

LOUIS MASSIGNON

TRANSLATED BY HERBERT MASON

The Passion of al-Hallaj, Mystic and Martyr of Islam, Volume 3

The Teaching of al-Hallaj



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LOUIS MASSIGNON
1883-1962

The Passion of al-Hallāj

*Mystic and Martyr
of Islam*

*Translated from the French with
a biographical foreword by*

HERBERT MASON

VOLUME 3

The Teaching of al-Hallāj



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NOTE TO THE FIRST EDITION

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[L. M.]

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FOREWORD

THE ten chapters of Section One, composing Volumes I and II, presented a silhouette of Hallāj's life, portraying its features as much as was allowed by the fragmentary state of the sources consulted. We have attempted, in any event, to sketch it with the whole *post mortem* flowering of his historical influence, convinced that the true biography of a man cannot be concluded with his death, and that, isolated from its influences and remote reactions, from the posthumous fruits of its example, a human existence proves to be elusive, unintelligible, and sterile.

Although, as we believe, it is in the gradual radiation of his influence, in the rising flame of his example *a parte post*, that we can perceive him in his incomparable originality, which is the true immortal personality of a man, we do not deny the usefulness in this regard of an examination of his traditional origins and of his intellectual methods. We shall therefore attempt to show the conditions *a parte ante* of his formation and of his growth among the men of his native land and his time. A close analysis of the common elements between Hallāj and certain of his contemporaries or predecessors forms the subject of the chapters of this second section. It sets up a model of his method of doctrinal construction; it is not an assembling in numbered pieces, as in a factory layout, of its separate parts, considered in their individual uses;¹ it is a presentation of their organic structure, a montage intended to convey the functional balancings of the whole.

This presentation is arranged in the following order: I (Chapter XI): Mystical Theology, *tasawwuf*; II (Chapter XII): Dogmatic Theology, *kalam*, *usūl al-fiqh*; III (Chapter XIII): Canon Law and Its Practical Outgrowths, *funū*.

It will give explicit references to other theological and philosophical systems of the time, thereby permitting us better to locate Hallāj in the scope of Muslim thought.

The most rigorous loyalty to his thought has been maintained in this study. I have discarded any descriptive concept that does not expressly belong to the mental experimentation that I have wished to absorb, to reproduce in myself,² and to transpose in French. I must state clearly that

¹ See our *Essai*.

² Cf. on that *RMM* XXXVI, 50-51, 53.

I would certainly not have persevered in this undertaking if I had not tested along the way the truth of certain postulates that I must mention here:

a. There is something in common between words that summarize facts for our memory; the objective authenticity of most of the sensations that they fix in it form the experimental basis of all documentation.³

b. There is something in common between methods of signalization, between the symbols that make the exchange of ideas between men possible: the similarity between individual logical processes, the historical and geographical invariance⁴ of discursive reason: the scientific possibility of coherent classifications, to work toward collectively.

c. There is something in common between the main intents that lead human wills to unite with or to oppose each other: their permanent capacity to choose, their freedom with regard to the motives that the memory stores and that the intellect compares: each person's historical reality.⁵

Finally, I would add that in my judgment the truly sociological element that the "comparative study of religions" must elucidate from each case studied in order to enable comparison is neither the decorative lexicon of events, folkloric themes, and experiences common to everyone, such as birth, grief, and death;⁶ nor the theoretical schematization of problems, philosophical commonplaces, which follow necessarily for all, such as creation, expiation, and judgment;⁷ but⁸ the particular order of real priority in which these questions are grappled with and resolved *hic et nunc*, an order that is different in each case. For it is in this way that one may grasp through parables the main intent of a doctrine, its plan and its aim. In short, this is all that matters to us, this for which we aim.

³ Compare skepticism, either fideistic or nihilistic.

⁴ Compare Lang and Gobineau.

⁵ Compare the so-called sociological monism.

⁶ This is the concern of philologists *sensu stricto*.

⁷ This is the concern of logicians and aestheticians.

⁸ Once these two preliminary inquiries are concluded.

THE TEACHING OF AL-HALLĀJ

XI

MYSTICAL THEOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION: HALLĀJ'S SOURCES

IN every aspect of his life and of his teaching, Hallāj continued to be, by temperament, by education, and by vocation, a man of firm and definite purpose. Not content merely to verify the presence or absence of facts, nor to connect or classify his ideas, he was a man of desire, eager to taste what survives of fleeting things. His method of thought was experimental; it was a mental introspection, making use of the Qur'ānic vocabulary to convey the states of Muhammad's soul, regarded as a model of the true believer,¹ and to convey the intentions required of one to carry out worship.

The question of how far this spiritual position is accepted in Islam can be debated. But what matters to us from the very outset is the fact that Hallāj was specifically a *Muslim*. Not just the original terms of his lexicon and the framework of his system, but the whole thrust of his thought derives from a solitary, exclusive, slow, profound, fervent, and practical meditation on the Qur'ān.² He began by hearing the words of God resound in his heart, as Muhammad himself must have done; by repeating the mental experience of the Prophet.

Many Europeans, failing to make sufficient use of the Qur'ān, have studied Muslim thinkers only "from outside," without entering into the heart of Islam itself. Unable really to become the guests of this still living Community whose members have "desired to live together" for thirteen hundred years, they could grasp neither the radiant structure nor the central interdependence of the lives that their patient erudition dissected.

Indeed, this religious code is the unique lexicon offered to the believer

¹ *Huwa huwa*; not of the saint.

² The Arabic edition of the Bible, reserved for the carnal descendants of Abraham through Ishmael. [The *tasliya*, the basic closing at marriages and at burials: *kamā sallayt 'alā Ibrāhīm*; cf. ms. Fatih, 5381 and this volume, p. 31]. "fī'l-Qur'ān 'ilm kull shay'" Hallāj proclaims (concerning Qur'ān 7:1; 47:19): "In the Qur'ān is the knowledge of all created things": for all things are revealed in it to be perishable; and the Qur'ān, *via remotionis*, attests to the essential mystery of God: *al-Ghayb*.

in the land of Islam, the essential "textbook" of his sciences, the key to his "weltanschauung."³ One cannot overemphasize in a sociological biography the central position that the Qur'ān holds in the elaboration of any Muslim doctrine, even of the most seemingly heterodox one. Memorized by heart in childhood,⁴ the Qur'ān is a real and revealed "world plan" regulating the experimentation, interpretation, and evaluation of every event. It is a *memorandum* for all the faithful, a complete reminder for everyday life, a verbal repository, "the dictionary of the poor." Much of it is also an *enchiridion*, a manual of definitions and guarantees, continually applicable and providing a basis for reflection. Lastly, it is for some a *vade mecum* for the will, a collection of maxims of practical action to meditate on by oneself, focusing attention on the unceasing proofs of divine glory.

The Qur'ān thus simplifies the problem of method for the faithful. This revealed code nourishes memory and inspires action without causing thought to waver for long between the two. This abrupt conclusion of the problem of scientific inquiry, this *tabula rasa* of all foreign experimentation for the benefit of the scrutiny of a homogeneous vocabulary that refers everything to direct and sovereign divine influence made possible in Islam a flowering of *theology* that was as original as it was prolific; just as in Greece, the flowering of *philosophy* sprang from the materialistic physics of the Ionians.

We should like to indicate briefly⁵ here the place that Hallāj's teaching holds in the body of theological systems constructed in the early centuries of the Hijra. "Knowledge," says a famous hadīth, "is a duty, *farīda*, for every Muslim."⁶ In Hallāj's view, the purpose of "knowledge" is not only to transmit to the faithful through the audition (*samā'*) of the laws that it sets forth to govern social life, acts of worship,⁷ division of inheritance, contracts, etc.; nor is its purpose merely to clarify the meanings of the Law, the causal connection between its prescriptions, as an exercise of one's intellect (*i'tibār*).⁸ The purpose ultimately is to find

³ Given once for all; each allusion to the Qur'ān must be verified by using Flügel's *Concordantiae Corani Arabicae*.

⁴ After thirteen centuries of existence, it is only in the last twenty years that the *maktab*, the Qur'ānic school, has lost its force, and only in Egypt. [Note written in 1921.]

⁵ Cf. *Essai*, pp. 309 ff.; cf. pp. 284, 304.

⁶ Makki, *Qūt* I, 129-130.

⁷ A modified Khārijite notion, that of Sufyān Thawrī, Ibn al-Mubārak, and Mālik: *fiqh*: the customary interpretation rightly followed.

⁸ Examination of the "rational reasons" for prescriptions, *'ilal*, so important in Abū Hanīfā, Tirmidhī (mystic), and Ibn Bābūyā (Imāmīte). This is the main idea of *kalām*: the

Reality itself and to partake of it forever by distinguishing it from what is fleeting, from tangible and possible things, conceivable things, and by conforming our intentions from within to the divine Command (*amr*), *hic et nunc*. Its method therefore is not a simple empirical and literal recording (*asmā*) of established customs, of authorized traditions, nor is it a mere rational comparison of well-defined concepts (*ma'ānī*); rather it is a moral self-examination. On the other hand, it excludes neither the use of rational dialectics to conduct discussion nor recourse to traditional authority to define its limits; but it subjects both to a test of interior experimentation in order to check their data and the conclusiveness of evidence by results.

Hallāj is indeed the direct heir, through his masters Sahl and Junayd, of the main idea, conceived by Hasan Basrī when he laid the ground, of the "science of hearts and movements of the soul," *'ilm al-qulūb wa'l-khawātir*.⁹

It is therefore highly fitting to begin an account of his teaching with his mystical theology, which coordinates and governs all of his ideas. If Hallāj concerns himself with describing the outward appearance of things to adjust the contour of phenomena, set exactly according to the rites of worship,¹⁰ it is to show that the divine power (*qudra*) is a simple activity, radically different from the sensible traces (*rusūm, āyāt*) that it leaves engraved upon our memory.¹¹ If he sets forth and contends with concepts, logical definitions and dialectical arguments, it is to declare that the divine word is a really transcendent truth, hidden by the very abstraction (*tajrīd*) and by the discursive concept of God that it implants in our intelligence.¹² If he directs all of his desires through outpourings of love to God, it is to prove that the divine Spirit alone can "fulfill" these desires, can vivify them through the supernatural gift of self, that efficacious sac-

purely intellectual adherence to theoretical truth (dogma) is the whole of religion; it is the view of the Mu'tazilites and of Ash'arī, of Abū Thawr, Dāwūd, and Karābisī.

⁹ *Nīya*, before *'amal*; *sunna* superior to *farīda*. Cf. Tirmidhī, *'Ilal*, f. 196 ff. *Fāsiq* = *munāfiq*. Armawī calls it the "science of *ikhlās*."

¹⁰ *Akhhbār*, no. 6; cf. *supra*. God wants the saint to continue to follow the law, "in order to be able to shine through his works" (Sulamī, 198).

¹¹ *Tanzīh*.

¹² "He is above souls (*nafs* = one's own spirit), for the Spirit (*Rūh*) transcends them in all of His primacy! The soul does not imply the Spirit. O you, let your soul blind if you should look! O you, let your sight blind if you should know! O you, let your knowledge blind if you should understand! O you, let your wisdom (*ma'rifa*) blind, if you should arrive! O you, let your very arrival blind, if you should find Him there! You blind yourself forever concerning the One Who exists forever" (*Shath.*, f. 131).

rifice without which our demonstrations of adoration (*da'wā*) and renunciation, our complete abandonment to the divine will, are of no value¹³ in uniting us with God.

Hallāj deliberately uses a very rich vocabulary drawn not only from traditional sources of the early "science of hearts" movement, but also from the most varied contemporary theological schools: from the Kul-lābiya and Karrāmīya to the Mu'tazilites, from the moderate Imāmites to the Qarmathians and to the experts in Hellenistic philosophy. This is not an effort on his part at syncretism; *it is in the spirit of apologetics*.¹⁴ He accepts and tries out all words in current use; he contrives them in such a way as to recast their definitions, but for the purpose of finally arriving at a choice among the sketched intentions and realized applications. Examples:

a) The quotations and uses of individual terms: *FIQH*: *tawba*, *da'wā*, *qiyām* (Khārijites);¹⁵ *KALĀM*: *nūr al-'ayn*, *khamr*, *hilāl* (Nusayrīs);¹⁶ *sayhūr* (= *bikār*), *āfāq*, *ghāyāt al-ghāyāt*, spiritual *qiyāma*, *jami'* *al-milal* (Qarmathians).¹⁷

b) The appropriation of methods, definitions, and doctrinal distinctions: *NAHW*:¹⁸ *af'āl*, *a'māl* — *shakk*, *yaqīn* — *hāl*, *na't* — *tajānus*, *tajāwuz*, *tajallī* — *ma'rifa*, *nakira* — *majāz* (*maqāl*), *haqīqa* — *mufassal*, *muja-mal* — *maqrūn*, *manūt* — *idmār* — *muhmal* — *la'all* — *mithāl*, *shāhid* — *iqtirān* — *ism manqūs*¹⁹ — *ma'tūf* — *'awāmil*; *BAYĀN*: *in qulta*,²⁰ *man qāla* — *hurūf al-faqīh*:²¹ *waw*, *ilā*, *in*; *faqad ka'annahu*; *lianna*; *famā?*; *mā (lā)* . . . *illā (siwā)*.

KALĀM: (taunts); the *shakk* formula: *'asā' wa la'all*²² — *ism bilā za-mān*²³ — *khatt* (*nuqat mujtami'a*)²⁴ — *lā shajara illā min bizra*²⁵ — *lā*

¹³ Sincere demonstrations of pure monotheism, *da'wā sahiha*, on the part of Satan had, in fact, an opposite meaning (*'aks al-ma'ānī*) to God, Who perceived the pride in them (*Tawāsin* VI, 7).

¹⁴ Cf. *supra* 1, 270.

¹⁵ Old elements borrowed by the students of Hasan from Khārijism.

¹⁶ Three images of the divine *zuhūr*: cf. *Taw.*, 130, 133, 135—with the ritual of the *Kelāziya*.

¹⁷ The theory of cycles making possible the comparison of religions. Cf. Pierre d'Abano's theory of the horoscope of religions. Cf. *Taw.* X, 2.

¹⁸ Cf. Howell, *Grammar* [bib. no. 2087-a], s.v.; *Taw.* XI, 1, 14; *Shath*, ff. 127, 131.

¹⁹ *Taw.* IX, 4.

²⁰ Cf. in the *madnūn saghīr* (cf. *infra*, 3, 301).

²¹ Qarāfi, *Tanqīh*, Qāsimī edition (on *mutūm usūliya*, 44). Cf. *Taw.* VIII, 7-10; X, 7-15; XI, 3-13.

²² Sulamī, on 2:51. Cf. Ibn Sinā, preface to *Mantiq al-mashriqiyyin*, 4.

²³ *Taw.* X, 9. Cf. the Aristotelian definition *lkhwān al-safā'* [bib. no. 2121] II, 107) and *infra* 3, 318-320.

yutaba''ad wa lā yutajazza, Bāk. 47 = Taw. XI, 12 — (traditional words):²⁶ *siṛāj* — *durrat baydā'* — *kibrīt ahmar* — *shirk khafī* — (dialectical methods):²⁷ *mu'ārada*, *mutālaba*, *tahqīq*; rather than *tashkīk* (3rd Qarmathian degree) or *takāfu'* *al-adilla*.²⁸

(Mu'tazilites):²⁹ *qīdam*, *hadath* — 'adl wa tawhīd — *istiwā'* = *istilā'* — *khalq wa i'tibār* — *dhāt* — Allāh Nūr = *hādī*, *haykal* — *nafy al-istithnā* — *tawba fard* — *sihhat imān al-muqallid* — *nubūwa abadīya*.

(Kullābiya):³⁰ *sifāt azaliya* — *sifāt dhāt* (e.g., *kalām*, *irāda*) — *sifāt fī'l-qadīma* — *dhāt mawsūf bisifāt* — *nafy al-maqādir* — *tajwīz* — *kalām nafsi li Mūsā* — *taklīf mā lā yutāq* (= *makr*) — *ridā'*, *irāda* — *ism*, *musamma* — *muwāfa'* — *Haqq*, *haqīqa* — *tā'a muwāfaqat al-amr*.

(Karrāmīya):³¹ *shahādat al-dharr* (= *mīthāq*) — *takhsīs al-qudra* — *Jawhar rabbānī* — *tablīgh (iblāgh)* — *zallāt al-anbiyā'* — *ikhtirām* — *sun'* (*samā'i*).

(Hanbalites):³² *wujūd* = *ithbāt* — *hudūr* = 'ilm (in God).

(Imāmītes):³³ *ism ākhir* — *Mīm* — *ashkhās* — *lāhūt*, *nāsūt* — *burhān* — *zuhūr* — *hijāb* — the twelve *burūj* — *mahall Muhammad* (= *makān*) — *nubūwa azaliya* — *lā sifa wa lā lāsifa* — *nūr sha' sha'ānī* — *ta'yīd al-Rūh* — *ikhā'* (offering of consecrated bread: for the dead) — *tamlīh* — *ghāmid al-'ilm* — *sanā'* *al-lāhūt* — *dhallat lahu al-'umūr* — at the beginning of a letter (*Akhbār*, no. 47 = letter ap. Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz* [bib. no. 2157A-a], 120).

(Khārijītes):³⁴ *isqāt wasā'it al-hajj* — *fāsiq munāfiq* — *madhhab al-as'ab* (tutorism).

(Hellenistic philosophers and physicians):³⁵

a) symbols: circles (*dawā'ir*) — *tinnīn* (= dragon in Syriac) — formulas in sigils on a stave — the breaking up of names into separate letters (*suryāniya*);

²⁴ *Ibid.* (I, 31, 43); and *Akhbār*, no. 4.

²⁵ Ibn al-Mar'a, *Sharh al-irshād* [bib. no. 393-a] III, s.v. "muqaddam." Cf. *Taw.* III, 6.

²⁶ A hadīth already debated in the third century of the Hijra.

²⁷ Cf. Goldziher, Ghazālī's introduction to the *Mustazhiri* [bib. no. 1640-g], 62; and Schreiner, *ZDMG*, XLII, 657-659.

²⁸ Ash'arī reproached by Harawī (*Dhamm*, 130).

²⁹ Cf. *infra*, Ch. XII, II, III, v.

³⁰ Cf. *infra*, Ch. XII, II, IV. Hallāj says "azaliya," like Ibn Kullāb. He was reproached also for using the word "azal" (Baqli, *Shathiyāt*, ff. 160a, 155b, 162b). Ibn Sālīm, Ash'arī, and Māturīdī will say "qadīma."

³¹ Cf. *infra*, Ch. XII, II and XII, v.

³² Cf. Hanbalite 'aqīda of the year 432/1040 (*infra*, Ch. XII).

³³ Technical words of the Nusayris and Druzes.

³⁴ Cf. *supra* with *Farq*, 86. *Akhbār*, nos. 5 and 6.

³⁵ *Tawāsīn* IV, 1; X, 1, 16. Cf. Asin, *Abenmasarra* [bib. no. 1725-a], 63, 69. *Taw.* IX, 1; X, 21. *Taw.* I, 15; IV, 26: probably in the school of the Qarmathians (cf. *supra*) or especially Rāzī the physician.

b) logic and sciences: categories and universals (*jawāhir, kayf, lima 'ayn, matā — jins, naw'*) — *takhyīl — annī (= annīya) — huwī (= huwīya) — huwa huwa — dahr, miqdār — itmām — ta'jīn — 'adad nāqis*³⁶ — *hisbān — khatt al-istiwā'*³⁷ — *khalā', malā' — hadma rūhanīya — qiyām: bi nafsīhi, bi haqqīhi — isti'dād li'l-nubūwa — talāshī — tasārīf, 'ital — jawlān*;

c) A convergence of main intentions: repeated and emphasized ideas:

— Hasan Basrī:³⁸ distinctions: *amr, irāda — sunan, fard — irziqnī*, cf. *Akhbār*, no. 1 (*turziqanī*³⁹) — *taklīf, tafwīd*.

— Ja'far:⁴⁰ *'aqida fi'l-tanzih — God = al-Haqq — commentary on (Qur'an 1:6) "ihdinā" (= urshudnā ilā mahabbatika) — tilāwa of the saint compared to the voice of the Burning Bush — ghamd al-'ayn (Taw. II, 7; VI, 2).*

— Sufyān Thawrī:⁴¹ "the function of the *tahlīl* in the faithful is like that of water in the world" (i.e., to vivify) — cf. "the function of the *basmala* in the saint is like that of the *fiat*" (i.e., to create) (ap. Sulamī on Qur'an 1:1).

— Ibn Adham:⁴² *Ilāh al-ālīhāt, Rabb al-arbāb*;⁴³ cf. QT, p. 59 and *Essai*, p. 57 (n. 5) and p. 256; — *al-'arīf fārigh min al-dunyā wa'l-ākhirā*: cf. QT, p. 54; — act of contrition: cf. this edition, I, 515.

— Ibn 'Iyād:⁴⁴ *man atā'a Allāh, atā'ahu kull shay'*, copied from Hasan: *man khāfa Allāh, akhāfa Allāh minhu kull shay'*⁴⁵ — cf. the theory of *Mutā'*.⁴⁶

— Dārānī and Mansūr ibn 'Ammār:⁴⁷ *kashf al-Wajh al-Karīm* — cf. *Akhbār*, no. 1.

— Ahmad ibn 'Asim Antākī:⁴⁸ *Allāh . . . alladhī yatawaddad ilā man yūdhī'uhu, fakayfa bi man yūdhā fīhi* — cf. this volume, p. 287 and n. 50.

³⁶ Numerous *imminutus*. Cf. *Ikhwān al-safā'* [bib. no. 2121] I, 39.

³⁷ *Akhbār*, nos. 29 and 33.

³⁸ Cf. *Munya* of Ibn al-Murtadā, 15 [bib. no. 2109?].

³⁹ *Tustarī* (Baqlī II, 106).

⁴⁰ *Kāshif al-ghitā, da'wa islāmīya*, 70 ff. (cf. the *'aqida* supposedly of 'Alī, ap. Tabarsī, *Ihtijāj* [bib. no. 315-a], 99 ff.); Tabarsī, *Ihtijāj*, 189; Makkī, *Qūt* I, 47 (cf. *Farq*, 288); Baqlī, *Tafsīr* XVII, 1. Hallāj, like Ibn 'Arā', made use of the fragmentary *tafsīr* attributed to Ja'far that Sulamī quotes at the beginning of his own (a work of Ibn Hayyān, Ibn Ghānim, or Yamān-b-'Adī). Cf. *Essai*, pp. 203 and 205.

⁴¹ *Tustarī*, *Tafsīr* [bib. no. 2237-a], 39.

⁴² *Ihyā'* [bib. no. 280-a], I, 223; Muhāsibī, *Mahabba* (*Hilya* X, 82, s.v. Muhāsibī). And again *Ihyā'* I, 223.

⁴³ Plurals explained by Ghazālī, *Mishkāt* [bib. no. 280-e], pp. 22, 30. Cf. *Psalm* 135:2-3; *Essai*, p. 57, n. 5, p. 256, n. 5; and *supra*.

⁴⁴ Makkī, *Qūt* II, 41. The theory of *Mutā'* was taken up again by Ghazālī, *Mishkāt*.

⁴⁵ Cf. *infra* III, 49, 249.

⁴⁶ Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, *'Iqd* I, 267.

⁴⁷ Qushayrī, 18 [bib. no. 231-a?]. Sarrāj, *Masāri'* [bib. no. 278-a], 113-114.

⁴⁸ *Hilya*, Leyden ms., 311, f. 175b.

—Bistāmī:⁴⁹ *sirāj min al-ghayb*: cf. *Taw.* 1:1—*mukhatābat Allāh*.

—Abū Hamza:⁵⁰ *qurb*.

—Kharrāz:⁵¹ God known '*alā haddayn*': cf. '*aqīda, infra* — '*ayn al-jam*': cf. this volume, p. 245 — '*fanā*', *baqā*'.

—Sahl Tustarī:⁵² *lisān dhāt* (and *fi'l*). Cf. *lisān hujja* (or *ishāra*) (QT, 70) — *asl, far* — *tajallī* — *dā'ī al-Haqq* — *basmala*⁵³ — *qiwām* — *al-Masmūd ilayhi* — *rabbānī*.

—Tirmidhī:⁵⁴ alphabetical etymologies (*suryāniya*) — *tayrān* — *ism a'zam* — *muhiqq* — *fadl al-qalb* — *wilāya*.

—Junayd:⁵⁵ *shabah* (cf. Hallāj, Sulamī on Qur'an 56:24) — *wahdāniya*, *tasārīf*.

—Ibn 'Atā':⁵⁶ the vocation of saints to suffering, *balā'*, which is a probation.

—Hallāj seems to me personally to have been the first to define the following six theses: *isqāt al-wasā'it*⁵⁷ — *tūl*, '*ard*⁵⁸ — *Rūh nātiqa ghayr makhluqa* — *qiyāmī bi haqq al-Rabb* — *shāhid ānī* — *mahabba, dhāt al-dhāt*. The famous allegory of the "moth and the lamp" also came from him. He was deemed authorized to practice in *fiqh*, not only in *talfiq*, but also *ijtihād*.⁵⁹ He used it to refute various doctrines.

d) Polemics; refuted theses:

In *FIQH*:⁶⁰ *shubuhāt al-rizq, khurūj* (Khārijites) — literal worship consisting of the *dhikr*, of the *shahāda*, of the *tasliya* (Hashwīya and Bukhārī) — *kull mujtahid musib* (Mu'tazilites) — '*fanā*' *al-taklīf* (Qarmathians).

In *KALĀM*:⁶¹ *tanzīl* (Hashw.), *ta'wil* (Mu'taz.), *ta'tīl, tajrīd* (Qarm.)

⁴⁹ Baqlī, *Tafsīr*, I, 14.

⁵⁰ Qushayrī, 50 [bib. no. 231-a?].

⁵¹ Baqlī, *Tafsīr* on Qur'an 68:22.

⁵² Köpr. ms. 727 (particularly "*Bāb al-tajallī*"). Yāfi'i, *Nashr* [bib. no. 541-c], f. 42a. Tustarī, *Tafsīr*, 49; 69, 80, 125; 40. Najdī, [bib. no. 976-a] 256.

⁵³ Cf. *infra* III, 52.

⁵⁴ Cf. '*Ilal al-sharī'a*', f. 197.

⁵⁵ *Dawā al-arwāh*.

⁵⁶ Cf. this edition, I, 119. Nābulūsī (*Radd matīn*) conveyed this idea very well.

⁵⁷ The disappearance of the means (rites) when the ends are achieved (*tahqīq al-haqā'iq*) (cf. Baqlī, *Tafsīr* on Qur'an 48:10 and Sulamī, *ibid.* Qur'an 7:158; and this volume, and *Riw.* XI, XIV).

⁵⁸ "Length and breadth" of understanding; a distinction deduced from analysis of the act of worship (*Taw.* XI, 16); in Hallāj it plays somewhat the role of the Aristotelian distinction between *matter* and *form*. And, just as Ibn Sab'īn was to deduce from hylomorphism that God is *form* and the world *matter* (Alūsī, *Jalā'*, s.v.), Ibn 'Arabī was to deduce from this dichotomy of Hallāj's that the spiritual world and the material world are the two dimensions of the Appearance in which the Unique One is contemplated; this is not Hallāj's view, however. (*Taw.*, 142, n. 5.)

⁵⁹ *Akhbār*, no. 6.

⁶⁰ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I, 334, and *infra*, Ch. XII, v.

⁶¹ *Infra*, Ch. XII, ii.

in *tawhīd* — limitation of the number of *sifāt azalīya* (Kullābīya) — *jihat al-'ulūw* (Hashw.) — reduction of the *ījād to takwīn*, of the *wujūd* to *wājib* (and *mumkin*) (philosophers)⁶² — joy in reasoning⁶³ attributed to God (*id.*) — noneternity of the *Rūh* (Kullābīya, etc.) — morcellation and traducement of the *Rūh* (*taqsim al-'aql al-akbar*, from Tirmidhī; *hulūl juz'ī*, *tashakhkhus* of the Sabaeans and Qarmathians)⁶⁴ — materialization and traducement of the “light of Muhammad” (Muhammadiya Imāmītes).⁶⁵

IN SUM, Hallāj, a tutorist in *fiqh*, makes use of the vocabulary of the customs and forms of rites such as those that the Khārijites and Sunnites developed, though in accordance with his rule of *isqāt al-wasā'it*,⁶⁶ so that their ceremonial appearance may vanish from our eyes in the realization itself of the divine will (*shahāda*⁶⁷ — *ādhān*⁶⁸ — *hajj*⁶⁹ — *bay'a*).⁷⁰

He allies himself with various metaphysical schema of *kalām* attributed to Hellenistic philosophy, but he does so in order to adhere more closely to divine transcendence and omnipotence. He repeats and adapts the thoughts of others but in order to advise how to select and exclude, in order to preach a rule of life that leads to God.

In the full elaborations of his thought, such as in certain chapters of his *Tawāsīn*, the main intent is a contemplated invitation to deliberate and resolute action, a naked gift of three powers of the soul—memory, intelligence, and will—turned straight through the dark night toward God alone. Examples:

The problem of the mystical *path*: where to seek God? [One seeks Him] by going beyond things,⁷¹ signs,⁷² one's own will⁷³ (Chapter II).

The problem of mystical *knowledge*: how to know God? By recognizing that He is really *transcendent* in the spelling, letter by letter, of His Names,⁷⁴ in the conceptual purification of His attributes,⁷⁵ and even in our pure intention of affirming His Essence⁷⁶ (Chapters VI-X).

The problem of mystical *union*: how to unite oneself with God? Because it is He Who creates and preserves the multiplicity of the Universe,

⁶² The theory of the “*kun!*” Cf. *infra*.

⁶³ *Ladhdha 'aqliya*, denied ap. his commentary on Qur'an 36:55.

⁶⁴ Cf. *infra*.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Taw.* I.

⁶⁶ Cf. this edition, 1, 634-640.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ch. XIII.

⁶⁸ “*Alhadta!*” (Qur'an 3:18). Cf. Ch. XIII.

⁶⁹ Cf. this edition, 1, 538-545.

⁷⁰ Cf. Ch. XII, v.

⁷¹ *Taw.* III, 1-6.

⁷² *Ibid.*, IV, V.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, III, 8-10.

⁷⁴ Against Ibn Hanbal, Sahl; even in the *h* with which dervishes become intoxicated in their *dhikr* sessions (*Taw.* IX, 2).

⁷⁵ *Taw.* IX and X.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, VI, 6-9.

one must look by means of Him and not in it.⁷⁷ Because it is on account of Him that it is explainable, one must immerse the intelligence in Him and not in it.⁷⁸ Because it is He, and not it, Who centralizes and moves it, it is He alone Whom we must allow to will in the depths of our heart,⁷⁹ where He cannot be at home⁸⁰ if He does not transform it⁸¹ (Chapter XI).

As for the short definitions that condense his thought, they enable us to witness, in abbreviated form, the proving process. In a violent and persuasive maneuver, he infuses his sentences with a dynamic cadence, an uninterrupted utterance, a militant structure. This is evident from a comparison with the more static definitions of Sahl and the more theoretical ones of Junayd. Example: definition of the word *hubb*, *mahabba*, love:

"Love means to embrace obedience and to reject pride" (Sahl).⁸²

"Love is the penetration of the attributes of the Beloved through permutation with the attributes of the lover" (Junayd).⁸³

"Love means that you remain standing close to your Beloved, when you would be deprived of your attributes, and that your conformance be no more (at that time) than a conformity to Himself" (Hallāj).⁸⁴

More than mere mnemotechnical aphorisms, or theoretical formulas, his definitions are invitations to action:

"Control⁸⁵ your respirations, your minutes, your hours, that which happens to you and that which you are engaged in doing. He who knows from whence he comes knows where he will go; he who knows what he does, knows what will be done to him; he who knows what will be done to him, knows what is demanded of him; he who knows what is demanded of him, knows what he is entitled to; he who knows what he is entitled to, knows what he owes; and he who knows what he owes, knows what is his (and will continue to be himself). —But he who does not know from whence he comes, nor where he is, nor how he is, nor to whom he belongs, nor of what he is (made), nor what he is, nor that for

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 7; XI, 10-12.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, V, 8-10, 21. The doctrine of *isqat al-wasā'it*.

⁷⁹ *Taw.* III, 11; V, 34-39; XI, 8.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, XI, 15.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 19-24.

⁸² *Tafsīr*, 36; quoted in Qushayrī, 171 [?]. '*Alāmat al-mahabba mu'anaqat al-tā'a wa mubāyanāt al-fāqa*.'

⁸³ Sarrāj, *Luma'*, 59.

⁸⁴ Ap. Sulamī on Qur'ān 3:31. "*Qiyām*" means to remain standing for prayer or battle (opposite of *qu'ūd*). "*Ittisāf*" is a qualification. Mas'ūd-b-Bāk (*Mir'āt*, f. 41b) reconciles that with the *anā'l-Haqq*.

⁸⁵ Ap. Sulamī, *Tafsīr* on Qur'ān 28:73 and Sulamī, *Jawāmi'* [bib. no. 170-c], Laléli ms. 1516, f. 167a.

which he is (made), he belongs with those whose living moments pass unused, with those who have rejected the urgent invitation of God 'Who, in His mercy, created for you the night (not perpetual, but alternating) with the day, so that you might rest (during the night from the work of the day), you might ask Him with love for His favor, and might give Him thanks (Qur'ān 28:73).' "

II. PSYCHOLOGY

a. *Man According to the Qur'ān: the Heart*

The following is the list of Qur'ānic data on the subject:

Insān, man. Externally, *zāhir*, body (*jism*), a weak vessel made of clay (Qur'ān 55:14), a frail material covering, and, in addition, enslaved by carnal woes, *bashar*.¹ Internally, *bātin*, a central inner void (*jawf*).²

Qalb, the heart.³ As the essential part of man, it is a movement within a lump of flesh⁴ placed in this central inner void: a regular oscillation, a permanent and incommunicable pulsation, a hidden spring of gestures: the heart, *qalb*, *tajwīf*, *fu'ād*. It is the secret and hidden place, *sirr*,⁵ of the conscience, whose secrets (*najwā*)⁶ will be laid bare at the Judgment.

Nafs, the soul.⁷ Sensations, actions, and various residues accumulate in this inner and secret cavity from the digestion that takes place in it: an incoherent and obscure mass of flowing illusions, thoughts, and desires that has collectively only the perpetual inconstancy, the particular vacillation, that the individual oscillation of the heart, *taqlīb*, frail life, imparts to them: such is the soul, the "self."

Sharh al-sadr, the expansion of the chest. The soul, the factitious embryo of an immortal personality, can gain stability only through instantaneous and renewable divine intervention;⁸ a reiteration of the initial creative impulse that set the heart in motion. By this intervention, owed

¹ The distinction between *insān* and *bashar*, between the ideal Adam shown to the Angels, realized in the saint, the pure and simple man capable of being transfigured, and sinning and carnal man, is elaborated upon by Hallāj.

² *Zahr*, *batn*: in man it contains the seeds of descendants.

³ Qur'ān 33:4, etc.; Cf. Matt. 10:19; St. Augustine, *Confessions*; the Psalms; St. Anthony (*Apophlegm. Verb. Senior.*); and, in the eighteenth century, the lexicon of mystics such as Pascal, the Blessed J. Eudes, and St. Marguerite Marie.

⁴ *Mudgha*.

⁵ Qur'ān 6:3; 20:7; 26:8; 71:9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 9:78; 43:80; 86:9.

⁷ Closely related to the blood in life. Cf. *infra*, p. 42, n. 115.

⁸ Ghazālī, *Munqidh*, 7.

to the "help of a spirit," to the "insufflation of the Spirit,"⁹ God strips away the lining of the heart,¹⁰ brushes back its veils,¹¹ *circumcises* it,¹² as if by means of a spark, faith. Faith, during the time it glows, transfigures the *nafs*. It makes it coherent and unifies it; it gives it a memory in which man rediscovers his pre-eternal vocation as a believer; in which it makes him read it in order to speak in an orderly well-constructed language; in which it makes him recognize, *hic et nunc*, his primordial vocation (*mūthāq*),¹³ the divine predetermination of his acts and his gestures; in which it makes him understand them as signs, *āyāt*, incomparable, unchallengeable, and direct, of the divine omnipotence. The heart was created to "bear the supernatural weight," "challenged by land and mountains," of the "deposit of faith" (*haml al-amāna*):¹⁴ to be the site¹⁵ of man's inevitable appearance before God.¹⁶

Man is seized by the Qur'ān in the very unity of his movement, in the uncompleted outline of his gesture, in the very course of his action, at the point of the spirit's insertion into matter, which is the heart, *qalb*, from where the movement rises like a spring to tonalize the displacements of the parts. In each one's particular "mode of passing."

The Qur'ān accepts as solved the basic enigmas of life—birth,¹⁷ suffering, sleep (and dreaming), death,¹⁸ life after death, resurrection—

⁹ The conciseness of the Qur'ān affords both interpretations simultaneously, though Sunnite tradition (except for the Hanbalites) has favored the first exclusively since the fourth century.

¹⁰ The hearts, *dhāt al-sudūr* (Qur'ān 5:70-81).

¹¹ See *infra* p. 18, n. 54. He closes them again over the rebellious heart: *tab'* (Qur'ān 4:155).

¹² *Ghulf* previously (Qur'ān 2:88; 4:155). The heart is laid bare; however, this is not yet supernatural infusion *within* the heart, *iftidād al-sirr* = *hulūl al-damīr jawfa'l-fu'ād* (cf. *Taw.*, 133; and this volume, p. 42).

¹³ Cf. *infra*, Ch. XII, II.

¹⁴ Qur'ān 33:72: compare Hallāj's commentary (Sulamī). This verse was criticized very early by the *zanādiqa* (Tabarsī, 122). Cf. Hudhayfa (Hanbal V, 353) and Bistāmī (ap. Sha'rāwī I, 75), *Farq*, 259 (M.P.A. Qahtabī, *I'tizāl tanāsukh*).

¹⁵ The Qur'ān does not say this explicitly, but the interpretation has seemed essential since Junayd (Baqlī, *Tafsīr*, f. 300a) (Ghazālī, *Ihyā'* [bib. no. 280-a], III, 11).

¹⁶ [This *amāna* is more than faith; angels are unaware of it. It is the *secret of hearts*, the deifying Love (Sumnūn, ap. Baqlī, criticized by Witri; and ap. Naysabūrī, *'Uqalā'*, 105)].

¹⁷ Described as an embryogeny in several stages (23:12-14; 40:69).

¹⁸ An ambiguity concerning the death of saints (3:163), particularly of Jesus (4:156); they are raised to God (cf. Sahl, this edition, 1, 70; and Hallāj, on Qur'ān 40: 65). In fact, the Jews could not have delivered the body of Jesus up to corruption (his body was *incorruptible* because of hypostatic union). *Al-'arīfūn la yamūtūn bal yunqalūn* (Junayd, cf. *infra*, p. 19, n. 15). *Al-shahīd laysa bi mayyit* (Rifā'i, *Burhān* [bib. no. 361-b], 112). The popular materialistic objection: in killing the body, one kills the soul (it is the tongue which lies, it is the cessation of breath which kills the soul; see *infra*, p. 22, n. 25), or, at least, one annihilates it

without explaining them. Its aim is to enclose human activity within its legal limits. It deals with none of the following theoretical questions:

a) How to reconcile desire, which increases from within, and gesture, which grasps outwardly; the tongue and the heart, the carnal and the immaterial, the perishable and the immortal. The solution based on the duality of *soul* and *body*, which arises so clearly in Christianity from the account of the resurrection of Jesus, will enter Islam through reflection, on the part of the Imāmītes, about the divine meaning, *ma'nā*, to be given to events;

b) How to reconcile the legal qualification of the direct consequences of human action (imputability, Last Judgment), with the irrevocability of its original release by a divine premotion (divine justice, pre-eternal decree). It was Hasan Basrī who arrived at the solution of *tafwīd*, of the divine "investiture" of man as a free agent,¹⁹ a solution undercut by the Mu'tazilites and their notion of psychological liberty, the privilege of indifference, the right not to choose;

c) How to coordinate in ourselves the origin of our acts; perception (memory) with reflection (intelligence) and with action (will); the problem of a "rule of life" in the way Muhāsibī will formulate it.

But, contrary to the Pharisaical opinion of many *fuqahā'*, accepted for sixty years by many Arabists, I have had to recognize, with Margoliouth,²⁰ that in the Qur'ān there are the real seeds of a mysticism, seeds capable of an independent growth without foreign impregnation.

b. Contemporary Theories about the Body and the Soul

(1) The atomistic theory (Jahm, 'Allāf, Jāhiz, Ash'arī, Junayd, and most of the *mutakallimūn*):²¹

until the Resurrection. Hence, the canonical objection on the subject of the saints and of Jesus: although it appears to be, the *personality* is not killed with the body; it survives (*tawaffī*, not *mawt*). Hence, the opposite extreme: belief in an immediate "ascension" of the body, following the soul to Paradise (the saying of a Cordovan martyr to Qādī Aslam [ap. Khushanī, *Qudāt* [bib. no. 2138-a], 186-87]), with the body no longer being one's own (cf. this edition, 2, 398; 3, 157). In fact, the *shibh* of Jesus, dead and left on the cross, was no longer his soul (descended into Hell), but was still *incorruptible*, "*in triduo mortis, Christus non fuit vere homo*" (St. Thomas). As Jesus was "*yaqīnan*," (his *yaqīn*) could not be killed (Ibn Taymiya, *Jawāb* [bib. no. 512-i], II, 275, 278). The inhibition of the Qur'ān concerning the death of Jesus: a prophet having *tahaddī* cannot be overcome (undoubtedly Jesus died voluntarily). [Similarly], the inhibition of the Qur'ān concerning the deferred death of Satan.

¹⁹ That is to say, his liberty exceeds him, that he cannot use it so that he surrenders it to God. Cf. *Essai*.

²⁰ *Early Development of Mohammedanism*, p. 199. Cf. "Sufism . . . , the Native Product of Islam Itself," R. A. Nicholson, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 305.

Man is only a superficial material covering,²² *badan*, an inert cadaver, *jasad*. This extension, this composite of atoms has within itself no lasting reality; its only basis of cohesion (*shakhs*) is the fact that the divine will constructs for it, from without, a patterned contour, molds²³ for it a variable form with external balance, *haykal mahsūs wa makhsūs*: a phantom-like soul,²⁴ an irreal assemblage of simple accidents²⁵ ('*arad*), that God causes supposedly to die and to resuscitate by the separation and reunion of these atoms; *haykal* = *nafs* = *rūh* = '*aql* = *qalb*. Ibn al-Farrā' retorts: *jism*, *lā 'arad*;

(2) The emanationist theory (Imāmītes):

Man is an artificial system of concentric material coverings, *ghilāf*,²⁶ without any other unity than the will of God, Who encases them within one another, after having cut them out of the substance of His successive luminous emanations, arranging them in an order of decreasing "subtlety," from the center to the periphery: a) the central casing, *altaf ghilāf*, a transparent layer of creative action, a fragment of the first divine emanation, which guides mechanically the whole: the "meaning": *ma'nā*;²⁷ b) the second casing, the conscious "self," *nafs* = *shakhs*; c) the third, the functionally alive: *rūh* = '*aql* = *qalb*; d) the outer casing, the "body," the pallid, dirty, tarnished luminosity: *jism* = *sanam* = *haykal*²⁸ = *barzakh* = *nūr zulāmī*.

This theory was held by the early Muslim physicians, who, like the

²¹ *Shāmīl*, Leyden ms. 1945, f. 13b; Hazm V, 65, 66, 74.

²² For them nothing exists (outside of God) but the materialized, extended *kawn*. There are no immaterial substances.

²³ Either created once for life (*tabī'a idtirāriya* of Jahm), or recreated with every breath, in every moment ('*āda*: Nazzām [Farq, 126]; Ash'arī—Bāqillānī—Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūhāt* I, 211; IV, 23) and Ibn Hazm, IV, 215.

²⁴ *Haykal* is not a substance, it is a simple accident or assemblage of accidents. Ibn Kaysān even denies its existence.

²⁵ In its moderate form this is the position of most of the orthodox until Ghazālī: Zāhirites and Hanbalites regard the *nafs* and the *rūh* as tenuous bodies (*jism*) which die and which return to life, except those of prophets and martyrs, with the body (Ibn al-Farrā', *Mu'tamad* [bib. no. 2066-b]); Bāqillānī identifies the *nafs* with *tanaffūs* (breath) and the *rūh* with life (*hayāt*; centered in the heart). Abū Hāshim (against Jubbā'ī) reduces *rūh* to *nafas* (Shiblī, *Akām*, 12).

²⁶ *Qustās*, a word used again by Ghazālī (*Qistās* [bib. no. 280-m], 28, 60). Which seems to be an exegesis of Qur'an 24:35.

²⁷ The early Imāmītes, until Hishām inclusively, were Jabarites (Ibn Qutayba, *Mukhtalif*, 59).

²⁸ *Haykal*, meaning literally "temple, residence," is an astrological term, possibly Harānīyan; it designates the astronomical body of a star in the center of its heaven (*falak*), that is to say, of the spherical enclosure of its orbit (Ptolemaic theory. Cf. Shahrastānī [bib. no. 2210-a] II, 123, and a verse of Sulaymān Ansārī, ap. Jāhiz, *Hayawān* [bib. no. 2125-e] IV, 64).

Imāmītes, accepted the superiority of the *nafs* over the *rūh*,²⁹ of the articulate soul (*nafs nātiqa*),³⁰ which personalizes, over the physical living spirit which flows in the body and dies with it, with blood as an enforcing agent;³¹

(3) The theory held by Hasan, Bakr, and certain Mu'tazilites:

Man is certainly a material casing, *qālab*, a mold. But this mold receives from God, from within, a certain personal unity through the sheltering of one or several elements of activity, *latā'if*, tenuous bodies. The latter are the seat of his subjective autonomy during his lifetime; they reside in his body like a star in its sphere of influence (*haykal*); they survive him and rejoin him in order to transfigure him in resurrection. The following are a few divergent views:

a) Aswārī, Fūtī, Ibn Hāyit, and Ibn al-Rāwandī,³² accept only a single inner element of activity and place it, a tenuous atom, in the heart: *qalb* = 'aql.

b) A growing spiritualism, imitated from the Platonists, inclines, leads some,³³ including Nazzām, 'Attār, Mu'ammār, Ibn Fūrak, Bāqillānī (secretly), Juwaynī,³⁴ Ghazālī, Musaffar, Rāghib, Fakhr Rāzī, 'Izz Maqdisī, al-Jildakī, to teach that the essence of man is *solely* an immaterial reason, a particle of spiritual and impassive substance, 'aql = *rūh* = *qalb*, independent of the feeling, wretched and illusory (*shabah*, *mithāl*) body, which is the temporary clothing (*thawb*) of humiliation, its accidental prison, from which death delivers it forever. The apparent unity of the body, during its life here below, does not come from the 'aql, but from a hylic equilibrium, from a blending of four humors, *akhlāt* = *arwāh*, cir-

²⁹ Only some Imāmītes and mystics, *Rūhāniya* like Jābir and Rabāh, maintain the primacy of the immaterial *rūh*: Tustarī and the Sālīmīya followed them, with Kharrāz.

³⁰ Hallāj will say to the contrary: *rūh nātiqa*.

³¹ Jibrā'il Bukhtyeshū', ms. P. 3028, ff. 40a, 40b. 'Alī ibn Rabban, *Firdaws al-hikma* II, § z. Tabarsī, *Ihtijāj* [bib. no. 315-a], 181: Nāsir-i-Khusraw, *Zād al-Musāfirin*, Persian Suppl. 2318. Same debate over the superiority of the *sūra* between the Imāmītes (for whom *sūra* = the physical appearance, and *ma'nā* = the divine act) and the philosophers (*sūra* = spiritual form, and *hayūlā* = matter). See this edition, I, 14, n. 72, the strange correction "*al-sūra hya* (for *fiḥā*) *al-Rūh*" by a Hanbalite philosopher (probably Ibn 'Aqīl), entirely Sālīmīyan (Makki was admired by Ibn al-Farrā').

³² Cf. Tahānawī, *Kashshāf*, s.v. *rūh*. Compare the pineal gland of Descartes.

³³ The idea appears in outline form as early as Hishām ibn al-Hakam (against 'Allāf); *Farq*, 117, 119, 256, 261; Haqqī, *Rūh al-bayān* [bib. no. 844-a] II, 300. The Imāmītes, Kar-rāmiya, and Sālīmīya affirm, against 'Allāf and Ash'arī, that the soul (*nafs*), among the Imāmītes; *rūh*, among the Sālīmīya) remains alive forever after the body dies (Hazm IV, 215; *Tabsira*, 391). Cf. Qustā ibn Lūqā (*Farq bayn al-nafs wā'l-rūh*, ed. Cheikho), who is confused by the conflicting definitions of Plato and Aristotle and develops the aforementioned doctrine, n. 116. Cf. Maqdisī, *Bad'*.

³⁴ According to Ibn Sab'in, he was supposed to have remained an Ash'arite, a partisan of the materiality of the *rūh*.

culating through the tissues and subject to the astral influences, *aflāk*. Moreover, there is a tendency, through syncretism, among the Druzes, the *ishrāqiyūn* and the philosophers, to regard the 'aql as a particle of the second divine³⁵ emanation, a kind of illuminating impersonal thought, a kind of angelic idea: 'aql = rūh³⁶ = nūr qāhir;

c) Hasan's disciples in mysticism, influenced by various traditions which were accepted also by the Imāmites and the Zāhirites, allowed the plurality of inner principles, *latā'if*.³⁷ Regarding them as distinct coverings, of different origins,³⁸ encased within each other (as the Imāmites held), *nafs* < *qalb* < *rūh* < *sirr*,³⁹ they saw them as "veils,"⁴⁰ separating them from the divine center, destined to be lifted successively by grace. Bistāmī, through an intense inner asceticism, even tried to raise the last veil, *sirr*, but this led him only to the blinding resplendence that prevents any vision.

c. Hallājīan Teaching

Hallājīan psychology, like that of Muhāsibī, seems to be strongly influenced by the spiritualism of Nazzām. It allows to man the guiding rule and basic unity of an immaterial principle: *qalb*, heart, or *rūh*, spirit.⁴¹ "God created these bodies (*hayākil*) on the causal model, subject to deformations (*āfāt*) and consisting of a reality which perishes. He caused spirits (*arwāh*) to grow in them up to a determined time (*ajal ma'dūd*). He brought spirits into subjection by death and bound them together at the very moment when He finished them⁴² with powerlessness ('*ajz*')." ⁴³

³⁵ Even Ghazālī (*Laduniya*, excerpt ap. *Tabsira*, 399).

³⁶ Kharrāz was opposed vehemently to this identification: "It is the *rūh* that communicates the word of life to the body; it is through it that the act germinates in it; it is it which verifies; without the *rūh*, the 'aql would remain inoperative (*muta'attil*), neither receiving nor administering proofs" (Baqlī, *Tafsīr*, f. 210a).

³⁷ Hujwiri, *Kashf*, 197.

³⁸ 'Amr Makki grants them an evolution that reminds one of the cosmogony of the Nusayris (Hujwiri, *Kashf*, 309). Hallāj corrects (ap. Sulamī on Qur'an 24:35) as follows: action of the *ilāhiya* (*sirr*), *rubūbiya* (*rūh*), *nūriya* (*qalb*: *nūr al-tadbīr*) and *haraka* (*nafs*). Cf. Tustarī, Köpr. ms. 727: man was created out of four things: *hayāt*, *rūh*, *nūr*, *tīn*.

³⁹ This is the list of 'Amr Makki [bib. no. 101-a], and of Ibn 'Atā' (Baqlī, *Tafsīr*, I, 547). Tustarī prefers *qalb*, 'aql, *sam*'.

⁴⁰ In contrast to the philosophers, who regard individual intellects, 'uqūl, as concentric spheres of influence, whose dignity grows, as in the case of the stars, with expansion from the center of the system to the periphery. To them the human *rūh* = 'aql bi'l-milka bathed in the higher 'aql that illumines it.

⁴¹ Inserted within: *qalb*. Separated without: *rūh*. Hallāj, agreeing with Muhāsibī, Khar-rāz, and their successors, refuses to confuse it with the 'aql, as did Nazzām and Jāhiz.

⁴² *Imām*: literally: when He made then the "entelechies" of their bodies; this is an Aristotelian word.

⁴³ Hallāj, ap. Sulamī, *Ghalātāt* [bib. no. 170-f], f. 79b. The terminology of this passage is

Man therefore has a dual aspect, a dual affinity (*nasab*).⁴⁴ Joined to an extended body, he must become carnal; he is destined to fall into the bondage of matter (*raqq al-kawn*) and into divine contempt;⁴⁵ and he fell into both. But, on the other hand, the form of his body, fated to be joined to a spirit, has been distinguished in advance from animals,⁴⁶ ennobled,⁴⁷ freed from slavery,⁴⁸ consecrated to liberty, before his creation; for the ideal clothing of divine glory that God, conceiving the model of Adam, presented for the adoration of the Angels as a divine image, *sūra*, is the prefiguration of the real affinity⁴⁹ that God keeps for men with Himself if they become pure:⁵⁰ affinity in the Spirit of holiness.

How does man bring about the purification of his heart? Hallāj retains the vocabulary of previous mystics who, preoccupied with their asceticism, subdivided⁵¹ and parceled out the heart into successive "boxes," running the risk of confounding it and destroying it with its "veils" out of desire to reach beyond it to God. Hallāj retains and expands the Qur'ānic notion that the heart is the organ prepared by God for contemplation.⁵² The function cannot be exercised without the organ. Thus, if he mentions the successive coverings of the heart,⁵³ he does so without stopping at them as reference points that measure⁵⁴ the progress of inner

taken from Nazzām: "(the spirit of) man, alive in itself and autonomous, *ya'jiz li āfatī*, is subject to powerlessness because of a deformity" (Baghdādī, *Farq.* 119). Powerlessness, to Nazzām and to Hallāj, describes the body; the deformity is the fixed end of this life.

⁴⁴ Developed by Wāsitī and Nasrābādhī. Wāsitī is very explicit about the immateriality of the *nūh* (Baqlī, *Tafsīr*, Berlin ms., ff. 198a, 210a).

⁴⁵ Creation is a voluntary humiliation of the divine thought, especially the creation of matter. Hasan Basrī held material creation in contempt "because God holds it in contempt" (*Risāla*, ap. *Hilya*) insofar as the Spirit does not transfigure it. The secret of creation is that God is humble. We find the idea of Adam's original sin in the relation between the material and the carnal; however, Bistāmī was the first to formulate it explicitly (*Luqma*).

⁴⁶ Sulamī, 25.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 99-100.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 181. A theory distorted by Wāsitī, "spirits freed from the debasement of the *fiat*" (Baqlī, *Tafsīr*, Berlin ms., f. 210a).

⁴⁹ *Intibā' al-Haqq*, Ibn Bābūyā notes.

⁵⁰ A symmetrical investiture of the acceptance by Adam of the burden of *amāna* (cf. this volume, p. 13). Not a divine emanation (Ibn al-Qārih): Hallāj, like Nibājī, sees the *nūh* to be created wholly by the divine *Rūh* (*Sarrāj*, *Luma'*, 222).

⁵¹ 'Alā' al-Dawla differentiated seven successive coverings whose colors are visible to the ecstatic (Fleischer, *ZDMG*, XVI, 235).

⁵² *Supra*, this volume, p. 12.

⁵³ *Qalb*, *janna*, *lubb*, *latīfa*, *tamalluq* (Baqlī, *Shath.*, f. 162b). The *sirr*, the seat of *tauhīd* (*ishāra*), is enclosed in the *qalb*, the seat of *ma'rifa* ('ibāra); the *Rūh* passes from one to the other through the *anfās* (cf. *Akhbār*, nos. 29 and 33; Baqlī, *Tafsīr*, f. 151b).

⁵⁴ The *nafs* corresponds to the *aghtiya*, the *qalb* to the *akīna* that open the *anwār*, the *nūh* to the *hujub* that open the *adhkār*, the *sirr* to the *aqfāl* that open the *qurb* (ap. Sulamī, XXIV, 37).

purification. And, at the end, he declares mystical union to be real; far from being the total disappearance of the heart, demanded of God in vain by Bistāmī, it is its sanctifying resurrection: total renunciation of the heart results in its immortalization by God.

Hallāj attempted to describe the latter process. The final covering of the heart, inside the *nafs*, whose appetite is lustful, is the *sirr*, the latent personality, the implicit consciousness, the deep subconscious, the secret cell walled up [and hidden] to every creature,⁵⁵ the “inviolable virgin.”⁵⁶

The latent personality of man remains unformed until God visits the *sirr* and as long as neither angel nor man divines it.⁵⁷ This is the *sarīra*,⁵⁸ a kind of uncertain “personal pronoun,” a provisional “I” = *annī*, *annīya*; *huwī*, *huwīya*:⁵⁹ a hecceity, an illeity.

When man agrees to give up this final covering of the heart, God makes it fertile, causing the *damīr*,⁶⁰ its ultimate explicit personality, its legitimate “personal pronoun,” the right to say “I,” to enter it: the right which unites the saint to the very source of the divine word, to its *fiat*.

I mention only in passing his theory of the three *tawaffī*⁶¹ of sleep, of death, and of spiritual ascension.⁶² Borrowed from his master Sahl, it asserts the following: first, in opposition to the evolutionism of Rāzī, that there is no *tanāsukh*, metempsychosis, between animals and men;⁶³ next, that the individual soul can be brought face to face with God.⁶⁴ Nazzām

⁵⁵ We must first act if we are to communicate our thoughts.

⁵⁶ “*Asrārūnā bikrun, lā yaftadduhā wahmin wāhimin*” (ap. Sarrāj, *Luma'*, 231); (*fu'ādī*) *bikrun māftaddahu qatt wajdun* of Khālid-b-Yazid Khātib (I, ap. 261) (Khātib, VIII, 310). Compare in opposition the cynical image by Allāf, (ap. WZKM, IV, 221). “*Asrār khāfiya abkār mā iftaddahā khātir Haqqin qatt*” (ap. Sulamī on Qur'an 74:53).

⁵⁷ Sabihī, Baqli II, 22.

⁵⁸ Cf. ap. Sulamī, *Tabaqāt* (about *Mawājīd Haqqin*).

⁵⁹ Cf. *Taw.*, 162, 204: correct *Taw.*, 165.

⁶⁰ God is the *Sirr al-sirr*, *Damīr al-damīr*. Cf. *Taw.*, II, 11; IX, 2; and this volume, p. 47.

⁶¹ Concerning Qur'an 40:65; 25:20; 74:31. Cf. Tustarī, *Tafsīr* [bib. no. 2237-a], 123-124: in fact, the three stages of the increasing mastery of the luminous *rūh*, which lives only by the *dhikr* (divine praise), over the *nafs* of carnal substance, which desires only to eat and drink. Tustarī asserts the actual primacy of the *rūh* over the *nafs*, contrary to Mubarrad, who believes that both die with the body (cf. this volume, p. 16, n. 33).

⁶² *Tawaffī* of Jesus before *raf'* according to Wahb (Ibn 'Arabi, *Musām*. [bib. no. 421-a]). It was not the Jews who killed Jesus: God alone “*tawaffā*” him (Qur'an 3:55).

⁶³ It is not the same angel who receives their souls (Sulamī, 103): contrary to Mālik (Haytamī, *Fatāwa hadīthīya* [bib. no. 742-a], 3) and Bāqillānī (Hazm IV, 216).

⁶⁴ This is the *nuqla*, transference (Tustarī [bib. no. 2237-a], Junayd, ap. Sha'rāwī, *Latā'if* [bib. no. 741-d], I, 126) and ap. *Shadd al-izār*, 10-12, -*lā yamūtūn* [cf. *infra*, p. 13, n. 18]. Not in the Qarmathian and Druze sense, which construes this transference as the passing of the soul of one man into another (Mu'izz, *Munājāt*), not knowing where to put the individual souls (cf. next note). Cf. Rāzī, a verse in Ibn Abī Usaybi'a [bib. no. 2092-a], I, 315: “*wa ayna mahall al-rūh ba'd khurūjihi?*”

had been the first in Islam to assert this in his theory of the "leap," *tafra*.⁶⁵ Individual souls are not obliged to pass through B, C, D, etc. in order to go from A to Z, but are transported directly in the presence of God.⁶⁶

Spatialized (*haykalī*) in terms of pulp, —luminous at the core, eternal in the living sap, —endowed with judgment and knowledge, the man (who dies) re-joins through the Spirit those (= the elect) in whom He resides,

Whereas the body dwells on earth in decay.⁶⁷

III. THE "SCIENCE OF HEARTS"

a. *The Inner Events of the Soul According to the Qur'ān*

God, the direct *creator* (*khāliq*) of all of the events which shape the particular existence of an individual, the author of all of his actions (*a'māl*), both external (material possessions) and internal (virtues, vices), is also the *providence* (*rāziq*) watching over them; He created them in advance for each as a whole and distributes them to each in an orderly way like lots to be drawn. These are the *arzāq*, "provisions for the journey," the *aksāb*, the resources or "earnings" of each man which maintain his capacity to act (*qudra*).

God, lastly, is the One Who causes one to live and to die (*muhyī, mumīt*). He fixes a beginning and an end to these *arzāq*, a precise limit: *ajal musamma*: an estimate, which death concludes and totals up the acts of, just as the Last Judgment¹ will weigh them in its balance, according to the law.

The important thing, therefore, is to be able to evaluate the legal qualification of the *arzāq* that are put at our disposal—helpful or harmful, licit or illicit—throughout this life. To do that, man must have received and must preserve certain prior *arzāq* in himself, in his heart: first, *faith*,² without which he is incapable of achieving this evaluation, *fiqh*; and then the memory of these *arzāq*, the knowledge, *'ilm*, of revealed ideas. He

⁶⁵ *Farq*, 124, line 3 ff. and 15 ff. Shahrastānī I, 71. The classical scholastic theory with regard to angels.

⁶⁶ Thought already jumps from one object to another without transition. This is the spiritualistic solution of the paradox of Eleates: "the flying arrow."

⁶⁷ Hallāj, ap. Suhrawardī of Aleppo (in Dawwānī, Ibn 'Aqila), Qur'ān 36:78 [on the subject of the] resurrection [: "who will restore bones to life when they are dust] (*ramīm*)?"

¹ Qur'ān 6:2.

² Through external means, *Wahy* (Qur'ān 68:1-2).

must cast out of his heart the other, harmful *arzāq*, the tendency toward egoism, *hamm*, *zann*, *shakk*, and Satanic suggestion, *waswasa*,³ which darken the vision of his heart, keep him in ignorance, *jahl*,⁴ prevent him from hearing the divine warning, *ibra*,⁵ *ilhām*,⁶ notifying the faithful of the legal qualification of the *arzāq* that he receives, distinguishing the “good” from the “bad.”

These inner “resources” of man are momentary,⁷ adventitious, inassimilable things like the outer ones; they belong to his heart only through arbitrary attribution, at the very most customary usufruct, naturally not by right.

In sum, the Qur’ān makes the heart the seat of knowledge and of consciousness.⁸ Since nothing else “retains” in him the irreversible and irremediable dissipation of his resources (movements, sensations), man can recover them only within himself, in his *taqlīb*, in his heart.⁹ This continual turning back “in place,” this incessant return to time one, gives him a fixed point of departure for the construction of his mental unity. This inversion of meaning perpetually realized beats the rhythm in him that measures his time by his breathing; it unfolds to him the historic thread by which his personal pattern is woven, the material of his conscious life.

The heart, according to Qur’ānic data, retains (*yadhkur*), knows (*ya’qil*) and accepts (*urf*) immediately the ideas that are communicated to it, without any clear distinction being made between “faculties.”¹⁰ There is only a rough outline [in the Qur’ān] of the results of “maladies” that impair the act of faith: a lack of memory (*ghafla*, opposite of *dhikr*), a mistake in judgment (*shirk*, opposite of *tawhīd*), willful duplicity (*riyā’*), op-

³ Which “circulates” in us like blood (a famous hadith; Rāghib Pāshā, *Safīna* [bib. no. 852-a], 272). On *fiqh*, Qur’ān 17:44-45.

⁴ False idea (synonym: *ghalat*).

⁵ Qur’ān 3:13; 12:111; 79:26.

⁶ The voice of the good angel, according to Khafājī (*Sharh al-shifā’* [bib. no. 811-b] IV, 594).

⁷ God changes them as He pleases: *hadīth* “*Yā Muqallib al-qulūb!*”

⁸ The place of sacramental union between the body and the soul, the point at which the spiritual is inserted into the temporal.

⁹ Contrary to sensual feelings whose effect is felt in all stories by Muslim authors in the liver and the bile (cf. this edition, 1, 339, n. 4). Qur’ān 24:37.

The *viscera of the flesh* is the *organ of contemplation*: in ecstasy there is a divine ascendancy over the living heart-beat, an insertion and a withdrawal (as in the case of a sharp blade) between the normal cerebro-spinal control system and the sympathetic nerve (cardiac slowing down). Cf. Imbert-Gourbeyre, [Carl Erhard] Schmoeger [*Das Leben der gottseligen Anna Katarina Emmerich* (Freiburg, 1867-70)], II, 267, 273.

¹⁰ Acts are always indicated by verbs in the personal form, not by nouns of action.

posite of *ikhhlās*).¹¹ One might say that the Qur'ān poses the basic problem of the "science of hearts": the purification of the act of faith.¹²

b. Contemporary Theories

The Khārijites believed, and were followed in this belief by Jahm on the one hand and by the Zāhirites and several *muhaddithūn* on the other, that the "science of hearts" was unsure and useless. As for the legal qualifications applying solely to the outward movements of the body, the social consequences of our acts, it is enough to study our *arzāq* from without, according to the evidence of our senses (vocal prayer, fasting, infractions, or public confessions). For, with regard to the inner *arzāq* (of the heart: ideas, virtues), God, Who grants them to us and withdraws them from us at His will, as He did with the others and without their transforming us, ascribes no particular legal qualifications to them in the Qur'ān.

This simplistic and convenient theory was contradicted from the beginning by the experimental studies of the grammarians.¹³ In studying usage, they verified the existence of two different kinds of verbs: *verbs of sensing*, *af'āl al-hiss*, like "to see, to hear"; and *verbs of the heart*, *af'āl al-qulūb*, the latter being divided into verbs of opinion or certitude (*shakk wa yaqīn*) which evaluate the plausibility of our actions, and *conversive* or *causative* verbs (*tahwīl wa tasyīr*),¹⁴ which create changes in qualification for our actions "from within," outside of time and space.

Thus, since man, without the "resources" of the heart, is incapable of evaluating (or defining) and of qualifying (or choosing) his external "resources," he must study first what happens in his heart if he intends to obey the Law. This is the theory of Hudhayfa (d. 36/656),¹⁵ which Hasan Basrī carried on and clarified.

Two trends prevailed among the pupils of Hasan Basrī: first, the

¹¹ Maladies of *dhikr*: *hawā*, *fitna*; of *fikr*: *makr*, *wahm*; of *nīya*: *shakk*, *ra'y*.

Wahm = deception (in war), error, conjecture. Cf. *wāhima* (*infra*, p. 70: the inner sense perceives details: "estimative, evaluative"), *tawahhum* (*compositio loci*, meditation), *wahm wāhimī*.

Wahm = the angel Azrael (according to A. K. Jīlī, ap. Tahānawī) [who inspires images at the moment of death].

¹² Dealt with by Hasan Basrī (ap. Tirmidhī, *ʿIlāl* [bib. no. 2234-b], f. 162a; cf. the chapters on physical "scruples" by Imāmītes like Tabatabāʾī, *ʿUrwat wuthqa*, 1328, 331-363). And by Ibn ʿIyād (ap. Tahānawī, s.v. *Ikhhlās*).

¹³ See Howell [bib. no. 2087-a]; Ibn Malik, *Alfīya* [bib. no. 2107-a], etc.

¹⁴ Like "to do, to institute, to call, to appoint." [Verbs] *existimandi* (not forming a legal bond) and *declarandi*.

¹⁵ Studies of the *imperfections* in acts of worship.

Mu'tazilites, who accepted the idea of the "science of hearts," but only after intellectualizing it.¹⁶ The rudiments of religion, *usūl al-dīn*, are the "acts of hearts"¹⁷ to be studied as the resolutions of a reason left absolutely free by God and without hindrances "within." Whereas the outward modalities of worship, the acts of the members [of the community] (prayer, fasting, etc.), are only their applications, *furū'*, which are arguable¹⁸ and secondary. The Mu'tazilites thus reduced all "acts of hearts" to a single effort of mind, the aim of which is the clear perception of divine Unity, *tawhīd*, the origin of which is the freedom allowed the intellect by divine Justice, *'adl*, and the place of which is the state of suspension (*bayn*) in which thought is placed in the alternative between the two suggested reasons, *khātirān*. Study of the two *khātir*,¹⁹ or instantaneous suggestions, was pursued deeply. Nazzām, studying the problem of deliberation, suspends thought in balance between the suggestion that inspires action, *khātir iqdām*, and that which dissuades and restrains it, *khātir kaff*.²⁰ Furthermore, he believes thought controls and curbs both of them. Bishr, less convinced about the absolute autonomy of thought, attributes the two *khātir* to the devil.

The other group of pupils of Hasan Basrī, the mystics (Sūfis),²¹ following divine action to the very end of their mental effort, revised the Mu'tazilite vocabulary. The dilemma of deliberation presented itself to them as the moral alternative between the "first movement" and the "second." Which of the two must one follow?²² Junayd, thinking of the promotion of grace, says that one must always follow the first movement. Ibn 'Atā', out of humility and mistrust of the flesh, says the second, for divine grace cannot destroy itself, but increases in power when

¹⁶ *Al-nīya ablagh min al-'amal*. Mālikite jurists recognize that "expression is ruled by intention" (Hamawī I, 274, according to Santillana).

¹⁷ *A'māl al-qulūb* (opposite of *a'māl al-jawārih*) according to 'Amr-ibn-'Ubayd (Goldziher, editor of *Mustazhiri* [bib. no. 280-g], 109) and 'Allāf (*Farq*, 110). Compare the list of their *usūl* (Mas'ūdī, *Murāj* VI, 20) with those of the Sūfis (Sarrāj, *Luma'*, 357). *Usūl*: *hidāya*, *tawhīd*, *ma'rifa*, *imān*, *sidq*, *ikhlas*. *Furū'*: *ahwāl*, *maqāmāt*, *a'māl*, *tā'āt*.

¹⁸ For they are not free, being dependent externally on God and others.

¹⁹ Plural: *khawātir*, synonyms: *hājis*, *qāsih*, *lamma*. Coming from God or from a good angel, *ilhām*; from the devil, *waswasa*, or from the egoism of the soul itself, *hadith al-nafs*; from reason (cf. Suhrawardī, *'Awārif* IV, 184 ff.; Kilānī, *Ghunya* [bib. no. 341-h] I, 89-90; Makkī, *Qūt* [bib. no. 145-a] I, 129). The Mu'tazilites deny the efficacy of the *waswasa* and of possession (Nasafī, *Bahr al-kalām* [bib. no. 2171-a], 63). Cf. Aswārī, ap. Shahrastānī [bib. no. 2210-a] I, 74.

²⁰ Ap. Ash'arī, ms. P. 1453, f. 142b; cf. *Akhhbār*, nos. 29 and 33. Sh. [bib. no. 2210-a] I, 68.

²¹ See *Essai*, p. 200.

²² *'Awārif* IV, 184. This proves that they had not attained mystical union.