



The Rise of **European** **Security Cooperation**

Seth G. Jones

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One of the most striking developments in international politics today is the significant increase in security cooperation among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred because of the changing structure of the international and regional systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by US dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in the security realm to increase their ability to project power abroad and decrease reliance on the United States. Furthermore, European leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe whilst building power abroad.

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1 Introduction

In the late 1930s, shortly before Germany's *blitzkrieg* into Poland and the beginning of World War II, Western Europe was a labyrinth of defensive walls and fortresses. A traveler journeying eastward from Paris to Stuttgart would have stumbled across two heavily fortified lines: the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. In France, the Maginot Line began near Basel, Switzerland, snaked northward along the Franco-German border, and ended near the French town of Longuyen. As a reporter for the British *Daily Express* wrote in May 1933:

I embarked today on a perilous pilgrimage to the battlefields of the next war . . . No man has yet succeeded in locating the exact positions of the mystery defences, in gauging their strength, appearance and cost. "Go at your own peril," a high official of the War Ministry said to me when I informed him of my intention . . . Along the scattered line of defences north of Metz, behind Belgium, where movable forts, strange modern devices with rolls of barbed wire, armaments and guns, travel from place to place, wherever they are needed, like lumbering tanks, my way lies.¹

French politicians and military figures – including André Maginot, French minister of war who directed its construction – conceived the Maginot Line as an impregnable barrier against any future German invasion.

It consisted of some fifty large fortifications. At the front were *maisons fortes*, fortified barracks manned by armed frontier police, whose job was to delay an enemy's advance and alarm the main defenses. Roughly a mile behind laid the *avant postes*, large concrete bunkers equipped with machine guns and 47mm anti-tank guns. They were protected by stretches of barbed wire to hinder the advance of infantry, anti-personnel mines, and upright rail sections embedded in concrete to impede tank movement. Behind the *avant postes* was the main defensive line, the

¹ Quoted in Vivian Rowe, *The Great Wall of France: The Triumph of the Maginot Line* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1961), p. 82.

position de résistance. These lines consisted of large forts known as *ouvrages* that were scattered roughly nine miles apart, held over 1,000 troops, and housed artillery ranging from the 75mm gun to the 135mm howitzer. The surface areas were protected by steel-reinforced concrete up to 3.5m thick, a depth capable of withstanding multiple direct hits.²

In Germany, the Siegfried Line (or West Wall) began near Basel, crept roughly 400 miles northward along the borders with France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and petered out just south of the Waal River. The line included a system of pillboxes, observation and command posts, and bunkers that housed machine guns and anti-tank weapons. Most were constructed of concrete, steel, logs, and filled sandbags. Scattered among them were trenches, minefields, barbed wire, and the infamous “dragon’s teeth,” large concrete slabs protruding from the earth to obstruct tank movement. As Winston Churchill noted in the late 1930s, the Siegfried Line presented a formidable barrier:

In the dawn of 1938 decisive changes in European groupings and values had taken place. The Siegfried Line confronted France with a growing barrier of steel and concrete, requiring as it seemed an enormous sacrifice of French manhood to pierce. The door from the West was shut.³

The heavily fortified walls in eastern France and western Germany are stark reminders of the security competition that plagued Europe in the two centuries prior to World War II. The Napoleonic wars (1803–1815), wars of Italian unification (1859), Seven Weeks’ War (1866), Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), World War I (1914–1918), and World War II (1939–1945) included some of the bloodiest and most destructive wars ever fought.

Today, little more than weeds and rubble are left of these once formidable walls. In fact, a traveler journeying from Paris to Stuttgart today may be forgiven for not realizing that he or she has even crossed borders. The differences between pre-World War II Europe and today are striking. Indeed, Europe has experienced two fundamental transformations in the security realm over the last century. The first was the move from Hobbesian balance-of-power politics and security competition during much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and half of the twentieth century, to US-led transatlantic cooperation during the

² On the Maginot Line see Rowe, *The Great Wall of France*; Anthony Kemp, *The Maginot Line: Myth and Reality* (New York: Stein and Day, 1982); J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann, *The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

³ Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 261–2.

Cold War. The second major transformation was the increase in intra-European security cooperation after the end of the Cold War. The latter transformation is the primary focus of this book. Yet a proper understanding of today also requires delving into the sinews of Europe during the Cold War.

The debate about Europe

This book examines one of the most striking developments in international politics today: the significant increase in security cooperation among European Union states since the end of the Cold War. To assess this development, this book offers the most systematic and comprehensive analysis of European security cooperation to date. The increase in European security cooperation today is especially impressive given Europe's bloody and divided history, which is neatly illustrated by the walls and fortresses that carved up the continent between World Wars I and II. It is also striking since security cooperation has continued despite such incidents as the French and Dutch veto of the European Constitution in 2005.⁴

Arguments about Europe tend to fall into two camps. A small minority believe that European security cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War. Some also believe that Europe is becoming a major global actor. For example, Henry Kissinger argues: "The emergence of a unified Europe is one of the most revolutionary events of our time."⁵ Another analysis contends that European security developments are "of revolutionary significance" and will likely "transform the nature of the European Union, its relations with other parts of the world and, in particular, the shape of transatlantic relations."⁶ But the vast majority of scholars and policymakers – especially in the United States – are deeply pessimistic that little, if any, meaningful security cooperation has occurred in Europe.

Consequently, this book examines the evolution of European cooperation in the security realm. It asks three sets of questions. First, has there

⁴ The French and Dutch rejections led some analysts to wonder whether this spelled the eventual demise of the European Union. See, for example, Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, "The End of Europe?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 6, November / December 2005, pp. 55–67. On the constitution see the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, European Convention, Brussels CONV 850/03, 18 July 2003.

⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 47.

⁶ Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, *Europe's Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001), p. 5.

been a significant increase in security cooperation among EU states since the Cold War? Second, if so, why? Why has there been significant cooperation since the end of the Cold War, and why was there comparatively little security cooperation through the European Community during the Cold War? Third, what are the future prospects for security cooperation among EU states? What are the implications for European–American relations?

The main argument can be divided into two parts. First, the evidence clearly shows that there has been a significant increase in European security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. To date, however, there has been virtually no effort to measure this change systematically. A “significant” increase in cooperation means that European states today predominantly cooperate with each other in such areas as imposing economic sanctions for foreign policy goals, developing and producing weapons, and building military forces – rather than unilaterally or with non-European states. It also means that there has been a measurable increase in intra-European cooperation compared to the Cold War. Several examples illustrate the point:

- *Security institutions*: European states established a foreign policy arm of the EU beginning with the Maastricht Treaty (1992). There was no meaningful intra-European security cooperation during the Cold War, as illustrated by such failed attempts as the European Defense Community, Fouchet Plan, and European Political Cooperation.
- *Economic sanctions*: European states impose sanctions for foreign policy goals roughly 78 percent of the time through the European Union. This marks a striking difference from the Cold War, when they sanctioned only 12 percent of the time through the European Community.
- *Arms production*: European states and defense firms largely develop and produce advanced weapons with each other. In some areas, such as missiles and helicopters, research and development occurs almost exclusively at the European rather than the national level.
- *Military forces*: European states have established a rapid reaction military capability, EU battle groups, European Gendarmerie Force, and a political-military structure to project power independently of NATO and the United States. They have also deployed nearly a dozen EU missions to such countries as Macedonia, Bosnia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, and Palestinian territory. There were no deployments through the European Community during the Cold War.

To be clear, I use the term “cooperation” rather than integration because European behavior has been intergovernmental, not supranational.

Major foreign policy and defense decisions are still made in European capitals. The European Union is not on the verge of becoming a supra-national state, nor is a European army imminent. European states also do not agree on all foreign policy issues, though they agree on many of them. The point, however, is that there has been a quantifiable and largely unrecognized increase in security cooperation among European states since the end of the Cold War.

Second, this cooperation has largely occurred because of the changing structure of the international and regional systems. The international system shifted from a bipolar structure during the Cold War characterized by competition between the United States and Soviet Union, to a unipolar structure after the Cold War characterized by US dominance. This shift caused European states to cooperate in the security realm for two reasons: to increase Europe's ability to project power abroad, and to decrease reliance on the United States. In addition, the regional system in Europe shifted from one with a divided Germany and a dominant US presence during the Cold War, to one with a rapidly declining US presence and a reunified Germany. This shift caused European leaders in the early 1990s to adopt a "binding" strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent. In sum, security cooperation has been about preserving peace on the continent and building European power abroad.

To test this argument, this book offers a comprehensive approach. It measures cooperation from World War II to the present by examining all major attempts to create a European security institution, all cases in which European states imposed sanctions for foreign policy goals, all cases of transnational weapons collaboration involving European defense firms, and the collaboration of military forces. The finding is unambiguous: European states are increasingly cooperating in the security realm. The likely result will be increasing friction between the United States and Europe in the future. Indeed, some in the US government have strongly opposed security cooperation outside NATO. For instance, the US Department of Defense has stated that it would actively work "to prevent the creation of an EU counterpart to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and a separate 'EU' army."⁷

Consequently, this book challenges two sets of arguments. First, it contends that the deep skepticism about the extent of European security cooperation and the prospects for the future are mistaken. For

⁷ United States Department of Defense, *Responsibility Sharing Report* (Washington, DC: US Dept of Defense, June 2002), Chapter II, p. 5.

the vast majority of scholars – especially in the United States – security cooperation has been more talk than action. European countries have been just as unwilling as always to coordinate foreign and defense policies. “On foreign policy issues,” notes the *Financial Times*, “Europe [is] more unwilling than ever to speak with one united voice.”⁸ Thomas Risse notes that on foreign policy and defense matters “Europe remains divided, while the US rules.”⁹ In his book *Of Paradise and Power*, Robert Kagan writes that “the effort to build a European force has so far been an embarrassment to Europeans.”¹⁰ Douglas Lemke likewise argues that European states, including France, continue to view NATO as the only viable regional security organization. “The [European Union] Rapid Reaction Force is too small to serve as a counter to U.S. military power and French officials have stated repeatedly that NATO will remain Europe’s primary defense organization.”¹¹

In addition, some argue that the future of Europe will likely be one of competition rather than cooperation. As John Mearsheimer writes: “Without the American pacifier, Europe is not guaranteed to remain peaceful. Indeed, intense security competition among the great powers would likely ensue because, upon American withdrawal, Europe would go from benign bipolarity to unbalanced multipolarity, the most dangerous kind of power structure.”¹² These arguments are misplaced. As this study demonstrates, there has been a measurable *increase* in security cooperation in several areas despite the withdrawal of 70 percent of US European Command since 1990, and despite the likelihood that more will withdraw from Europe in the near future.¹³ The departure of large numbers of US forces – and European expectations

⁸ Judy Dempsey, “Result May Not Focus European Minds,” *Financial Times*, November 7, 2002, p. 3. See also, for example, Martin Walker, “Walker’s World: The EU’s Grim Year,” *United Press International*, December 31, 2005.

⁹ Thomas Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2005, p. 303.

¹⁰ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 53. Walter Russell Mead similarly argues that “Europe’s relative decline in world influence will continue at least through the first half of the new century,” including its feeble attempt at foreign policy and defense cooperation. Walter Russell Mead, “American Endurance,” in Tod Lindberg, ed., *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 163.

¹¹ Douglas Lemke, “Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective,” in T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 60.

¹² John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 5, September/October 2001, p. 52.

¹³ Congressional Budget Office (US Congress), *Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, May 2004).

that the US military presence will be short-lived – should have led to less cooperation in the security realm. Instead, there was more.

Second, it challenges several explanations regarding why cooperation has occurred. European security cooperation is not caused by pressure from domestic and transnational actors on state preferences, as argued by *liberal intergovernmentalists*. This argument, which has its roots in broader liberal theories of international politics, assumes that states' strategic preferences for European cooperation come largely from the efforts of powerful domestic interest groups. Nor is security cooperation primarily a function of efforts to increase the prospects for mutual gain through an international institution, as *institutionalists* argue. European security cooperation is also not caused by the internalization of a *European identity*. This argument assumes that German, French, Italian, and other national identities and security interests have increasingly been transformed into a collective European identity. Finally, cooperation is not caused by *functional spillover* from the economic or other realms.

Part of the problem with the current debate about European security is that the dependent variable is almost never clearly specified or measured. What do we mean by foreign policy or defense cooperation? How do we measure it? How do we know whether European Union states are speaking or acting with "one voice"? The development of the European Union and the subsequent political, economic, and security changes in Europe have led to a sizable – though not always impressive – amount of scholarly work seeking to explain the causes of European cooperation. The bulk of it, however, has focused on explaining cooperation in such areas as economic and monetary affairs. What is perhaps most troubling, though, is the absence of rigorous work that seeks to measure the behavior of European states *over time*. Has there been a change over the past few decades in the coordination of foreign and defense policies? And, if so, why?

An additional problem is one of selection bias. Skeptics often argue that European cooperation is illusory because European states have not devoted sufficient resources to defense in comparison to the United States.¹⁴ But this is a false dichotomy. It is certainly true that the United States has spent significantly more on defense than Europe. But it is unclear why United States capabilities should serve as a benchmark for European security cooperation, especially when European states collectively amass greater military resources than any other state in the world except the United States.

¹⁴ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 72–108.

Social scientists have much to offer here. As Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba argue: "The distinctive characteristic that sets social science apart from casual observation is that social science seeks to arrive at valid inference by the systematic use of well-established procedures of inquiry."¹⁵ With this in mind, this study examines European security since World War II by undertaking a time-series study to measure the extent of security cooperation.

The argument

The major argument is that structural shifts in both the international and European systems have caused a notable increase in EU security cooperation in the post-Cold War era. As used here, "security cooperation" occurs when states adjust their foreign policy and defense behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.¹⁶ States cooperate to realize gains that are unachievable through individual action; policymaking is achieved multilaterally rather than unilaterally.¹⁷

My aim is to develop a theory that can explain the significant increase in European security cooperation since the end of the Cold War, and offer a useful roadmap for the future. Consequently, this book examines three time periods: past, present, and future. Past evidence strongly indicates that structural factors played a determining role in discouraging European states from pursuing widespread security collaboration through the European Community during the Cold War. Recent evidence suggests that changing structural conditions in the post-Cold War created a strong impetus for states to cooperate through the EU. The evidence from both the past and present suggest that EU security cooperation will increase in the future. In short, the overriding independent variable of this book is the structure of the international and regional systems.

The international system

During the Cold War, the international system was bipolar. It was characterized by security competition across the globe between the United States and Soviet Union. Under these conditions, European

¹⁵ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 6.

¹⁶ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 51.

¹⁷ See, for example, Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 41.

states were primarily concerned about balancing the Soviet Union, and most security cooperation was transatlantic rather than intra-European. NATO was the primary security institution, the United States was a key sanctions partner, and arms collaboration was largely transatlantic rather than intra-European.

However, the structure of the international system shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity when the Soviet Union collapsed, and the United States emerged as the preponderant global power. This structural shift left European states with a series of choices. One was to bandwagon with the United States through NATO and to continue dependence on American power. But the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the one issue that had inextricably tied Europe and America together for over four decades: balancing against the Red Army. European states also became increasingly concerned about American power and, with a growing divergence in security interests, wanted to increase their ability to project power abroad and decrease US influence. Power is important because it can make states more secure, and it can increase states' ability to influence, deter, and coerce others. Consequently, the European Union allowed European states to project power abroad and increase autonomy from America.

This action would not have been taken if the US were not so powerful, or if the international system was still bipolar. As French President Jacques Chirac argued, a powerful America reinforces the need for a stronger Europe "politically and economically." "The distance between America and Europe continues to increase," he noted, and this development led "toward a growing consolidation in Europe."¹⁸ In addition, as the *European Security Strategy* pointedly noted: "The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy is that we are stronger when we act together."¹⁹ This means coordinating foreign and defense policies through the European Union.

In three important areas – economic sanctions, weapons production, and military forces – EU states began to aggregate power in the post-Cold War era. Between 1950 and 1990, European states sanctioned

¹⁸ Christophe Jakubyszyn and Isabelle Mandraud, "Face à l'Amérique de Bush, les responsables politiques misent sur l'Europe," *Le Monde*, November 5, 2004; Pierre Avril, "Les Vingt-Cinq face à leurs limites," *Le Figaro*, November 5, 2004, p. 6; Patrick E. Tyler, "Europe Seeks Unity on New Bush Term," *New York Times*, November 6, 2004, p. A1; Daniel Dombey, "EU Still Split Over Diplomacy with US," *Financial Times*, November 6, 2004, p. 8; "Europe Should Bolster Powers in Face of Strong US," *Agence France Presse*, November 5, 2004.

¹⁹ Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels: European Council, December 2003), p. 13.

through the European Community in only two out of seventeen cases (12 percent). Yet between 1991 and 2006 they sanctioned through the EU in twenty-one out of twenty-seven cases (78 percent). Between 1950 and 1989, European defense firms were more likely to cooperate with US defense firms in mergers, acquisitions, and codevelopment and coproduction projects. But since 1990, intra-European defense cooperation has increased in order to compete with such powerful US firms as Boeing and Lockheed Martin. This has included the development of the European Defense Agency to develop European military capabilities, improve defense research and technology, manage cooperative programs, and strengthen the European defense industry. Finally, while European states coordinated their military forces through NATO during the Cold War, they established a European Union rapid reaction force, EU battle groups, and an independent planning capability in the post-Cold War era.

To be sure, European states are not “balancing” against the United States as conventionally defined, since the US does not pose a military threat to Europe. Jeffrey Cimbalo argues, for example, that “there is considerable evidence that EU foreign policy, led by Paris and Berlin, will actively seek to balance . . . US power.”²⁰ Some also argue that European security cooperation is a form of “soft balancing” against the United States.²¹ But balancing, as conventionally defined, refers to an attempt by states to build economic and military power to contain an aggressive opponent that directly threatens their security through *military conquest*. The United States does not present a military threat to Europe.

The regional system

In addition, European Union states have cooperated in response to structural shifts in the regional system. During the Cold War, the Soviet

²⁰ Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, “Saving NATO From Europe,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 6, November/December 2004, p. 115. See also Timothy Garton Ash, “President Kerry and Europe,” *Washington Post*, October 24, 2004, p. B7.

²¹ Robert J. Art, “Europe Hedges its Security Bets,” in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, *Balance of Power Revisited*, pp. 179–213; Barry R. Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” *The International Spectator*, Vol. 39, No. 1, January–March 2004, pp. 5–17; Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 7–45; T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 46–71; Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), pp. 126–32.

threat and concerns about German revanchism led to a large United States military presence in Europe and the division of Germany. This development was neatly captured in Lord Ismay's famous quip that NATO was critical "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." The presence of the "American pacifier" ensured that most security cooperation was transatlantic, rather than intra-European.²² As noted earlier, NATO was the primary security institution and there was little intra-European cooperation in such areas as sanctions, arms collaboration, and military forces.

But structural shifts at the end of the Cold War increased the likelihood of security cooperation through the European Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to dramatic cuts in US forces in Europe and concerns about the US's long-term commitment to – and the relevance of – NATO. The reunification of Germany also created a potentially unstable regional situation, and British and French leaders were deeply concerned that a Germany which opted out of Europe would destabilize the region. Consequently, European states adopted a "binding" strategy in the early 1990s to tie Germany into Europe and increase the likelihood of peace on the continent. Binding Germany ensured peace because German leaders renounced unilateralism and agreed to a number of limitations, such as a reduction in German armed forces and the rejection of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The European Union offered a logical long-term solution. A binding strategy was possible because Germany was a status quo power, and German, French, and British leaders had learned from Europe's troubled history. In short, structural shifts in Europe at the end of the Cold War triggered an increase in security cooperation through the European Union. Cooperation allowed European states to bind Germany and ensure long-term peace on the continent.

This book offers two additional arguments. First, European security cooperation has been – and will likely continue to be – intergovernmental rather than supranational for the foreseeable future. Major EU foreign policy and defense decisions have been made in European capitals rather than in Brussels. Second, Europe's major powers – Germany, France, and Britain – have been the primary motors of security cooperation. Indeed, one of Angela Merkel's first statements as German

²² On the American pacifier see Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, No. 54, Spring 1984, pp. 64–82; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 377, 379, 386–92, 394; Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 1–39.

chancellor in 2005 was to remind Europeans that France and Germany remained the key “motors” of European cooperation.²³ Cooperation is thus a function of relative power.

Those who argue that this approach misses the contributions of other member countries tend to overestimate these contributions.²⁴ Perhaps more importantly, the point is not that other countries never matter, but rather that Germany, France, and Britain matter most. For economic sanctions, they have the largest economies and the most power to wield when trying to coerce or deter other states. For arms production, their arms companies are the largest in Europe: Britain’s BAE Systems; France’s Thales; and the German, French, and Spanish conglomerate EADS. These companies and their respective national defense ministries have the greatest power in developing and producing advanced weapons and platforms. For military forces, Germany, France, and Britain have the largest defense budgets in Europe and, especially for France and Britain, have the most competent expeditionary military forces.

Neither of these arguments means that France, Germany, and Britain as a group – or even Europe as a whole – always speak with one voice in the security realm. Indeed, it logically follows from the first argument that they may disagree on issues because of the intergovernmental nature of cooperation. As Robert Art concludes:

[W]e must remember that there is as yet no single entity called Europe that speaks with one voice on foreign, security, and defense policy . . . On these issues, Europe still remains a set of nations that retain individual control over their foreign policies and defense establishments and whose national interests on these matters differ.²⁵

As examined in more detail in later chapters, French leaders have historically pushed hardest for European security cooperation. German leaders strongly preferred cooperation through NATO during the Cold War, but have increasingly viewed the European Union as the key security, economic, and political organization in Europe. British leaders have historically resisted European security arrangements if they threaten – or appear to threaten – the preponderance of NATO, though

²³ Carsten Volkery, “Wie Merkel die Skorpione zähmte,” *Der Spiegel*, December 17, 2005; Marlies Fischer, “Merkel zähmte Blair und Chirac,” *Hamburger Abendblatt*, December 19, 2005.

²⁴ See, for example, Helen Wallace’s criticism of Moravcsik in “Review Section Symposium: The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1999, pp. 155–79; Michael E. Smith, *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 19–20.

²⁵ Art, “Europe Hedges its Security Bets,” p. 183.

they have increasingly supported a European Security and Defense Policy.

Research design

The research design adopted in this book is straightforward. First, I parsed the dependent variable – security cooperation – into four categories: security institutions, economic sanctions, arms production, and military forces. These categories were chosen because they represent a cross-section of tools states possess in the security realm. The category of *security institutions* includes the creation and development of a European (as opposed to a transatlantic) security institution. *Economic sanctions* cover the coordinated use of sanctions for foreign policy goals, such as ending civil wars or establishing democracy. *Arms production* encompasses collaboration in the arms industry, especially through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and coproduction and codevelopment projects. Finally, the category of *military forces* includes the establishment and use of joint military and other crisis response forces. What ties them together is that states use them to pursue specific goals in the security realm: security institutions are constructed to balance against external powers or ameliorate the possibility of war; weapons such as fighter jets or precision-guided missiles are manufactured to provide security and project power; economic sanctions are utilized to coerce target states into changing behavior; and military forces are used for coercive or deterrent purposes.

Second, the principal historical evidence I use is the diplomatic history of Europe between 1950 and 2006 – though there is some variation because of access to data. I identified at least 4 major attempts to create a European security institution, 44 cases in which European states imposed sanctions, 482 instances of weapons collaboration, and several cases of military forces. I then deduced trends in the data and, through comparative case studies, examined state motives for deciding whether or not to pursue security cooperation.²⁶ Case studies offer a useful approach to help understand the motivations of European leaders.²⁷

²⁶ In particular see Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43–68.

²⁷ On the costs and benefits of comparative case studies see David Collier, “The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change,” in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 7–31; Charles C. Ragin, “Comparative Sociology and the Comparative Method,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 22, Nos. 1–2,

As Alexander George and Timothy McKeown argue, they are useful in uncovering “what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior.”²⁸

This time-series approach should counter the criticism that scholarly work on European security cooperation is methodologically problematic because it is a single case.²⁹ Single observations can lead to indeterminate results, particularly since they don’t control for random error and can make it extremely difficult to determine which of several alternative explanations is the most viable.³⁰ However, this study includes numerous observations and does not have an *N* of 1.

Third, I have chosen to examine Europe for several reasons. One is that there has been a significant and largely unprecedented increase in security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. This makes developments in Europe an intriguing puzzle. Charles Kupchan argues that “Europe will soon catch up with America not because of a superior economy or technological base, but because it is coming together, amassing the impressive resources and intellectual capital already possessed by its constituent states.” Kupchan notes that in the defense realm Europe’s “military presence will mount in the years ahead.”³¹

March–June 1981, pp. 102–20; Charles Tilly, “Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology,” in Lars Mjoset *et al.*, *Comparative Social Research: Methodological Issues in Comparative Social Science*, Vol. XVI (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1997), pp. 43–53; Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macro-social Inquiry,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1980, pp. 174–97; Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 49–88.

²⁸ Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (eds.), *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations: A Research Annual*, Vol. II (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), p. 35.

²⁹ On Europe and the *N* = 1 debate see James A. Caporaso, Gary Marks, Andrew Moravcsik, and Mark A. Pollack, “Does the European Union Represent an *n* of 1?” *ECISA Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 1–5.

³⁰ See, for example, King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 208–30; John H. Goldthorpe, “Current Issues in Comparative Macrosociology: A Debate on Methodological Issues,” in Mjoset *et al.*, *Comparative Social Research*, pp. 1–26; David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 1, October 1996, pp. 56–91.

³¹ Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), pp. 119, 148. See also Kupchan, “Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity?” in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 68–97; Kupchan, “The Travails of Union: The American

Some analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency predict that the European Union will be a unified economic, political, and military actor in 2015, second only to the United States in total power.³²

Europe also has been – and will continue to be – an area of strategic importance for the United States. This is partly because of the combined power of the EU and the individual power of its major states: Germany, France, and Britain. Furthermore, European history since World War II includes substantial variation in the independent variable (the structure of the international system), as well as substantial variation in the four categories of the dependent variable (security institutions, economic sanctions, arms production, and military forces). Finally, the Treaty on the European Union in 1992 (Maastricht) and subsequent treaties in the post-Cold War era provide an opportunity to study security institutions, a subject that has received inadequate attention in the international relations literature.³³

Related to this, some readers might question why this book focuses on security cooperation in Europe, and not on other regions. After all, why hasn't the global distribution of power caused other states to cooperate in response to American power? There has not been similar cooperation in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa. The answer is straightforward. Europe has been unique because of the nature of European states led by Germany. Regional cooperation in the post-Cold War era is possible because Germany was a status quo power and German, French, and British leaders had learned from Europe's bloody history. European cooperation thus benefited from the decision by its major powers – especially Germany – to pursue multilateral cooperation. Consequently, significant security cooperation in Asia and

Experience and its Implications for Europe,” *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 2004/5, pp. 103–20. As William Wallace and Bastian Giegerich conclude: “There has been a remarkable increase in the scale, distance and diversity of external operations by European forces – an increase that has scarcely registered in public debate across Europe, let alone the United States.” Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, “Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces,” *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2004, p. 164.

³² Central Intelligence Agency, *Modeling International Politics in 2015: Potential U.S. Adjustments to a Shifting Distribution of Power* (Washington, DC: Strategic Assessments Group, CIA, 2004).

³³ Notable recent exceptions include G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); David A. Lake, *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

other regions hinges on the support of potential hegemonies such as China. To date, there has been little interest by major powers, including China, for regional cooperation. Absent this support, significant security cooperation is unlikely.

This leaves Europe in a unique situation. The decision by great powers to pursue widespread security cooperation is historically anomalous. States have, of course, created formal military alliances such as NATO and collective security organizations such as the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe. But the breadth of European efforts in the post-Cold War era is largely unprecedented, and the current European Union security project thus presents a very interesting theoretical and empirical puzzle.

Outline of the book

The final section offers a brief outline of the book. Chapter 2 outlines the structural argument and then examines four alternative arguments: (1) there has not been significant security cooperation among EU states; (2) security cooperation has been caused by pressure from domestic actors; (3) security cooperation has been caused by a desire to increase the prospects for mutual gain through international institutions; and (4) security cooperation has been caused by the construction of a European identity.

Chapter 3 examines the structure of the regional system and asks: why was a security arm of the EU created in post-Cold War Europe? Why did it succeed when earlier attempts failed? It then examines four cases: the European Defense Community (1950–1954), the Fouchet Plan (1958–1963), European Political Cooperation (1969–1991), and the Treaty on European Union and beyond (1992–). It finds that while the three earlier attempts failed, a European security arm was finally created as part of the Treaty on European Union for structural reasons.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 examine the structure of the international system and show that EU states have been motivated by a desire to build and project power in a unipolar world. Chapter 4 asks: why have European states increasingly imposed economic sanctions for foreign policy goals through the EU in the post-Cold War era? Why did they refrain from using the EC during the Cold War? It explores the extent of European security cooperation since 1950 by examining forty-four cases in which European states imposed sanctions. Chapter 5 asks: why has there been a substantial increase in intra-European weapons collaboration in the post-Cold War era? Why was there minimal cooperation during the Cold War? It explores the extent of weapons production

collaboration by examining 482 cases of M&As and coproduction and codevelopment projects involving European defense firms. Chapter 6 asks: why have European Union states opted to build a rapid reaction force in the post-Cold War era? It examines the creation of NATO and the establishment of EU military and crisis response forces, and finds that there has been a notable shift in the post-Cold War era toward the establishment of an autonomous EU military capability.

Finally, Chapter 7 uses the arguments developed in this study to assess the future of European security over the next decade and offer policy prescriptions. It concludes that EU security cooperation will likely increase in the future, and predicts that the US–European strategic relationship will be characterized by increasing competition and friction. We now turn to possible explanations of EU security cooperation.

2 Power and security cooperation

It has become *de rigueur* to focus on the European Union as a global economic actor. The introduction of the euro as Europe's common currency and the establishment of a single European market have indeed transformed the European Union into a major economic power. As former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer noted regarding economic and monetary union:

In Maastricht one of the three essential sovereign rights of the modern nation-state – currency, internal security, and external security – was for the first time transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution. The introduction of the euro was not only the crowning-point of economic integration, it was also a profoundly political act, because a currency is not just another economic factor but also symbolizes the power of the sovereign who guarantees it.¹

The evidence shows that European states have also increasingly cooperated in the security realm, though it has been intergovernmental rather than supranational. Examples include the creation of a security arm of the European Union, the coordination of economic sanctions for foreign policy goals, rationalization in the European arms industry, and the creation of a rapid reaction military force.

This poses an interesting puzzle. Why has there been a substantial increase in security cooperation among European Union states since the end of the Cold War? Why was there little cooperation during the Cold War? The answer is a function of the changing structure of the regional and international systems. First, EU states have pursued cooperation in such areas as economic sanctions, arms production, and military forces in response to the end of bipolarity and the resulting unipolar structure of the international system. Aggregating power decreases European states' reliance on the United States and increases their ability to project power abroad. Second, European Union states have cooperated to

¹ Speech by Joschka Fischer, "From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration," Berlin, May 12, 2000 (www.germany-info.org).

ensure peace on the continent and to prevent the rise of Germany as a regional hegemon. This decision has been facilitated by the ability of German, French, and British leaders to “learn” from history.

This chapter is divided into five major sections. First, it outlines the core assumptions. Second, it explores structural changes in the international system, as well as state strategies to deal with a unipolar power. It looks at the European response in three areas: economic sanctions, arms production, and military forces. Third, it examines structural changes in the European system, as well as European strategies in the early 1990s to deal with the rise of Germany and the withdrawal of US forces. Fourth, it explores potential counter-arguments. Fifth, it concludes by summarizing the key arguments and briefly examining them.

Structure and the distribution of power

The ultimate criterion for assessing any argument is the ability to explain real events in the real world. This places a high premium on empirical evidence. In addition, good arguments should also be logically consistent and precise. Other things being equal, arguments that are stated precisely and are internally consistent are preferable to those that are vague or contradictory.² The purpose of this chapter is to sketch the logic of my argument and several other competing arguments; the rest of the book then examines the evidence.

I begin by arguing that states seek security and influence in the international system. Policymakers and their populations want to be secure from internal and external threats, and seek to influence others to ensure their safety. Security and influence are not their only goals, but they are generally prerequisites for other goals such as wealth.³ In addition, states are rational actors. Policymakers are generally aware of their external environment, and they think strategically about how to

² On how to judge social science arguments and theories, see Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 5–48.

³ This assumption has its roots in several key realist arguments. First, the international system is anarchic. This is an ordering principle; it does not mean that the international system is chaotic or disorderly. Rather, it means that there is no world government or authority above states to enforce agreements or guarantee security. Second, states can never know with 100 percent certainty the current and future intentions of others. In the economic realm, most actions are reasonably transparent and information on compliance is often a matter of public record. In the security realm, however, there are limits to transparency and information sharing. States may have an incentive to misrepresent such information, and intentions can change. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

survive in it. They tend to be forward-looking and calculate the best means to assure their survival and security given the actions and reactions of other states.

Consequently, states care a great deal about power, especially the distribution of power. Power in this context refers to material capabilities, and particularly to military and economic assets. Power is important because it can make states more secure, and it can increase their ability to influence others. Conversely, the absence of power decreases the ability of states to do these things, and makes them more reliant on those with greater power. Power is thus relative.⁴ Weaker states have a strong incentive to increase their power to ensure survival and increase security. Increasing their power also helps decrease reliance on more powerful states and raises their ability to project power abroad to influence, deter, and coerce others. States may not behave this way all the time. But those who do are more likely to flourish, and those who do not are more likely to suffer. As noted below, states may adopt a wide range of other strategies, such as bandwagoning with more powerful states or passing the buck to others.

The distribution of power in international and regional systems is an important causal variable. Historically, two distributions of power have existed: multipolarity and bipolarity. A multipolar system is one in which there are three or more great powers. It has been the most common pattern. Bipolarity is a system with two great powers, such as the international system during the Cold War with the US and Soviet Union.⁵ In the aftermath of the Cold War, the international system moved to yet another distribution of power: unipolarity. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States became the most powerful state in the international system.

Structural theories are at best rough predictors of which states will combine capabilities against a dominant power.⁶ While structural

⁴ Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 485–507.

⁵ Among the key works on bipolarity and multipolarity are Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3, April 1964, pp. 390–406; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3, Summer 1964, pp. 881–909; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 1, Spring 1990, pp. 137–68.

⁶ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer 1999, p. 29; Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," pp. 137–68.

conditions provide the impetus for weaker states to aggregate power, unit-level factors may determine whether – and with whom – a state will aggregate resources.⁷ Specifically, participant states must share a certain degree of similarity and trust to overcome fears and to aggregate power. States that have common cultural, political, strategic, or economic similarities and interests may be more likely to cooperate because the barriers and costs of combining resources are lower. But these unit-level factors are at best intervening variables, and structural factors do exert a powerful influence on state behavior. Consequently, focusing predominantly on structure should tell us a lot about security cooperation.

Europe and the international system

During the Cold War, the international system was bipolar. This caused European states to cooperate with the United States to check Soviet power. NATO was the primary security institution, and European states imposed sanctions and built weapons with the United States. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity. A unipolar system is one in which no single state is powerful enough to balance against the dominant power. However, it is not a hegemonic system. It is still possible for a group of second-order powers to act in concert against the dominant power in a unipolar system.⁸ The United States became the preponderant global power, and its economic, military, technological, and geopolitical dominance has been historically unprecedented.⁹

“One can’t deny that there is henceforth a dominant ‘pole,’ the United States,” noted Hubert Védérine, former French foreign minister. “In this

⁷ Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Fall 1993, p. 9; Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 335.

⁸ Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” p. 11.

⁹ G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002); Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” pp. 1–36; Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” pp. 5–51; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41; Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 44–79; Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring 1997, pp. 49–88; Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 68–83.

sense the world is unipolar.”¹⁰ This structural shift created an important incentive for European states to pursue security cooperation. European leaders believed that aggregating power was necessary to decrease reliance on the United States and increase their ability to project power abroad. Power and autonomy are important because they make European states more secure and increase their ability, as already stated, to influence, deter, and coerce others. This has been particularly true since American and European security interests steadily began to diverge with the collapse of the Soviet Union. To be clear, aggregating power in response to structural changes must be causally linked with the systemic concentration of power. That is, states would not take these actions if the United States were not so powerful.

States may adopt one of several strategies when confronted with a unipolar international system. First, they can *bandwagon* with the dominant power by allying with it and trying to acquire at least some of the spoils of war. However, there is a significant drawback: bandwagoning fails to check the power of the unipole, and states that pursue this strategy give up any hope of preventing it from gaining power at their expense. This strategy jeopardizes their ability to influence, deter, and coerce others, and makes them dependent on the dominant power. Second, states can adopt a *buckpassing* strategy by refusing multilateral cooperation, pursuing independent foreign and defense policies, and passing to others the task of dealing with the dominant power. This strategy has a similar drawback: it fails to check the dominant power, especially if there is no one to catch the buck. By definition, a unipolar system is one in which no state possesses the capabilities to check the power of the dominant state on its own. Third states can try to *bind* the unipolar power in a multilateral institution.¹¹ The major problem with this strategy, however, is that it hinges on the willingness of the most powerful state to cooperate. Because of the significant disparity in power between the dominant state and second-order powers, however, the dominant state in a unipolar system is unlikely to agree to a binding strategy. Fourth, states can *balance* against the unipole to protect themselves from attack. As John Mearsheimer argues: “With balancing a great power assumes direct responsibility for preventing an aggressor from

¹⁰ Hubert Védrine, *France in an Age of Globalization* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 2.

¹¹ Walt, *Taming American Power*, pp. 144–52; Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 70–1; Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227–62.