

# The Intrinsic Worth of Persons

Contractarianism  
in Moral  
and Political  
Philosophy

**Jean Hampton**

Edited by  
Daniel Farnham



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## The Intrinsic Worth of Persons

### *Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy*

Contractarianism in some form has been at the center of recent debates in moral and political philosophy. Jean Hampton was one of the most gifted philosophers involved in these debates and provided both important criticisms of prominent contractarian theories and powerful defenses and applications of the core ideas of contractarianism. In these essays, she brought her distinctive approach, animated by concern for the intrinsic worth of persons, to bear on topics such as guilt, punishment, self-respect, family relations, and the maintenance and justification of the state. Edited by Daniel Farnham, this collection is an essential contribution to understanding the problems and prospects of contractarianism in moral, legal, and political philosophy.

Jean Hampton completed her Ph.D. under the direction of John Rawls at Harvard University. She was a Harvard Knox Fellow at Cambridge University; a Pew Evangelical Scholar; and a distinguished visiting lecturer at Dalhousie University, University of Notre Dame, Pomona College, and Bristol University. She taught at several American institutions, most recently the University of Arizona, where she was a professor of philosophy at the time of her death in 1996. Her last book, *The Authority of Reason*, was published posthumously in 1998.

Daniel Farnham is a Franklin Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Georgia.



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JEAN HAMPTON

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*University of Georgia*



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## Preface and Acknowledgments

Jean Hampton wrote on an astonishing variety of topics. A small collection cannot hope to convey the full power and breadth of her thought. But it can suggest its richness, and it can push our own thinking further on issues she cared about. I have chosen essays on some of her central concerns in moral, legal, and political philosophy – concerns she returned to repeatedly to improve her view. Fortunately, much of Jean’s work on other topics – in particular, her book on reason – remains in print. I have appended a selected bibliography to help guide the reader looking for further engagement with Jean’s philosophy.

I would like to thank Tom Christiano, Richard Healey, Christopher Morris, David Schmidtz, and three anonymous referees from Cambridge University Press for their guidance. I am especially grateful to David Gauthier for his foreword and remembrance. The late Terry Moore helped to initiate the project at Cambridge, and Beatrice Rehl and Stephanie Sakson patiently saw it through to its completion. Work on this collection was supported by the Jean Hampton Memorial Fund at the University of Arizona.

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*Philosophy and Policy* 7, no. 2 (1990): 1–28. Chapter 4, “Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,” previously appeared in *UCLA Law Review* 39 (1992): 1659–1702. Chapter 5, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” previously appeared in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 775 (1994): 186–216. Chapter 6, “The Contractarian Explanation of the State,” previously appeared in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 15 (1990): 344–71.

## Foreword

### *For Jean – Some Opening Words*

David Gauthier

To be invited to introduce a selection of Jean Hampton's writings is a great honor. Would though that neither I nor anyone else were to receive it, and that Jean herself were still among us, able to write her own introduction. And if still among us, then still contributing striking ideas and challenging arguments to the never-ending conversation that we call philosophy. I miss Jean. But I am glad to have known her, and because to know Jean was to argue with her, glad to have crossed swords with her in mutually fruitful, constructive confrontation.

Like many moral philosophers of her generation, Jean received the core of her training from John Rawls – an experience that encouraged the development of a Kantian perspective. Kant was certainly one of Jean's philosophical progenitors, but so was Hobbes, and at times one can sense the opposing tugs of each on her thought. And we should not overlook the presence of a third influence, for Jean belonged to the distinct minority of analytic philosophers who are firmly committed Christians. Not that her faith replaces argument in her writings, but it is, I think, easier to appreciate the focus of some of her thinking, especially in one of the finest pieces in this volume, "*Mens Rea*," if one is aware of her religious background.

As a philosopher Jean was unusually forthcoming. Too many of us – at least in my experience – are reluctant to let our views into the public sphere until we believe we can meet all objections to them – a futile hope! – and once publicly committed, we are even more reluctant to

change our positions, disguising shifts in thought as elaborations of what we of course meant all along. Jean didn't express views casually, but being rightly suspicious of final truths in philosophy, she willingly shared her views with her fellows and, while she defended them vigorously, was ready to alter or even abandon them in the light of what seemed to her the better argument. Tenacious in debate, she was flexible in her thought – an uncommon but welcome combination.

Were Jean still with us, she would be ready and eager to continue the debates that the chapters in this collection invite. Instead, we must carry on alone, absent the protagonist. Not being able to provoke her to respond, I will play a tamer role, raising, in this introduction, my questions and worries that the reader may, if he or she wishes, try either to answer on Jean's behalf or to incorporate into developing a more convincing alternative. Or the reader may prefer to ignore my comments, as distracting him or her from the encounter with Jean. What matters most is that the reader find, or find again, how fertile it is to read Jean and enter with her into some of the most challenging questions of moral, political, and legal philosophy.

In discussing Jean's papers that are reprinted here, I shall follow my own thread through her ideas, rather than proceeding in the order the editor has chosen for them. I begin with "*Mens Rea*," in which Jean offers an original account of culpability, taking defiance as her key. Genuine culpability, whether rational, moral, or legal, requires a defiant mind. The culpable lawbreaker knows, or should know, the law; he or she recognizes its authority but believes that authority can be defied, replaced by a different authority more to his or her liking. I am reminded of Milton's Satan, who expresses his (futile) defiance of God's law in his cry, "Evil, be thou my good!"

Essential to Jean's account is the idea that defiance is, and must be, deeply futile, in that the authority defied, be it reason, morality, or law, cannot be dethroned. Jean gives us an account of rational authority that establishes this. But moral and legal authority, as she recognizes, are deeply problematic. So what Jean offers us seems to me to be an account of legal culpability that needs impregnable authority as its basis. And the reader must ask him- or herself if such authority is to be had.

Before leaving this profoundly original chapter, one word of advice as to how to read it. Read the conclusion only after you have assimilated the body of the chapter. For the conclusion should come as an unexpected twist in Jean's argument – and, as it happens, one that reveals more about her character than any other single passage in this collection.

“Selflessness and the Loss of Self” is also a deeply illuminating chapter, both for its argument and for what it reveals about its author. Moral philosophers are all too ready to come down on the side of altruism and to consider self-sacrifice, if not always a moral demand, yet a mark of moral sainthood. Jean is rightly suspicious; not all self-sacrifice, she tells us, deserves our respect or approval. Selflessness may be a loss of the self that we should be guarding against those whom we might call moral imperialists (my term, not hers) – those who would use their fellows in the name of morality.

Of course Jean would not have us embrace egoism and selfishness in our effort not to be stifled by altruism and selflessness. There is a balance to be struck – and it is the need for balance that made contractarian thinking appealing to Jean, since the contractarian seeks principles and practices that afford fair mutual benefit, rejecting one-sided sacrifice but forbidding unconstrained self-assertion.

Two of the chapters in this collection focus on contractarian themes. In “The Contractarian Explanation of the State” Jean boldly attempts to use the social contract argument to answer not normative or justificatory but causal questions about the state, its origins, and its maintenance. Most contemporary contract theorists would cast a dubious eye on the explanatory use of the social contract, but Jean, with her usual disregard for conventional wisdom, is undaunted.

But Jean recognizes that her claim is deceptive, in that the procedure by which she supposes a state might be generated is coordinative rather than contractual, in that it does not involve the promises that characterize contractual agreement. (We in North America follow a convention in driving on the right; common sense, and not any contract or promise, ensures that we follow the convention.)

The interest of the chapter, however, does not turn on a terminological point. Jean proposes what she calls the convention model, and the questions for the reader should concern the merit of the model. And here one should, I think, applaud Jean for recognizing that any explanation of a democratic state must account for two directions of control: the rulers by the people and the people by the rulers. She deploys her model to try to show how these seemingly opposed directions may be fitted together. If she succeeds, we can readily forgive her for replacing the idea of a contract with that of a self-interested convention.

But we may be less ready to forgive her departure from the idea of a contract in “Feminist Contractarianism.” This chapter plays a valuable philosophical role, making clear the difference between Hobbesian and

Kantian ideas of the social contract and showing how contractarian modes of thought are the ally, rather than the enemy, of the feminist moral theorist. And before raising my concern with Jean's approach, I want to comment briefly on the divide between Hobbes and Kant. The former treats the contract as a deal that each person finds reasonable to accept in order better to advance his or her own interests. The latter treats the contract rather as guaranteeing proper respect for him- or herself as an end. One can readily appreciate, in the latter, the connection with Jean's insistence that we not be morally used. The contract ensures that everyone receives due moral recognition. And it is a short step from this to seeing the contract as a device appealing to feminists who seek to eradicate male dominance in morality as elsewhere.

But now my worry. In "Feminist Contractarianism" Jean insists that "every contract theory . . . has used the idea of a contract as a heuristic tool that points us toward the correct form of moral reasoning and has not relied on the notion of contract in any literal way to do any justificatory work." This seems to me to sell contractarianism short. For at least on my view, the contract is intended to do real work.\* Only by determining what rational persons would agree to in a suitable pre-moral situation can we give content to and a rationale for moral principles. Proposed or alleged moral principles can be put to the contractarian test – might they be agreed to by rational persons seeking principles to govern their interactions? I leave to the reader the question whether this role is merely a "heuristic tool." Would that I could argue the issue with Jean herself!

"The Common Faith of Liberalism" pits Jean once more against her mentor, John Rawls. Here the issue is whether a pluralist society can be unified by "Enlightenment liberalism," a rationally grounded political conception that provides social justice and stability. Rawls dismisses such a conception as partisan and tries to replace it by a conception of political liberalism freed from the bias of the Enlightenment. Jean – rightly to my mind – argues that Rawls is unable to avoid the faith that, she believes, all liberals share: faith in the possibility of "a social and political structure that is reliant on reason and respectful of all individuals' dignity and autonomy." In a world increasingly hostile to the idea of the Enlightenment, Rawls has sought to maintain the vestiges of liberalism without

\* *Editor's note:* Hampton discusses Gauthier's view at length in "Two Faces of Contractarian Thought," in Peter Vallentyne, ed., *Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31–55.

its traditional commitments. Jean's chapter is a salutary reminder that without those commitments, liberalism would be defenseless.

One chapter remains to be mentioned: "Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution." Jean sees retribution as expressive, as asserting the claim of the moral order in the face of one who denies it. (Is this another case of defiance?) More specifically, moral wrongdoing consists in diminishing human value; retribution reasserts that value. But what is it to *diminish* value? It cannot be literally to degrade someone, for as a Kantian Jean denies that persons can be degraded. The attempt to degrade is futile. (But, to refer back to another of Jean's papers, what is loss of self if not degradation?) Diminishment is "the appearance of degradation" – treating someone as if he or she lacked the inalienable value he or she possesses. And retribution treats the wrongdoer in a way that repudiates his or her attempt to degrade and reasserts the value that he or she diminishes.

I find this doctrine puzzling. If we cannot be degraded, how can we appear to be degraded – how can we be diminished? Jean is aware of this question – objections to her views rarely escape her notice. And of course she grapples with it – how successful she is will have to be judged by the reader.

So these are the ideas awaiting the reader of this book. I have tried to suggest some of the treats in store – and some of what to me are the hard questions to be faced. Jean would want us to pursue those – and other – questions. She was never one to shy away from controversy. The best way we can honor her is to accept the challenges of the papers she has left us, and seek to carry forward their arguments.





## Feminist Contractarianism

Like any good theory, [a woman's moral theory] will need not to ignore the partial truth of previous theories. So it must accommodate both the insights men have more easily than women, and those women have more easily than men. It should swallow up its predecessor theories. Women moral theorists, if any, will have this very great advantage over the men whose theories theirs supplant, that they can stand on the shoulders of men moral theorists, as no man has yet been able to stand on the shoulders of any woman moral theorist. There can be advantages, as well as handicaps, in being latecomers.

Annette C. Baier<sup>1</sup>

Is it possible to be simultaneously a feminist and a partisan of the contractarian approach to moral and political theory? The prospects for a successful marriage of these two positions look dubious if one has read recent feminist criticisms of contemporary contractarian theories. Moreover, this brand of moral theory has been suffused with the technical machinery of game theory, logic, and economics of the sort often thought to attract male philosophers and repel female ones, making such theorizing, in the words of one feminist philosopher, a “big boys’ game” and a “male locker room” that few female philosophers have “dared enter.”<sup>2</sup>

But this seemingly inhospitable philosophical terrain has been my intellectual home for some years now. And I have been persistently attracted to contractarian modes of theorizing not merely because such

<sup>1</sup> Annette C. Baier, “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?,” *Nous* 19, no. 1 (March 1985): 56.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54. And see Ian Hacking, “Winner Take Less: A Review of *The Evolution of Cooperation* by Robert Axelrod,” in *New York Review of Books*, June 28, 1984.

theorizing offers “good clean intellectual fun”<sup>3</sup> but also because it holds out the promise of delivering a moral theory that will answer to my political – and in particular my feminist – commitments. This is not to say that particular contractarian moral theories don’t deserve much of the feminist criticism they have received. In this chapter, I will explore and acknowledge the legitimacy of these feminist challenges. Nonetheless I want to argue that one version of this method of moral theorizing offers us what may be the keystone of any truly adequate moral theory.

In a nutshell I will be contending that contractarianism illuminates distributive justice, and this form of justice is required not only in relationships between strangers but also in relationships between intimates, including husbands and wives, parents and children, friend and friend. In making this argument I am opposing conventional philosophical wisdom going back as far as Aristotle, who writes, “If people are friends, they have no need of justice.”<sup>4</sup> Among contemporary theorists, David Hume’s claim that justice is necessary only in circumstances in which people have limited feelings of benevolence or friendship toward one another has been accepted by virtually every political philosopher since then, including Karl Marx and John Rawls. But I will contend that distributive justice, understood in its deepest sense, is inherent in any relationship that we regard as morally healthy and respectable – particularly in a friendship. Indeed, Aristotle himself hinted at this idea immediately after the passage just quoted – he says not only that those who are just also require friendship but also that “the justice that is most just seems to belong to friendship.”<sup>5</sup> The reflection in this chapter might be taken as a way of exploring this enigmatic passage.

## I. Hearing Voices

Recent work by Carol Gilligan has reinforced the general tendency of philosophers to see the concerns of justice and friendship as distinct from one another. Using interviews with older children and adults that address real or hypothetical moral problems, Gilligan attempts to display two different “moral voices” – voices she calls the “ethic of justice”

<sup>3</sup> Baier, “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?,” p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by T. E. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 1155a22 (p. 208).

<sup>5</sup> See 1155a27 (Irwin translation, p. 208). It may be, however, that Aristotle is primarily arguing that if one is just, one is also friendly (as part of his concept of civic friendship), whereas I want to emphasize that if one is friendly, one is also just.

and the “ethic of care” – and finds some evidence (albeit controversial) associating the first with men and the second with women.<sup>6</sup>

Two of her interviews with older children have always struck me as highly interesting. Eleven-year-old Jake, whose answers to the interviewers earned him high marks on Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral maturity scale, gave the following answer when asked, “When responsibility to oneself and responsibility to others conflict, how should one choose?” He replied with great self-assurance, “You go about one-fourth to the others and three-fourths to yourself.”<sup>7</sup> Contrast the following answer to the same question given by eleven-year-old Amy, whose answers to the interviewers earned poorer marks on Kohlberg’s scale:

Well, it really depends on the situation. If you have a responsibility with somebody else [*sic*], then you should keep it to a certain extent, but to the extent that it is really going to hurt you or stop you from doing something that you really, really want, then I think maybe you should put yourself first. But if it is your responsibility to somebody really close to you, you’ve just got to decide in that situation which is more important, yourself or that person, and like I said, it really depends on what kind of person you are and how you feel about the other person or persons involved.<sup>8</sup>

This rather tortured reply indicates considerable sensitivity and beneficent concern for others. Unsurprisingly, Amy’s discussion of other moral problems reveals an interest in maintaining the well-being of others and in keeping relationships intact, which, according to Gilligan, shows that Amy values care. In contrast, Jake’s remarks take for granted the importance of following rules that preclude interference in other people’s pursuit of their interests, which, according to Gilligan, shows that Jake values justice. When asked to explain his answer to the question about responsibility to himself and others, Jake replies, “Because the most important thing in your decision should be yourself, don’t let yourself be guided totally by other people, but you have to take them into consideration. So, if what you want to do is blow yourself up with an atom bomb, you should

<sup>6</sup> Carol Gilligan’s classic work is *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). She has revised and expanded her ideas since then. See a variety of articles about Gilligan’s recent work in *Mapping the Moral Domain*, ed. Carol Gilligan, Victoria Ward, and Jill McLean, with Betty Bandige (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for the Study of Gender, Education, and Human Development, 1988). See also Carol Gilligan, “Moral Orientation and Moral Development,” in *Women and Moral Theory*, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), pp. 19–33.

<sup>7</sup> Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, pp. 35–36.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

maybe blow yourself up with a hand grenade because you are thinking about your neighbors who would die also.”<sup>9</sup>

As Jake’s remarkable example shows, he regards “being moral” as pursuing one’s own interests without damaging the interests of others, and he takes it as a matter of moral strength not to allow the interests of others to dictate to him what he ought or ought not to do. (“Don’t let yourself be guided totally by other people,” he warns.) In contrast, “being moral” for Amy means being responsive to the needs of others who are close to you or to whom you have made a commitment. Each child therefore makes a different assumption about the extent to which any of us is self-sufficient. Jake assumes that we are and ought to be interested in and capable of caring for ourselves, so that interaction with others is likely to be perceived either as interference or as an attempt to compromise one’s independence. In contrast, Amy takes it for granted that we are not self-sufficient and that service to others will be welcomed as a sign of care and commendable concern.

Many feminist theorists maintain that the kind of moral voice that Amy exemplifies is clearly preferable to that of Jake. Annette Baier, for example, writes,

Gilligan’s girls and women saw morality as a matter of preserving valued ties to others, of preserving the conditions for that care and mutual care without which human life becomes bleak, lonely, and after a while, as the mature men in her study found, not self affirming, however successful in achieving the egoistic goals which had been set. The boys and men saw morality as a matter of finding workable traffic rules for self assertors, so that they do not needlessly frustrate one another, and so that they could, should they so choose, cooperate in more positive ways to mutual advantage.<sup>10</sup>

Certainly Baier is right that a “traffic rule” perspective on morality is neither a sophisticated nor a mature moral perspective. It appears to derive from the mistaken assumption that each of us is self-sufficient, able, and desirous of “going it alone.” Amy is surely right that this is false. In contrast, a perspective on morality that emphasizes caring for and fostering the well-being of others appears to be not only a richer, sounder theory of what genuine moral behavior is all about but also a better guide to behavior that enables one to live a life full of friendship and love. Such a perspective is one that women (and especially mothers) are frequently thought to exhibit more than men. Baier concludes, “It

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>10</sup> Baier, “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?,” p. 62.

would not be much of an exaggeration to call the Gilligan ‘different voice’ the voice of the potential parent.”<sup>11</sup>

Baier’s way of responding to Jake’s answer makes him into an archetype for a (commonly male) brand of moral immaturity. But one can respond to Amy’s answer in a way that makes her an archetype for a quite different (and commonly female) brand of moral immaturity. Consider that Jake’s answer is 13 words; Amy’s is 109 words, and it is neither clear nor self-assured. *Maybe* she can put herself first, she says, if not doing so would mean losing out on something that she “really, really” wants. But only maybe. Jake is convinced not only that his interests count, but that they count far more than other people’s (three-quarters to one-quarter). Amy appears to be having trouble figuring out whether or not her interests count at all. Consider her answer to the responsibility question:

Some people put themselves and things for themselves before they put other people, and some people really care about other people. Like, I don’t think your job is as important as somebody that you really love, like your husband or your parents or a very close friend. Somebody that you really care for – or if it’s just your responsibility to your job or somebody that you barely know, then maybe you go first.<sup>12</sup>

Again, note her “maybe.” Even in a situation in which she takes her responsibility to others to be minimal, she is having trouble asserting the priority of her own interests. Here is a child who appears very much guided by the interests of other people and takes that guidance to be what “being moral” means. One worries that she will find it difficult to plan a life that takes into consideration what she alone wants, because she is highly susceptible to being at the beck and call of others.

These interpretations are harsh and are probably not fair to the real children. But the fact that they are not only possible but natural shows the immature directions in which each child’s thinking tends. Jack is susceptible to a brand of moral immaturity that manifests itself in an insensitivity to the needs of others and a failure to see himself as a fellow caretaker in a relationship. His remarks define a morality only in the most minimal sense. There is too much distance between him and others to enable him to be aware of and responsive to the needs or interests of others. In contrast, Amy is susceptible to a moral perspective that makes her too sensitive to other people, and her concern to meet their needs borders on

<sup>11</sup> Annette Baier, “The Need for More Than Justice,” in *Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory*, ed. Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987), p. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, p. 36.

outright servility. Whereas the authority and importance of others' needs are clear for her, the authority and importance of her own needs appear not to be. Indeed, unlike Jake she can offer no principle upon which to adjudicate the conflict between her claims and the claims of others, presumably because she has difficulty seeing herself as entitled to make any claim at all. And because she is so readily able to appreciate and be responsive to the needs of others, she is potentially a highly exploitable person. Thus if we interpret Amy's remarks as typifying a brand of moral immaturity quite different from that of Jake, they define an "ethic of care" that is really just a mimicry of genuine morality insofar as "caring" actions are generated out of the assumption that the agent is worth less than (and hence the servant of) the people she serves. Such caring cannot be moral because it is born of self-abnegation rather than self-worth.<sup>13</sup>

Although she respects Amy's concern for care, Gilligan herself admits the immaturity of Amy's response (while also stressing the immaturity of Jake's perspective). Moreover, that this brand of caring is an imitation of a genuinely moral response to others has also been noticed by other feminist writers,<sup>14</sup> and it is a surprisingly common theme in literature by women. For example, Charlotte Brontë's heroine in *Shirley* begins the journey to genuine maturity when she comes to question her own propensity to offer to care for others:

"What was I created for, I wonder? Where is my place in the world?" She mused again. "Ah! I see," she pursued presently, "that is the question which most old maids are puzzled to solve: other people solve it for them by saying, 'Your place is to do good to others, to be helpful whenever help is wanted.' That is right in some measure, and a very convenient doctrine for the people who hold it; but I perceive that certain sets of human beings are very apt to maintain that other sets should give up their lives to them and their service, and then they requite them by praise: they call them devoted and virtuous. Is this enough? Is it to live? Is there not a terrible hollowness, mockery, want, craving, in that existence which is given away to others, for want of something of your own to bestow it on? I suspect there is. Does virtue lie in abnegation of self? I do not believe it. Undue humility makes tyranny: weak concession creates selfishness. . . . Each human being has his share of rights. I suspect it would conduce to the happiness and welfare of all, if each knew his allotment and held to it as tenaciously as a martyr to his creed."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See Marcia Homiak's "Feminism and Aristotle's Rational Ideal," in L. Antony and C. Witt, ed., *A Mind of One's Own*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), which discusses the degenerative form of kindness that emerges when one lacks self-love.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, L. Blum, M. Homiak, J. Housman, and N. Scheman, "Altruism and Women's Oppression," in *Women and Philosophy*, ed. Carol Gould and Marx Wartofsky (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1976), pp. 222–47.

<sup>15</sup> Charlotte Brontë, *Shirley*, quotation taken from edition of Andrew Hook and Judith Hook (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 190.

And there is Virginia Woolf's well-known description of "the angel in the house" who threatens to take over and destroy a woman's soul:

She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She was utterly unselfish. She excelled in the difficult art of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg: if there was a draught she sat in it – in short she was so constituted that she never had a mind or a wish of her own, but preferred to sympathize always with the minds and wishes of others. Above all – I need not say it – she was pure. . . . I turned upon her and caught her by the throat. I did my best to kill her. My excuse, if I were to be had up in a court of law would be that I acted in self-defence. Had I not killed her she would have killed me.<sup>16</sup>

Both novelists believe that a genuine moral agent has to have a good sense of her own moral claims if she is going to be a person at all and thus a real partner in a morally sound relationship.<sup>17</sup> She must also have some sense of what it is to make a legitimate claim if she is to understand and respond to the legitimate claims of others and resist attempts to involve herself in relationships that will make her the mere servant of others' desires. Both philosophical and commonsense understandings of morality have been so fixated on the other-regardingness of moral life that they have encouraged us to mistake archetypal Amy's response for a moral response.<sup>18</sup>

What happens when archetypal Jake and archetypal Amy grow up? If they were to marry, wouldn't Amy take it upon herself to meet the needs of Jake and do the work to maintain their relationship (giving up her career

<sup>16</sup> From "Professions for Women" in *The Virginia Woolf Reader*, ed. Mitchell A. Leaska (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1984), pp. 278–79.

<sup>17</sup> See Blum et al., "Altruism and Women's Oppression," for a discussion of the way altruism must be accompanied by autonomy if it is going to be a morally healthy response.

<sup>18</sup> I take this to be an idea suggested by Susan Wolf in her "Moral Saints," *Journal of Philosophy* 79, no. 8 (August 1982): 419–39. Ironically, this fixation has been more the product of theories developed by males (e.g., Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham) than by females. Perhaps such a fixation is the natural result of male dissatisfaction with a Jake-like moral perspective and an attempt to redirect the largely self-regarding focus of that perspective. But theorists, such as Kant, who stress the other-regarding nature of morality, invariably start from an assumption of self-worth and personal autonomy. In a paper that celebrates interdependence and connection, Baier notes that Kant thought women were incapable of full autonomy and then remarks, "It is ironic that Gilligan's original findings in a way confirm Kant's views – it seems that autonomy really may not be for women. Many of them reject that ideal" ("Need for More Than Justice," p. 50). But such a rejection may actually be evidence of these women's development into servile and dependent beings rather than free, self-respecting, and claim-making persons. For discussions on this general topic, see the contributions by DuBois, Dunlap, Carol Gilligan, Catharine MacKinnon, and Menkel-Meadow in "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law," *Buffalo Law Review* 34 (1985): 11ff.

if necessary, insofar as she thinks that a job isn't as important as "someone you really love")? And wouldn't Jake naturally take it for granted that his interests should predominate (three-fourths to one-fourth) and be ignorant of many of the needs of others around him that might prompt a caring response? I find it striking that these children's answers betray perspectives that seem to fit them perfectly for the kind of gendered roles that prevail in our society. In their archetypal forms, I hear the voice of a child who is preparing to be a member of a dominating group and the voice of another who is preparing to be a member of the group that is dominated. Neither of these voices should be allowed to inform our moral theorizing if such theorizing is going to be successful at formulating ways of interacting that are not only morally acceptable but also attack the oppressive relationships that now hold in our society.

## II. Two Forms of Contractarian Theory

So how do we set about defining an acceptable formulation of morality? The idea that the essence not only of human rationality but also of human morality is embodied in the notion of contract is the heart of what is called the "contractarian" approach to moral thinking. Advocates of this approach ask us to imagine a group of people sitting around a bargaining table; each person is interested only in himself. This group is to decide answers to moral or political questions by determining what they can all agree to or what they would all be unreasonable to reject.

However, both proponents and opponents of this style of argument have failed to appreciate just how many argumentative uses of the contract idea have appeared over the centuries. Arguments that self-consciously invoke a social contract can differ in what they aim to justify or explain (for example, the state, conceptions of justice, morality), what they take the problem of justification to be, and whether or not they presuppose a moral theory or purport to be a moral theory. Thus, even though theorists who call themselves "contractarians" have all supposedly begun from the same reflective starting point – namely, what people could "agree to" – these differences and disagreements among people who are supposedly in the same philosophical camp show that contractarians are united not by a common philosophical theory but by a common *image*. Philosophers hate to admit it, but sometimes they work from pictures rather than ideas. And in an attempt to get a handle on the nature of the state, the reasons for its justification, and the legitimate moral claims each of us can make on our behalf against others, the contract imagery has struck many as enormously promising. But how that image has been translated