

# CITIZEN AND SELF IN ANCIENT GREECE

INDIVIDUALS  
PERFORMING  
JUSTICE AND  
THE LAW

Vincent Farenga

CAMBRIDGE

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# CITIZEN AND SELF IN ANCIENT GREECE

This study examines how the ancient Greeks decided questions of justice as a key to understanding the intersection of our moral and political lives. Combining contemporary political philosophy with historical, literary, and philosophical texts, it examines a series of remarkable individuals who performed “scripts” of justice in Early Iron Age, Archaic, and Classical Greece. From the earlier periods, these include Homer’s Achilles and Odysseus as heroic individuals who are also prototypical citizens, and Solon the lawgiver, writing the scripts of statute law and the jury trial. In democratic Athens, the focus turns to dialogues between a citizen’s moral autonomy and political obligation in Aeschylean tragedy, Pericles’ citizenship paradigm, Antiphon’s sophistic thought and forensic oratory, the political leadership of Alcibiades, and Socrates’ moral individualism.

Vincent Farenga has taught Classics and Comparative Literature at the University of Southern California since 1973. He served as head of the Comparative Literature Department from 1985 to 1991.



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AND THE LAW

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À Nicole, qui m'a conduit à la victoire,  
et à Stéphane, qui l'a couronnée





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# INTRODUCTION

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## PERFORMING CITIZENSHIP AND ITS SCRIPTS IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS

A new field has emerged over the past fifteen years out of the perennial interest ancient historians and classicists have shown in the Athenian democracy of 508–322 BC; we might call it “Athenian democracy studies.”<sup>1</sup> Reasons for its popularity are not hard to identify in an era devoted to the ideal of interdisciplinary research, but its developing contours already demonstrate how complex a topic democratic society can be, especially if we inquire into ways human subjects experience it through democratic citizenship. And so not surprisingly Athenian democracy studies are expanding rapidly right now, propelled by variety in evidence and eclecticism in methodology as scholars seek out Athenian cultural practices and beliefs peculiar to the democracy – and devise new ways to scrutinize them. For one manifestation of this variety and eclecticism we need only look to the “smorgasbord” essay collections by multiple authors that proliferate in so many fields today: major collections on Athenian democracy keep multiplying, at least in English.<sup>2</sup> One effect of these collections is to suggest that scholars find it difficult to forge a single, interdisciplinary approach to the Athenian democracy. They may also encourage readers to believe – mistakenly, I

<sup>1</sup> All dates in this study referring to developments in Greek history are BC. All translations from languages ancient and modern are mine unless otherwise noted.

<sup>2</sup> See Rhodes 2004, Goldhill and Osborne 1999, Cartledge, Millett, and von Reden 1998, Morris and Raaflaub 1998, Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998, Ober and Hedrick 1996, Euben, Wallach, and Ober 1994, Boegehold and Scafuro 1994, and Osborne and Goldhill 1994. For multilingual essay collections see David Cohen 2002, Kinzl and Raaflaub 1995, and Eder 1994.

think – that democratic community and citizenship are too multiform and confusing to accommodate a single line of inquiry.

About a decade ago a neat bifurcation distinguished old and new paradigms for studying Athenian democracy and citizenship. Older studies were grounded in a constitutional sense of legal status and participation in political institutions, while more recent studies emphasized ideological questions of social behavior, values, and attitudes affecting citizens and noncitizens alike.<sup>3</sup> Today, however, the dynamism of Athenian democracy studies has caused that bifurcation to ramify into an array of options. One is methodological, a version of the “theory question” many classical scholars and ancient historians face these days: “Should my approach be cross-fertilized by contemporary political, social, and cultural theory, or should it remain ‘empirically’ based in traditional senses of ‘what life was like in democratic Athens?’”<sup>4</sup>

Scholars who choose a theoretically informed approach also face the Pandora’s box of eclecticism: “Should I draw on a mix of thinkers and theories or stay grounded in one primary approach?”<sup>5</sup> The choice of

<sup>3</sup> Scafuro discusses this bifurcation (1994: 2–8); Manville proclaims the “new paradigm” (1994 and 1990); Ober’s work is most representative of the focus on ideology (1998, 1996, 1994 and 1989).

<sup>4</sup> Studies using cross-fertilization include Ober 1998, 1996 and 1989, Hunter 1994 and Euben 1990. Equally valuable empirically based contributions include Hansen 1987 and 1991, Stockton 1990, Sinclair 1988, and Ostwald 1986. M. I. Finley practically created the field of contemporary Athenian democracy studies, serving as both an inspiration and bridge for scholars of both approaches (e.g., 1983, 1985a, and 1985b). Rhodes divides the methodological possibilities of this field into eight neat categories (2003a: 70–71).

<sup>5</sup> Typical ingredients for the theory mix include Foucault, Bourdieu, and Searle. Sagan (1991) examines Athenian democracy and paranoia through a classically psychoanalytic lens; Saxonhouse (1992) uses gender theory to assess the democracy; McClure (1999) and Lape (2004) do also for Athenian democracy and drama, with Lape combining ideologies of gender and race (2003). Loraux’s work eclectically draws on multiple models (Foucault, structuralism, poststructuralism, feminism, psychoanalysis, etc.) (e.g., 2002a, 2002b, 1998).

how widely to gather evidence also presents an option: “If my study is empirically grounded, do I draw on a wealth of evidence for democratic life in Athenian politics, law, religion, warfare, economy, gender relations, philosophy, and so on, or do I limit myself to a single cultural practice?”<sup>6</sup> More materially based research might focus solely on artistic or archaeological evidence for democratic practices or on interpretive models grounded in archaeology and visual theories.<sup>7</sup> Yet another option, pursued only sporadically, combines the questions of methodology and evidence, asking, “Should I set Athenian democracy and citizenship into dialogue with contemporary studies of democratic theory and practice in fields such as political science, sociology, policy and planning, and law?” To put it more bluntly, “Can the realities and theories of ancient, modern, and postmodern democracies inform one another?”<sup>8</sup> This last project might prompt some scholars self-consciously to wonder to what degree their own nationalist traditions influence the ways they approach and evaluate ancient democracy.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The approaches featured in the 1996 Ober and Hedrick anthology draw on a wide spectrum of evidence; one popular choice for a single cultural practice has been litigation in Athens’ democratic courts, as in studies by Allen 2000, Johnstone 1999, Christ 1998, and the essays in Hunter and Edmonson 2000, and Cartledge, Millett, and Todd (1990).

<sup>7</sup> Studies in art history and Athenian democracy include Neer 2002, Hurwit 1999, and Castriota 1992; see also the majority of essays in Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998. See the archaeological evidence covered in the essays edited by Coulson (1994), where Brenne’s study of *ostraka* is a good example. For interpretive models see the discussion by Small and Morris in the Morris and Raaflaub collection (1998: 217–46).

<sup>8</sup> Rhodes tackles this broad methodological question, providing partial answers (2003a). Recent studies include Colaico 2002, Wallach 2001, Villa 2001, and Mara 1997 on Socrates and/or Plato; for more limited attempts see contributions in Ober and Hedrick 1996, Ober 1996: 161–87, Wolin 1994, and passages in McAfee 2000 (1–18), and Farrar 1988 (e.g., 3–14 and 273–78). But see now Samons 2004 and Ober 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Rhodes misleads us when he characterizes all modern scholars as epigones locked into their respective national democratic traditions (2003a: 34–53). This pigeonholing ignores individuals whose personal and educational histories are multinational and

These options within Athenian democracy studies create the false impression that ancient democracy and its citizenship are not amenable to a unified set of questions, definitions, or concepts. The polyphony of issues concerning methodology and evidence might even discourage us from asking what democratic citizenship (ancient, modern, and postmodern) is, and encourage us to conclude that there couldn't be a fundamental nature behind the heterogeneous ways subjects experienced it in antiquity and after. However, one recent development in Athenian democracy studies has taken a step toward a more conceptually unified approach, one employing a mix of theories to study an array of cultural practices in Athens. Its key innovative strategy links democratic citizenship in Athens to what we call today "performance studies." In a helpful introduction to the essay collection *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy* (Goldhill and Osborne 1999), Simon Goldhill offers a detailed explanation for this link. A quick look at his enthusiastic "Programme Notes" (1999) provides an Ariadne's thread to lead us past the variety, eclecticism, and apparent confusion surrounding ancient democratic citizenship.

According to Goldhill, performance theory, springing about thirty years ago from such fields as ethnography and theater studies, then migrating to gender studies, and finally infiltrating classics, constitutes a sort of royal road to understanding democratic citizenship in Athens.<sup>10</sup> He "maps" the "intellectual space" of performance as a "heuristic category" to connect such varia of Athenian life as theatrical spectacle, law court debate, deliberation in the citizen assembly, civic religious festival, gatherings at symposia and gymnasias, social rituals

multicultural; it also flirts with a subjective indulgence in national stereotypes (54–69). On Athenian democracy and modern nationalism and nation building, see Anderson 2003.

<sup>10</sup> See Goldhill's survey of theoretical approaches in performance studies, with bibliography (1999: 10–20); for performance and Greek culture, see Mackie 2004, Faulkner, Felson, and Konstan 1999, Bassi 1998, Edmunds and Wallace 1997, and Martin 1994.



like homoerotic courtship, and the use of inscriptions both public and private. From the unifying perspective of performance, then, Goldhill implies that these multiple practices derive their coherence from some sort of key social action at the core of citizenship. While he never says so, we're invited to envision citizenship as a kind of performance *tout court*. He grounds Athens' performance culture in a single social scenario of actions by individuals who make competitive displays of self-presentation so that their social standing (*timê*) can then be collectively evaluated (4, 5) and judged (5, 6, 8) by others. This "dynamic of self-presentation" or "self-promotion" occurs in four master citizen actions of Greek social life: *agôn* or competition; *epideixis* or display; *schêma* or appearance (also "posture," "pose") and *theôria* or "spectating" (2–8).

This abstract, synthetic description of four citizen actions implies that Athenians sustained their democratic citizenship performatively – and it further suggests that, to understand the nature of that citizenship, we need a unified theory of citizen action. But this action, though unified, could not be a simple one because its multiple practices contribute to the "construction" of "the public discourse of democracy. . . ." (8). In other words this action must be composite and at least in part linguistic (I prefer to call it "communicative"). In it Goldhill sees another dimension too, offering nothing less than the key to Athenian subjectivity itself, or "the construction of the [democratic] self" and "self-consciousness" (1–10). For it is through the four master citizen actions that the "self" or "political subject of democracy" is somehow "constructed" (9) or "negotiated" (4). So, in addition to action and language, citizenship somehow contributes to forming individual subjects, and this justifies an impressive scope of theoretical resources on which performance studies can draw.<sup>11</sup> "Performance" thus seems poised to

<sup>11</sup> Among others, Goldhill suggests Bakhtin, Victor Turner, Erving Goffman, Austin and Searle, Freudian-Lacanian "gaze theory," Foucault, new historicism, and Clifford's poststructural anthropology. On performance and gender see Butler 1990.

display for classicists the aura of those overarching, master concepts in contemporary cultural theory, such as “violence” in the seventies, “power” in the eighties, and “the body” in the nineties.

But like these blockbuster concepts, performance seems to me fuzzy and a little crude as a theoretical *passe-partout*. Goldhill acknowledges that it owes some of its allure to a heavily composite nature: as he puts it, “Indeed, for all the claims of ‘performance studies’ to be a discipline, it remains a bricolage” (15). As an amalgamated methodology, performance studies and its object, the amalgamated activity of citizenship, are therefore congruent; and this goes a long way toward answering the question of whether Athenian democracy studies should be eclectic in both evidence and methodology with an emphatic “Yes, they must!” But how should we refine the concept of performance so that classicists and ancient historians, when using performance studies to illuminate Athens’ “performance culture” (8, 10), might understand more clearly the relation between citizenship and performance? Goldhill for the most part sees performance as an instrument or vehicle for enacting citizenship, or as one element in a mix that constitutes citizenship: it’s “part of the exercise of citizenship” (1); through it the “public discourse” of Athenian democracy is in part “constructed, articulated and reflected on” (8); and the democracy’s development has had at least one “focus” in “performative elements” (10).

But we can relate performance to citizenship in a more fundamental way – a way that will also enable us to benefit from a wide spectrum of contemporary theoretical work on citizenship and democratic community. I propose going farther than Goldhill, for whom the Athenian democracy “might *depend* on performance in specific and special ways” (1; my emphasis). I’d like to entertain the more radical possibility that performance and democratic citizenship are one, that citizenship actually *is* performance.

What might this mean? Performance studies employ the term “performance” in a wide range of culturally defined contexts embracing, for

example, ethnographic observations of rituals and genealogical recitations, theatrical presentations in Western or non-Western societies, and the sociology of encounters (e.g., through role-playing) in everyday modern life. What's essential is that someone enact some sort of "script," within a specific framework of time, space and agency, which guides speaker and listeners to interpret a shared sense of its possible meanings.<sup>12</sup> Applied to Athens, this should prompt us to think of democratic citizenship as the know-how to perform a repertoire of significant actions before others who possess similar knowledge, or as a shared understanding between people about how to behave, communicate, and respond to one another at various times and places in the public and private spheres. It shouldn't matter whether the script in question is played out formally in a courtroom, in the citizen assembly, while participating in a religious procession, or more informally while at the theater, performing a ritual at one's family hearth, or conversing at a symposium with fellow members of one's *phratry* (a local political, social and religious organization of citizens).<sup>13</sup>

The ability to perform citizen scripts as "rules of engagement," I maintain, was not invented wholesale in the early years of the democracy; instead Athenians developed these scripts piecemeal from a cultural storehouse of prescribed behavior inherited from earlier stages

<sup>12</sup> For a folklorist and anthropological notion of "script," see Bauman 1977: 9.

<sup>13</sup> On the various citizen organizations in the democracy, see Jones 1999. How distinctive were citizen scripts compared to scripts played out by noncitizens? E. Cohen challenges long-standing assumptions that: (1) Athenian citizens saw themselves as markedly different from noncitizen metics (resident aliens) and slaves; (2) inhabitants of Attica (the territory of Athens) regularly distinguished citizens from noncitizens in daily encounters; (3) citizens' relations to others were fundamentally power relationships; (4) citizens and noncitizens in daily life pursued significantly different goals (2000). Despite Cohen's at times persuasive arguments, Athenians did distinguish citizens from noncitizens in scripts played out in the political and cultural spheres, especially when deliberating and deciding questions of justice and public policy, verifying membership in the citizen body, and practicing certain cults and civic performances.

of political life. In recent years a few classicists have begun connecting research in cognitive psychology and discourse analysis to early Greek poetry with the goal of understanding how the early Greeks stored cultural knowledge in narrative “scripts” that enabled them to retrieve and express that knowledge in stereotypical bits and chunks.<sup>14</sup> The terminology these scholars use can at times be confusing, for they speak of “frames,” “scripts,” “scenarios,” “schemas,” “plans,” etc., to describe the “shared seeing” of a world between performer and audience. I’ll adopt their use of “script” to designate a fixed, stereotypical representation of knowledge incorporating a sequence of actions, speech acts and situations. For example, today a static stereotype such as the “automobile” can be scripted various ways into “at the auto show,” “at the carwash,” “buying a new car,” “buying a second-hand car,” or “fatal automobile accident.” Or, in Homer, scripts take the form of narrative themes that transform a stereotype such as “weapon” into “a hero arms for battle,” or “meal” into “a meal of hospitality shared by host and guest.”<sup>15</sup> From these scholars’ perspective, we might then want to know, for example, whether Goldhill’s four master citizen actions constitute “citizen scripts” of this sort.<sup>16</sup>

### PERFORMING SELFHOOD

The notion of citizenship as the ability or privilege to perform certain roles in citizen scripts accounts well for the collective identity citizens share. But if we recall Goldhill’s suggestion that performing citizenship led Athenians to a “construction of the self” as “the

<sup>14</sup> I have in mind Minchin 2001 and 1992, Russo 1999, Bakker 1997a, 1997b, 1993, and Rubin 1995.

<sup>15</sup> See Minchin 1992: 233–35, esp. 235, n. 29, adapting the term from Schank and Abelson 1977. See also Brown and Yule 1983: 241–43.

<sup>16</sup> I use “script” to include the more complex organization of what some discourse analysts and classicists call a “schema” (Russo 1999; Brown and Yule 1983) or a “scenario” (Sanford and Garrod 1981).

political subject of democracy” (9), we’ll want to know whether performance can also serve as a royal road to understanding how Athenians experienced their individuality. And by this I mean not just bringing an idiosyncratic style to playing a certain role but enacting a selfhood distinct from others who might share that same role.<sup>17</sup> To achieve this, performance needs to account for the similarities and differences between ancient and modern conceptions of selfhood. This gap, Goldhill realizes, has become problematic today because we are increasingly sensitive to ways in which classicists of previous generations anachronistically evaluated the Greek self through Cartesian and Kantian models of subjectivity, but the remedy he proposes sidesteps the most important issues.<sup>18</sup> Because of work bridging classics and moral philosophy by scholars such as Nussbaum (1986), B. Williams (1993), Gill (1996), and others, it’s become clear that contemporary theories of the self influence our capacity to appreciate whether or not the Greeks, from Homer to the Classical period, could achieve selfhood in the modern sense, or genuinely deliberate and exercise a will, or possess any degree of individual moral autonomy, or, to our mind, be held morally responsible for their actions. These scholars show us, in other words, the need to theorize about the self comparatively if we wish to determine how close or distant Greek selves are from our

<sup>17</sup> On the various meanings of our modern notion of the self, see Gill 1996: 1, with his discussion of the methodological problems we face when we apply these meanings to the Greeks (2ff.). See also the typology of modern individuals and its application to the Greek city-state in Gribble 1999: 7–23, and the essays in Pelling 1990.

<sup>18</sup> Goldhill thinks we can avoid projecting modern notions of “inwardness, privacy and individual personality” onto Athenians if we provide a “historically specific and nuanced account of the constitution of the citizen as a political subject across and through a range of particular social practices and discourses” (1999: 9–10); cf. Rhodes’ warnings on scholarly “subjectivity” (2003a: 9–17). For discussion of increased scholarly sensitivity to confusing ancient and modern notions of self, Goldhill cites Pelling 1990 and Gill 1996.

own – and somehow performance would have to accommodate this theorizing.<sup>19</sup>

We've seen, for example, effective criticisms of Snell's contentions that Homeric individuals lack a true self in the sense of a self-conscious agent possessing psychic unity and a true will, and that they are therefore "deficient" in moral autonomy.<sup>20</sup> It's also harder now to uphold M. I. Finley's contention that nowhere in Homer do we find "rational discussion" and deliberation in the form of "a sustained, disciplined consideration of circumstances and their implications" (1979 [1954]), whether by individuals or groups.<sup>21</sup> We've learned as well to recognize in the practical conflicts faced by tragic characters, such as Aeschylus' Agamemnon, moral dilemmas consistent with a modern understanding of this term, and appreciate how individual characters, such as Homer's Penelope and the female protagonists of Athenian tragedy, function as moral agents in senses both ancient and modern.<sup>22</sup> And Gill has recently facilitated this effort to shuttle between ancient and modern selves by devising a classificatory scheme to distinguish Cartesian- and Kantian-inspired types of self, which he calls "subjective-individualist" because they are centered around the "I" as the subject of

<sup>19</sup> Alford's *The Self in Social Theory* (1991) offers a comparative, psychoanalytic approach to theorizing about the self from Homer and Plato to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and John Rawls. Villa (2001) reconstructs Socrates' notion of the citizen as an individual center of moral and intellectual agency and then relates this ideal to modern notions of citizenship in J. S. Mill, Nietzsche, Weber, Arendt, and L. Strauss.

<sup>20</sup> See, e.g., Sharples 1983, Gaskin 1990, B. Williams 1993: 21–49, Gill 1996: 29–41, and Hammer 1998. Vernant's has been the most influential recent argument for the Greeks' lack of a true will and moral decision-making in the modern sense (1988).

<sup>21</sup> On rational deliberation and decision making in Homer, see in particular Schofield 1986, in addition to Sharples 1983, Gaskins 1990, B. Williams 1993: 35–36, Teffeteller 2003, and Barnouw 2004: 7–120.

<sup>22</sup> On conflicts like Agamemnon's, see Nussbaum 1986: 25–50; for Penelope and female tragic protagonists, see Foley 1995 and 2001: 107ff.

self-consciousness, from other approaches to the self, which he calls “objective-participant” because they are grounded in a more objectively based understanding of individuals as psychological entities that participate in interpersonal, collective relationships (1996: 1–13, esp. 11–12).

So my retooling of performance, if it is to account for degrees of identity that are both shared with others and distinct from them, must embrace ancient and modern understandings of self. It also needs to enrich the notion of a script from discourse analysis in order to accommodate ancient and modern theories of citizenship.<sup>23</sup> Interestingly, most of the scholars who are adept at theorizing the Greek and modern selves have little to say about citizenship in connection to selfhood, whether in ancient Greece or the modern world. And since, as we’ve seen, most scholars of citizenship in Athenian democracy studies don’t engage much in dialogue with contemporary theories of citizenship, they likewise don’t incorporate theories of self into their work. I propose, however, to relate the Greeks’ experience of how citizenship and selfhood overlap to attempts in contemporary political theory to understand their interconnection, for this field explores ways we might pursue our individuality today and still retain or renew our capacity for citizenship.<sup>24</sup> Simultaneously maintaining both ancient and modern perspectives on citizenship and selfhood is essential, I believe, because we find already embedded in every theory or model of citizenship a

<sup>23</sup> I generally agree with Rhodes’ dictum that contemporary approaches to ancient history need to “do justice” to the past by avoiding a simple projection of our concepts and needs (our “subjectivity”) onto the ancients (2003a: 17). But his criteria for regulating the scope of our interpretations oversimplifies the variety of meanings an action, text, or object may have in its original context and when seen in other contexts (9–17).

<sup>24</sup> See Kymlicka 2002: 284ff. for a survey of major trends in contemporary citizenship theory.

particular concept of self. And this self relies on performing a finite number of scripts to enact its relation, whatever that might be, to a community of speakers.

### SELF AND COMMUNITY: THREE CONTEMPORARY VISIONS AND THEIR SCRIPTS

Three particularly coherent visions of how self and community should be interconnected have emerged in contemporary political theory since the early 1970s: revised liberal models of society and the individual; the communitarian critique of these models; and most recently the alternative vision of deliberative democracy. Liberal thinkers have long tended to conceive of individuals as closed, “atomist” or “unencumbered” beings constituted prior to interaction with others by their individual preferences and willful choice of self-interest. In the liberal vision communal ties to one another result from contractual agreements secured by inalienable rights designed to protect individual freedoms and by a “thin,” minimal consensus about collective needs.<sup>25</sup> Beginning in the 1980s, communitarian thinkers began questioning the coherence of this vision of individuals and their communities, arguing for the notion of a more interpersonal self whose nature was constituted by moral choices conditioned by ties to others and by historically defined traditions, and calling for revival of a “thick” sense of collective identity not unlike classical forms of republicanism.<sup>26</sup> By the 1990s an alternative to the communitarian critique of liberalism

<sup>25</sup> I’m referring to the liberalism of Rawls 1971 and 1993, and to neo-republican versions of liberalism like Dagger 1997. For an overview of Rawlsian liberalism in the context of contemporary political philosophy, see Kymlicka 2002: 53–101, with bibliography.

<sup>26</sup> See Sandel 1998 and 1984, Taylor 1995, 1994, 1989, 1985a, and 1985b, and Walzer 1990. For an overview of communitarianism in its contemporary context, see Kymlicka 2002:



became apparent through a “deliberative turn” in democratic theory, which identified democratic legitimacy with the ability of individuals and groups to participate in decisions about public values and policies through a discourse free from coercion, manipulation, or deception.<sup>27</sup> At the heart of this ability lies the process by which diverse individuals and groups reach agreement or consensus, and here some proponents of deliberative democracy characterize the self as not merely interpersonal but “intersubjective.”<sup>28</sup> Some deliberative democrats also maintain that universal participation in forming consensus even has the potential to transform a self whose decision making was previously impaired.<sup>29</sup>

Each of these contemporary visions depends for its vigor on different theories of the self and community; and each contributes to debate today in democratic theory centering around features of selfhood and

208–83, with bibliography. From a liberal perspective, Phillips uses four criteria of community in thinkers like MacIntyre (1984), Sandel, Taylor, and Walzer to evaluate democratic Athens – and finds the totality of Athenian society falling far short of that ideal (which he considers a historical illusion) (1993: 122–48 and 10–21).

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., Warren 2001 and 1995, Dryzek 2000, Elster 1998, Bohman and Rehg 1997, Bohman 1996. I also include Habermas’ major contribution to deliberative democracy (1996a, 1996b, 1992, 1990, 1987, and 1984).

<sup>28</sup> I use this term in connection with the need of one self and another to cooperate if they are to produce meaningful utterances, especially according to G. H. Mead’s (1934) theory. For Mead, communication occurs only when a speaker chooses an utterance because of the meaning he or she believes it will have for an addressee: meaning thus emerges not from the privileged position of a self (or subject) but only when self and other meet to share positions mutually; cf. Bakhtin’s “communicative function” of language (1986: 67–68). For thinkers like Habermas intersubjectivity accurately reflects the process of individuation that produces the self, and it also describes the necessary communicative dynamics behind the rational exchange of ideas that produces understanding. See, e.g., Habermas 1987: 10–11 and 58–60; 1992: 149–204. For the term’s pervasive importance to Habermas’ work, see Rehg 1994, and for its Habermasian use in contemporary citizenship theory, see McAfee 2000: 23–55.

<sup>29</sup> Warren 1995: 184–88.

community that sometimes compete and sometimes overlap. The tendency of the liberal, communitarian, and deliberative democrat visions to contradict as well as converge with one another strikes me as particularly fruitful, especially where we can recognize similar patterns of contradiction and convergence in the Greeks' experiences as citizens and selves. In this study I identify these patterns in a finite number of citizen scripts that were practiced at particular historical moments in the development of Greek polity. These range from very early scripts, which predate citizenship itself in the state's Formative period (the Middle to Late Geometric periods, ninth to eighth centuries); they include scripts from oligarchic city-states in the Archaic period (seventh to late sixth centuries); and they conclude with scripts from the Athenian democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries. And so, just as modern theories of the self can clarify our perceptions of Greek selfhood, I believe that arguments among liberal, communitarian, and deliberative democrat understandings of self and community can inform our understanding of how the Greeks experienced these two dimensions of identity.

### *The Liberal Script: The Citizen as Self*

If there is a particular notion of self embedded in every theory or model of citizenship, and if the self enacts its relation to a community in performing a script, then each script asks the following question: How autonomous is the self? It's important to note at the outset that autonomy, in the basic senses of self-legislation and self-determination, has acquired a plurality of meanings that sometimes mix political, social and moral dimensions, and that this was true for its ancient<sup>30</sup> as well as

<sup>30</sup> We'll see in Chapter 5 that Athenians didn't begin using the word *autonomia* until the 460s or 450s, and then in a restricted sense to designate one city-state's freedom from a more powerful ally's interference in its domestic politics (Ostwald 1982: 1–46; cf. the critique in Farrar 1988: 30, n. 54, and 103–6). But soon enough the term could

modern and contemporary uses.<sup>31</sup> So performing a citizen script invokes a cluster of ancient and modern concerns about the self's autonomy – and ways to qualify it when the self enacts its tie to community. For an example we can see how the history of these concerns links ancient and modern thinkers if we compare the moral autonomy Socrates defends in the *Apology* to the modern liberal tradition's understanding

refer to the social and political freedoms (*eleutheria*, *isêgoria*, *parrhêsia*) democratic Athenians enjoyed in their public and personal lives – positive freedoms of speech, conduct, and thought, and negative freedoms from political control and social censure. These senses are distinct from the moral autonomy that enabled them collectively to determine the values and “goods” characteristic of their community and individually to decide how to pursue a life dedicated to self-determined values and “goods.” On the *eleutheria* enjoyed by Athenians both collectively and individually, see Wallace 1996 and 1994, Hansen 1996 (esp. 94), and Raaflaub 1983. For the Athenians' practice of individual autonomy in the moral sense, in addition to Farrar 1988 see Nussbaum 1986 (as “self-sufficiency”), and B. Williams 1993: 75–102.

<sup>31</sup> On the role of autonomy in the history of modern moral philosophy up to and including Kant, see, for example, Schneewind 1998. Contemporary discussions of post-Kantian autonomy as individual self-determination tend to intertwine social, political, and moral visions. The concept remains the “true core . . . the inner citadel” of liberalism upon which its notion of moral responsibility depends (Kekes 1997: 15 and 1–22); see Norton 1991: 8 and 44ff., for a liberal version of autonomy influenced by communitarian critique. Individual and collective autonomy provide the battleground for the communitarian critique of liberalism, inspiring some liberal and neo-republican thinkers to conceptualize a hybrid “liberal republicanism” whose individual autonomy rests on “interdependence” with others, not independence from them. See Macedo's notion of an autonomous individual whose public and private virtues are “interdependent” (1990: 265); Norton's definition of interdependence as “determining for oneself what one's contributions to others will be, and determining for oneself which values from the self-actualizing lives of others to utilize, and how” (1991: 113); and Dagger, for whom “autonomy entails *interdependence*,” transforming the liberal autonomous person from a “lone rights-bearer” into “someone who depends upon others” for substantial independence (1997: 39). For deliberative democracy both senses of autonomy constitute democracy's “fundamental norm” or “good”; see Warren, who argues for autonomy as a *political* good while trying to suppress its moral dimensions (2001: 62 and 236, n. 2 [with references]). Others stress that citizens in a democracy must recognize one another as “equal moral persons” (J. Cohen 1998: 18).

of individual autonomy. The latter is envisioned as a script enacted by an agent resembling Kant's transcendental subject, with free access to an autonomous will when deciding questions of justice on the basis of universal categories of duty or prohibition. And for Kant these categories, above all, cannot be defined by practical circumstances or fixed notions of the good (1788).

Contemporary liberal thinkers have adapted this Kantian subject in various ways, most notably in Rawls' formulation of the "unencumbered self" who is free from the accidents of birth and circumstance (familial, ethnic or racial, religious, etc.) and so may enact the "original position" when deciding questions of distributive justice (1971). As a script the original position establishes for Rawls a context of time, space, and agency that preserves the self's autonomous will by positing real, and not transcendental, beings who exercise the right to decide about justice behind a "veil of ignorance" concerning their own or anyone else's place in society, assets, abilities, or specific purposes, ends, and conceptions of the good (Rawls 1971: 12). In this way each agent of justice is free to choose principles that are not informed or constrained by knowledge that might foster privilege or prejudice. Rawls' is a script, then, where the "right" of a radically autonomous self to choose is, above all, prior to any "good" it or others might choose; and it justifies the pursuit of a diversity of goods.

As a citizen script the original position and its unencumbered self are designed to ensure a particularly liberal vision of distributive justice in our contemporary, multicultural societies.<sup>32</sup> But the script has antecedents, not only in the modern liberal tradition of social contract theory, but in democratic Athens, where Socrates enacted a dissident form of citizenship whose goals were to avoid two moral faults: com-

<sup>32</sup> See Kymlicka's lucid description and defense of Rawls' original position (2002: 60–70).

mitting injustice, and contradicting one's own moral commitments. In Chapter 7 I will discuss attempts by today's ancient historians, philosophers and political theorists to justify the democratic citizenship Socrates enacts in such texts as the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Gorgias*. They readily acknowledge its foundation in a new theory of the self's relation to community – in “an individual's private decision to behave ethically” (Ober 1998: 181), or in the “moral individualism” Socrates invented (Villa 2001: 1).<sup>33</sup> To achieve “genuine autonomy” for a human being (Farrar 1988: 1988), or “the thinking individual's relative moral independence” (Villa 2001: 41), Socrates had to preach a “partial estrangement” (14) of the self from the collective, shared norms of democratic citizenship outlined by Pericles in his Funeral Oration and experienced by Athenians through the citizen scripts they played out in the Assembly, law courts, and so forth (5–12). And the sort of knowledge this required, again according to Villa, was nonexpert and not dependent on the transcendental truths and realities later endorsed by Plato (28–29). We therefore could make a case for Socrates (at least in the *Apology* and *Gorgias*) as a fair Athenian equivalent to Rawls' unencumbered self in the original position. But how can we evaluate Socrates' aberrant achievement as a citizen and self if we don't locate it within a dialogue between ancients and moderns that embraces both moral theory about the self and political theory about citizenship?<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See Ober on Socrates the citizen within the context of Athenian politics of the late fifth and fourth centuries BC (1998: 166–213); cf. Colaico 2002. See Wallach on the historical Socrates' influence on the Platonic art of politics (2001: 92–119), esp. his summary (116–18, nn. 193 and 194) of scholarly opinion on Socrates' relation to democracy (e.g., Wood and Wood 1978, Euben 1990, Vlastos 1991 and 1994, Kraut 1984, and Irwin 1977 and 1995). Villa discusses Socrates' dissident citizenship in light of its influence on later political thinkers (2001: 1–58).

<sup>34</sup> Villa acknowledges Socrates' founding role in liberal thinking (e.g., 2001: 306), and casually refers to him as hostile to the contemporary notion of an “encumbered” self (23), but his discussion avoids detailed engagement with contemporary ideologies

*The Communitarian Script: The Self as Citizen*

By the 1980s Rawls' original position, with its "priority of the right over the good," had come under attack by communitarian thinkers such as Michael Sandel, who pinpoints contradictions in the key actions that constituted the self and its relations to others.<sup>35</sup> In particular Sandel finds illusory the claim that the unencumbered self possesses a radical autonomy "individuated in advance" of contact with others and with "bounds [that] . . . are fixed in advance," arguing instead that the self must be both "intersubjective" (constituted by ties to others in various senses of community) and "intrasubjective" (constituted by competing, multiple identities within a single person) (1998: 62–63). Most importantly, Sandel challenges Rawls' notion of the self as an exclusively "voluntarist" agent. By this he means that, if we understand human agency as "the faculty whereby the self comes by its ends" (58), then for Rawls the self in the original position exists prior to its ends – and yet it defines itself by the willful act of choosing its ends. We can, Sandel suggests, alternatively conceive of the self as an agent whose ends are given in advance – by the norms and traditions of its community, for example – and in this case self-definition is achieved through reflection and introspection about which ends one might "own up to," as I prefer to phrase it. Such a self-constitution Sandel calls "cognitive," in

like liberalism and communitarianism. Santos explores Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the ultimate good in light of Rawls' diversity of goods, especially in relation to theories of justice (2001). Wallach places Platonic political theory within an ancient–modern context (2001: 396–401), suggesting that we look to a "rehistoricized" Plato as a superior theorist of deliberative democracy compared to contemporaries like Rawls and Habermas (400–10). Mara tries to cast Plato's Socrates as the Athenian equivalent of a contemporary deliberative democrat who is also a "liberal ironist" (1997, esp. 251–59).

<sup>35</sup> See Sandel 1998. Sandel 1984 provides a brief introduction to his critique of Rawls' original position.

this special sense, and its script focuses on the act of discovering within oneself senses of the good (58ff.).<sup>36</sup>

This communitarian critique of liberalism's script in the 1980s and 1990s clearly draws on models of the self anchored in the ideology of classical civic republican communities like Athens and Rome (often described as "Aristotelian republicanism").<sup>37</sup> And Sandel's "voluntarist" and "cognitive" types of the self in relation to its ends (and in relation to community) clearly resonate with a history of the self, from Homer onward, which moral philosophers and classicists can trace. If we take these voluntarist and cognitive types of self as different dimensions of, or elements within, the self, we can find the tension between them in two heroic prototypes for the Greek citizen, Homer's Achilles and Odysseus. Chapters 1 and 3 of my study demonstrate the first stage in such a history of citizenship and selfhood, when each hero experiences a version of the unencumbered self in a moment of moral duress. Each needs to decide a question of justice concerning his own *timê*, the relative rank or reward he deserves from authoritative others in his society. Both Achilles in his tent at Troy and Odysseus on Calypso's isle use voluntarist elements of self to define themselves through ends they might obtain from others, but each in different ways briefly hypothesizes about the kind of self he might *wish* to be. The self each chooses to become, however, is not entirely self-fashioned by voluntarist elements – as a liberal self would be – but one they own up

<sup>36</sup> Rawls defends the "original position" in *Political Liberalism* (1993), jettisoning a Kantian conception of the self in favor of a self split into two discontinuous roles: a private individual free to pursue whatever moral ends it might choose, and a political, public identity as a citizen deliberating autonomously about justice in a public arena free from anyone's personal conceptions of the good. Sandel challenges this script centered on a self bifurcated into private and political roles (1998: 184–218)

<sup>37</sup> See Kymlicka's discussion of the civic republican strand in contemporary citizenship theory (2002: 294–99; cf. Kymlicka and Norman 1995: 293–94).

to when, responding to cognitive elements, their will accepts ends and attachments provided by others.

Later chapters (6 and 7) extend this history to democratic Athens, where we'll see Socrates and his contemporaries play out similar inner conflicts between voluntarist and cognitive elements of the self. The divide between today's liberals and communitarians serves as a helpful lens to examine the ideal of democratic citizenship engineered from about 450 to the 420s by the sophist Protagoras and statesman Pericles – and also to understand how alternatives to their paradigm of citizen and self could be performed by Athenians as diverse as the sophist and speechwriter Antiphon (ca. 480–411), and the statesman, general and bon vivant Alcibiades (ca. 450–407), in addition to Socrates (ca. 469–399). As alternative paradigms, all three of these emerged in the shadow of the citizenship and selfhood endorsed by Protagoras and Pericles, and I'll relate these shadow citizens and selves to the possibilities for moral autonomy opened up by the *nomos/physis* controversy and by different styles of a democratically narcissistic personality.

But in the 1980s and 1990s other voices besides Sandel's have been contributing to the communitarian critique of liberal scripts of selfhood and citizenship. Some of these foreground more fundamentally linguistic or communicative questions about the self's constitution and ties to others, and these voices will enable us to: return closer to performance as a royal road to understanding ancient and modern citizen scripts; and find a few paths of convergence linking the liberal, communitarian and deliberative democrat visions. Charles Taylor, in a range of essays, has challenged liberalism's radically autonomous self by insisting on the self's anchorage in a linguistic tie to others, so that "one cannot be a self on one's own. I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors . . . only within . . . 'webs of interlocution'" (1989: 36). For Taylor this crucible of language determines the very nature of human agency, or what it means to be a "person," because it enables



us to interpret our lives and make the choices we use to define ourselves (1985a). (It's in these choices enacting personhood and autonomy that we'll find possible convergences between Rawlsian liberalism and the communitarianism of Taylor and Sandel.<sup>38</sup>) For Taylor language also provides the sole medium we have to achieve "recognition" of our unique identity from "significant others" (here Taylor adapts G. H. Mead's term "generalized other") with whom we struggle in dialogical relationships.<sup>39</sup>

Using Taylor's concept of the person, I derive two fundamental, programmatic questions about Greek individuality from the moral dilemmas about justice confronted by Achilles, Odysseus, the democratically ideal citizen of Protagoras-Pericles, his "shadows" in Antiphon, Alcibiades, and Socrates, and others. These questions are: "If I am to decide this question of justice, what kind of person must I become?" And: "If I am to decide this question of justice, what kind of person do I wish to become?" The negotiation between this imperative and this

<sup>38</sup> In this act of choice that defines us as a person, we find a potential overlap between the Rawlsian self and the self of communitarians like Taylor and Sandel. Kymlicka points out that the distinction in these three thinkers' concept of the self boils down to "where, within the person, to draw the boundaries of the self" (2002: 227), and how to understand the conditions under which we exercise autonomy (245–46). It would not be inaccurate to describe the self of Taylor and Sandel as a hybrid liberal–communitarian self alternately dominated by its voluntarist and cognitive dimensions.

<sup>39</sup> Taylor 1994: 32–33. Mead's "generalized other" is the organization of all the attitudes which members of a community or social group may legitimately adopt toward one another and the group as a whole. Each fully developed self must learn to internalize the attitudes not only of particular others he or she encounters but of the group as a whole (1934: 152–64). Mead uses an analogy from game-playing: before each move, the individual chess player must keep in mind not only his or her opponent's possible moves but those moves that all competent chess players might legitimately make at that moment. In this study I use "dominant social other" as a synonym for Mead's "generalized other." Cf. Joas on game-playing and the "role," self, and generalized other in Mead (1985: 118–20).

imaginative hypothesis, and the self-transformation each implies, is a major focus of the study.

Taylor helps us move away from a preoccupation with individuality and toward community because his communitarian script insists that the interpersonal linguistic link between speaker and listener has the capacity to create public space: “But the crucial and highly obtrusive fact about language, and human symbolic communication in general, is that it serves to found public space, that is, to place certain matters before *us*” (1985a: 259, emphasis in the original). He describes this achievement as a “move” into the “for-us,” and he regards this “move into public space” as “one of the most important things we bring about in language . . .” and as “essential” to the “sense of a shared immediate common good” characteristic of republics ancient and modern (1995: 190–91). To exemplify how language forges a shared, “for-us” reality, he in fact points to democratic Athens, suggesting that visiting Persians would have been befuddled by the political sense Athenians created for such ordinary words as “equal” and “like” (*isos*, *homoios*). While not unfamiliar with the simple concepts of equality or likeness as an attribute of many things, the Persians’ “horizon of values” would not have enabled them to articulate the Athenian idiom in a linguistic currency that had meaning for the Persian political experience (1985a: 275–77).

A key critical voice that points to both contradictions and convergences within liberal and communitarian thinking, offering a bridge between these visions and deliberative democracy, belongs to Jürgen Habermas. From as far back as the 1970s he too has located the self’s origins and its tie to the dominant social other (i.e., Mead’s “generalized other”) in language – and here we return to performance and my promise to retool it. As Goldhill implied when he identified four master-actions of Athenian citizenship, the performance linking citizen and self to others enacts a fundamentally linguistic relation. But Habermas makes this more explicit by borrowing the term “performative” from

Austin's speech act theory to designate a dimension within an utterance that enacts rather than proposes a certain state of affairs – as expressed, for example, by stating, “I hereby declare the games of this Thirtieth Olympiad open.” The performative thrust of an utterance helps transform its “propositional” dimension, which states something to be the case from a third-person, objective perspective, into an “illocutionary” dimension enabling a first-person speaker to communicate how he/she intends a second-person listener to interpret it – in this case, by “declaring” the games open rather than merely stating that they're open or “denying,” “forbidding,” or “lamenting” their opening.<sup>40</sup> So in the performative utterance a first-person speaker affirms to a second-person listener that a certain state of affairs is “hereby” the case – and in the process establishes an intersubjective relation between them to serve as a basis for reaching understanding.<sup>41</sup>

To see how the performative quality of an utterance works hand-in-glove with its illocutionary force, recall how at *Iliad* 9.132–33 Homer dramatically transforms the proposition “Agamemnon never climbed into bed and made love to Briseis” (Achilles' prize captive) into the old warlord's performative declaration of a *promise* to *swear an oath* to Nestor and the other chiefs: “*And I will swear a mighty oath that I never climbed into bed and made love to her*”). By promising “hereby” to swear that

<sup>40</sup> See, e.g., Habermas 1979: 43ff., where he distinguishes between these two dimensions of a speech act in this way: illocutionary meaning emerges when we intersubjectively share an interpersonal relation with a first-person speaker. We tend to grasp a speech act's propositional content through the objective, third-person attitude of an observer (48). See also Habermas 1984: 111. Petrey provides useful definitions and descriptions of performative utterances (1990: 4–21), and he indicates how Austin's notion of an utterance's “illocutionary force” and meaning conform to social conventions that are in effect for a particular social group at a particular historical moment (12–15).

<sup>41</sup> For Habermas the illocutionary component of a speech act relies on a performative sentence to carry it out, usually in a present indicative affirmation to a second person, and accompanied explicitly or implicitly by an expression meaning “hereby” (1979: 36).

“hereby” he has never, Agamemnon, with a first performative utterance, a promise (“I will swear”), endows with certainty a state of affairs, namely, that a second performative utterance will occur (“a mighty oath”). And this second performative utterance endows with certainty the proposition that he never slept with Briseis. All three utterances are bound with an illocutionary force made doubly explicit through the promise and the oath. In this way he assumes a “performative attitude” toward his community, one anchoring his interlocutors and himself in the shared set of norms they rely on to reach mutual understandings.

In effect, Habermas isolates the performative attitude accompanying the illocutionary dimension of speech acts to see it as the key element in a script conferring (or confirming) both individuality and one’s social relation to others. And while he explicitly sees it at work in the “illocutionary mode” of modern genres such as the confession, diary, and autobiography, its communicative dynamics match well enough the competitive displays of self-presentation in the four master citizen actions of competition, display, appearance and spectating that, according to Goldhill, enabled Athenian citizens to have their social standing (*timê*) collectively evaluated and judged by others (1999: 4–6, 8). Habermas describes this performative attitude in terms consistent with Taylor’s understanding of what constitutes a “person” and the person’s need for recognition from a “significant other” (what I call the “dominant social other”): “it is not a matter of *reports* and descriptions from the perspective of an observer, not even of *self-observations*; rather, it is a matter of interested *presentations of self*, with which a complex claim presented to second persons is justified – a claim to recognition of the irreplaceable identity of an ego manifesting itself in a conscious way of life” (1992: 167; emphasis in the original).<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> There’s a congruence here with the script Taylor outlines for modern identity in his essay on the “politics of recognition” (1994), especially concerning the self’s

This notion of a performative attitude, when it accompanies illocutionary statements in an act of self-presentation, holds the key to understanding how performing certain cultural scripts enables individuals to negotiate with others recognition of both citizenship and selfhood. By identifying and describing how it operates within a given script, we should be able to see how this use of language opens up a public, “for-us” space that is intersubjectively shared by interlocutors, and that may well exclude others – Persians visiting Periclean Athens, for example – who cannot participate in the performative attitude struck by Athenian speakers of equality. (In fact the Persians’ perplexity when Athenians use words for equality describes the corresponding performative attitude of the Asiatic foreigner.) Also, if we wish to determine degrees of the self’s autonomy vis-à-vis others and their community traditions, this performative attitude should serve as an index: at one extreme the self may be entirely constituted by the discourse of others and of traditions; at another it may establish itself as an outsider, essentially distinct from their discourse and traditions; or it may discover intermediate positions between these poles.<sup>43</sup>

To appreciate the importance of performative attitudes embedded in the illocutionary force of what citizens say, let’s look at the act that inaugurated Athenian citizenship. This act required an individual to cross over an illocutionary threshold by performing a speech genre: swearing

dependence on others for its identity. For Habermas the ego itself “retains an intersubjective core because the process of individuation from which it emerges runs through the network of linguistically mediated interactions” (1992: 170). For Taylor “my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others” (1994: 34).

<sup>43</sup> My use of “performative attitude” lends more flexibility to the positions individuals may take vis-à-vis the dominant social other. Compare, e.g., Gill’s rigid distinctions between “subjective-individualist” and “objective-participant” selves (1996: 11–12 and *passim*).

an oath.<sup>44</sup> When young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty served as apprentice citizens (ephebes), they received military training, religious instruction, and moral guidance from elders.<sup>45</sup> After passing scrutiny at a formal ceremony called a *dokimasia* on both the local and state levels – we’ll discuss this script at greater length in Chapters 5 and 7 – they took an oath at the sanctuary of the god Aglaurus.<sup>46</sup> Note in the following epigraphic version of the oath how each ephebe presents himself to the dominant social other by using the promissory part of the oath to represent persons and objects listening to him as the citizen body he will soon join; they occupy the subject position of third-person observers (future comrades in the hoplite phalanx, state officials, weapons, and state institutions). Also note how he then uses the oath’s invocation to establish an I–you relationship with ancient divinities and the land itself (its boundaries marked by fields of key agricultural products); these he configures as second-person interlocutors called to witness the promise. As a composite speech genre, the oath combines the promise and invocation into one illocutionary component and into a performative attitude that constructs two spatiotemporal frames, one

<sup>44</sup> Bakhtin defines a speech genre as a stable type of utterance with a characteristic use of thematic content, style, and structure (1986: 60). See Hirzel’s basic study of the oath in Greek literature and society (1966). See the more recent Sealey 1994: 95–100 (primarily on Homeric oaths), Loraux 2002a (oaths and civic strife from Hesiod to democratic Athens), and Cole 1996 (oaths used to define and enact citizenship in Athenian democracy). In Sealey’s simplified scheme, a typical Greek oath consists of: invocation (to a deity), content (a promise or statement of fact), and imprecation (a curse the speaker calls down on himself if he fails his promise or lies in stating facts) (1994: 96).

<sup>45</sup> Pseudo-Aristotle’s *Constitution of the Athenians* provides the most detailed description of the ephebate as it existed in the fourth century (*Ath. Pol.* 42). On the traditional nature of the ephebate and its probable establishment early in the democracy, see Pélékides 1962, esp. 78, and my discussion (with additional references) in Chapter 5.

<sup>46</sup> For the time of the oath’s administration, see Pélékides 1962: 111 and Rhodes 1981: 506.

nested inside the other: the larger frame of Athens' community memory over which divine agents and the land preside, and the smaller frame of each ephebe's own life as a citizen.

To echo Taylor, the oath creates in just a few words a "web of interlocation," a "for-us" reality; to echo Habermas, the oath uses all three subject positions (first, second and third persons) to transform the ephebe from an outsider into a privileged member of the community. In my sense of citizenship as performance, it splices the "performative" of speech act theory into the performance of a social script by aligning individuals, groups, and temporal-social spaces into performative attitudes and subject positions. The end result has the speaking self and the dominant social other he invokes reciprocally recognize one another. The inscription reads:

*This is the ancestral oath the ephebes must swear:*

*"I will not disgrace these sacred weapons, nor will I abandon the man at my side wherever [in the line] I may be stationed. I will protect our sacred and public institutions, and I will not pass on my fatherland in worse condition but greater and better, by myself or with everyone's help. And I will obey those who for now hold authority reasonably, and the established laws, and those they will establish reasonably in the future. If anyone should try to do away with them, I will not let them, either by myself or with everyone's help. And I will respect our ancestral sacred institutions. As witnesses I name the gods Aglaurus, Hestia, Enyo, Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Heracles, and the boundaries of the fatherland: wheat, barley, vines, olive trees, fig trees."*<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> This version of the oath was inscribed in the deme of Acharnae in the fourth century; I've modified Siewert's translation (1977: 103).

But the performative attitude within an illocutionary statement can generate other, more innovative or flexible types of individual identity and community membership. Let's return to Taylor's example of Persian visitors in Athens. Does their perplexity inevitably exclude them from ever participating in the sense of community Athenian citizens share? Ideally, according to Habermas, these Athenian speakers and their Persian listeners *could* align their performative attitudes to reach mutual understanding through a type of reasoning he calls "communicative." In this case they would overcome their cultural and linguistic divide by, first, understanding one another's utterances about equality as interpretations of their respective worlds, and, second, "negotiat[ing] common definitions of the situation" as a basis for generating a "communicative action" they might jointly carry out concerning a mutually acceptable notion of equality – perhaps in the diplomatic form of a peace treaty, or an agreement to form common cause against a third party (Habermas 1984: 95). Under these circumstances, their realignment of performative attitudes would have resulted in the creation of a new, if perhaps fragile, form of community, through a script we might call "forming an alliance" (*summakhia*).

Taylor helps us develop this example further by pointing to another term in the classical Athenian vocabulary with which visiting Persians would have struggled: "freedom" (*eleutheria*). For a person from a despotic culture, Taylor explains, "This notion of freedom, as a status within a certain kind of practice of self-rule, seems utterly devoid of sense. . . . What our Persian observer [can] not see . . . is the way in which 'equal,' 'like,' 'free,' and such terms as 'citizen,' help define a horizon of value. . . . They articulate the citizen's sensitivity to the standards intrinsic to this ideal and this way of life" (1985a: 276). In other words such propositions as "The freedom of Athenians makes them superior to other peoples," or "Athenians are fortunate to possess their kind of freedom," or "Freedom to an Athenian is worth more than any other possession," while perfectly comprehensible to the speaker and listeners



of Pericles' Funeral Oration in 430, might provoke only a shake of the head from a Persian interlocutor – unless of course one could imagine a bilingual, bicultural Persian capable of exercising communicative reason and sharing common cause with Athenians and other Greeks who prized this freedom. The Athenian historian Xenophon tell us that this is more or less what the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger displayed in 401, when, in a doomed attempt to wrest the throne from his half-brother Artaxerxes, he exhorted his ten thousand Greek mercenaries before the battle of Cunaxa near Babylon. Note how he transforms versions of the three propositions about freedom into the illocutionary statements I italicize. In this way Cyrus uses self-presentation to enact a performative attitude which, at least momentarily, places him within a new, if fragile, community that is both Persian and Greek as he leads freedom-loving Greeks into this battle – now a genuinely Greco-Persian communicative action:

*Men of Greece, I'm not leading you as my allies [summakhous] because I lack non-Greek men; rather, I've taken you with me because I acknowledge [nomizôn] you to be braver and stronger than non-Greeks. And so be worthy of the freedom you've come to possess and for which I consider you to be fortunate [eudaimonizô]. Know well that I would prefer [heloimên an] to have that freedom in exchange for many times more than all my other possessions. (Anabasis 1.7.3–4)*<sup>48</sup>

### *The Script of Deliberative Democracy: Citizen, Self, and Discourse*

Through speeches like this we see how language uses such resources as illocutionary force and performative attitudes to transform the identity of both individuals and communities: Cyrus and his Greek mercenaries briefly metamorphose into Greco-Persians, hybrid versions of

<sup>48</sup> See Dillery's discussion of this passage in the context of panhellenic community, and others like it by fifth- and fourth-century Greek writers (1995: 60–61).

one another. This self-transformative potential in discourse leads us finally to a third contemporary voice in democratic theory, deliberative democracy. Habermas has been the most influential contributor to the strand of deliberative democracy nourished by the tradition of critical theory, usually called “discourse theory.”<sup>49</sup> He contends that the liberal model of democracy, compared to the discourse theory model, defines the citizen’s autonomy as too narrowly constricted by a series of negative rights to secure freedom from compulsion. The citizen’s autonomy in communitarian models, he claims, may guarantee positive freedoms to participate in public deliberations, but such deliberations are “ethically constricted” because individuals ideally can discover who they are (or wish to be) only by drawing on fixed cultural or national traditions that converge toward common senses of the good (1996a: 23–25). Discourse theory better suits the diversity of today’s democracies; rather than aim toward self-discovery, individual or collective, it forms public opinion by seeking out procedures of argument and reasoning that include the deliberative techniques of every political, ethnic, or moral tradition represented by those who will be affected by the outcome. And its ultimate goal should be, not a moral-political consensus, but a legal consensus on questions of justice in the form of law (25–30).

Discourse theory’s self-transformative nature also offers the advantage of a field where political theory and psychology overlap, for it asks what impact participation in democratic discourse might have on “self-realization,” or individuation, and on developing a more autonomous citizenry as well as self.<sup>50</sup> Warren has recently tried to explain democracy in terms of “democratic self-rule” or autonomy, which for him

<sup>49</sup> See Dryzek’s account of the various “strands” in deliberative democracy (2000: 1–30).

<sup>50</sup> I have in mind studies like Warren 2000, 1995, and 1992, McAfee 2000, Seligman 1997, J. Cohen and Arato 1992, and Alford 1991.

includes ideals of equal access to the “power to make collective decisions” and to participate in “collective judgment.” Within the latter, he suggests, we find individual and collective identity interrelated:

*First, democracy implies processes of communication through which individuals come to know as individuals what they want or think is right. Individuals should be the owners of their beliefs and preferences, meaning that beliefs and preferences should not be the result of manipulation or received opinion but rather the result of considered adherence. Second, democracy implies processes of communication through which a collectivity comes to know what it wants or thinks is right as a collectivity. Collective judgment indicates that individuals have given due consideration to what each wants as a member of the collectivity, enabling the collective to form a will or “public opinion.”*  
(2001: 60; emphasis in the original)

In other words both senses of collective judgment depend on the exercise of autonomy at the individual and political levels. For individuals today this might include the sense of a unique life history, the ability to project goals from the past and present into the future while retaining a reflexive core of self-identity, the ability to create projects and ideas, and a capacity to separate oneself from circumstances like traditions or institutions, perhaps by exercising self-reflexive evaluation of one’s own inner thoughts and emotions (Warren 2001: 63–65; cf. 1995: 172–75). For communities, political autonomy implies a corresponding ability to create a public will through processes of reasoning and justification that incorporate individual judgments into consensual criteria for the validity of opinions and reasons (Warren 2001: 65–67).

Deliberative democracy therefore contains its own conception of a self whose participation in communicative interactions with others promises degrees of change and even transformation. Some of these changes may realize the personal, “voluntarist” ideal of liberalism, to

define oneself by the ends one chooses, but other changes will more closely correspond to the communitarian's ideal of a "cognitive" self reaching self-understanding through the traditions and norms of established communities – and owning up to them. Still other changes will result from the more innovative outcomes of communicative actions formed in debate and discussion with groups and individuals "foreign" to one's own experience. It is the interaction of all three of these dimensions of self – voluntarist, cognitive, and deliberative – that completes the notion of performance I see as the key to citizenship and selfhood.

#### HOW GREEK CITIZENS AND SELVES USE DELIBERATION TO PERFORM JUSTICE AND THE LAW

But did the Greeks engage in genuine deliberation by our contemporary standards? Some of today's deliberative democrats, such as Jon Elster, claim that the Athenians merely "mimicked" genuine deliberation (1998: 1–2). And some historians, such as M. I. Finley, claim that nowhere in Homer do the Greeks deliberate in the modern sense of a sustained, rational discussion of competing courses of action, with clear consideration of their advantages and disadvantages (1979: 114–15). In this study I maintain that, starting with Homeric epic, the Greeks certainly deliberated in our sense of the term, and that they used deliberation to negotiate their identities as citizens and selves with varying degrees of individual freedom and political autonomy. The gallery of remarkable individuals already mentioned (Homer's Achilles and Odysseus; the Athenian democrats Protagoras, Pericles, Antiphon, Alcibiades, and Socrates) each performed selfhood and citizenship as a kind of deliberation. I also suggested that an important part of that deliberation tries to determine self-worth by taking the hypothetical form of such questions as "What sort of person must I become?" and "... do I wish to become?" But that deliberation is not just – or even

primarily – about self-evaluation. More often, deciding a question of justice demands that an individual or group decide about the relative *timê* of others.

As a result this study tells the history of how the Greeks deliberated not just as individuals concerned with self-worth but as individuals and groups concerned with evaluating the worth of others in their community – both what sort of rank others should have and what sort of person others should be. In some form or other the citizen scripts “how citizens deliberate” and “rendering a judgment” therefore provide a thread I follow in each chapter – a blueprint congruent with Aristotle’s in-a-nutshell definition of citizenship as “nothing else but participating in judgment and in exercising state authority” (*metekhein kriseôs kai arkhês*, *Pol.*3.1.4), which he further boils down to serving as a juror (*dikastês*) and member of a citizen assembly (*ekklêsiastês*, 3.1.8). In this study we’ll see how the history I describe intertwines citizenship and individual autonomy in Greek states<sup>51</sup> in ways demonstrating that we cannot regard Aristotle’s definition of citizenship as an attribute subordinate to selfhood or vice-versa: the two interconnect like the surfaces on a Möbius strip. We’ll see that to be a Greek citizen one must enjoy the following privileges: a measure of individual *timê* deserving sufficient recognition from others to maintain a positive public image; a qualified personal autonomy permitting exercise of the will in individual and family self-interest so long as community welfare isn’t damaged; and a set of deliberative freedoms including participation with peers in freedoms of speech, assembly, and an exchange of reason giving.

<sup>51</sup> By “Greek state” I mean both the city-state (the *polis*, pl. *poleis*) and the regionally defined state (the *ethnos*, pl. *ethnê*). For the distinction between them in the Archaic period (ca. 800–500), see Snodgrass 1980: 28–31 and 42–47; more generally, see Fouchard 2003: 9–70. Recent scholarship disputes this neat distinction, preferring to see these types as “tiers of identity” a community could adopt for various reasons at various times (see C. Morgan 2003: 1–16, and Hansen 1998).

In contrast to Achilles' discovery of a new kind of self in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines ways of performing justice in the prestate and early state periods (ninth to seventh centuries), when judicial chiefs (*basileis*) orchestrate deliberation in dispute settlement. Here the chief tries to lead disputants and their supporters to an agreement (a "straight" *dikê*) incorporating the interests of each side and in accord with tradition. We'll see, though, that the judicial chief achieves this sort of consensus through a cognitive virtuosity linking his performance to that of epic bards and compromising the autonomy of the dispute's participants.

In Chapter 3 I argue that Odysseus' self-transformation enables him, in comparison with the judicial chief, to play a very different agent of justice when he takes revenge on Penelope's suitors. He models for Homer's audiences around 700 one of the primary roles individual citizens will play when soon after 650 they begin administering state justice as magistrates and jurors in a law court. It's the development of written, statute law, however, that permits a new citizen script, the jury trial, to emerge with its particular form of deliberation. Chapter 4 ties statute law to another sort of remarkable individual: the lawgiver. None of these legendary figures is more remarkable (or unique) than Solon of Athens (ca. 590), and this chapter explores how he combines role-playing as a lawgiver, politician, and poet in order to demonstrate to citizens the deliberative and cognitive arts they need in order to "perform the law" as magistrates and jurors. Because Solon's figure looms large over Athens' legal and political history, I extend Chapter 4's scope to the fifth and fourth centuries, where we can appreciate changes in the law as a performance tradition. We'll see that forensic oratory (Antiphon, Demosthenes, and Aeschines) prompts jurors to practice types of mimesis that carry on Solon's lawgiving in ways that respond differently to the democracy's changing political ideologies.

What are the risks to individuals, to the collective citizen body, and to the community's well-being when citizens deliberate about justice

and the worth (*timê*) of others? Chapter 5 claims that Aeschylus dramatizes these questions on the tragic stage of democratic Athens in his play *Suppliants* (ca. 463–61). I argue that the key dilemma of the play (and the trilogy it belongs to) is alliance formation, by which I mean a decision about whether to recognize that one's own well-being coincides with another's. Aeschylus stages the need to make this judgment as a test his spectators face in evaluating others who are noncitizens (specifically, foreigners and females) – and they do this in the double register of a heroic legend's fictional world and Athens' contemporary world of democratic imperialism. He forces his spectators to deliberate over justice as both individuals and citizens, divided on one hand by private emotions such as compassion and fear, and on the other hand by collective reason-giving under the guidance of elite leaders. The first kind of justice prompts them as individual human beings to identify with others in a nonpolitical sense of community; the second kind demands they use strategic reasoning to further their community's interest over that of their rivals and preserve its autonomy.

The subsequent history of Athenian democracy from around 450 onward continued developing ways for citizens to define themselves and their interests individually and collectively. I've already alluded to changing paradigms of citizenship and selfhood under the Periclean regime (from the 450s to the early 420s) and in the remaining years of the fifth century. I explore alternatives to the Periclean paradigm – its “shadows,” I call them – in Chapters 6 and 7 through deliberations that are increasingly interior to the individual and based on self-interest or criteria such as Socrates' commitment to “self-regarding” rather than “other-regarding” virtues (Irwin 1977: 255). I use the sophistic opposition between *nomos* (law, social custom) and *physis* (nature, human nature, individual personality) to set for us the terms of a conflict between “communitarian” values based on owning up to the ends others provide us and more “liberal” values that seek a moral shelter

conducive to self-fashioning. But since Antiphon, Alcibiades, and the historical Socrates enact forms of moral autonomy that are radical and elite, their social negotiability is questionable. And so both chapters explore strategies each of these remarkable individuals uses to play the game of citizenship; we'll also consider ways ordinary Athenians try to make sense of such hyperintelligent scripts based on inner deliberation.

The Conclusion considers whether we can see in the history we've traced a convergence between the paths of performing justice as a self-evaluation and as an evaluation of others. We return briefly to fourth-century oratory, to an unusual speech (Demosthenes 25, written in 338–24) that struggles to harness competing legal and political ideologies in persuading jurors how to perform the law and evaluate the defendant correctly. This struggle recalls our competing contemporary scripts of liberalism, communitarianism and deliberative democracy; it also indicates how in performing justice the Greeks and ourselves enact the interdependence of citizenship and selfhood.



# 1 JUSTICE TO THE DEAD: PROTOTYPES OF THE CITIZEN AND SELF IN EARLY GREECE

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BEFORE THE FORMATION OF THE CITY-STATE AND ETHNOS-STATE, what kinds of script and what kinds of self enabled Greek communities to perform justice? Did these scripts and selves undergo changes when the state and its citizens emerged in the early eighth century? My goals in this chapter are to recover a likely version of the earliest pre-citizen script, including its cognitive dimensions (especially the sort of reasoning) and its communicative dimensions (especially key speech acts, speech genres, and performative attitudes), and to identify a kind of performer we can consider a prototype for the earliest citizens, including his or her degrees of social and moral autonomy. Given the nature of the evidence at our disposal, my argument must remain hypothetical. I claim that, first, Early Iron Age communities created a heroic self when they used funerary ritual, especially lamentation, to render justice to deceased warrior chiefs (*basileis*); and, second, that around the time of state formation this heroic self achieves a degree of autonomy when performances of the *Iliad* enable Homer's Achilles to manipulate scripts of lament and deliberation, effecting a self-transformation into a prototype for the citizen.

I divide my inquiry into three unequal parts. The first, "Doing Justice to the Dead in Early Iron Age Communities," outlines key social features of typical communities in Early Iron Age Greece (ca. 1100–700), particularly in the state's "Formative Era," the Early to Middle Geometric periods (ca. 900–760).<sup>1</sup> Here I argue that the worldview of

<sup>1</sup> For this "Formative Era" see Donlan and Thomas 1993: 5. My use of the term Early Iron Age refers to the period ca. 1100–700, although most classicists and historians

these prestate communities probably depended on narratives about ancestors, and I identify a “script” (as defined in the Introduction) that establishes justice in funerary ritual for warrior chiefs – in particular lament. The second part, “Performing Justice in Homeric Lament,” uses the *Iliad* to identify an additional script that communities in the Formative period used to establish justice: I call it “how leaders deliberate” and contrast its cognitive and communicative dimensions with those of lament. The third and longest part, “Achilles’ Self-transformation,” focuses on this Iliadic performer at three moments in the poem where he tries to transform “how leaders deliberate” into a deliberative script that can accommodate a new, more autonomous self, which I identify with the prototypical citizen. The key to Achilles’ effort is his self-transformation through the adaptation of traditional lament: in Books 1, 9, and 24, he progressively splices lament for a fallen leader and the deliberation of leaders into a unique, hybrid discourse, a “self-lament.” Through it he determines his own *timê* autonomously, publicly proclaims it as consistent with a just fate, and demands its recognition by peers. He is thus the first in this study’s gallery of remarkable individuals to frame the programmatic questions, “What sort of person must I become if I am to decide this question of justice? And what sort of person do I wish to become?”

## I DOING JUSTICE TO THE DEAD IN EARLY IRON AGE COMMUNITIES

### *A Profile of Early Iron Age Communities*

To identify scripts and performers for establishing justice in Greece’s prestate communities, we need to outline key features of their world-view(s). Material evidence, crosscultural ethnographic models, and Homeric epic enable us to approximate the categories of time, space,

still prefer “Dark Age” when referring to roughly the same period (ca. 1100–ca. 800); on the different terms, cf. Antonaccio 1995a: 2, n. 4. (My profile of Early Iron Age communities revises arguments and updates data in Farenga 1998.)

and human agency behind their understanding of the world. We can also, with some accuracy, identify typical settlement patterns, population levels, modes of production, degrees of social stratification, and forms of authority. This composite evidence highlights specific dilemmas in material and social life and in ideology, all of which made a coherent worldview problematic: dilemmas of settlement instability and survival, a potential crisis over the death of a community leader, and contradictions in the hybrid form of his big-man and chieftain authority. In particular this dilemma of leadership challenged communities to construct a stable and coherent social persona for the *basileus*, one to which an individual's achievement could justly be assimilated upon his death. But these communities possessed symbolic resources to meet these problems, among them an understanding of time and space grounded in stories about ancestors and funerary ritual for individuals of high status. These resources transformed the Early Iron Age warrior chief from an "indebtor" into an "indebted" self. I use these terms to describe a leader who in life actively sustains his social persona through exchange relations that bind followers in obligation to him, but who in death passively owes his social identity in community memory to their obligation to repay him.

Greece's Early Iron Age settlements were for the most part villages conforming to the dominant settlement pattern throughout the Bronze Age, in which an extended family's household (*oikos*) joined with several others to form a "nucleated" hamlet or village cluster; and these villages remained independent, much as they had been in the Bronze Age, except for the relatively brief period of palace-state formation in the Late Bronze Age.<sup>2</sup> Generally speaking, these autonomous villages

<sup>2</sup> Donlan and Thomas 1993: 61–2; for Crete see Haggis 1993 and Cavanaugh et al. 1998. For Greece as a whole see recent archaeological surveys by Whitley (2001: 80–101) and Morris (2000: 201ff.; 1998a); cf. Thomas and Conant's profile of six Dark Age sites (1999). See Thalmann's portrait of Dark Age social life in relation to Homeric

(re)appeared within a generation or two of the Mycenaean collapse, around the start of the Protogeometric period (ca. 1050), flourished around 900, and lasted until the state emerged between 800 and 750. They can be characterized by peaceful prosperity, by a considerable level of economic activity, and in some locations by contacts with the Near East. Instability characterized most individual settlements, which were inhabited for anywhere from fifty to three hundred years, although a few (Athens, Knossos, and Argos) were stable, and inhabited continuously from the Bronze Age to the Archaic period.<sup>3</sup> Population density tended to be low, with most people living in hamlet groups of thirty to fifty individuals, although villages whose population numbered in the hundreds were not unusual, and a few communities (again, Athens, Knossos, and Argos) probably numbered in the low thousands.<sup>4</sup> The “domestic mode of production” prevailed everywhere, driving a subsistence economy mixing pastoralism with agriculture;<sup>5</sup> and its ideal of the self-sufficient *oikos* applied to the “autarkic and autonomous” village as well.<sup>6</sup>

The typical Early Iron Age community prior to 800 was therefore an isolated village of thirty-five to one hundred and fifty inhabitants occupying its site for about one hundred and fifty years.<sup>7</sup> Despite a

society (1998: 249–55) and Hammer’s overview of evidence for Dark Age political community, with profiles of three sites (2002: 29–43).

<sup>3</sup> Whitley 1991a: 346–47, 1991b: 184, and 2001: 88–89. See Haggis 1993 on stability in East Crete’s small village clusters.

<sup>4</sup> Garnsey and Morris 1989: 99; Morris 1991: 33; Donlan 1994: 34. On modeling demographic expansion from the tenth century onward, see Scheidel 2003.

<sup>5</sup> See Johnson and Earle’s adaptation of Sahlins’ “domestic mode of production” (2000: 23–24); Donlan 1989: 7–12 on the Dark Age *oikos*; Snodgrass 1987: 193–209 on pastoralism; Morris 1987: 23 and Garnsey and Morris 1989: 99 on pastoralism and agriculture.

<sup>6</sup> Donlan and Thomas 1993: 64.

<sup>7</sup> See Snodgrass 1987: 190–92 on the average life-span. Donlan and Thomas see hamlets and villages as the “normal community for most inhabitants” of Dark Age Greece

diversity of settlements, one general conclusion may be drawn: the fundamental problem for the typical community was long-term survival, especially at the lower end of so-called “local groups,” as well as for other settlements on the spectrum where households and the community strove for economic autonomy.<sup>8</sup> For the continuously inhabited “big three,” perhaps for settlements like Lefkandi, which survived from the Bronze Age to perhaps 700,<sup>9</sup> and for isolated village clusters like those in East Crete, stability rather than survival was the challenge. For despite prosperity and economic development, the long-term material resources of even the larger settlements varied due to climate and the intermittent contacts of exchange, long-distance trade, warfare, and migration.<sup>10</sup>

These problems of survival and stability were compounded for all settlements by two additional features: degrees of social stratification and forms of authority. Both resist precise understanding – especially forms of authority – because material evidence presents an incomplete

(1993: 63). Whitley concludes, “it would not be unreasonable to say that, in general, Dark Age settlements were small . . . scattered across the landscape; and that the population was, compared to later periods, low” (2001: 89). Nevertheless, the broader perspective of political anthropology indicates that the Early Iron Age knew a variety of prestate polities on an ever-shifting spectrum of evolution and devolution. Cf. Ferguson on the Dark Age’s “hybrid polities” (1991: 170–71); Farenga 1998: 181, and Thalmann 1998: 249, on evolution and devolution; and Whitley 2001: 90 on diverse settlement patterns. Edwards makes a similar point to characterize Hesiod’s Askra around 700 as a sparsely populated, autonomous village typical of Dark Age settlements (2004: 6, 33, 37).

<sup>8</sup> “Local groups,” consist of multiple families in village or regional settlements five to ten times the size of the “family-level groups,” which ranged from 5–8 persons to 25–35 (Johnson and Earle 2000: 33–34 and 123–40).

<sup>9</sup> For the end of settlement at Lefkandi, see Thomas and Conant 1999: 88 and 102; settlement was perhaps briefly interrupted from ca. 1100 to 1050 (92–93; 103).

<sup>10</sup> Whitley’s division into “stable” and “unstable” seems too rigid, especially the claim that each type experienced “quite different” social formations (1991b: 184); Thomas and Conant also reject this rigid distinction (1999: 102).

picture of class differences and leadership. Also, crosscultural, ethnographic models of authority and leadership don't correspond with great precision to Aegean communities. We can say that social stratification in the smaller and more unstable communities (between the "family-level" and "local" groups of Johnson and Earle 2000) must have been minimal; in these "homogeneous" hamlets, ranking appeared only in the form of the village headman, who may have been called a *basileus*.<sup>11</sup> But in larger settlements, or as smaller settlements grew, local village groups of 100 to 300 would have experienced increased segmentation and ranking; and when local village groups of 300 to 500 appeared, more common by the Middle Geometric period (850–760), they demonstrate incipient stratification.<sup>12</sup> (The largest communities, Athens and Knossos, likely preserved their Late Bronze Age social hierarchy.<sup>13</sup>) So it's reasonable to conclude with Thalmann that "Hierarchy – at least in the simple form of a line between elite and commoners – evidently persisted" from the Bronze Age (1998: 250); but we should allow for varying degrees of stratification in relation to population, so that "hierarchies shifted constantly" (Whitley 2001: 90) and were not "elaborate, rigid hierarchies" (97).<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> See Donlan and Thomas 1993: 63–5, and Donlan 1994: 35. A good example of such a settlement is Nichoria, with a population of about 60 (13–14 families) in its first Early Iron Age phase (ca. 1075–975) (Thomas and Conant 1999: 36–37, drawing on MacDonald, Coulson, and Rosser 1983: 322–25; see also Donlan and Thomas 1993: 64).

<sup>12</sup> Donlan and Thomas 1993: 65; cf. Morris 1991: 43 on "complex, stratified society" at Lefkandi and Naxos. Tandy in a general sense recognizes stratification in Iron Age communities, but he points mainly to the eighth century (1997: 93).

<sup>13</sup> Morris 1991: 27–40, 42. He sees Iron Age societies as stratified between an elite (one-quarter to one-third of the population) and serf-like peasants (1987: 173–83; 1989b: 506).

<sup>14</sup> E.g., Nichoria's population of about 60 in its first Early Iron Age phase (1075–975) shows no material evidence of stratification and looks like a largely acephalous "local group" without perceptible degrees of status distinction and leadership until

This varying degree of social stratification vexes the question of how to categorize the typical leaders of these changing communities. As with settlement types and diversity, we are probably better off conceiving of Early Iron Age leadership along a developmental spectrum from village headman to big man to chieftain, with many leaders combining features of any two of these ethnographic types.<sup>15</sup> We might imagine any profile we draw of Early Iron Age leadership to possess the fluid proportions of one of those computer-generated, composite photographs that one moment seems to represent a recognizably real individual and the next moment doesn't. This is particularly so when we try to use models to distinguish the functions of a big man from a chieftain,<sup>16</sup> or when we

its second phase, when its population of about 200 sees the construction of the "chieftain's house." Nevertheless, despite this building's conspicuous dimensions and functions, "minimal distinctions separated the families" (Thomas and Conant 1999: 57).

<sup>15</sup> In a typical Iron Age village of 35–150 people, a headman may or may not have organized the village's households for productive and ritual activity. But as some village groups increased in population toward 300, headmen would have functioned as incipient big men through more intergroup, regional efforts at clan-like organization for the purposes of reducing production risks, focusing ceremonial activity, defending territory, and initiating personal networks of exchange (Johnson and Earle 2000: 33–34 and 126; cf. 203ff. for profiles of three typical big-man systems). See Edwards' argument for lack of a local leader in Hesiod's *Ascrea* (2004: 118–23). Contra Thomas and Conant, I don't believe Nichoria's "chieftain's house" signals the transition from big-man to chieftain leadership since a village of about 200 persons is not large enough for a transition from personally constructed to institutionally based leadership (1999: 56–57). Even at the height of its growth (ca. 900 BC), Nichoria's leader was still a would-be big man. When village groups of 500 became more common in the Middle Geometric, their big men would have operated on a wider regional scale as well and projected the function of the chieftain, whose authority compromises the autonomy of individual communities in a region and relies on a more institutionally secured than personally maintained basis.

<sup>16</sup> See Johnson and Earle 2000: 265–67 on simple chiefdoms and 276–77 on intermediate forms combining big-man/chieftain systems. Earle defines the chiefdom as "a regional polity with institutional governance and some social stratification organizing a population of a few thousand to tens of thousands of people. . . . Chiefdoms are

expect Greek leadership in this Formative period to conform neatly to ethnographic models. (For example, these communities' would-be and bona fide chieftains did not provide regional centers for storage and redistribution, suggesting that the Aegean leadership departed in fundamental ways from a key feature in classic ethnographic models.<sup>17</sup>) Because these communities grew, and sometimes shrank again, and had varying degrees of social stratification, they likely generated a hybrid leadership whose social persona combined features of headman, big-man and chieftain authority.<sup>18</sup>

Not surprisingly, some of the earliest scholars to apply ethnographic models to Iron Age and Homeric *basileis* soon enough recognized the instability of settlements and leaders as a principal characteristic: Donlan and Qviller in the early 1980s attributed it to the predominance

intermediate-level polities, bridging the evolutionary gap between small, village-based polities and large, bureaucratic states." (1997: 14). In contrast to the classic chiefdoms of Polynesia, Whitley thinks we can "exclude the possibility that many communities in Early Iron Age Greece were 'chiefdoms' . . ." (2001: 97) but after 900 Athens, Knossos, and Argos look to me like "immature chiefdoms" in Donlan's (1982a, 1982b) and Qviller's (1981) sense. Earle's profile of chiefdoms in the Thy region of Late Neolithic and Bronze Age Denmark (ca. 2300–1300) may offer parallels to Early Iron Age Greece (1997: 18–33, and *passim*).

<sup>17</sup> Donlan and Thomas 1993: 66. Garnsey and Morris note in passing that early Greek states show no evidence of "large concentrations of storage facilities" for the presumed surplus production of elites (1989: 100). Thalmann points out how difficult it is to see the Homeric *basileus* as a redistributor along the lines of the big-man and chieftain models (1998: 262–62). Tandy assumes that redistribution increased in Greece after around 850 (1997: 111), but he offers no material evidence and adduces Homeric examples whose scope and applicability to existing social realities are unclear (cf. Schaps 1998).

<sup>18</sup> Thalmann addresses this hybridism in assessing Homeric leadership, asking, "Is status achieved (as with big-men) or ascribed (as in chiefdoms)?" (1998: 268). He concludes that the epics' elite ideology makes this simple opposition undecidable and that perhaps both types of authority coexisted (269–71). Whitley sees Early Iron Age communities as "rank" rather than "stratified" and status as achieved, not ascribed (2001: 90).



of “immature chiefdoms” in Dark Age and Homeric societies.<sup>19</sup> Donlan subsequently began to emphasize how “notoriously unstable” these polities were; not only could their populations shift allegiances from one local big man’s kin- or clanlike “pyramid” of authority to another’s, but local big men could in turn shift allegiance toward or away from a regional pyramid “constructed” by a paramount chief or his rivals.<sup>20</sup> More recently he has characterized what was a “fatal defect” of these chiefdoms (1989: 25) in stronger terms as an “underlying contradiction” based on the “conflicting claims of egalitarianism and authoritarianism which are inherent in chiefdoms” (1994: 45). In other words, as general system problems, the survival and instability of settlements both small and large appear tied to the figure of the *basileus*, whose authority raised ideological questions about the legitimacy of power while it simultaneously attempted to manage the economic flux of uncertain resources, such as exchange, trade, and climate.

As a focus for both economic stress and ideological contradiction, the Iron Age *basileus* must have, I think, provoked his followers to find cognitive resources to resolve material dilemmas linked to instability so that they might render his social persona and their world ideologically more coherent. Until recently not much attention has been paid to the type of thinking, reasoning, and argumentation that impelled inhabitants of prestate communities to establish or abandon

<sup>19</sup> Donlan 1982a: 172, 173 and 1982b: 3–7; Qviller 1981: 120. Cf. Ferguson on “overlapping, layered and linked authority patterns” before and after statehood (1991: 171), and Earle 1987: 282 and Johnson and Earle 2000: 268 on continuity between non-Greek big-man systems and chiefdoms. Whitley rigidly assigns big men to unstable and chiefs to stable communities (1991a: 352 and 1991b: 192).

<sup>20</sup> Donlan 1985a: 304–5 and 1989: 22; cf. Donlan and Thomas 1993: 65–69. For Thalmann, power in Homeric society rests on a “more secure basis” than Donlan’s assessment of unstable leadership suggests (1998: 266). But I doubt that the “stable social organization” he sees in the poems existed in most communities prior to the eighth century.

settlements, to legitimate or chafe against degrees of social stratification, or to explain the flux of material and symbolic resources. Political anthropology has begun to explore the function of cognition, ideology and symbolic thinking in chiefdoms, and Earle in particular has examined the ways that chiefdoms manipulate the economic, military, and ideological sources of power to legitimize their regional political control. He assigns a primary role to the process he calls “materialization,” which is “the transformation of ideas, values, stories, myths and the like into a physical reality that can take the form of ceremonial events, symbolic objects, monuments, and writing” (1997: 151). Through these forms of materialization, chieftains manipulate ideology to give concrete form to a worldview, to its principles of moral and religious order, and to its understandings of what is just (144).

Earle specifically recognizes materialization at work in the elite use of symbolic objects and monuments to establish narrative senses of time and place (155ff.). This links his work to the efforts of classical archaeologists who explore the ways Early Iron Age communities manipulated time and space as a cognitive resource to sustain their worldviews. Studies by Morris (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1998a, 2000), Whitley (1991a, 2001), Antonaccio (1993, 1994, 1995a and 1995b), and Sourvinou-Inwood (1981, 1983, 1995), to name a few, have called attention to the funerary sphere as the principal symbolic resource of Early Iron Age communities of around 1100–800. Their work has illuminated the considerable amounts of labor and wealth these communities invested in the privileges of formal burial, in the manufacture, disposition and decoration of grave goods, in the periodic practice of tomb cult, and in the use or disposal of iron. But I believe these communities utilized a more fundamental symbolic resource without whose categories of time, space, and agency these other activities would have been inconceivable and incomprehensible: storytelling, or the formulation and reformulation of oral narratives about *basileis* both living and deceased.

### *Funerary Ritual and Its Scripts*

A link between storytelling and burials – especially those that appear “heroic” – helps explain how Early Iron Age communities before 800 could establish continuity between the present, the past, and the near future, where discontinuity in fact had been (and likely would continue to be) more common. As the evidence of tomb cult suggests, some communities needed to reinvent over and again, in the face of present difficulties and an uncertain future, a “shallow” past emerging from stories of ancestors and events spanning no more than two or three generations.<sup>21</sup> Such stories could also use ancestors to invent ties to other communities within or outside a given region as patterns of trade, warfare and migration changed, making more coherent the tension between purely local interaction and its sometime expansion to regional and interregional levels. Stories about *basileis* and ancestors could also evaluate a recently deceased leader’s achievement in light of the social persona of an ancestral *basileus*: Was the man an ethical success or failure? Has his community thrived or failed? Does he merit praise or blame for its fate? These sorts of stories would have operated ideologically within a wider and more abstract sphere, that of the cosmic framework of justice. So if “instability” or “variability” in social life typified these communities, what more valuable resource for rendering justice could they possess than storytelling’s ability to fashion a coherent worldview as they grappled with survival, instability, war, and an ideologically flawed leadership?

Recent reinterpretations of physical evidence for Early Iron Age burials do suggest that the funerary sphere used elite burials to anchor narratively based worldviews.<sup>22</sup> In communities with a shallow

<sup>21</sup> “Tomb cult” refers to occasional (or even unique) visits and offerings at grave sites; see Antonaccio 1995a: 6 and 264ff., 1994: 401–2, and 1993: 63.

<sup>22</sup> Morris’ survey of post-Mycenaean burial practices infers a use of oral traditions about ancestors (2000: 201ff. and 225). After 1050 communities may have restricted archaeologically recoverable burials to adults of rank, with cemeteries organized

genealogical memory of about three generations, funerary ritual and/or tomb cult seem intent on merging in the nonspecific category of “ancestors” the recent dead with the unknown dead who inhabited the location in a distant past.<sup>23</sup> These symbolic resources were thus marshaled to configure a time, space and agency projected backward to forge a vital if uncertain continuity between past and present, perhaps to legitimate a kinlike group that, not lacking rivals, faced a far from certain future.<sup>24</sup> Some historians and classical archaeologists have begun to probe the possibility that narratives about ancestors and use of funerary ritual provided cognitive resources for Early Iron Age social problems. Sourvinou-Inwood surmised that the death of even one adult member constituted an unwelcome event for which funerary ritual provided a cognitive tool for restoring continuity and order:

*In the small Dark Age villages, community life was de facto disrupted by each death, and each dead person had inevitably had social relationships with all the rest of the community which needed severing and consequent adjustment, so the whole community was de facto*

along kinship lines (1987 and 1989a; cf. Humphreys’ critique [1990], and Morris’ reply [1998b: 27–29]). At about this time communities either prepared new tombs for elites, with evidence of tomb cult, reused Mycenaean (or earlier) tombs for burial and tomb cult of their own dead, or made offerings to unknown occupants of earlier graves (Antonaccio 1993: 46–70 and 1995a: 6–7). After 925 more wealth, new decorative styles (Geometric) and disposal techniques suggest increased competition among elites (Morris 1987: 42 and 181–82; Whitley 1991b: 136–37; Antonaccio 1995a: 257ff.). Tomb cult, often of short duration, may reflect these changes and pressures (Antonaccio 1993: 48–56, 1994: 401–2, and 1995a: 245–46).

<sup>23</sup> See Antonaccio 1993: 63–64, 1995a: 252–53 and 264–65; cf. Lambrinoudakis 1988: 245.

<sup>24</sup> Antonaccio 1993: 64; cf. 1994: 410 (though burials and tomb cult may not always have been restricted to elites; 403.) On tomb cult as competition for the past both locally and panhellenically, see Antonaccio 1994: 408; cf. Whitley 1995: 49–50 on the Dark Age use of the past to legitimate the present. Morris sees eighth-century tomb and hero cult as “ambiguous, meaning different things to different people” (1988: 758).

*involved in each death-ritual. Moreover, in those years, the survival of the (vulnerable and depopulated) community was the top priority. (1981: 29; cf. 1983: 42)*

More threatening for communities large or small, with a hybrid headman/big-man/chieftain authority, was the leader's death.<sup>25</sup> Because of mixed degrees of achieved and ascribed authority, these communities lacked institutional procedures for an orderly succession of power, and so the leader's demise would have thrown the community's stability, or even its future, into doubt. Calligas (1988) suggested that communities of the "Lefkandi Period" (ca. 1050–830) originated the heroic narrative tradition we associate with Greek epic; and he linked storytelling to the funerary sphere by arguing that narratives extended "heroic" burials for leaders and prolonged their legitimacy into the future. More recently, Morris has suggested that the great warrior burial at Lefkandi (ca. 950) actually initiated the Greeks' belief in the gap separating themselves as an impoverished Iron Age race from their heroic ancestors (2000: 228–37).

Thomas and Conant have in a broader sense stressed the role that oral memory and narration probably played in "honoring the deeds of local ancestors" in Nichoria, and in "mold[ing] fundamental conceptions of the world and the role of humans in it," including "maintaining proper order" and the "communal business of justice" (1999: 49, 50). They've also pointed to the heroic burials at Lefkandi from 950 to 825 as expressions of materialization in Earle's sense because the burials testify to a "heroic" worldview centered around warfare, adventure, and "an obsession with honor and prestige (*timê*)" (108–9). This obsession with *timê*, they suggest, also depends on an oral, "remembered tradition"

<sup>25</sup> See Sourvino-Inwood 1981; 30, n. 53, for the greater impact of a leader's death and a difference in the scale of symbolic expression for his funerary ritual.