



IDEAS IN CONTEXT

# Utilitarianism and the New Liberalism



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## UTILITARIANISM AND THE NEW LIBERALISM

In this groundbreaking study, David Weinstein argues that nineteenth-century English New Liberalism was considerably more indebted to classical English utilitarianism than the received view holds. T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, D. G. Ritchie and J. A. Hobson were liberal consequentialists who followed J. S. Mill in trying to accommodate robust, liberal moral rights with the normative goal of promoting self-realization. Through careful interpretation of each, Weinstein shows how these theorists brought together themes from idealism, perfectionism and especially utilitarianism to create the new liberalism. Like Mill, they were committed to liberalizing consequentialism and systematizing liberalism. Because they were no less consequentialists than they were liberals, they constitute a greatly undervalued resource, Mill notwithstanding, for contemporary moral philosophers who remain dedicated to defending a coherent form of liberal consequentialism. The New Liberals had already travelled much of the philosophical ground that contemporary liberal consequentialists are unknowingly retraveling.

DAVID WEINSTEIN is professor of political science at Wake Forest University, North Carolina. His previous publications include *Equal Freedom and Utility* (Cambridge, 1998) and *The New Liberalism* (co-edited with Avital Simhony, Cambridge, 2001).

Utilitarianism and the New Liberalism

## IDEAS IN CONTEXT

*Edited by* Quentin Skinner and James Tully

The books in this series will discuss the emergence of intellectual traditions and of related new disciplines. The procedures, aims and vocabularies that were generated will be set in the context of the alternatives available within the contemporary frameworks of ideas and institutions. Through detailed studies of the evolution of such traditions, and their modification by different audiences, it is hoped that a new picture will form of the development of ideas in their concrete contexts. By this means, artificial distinctions between the history of philosophy, of the various sciences, of society and politics, and of literature may be seen to dissolve.

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# UTILITARIANISM AND THE NEW LIBERALISM

D. WEINSTEIN

*Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem*



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*For Kiddo*







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## *Preface*

I would like to thank Gale Sigal, Peter Nicholson, Michael Freeden, Fred Rosen, Avital Simhony, Jerry Gaus, Robert Audi, Roger Crisp, Bart Schultz, David Brink, Avihu Zakai, Leah Hochman, Win-Chiat Lee, Lee Overton, Tom Brooks and Colin Tyler for their willingness to comment on parts of this manuscript over recent years.

I would also like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for a 1998 Summer Stipend; the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for awarding me a 1999 Visiting Professorship and Mansfield College, Oxford University for hosting me as 2003 Visiting Fellow. Many thanks, in addition, are owed to the Master and Fellows of Balliol College, Oxford University for allowing me to examine the T. H. Green Papers held at Balliol and to the Warden and Fellows of Merton College, Oxford University for granting me permission to examine the F. H. Bradley Papers held at Merton. Finally, I owe special debts of gratitude to Wake Forest University for providing me with a 2001 Reynolds Research Leave and to Dean Paul Escott and Dean Deborah Best for being flexible and generous by allowing me to take advantage of the other fellowship opportunities that I have had. Lastly, I am especially grateful to Kathy Smith, Chair of Political Science at Wake Forest, for being no less flexible and supportive.

Parts of this book have been published in *Political Studies*, *The Journal of the History of Ideas* and *Utilitas*. Segments have also been presented at international conferences of The International Society for Utilitarian Studies; annual meetings of the American Political Science Association; the 2003 Idealism Today conference, Manchester College, Oxford University and the Centre for the Study of Political Ideologies, Oxford University. I am grateful to the participants and commentators for their queries, criticisms and suggestions about how to make my account of the new liberals more compelling.

I have always viewed writing as a collective enterprise in which authors depend upon their critics to assist them in refining and clarifying what they are trying to say. Without sympathetic critics, and even unsympathetic ones, the practice of philosophy and intellectual history might produce better or worse results but it would certainly be lonelier and thus much less gratifying. Reading is equally collective rewriting. My text now begins life on its own.

## CHAPTER I

### *Introduction*

#### ANALYTICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

The converging currents of Anglo-American political theory have swept away much of English political theory's distinctiveness including the latter's greater sensitiveness to its own historical past. For all its many virtues, contemporary Anglo-American political theory has become an impoverished history of ideas, having substituted a truncated eulogized canon for the richness of its predominantly English historical tradition.

This historical amnesia stems, in large part, from the legacy of logico-positivism, which discredited normative political theorizing as just another variety of emotivist venting and unmeaning metaphysical gibberish. Fortunately, Hart's *The Concept of Law* (1961) and Barry's *Political Argument* (1965) resurrected normative political theory. Rawls followed with *A Theory of Justice* (1971), which, in turn, unleashed an industry of criticism that shows no signs of abating.<sup>1</sup> Ironically, then, English analytical philosophy eviscerated English-speaking political theory early on in the last century only to redeem it fifty years later. And what it redeemed quickly spread elsewhere, becoming what we now know as Anglo-American political theory.

Whereas English political theory may have lost much of its identity in its confluence with Anglo-American political theory, the latter remains robustly at odds with the continental philosophical tradition. Whatever English political theory has become, its analytical rigor and empiricism extensively immunized it from the counter-Enlightenment preoccupations of continental theory. This is not to say that Anglo-American political

<sup>1</sup> I am following Philip Pettit, "The Contribution of Analytical Political Philosophy" in *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, ed. Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), who provides a compelling account of the impact of analytical philosophy on modern political theory. Also see Richard Tuck's contribution, "The Contribution of History," in the same volume.

theory has been uninfluenced by continental theorizing, especially recently. Continental motifs have also informed late nineteenth-century English idealism, Berlin's value pluralism and even, as we shall momentarily see, the Cambridge School of textual interpretation.

Despite Anglo-American political theory's homogenizing interpolation, English theorists have resisted forsaking intellectual history more than their American counterparts. The triumph of conceptual analysis caused American political theorists to lose interest in the history of political thought except as a way of certifying their current theoretical positions. Canonical theorists were typically invoked (Nozick's use of Locke) as remarkably prescient in purportedly anticipating – or at least identifying – solutions to current conceptual disputes.

By the 1970s, the Cambridge School of political thought, led by Skinner, Pocock, Dunn and later Tuck, began challenging such interpretative strategies, countering that the meanings of past political philosophical texts could only be recovered with difficulty by historically contextualizing them. Contemporary English political theory has struggled to resist marginalizing the history of political thought in face of the ascendancy of philosophical analysis. Indeed, the parochialism of analysis has rejuvenated the former, which has, in turn, rebounded to the practice of analysis itself. For the Cambridge School, intellectual history remains a veiled analytic exercise. Both its method and purpose are fundamentally linguistic. What words formerly meant can help us refine our own meanings and consequently improve our own philosophical thinking. Intellectual history, when not rational reconstruction, can be analytically provocative and therefore “educationally mandatory.”<sup>2</sup>

Pocock is less vexed than Skinner about the dangers of parochialism, which may partially account for the similarities between his method of doing intellectual history and continental political theory. For instance, his emphasis on the determining roles played by discursive paradigms makes his interpretative methodology structuralist. Yet, his interpretative methodology is equally post-structuralist insofar as meanings are unstable since he claims that every textual interpretation invariably spins, recasts and multiplies meanings in ways unintended by the author. As one post-structuralist insists, “our meaning always escapes any unitary conscious grasp we may have of it, for language, as ‘writing,’ inevitably harbors the

<sup>2</sup> John Dunn, *The History of Political Theory and other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), I.



possibility of ... an indefinite multiplicity of recontextualizations and reinterpretations.”<sup>3</sup>

Contemporary Oxford political theory has not been entirely swept aside by the vogue of philosophical analysis either. Isaiah Berlin early on abandoned analytical theorizing for Herderian-inspired history of ideas. Like Pocock, he affirms that the “history not only of thought, but of consciousness, opinion, action too, of morals, politics, aesthetics, is to a large degree a history of dominant models.” In examining any civilization, “you will find that its most characteristic writings ... reflect a particular pattern of life which those who are responsible for these writings ... are dominated by.”<sup>4</sup> Echoing Skinner, he writes that “unless you try by some act of imagination to reconstruct within yourself the form of life which these people led ... your chances of truly understanding ... their writings and really knowing what Plato meant ... are small.”<sup>5</sup> In short, in order to interpret Plato properly, we must contextualize him as best we possibly can by re-imagining the form of life in which he lived and philosophized.

More recently, Oxford’s Freeden has championed conceptual political theory but also without forsaking the value of the history of political thought. Following Gallie, Freeden agrees that conceptual disputes are unavoidable but locates the source of these disputes in the underlying ideological structure of political theorizing. For Freeden, political ideologies are distinct systems of interrelated conceptual interpretations. The disagreements between liberalism and socialism about liberty are tethered, for example, to their respective disagreements about the meaning of equality. Hence, conceptual disputes are always disputes about a host of interconnected political ideas. Political ideas come in distinctive conceptual packages. Diligent intellectual history is crucial in sensitizing us to the nuanced variety of these conceptual packages, reminding us of the contested nature of all normative political concepts and thus commemorating the always unfinished nature of political theory.<sup>6</sup>

In sum, analytical English political theory has never forsworn the history of political thought as much as its American counterpart. It has not relegated intellectual history to the margins of scholarship despite the

<sup>3</sup> T. McCarthy, “The Politics of the Ineffable,” *Philosophical Forum*, 21 (1989–90), 148.

<sup>4</sup> Isaiah Berlin, *The Roots of Romanticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>6</sup> See Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Also see John Plamenatz and W. L. Weinstein for earlier Oxford combinations of conceptual analysis and the history of political thought. See especially John Plamenatz, *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) and W. L. Weinstein, “The Concept of Liberty in Nineteenth Century English Political Thought,” *Political Studies*, 13 (1965).

ascendancy of Anglo-American philosophical analysis. And in taking intellectual history seriously, English political theory has been less historically nearsighted and less prone to mistake its purported discoveries for unwitting duplications of past debates.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, for all its greater historical sensitivity to its own past, contemporary English political theory has not entirely avoided following American political theory in dichotomizing this past, reducing varieties of liberalism, utilitarianism, communitarianism and socialism to mutually exclusive, rival discourses. Dichotomizing conceptual analysis has encouraged contemporary analytic liberals to reconstruct rationally their own very uncertain tradition in accordance with their analytical preoccupations, compressing the history of liberalism into a slim and convenient canonical tale full of pregnant anticipations. This study will try to renarrate an undervalued piece of this history, hoping to restore it to prominence in the liberal canon.

More particularly, this study examines two historical versions of two purportedly rival theoretical discourses, namely nineteenth-century English utilitarianism and turn-of-the-century, English new liberalism. I suggest, first of all, that new liberals borrowed more from nineteenth-century English utilitarianism than they rejected. In my view, the new liberalism, including Green's new liberalism, was fundamentally consequentialist if not always straightforwardly and traditionally utilitarian. Secondly, I insist that precisely because the new liberalism absorbed more utilitarianism than the received view acknowledges, contemporary critics of utilitarianism should proceed more judiciously in condemning utilitarianism as fundamentally incompatible with liberalism. In other words, the new liberalism's *actual* historical debts to nineteenth-century utilitarianism reinforces the cogency and promise of recent analytical attempts to liberalize utilitarianism by investing it with respect for strong moral rights and robustly celebrating individuality.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For the way that contemporary liberals and communitarians replay unknowingly new liberal political theory in their efforts to accommodate their positions, see Avital Simhony and D. Weinstein, "Introduction" in *The New Liberalism: Reconciling Liberty and Community*, ed. Avital Simhony and D. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> My study assumes that the reader is sufficiently familiar with several basic terms of contemporary moral theory. These include liberal utilitarianism, consequentialism and perfectionism. For readers wishing to familiarize themselves with these concepts more adequately, I suggest they consult the following: for liberal utilitarianism, see Jonathan Riley, *Liberal Utilitarianism: Social Choice Theory and J. S. Mill's Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and see the "Introduction" to my *Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer's Liberal Utilitarianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); for consequentialism, see *Consequentialism*, ed. Stephen Darwall (Oxford:

## IDEALISM, UTILITARIANISM AND THE NEW LIBERALISM

Utilitarianism reigned in England during the nineteenth century, gradually giving way to analytical egalitarian liberalism during the twentieth. As English political theory lost its distinctively utilitarian identity, it also lost its distinctively English identity, becoming just another comforting voice in the homogenizing discourse of Anglo-American, egalitarian liberalism.

Egalitarian liberalism's pedigree emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries via English new liberals such as Green, Hobhouse, Hobson and Ritchie who were, in turn, powerfully influenced by the British idealists.<sup>9</sup> Hence, the history of the triumph of Anglo-American egalitarian liberalism requires taking account of its undervalued indebtedness to the new liberalism. And insofar as the new liberalism borrowed heavily from idealism, including especially the latter's criticisms of Benthamite utilitarianism, we must reach back into idealism too if we wish to understand properly the emergence of egalitarian liberalism. So the history of Anglo-American liberalism should include the legacy of the new liberalism and idealism much better than it does. As we shall see, this legacy is, in turn, considerably more indebted to nineteenth-century utilitarianism than we have otherwise been misled to expect. This study makes a sustained and extensive effort to substantiate these much underrated debts.

British idealists combined a coherence theory of truth with neo-Hegelian historical teleology. For them, thinking partially constitutes whatever we describe, explain or interpret. Facts are never simply discovered nor just speak for themselves but are mediated by cognition. When we theorize, we make and organize facts according to our systems of value, interpretative perspectives and preoccupations. Hence, the more

Blackwell, 2003); for perfectionism, see Thomas Hurka, *Perfectionism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and for a comprehensive historical and conceptual introduction to utilitarianism, see Geoffrey Scarre, *Utilitarianism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

<sup>9</sup> Some scholars consider Green and Ritchie idealists as much as new liberals. For Peter Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Green is a quintessential idealist as much as Bradley and Bosanquet. For David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, *British Idealism and Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 12–13, Green, Bosanquet and Ritchie are idealists in addition to Bradley, Caird, Jones, Haldane, Collingwood and Oakeshott. By contrast, Hobhouse and Hobson are new liberals. Boucher and Vincent nevertheless claim that idealists and new liberals “shared the same general moral and political ideals.” But Boucher calls Green, Caird, Ritchie, Bosanquet, Jones and Haldane “Idealist New Liberals” in his “Introduction,” *The British Idealists*, ed. David Boucher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xxiii. Also see 182–3, n34, where Boucher and Vincent claim that the new liberalism fractured into three major strands (left, center and right) after 1914. For them, Hobson is a left new liberal whereas Hobhouse is a centrist new liberal.

coherently we theoretically mediate and organize the world, the more truthful our understanding becomes. And as we theorize the world with increasing sophistication, we realize universal history more completely.

British idealists like Bradley and Bosanquet were as much indebted to Hegel for their social ontology and moral and political theory as for their conception of history. Bradley argues that individuals are socially constituted, making morality deeply social in the sense that acting morally requires acting *for* others rather than simply leaving them alone. Hence, insofar as Bradley regards good as self-realization, acting morally means promoting everyone's self-realization, not merely one's own. Being so interdependently constituted, we best promote our own self-realization by simultaneously promoting our fellow citizens' and they best promote theirs by promoting ours.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, because our identities are socially encumbered, rationalistic moral theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism are misconceived and self-defeating. Both theories share the misguided pre-Hegelian delusion that we can somehow detach ourselves from our social milieu when determining how to act. Acting morally primarily entails embracing one's socially constituted identity by fulfilling "one's station and its duties." Nonetheless, fulfilling the duties of one's station is not the whole of morality since the kind of society in which one lives also matters. For Bradley, conventional morality must not be taken uncritically.

Bosanquet's *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899) takes up politically where Bradley's *Ethical Studies* (1876) leaves off. Bosanquet agrees with Bradley that, insofar as our identities are socially constituted, others are not merely external constraints on our self-realization. Societies are free according to how well they manipulate social relations so that everyone flourishes. For Bosanquet, and for new liberals as well, freedom consists in being empowered by meaningful opportunities ("positive or political . . . liberty") as well as being left alone ("negative or juristic liberty"). "It . . . must be maintained . . . that the 'higher' liberty is also . . . the 'larger' liberty, presenting the greater area to activity and the more extensive choice to self-determination."<sup>11</sup> For Bosanquet, higher freedom *also* entails

<sup>10</sup> F. H. Bradley [1927], *Ethical Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 116. According to Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists*, 14, Bradley's conception of self-realization, though difficult to understand, is crucially important because it underlies "the whole political philosophy of the British Idealists." And since Nicholson regards Green as a British idealist, we can assume that Nicholson believes that Bradley's notion of self-realization grounds Green's political theory. For Nicholson's subtle analysis of Bradley's conception of self-realization, see 12–17. Also see Richard Wollheim's briefer discussion in *F. H. Bradley* (London: Penguin, 1959), 236–9.

<sup>11</sup> Bernard Bosanquet [1899], *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, eds. Gerald F. Gaus and William Sweet (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's, 2001), 147.

mastering oneself in the sense of giving “effect to the self as a whole, or remov[ing] its contradictions and so mak[ing] it most fully what it is able to be.”<sup>12</sup> Being fully free is therefore being autonomous.

Moreover, being positively free entails juridical security: Our “liberty . . . may be identified with such a system [of rights] considered as the condition and guarantee of our becoming the best that we have it in us to be.”<sup>13</sup> Self-realization is most effectively promoted indirectly by a system of strong, though not indefeasible, rights. As with liberal utilitarianism, rights function as ready-made decision procedures. Like habitual bodily activities such as walking or even just breathing, acting justly by respecting other’s rights usually demands “no effort of attention” enabling citizens to devote themselves to “problems which demand . . . intenser efforts.”<sup>14</sup> And whenever citizens lose their justice habit, liberal states swiftly reeducate them through punishment. While states can never make citizens just, they can encourage just behavior indirectly by maintaining a system of rights. By enforcing rights, they “clear the road to true volition” thus securing the conditions of self-realization.<sup>15</sup> And insofar as states restrict themselves to hindering “hindrances of the good life,” they warrant our loyalty.<sup>16</sup>

As we shall shortly see, new liberals theorized self-realization, freedom and rights much like idealists such as Bradley and Bosanquet. Few readers will find this similarity surprising. But what many might find surprising are their similar criticisms of Benthamite utilitarianism (or at least what they took Benthamite utilitarianism to be) and, even more remarkably, their similar receptivity to improved Millian utilitarianism. Idealists famously attacked utilitarianism on many fronts, which new liberals mimicked without explicitly acknowledging. However, like new liberals, they were

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 149–50. Bosanquet’s theory of freedom complements Gerald MacCallum’s later celebrated analysis of the over-inflated distinction between negative and positive freedom. For MacCallum, see Gerald C. MacCallum, “Negative and Positive Freedom,” *Philosophical Review*, 76 (1967). For Bosanquet, see, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 148.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 139      <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 201–2.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 216. According to Nicholson, Bosanquet follows Green insisting that the state should limit itself primarily to enforcing rights as conditions of individual self-realization though he differs from Green somewhat regarding the content of social rights. Hence, Bosanquet did not “radically and dangerously” depart from Green contrary to the “myth” created by Hobhouse in his 1918 *The Metaphysical Theory of the State: A Criticism*. In particular, for Nicholson, Hobhouse’s account of Bosanquet’s conception of the general will as literally a corporate independent will is a misplaced “caricature.” See Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists*, 199 and 207. Also see S. Panagakou, “Defending Bosanquet’s Philosophical Theory of the State: A Reassessment of the ‘Bosanquet–Hobhouse Controversy,’” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 7 (2005), 29–47.

<sup>16</sup> Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 21. Also see 155–6 for more on Bosanquet’s account of political obligation.

not unambiguously anti-consequentialist. Furthermore, though they were clearly more hostile to *utilitarian* consequentialism than new liberals, they never rejected utilitarianism *in toto*. They followed Green, conceding that utilitarianism possessed at least some practical value. The story of the relationship between idealism, utilitarianism and the new liberalism is complicated and nuanced.

Bosanquet was much less preoccupied with utilitarianism than Bradley though he criticized Bentham, Mill and Spencer especially in Chapter III of *The Philosophical Theory of the State*. Mostly, Bosanquet took issue with what he regarded as Bentham, Mill and Spencer's excessive individualism, which he felt their respective theories of liberty presupposed. Nevertheless, Bosanquet treats utilitarianism briefly on occasion such as where he discusses Sidgwick critically in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of *The Philosophical Theory of the State*. For instance, there, Bosanquet says that every person and organization "must take account of the consequences" of their actions, which entails that "limitations on veracity, justice, and good faith (I take Sidgwick's cases) become more and more imperative."<sup>17</sup> For Bosanquet, in other words, utilitarian considerations matter for determining right action. They also matter because "taking perfection as our criterion we are not barred from recognizing pleasure as an evidence . . . of certain elements in it."<sup>18</sup>

According to Nicholson, Bradley and Bosanquet admired each other greatly. In Nicholson's view, Bradley's *Ethical Studies* especially influenced Bosanquet, causing him to describe Bradley as his "master." Bradley, in turn, wrote Bosanquet that he valued his opinion most of all. However, Nicholson believes that neither Bradley nor Green knew one another particularly well nor seem to have directly influenced each other much, which is surprising.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, unlike Green as well as unlike Bosanquet, Bradley avoided political philosophy. Whereas as one might say that *Ethical Studies* complements Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bradley never explored the political implications of his moral theory as Green did in *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* or as Bosanquet did in *The Philosophical Theory of the State*.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 37–8, n53.

<sup>18</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, "Hedonism among the Idealists," *Mind*, n.s., 12 (1903), 213.

<sup>19</sup> Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists*, 50–3. Nicholson claims that Bradley (*Ethical Studies*, 96, note 1) only once referred to Green explicitly. Nicholson also holds that Bosanquet viewed hedonism and utilitarianism more favorably than Bradley. I have been arguing that Bradley, like new liberals after him, was much less adverse to utilitarianism than most scholars have recognized. Nicholson's assessment may therefore be overstated.

Nevertheless, as we are about to see in the chapters that follow, Bradley's ambivalence towards utilitarianism not only matched Green's in crucial respects but also reappeared in Hobhouse, Ritchie and Hobson. Though Bradley may not have influenced Green directly (and vice versa) nor Hobhouse, Ritchie and Hobson, still much in the new liberalism resembles Bradley's idealism, including their respective assessments of the then dominant utilitarianism. But my concern here is principally with the new liberalism and its philosophical debts to utilitarianism. British idealism shared some of these debts but not nearly so extensively.

New liberals, then, shared some of Bradley's ambivalence about utilitarianism. And they also followed Bradley and Bosanquet in combining a moralized theory of freedom and strong rights with a communitarian social ontology. For Green, Ritchie, Hobhouse and Hobson, moral self-realization was unconditionally good. Realizing oneself morally meant being fully free by being both "outward[ly]" and "inward[ly]" free. Such freedom meant, as Green famously said, having the enabling "positive power or capacity of doing ... something worth doing" *and* actually "doing ... something worth doing."<sup>20</sup> Or as Hobhouse put it, morally realizing oneself meant being "moral[ly]" as well as "social[ly]" free.<sup>21</sup>

For new liberals as well, rights indirectly promoted everyone's self-realization by enabling each with opportunities to flourish. And to the extent that each flourished morally, each, in turn, promoted common good by respecting the rights of others. Thus, for Hobhouse, common good was "the foundation of all personal rights."<sup>22</sup> In Green's words, rights realize our moral capacity negatively by "securing the treatment of one man by another as equally free with himself, but they do not realise it positively, because their possession does not imply that ... the individual makes a common good his own."<sup>23</sup>

In addition, new liberals invoked strong rights in defense of robust equal opportunity. Although they concurred with politically cautious idealists like Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of "self-utterance" and therefore crucial to externalizing and realizing ourselves successfully, they also stipulated that private property was

<sup>20</sup> T. H. Green [1881], "Lecture on 'Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract'," *Collected Works of T. H. Green*, ed. Peter Nicholson (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), Vol. 111, 371.

<sup>21</sup> L. T. Hobhouse [1922], *The Elements of Social Justice* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949), 57.

<sup>22</sup> L. T. Hobhouse [1911], *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (Port Washington, DC: Kennikat Press, 1968), 198.

<sup>23</sup> T. H. Green [1886], *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, *Collected Works of T. H. Green*, Vol. 11, Sect. 25.



legitimate only as long as it did not subvert equal opportunity.<sup>24</sup> In Hobson's words, "A man is not really free for purposes of self-development . . . who is not adequately provided" with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit.<sup>25</sup> New liberals, therefore, transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. But this story is a slightly more familiar one. Much less familiar, if not entirely unfamiliar, is the extent to which they also transformed utilitarianism.

Regrettably, contemporary Anglo-American political theory has underappreciated the new liberalism both for the way in which it accommodates liberalism with what we now call communitarianism and for the way in which it additionally accommodates liberalism with utilitarianism. No doubt the new liberalism has gone undervalued partly because it makes these accommodations and partly because it constitutes an idiosyncratic medley of neo-Kantianism, consequentialism and perfectionism.<sup>26</sup> Rather than creating an interconnected, legitimizing narrative, these mixed allegiances have caused contemporary liberals and communitarians to disable themselves, due to their historical insensitivity, in their struggle for theoretical accommodation.<sup>27</sup> Contemporary liberals

<sup>24</sup> Of course, not all idealists favored limited government like Bosanquet. Some, like Jones and Collingwood, favored vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government like the new liberals.

<sup>25</sup> J. A. Hobson [1909], *The Crisis of Liberalism*, ed. P. F. Clarke (Brighton: Barnes and Noble, 1974), xii. Also see L. T. Hobhouse [1911], *Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 87, where Hobhouse labels his new liberalism, "Liberal Socialism."

<sup>26</sup> See D. Weinstein, "The New Liberalism and the Rejection of Utilitarianism" in *The New Liberalism*.

<sup>27</sup> See especially Simhony and Weinstein, "Introduction" in *The New Liberalism*. Contemporary political theory's historical myopia has consequently made Raz's perfectionist liberalism seem more anomalous than it is in fact. Though Mulhall and Swift are correct in concluding that Raz "transcends" the rivalry between liberalism and communitarianism, they overemphasize his originality (Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 250). Raz's perfectionist liberalism is refurbished new liberalism with some differences. For instance, Raz distinguishes autonomy, a seminal value requiring serious political attention, from self-realization, which he holds is merely one variety of autonomy. Whereas a self-realizing person develops all of his capacities to their full potential, an autonomous person merely develops "a conception of himself, and his actions are sensitive to his past." In "embracing goals and commitments, in coming to care about one thing or another," such persons "give[s] shape" to their lives though not necessarily according to a unified plan as we shall see Hobhouse claims (Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 375 and 387]). Notwithstanding such differences, for Raz, autonomous agents nevertheless "identify" with their choices and remain "loyal" to them just like new liberal self-realizing agents. Secondly, in shaping their lives, autonomous agents, like new liberal, self-realizing agents, do not arbitrarily re-create themselves in spite of their social circumstances. Brute Nietzschean self-creation is impossible, for we are all born into communities presupposing our values. At best, acting autonomously transforms slightly, or reconfirms, these values selectively (382 and 387–8). But more than anything, Raz echoes new liberals because of the thoroughly liberal nature of his perfectionism. For Raz, following the new liberals, rights equalize opportunities for



and utilitarians have likewise handicapped themselves just as much, if not more, in their parallel attempts at accommodation. Again, the latter project of accommodation concerns me primarily in this study.

## KANT AND HEGEL

[W]oe to him who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its amount by the advantage it promises, in accordance with the Pharisaical saying, “It is better for *one* man to die than for an entire people to perish.”<sup>28</sup>

The preceding from *The Metaphysics of Morals* reinforces the view that Kant was no less anti-hedonistic than he was anti-utilitarian. For instance, Thomas Hill, Jr. insists rather typically that much of Kant’s ethics was “devoted to putting happiness in its place.”<sup>29</sup> And although Hill admits that, for Kant, acting for the sake of happiness is permissible as long as doing so is compatible with duty, Hill nevertheless reads him as devaluing happiness as an essentially unworthy pursuit. By splitting happiness off from virtue, he thus parts company with perfectionists going back to Aristotle for whom both virtue and happiness constitute human flourishing.

Contrary to views of Kant typified by Hill, Paul Guyer has insisted that Kant never irrecoverably divorced happiness from virtue. For Guyer’s Kant, virtue and happiness were always inseparable both in Kant’s early unpublished notes and fragments on moral philosophy and in his mature published writings. They were permanently and ineluctably “joined at the

acting autonomously. Rights are necessary though insufficient conditions for achieving autonomy. Furthermore, these conditions must be redistributively robust if citizens are to enjoy *meaningful* opportunities to make the best of themselves. Hence, as with new liberals, rights indirectly promote good. Governments cannot make citizens good but governments should indirectly encourage them to make themselves good by providing appropriate opportunities. Hence, politics can, and should be, perfectionist: “The autonomy principle permits and even requires governments to create morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones. In other words, we are duty bound to provide fellow citizens with the conditions of autonomy as long as we do not harm them. Coercing citizens into leading valuable lives harms them whereas providing valuable options for all harms no one. For more on how contemporary theorists, including Miller especially, unwittingly renegotiate new liberal efforts to fuse liberalism and communitarianism, see D. Weinstein, “English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” in *Handbook of Political Theory*, ed. Gerald Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage, 2004).

<sup>28</sup> Immanuel Kant [1797], *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 183. Leah Hochman has suggested to me that Kant misreads the Pharisaical tradition of Rabbinic Judaism according to which killing one person kills an entire people because when one kills a single individual, one also kills that individual’s innumerable descendants. Hence, one is really not just sacrificing one to save many but sacrificing perhaps just as many to save many.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Happiness and Human Flourishing” in *Human Welfare and Moral Worth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 168–9.