STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 20

Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements

THE POLITICS OF LABOR IN THE FRENCH THIRD REPUBLIC

Christopher K. Ansell

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Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements

Like many organizations and social movements, the Third Republic French labor movement exhibited a marked tendency toward schism into competing sectarian organizations. During the roughly fifty-year period from the fall of the Paris Commune to the creation of the powerful French Communist party, the French labor movement shifted from schism to broad-based solidarity and back to schism. Ansell analyzes the dynamic interplay between organization, ideology, and political mobilization that produced these shifts between schism and solidarity. The aim is not only to shed new light on the evolution of the Third Republic French labor movement, but also to develop a more generic understanding of schism and solidarity in organizations and social movements. This book builds on insights drawn from sociological analyses of Protestant sects and anthropological studies of segmentary societies, as well as from organization and social movement theory.

Christopher K. Ansell is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he teaches organization theory and political sociology. He has published articles on political organization in a number of journals, including the *American Journal of Sociology, Politics & Society*, *Studies in American Political Development*, *Comparative Political Studies*, the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, and *Governance*.

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To Jeannine Mathyer Ansell
and the memory of
Robert James Ansell

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Acknowledgments

Upon completing this book, I feel a bit like I imagine a French journeyman may have felt after completing his *tour de France* – that obligatory journey around France to hone his skills. It was quite an ordeal, but he knows he is a better craftsman now than when he started. He is also highly aware of the fact that he could neither have developed these skills nor completed the trip without the sustained help of others. My *tour de France* began at the University of Chicago. In my mind's eye, that experience is forever associated with trudging through wintery Hyde Park to the weekly meeting of the Workshop on Organizations and State-building. Under the inspired leadership of John Padgett (master craftsman), that workshop became my intellectual hometown, the place where the ideas for this book were hatched and nurtured. Sincere thanks to John for his continuing guidance and unswerving commitment to this project over many years. Many others also contributed to the special intellectual atmosphere at Chicago, especially Camille Bussette, José Cheibub, Roger Gould, J. David Greenstone, Frances Haman, Gary Herrigel, Roland Hsu, Antoine Joseph, David Laitin, Walter Mattli, Paul McLean, Janet Morford, Adam Przeworski, Bill Sewell, Bernie Silberman, Natalie Silberman-Wainwright, Bat Sparrow, Greg Vince, Pat Vince, and Mark Wainwright. In particular, David Greenstone had a profound influence on this book, although he died of cancer at a very early stage in my research. I recall David telling me once that the project needed a "little more Tocqueville." I ignored him at the time, but I hope he might be less critical of the final product.

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I reserve the final note of thanks for my wife and fellow political scientist Suzanne Ryan, who lived this book from beginning to end. A single example must suffice to demonstrate her devotion. When my fellowship

money ran out, I was frantic to complete some critical archival research before returning to Chicago. There was no money for photocopies or even Metro fare. Suzanne walked from the Twentieth Arrondissement to the Marais every day for two weeks and spent eight hours a day hand copying the elaborate orthography of French clerks. Love knows no bounds!

1

The Struggle and the Conciliation

Church or sect? For French trade unions and socialist parties that seems to have always been the question. Two of the leading socialist leaders of the Third Republic, Jean Jaurès and Jules Guesde, even came to personally embody this choice. As their fellow socialist Charles Rappoport, who knew them both, wrote in his memoirs:

> Jules Guesde and Jean Jaurès, two men, two worlds: two psychologies, two characters, two philosophies; the struggle and the conciliation; the analysis and the synthesis; harshness and generosity; intransigence and suppleness. (Rappoport 1991, 185)

Trotsky described Jaurès as a "capacious spirit" with "a physical revulsion for all sectarianism" (Goldberg 1968, 329, his translation). In contrast, Jules Guesde was the "guardian of the dogma" for whom "all deviation inspired . . . the same horror as the Christian schism did Innocent III" (Willard 1991, 93; Lefranc 1963, 50).

Between 1884 and 1905, French socialists were organized as sects – the Guesdists, the Possibilists, the Allemanists, the Independent Socialists, the Blanquists, and the anarchists – fighting among themselves for influence with the unions. Then, in 1905, these socialist sects set aside their differences under the broad tent of Jaurès's ecumenical ministry – his intellectual synthesis of the competing "traditions" of French socialism. In 1920, this Jaurèsian synthesis unraveled: the French Communist party was founded in a schism of, in Léon Blum's words, "the Old House." To this day, the French Left remains fundamentally divided, albeit with important moments of alliance along the way – the Popular Front in 1936 and the Common Program in the 1970s.

In parallel with the socialist parties, the French unions have also struggled between church and sect. Between 1884 and 1902, the unions were balkanized by their allegiance to different political sects. But in 1902, the unions tentatively united in the Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor; CGT); by 1906, in the famous "Charter of Amiens," the CGT further consolidated this unity by ratifying a principle of strict autonomy from political parties. But like party unity, the solidarity of the unions was not to last. In 1921, approximately a half year after the party schism, the CGT itself broke into two rival blocs. Unions were again divided by their allegiance to competing parties. Contemporary French unions remain divided between several rival union confederations.

This book analyzes the organizational and ideological development of the French labor movement between 1872 and 1922. These were critical formative years for the modern French labor movement, institutionalizing a pattern of labor organization and ideology still visible in contemporary France. In trying to understand these developments, the book has two goals. The first is to describe the particular social, political, and economic conditions that explain these historical outcomes. From this perspective, understanding the formation of the French labor movement has its own intrinsic importance. The second is to provide a general framework for explaining a pattern of schism and solidarity common to many organizations and social movements. Here, French labor history has been used more instrumentally to develop and evaluate this general framework. Although sometimes tugging in different directions, these two goals are generally complementary. They will be discussed in turn.

Urban Populism and Communal Unionism

With its early appearance (alongside the British and American labor movements) and international visibility, the French labor movement has always been regarded by some as a critical comparative case for understanding the emergence of "modern" labor movements (Katznelson and Zolberg 1986). For others, the formation of the French labor movement provides insight into the political and intellectual development of a nation with enormous influence in Europe and abroad. From either perspective, the French labor movement has four distinctive (though not unique) characteristics that this book seeks to explain:

1. The development of a divided labor movement, rent by the schisms of 1920–1 into communist and socialist blocs
2. The establishment of one of the largest Communist parties (with Italy) in Western Europe
3. The mobilization of a prewar labor union movement around an ideology known as "revolutionary syndicalism," which had its intellectual counterpart in the theories of the philosopher Georges Sorel

4. The development of a form of strike and union mobilization that rejects bureaucratic unionism, eschews representation by political parties, celebrates grassroots "direct action," and makes broad-based social and political demands; in other contexts, this form of mobilization has been labeled "social movement unionism" (Seidman 1994)

This book argues that the distinctive evolution of the French labor movement in the late nineteenth century can be understood in the context of a populist tradition in France that reaches back at least to the Revolution. There can be no more succinct summary of the populist creed than this phrase from a manifesto written by French Republicans in 1848: "Hence, the State is the people, the producer . . . [I]s it not sovereign, the producer of all riches?" (cited by Sewell 1980, 250). The analytical value of the term "populist" resides in its similarities to and differences with "class mobilization" and "republicanism." On the one hand, like class mobilization, populism is oriented toward the mobilization of producers, although "the people" is a more elastic category than "the working class." On the other hand, in its concern for sovereignty and its suspicion of the state and representative institutions, populism is close to republicanism. Like republicanism, populism tends to attribute the economic woes of the people as much to political causes as to economic ones.

In the late nineteenth century, the French labor movement was torn between its traditional republicanism, which organized a cross-class coalition in defense of Republican institutions, and a movement that sought to sever the link with republicanism by organizing workers strictly along class lines. Since populism overlapped with both Republican forms and class forms of mobilization, it provided a discourse that partially superseded this polarization. While populism is often thought of as a form of rural agrarian protest, the French working class was predominantly urban. French trade unions developed this urban populism into a doctrine known as revolutionary syndicalism, elements of which became a type of constitutional framework for the unification of the union movement. A form of "class populism" mediated between the republicanism of French workers and the pure class-conflict model advocated by Jules Guesde and, later, by the Communists. This class populism not only expressed the links of the labor movement to the Republican movement but also affirmed its position as a class movement within that larger movement.

Populism was a pattern of mobilization as well as a discourse. During the Third Republic, populism was associated with a series of strike waves that erupted every ten years or so (Figure 1.1). These strike waves were contagious grassroots protests that expanded across the boundaries of trade, industry, and skill. As these protests snowballed, strike demands became increasingly political in character and national in scope. Their timing typically coincided with significant political crises and important episodes of republican state building. For the French labor movement, these populist strike waves were the "critical junctures" of both organization building and ideological articulation. They followed a distinctive pattern: increasingly expansive organizational and ideological solidarities developed in the ascending phase of the strike wave; then, during the descending phase, the movement tended to splinter into rival organizational and ideological camps. Sectarian groups like the Guesdists or the Communists were born in the descent.

This urban populism was associated with a second critical characteristic of French working-class mobilization: the strong tendency of French workers to mobilize and organize along territorial lines. Community-based labor movements were common in many countries in the nineteenth century. Many authors have described the local working-class subcultures that developed dense institutional infrastructures in neighborhoods and cities.[1] But the local "embeddedness" implied by these subcultures was challenged at the end of the nineteenth century, and in some cases much earlier, by the rise of powerful national organizations to represent labor. Although territorial unions organized by city or region thrived in many countries in the late nineteenth century, sectoral unionism emerged as the dominant trade-union structure in most nations by 1900. In the United States, for instance, the rise of national trade federations tended to undermine the autonomy of local unions and, consequently, the vitality of territorial unionism (Ulman 1966). Although territorial unions continued to exist, they played second fiddle to the sectoral unions. In France and a few other countries (like Italy), however, territorial unionism provided a strong counterweight to the power of the sectoral federations.

Political parties also posed a challenge for territorial unionism. Not only did political parties claim territorial representation for themselves, but the national scale of parliamentary representation also tended to "disembed" this representation from autonomous local working-class cultures. The famous German Social Democratic party, for example, devised institutional mechanisms that essentially disenfranchised vigorous urban subcultures (Schorske 1955; Nolan 1981). French parties

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[1] An important sample includes Bell (1986); Bonnell (1983); Greenberg (1985); Kealey (1980); Merriman (1985); Nolan (1981); and Oestreicher (1989).



Figure 1.1. Strikes, politics, and organization building. *Source of strike data*: Shorter and Tilly (1974, 361–2).

mounted similar challenges, but territorial unions in France were able to establish and maintain an independent role in the labor movement. As examined in detail in this book, the relative importance of territorial unionism in France reflected the character of the nation's industrial organization and labor markets, its corporatist and mutualist traditions, and its republican electoral dynamics. Ultimately, territorial unionism both reflected and reinforced the populism of the French unions. By mobilizing unions around political issues that transcended the narrower economic concerns of sectoral unions, the territorial unions encouraged a type of communal solidarity more like that of political parties than of sectoral unions. Alfred Rosmer, a French revolutionary syndicalist turned Communist, observed that the pre-1914 French trade union confederation, the CGT, which gave a prominent place to territorial unions, was "something hybrid, at once a syndicalist organization and a political party, and more of a party than a syndicalist organization."[2]

Territorial unionism was the primary manifestation of a communal unionism that saw unions as a comprehensive moral agency – a role more commonly asserted by socialist parties, which saw sectoral unions as special-purpose associations designed to defend working-class interests at the workplace. Territorial unions portrayed themselves as centers for moral development and education (much as the Republican schools did for the larger society) and as champions of general ethical causes like antimilitarism (a position that inverted the traditional Republican celebration of military virtue). Communal unionism essentially fused two medieval institutions – the commune and the corporation – into one.[3] The medieval commune and the medieval guild corporation were both autonomous self-governing moral agencies built around fraternal fellowship. In the late-nineteenth-century context, communalism, as symbolized by the Paris Commune, represented political autonomy from the centralizing Republican state. Corporatism, as symbolized by modern unions, represented the economic autonomy of workers. Together, they embodied a populist challenge to more conservative Republicans. The link between urban populism and communal unionism drew its clearest expression from Paul Brousse, an important figure in the Third Republic labor movement, who argued: "The Commune and the Corporation are the only means that the people will have, one day, to make its will prevail."[4]

[2] Cited in Wohl (1966, 43, his translation).

[3] In *Work and Revolution* (1980), William Sewell developed the argument that the postrevolutionary French labor movement strongly continued the traditions of ancien régime corporatism.

[4] Cited in Lefranc 1963, 22.

Sectarian and Segmentary Systems

The book's second goal is to use French labor history to develop a more general theoretical perspective on the dynamics of organizational schism and solidarity.[5] In the annals of many organizations and social movements, the history of the French labor movement represents an oft-heard story: hyper-politicization and ideological polarization followed by organizational schism and fragmentation. At the same time, the French labor movement (like other such movements) often exhibits a surprising capacity for broad-scale solidarity and mobilization. Under certain conditions, narrow sectarianism can evolve into the most surprising ecumenicalism, only to descend again into sectarianism. In both Protestantism and the French labor movement, schism and solidarity appear as the two sides of the same coin.[6]

As illustrated in Figure 1.2, three distinct alignments of union and party organization can be identified over the course of the fifty years between 1872 and 1922.

The first alignment, which was complete by 1882, was sectarian in the sense that a number of groups, arising through schism, competed for the heart and soul of the French working class. The third alignment (c. 1922) also arose through schism, though it produced two ideological blocs (Socialist and Communist) rather than myriad small sects. In both the first and the third alignments, unions were divided by their allegiance to different party groups. The second alignment (c. 1906) was the mirror image of these sectarian alignments: unions overcame their disagreements to unite in a broad-based union confederation, and party sects united into a single integrated Socialist party. A division between unions and parties replaced the division within unions and parties.

As chaotic as these organizational alignments and realignments may appear, the purpose of the book is to demonstrate that they have a type

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[5] There is a limited but interesting theoretical literature focusing on schism. In social movement theory, see Gerlach and Hine (1970), Defrance (1989), Gamson (1990, 103–8), Zald and Ash (in Zald and McCarthy 1994, 121–41), and Balser (1997). In the sociology of religion, see Wallis (1979), Bryant (1993), Bruce (1990), Stark and Bainbridge (1996, 121–49), and Liebman, Sutton, and Wuthnow (1988). In social psychology, see Sani and Reicher (1991). In anthropology, see Bateson (1958). Among studies of political parties, see Nyomarkay (1967, 145–50) and Schorske (1983). For an important theoretical discussion linking schism and solidarity, see Lockwood (1992).

[6] A number of authors in different fields have remarked on the sometimes surprising juxtaposition of fragmentation and integration in social systems. Examples include Chisholm (1989), Eckstein (1966), Gerlach and Hine (1970), Kaufman (1967), Oestreicher (1989), Padgett and Ansell (1993), Perry (1993), and Price (1997).


1882
1906
1922
PARTY
UNION
POSSIBILISTS
GUESDISTS
ANARCHISTS
INDEPENDENTS
BLANQUISTS
Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrier (SFIO)
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)
PCF
SFIO
CGTU
CGT

Figure 1.2. Three party–union alignments, 1882–1922.

of systemic logic. This logic is demonstrated by drawing an analogy between the organizational evolution of the French labor movement and that of two other social systems: Protestantism and segmentary lineage systems. Like the French labor movement, Protestant sects and lineage segments are known to have a propensity to schism. Yet they are also known, like the French labor movement, to recombine into broader solidaristic alliances. Protestant sects are able, on occasion, to shift from narrow sectarianism to more inclusive ecumenicalism. Segmentary lineage systems can shift from systems in which cousins fight cousins to interclan alliances.

As analogies, Protestantism and segmentary lineage systems bring different but complementary insights to bear on the pattern of schism and solidarity. The core dynamic of Protestant sectarianism is the tension, first noted by Weber (1946, 1978) and Troeltsch (1956), between church and sect. From this perspective, the central dynamic producing organizational schism is the tension over the institutional intermediation of religious salvation. In the Reformation, rebellion against the Catholic doctrine of immanence and against the priestly hierarchy of the Catholic Church led to the formation of schismatic religious sects. At the heart of this conflict was always the tension between whether the "invisible church" (*ecclesia*) resided in the concrete visible institutions of the Church or with the faithful themselves (Wach 1972, 191–2). Once the Reformation began, it spawned increasingly more radical challenges to

Church institutions leading to what has been described as a "revolution within the revolution" or a "reformed" reformation (Lewy 1974; Moeller 1982, 103). New organizational schisms (and civil wars) followed, creating a plethora of new churches divided by doctrine and organizational structure. Whereas the Catholic Church lodged authority in a sacerdotal hierarchy crowned by the patriarchal authority of the pope, Lutheran and Anglican churches sought to lodge authority in the more collegial, though still patriarchal, authority of bishops. Presbyterians, Baptists, and Congregationalists sought to decentralize further, placing authority in the hands of elders, of ministers of the presbytery, or of local congregations. Quakers went still further by rejecting any ministerial intermediary between people and God.

The analogy to Protestantism has concrete historical referents in the French case. If the Protestant Reformation failed in France, it reappeared in political and secular form in the French Revolution.[7] The parallel between the Reformation and the Revolution was voiced by Tocqueville, who wrote:

> In all the annals of recorded history we find no mention of any political revolution that took this form; its only parallel is to be found in certain religious revolutions. Thus, when we seek to study the French Revolution in the light of similar movements in other countries and at other periods, it is to the great religious revolutions we should turn. (Tocqueville 1955, 10)

Much like the earlier English Revolution, the French Revolution fused political and religious protest. And much like English Protestantism, French republicanism demonstrated a strong tendency toward sectarianism. Eduard Bernstein drew the parallel in reverse between the French Revolution and the more obviously religiously inspired English Revolution: "Its Girondists were the Presbyterians; its Hébertists and Babeuvists were the Levellers, whilst Cromwell was a combination of

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[7] Although Te Brake's (1998) study of the Reformation does not go beyond the seventeenth century, his argument suggests that the relationship between these religious upheavals and patterns of nineteenth-century popular mobilization in France may, in fact, have been historically connected. In France, the Counter Reformation's consolidation of territorial sovereignty over cities left a legacy of urban sectarianism. This contestation penetrated directly into the heart of popular politics. Religious confraternities, for example, were instruments of the Counter Reformation, though they often cultivated a form of popular religiosity that escaped the control of both religious and secular authorities (Te Brake 1998, 92–3; Truant 1994, 68–9, 288). These religious associations influenced the development of the journeymen's associations known as the *compagnonnages*, which in turn influenced post-Revolution working-class formation (Sewell 1980; Truant 1994). The *compagnons* were often fiercely sectarian, and Icher suggests that divisions between Catholic and Protestant *compagnons* were at the root of their critical historical schisms (Icher 1992, 253; Truant 1994, 288–9). I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the possibility of these connections.

Robespierre and Bonaparte, and John Lilburne the Leveller was Marat and Hébert rolled into one" (Bernstein 1963, 10). French Republicans were avowedly anticlerical but nevertheless took on many of the trappings of quasi-religious movements.[8] The labor movement of the Third Republic inherited the tendency toward sectarianism that grew out of the Republican revolutionary tradition.[9]

Although Protestant churches have a propensity for schism, they can sometimes join in broad ecumenical alliances built upon a respect and tolerance for religious differences. The sociology of religion points to a distinctive organizational form around which ecumenicalism is built: the denomination (Wach 1972, 191–6). Like the sect, the denomination organizes itself in opposition to both the Catholic Church and the reformed ecclesiastical bodies (e.g., Anglican or Lutheran churches), but its defining feature is "an insistence upon the independence of the local congregation, with correspondingly less emphasis on unity and universality." It is more radical in doctrine than that of the ecclesiastic bodies but less exclusive "owing to a less institutional and more spiritual notion of Christian fellowship." Whereas one approach to religious denominations views them as routinized sects, another interprets their evangelism and decentralized congregationalism as promoting broad-based solidarity.[10] The covenantal theology that grew out of the Protestant Reformation also encouraged solidarity. A covenant is a morally binding pact that rejects hierarchical organization and embraces the moral autonomy of multiple sovereignties. It leads directly to a theory of federalism (Elazar 1998). In the French case, territorial unions were the equivalent of decentralized congregations and the basis for strong federalism within the broader labor movement. The "myth" of the general strike, as Georges Sorel called it, was the equivalent of an evangelical and morally binding covenant.[11]

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[8] See Brinton (1957, 1961), Mazlish (1976), Talmon (1955), and Walzer (1965); cf. Yack (1986).

[9] A number of authors, including Bernstein (1963), Engels (1926), Gramsci (see Fontana 1993, 39), and Mannheim (1985) have drawn the parallel between Reformation sects and early working-class organizations. For other studies on sectarianism in labor organizations, see Coser (1970, 1974), Hobsbawm (1959), Lipset (1963, 97–100), O'Toole (1975, 162–89; 1977), and Pope (1942). For additional examples of political sectarianism, see Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and Apter and Sawa (1984).

[10] The first approach is represented by H. Richard Niebuhr (1957), and the second is expressed in Richey (1977).

[11] The early civil rights movement in the United States provides a nice parallel example to this denominationalism and ecumenicalism. Aldon Morris describes the way that the creation of local umbrella organizations, like the Montgomery Improvement Organization, helped to overcome factionalism and "organized schisms" in black communities in the mid-1950s (Morris 1984, 42). These city-based umbrella organizations corresponded to the French territorial unions.

The literature on segmentary lineage systems contributes something quite different to the analysis of shifts from schism to solidarity. The earliest description of a segmentary lineage system is probably Fustel de Coulanges's portrait of the clan as the basic unit of the ancient polis (Coulanges 1956 [1877]). But it is to Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity in *The Division of Labor in Society* that we owe the modern anthropological concept. Durkheim called clan societies segmentary "to denote that they are formed from the replication of aggregates that are like one another, analogous to the rings of annelida worms" (1984, 127). The principle of cohesion in such societies is mechanical solidarity or "solidarity by similarity," in which each segment (clan) is united by a common genealogical heritage (shared ancestors).

Durkheim argued that segmentary societies are not particularly cohesive or stable (1984, 123). The absence of a division of labor between segments means that the segments are not bound together by interdependence. Thus, all the weight of social solidarity hangs on a shared collective consciousness that takes on a sacred religious form. As Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Fortes (1949) observed in their classic anthropological studies of segmentary societies, these societies exhibit a notable tendency toward "fission and fusion." When faced with an external threat, the whole segmentary structure may fuse into a cohesive fighting group. But in the absence of external threats, segmentary lineage systems have a tendency to "fission" into smaller and smaller segments.

Craft communities in France were the equivalent of clans in the segmentary lineage system.[12] This parallel was particularly true of the trade organizations known as the *compagnonnages* that joined journeymen together around a common craft. The *compagnons* were organized around the fictive kin relationship of brotherhood that was created through elaborate religious and quasi-religious rituals of initiation and commensalism. These trade organizations were loosely federated with other trades in larger multitrade associations, but, as Sewell has noted, "[T]he links between trades were not nearly as strong as those between *compagnons* of the same trade" (Sewell 1980, 52). However, the different trades did unite to engage in ongoing warfare with rival multitrade "sects." By the beginning of the twentieth century, though they still existed, the *compagnonnages* were regarded by modern unionnists as conservative and archaic forms of organization. Yet fin de siècle unionism inherited many traces of the esprit de corps of the earlier journeymen's associations.

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[12] Marx's famous line about French peasants being like "potatoes in a sack" is perhaps the most infamous statement ever made about the segmentary character of French life (Marx 1987, 124). Tocqueville provided a similar portrait of the "segmented" French bourgeoisie (Tocqueville 1955, 94). Hoffmann has made the most general argument, observing that the "segmentation of solidarity" was the foundation of the "stalemate society of France under the Third Republic" (Hoffmann et al. 1963, 3). Sahlins (1989) has applied the segmentary lineage model to French state building. France, however, is not exceptional in this regard. On segmentalism in Norway, see Eckstein (1966); in the United States, see Wiebe (1979).

Studies of segmentary lineage systems have suggested that different segments tend to fuse only in the face of an external threat (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1963, 5, 11–14). Yet work by the anthropologists Marcel Mauss, Max Gluckman, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Victor Turner also suggest endogenous mechanisms that can promote broad-based solidarity. For example, Lévi-Strauss (1969) has advanced a theory of how the principles of lineage, residence, and marriage can combine to produce radically different patterns of social integration. In what he calls restricted exchange, two clans engage in bilateral wife exchange ($A \leftrightarrow B$), which leads to only narrow social integration. In generalized exchange, however, a unidirectional exchange occurs ($A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow A$) that leads to more expansive marriage cycles and, consequently, to wider social integration. Lévi-Strauss argues that generalized exchange occurs in segmentary societies with "harmonic" principles of lineage and residence (patrilineal = children belong to the father's lineage; patrilocal = the children live in the father's village). The principle of marriage exchange that tends to be adopted by such societies (matrilateral cross-cousin exchange) encourages unidirectional marriage cycles that lead to broad social integration.

The French case suggests that Lévi-Strauss's model may be more generalizable. In ancien régime corporatism, for example, the *corps des métiers* organized a particular trade (lineage) and regulated that trade in particular cities (residence). The central organizing principle of these guilds was paternal hierarchy. The *compagnonnages*, in contrast, were intercity organizations that provided job placement for migratory journeymen on their *tour de France*. At each stop along this circuit, the journeymen stayed with other *compagnons* at a local boarding house called the *mère* (mother). It is probably not coincidental then that this journey was itself organized as a large unidirectional cycle around France (generalized exchange).

The union movement of the late nineteenth century continued to reflect aspects of this system, yet the precise interaction between principles of lineage, residence, and exchange were transformed. Relatively well-established trades that preserved some degree of hierarchy on the shop floor – like molding, printing, and glassblowing – were able to establish national craft federations (lineage). Although these trades were fraternal, national organization encouraged centralized authority within the trade. In contrast, opposition to hierarchy (on the shop floor and in craft organizations) prompted workers to join in fraternal solidarity. This intertrade solidarity operated within the same city (residence). In this case, the generalized cycle of exchange occurred locally, through an institution known as the *bourse du travail* (labor exchange). These city-based union federations fostered fraternal solidarity among workers across different trades operating within the same city.

Whereas church-sect theory and segmentary lineage theory offer different explanations for systemic shifts from schism to solidarity, Chapter 2 explores the complementarity of the theories and argues that the two perspectives share a deeper structural-cultural dynamic. The intention is to develop a richer and more generalizable model of schism and solidarity.

Plan of the Book

This book proceeds from the general to the specific. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework for understanding the organizational characteristics of schism and solidarity. It argues that communal organizations, especially those that I will refer to as "clans" (closed, communal organizations), have a propensity for schism. Clans tend to fluctuate between hierarchy and "inverted" hierarchy – a tendency common to both sectarian and segmentary systems. This chapter then examines the institutional conditions under which segmentary and sectarian systems can "fuse" or link together in broad ecumenical alliances.

Chapter 3 analyzes the populist character of mobilization in the French labor movement and identifies a populist tradition in France that can be traced back to the French Revolution. This populism tends to organize itself around a religious master frame, though after 1848 a distinctly secular one. The Republican rebellion against the Catholic domination of society and politics associated with the ancien régime gave this populist religiosity a distinctly "Protestant" cast. The sectarianism of the Third Republic labor movement can be seen, in turn, as a "Protestant"-style rebellion against Republican domination of society and politics.

Chapter 4 examines some characteristics of industry and work that shape the relationship between different structuring principles of French unionism – craft (intracraft vs. intercraft solidarity) and community (union vs. party mobilization). Most importantly, the chapter emphasizes the focus of French workers on organizing the workplace rather than the labor market. Whereas a labor market focus encourages a sectoral approach to mobilization (by trade or industry), organizing at the "point of production" created opportunities for French workers to join together across the boundaries of trade and skill. It also tended to politicize the workplace around generational, trade, and skill-related differences. Although the reliance of French industry on skill specialization and the weakness of unions in collectively controlling skill reproduction fragmented skill communities in France, they also encouraged alliances that spilled over the boundaries of trade and industry. Finally, the workplace focus of French workers not only encouraged unions to become engaged in local politics but also counterposed unions and political parties as alternative agencies of community mobilization.

Chapters 5–10 provide a detailed empirical analysis of the three types of union–party alignments described at the beginning of this chapter. Chapter 5 examines the reemergence of an organized post-Commune labor movement, which led to the creation of the first French Socialist party in 1879. The chapter then analyzes the subsequent organizational schisms that divided the labor movement into rival political sects.

Chapter 6 analyzes the beginnings of a major realignment of the labor movement that developed between 1887 and 1894 as the result of the rise of *bourses du travail.* These communal institutions encouraged unification of trade unions across their political divisions and around a local, territorial model of union organization.

Chapter 7 examines the final consolidation of a union realignment that was only partially completed in 1894. The chapter focuses on the complementary relationship that eventually developed between the national trade federations and local multitrade federations.

Chapter 8 examines the parallel reorganization of the party sects that occured in response to the realignment of the unions. This period, between 1898 and 1905, witnessed the proliferation of party organizations that "federate" the competing party sects at the local level, a structure paralleling the *bourses du travail.*

Chapter 9 describes the tensions among unions as pressures developed toward the consolidation of industrial unionism and more centralized organizational control, especially between 1910 and 1914. Parallel tensions in the Socialist party prompted several unsuccessful prewar attempts to form a more revolutionary party that prefigured the postwar creation of the Communist party. Wartime corporatism enhanced the centralization of the labor movement, but accelerated wartime production also initiated a grassroots strike wave that culminated in the massive strikes of 1919–20. Finally, Chapter 10 describes the decisive polarization of the labor movement that occurred as the result of this strike wave.