
JOEL S. MIGDAL



Explorations in State and Society



THROUGH THE LENS OF ISRAEL

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JOEL S. MIGDAL

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To Ariela and Ethan Tamar and Amram



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My fascination with Israel long pre-dated any writing I did on the topic. In fact, it was not until the middle 1980s, about fifteen years after my first academic publication, that I began to put pen to paper on issues of Israeli state and society. Part of the reason for the delay in research and writing, I think, was that I did not initially trust my instincts. As I explain in chapter 1, the decades of the 1960s and 1970s were ones in which I was coming to terms with the myths I held and those I found in the academic literature about Israel, holding them up to my actual observations and experiences in the country. That difficult process was eased by numerous conversations with others writing honest, original material on Israel, including Myron Aronoff, Baruch Kimmerling, and Aharon Klieman among many others. My debt to them for their insights and good company is immeasurable.

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PART I

Introduction



CHAPTER 1

Myths and Models: The State-in-Society Approach and the Experience of Israel

USING THE STATE-IN-SOCIETY MODEL TO STUDY ISRAEL

The essays in this book develop an unorthodox way of understanding Israeli politics and society and, by extension, domination and change in other societies, as well. Israel serves as a lens, as the title of the book indicates, through which one can view the innards of critical social and political processes determining who obeys and who commands, whose life is marked by exultant privilege and whose by abject subjugation. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and other twentieth-century states, the three central themes of this book—state formation, society formation, and the mutually constitutive roles of state and society—are especially cogent at the dawn of the new century.

I have developed the state-in-society approach in a number of books over the last dozen or so years, in addition to the essays in this book. The questions that I try to get at through the model are fairly conventional. How do particular societies and states end up with their distinctive character? How are the rules that shape everyday behavior determined? Who gains from these rules and who loses? And how and when do these rules and patterns of privilege change?

The search for the answers to these questions through the state-in-society approach begins with the premise that one cannot speak of a singular set of *The Rules*. By "rules," I mean both formal and informal types of sanctioned behavior. No single set of dictates shaping daily life or sorting out conflicting demands on people exists in Israel, or anywhere else, for that matter. Different groups and powerful figures promote a variety of codes that clash with one another. Some of these struggles are contained within a framework, such as state law, that mediates among the different claims through the use of courts or other agencies. But there are differences, too, that go beyond such frameworks of conciliation. It is then the delicate task of individuals and groups to pick

their way through the maze of competing, potentially punitive, claims on their behavior and loyalties. The distinctive patterns that characterize any society come from the outcomes of the struggles over the conflicting sets of rules.

To be sure, the preferences of those groups with multiple rewards and sanctions at their disposal, especially violence, are much easier to discern in the way people actually behave than the rules put forth by weak groups. Still, people's behavior is not the simple product of any one group's preferences—even, as in Southeast Asian cases described by James C. Scott, where that group may be vastly more powerful than others.² The "hidden transcripts" and weapons of the weak, as Scott and others have shown, have some impact, too.³ No, day-to-day behavior is not the simple reflection of the codes and preferences of any single group but is the outcome of the ongoing, if often veiled, struggles among multiple groups. Additionally, the very engagement of groups with each other in the battle over rules continually transforms the tactics, goals, and even structure of the groups themselves.

The state-in-society model, then, does not view the structures of domination as the outgrowth of the intentionality or design of a particular figure or group. They are seen, rather, as constructed by the process of hidden and open conflict of varying sets of rules and their promoters, including the negotiations, networks, alliances, and fabrications that are part of that process. Chapters 2 and 6 focus on precisely this point. They analyze Israel's experience in the clashes over rules, especially as the Israeli state and its place in overall rule making took form.

The state component in the state-in-society approach has two distinct, sometimes clashing, sometimes reinforcing, sides to it—the image of the state and the state's actual practices. The first side leads us to think of the state as yet one more grouping or organization in society, vying in a coherent, unified manner for supremacy of its rules, its laws and regulations, against those of other social groups. It differs from practically all the others, to be sure, in its mass—in the sheer extent and quantity of the sanctions and rewards at its disposal—and the (unreachable) aims of its officials to make it the ultimate rule maker, either devising all the rules itself or determining who else might make some of them in society.

In this sense, its leaders work to create the image of the state as the monolithic, ultimate rule giver, making both the most nitty-gritty sorts of rules, such as which side of the street to drive on, as well as foundational rules, refereeing through its courts and bureaucracy which of society's rules apply when they are in conflict. The state, especially the democratic state, can be strengthened by vociferous conflict in civil society as long as that conflict is contained within the state's foundational

rules. But, if the image of the state—the premise that it provides the framework for resolving conflict—is challenged, as I indicate in chapter 5, then conflict can weaken even the democratic state, as it has in Israel.⁴

For all their aspirations, state leaders' goals of making everyday rules and foundational rules, of creating the indisputable image of the state, can never be, in fact, achieved. Nonetheless, that image of the state is itself very powerful's and involves distinguishing the singular state in two ways: 1) by drawing a social boundary between it (as the ultimate rule maker) and the rest of society, that is, the state-society divide, and 2) by drawing a territorial boundary between the physical space where it claims to make rules and the space beyond its so-called sovereign control. Other states (and the organizations that they create, such as the United Nations) thus end up legitimating and reinforcing the image of the state as the centralized, unified organization establishing preeminence over the population in a given territorial space.

It seems to me that the issues of territoriality and boundaries have received far too little scholarly attention during the last half-century, in part because of the unusual, temporary stability that the Cold War gave to political boundaries, making them seem almost unproblematic.6 And, if the issue of boundaries was not ignored altogether, scholars often assumed that societies shape boundaries, not, as I argue in chapters 6 and 7, that boundaries play critical roles in defining the society. In this sense, Israel, as an important exception to this Cold War boundary stability, serves as an important corrective. Its borders were problematic from the beginning, and they changed radically in midstream. The 1967 war and its reconstitution of the area's territorial boundaries give special insight into the relationship of borders and the strength and coherence of the state in rule making. One key element that the Israeli case suggests is that unstable boundaries create a pervasive sense of insecurity that may push societies into ethnic self-definitions and increased ethnic conflict.

In chapter 7, I discuss how Israel's uncertain and changing boundaries have complicated the efforts of its political leaders to establish and maintain the preeminent image of the state, especially in the wake of the 1967 war, which opened the question of the ultimate shape of those boundaries to endless debate. Indeed, one strain of Israeli social science, from Baruch Kimmerling's classic work on the frontier to Adriana Kemp's recent dissertation on borders in the postindependence era, has put the question of boundaries at the center of understanding state power and its limitations in the case of Israel (as has, too, the important work of Ian Lustick).⁷

The second side of the state moves from what its officials profess, the image of the state, to its actual practices. The move induces the observer to shift from speaking about the state in the singular form, as if it were coherent and unitary in purpose and action, to the plural form, recognizing the state's multiple faces. Here, the fragments of the huge state, the many bureaus and other organs—and the people who make them up—face resistance from other rule-making groups, as well as all sorts of lures from those in other groups to modify the state's singular set of rules represented in the image of the state. In other words, this side of the state involves the practices of its parts in the ongoing struggle among multiple groups over whose rules will prevail. The resulting networks, alliances, and crony relations that are part of the struggle serve to devalue and blur precisely those two boundaries that the image of the state seeks to consecrate—between state and society, and between the state and territory outside its claimed borders. Parts of the state become partners in creating alternative, competing sets of rules that recognize neither the division between state and society nor the sovereign sanctity of the territorial boundaries.

To my mind, the two dimensions of the state, the image of it as well as its actual practices, are distinguishable analytically, but both serve as powerful effects on everyday behavior and forms of domination. The tangible expression of the image of the state in such institutions as the Rule of Law, even in the face of contradictory practices by police and judges and other state officials, acts both synergetically and dialectically with actual state practices. These dynamics have powerful effects on the overall struggle over which rules will prevail and under what conditions. Indeed, the practices of the state cannot be seen as generated independently of the image of the state. As the Friday night Jewish liturgy notes, "Sof ma'aseh b'mahashava tehilah," the final deed (or practice) has its beginnings in the idea.

Why do I think of this state-in-society approach as unorthodox for Israel? As with many newly minted twentieth-century states, maybe even more than for most others, the attempts to understand the distinctive character of state and society in Israel have suffered from what I call heroic-style scholarship. By this, I mean an emphasis by scholars in explaining structure and change in terms of key figures who have a blueprint for what they want and act tirelessly to make that design into a reality. Heroic-style scholarship sees social and political outcomes—how society is structured, who dominates, the path of change—in terms of the intentionality of particular groups or figures; they get what they want. Ironically, this style of scholarship has been as characteristic of the recent, critical scholarship that blossomed in Israel in the 1990s as it was for research in the decades following Independence.

In the early years of Israeli statehood, the heroes found in the dominant scholarship were the *halutzim*, the pioneers and leaders from a

variety of sectors, who, for all their petty differences, shared key Zionist values and norms. The study of Israeli society and politics for most of the half-century after the creation of the state cleaved closely to the conventional social science theories that emerged in the post–World War II period, especially those coming out of the United States. As American political scientists and political sociologists, for example, delved into behaviorism and electoral studies, displacing the older concerns with formal institutions, so too did Israeli scholars follow suit.⁸ Both in the United States and Israel, no scholarly approach was more important than social-systems theory developed by Talcott Parsons and applied to the new states by Parsons's collaborator, Edward Shils.⁹ And, for Israel, social-systems theory provided a way to enshrine in scholarship the role of the heroic *halutzim*.

Far and away, S. N. Eisenstadt towered over the study of Israeli society and politics during the country's first half-century, and he was a key figure in developing this systems-oriented approach internationally. He was strongly influenced by Parsons and, particularly, by Shils's concept of a dominant center transforming divergent normative orders. The seminar on social change that I took with Eisenstadt at Harvard in the late 1960s during my second year of graduate school was the most stimulating and mesmerizing of any I have ever attended. It was not hard for me to understand in later years why he had such a marked effect on several generations of Israeli social scientists. I became a very big fan of his and have remained one to this day, even as I have departed from his type of interpretation of Israel and of social change generally.

The key to Eisenstadt's analysis and to those of his disciples was the integrated character of the Israeli center. This followed Parsons's argument that "the core of a society, as a system, is the patterned normative order through which the life of a population is collectively organized." Criticism of this approach has come from a number of directions, focusing on its functionalism, its insensitivity to conflict in society, and its misbegotten hopes of creating an overarching theory of society. My concern here is with its tendency to overlook critical dynamics of society, imparting a *deus ex machina* quality to social and political change, through its heroic-style scholarship. For Eisenstadt and other early heroic-style scholars, Parsons's patterned normative order was the "Zionist normative consensus" forged by the *halutzim*. That consensus was the glue for an active center, in precisely the terms put forth by Shils, bent on creating a modern society. Eisenstadt wrote,

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the Yishuv [the pre-state Jewish society in Palestine] was that its centre developed first. Its central institutions and symbols crystallized before the emergence of the "periphery" made up of broader, less creative social groups and strata.

This centre—built up through the élitist and future orientations of the pioneering sects—was envisaged as being capable of permeating and absorbing the periphery which (it was hoped) would develop through continuous migration.¹²

This perspective was adopted by Eisenstadt's followers, as well. The most important of these in the study of Israel were Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, professors at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which was also Eisenstadt's academic home. Their first joint work, *Origins of the Israeli Polity*, in particular, proved to be among the handful of truly influential books on Israel in the twentieth century. It emphasized how the center in the *yishuv* coordinated and regulated "the relationships between the subcenters . . . and also cultivated certain values that served as the common normative basis of the subcenters." This statement is almost a classic representation of the social-systems approach and its use of the center-periphery model to outline the process of change in new states.

A number of Eisenstadt's students rebelled against his macrohistorical approach and went on to study for their doctorates under the famous British anthropologist, Max Gluckman. In some ways, Gluckman was the polar opposite of Eisenstadt, magnifying the smallest details of social relations in the African societies he studied, rather than seeking the broad brush strokes for which Eisenstadt was famous in his macrohistorical accounts. Gluckman's students were frustrated by the highly abstract nature of prevailing Israeli sociology. Still, key analytic elements of the social-systems approach present in the writings of Parsons, Shils, and Eisenstadt could be found in Gluckman's work and in that of his students who studied Israel, as well. In Gluckman's words, "The search for the systematic interdependence of customs remains a hallmark of social and other kinds of anthropology. . . ." This was a page taken directly out of the social-systems theory book.

Gluckman and his students saw the direct connection between their anthropology and Eisenstadt's sociology. "It seems to me," Gluckman wrote in the foreword to a book by one of his students who went on to great success in Israeli academia, Shlomo Deshen, "that in the nature of their trade our sociological confrères are concerned to analyse the structure of social systems in terms of certain abstract variables, which have proved to be significant, in determining the interdependence of social roles, groups and categories in an external environment, both physical and politico-economic. . . . They have in this way greatly deepened our understanding of social action, of how people live in societies. . . . "15

Anthropologists, he felt, added a distinctive methodology, a highly detailed, nuanced look at structures, to the work of the sociologists. They also contributed a close study of culture, customs, and beliefs. It is

not surprising, then, that Gluckman tended to focus on the same sort of systemic integration that characterized the work of Eisenstadt, and, like social systems theorists, he sometimes did this at the expense of seeing deep structural conflicts. Note his idyllic account of what he describes as Israel's national dance in one village: "The *hora*—in which I have seen colonels and majors embrace the shoulders of privates, ashkenazi and sephardi—with its whirling circle was the appropriate symbol of the achievement of a new national unity." As was the case for Eisenstadt, Horowitz, Lissak, and others, the heroism of the pioneers, for Gluckman, was in creating the normative consensus that underlay that "national unity."

For all of the serious problems and pitfalls that social-systems analysts found in Israeli society, their approach was one that fell victim to its own assumptions about the inexorable march of social integration. Hidden teleological assumptions ran through the approach. It was the hora, more than, for example, the deep resentment of ashkenazi domination expressed by a sephardi, cited by Gluckman, that overall symbolized Israeli society and foretold its future.

While the social-systems approach dominated much of Israeli scholarship for the first three decades of the country's history, critics and dissidents certainly did emerge, especially from the 1980s on. Again, as in the United States, one strain of criticism came from so-called state theorists who took aim at social-systems (and Marxist) theorists for their failure to take seriously enough the distinction between the state and other parts of society. They were particularly critical of the functionalism of social-systems theories. Stressing the awesome power and autonomy of the state, this approach emphasized its special place in rule making and overall social domination.

A second, and sometimes overlapping brand of criticism, came from so-called critical or "new" historians. Here, fault was found not so much in the theoretical shortcomings of social-systems theory as in the uncritical stance taken toward the founders of Israel and their myths. Ironically, both the state-centered theorists and the new historians developed their own brands of heroic-style scholarship, theoretically reminiscent of the literature they were roundly criticizing. Additionally, a third group of critical sociologists and political scientists, the so-called "new" sociologists (a label pinned on me on more than one occasion), leveled a series of diverse salvos at Eisenstadt and his students. While some of these also reproduced heroic-style scholarship, others opened new, exciting paths in the study of state and society in Israel.

No one was more important among the state-centered critics than political sociologist Yonathan Shapiro of Tel-Aviv University. He truly was a leading light in the study of Israel. Shapiro took sharp aim at the

functionalism of the social-systems theorists, hitting at their inclination to focus on stability and integration, rather than change and conflict. But, in Shapiro and his disciples' elite-driven theories, the heroes simply narrowed from the *halutzim* and their normative order in general to the state founders and leaders specifically.¹⁷ In fairness to Shapiro, his treatment of his "heroes" was much less hagiography than a critical (sometimes, very critical) assessment of their actions. Still, the analysis centered on these men (with a rare woman thrown in), as the molders of the state, and on the state, as the molder of society.

In Israel, the "bringing-the-state-back-in" literature popular in the United States had special resonance. As Shapiro pointed out, Israeli founders brought both the ideology of state socialism and the practices of Bolshevism to the development of the Yishuv. They thus created a top-heavy society in which the top was the institutions that would eventually become the state. Also, the disruption to other social institutions that came through immigration of Jews to the country and the difficulty of piecing together the diverse streams of immigration in effective and powerful social institutions gave the state an unusually privileged status. Lev Luis Grinberg in his critique of the state-centered approach presents its key elements:

The new Israeli state created in 1948 became a strong institution with a significant potential for autonomous action. The state concentrated in its hands tremendous material resources: all capital inflows from abroad and all property "abandoned" by the Palestinian refugees (this included both land and private homes). The state also unified and centralized the authority of the military forces that had recently defeated the Arab armies, and created a large apparatus to absorb the mass of immigrants requiring state assistance.²⁰

The state in Israel, and not the vague conception of a normative Zionist consensus put forth by the social-systems theorists, now became the starting point for numerous analyses of social change and social domination. It was not that the origins of the state itself were not explored—as a new state those could hardly be taken for granted. Indeed, it was precisely the question of origins that engaged Shapiro in his best-known book.²¹ Rather, in focusing on the precursors of the state and then on the state itself, many studies minimized or ignored any sources of authority other than the state as progenitors of sustained, meaningful social change. They tended to focus on the state as a tightly coiled organization that totally dominated the other sectors of society. It imposed order on society and was the source of society's consequential rules. Understanding social action in Israel, this approach maintained, demanded studying the state first and foremost. The particular

character and structure of Israeli society, in this view, came out of the intentionality with which state policies were invested.

One ironic aspect of state-centered theories is that they came into prominence in the 1980s, at the very moment that observers began to note that global forces were challenging state dominance and even sovereignty everywhere. And, in Israel, all sorts of domestic factors (discussed in chapters 5 and 7) combined in the period after the 1967 war with these international forces to diminish the impact of state on society. For these reasons, the impact of Shapiro's state-centered sociology on Israel studies had a relatively short heyday.

Besides the state-centered type of research, the 1990s also brought a second (sometimes overlapping) set of critical works aimed at the earlier research dominated by social-systems theory. Many of these, too, promoted scholarship that tended to attribute Israel's distinctive rules to the intentionality of a powerful group, just as the heroic-style scholarship it so bitterly attacked had. The twist was that the critical works turned the heroes into villains. They did not see the central characters as forging national unity, as the social-systems theorists had earlier, but as a cabal imposing odious structures of domination on weak internal groups and on Israel's neighbors.

The fierce battles over Israeli historiography that developed in the 1990s between the new and old historians, especially regarding the history of the Yishuv and the 1948 war, stemmed in good part from the convergence of academic studies in the early decades of Israel's history with the national myths constructed by actual political and social leaders.²² Works that, wittingly or unwittingly, accepted the teleology of an integrated center and social system suited the purposes of leaders eager for acceptance of their own version of society's "consensus," in Israel's case, the Zionist normative consensus. Heroic-style leadership, after all, made them into heroes. And, in Israel for someone like Ben-Gurion, being a hero could have even a messianic quality to it. The critical sociologist Michael Shalev put it this way: "According to this image," he writes, "the seeds of Israeli society were planted by the vision of the Second Alivah [the wave of immigration in the early twentieth century] pioneers and their translation of this vision into both individual sacrifice and collective action. . . . This account is profoundly conservative. It echoes the official version of history and self-image of the founding fathers."23

The new historians, then, attacked the old studies as much for their uncritical acceptance of Israel's dominant political myths—for their anointment of these leaders—as for the theoretical inadequacy of the social-systems approach. And, in that regard I would have to place myself among these new critics and their rejection of the old way of

doing history and social science in and on Israel.²⁴ Where I part ways with many of the new historians is in the continued use of conceptions of integrated centers and great leaders found in many of their works.

This deficiency of the critical literature is pronounced in books such as Avi Shlaim's The Iron Wall and Joel Beinin's Was the Red Flag Flying There? 25 For all its professions to revisionism and new history, Shlaim's much-touted book is the most conventional (and tired) form of foreign policy analysis, the representation of the entire state and society in particular, single-minded figures. From Ben-Gurion all the way to Netanyahu, and others in between, the story of Israel's relations with its neighbors is the sad tale of the misbegotten designs of single leaders. The revisionism or "new history," I suppose, is in the fact that Shlaim does not like these leaders or their policies. The old hagiography is gone, and we are left with diabolical, calculating leaders. The old hero-worshipping myths are certainly put to rest. But the kind of layered complexity to explain foreign policy in analytic terms that one finds in the works, say, of Aharon Klieman or Michael Barnett, which are far more innovative and imaginative, is wholly absent here.26 The construction and reconstruction of foreign policy goals through the roiling events of Israel's history of international relations and through the interaction of state and society, and parts of the state with each other, are nowhere to be found in Shlaim's oddly staid account.

Beinin is much more willing than Shlaim to depart from old-style high politics in his analysis, moving from a focus on individual leaders to a more class-based account. He asks why Marxist movements were marginalized in Israel in the years surrounding the creation of the state (and in Egypt under President Gamal Abdul Nasser). The answer for the Israeli case takes on an odd resemblance to "pulling-yourself-up-byyour-bootstraps" analytic quality of the mythic-style scholarship. That is, Beinin's answer tends to bore in on the Zionist and state leadership and its deliberate policies as the principal factor explaining the Left's failure. The dynamic of interaction of that leadership with the Marxists is present but attenuated. But the dynamic interaction of the Zionists, both of centrist Labor and the left-wing Mapam Party, with the Palestinians (and the British)—the Zionists and Palestinians were, after all, at war for nearly two years and lived side by side long before that—is entirely analytically absent. Somehow, the redefinition of goals, tactics, and strategy and the restructuring of the parties themselves through the process of Arab-Zionist interaction, in war and in other settings, finds no place in Beinin's analytic construct. It is that sort of redefinition and restructuring that a state-in-society approach homes in on. And, without it, Beinin's story ends up sounding more like a morality tale than a rich explanation of why left-wing parties, such as Mapam, ended so far

from their original Marxist principles. Beinin's readers are left with a shopworn account of the bad guys who undermined class solidarity, rather than a close analysis of how Arab-Jewish interaction reshaped the Jewish left. Indeed, Beinin's work is no less a morality play than the works of the old historians, such as Shabtai Teveth, writing of Ben-Gurion and his heroic exploits.²⁷

Besides state-centered theories and the works of the new historians, a third stream of criticism directed at the old-style scholarship came from the critical or new sociologists. Their critiques have led to vituperative debates in Israel's newspapers, scholarly journals, and academic conferences. ²⁸ Unlike the attacks from the new historians, the barbs from the new sociologists have been directed, not only at the chummy relationship between the "establishment" figures and the Zionist leadership, but also at the theoretical underpinnings of the old theories. It is difficult to cast these critics as part of a single group because their theoretical points of view differ substantially. ²⁹

To take one important example, Shalev employs the tools of political economy to tell a very different story about the Yishuv (and the state) from that of Horowitz and Lissak. Shalev's innovative account of Israel's labor history treats the founders much more critically than earlier works and, at the same time, employs theoretically sophisticated tools. Still, he fails to make problematic the relationship between what these founders intended and what actually occurred. In his account, Ben-Gurion and others maintain their mythically powerful qualities, even as they operate in a complex and constraining environment. These leaders, according to Shaley, had a single-minded goal and achieved it, even if they did have to experiment with various means to do that. A political economy in which the dominant labor group, for instance, both coopted and discriminated against Arab workers was explained by Shalev in terms of the overall goals of the state (or Yishuv labor) leadership.³⁰ To be sure, Shalev wrote about a period in which the labor and political institutions were perched on the top of the social hierarchy. Still, his reliance on the notion of state autonomy provides too easy answers, it seems to me, to questions about complex processes of domination. He tends to miss the most interesting problems by focusing on the strategic goals of the political leaders and their supposed ability to have their way with others who might have leaned toward Arab-Jewish worker class solidarity.

Some of the intricacy and originality of Shalev's valuable book are thus blunted by an approach that tends to see a straight line between state leaders' intentions and the social results, rather than one that takes the process of state-society interaction as important in determining final outcomes. Like some of the other leading books among the new critics, his account has a disturbingly conspiratorial air about it, in which powerful leaders plot what they want and then achieve those aims. For all the originality of Shalev's valuable study, the characters in his story of labor in the Israeli political economy are static, stick figures who maintain fixed goals even in the process of tumultuous interaction over the course of decades. The shortcomings of his work stem less from an ideologically oriented approach (of which Lissak accuses him and other new sociologists)³¹ than from the weaknesses inherent in the political economy theory that he embraces.

For all the problems in a work such as Shalev's, it brought new vigor to the study of Israel. Other new sociologists, with different theoretical perspectives, have also breathed new life into research on Israeli society and politics at the turn of the century. They have taken aim at both the social-systems and state-centered theories of previous decades. They no longer dismiss society as putty in the hands of the state, as an undifferentiated passive periphery shaped by the center or as sectors or subcenters dominated by the state. Works such as Uri Ben-Eliezer's wonderful research on civil-military relations have disaggregated the state in useful ways.³² Among the first and most important figures looking at the interactive effects of state and society was Baruch Kimmerling, my collaborator for chapter 8. His innovative political sociology took the interaction of state and society quite seriously in topics ranging from civil-military relations to competing forms of social and political identity. He was one of the first Israeli sociologists to look carefully at the impact of Israel's domestic Arab-Palestinian population and the conflict with Arabs more broadly on the structure of Israeli state and society.³³ Gershon Shafir, Gad Barzilai, and others followed in his footsteps, opening up the study of Israeli society in new and exciting ways.³⁴

Even among those who do not identify, as such, as new sociologists, one finds exciting accounts of new Israeli voices resisting, combating, or usurping the heroic state. Efraim Ben-Zadok, for example, began his edited collection on the growing power of local communities as follows: "The chapters in this book shed light on a new trend which is likely to change social relations and the distribution of power in Israel in the years to come. Since the early 1970s, local communities and regions began to demand their share of power from the central government and gained importance in the politics of the country." ³⁵ Yael Yishai and Gadi Wolfsfeld echoed similar sentiments regarding the growing power of interest and protest groups. ³⁶ As in the U.S. and European cases, a new emphasis was put on Israel's state as one in retreat from its previous dominating role. ³⁷ It is interesting that even among these new studies of society, analyses often begin with an explanation of how the *old* pattern of state domination no longer holds (implying that, before then, it had stood up quite well).