotiate a treaty with King Darius in 424-423."<sup>92</sup>

There need be no surprise that the Athenians moved as swiftly as possible to prevent Persian assistance to Sparta. By the end of 424, Brasidas had taken Amphipolis and was threatening to disrupt the entire Thracian-Macedonian region of the Athenian Empire. Persian support in ships and money would liberate Brasidas from reliance on the untrustworthy king of Macedonia and unleash him for further conquests, perhaps even for a march eastwards to the Hellespont. Such a terrifying prospect easily explains why the Athenians rushed to make terms even with the newly enthroned and very insecure king of Persia, Darius II.

The confusion resulting from the death of Artaxerxes I has led one scholar to speak of the ensuing period as the "Year of the Four Em-

<sup>90</sup>And. 3.29.

<sup>91</sup>Andrewes, *Historia X* (1961), 2-3.

<sup>92</sup>Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 135. The most important inscription is IG II<sup>2</sup> 8 = *GHI*, 70. Since the inscription mentions τὰσπονδάς and βασιλέως, the topic is clearly a treaty with the Great King of Persia, who alone is called "the king," without further description. The date 424/23 is established by a set of linkages with officials listed on inscriptions datable to that year set out by H. T. Wade-Gery (*Essays in Greek History* [Oxford, 1958], 201-232). D. L. Stockton's vigorous assault on the major aspects of this interpretation (*Historia VIII* [1959], 61-79) is met successfully by Andrewes (*Historia X* [1961], 3, n. 6) and Meiggs-Lewis (*GHI*, 202-203). There have been several suggestions for different dates ranging from 422/21 to a little before 415. Lewis has evaluated them and has also made good use of evidence from the Persian Empire, including a new tablet from Babylon. He concludes: "I do not think that the current dating of the treaty is obviously wrong, and the new tablet, by advancing the date at which Darius may seem likely to come out on top, usefully relaxes the rightness of the timetable" (*Sparta and Persia*, 77).



perors" in analogy with the chaotic year of civil war following the death of the Roman Emperor Nero.<sup>93</sup> Artaxerxes was succeeded by his only legitimate son, the offspring of his Persian wife, who took the throne as Xerxes II. But Artaxerxes had also sired 17 bastard sons by various concubines, and one of them, Sogdianus, was able to seize the throne and kill Xerxes only forty-five days after his accession. His position was soon challenged by another of Artaxerxes' bastard sons, Ochus, satrap of Hyrcania. Ochus' rebellion was successful, and he took the throne as Darius II, being recognized as king as early as August 16, 424.<sup>94</sup> But 16 bastard sons of Artaxerxes remained, as well as others whose pure Persian blood and descent from the royal family might make them think they had a better claim to the throne than Darius. In fact, he was soon faced with a rebellion, the first of several, led by his full brother Arsites.<sup>95</sup>

In these circumstances, Darius must have been no less eager than the Athenians to come to an agreement. Far from having any interest in helping the Spartans, Darius needed protection against Athenian intervention on the side of his enemies, for Arsites was already employing Greek mercenaries against him.<sup>96</sup> These considerations help explain the treaty of Epilycus and may even lend support to Andocides' version of its terms. The usual view is that the new treaty was merely a renewal of the terms of the Peace of Callias, and so it may have been.<sup>97</sup> However, in the special circumstances of 424/23, both sides may have wanted stronger assurances of friendly relations and noninterference.<sup>98</sup>

From the Persian point of view, at least, the treaty proved opportune. Some time, probably not long, after the defeat of Arsites, Darius faced

<sup>93</sup>Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 73.

<sup>94</sup>Our knowledge of these events comes chiefly from Ctesias (43–51), briefly and generally supported by Diodorus (12.64.1 and 71.1). For an excellent discussion of the difficult chronological problems, see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 70–77.

<sup>95</sup>Ctesias 50–51. Andrewes (*Historia* X [1961], 4) is right to conclude that the rebellion must have occurred "right at the beginning of the reign." Not only is it the first event mentioned by Ctesias after Darius' accession, but "the last sentence of this section joins executions of Xerxes' murderers with the execution of Arsites."

<sup>96</sup>Ctesias 50.

<sup>97</sup>Wade-Gery, *Essays*, 211; Andrewes, *Historia* X (1961), 5; Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 135.

<sup>98</sup>A. Blamire's perception of the situation seems to me to represent the best understanding of the motives of both Athenians and Persians. See his article in *Pboenix* XXIX (1975), 21–26.

another uprising, this time by Pissuthnes, the satrap at Sardis.<sup>99</sup> This rebellion was even more dangerous, for Pissuthnes was the legitimate grandson of Darius I, the experienced and well-entrenched satrap of an important province, and his army included a force of Greek mercenaries.<sup>100</sup> Darius sent a force against him under the three generals, the chief one being Tissaphernes. They bribed the mercenaries away from the satrap, paying off their chief with lands and cities. Pissuthnes was killed and his satrapy given to Tissaphernes. Darius was forced to beat off still another, apparently lesser, threat to his throne some time after 418.<sup>101</sup>

During these troubles Darius must have been glad he had come to terms with Athens, especially between 421 and 415, when Athens was formally at peace and in practice regaining its strength and ambition. After the defeat of his enemies, however, and the establishment of his rule on a firm basis, Darius might look westward in the hope of regaining Persia's lost provinces. But with Athens at peace, Sparta occupied in the Peloponnesus, the Athenian navy in control of the sea, and the Athenian treasury being filled by the increased tribute payments while not being drained by military expenditures, the Persian king could take no action. He must wait for a better opportunity. As one scholar has put it, "had it not been for the Athenian expedition to Sicily, he might have had to wait for a very long time."<sup>102</sup>

An objective and well-informed observer of the scene in 413 might have drawn some surprising conclusions. In spite of the Sicilian disaster, the damage it had done to Athens, and the great enthusiasm of its enemies, the outcome of the war was not much more predictable than it had been at its start in 431. If the Athenians could keep their nerve, limit expenditures, and keep control of their allies, they need not give in, even though the defeat in Sicily provided an invitation for Persian involvement. Unless the Persians were willing to make a considerable investment, the Athenians could not be defeated at sea, and Persia's willingness to pay the price had yet to be demonstrated. No

<sup>99</sup>Ctesias 52. The date can be any time between 423 and 415; H. D. Westlake's arguments for a date early in the reign, in *Phoenix* XXXI (1977), 321–322, are persuasive.

<sup>100</sup>For Pissuthnes' lineage, see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 55. The commander of the mercenaries was an Athenian named Lycon, but as Andrewes (*Historia* X [1961], 4, n. 10) and Westlake (*Phoenix* XXXI [1977], 321, n. 8) point out, his origin is no indication of the policy or actions of his native state.

<sup>101</sup>Ctesias 53. For the date, see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 81.

<sup>102</sup>Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 82.

one could be sure that the Great King might not again be distracted by problems in his vast empire. Even if he were not, there still remained the question of whether his goals were compatible with those of the Spartans. As in 431, no Athenian strategy could guarantee a victory over the Peloponnesians, but even with its reduced resources, a Periclean stand-off was still possible. What was different in 413 was that the possibility of victory was available to Sparta if it could find a way to engage Persian power on its side and use it effectively. That possibility existed, but it would not be easy to realize. In 413 the issue was still very much in doubt, and the key to its resolution lay not in Athens but in Sparta and in Persia.

## 2. The War in the Aegean

The last phase of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides tells us, started with both sides making preparations for it as if it were just beginning.<sup>1</sup> Once again the initiative lay with Sparta while Athens stayed on the defensive, guarded her treasury, and watched over her allies. This time, however, there was no offensive element, not even a measured and limited one. After Sicily, the Athens of the *probouloi* had to be even more cautious than Pericles had been.

Sparta, on the other hand, needed to be more aggressive and inventive, and under the leadership of Agis the Spartans were ready to try. Archidamus had warned that if they went to war in 431 they would pass that war on to their sons, and in 427/26 the old king, at least, had done so.<sup>2</sup> His son, who commanded the Spartans at Decelea in 413, was a more appropriate leader for the kind of war that was now necessary than his cautious and reluctant father would have been. Agis' career before the battle at Mantinea had been marked by misfortune, bad judgment, failure, and even disgrace. He had entered that battle accompanied by ten *xymbouloi*, advisers sent to watch over him, having avoided serious punishment only by promising to redeem his previous blunders by brave deeds in battle.<sup>3</sup> His leadership at Mantinea amounted to a comedy of errors that would have produced tragedy for Sparta had not Agis benefited from the timely restraint of an adviser, disobedience to his absurd orders, and an important tactical

<sup>1</sup>8.5.1.

<sup>2</sup>1.81.6 (Archidamus' prediction); 3.89.1 (Agis' first command).

<sup>3</sup>Kagan, *Peace of Nicias*, 105–109.

error by the enemy.<sup>4</sup> But victory has magical powers to erase the memory of previous error, especially a victory of the magnitude and significance of Mantinea. Agis emerged from that battle a hero, and the disobedient captains were punished, putting the official seal of approval on Agis' strategic genius.

In 413 the Spartans sent him to command their permanent garrison at Decelea, where he enjoyed extraordinary powers. He had full authority "to send the army wherever he liked, to gather troops and collect money. And during this period the allies obeyed him more than those in the city of Sparta, one might say, for having an army under his own control, he could swiftly appear anywhere and inspire fear."<sup>5</sup> Agis, moreover, appears to have been eager to use this unusual power aggressively to extend Sparta's hegemony over the Greeks. Even before Mantinea, there are clues that may indicate his association with the aggressive faction in Sparta, and his behavior at that battle was that of a man given to rash aggressiveness in an attempt to achieve military distinction.<sup>6</sup> In any case, his actions in 413 made clear his energy and determination to advance Spartan hegemony.

Late in the autumn of 413, Agis took part of his army from Decelea and marched northward into Central Greece to the region of the Gulf of Malis (see Map 1). There, he carried off many cattle as well as a sum of money extorted from the Oeteans in payment and revenge for a standing grudge. The Oeteans had attacked and oppressed both the neighboring Trachinians and Doris, the traditional ancestral home of the Dorians, leading the Spartans to establish a colony at Heraclea in Trachis in 426. Heraclea was troubled immediately by misrule on the part of its Spartan governors and by attacks from its neighbors.<sup>7</sup> In the winter of 420/19 Heraclea received such treatment from its local enemies that the Boeotians dismissed the Spartan governor and took control of the city themselves, ostensibly to prevent it from falling into Athenian hands, but the Spartans were angered.<sup>8</sup> It seems clear that Agis' purpose was more than revenge and included the recovery of Heraclea, for that colony was back under Spartan control by 409,


<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 109–132.

<sup>5</sup>8.5.3.

<sup>6</sup>For Agis' association with the aggressive faction, see Kagan, *Peace of Nicias*, 84–86, 90; for his behavior at Mantinea, see ibid., 105–132.

<sup>7</sup>3.92–93.

<sup>8</sup>5.51–52.1.



MAP 1. HERACLEA AND ENVIRONS

when its Spartan harmost, or governor, was dying in battle against the Oeteans.<sup>9</sup>

The Spartans had been eager to found the colony, Thucydides tells us, because of its strategic location, "for a fleet could be equipped there against Euboea in such a way as to have only a short crossing."<sup>10</sup> In light of Sparta's plans for fomenting rebellion in the Aegean, the recovery of Heraclea might seem reason enough for Agis' expedition, but he clearly had larger plans in mind. He forced the Achaeans of Phthiotis and other allies of the Thessalians, probably the Aenianians, Dolopians, and Malians, to pay him money and to give hostages. He placed the hostages at Corinth for safekeeping and used them to try to force their people into the Spartan alliance. The Thessalians objected but could do nothing to prevent the Spartans' actions.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, there is some evidence that Agis may also have gained control of Echinus and the borders of the Gulf of Malis at this time.<sup>12</sup> These actions go far beyond the Spartans' establishment of a colony at Heraclea in 426 and point to the policy of expanding their alliance and power into Central Greece, a policy they would follow early into the next century.<sup>13</sup> The actions also show that in 412 Agis was willing to

<sup>9</sup>Xen. 1.2.18. Andrewes (*HCT* V, 9) suggests that the Spartans regained Heraclea before Agis' expedition, "for if it has remained in Boeotian hands till now Thucydides' silence about this would be hard to explain." But Thucydides never mentions Sparta's recovery of its colony anywhere, so his silence about it, whenever it occurred, remains hard to explain, as are so many of his silences. It is better to believe, with H. D. Westlake, that "the activities of Agis in this area must have included the reestablishment of Spartan control over the important outpost at Heraclea" (*JHS* LVIII [1938], 35). Xenophon says explicitly that the Spartan governor in 409 was called "harmost." H. W. Parke's suggestion that the Spartan governors of Heraclea were harmosts from its founding in 426 is persuasive (*JHS* L [1930], 39).

<sup>10</sup>3.92.4.

<sup>11</sup>8.3.1. Thucydides mentions only the Achaeans among the Thessalian allies. The others, as Andrewes points out (*HCT* V, 9), must be the same peoples who assailed Heraclea in 420 (5.51.1).

<sup>12</sup>The Athenian speaker in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (1169–1170), when asked to make a counterdemand to the Spartans' request for the restoration of Pylos, mentions Echinus and the Gulf of Malis, as well as the long walls of Megara. All of these names are grist for the comedian's mill, for they provide splendid opportunities for obscene double meanings. It is precisely the genius of Aristophanes to provide real contemporary allusions as the basis for his jokes. We know that Pylos and Megara, each of which allows obscene interpretation, were real places subject to bargaining. There is no reason to doubt that the other two references were equally relevant. As Andrewes points out, "it can hardly be coincidence that Agis had been active here little, if at all, more than twelve months before" (*HCT* V, 9).

<sup>13</sup>*HCT* V, 10.

pursue vigorous and aggressive action that went beyond traditional bounds.<sup>14</sup>

Upon his return to Decelea from the Gulf of Malis, Agis received visits from two sets of envoys to discuss rebellion from the Athenian Empire. First came the Euboeans, encouraged, no doubt, by Agis' recent campaign near Heraclea. Agis received them warmly and sent word to Sparta for Alcamenes and Melanthus to lead 300 *neodamodeis* to Euboea. As they were preparing to cross over to the island, another embassy arrived, this one from Lesbos. The Lesbians were accompanied and supported by the Boeotians and were able to persuade Agis to delay the Euboean expedition and support a rebellion on Lesbos instead. The Boeotians promised to provide ten ships; Agis would provide an equal number, along with Alcamenes as harmost, or commander, and his corps of *neodamodeis*.<sup>15</sup> Agis may have been persuaded by the offer of ten ships or by some strategic consideration not mentioned by the ancient sources, but we also suspect that he was much influenced by the Boeotians, whose growing power and strategic location gave them considerable importance in the new situation.

Agis made these decisions at Decelea by virtue of his special powers, but his was not the last word. Two other delegations came to seek Spartan support for rebellions from Athens, but they went not to Agis at Decelea but to Sparta itself. One came from Chios and Erythrae, and, most striking, it was accompanied and supported by an envoy from Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap of Sardis.<sup>16</sup> The other one was composed of two Greeks, Calligeitus of Megara and Athenagoras of Cyzicus, exiles from their home cities, speaking in behalf of Pharnabazus, satrap of the Hellespontine province with his capital at Dascylium. They urged the Spartans to support the rebellions of Greek cities in the Hellespontine region.<sup>17</sup> The most remarkable part of these

<sup>14</sup>Westlake (*JHS* LVIII [1938], 35–36) has suggested an even more ambitious purpose for Agis' actions: "to reopen the land-route to Thrace." This would allow the Spartans to cause defections from Athens in the Chalcidice, to prevent the Athenians from obtaining timber for ship-building in Macedon, and to put more pressure on Thessaly. Since execution of this "northern plan" never went beyond these actions around the Gulf of Malis, we cannot be sure of these grander goals. Nor is there evidence to support Westlake's suggestion that Alcibiades, collaborating with Agis, was the inventor of the scheme (see Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*, 214).

<sup>15</sup>8.5.1–2. For a discussion of the role of harmosts, see H. W. Parke, *JHS* L (1930), 37–39; and G. Bokisch, *Klio* XLVI (1965), 129–239.

<sup>16</sup>8.5.4.

<sup>17</sup>8.5.4–5, 6.1.