


Romantic Psychoanalysis

The Burden of the Mystery

Joel Faflak



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*For my sister Pat and brother Jim, who are greater influences than they know;
For my father Joe, who would have been proud;
For my mother Doreen, who is;
And for my partner Norm, who makes me smile and keeps my spirit light.*

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So does the love of a good man, which, above all, forgives most things. This is for Norm.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A* Immanuel Kant. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Translated by Victor Lyle Dowdell. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996. Cited by page number.
- BL* Samuel Taylor Coleridge. *Biographia Literaria; or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions*. Edited by James Engell and W. Jackson Bate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983. Cited by volume and page numbers.
- BT* Friedrich Nietzsche. *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967. Cited by page number.
- Cf* Immanuel Kant. *The Critique of Judgement*. Translated by James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Cited by volume and page numbers.
- CL* Samuel Taylor Coleridge. *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Edited by Earl Leslie Griggs. 6 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956–1971. Cited by volume and page numbers.
- CN* Samuel Taylor Coleridge. *The Collected Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. 4 vols. New York: Bollingen Series: Pantheon Books, 1957–1990. Cited by volume and page numbers.
- CP* Samuel Taylor Coleridge. *Coleridge's Poetry and Prose*. Edited by Nicholas Halmi, Paul Magnuson, and Raimonda Modiano. New York: Norton, 2004. Cited by line and/or page numbers.
- CR* Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. 1929. London: Macmillan, 1993. Cited by page number.

- CWJ* Carl Gustav Jung. *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*. Edited by Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler and translated by R. F. C. Hull. 21 vols. New York and Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953–83. Cited by volume and page numbers.
- KL* John Keats. *Letters of John Keats*. Edited by Robert Gittings. 1970. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. Cited by page number.
- KP* John Keats. *Complete Poems*. Edited by Jack Stillinger. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982. Cited by book, canto, page, and/or line numbers.
- P* William Wordsworth. *The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850*. Edited by Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams, and Stephen Gill. New York: Norton, 1979. I use the 1805 version, cited by book and line numbers, unless otherwise noted as 1799 or 1850, or 1805 to avoid confusion.
- SE* Sigmund Freud. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by James Strachey. 23 vols. London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974; London: Vintage, 2001. Cited by volume and page numbers.
- SPP* Percy Bysshe Shelley. *Shelley's Poetry and Prose*. 2nd edition. Edited by Donald Reiman and Neil Fraistat. New York: Norton, 2002. Cited by page number for the prose works and act, scene, and/or line numbers for the poetry.
- WDQ* Thomas De Quincey. *Works of Thomas De Quincey*. Edited by Grevel Lindop et al. 20 vols. London: Pickering and Chatto, 2000–2003. Cited by volume and page number.
- WL* William Wordsworth. *The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth*. Edited by Ernest de Selincourt. 2nd edition. Vol 1. *The Early Years, 1787–1805*. Revised by Chester L. Shaver. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. Vol 2. *The Middle Years, Part 1, 1806–1811*. Revised by Mary Moorman. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. Cited by volume and page numbers.
- WP* William Wordsworth. *Poetical Works*. Edited by Thomas Hutchinson. Revised edition by Ernest de Selincourt. 1936. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Cited by book and/or line numbers for the poetry and by page number for the prose.
- WWR* Arthur Schopenhauer. *The World as Will and Representation*. 2 vols. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover, 1958. Cited by volume and page numbers.

INTRODUCTION

I tried to arrive at a sense for each text I encountered (it was my private touchstone for when an interpretation had gone far enough to leave for the moment) that psychoanalysis had become called for, as if called for in the history of knowledge.

—Stanley Cavell, “Freud and Philosophy”

An Unnatural Thought

Let me begin with a case study of what I call one of the ur-scenes of Romantic psychoanalysis. The text, to which I will return at greater length in Chapter Two, is “The Ruined Cottage,” composed by Wordsworth in 1797–98 as one of his earliest writings for *The Recluse*. The text opens by describing a noonday summer idyll “Pleasant to him who on the soft cool moss / Extends his careless limbs beside the root / Of some huge oak whose aged branches make / A twilight of their own,” where “the wren warbles.” This “dreaming man,” who might or might not be the Narrator, is only “Half-conscious of that soothing melody.” “With sidelong eye [he] looks out upon the scene,” which seems natural only insofar as the Narrator construes its naturalness (10–15).¹ Indeed, both the dreamer’s “sidelong” suspicion and his “half-conscious” state become symptomatic of a *preternatural* ideality, repeated through the darker scene within the *mise-en-scène*: the separate “twilight” shadowed by the tree’s “aged branches.” From the poem’s opening, there is a counter-signing that leaves its mark yet remains, as we come to find, traumatically untold. This counter-signing propels the Narrator, nonetheless, toward a

different telling. As a representation of nature and naturalness, his perception of things becomes the symptom of his displacement from the scene:

Other lot was mine.
 Across a bare wide common I had toiled
 With languid feet which by the slippery ground
 Were baffled still; and when I stretched myself
 On the brown earth my limbs from very heat
 Could find no rest . . . (18–23)

The passage necessitates overcoming the perceptual and psychological struggle occasioned by the Narrator's separation from his world by *seeking out* and *constructing* this struggle ("Other lot was mine") as the subject's native position. To be empirically displaced from nature and the natural is to live in the world of "dreaming man." The Narrator removes himself from this imaginary realm, but not without first marking its visionary hold on his consciousness.

The Narrator is thus caught between two solitudes of his human nature: a nature that is anything but natural; a humanity that is his natural bourn but that he experiences preternaturally. As the "twilight" within the scene emerges in a clearer—and more clearly traumatic—form, we begin to understand what is at stake in his dilemma. He encounters another displaced wanderer, a Pedlar "Alone and stretched upon the cottage bench," "beneath a shade / Of clustering elms that sprang from the same root" in front of "a ruined house, [with] four naked walls / That stared upon each other" (29–34). The single "root" suggests an organic origin behind the cottage's bleak humanity: however traumatic, this uniformity makes sense of and naturalizes the scene. But the cottage is also spectrally anthropomorphized as a kind of inaccessible primal scene blankly gazing on its own lack of meaning. The scene mirrors the individual psychologies of the Narrator and the Pedlar, but also the subject of their ensuing dialogue: the madness of Margaret and her unremittingly bleak and traumatic life. Simultaneously within and apart from nature, the scene acquires a phantasmal life of its own that compels conversation between the Narrator and the Pedlar in their attempt to make sense of this life, as if to tell the record of humanity itself.

But the attempt to displace the threat of madness in the conversation between men fails, for they become mutually mesmerized by their attempt to make sense of Margaret's life. Their transference prolongs as much as it attenuates madness, and they become desperate to restore a 'naturally' sane state of affairs, which the text from its very beginning is

clear to displace. The trees' uniformly "clustering" shape begins to suggest the psychic fragmentation of multiple personalities. This oppressive psychology prevents either man from connecting the past and present in a meaningful way. Their final reduction of Margaret's life to "spear-grass" marks, ironically, the return in their own psyches of a nature they would rather set aside. This threat of madness—of a sense of profound loss coupled with a traumatic inability to know the truth of one's identity—remains immanent within the text as a part of a nature that will not go away, an incipient madness that is also the title of one of Wordsworth's earliest writings for "The Ruined Cottage."

But whose madness is it: a) Margaret's; b) the Narrator's or the Pedlar's; c) Wordsworth's? According to *The Prelude*, the answer is 'c.' Certainly the trauma of loss had greatly affected Wordsworth by the time he began writing *The Prelude* in 1798. By 1783, at thirteen, both his parents were dead. His political hopes for the French Revolution had dissipated, and he had left behind in France Annette Vallon and their illegitimate child, Anne Caroline, precipitating his 1796 crisis of moral, spiritual, and psychological confidence. This crisis was a primary reason for his expansion of *The Prelude* first to five books between January and March 1804. Coleridge's departure for Malta (he did not return until 1806) left Wordsworth unable to continue with *The Recluse* and provoked a further expansion to thirteen books completed by May 1805, three months after the death of Wordsworth's brother John at sea. Further exacerbating the situation was the strain of his growing estrangement from Coleridge, whose poetic and philosophical support in the mid- to late-1790s had been so crucial to Wordsworth's own creative development. We should not be surprised, then, that at the opening of *The Prelude*, like that of "The Ruined Cottage," the poet stretches himself "in the sheltered grove" (*P* 1.78) beneath an oak tree. Here he is "Cheared by the genial pillow of the earth," but only after recognizing in the "gentle breeze" of nature, "half conscious of the joy it gives," the "redundant energy" of his own "corresponding mild creative breeze" (1.88, 1, 4, 46, 43). The struggle between these forces occasions the text's dialogue between Wordsworth and Coleridge as a phantom-like silent screen to ease the "burthen of [Wordsworth's] own unnatural self" (1.23).

Whatever historical or political contingencies have impacted upon this dialogue, however, become inseparable from the text's crises of psychological representation played out between Wordsworth and Coleridge as the text's coauthors. This transference uncannily replicates the situation of the poet who is both at home and not at home in his 'natural' environment. The struggle to hold these two states in consciousness simultaneously produces dialogue about the state of the self in nature as a

site of traumatic displacement. This crisis of his natural state, at once unnatural and preternatural, necessitates in the poet the struggle to manage his “Unmanageable thoughts” (1.149) in order to gain “clearer insight” (1.238). The text’s problematic empiricism—its struggle to locate the subject in the world—is also an epistemological problem, the trauma of not knowing or being able to comprehend this position. This lack of knowledge is one way of understanding Wordsworth’s description of his “brain / Work[ing] with a dim and undetermined sense / Of unknown modes of being” (1.419–21), the way in which the empiricism of perception itself, as Laura Quinney notes, mobilizes the unconscious as a force with which the mind must then reckon.²

To accommodate this process Wordsworth figures himself as “couched” on the “ground” in “[a] perfect stillness,” “Passing through many thoughts, yet mainly such / As to [him]self pertained” (78–81). In the process he writes one of the first case histories of psychoanalysis, an epochal moment Wordsworth marks by saying that “it is a thing unprecedented in Literary history that a man should talk so much about himself” (*WL* 1:586–87). Both *The Prelude* and “The Ruined Cottage” ‘couch’ the analytical subject within a scene of psychoanalysis built around a past trauma necessitating a cure. All of the elements of the Freudian setting are here: the couch; the scene of ‘stillness’ clinically separated from nature and the social sphere; an analysand and an analyst; the process Freud describes as remembering, repeating, and working-through the past, with its attendant phenomena of repression and repetition; a reliance on the importance of dreams and phantasy as a key to unlocking the secrets of the unconscious; the primal scene as a site of trauma necessitating the analytical process in the first place; the affective and psychic bonding between analyst and analysand in the transference/countertransference. These clinical features, remarkable enough in Wordsworth’s texts, repeat themselves throughout a body of writing that we have come to call Romantic, although this rubric in no way fits the period’s heterogeneity.

For reasons that I will outline in the next section, this book will read differently from Romantic criticism’s recent historical, ideological, and cultural turns, and therefore will not explore a cultural so much as a psychological history of psychoanalysis as it emerges in Romanticism. This is also to say that I employ criticism here, amidst its other valences, as an essentially psychological venture. When criticism returns to the past, it does so by confronting that past’s validity, which is also to say the validity of the return and thus of criticism itself. We wrestle to make sense of the past within the theater of our critical imaginations, where *imagoes* of the past—of the various artifacts, textual or otherwise, that mark the past’s revenance—as well as the *imagoes* of our attempt to come to grips with

this past form parts of the same associative critical matrix within which past and present, while often distinguishable, are nonetheless intermixed. Put another way, in its attempt to make sense of a past that is always traumatically absent to it, criticism is inevitably itself traumatic and thus implicitly psychoanalytical, always engaged in the (im)possible task of remembering, repeating, and working through to some understanding of a past that perpetually shifts with our attempts to comprehend it.

I belabor this explanation of criticism's psychoanalytical nature precisely because my object of inquiry is the emergence *of* psychoanalysis in Romanticism. One of this book's assumptions is that Romanticism's concern with the trauma of self-identity is one of the ways it coheres as an historical entity, but that this historical identity is always subject to the psychoanalysis that is so much a part of its emergence, a psychoanalysis that both consolidates Romantic identity and places it under erasure. I do not doubt that there are clear historical precedents for this emergence somewhere between 1789 and 1832, to name two arbitrary markers of the British Romantic period with which this book primarily concerns itself. The birth of Romantic psychiatry during this period would form one set of both material and discursive conditions for this emergence; mesmerism, which *is* central to this book's concerns for reasons that will later become apparent, forms another.³ Again, rehearsing a material, discursive, or cultural history of these phenomena is not my primary concern here, and those concerned with Romanticism's history will find such a decision problematic, even negligent. A definitive critical history of Romantic psychiatry and its relationship to literature remains to be written, and I applaud whatever can or might be done to write one.⁴ But my present argument is that it is not at the level of history and its materialities, at least not strictly or in the first instance, if one can name such an instance, that Romantic psychoanalysis itself takes shape. And I hope that this book, by addressing itself to *this* phenomenon, will offer some productive commentary on the *impossibility* of writing such a history, despite whatever critical resistances one might otherwise have to this book's methodology. For it is precisely in the nature of psychoanalysis at its emergence in Romanticism to disclaim such a purchase on 'reality,' although it may claim a rather more radical purchase on what we might call 'the real.'

This study takes shape, then, around the issue of how Romanticism constitutes itself as a scene of psychoanalysis to deal with the trauma of Romanticism's search for itself. More remarkable is the emergence of what I will call the scene of Romantic psychoanalysis in the metaphorical and seemingly *unclinical* terrain of poetry, and at a time when in the Preface to *Lyrical Ballads* Wordsworth warns against "frantic novels,

sickly and stupid German Tragedies, and deluges of idle and extravagant stories in verse" (*WP* 735) or Shelley, somewhat later in *A Defence of Poetry*, refers to poets as the "*unacknowledged legislators of the world*" (*SPP* 535; my italics). One of the purposes of this book will be to examine Romantic poetry's anxiety about articulating a language of the psyche that resists articulation, an anxiety that in turn demands psychoanalysis. From early on Romanticism submits the idealism of its visionary and imaginative apparatus to psychoanalysis. Indeed, it is one of my central assumptions that the emergence of this apparatus is concerned with its own psychoanalysis, an idealism that generates its own demystification. Romantic psychoanalysis takes place as part of a monumental philosophical effort to explain human existence. In his early 1799 manuscript version of the Prospectus to *The Recluse*, which was to have contained both "The Ruined Cottage" and *The Prelude* as part of its larger structure, Wordsworth writes:

On man, on nature, and on human life,
Thinking in solitude, from time to time
I find sweet passions traversing my soul
Like music; unto these, where'er I may,
I would give utterance in numerous verse. (*WP* 1–5)

Philosophy, or in Wordsworth's case eighteenth-century British empiricism and early nineteenth-century philosophical idealism, meets poetry and the visionary imagination to produce the hybrid of what Coleridge calls "the first & finest philosophical Poem" (*CL* 2:1034). Yet the moment the poet puts himself on his own couch, he is compelled to confront other facets of his psyche, which makes him irrevocably complicit in his own analysis.

In the texts that stand in for what I will call the absent body of *The Recluse*, the poetry of "dreaming man" gives way to the contemplation of philosophy ("Other lot was mine"), the stance of man "thinking in solitude" in order to figure out what's wrong. But this stance produces "no rest." Instead there is the third "lot" signified by the Narrator's seeking dialogue with an other. This stance is constructed from the sense of the first two being themselves *unnatural* or *preternatural* constructions of the human condition. Psychoanalysis emerges as this third thing, ostensibly as a solution to a dilemma left unresolved by poetry or philosophy, but rather more problematically as the mobilization of uncanny forces in both. Psychoanalysis remains vulnerable to this haunting, which affects the reader in turn as an interloper upon its uncanny terrain. Poetry and philosophy may not have all the answers, but psychoanalysis is equally set

aside as a self-alienating gesture within both. Put another way, once psychology enters philosophy to produce psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis immediately becomes alien to itself. Philosophy turns to poetry, or vice versa, to produce psychoanalysis at the site where thinking man discovers that human nature is neither *human* nor *natural*, his own perception having constellated how this separation manifests itself precisely at the moment he perceives himself to be *otherwise* part of the world.

Hence this book's argument, in short: Romantic poetry, by confronting the unconscious of philosophy, *invents* psychoanalysis. When Freud admits that his case histories "lack the serious stamp of science" (*SE* 2:160) and read more like "short stories" than confirmed diagnoses, he marks psychoanalysis as a seismic confrontation between the reason of philosophy and the phantasy of literature and the literary. This concession responds to the fact, as Freud states in *The Ego and the Id*, that the "psychology of consciousness" understood by philosophy "is incapable of solving the problems of dreams and hypnosis" (*SE* 19:13). Focusing specifically upon the latter, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen argues that "by invoking hypnosis against the philosophy of consciousness, Freud calls up a phenomenon that escapes his own theory of the unconscious." Whereas early on in his writings Freud saw dreams as a rationalizable bridge between conscious and unconscious life, hypnosis, which suspended the consciousness of reason and of philosophy, was beyond explanation. It confronted psychoanalysis with an inalienable part of itself that was at the same time utterly alien and beyond its grasp. Borch-Jacobsen continues by asking, "Could Freud have been trying to tell us that psychoanalysis is not really 'itself' or 'at home' except when estranged from itself?"⁵ The question, especially because of the strange confluence of post-Enlightenment thought, Romantic poetry, and mesmerism that is one of this book's central concerns, leads us to wonder how philosophy and poetry before Freud complicate their own idealisms in an attempt to deal with this blind spot in Freudian insight. Put another way, how is philosophical idealism complicated by Romantic poetry's response to it to produce a psychoanalysis before Freud? We know that the encounter between reason and phantasy is hardly novel to psychoanalysis after Freud, nor is it the exclusive province of Romantic literature. Yet it might be that such an encounter, as it produces psychoanalysis, might be very particular to Romanticism.

One salient fact should galvanize our attention here: Coleridge coined the term "psycho-analytical" in a September 1805 notebook entry, coincidentally the same year that Wordsworth completed his thirteen-book *Prelude* in Coleridge's absence and in place of the missing *Recluse*. Kathleen Coburn first pointed out the neologism in the 1970s.⁶ But

Romantic studies have yet fully to internalize the term's astonishing resonance within a psychoanalytic imaginary that includes, besides Freud, British Romantic poetry, and its relationship to eighteenth-century empiricism and philosophical idealism, especially as all of these are haunted by the specter of mesmerism. What is troubling about mesmerism, as I will suggest in the next chapter, partly explains why the "psycho-analytical" took so long to make it from Coleridge's notebooks into common parlance. Informing this psychoanalytic imaginary is a scene of understanding both articulated and clouded by its own experience, that experience residing, paradoxically, in a traumatic and traumatizing lack of comprehension. Against a "disciplinary closure of identity," Sonu Shamdasani and Michael Münchow argue, "psychoanalysis reveals an unmasterable exteriority encrypted within itself."⁷ Romantic poetry stages this encryption at one of the inaugural moments of psychoanalysis as it is engaged in its own impossible disciplining. Romantic poetry, that is, confronts psychoanalysis as its own impossibility. The "greatest speculative power" of psychoanalysis, Derrida writes, is its "greatest resistance *to* psychoanalysis," a deconstructive gesture within enlightenment Reason that "remain[s] forever heterogeneous to the principle of principle."⁸ Keats will refer to this as being able to live with the "Burden of the Mystery" (*KL* 92), a burden which, as we shall see in the poetry itself, Romantic psychoanalysis 'understands' only too well.

Romanticism and Psychoanalysis

For the sake of argument, then, this book defines Romanticism as a body of writing struggling to find its own identity, what Tilottama Rajan calls a "literature involved in the restless process of self-examination."⁹ A telling symptom of this process is the fact that subjects in key Romantic texts spend a lot of time talking to themselves and to others about the trauma of who they are: the Ancient Mariner and the Wedding Guest, the Narrator and the Pedlar in "The Ruined Cottage," the Narrator and Moneta in "The Fall of Hyperion," Wordsworth in *The Prelude*, De Quincey in *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*, among others. Like Freud, the Romantics undertake analyzing "an unmasterable exteriority encrypted within themselves," a taking in of the world through subjective experience that finds its origins in Enlightenment thought and that leaves the subject bewildered by an attempt to make sense of this subjectivity and thus of the world itself. In this way we can say that Romanticism parallels psychoanalysis, which emerges at the end of the nineteenth century when Freud advocates a talking cure through which his patients can make sense

of their symptoms, hysterical ones in the first instance, such as these symptoms betray a fundamental glitch in the subject's experience of the world. Criticism has rarely observed this parallel, however. Genealogies constructed to link Romanticism and psychoanalysis have tended to diminish Romanticism as an earlier blindness cured by the theoretical insight of a later psychoanalysis. This is to follow Matthew Arnold's observation that, in general, Romantic writers "did not know enough"¹⁰ and so were unable to bring their own insights to proper fulfillment by turning all that mental effort of self-scrutiny outward to public action—to master an "unmasterable exteriority" in order to demonstrate the subject's ability to bring the world under his control. For Arnold, Romanticism evoked something heterogeneous in need of Victorian prescription; and so, compensating (ironically) for his own Romantic past, he treats literature as a body of knowledge that other disciplines need to regulate, a Victorianizing privileging of psychoanalysis over literature that lasted well into the twentieth century.

Freud's own historicization of psychoanalysis betrays a similar Victorianizing impulse. In his 1923 "A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis" he writes that psychoanalysis

did not drop from the skies ready-made. It had its starting-point in older ideas, which it developed further; it sprang from earlier suggestions, which it elaborated. Any history of it must therefore begin with an account of the influences which determined its origin and should not overlook the times and circumstances that preceded its creation. (*SE* 19:191)

The sensitivity about precedents betrays a deeper concern about how this history could or should be written. "For," Borsch-Jacobsen writes, "it remains that Freud *does* oppose psychoanalysis to philosophy, and he found no better way to do so than by calling on a phenomenon that remains estranged not only from philosophy but from psychoanalysis itself."¹¹ That phenomenon, hypnosis, as Freud writes in "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," thwarted "rational explanation" and contained "a great deal in it which we must recognize as unexplained and mysterious" (*SE* 18:115). Explaining hypnotism becomes the Holy Grail of psychoanalysis, the secret mechanism of the psyche that psychoanalysis could claim to make sense of, where other disciplines had failed. Yet hypnotism is precisely what sets psychoanalysis beside itself, marking its fundamental failure to distinguish itself from philosophy and thus to claim the authority Freud seemed desperate to achieve for the 'science' he invented. We can thus read hypnotism back to its earlier precedent in

mesmerism, which will emerge in the present examination as the specter haunting Romantic psychoanalysis in the same way that Freud's theoretical rationalism remains haunted by hypnotism in the early twentieth century. What "sprang from earlier suggestions" to produce psychoanalysis in both its Romantic and Freudian incarnations is an unexplainable suggestibility transacting between subjects, played out in the transference relationship between them.¹² And this transference bears the traces of a subjective interiorization of the world that, by virtue of its dependence on others' similar (or often not so similar) experiences, constitutes a slippery slope of human comprehension.

That literature becomes an equally occult strain of Freud's exploration betrays the powerful cathexis between literature and mesmerism in the cultural imaginary of psychoanalysis that this study explores. The power of the literary, that is, its ability both to conjecture and to replicate the imaginary space of human comprehension, *hypnotizes* or *mesmerizes* both philosophy and psychoanalysis in their attempt to rationalize the subject. We need only remind ourselves of the fact that, even as the child of earlier precedents, Freud both uses his theories to parent literature and uses literature as a scapegoat for his theories. Setting aside for the moment the question of how psychoanalysis itself construes experience at the intersection of literature and philosophy, I would note how this trend influenced the locating of psychoanalysis within literary studies and thus of psychoanalysis *against* literature. In his 1947 "Freud and Literature," Lionel Trilling marks what Harold Bloom calls a "classical" antithesis between the disciplines by recalling Freud's admission that the "poets and philosophers before [him]" discovered the unconscious and that "[w]hat [he] discovered was the scientific method by which the unconscious can be studied."¹³ Again, whatever precedence Freud gives to philosophy or poetry he then takes away by announcing psychoanalysis's scientific precedence over both. Trilling followed Freud's suggestion by arguing that literary analysis needed to become more scientific, which Bloom famously disputed by calling Shakespeare "the inventor of psychoanalysis" and Freud "its codifier."¹⁴ Overturning the precedence, however, doesn't quite get at literature's more disruptive psychic legacy. Whereas Bloom would examine how literature overcomes its own psychic paternity, we also need to examine how literature displaces a theoretical paternity in which the child (theory) has become father of the man (literature). We need to remember, as Ned Lukacher writes, that "Literature is always what philosophy/psychoanalysis forgets in its progress toward the Spirit of Absolute Knowledge."¹⁵ It is this radical sense of literature and the literary that will concern us here.

If “psychoanalysis did not drop from the skies ready-made” but “sprang from earlier suggestions,” one is led to wonder what omissions psychoanalysis has made in suggesting its own history to itself. Shoshana Felman’s 1977 “To Open the Question” has been one of the most effective statements against the master/slave relationship between literature and psychoanalysis. As noted earlier, however, discussions of Romanticism *and* psychoanalysis have nonetheless tended to oppose Romantic literary blindness to the theoretical insights of psychoanalysis.¹⁶ To borrow Felman’s terms, the issue appears to be one of disciplinary hygiene: one studies *either* literature *or* psychoanalysis, but must avoid having one contaminate the “interiority of the other” because “a theoretical body of thought always is traversed by its own unconscious, its own ‘unthought,’ of which it is not aware, but which it contains in itself as the very condition of its disruption, as the possibility of its own self-subversion.”¹⁷ Felman’s account is a telling gloss on the relationship between Romanticism and psychoanalysis in Romantic studies, which has traditionally contained psychic interiority as the privileged site of Romantic consciousness. Northrop Frye and M. H. Abrams, for instance, associated Romantic idealism with the mythopoeic imagination and its ability to overcome political and social disillusionment and to transcend the narrowness of Enlightenment materialism and rationalism. Bloom and Geoffrey Hartman foregrounded how the Romantic transcendental *mythos*, redeeming the mind from natural determinism, in fact produces in the subject a desire to return to a “self-less self” from the alienating *excess* of consciousness, an oddly proto-Victorian answer to Arnold’s later concern about the Romantics.¹⁸

More recent posttranscendentalist versions of Romanticism have thoroughly de-privileged the metaphysics of Romantic interiority. Reading consciousness as a textual effect, deconstruction questions this effect as what Paul de Man called one more “metaphor[] of primacy, of genetic history, and, most notably, of the autonomous power to will of the self.”¹⁹ New historicism internalizes deconstruction’s hermeneutics of suspicion so as to replace what Joseph Litvak calls the “deconstructive abyss” with a “cultural reality” that is “shocking and even painful.”²⁰ Jerome McGann, for instance, has critiqued a Romantic ideology that sublates the material conditions of the human, and hence the materiality of the subject, by repressing history in both Romantic literature and the criticism it valorizes, whether logocentric or deconstructive.²¹ The point, as Clifford Siskin argues, is to historicize Romanticism’s own stake in constructing “a self-made mind, full of newly constructed depths.”²² Such a process maps the shifting cultural contexts within which Romanticism’s various models

of the mind emerged. Recent historical and cultural criticisms, reading the subject as the unstable effect of sociohistorical discourses, are thus committed to demystifying the category of “the subject” in order to avoid reifying any singular account of the psyche or, more accurately, to document what forces have profited from the reification where it has occurred.

This book turns its attention to a psychoanalysis of this spectralizing emergence of the subject precisely as this process marks the emergence of psychoanalysis itself as a radically phantasmal and destabilizing process of nonetheless considerable imaginal and critical power. This is necessarily also to return to the question of agency and interiority, usually figures of false consciousness in deconstructive, new historical, or cultural practice. Mary Jacobus asks the “question of how things get . . . from the outside to the inside—simultaneously establishing the boundary between them and seeming to abolish it”: “What does it mean to call this ‘interiority’? Where is this place that has neither outside nor inside, and by what process does it come into being?”²³ Jacobus draws on both post-Lacanian and post-Kleinian object relations psychoanalysis to argue that interiority, rather than protecting the category of the subject, in fact radicalizes, and is radicalized in turn, by the transference/countertransference between subjects within this space. For our later purposes the work of Julia Kristeva, herself influenced by both Lacanian and Kleinian models, will become central to thinking through this interiority. Via Kristeva’s revision of Freud’s legacy, I wish to return to the ramifications of an earlier criticism’s concern with imagination and mythopoeia as figures of psychic interiority and psychoanalysis and hence to read these figures post-transcendentally.

In *The Psychic Life of Power* Judith Butler argues that the subject is formed from his subjection to “regulatory power” by “producing and exploiting the demand for continuity, visibility, and place.” The subject’s psychic life is determined by power’s “iterability” as the inbred effects of social regulation. This iterability, paradoxically, constitutes the subject’s agency, the way in which power acclimatizes him to its arbitrary nature by repeating itself so as to appear natural or given. However, Butler continues, agency also “consist[s] in opposing and transforming the social terms by which it was spawned.”²⁴ The repetition of power’s effects offers the *possibility* of transformation, not as transcendence, but as the subject’s opportunity productively to alter, recreate, or transgress these effects—as it were, to *denaturalize* their cultural authority. As Andrea Henderson argues in a recent study of how varieties of subjectivity constructed in the Romantic period take on a life of their own, Romantic interiority evokes the “notion of a heart or core in either society or the individual [that] is

threatening because such a core becomes, in both cases, the center of movement or circulation, a place of dangerous fluidity.”²⁵ As I will show in the opening sections of my first chapter, eighteenth-century empiricist models of the mind generate this fluidity as the threat of psychology to the philosophy by which it is generated. This generation of the self at the phantasmal matrix of its own mobilization gives the concepts of the self and subject their own particular power and dark legitimacy.

If Romanticism generates an overdetermined depth model of subjectivity, an interiority inconsistent within itself, then the Gothic is surely the place to investigate its haunting and haunted locus. As Andrew Smith argues, “The Gothic does not merely anticipate the arrival of Freud, it also . . . identifies the inconsistencies and incoherences which govern Freud’s accounts of the unconscious and the uncanny.”²⁶ Indeed, Gothic studies at the present moment, as in the recent work of Jerrold Hogle, David Punter, or Anne Williams, can claim to be one of the most fertile sites for investigating the prehistory of psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic imperatives in nineteenth-century literature and culture.²⁷ Terry Castle considers the Gothic as part of the invention of the uncanny in the late eighteenth century, so that “psychoanalysis seems both the most poignant critique of romantic consciousness to date, and its richest and most perverse elaboration.”²⁸ Castle’s work, like Hogle’s, Punter’s, Smith’s, or Williams’s, helps to rewrite the narrative of progressive enlightenment that has traditionally informed the critical movement from Romantic literature to psychoanalytic theory. Somewhat differently, my approach subsumes the Gothic as a force of destabilizing articulation within a broader investigation of Romantic poetry and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy. In the manner of Williams’s poetics of Gothic, that is, I would trace a *poetics of Romantic psychoanalysis*.

As much as recent ideological interrogations have questioned the reductivism of an earlier transcendentalist view of Romantic interiority, then, it is also possible to read within Romantic texts an immanent self-critique that is already a critique of the ideology that Romantic interiority had been thought to protect.²⁹ Specifically, one can explore this auto-critique in the form of a psychoanalytical apparatus that allows us in turn to reflect on the ideologies generated by the text without reinscribing another ideology. How, that is, can one account for the generation of psychoanalysis in Romanticism before a theoretical or metapsychological framework existed through which to read Romanticism’s psychoanalytical insights? This is to address in Romanticism the radical power of phantasy within the literary imagination that always disrupts the very authority of science and truth it makes possible—the kind of phantasy of truth, for

instance, that makes possible the theoretical distinctions of the Freudian metapsychology. For the current study, to answer the previous question is to frame a set of philosophical and theoretical concerns more than cultural or sociohistorical ones. That is to say, I wish to trace in the emergence of Romantic psychoanalysis the tension between a scientific *consciousness* associated with philosophical enlightenment and a literary *unconscious* associated with both mystification and self-making. Rather than reading either consciousness or the unconscious as the exclusive domain of a particular discipline, however, I read across the disciplines for a particular phenomenology of the philosophical *cogito*, whose consciousness is unsettled by the *literature* or *poetry* of its own unreason, especially as this phenomenology can be traced within literature or poetry itself.³⁰

Ultimately, I am concerned to explore in certain Romantic texts a confrontation with the work of reason, more particularly with reason's tenacious resistance to unreason in the work of the imagination. Romanticism evolves an aesthetic or literary approach to the subject partly because philosophy's systematization of reason is threatened by the psychic determinism of an unconscious that philosophy generates in the first place. This meeting between philosophy and poetry *in literature*, I am suggesting, is the breeding ground of a particular psychoanalytic hybridization of the subject at the encounter of his psychic determinism with his self-making potentiality. By reading Romantic psychoanalysis before psychoanalytic theory, then, one can intercept the discourse of psychoanalysis that emerges within Romantic texts themselves, but intercept this emergence within the broader *philosophical* currents of Romanticism's emergence, the topic of my first chapter. I am not therefore concerned with the 'discovery' of the unconscious *per se*, which already has a rich and complex scholarly history.³¹ Instead, I address how certain Romantic texts attempt to read the effects of the unconscious by evolving a psychoanalytic apparatus for its exploration before Freud. In particular, I want to address how the positivism of Romantic self-discovery unmasks within itself an undecidable encounter with the trauma of not knowing, a trauma that continually turns Romanticism back upon the radically self-making and phantastic terms of its own epistemology. It is Romanticism's gradual acceptance of the radically mythopoeic nature of its psychoanalysis that we can read in advance of modern psychoanalysis' own struggle to return itself to the poetry-making ground of the *cogito*. Although conceding the influence of literature on his metapsychology and admitting the role of phantasy in the psyche's self-constructions, Freud essentially repressed the poetics of psychoanalysis within his confirmed scientism. Romanticism, I would argue, repeats Freud's repres-

sion, but by remaining skeptical about and even psychoanalyzing its terms as antithetical to the very project of inventing psychoanalysis that Romanticism undertakes.

Let me briefly suggest the terms of this invention. Romanticism offers many forms of psychic interrogation that look uncannily like psychoanalysis: Keats's "Large Mansion of many Apartments" or "vale of Soul-making" as metaphors of psychic development (*KL* 95, 249); De Quincey's interpretation of dreams; the repetition of texts in displaced and problematic forms, as in Keats's two *Hyperions*, De Quincey's *Confessions*, or Wordsworth's writings toward *The Recluse*, which repetition constitutes a larger traumatic hermeneutics of self-understanding. One could allegorize these phenomena within a later theoretical framework such as psychoanalysis to produce a psychoanalytical or psychological reading of Romantic texts. Yet this is to assert both a theoretical and historical precedence over literature. Rather than being the nascent form of psychoanalysis, Romanticism has become its unconscious, a receding literary scene within the theoretical mind of psychoanalysis.³² Yet a psychoanalysis *avant la lettre* is equally the primal scene of Romanticism, for in the search for psychic origins the Romantic subject comes to the self-receding scene of his own identity which it is the particular endeavor of psychoanalysis to find.

In *The Order of Things* Foucault argues that the "mere emergence" of "man" as an epistemic category "impl[ies] an imperative that haunts thought from within," an "imperative lodged within thought and its movement towards the apprehension of the unthought."³³ This study will read psychoanalysis archaeologically back through Romanticism in order to find disruptions that manifest the unconscious or "unthought" between them and within the conscious shape of the *anthropos* that they both share. The knowledge Romanticism comes to have of itself suggests what is unthought about its subjectivity. Moreover, within the process of what I shall examine as a Romantic psychoanalysis both *terminable* and *interminable*, Romanticism is frequently blind to its own insights. Yet it also articulates itself within an analytic apparatus that allows it to apprehend these blindnesses without necessarily giving them cognitive shape and thus making them conform to reason. Applying literature to a psychoanalysis that literature generates and always exceeds, this study returns to the future of psychoanalysis in Romanticism, but not as the disciplined child of a later theoretical parent. Instead, I shall argue that Romanticism *invents* psychoanalysis as the struggle for an identity radically divided between its scientific—by which I also mean theoretical and philosophical—and literary or aesthetic impulses.

The Authority of Psychoanalysis

The object lesson of (post-)Freudian psychoanalysis offers a particularly instructive way of reading Romanticism's struggle to avoid the prescriptive terms of its own unfolding. Freud's attempt to make sense of the unconscious suggests a kind of theoretical rationality that in turn evokes his desire for acceptance by the scientific community from which he emerged.³⁴ *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for instance, systematizes the dreamwork in the way that Kant's first critique maps the conscious mind's architectonic:

In the pages that follow I shall bring forward proof that there is a psychological technique which makes it possible to interpret dreams, and that, if that procedure is employed, every dream reveals itself as a psychical structure which has a meaning and which can be inserted at an assignable point in the mental activities of waking life. I shall further endeavor to elucidate the processes to which the strangeness and obscurity of dreams are due and to deduce from those processes the nature of the psychical forces by whose concurrent or mutually opposing actions dreams are generated. (*SE* 4:1)

Yet Freud's scientism seems to overshadow the fact that his metapsychology derives much of its explanatory power from literature and phantasy. Moreover, this scientism is subverted by Freud's case histories, in the same way that Coleridge's case history of a woman's nervous "fever" (*BL* 1:112), as we shall see, disrupts the theoretical authority of his *Biographia Literaria* (1817). In the case history narrative invades science to expose both Coleridge and Freud to later revision. In these narratives both analyst and analysand, as well as subsequent readers, remain vulnerable to an unconscious that escapes narrative's signification itself.

That Freud's psychoanalysis is overdetermined by its own evolving theoretical framework is the point of Lacan's return to Freud, the fact that, according to Jeffrey Mehlman, "Freud's discovery of repression was itself necessarily and constantly threatened with being repressed"³⁵ and that Freud's theories are unsettled by the negativity of the psychological mechanisms they seek to rationalize. Lacan's Freud, Althusser argues, comes before the "fall of psycho-analysis into biologism, psychologism and sociologism," before Freud's radical insights "fall into [the] ideology"³⁶ of Freudianism itself, particularly that of American ego psychology. Yet Lacanianism's demystification of Freud carries its own scien-

tific authority. Frederic Jameson argues that Lacan's work is not "the transformation of Freud into linguistics" but "the disengagement of a linguistic theory which was implicit in Freud's practice, but for which he did not yet have the appropriate conceptual instruments."³⁷ Figuring Lacan as a Victorian who clarifies Freudian blindneses, Jameson inscribes a Lacanian paternity in place of Freud's. The Lacanian theoretical child becomes the father of the Freudian man in order to enforce the hegemony of the de-idealizing signifier.³⁸ Lacan himself writes that "[Freud] is not only the subject who was supposed to know. He did know, and he gave us this knowledge in terms that are indestructible."³⁹

For Todd Dufresne the whole debate is "rotten to the core of psychoanalysis." By *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Dufresne argues, Jung and Adler had defected from Freud's camp and psychoanalysis had gained little scientific respectability. Enter the death drive and the repetition compulsion, ideas "immune to [future] criticism." The death drive is a theoretical ruse designed to insure for psychoanalysis a potent if spectral half-life. Freud's *thanatos* is the crux of a "metapsychology [that] became the delicate inner space of psychoanalysis, a theater or cave from which everything began and will return again and against which nothing truly critical can be said." Lacan plays an important role in this half-life for, "having found the place of Truth empty in light of the deaths of God and Man, [he] nonetheless continued to play the role of resurrected father; like Freud, Lacan occupied a privileged reference point in the transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge."⁴⁰ My purpose generally in this study is to extract from the theoretical endgame Dufresne describes "the delicate inner space of psychoanalysis" in order to explore this space otherwise in Romanticism. At present I would note that a telling feature of "the transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge" Dufresne critiques is the fact that Lacan does not employ case histories in support of his own theory. On one hand, this absence fits with his essential denial of any constitutive subject position. On the other, it occludes the literary dimension of psychoanalysis as self-writing or self-dramatization, protecting it from external critique, or else internalizing a self-critique hermetically sealed within the discipline's private theoretical domain.

This Lacanian hermeticism is symptomatic of another repetition compulsion in psychoanalysis. Following a pattern set by Freud, one way that psychoanalysis has sought to consolidate its authority is by abjecting as occult strains threats to its disciplinary and institutional purity.⁴¹ By criticizing Freud's scientific reductivism, for instance, Jung marked Freud's 'fall into ideology' precisely by rejecting Freud's materialism, just as Lacan displaces Freudian positivism, but to different ends.

Among other disagreements, Jung rejected Freud's medical prejudice against art as a neurosis, because it suggests that the psyche is determined wholly by infantile sexuality or repression. As Jung writes in "Psychology and Literature,"

The reduction of the vision [of the artist] to a personal experience makes it something unreal and unauthentic—a mere substitute . . . The vision thus loses its primordial quality and becomes nothing but a symptom; the teeming chaos shrinks to the proportions of a psychic disturbance. We feel reassured by this explanation, and turn back to our picture of a well-ordered cosmos. (*CW* 7 15:93).⁴²

In Jung's more 'literary' conception of the psyche, the subject finds his identity as it calls to him from the collective unconscious, like the "magus Zoroaster . . . / [Meeting] his own image in the garden" (*SPP* 1.192–93) in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*. But this process of imaginary individuation also offers a self-making response to the psychic determinism of this unconscious, a process of transformation rather than transcendence. By occupying a transitional space between a 'literary Jung' and a 'literary Freud,' Julia Kristeva's writings encrypt a return of Jung through a rereading of Lacan's Freud. The network of theoretical possibilities generated by reading *between* Freud, Jung, and Lacan is remembered, repeated, and worked-through in a Kristevan encounter between psychoanalysis and literature. This encounter reads both dialectically and dialogically rather than hierarchically or antithetically between scientific and literary conceptualizations of the subject. Kristeva (dis)locates the subject between Freud's tempering of the pleasure principle of phantasy by the reality principle of the death drive and the determinism of Lacan's desiring subject, and thus also between Freudian psychic determinism and Jungian self-making, resisting the former and remaining, not unlike Jung, ambivalent about the latter.⁴³

Kristeva revises the psychoaesthetics of Lacan's distinction between the imaginary and the Symbolic, which itself revises Freud's Oedipal schema. The imaginary's narcissistic dynamics dramatize the child's relationship to the Mother as preparation for the subject's inscription *as subject* by the Symbolic intervention of the Father. In Lacan's words this mirror stage "situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction" and mobilizes subjectivity before it is objectified within the language of the Symbolic, which "projects the formation of the individual into history." The mirror stage is a "drama . . . which . . . machinates the succession of fantasies which go from an image of the

body in bits and pieces to a form which we will call orthopaedic of its totality.” But this *imago* is also, paradoxically, the signifier of Symbolic identity as fragmentary and dependent (the child’s separation from the Mother and castration by the Father). The Symbolic is a type of deterministic repetition of the mirror stage (“which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development”), “the assumption of the armor of an alienating identity.”⁴⁴ The paradox is this: the subject inhabits the imaginary only symbolically, but in turn inhabits the Symbolic in only an imaginary manner. Yet Lacan also reads the imaginary as prior to and thus separate from the Symbolic and thus privileges the Symbolic for its significative complexity. Correspondingly, he reads the “fictional direction” of the mirror stage as seducing the subject with the illusion of an autonomy she cannot possess except in a purely hypothetical manner. The fiction and “drama”⁴⁵ of the mirror stage mark self-making potentiality as an illusory dimension that masks Symbolic determinism. The Lacanian subject is both identity-less and trapped by the Symbolic’s arbitrary effects, her own performative and fiction-making power greatly reduced.

Kristeva recuperates this power in the same way that Keats reclaims from the Wordsworthian “egotistical sublime” (*KL* 157) its self-making potentiality. Kristeva recasts the Symbolic as a monological and univocal mode in order to address how the semiotic (her renaming of the imaginary) functions ambivalently *within* the Symbolic. This Kristevan imaginary is a primordial and necessary positing of the subject as a site of generative self-fashioning and *productive* illusion. The Kristevan subject emerges from a semiotic *chora*, an “essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases.” The *chora* functions like the primary processes and registers the drives as “‘energy’ charges as well as ‘psychical’ marks.” As the psychic ‘binding’ of the subject’s instinctual and libidinal “motility,” the semiotic is associated with the infant’s biological attachment to the mother, but also with the intersubjective and imaginary relationship between them. This (m)other is both material and psychic, its identity constituted through “inseparable” semiotic and symbolic modalities “within the *signifying process* that constitutes language.”⁴⁶ Kristeva calls this process *poetic* and associates it with what she calls “the dramaturgy of the drives,”⁴⁷ which both overdetermine and are overdetermined by an unconscious negativity that Kristeva does not read exclusively through Lacanian speech and language. The *chora* re-visions the genetic gradualism of Freudian materialism, yoking the ‘scientific’ subject of Freud’s psychoanalysis to an immanent aesthetic potentiality through which her identity, like the physiological processes of the body, is continually (de)constituted.