

# COSMOPOLITAN REGARD

Political Membership and Global Justice

**Richard Vernon**



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## Cosmopolitan Regard

Cosmopolitan theory suggests that we should shift our moral attention from the local to the global. Richard Vernon argues, however, that if we adopt cosmopolitan beliefs about justice we must re-examine our beliefs about political obligation. Far from undermining the demands of citizenship, cosmopolitanism implies more demanding political obligations than theories of the state have traditionally recognized. Using examples including humanitarian intervention, international criminal law, and international political economy, Vernon suggests we have a responsibility not to enhance risks facing other societies and to assist them when their own risk-taking has failed. The central arguments in *Cosmopolitan Regard* are that what we owe to other societies rests on the same basis as what we owe to our own, and that a theory of cosmopolitanism must connect the responsibilities of citizens beyond their own borders with their obligations to one another.

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As the twenty-first century begins, major new political challenges have arisen at the same time as some of the most enduring dilemmas of political association remain unresolved. The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War reflect a victory for democratic and liberal values, yet in many of the Western countries that nurtured those values there are severe problems of urban decay, class and racial conflict, and failing political legitimacy. Enduring global injustice and inequality seem compounded by environmental problems, disease, the oppression of women, racial, ethnic and religious minorities, and the relentless growth of the world's population. In such circumstances, the need for creative thinking about the fundamentals of human political association is manifest. This new series in contemporary political theory is needed to foster such systematic normative reflection.

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## Political Membership and Global Justice

RICHARD VERNON



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The second origin lies in the remarkable work of other scholars who, in barely three decades, have turned a persistently neglected area of inquiry into such a flourishing field. Many of them are mentioned in my footnotes, and I hope it goes without saying that my appreciation of their work is no less when I happen to disagree with their conclusions. I will single out my colleague and friend Charles Jones, whose clarity of thought and expression I cannot hope to match, and whose encouragement I have greatly valued.

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# Introduction

The most remarkable development in political theory, over the past two or three decades, is its new orientation to issues of global justice. When Charles Beitz published *Political Theory and International Relations* in 1979, it stood virtually alone as a normative account of our duties beyond our political borders. By now, however, the literature is immense: dozens of books and hundreds of scholarly articles address issues of global distributive justice and related questions of what we owe to those who are not our co-citizens. In this literature the idea of “cosmopolitanism” – variously interpreted – emerges as a political concept of central importance. That term now denotes an idea of moral and political obligation that gives weight to the interests of all human beings, in ways that are taken to impose significant constraints on the pursuit of our own national self-preference. According to the editors of a particularly illuminating collection, “everyone has to be at least a weak cosmopolitan now if they are to maintain a defensible view, that is to say, it is hard to see how one can reject a view that all societies have *some* global responsibilities.”<sup>1</sup> Likewise, from the nationalist side, it is agreed that cosmopolitanism’s “weak ethical version – formulated in terms of a principle of equal moral worth or equal moral concern – can be accepted by almost anybody barring a few racists and other bigots.”<sup>2</sup> Disagreements are not, of course, any less significant for that reason, for the possibility of a common formula scarcely diminishes practical controversy. Stronger cosmopolitans believe that more follows from that weak premise than nationalists allow; they believe that it leads

<sup>1</sup> Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (eds.), *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.

<sup>2</sup> David Miller, “Cosmopolitanism: A Critique,” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 5 (2002): 84.

directly to global responsibilities, while their critics maintain that, in the allocation of responsibilities, national or else civic obligations take up much or even most of the ground before we turn to what we owe to outsiders. Nevertheless, both cosmopolitans and their critics now occupy what we may term a “weak cosmopolitan plateau,” upon which struggles are waged not over whether we owe outsiders anything, but how much, and what it is.

In this book I adopt the term “cosmopolitan regard” for the belief or assumption that what happens to everyone is of moral importance – that only “racists and other bigots” will defend the contrary view, that some lives are of less importance than “ours” (or certain people’s). I distinguish between this regard and anything that is determinate enough to be called a political responsibility, and in that respect I agree with critics of strong cosmopolitanism who believe that several intermediate steps must be taken before that basic moral belief issues in an obligation that falls to people in their capacity as citizens. On the other hand, I do not agree that global obligations are, as it were, residual, or that national or civic associations take up moral space independently of what can be said to be owed to outsiders. My view is that, given cosmopolitan regard, they take up their moral space only conditionally, and that their own moral sustainability implies strong if limited obligations to those who are outside it. As a citizen, one’s obligations to co-citizens and to outsiders rest on the same footing. In making this case, obviously the argument takes issue not only with strong cosmopolitans and cosmopolitan-skeptics of the nationalist kind, but also with theorists of “moral dualism” who maintain that cosmopolitan and local obligations are of different and incommensurable types, irreducible to one another.

I shall shortly give a synopsis of the book’s argument and the sequence of steps that it takes, but before doing so let me explain its motivation. The significance of its attempt arises from what I believe to be an under-explored paradox.

“Cosmopolitan” is of course an ancient term, coined and deployed by Cynics and Stoics in the late classical period in order to

contrast local political membership with membership in the world – strictly speaking, the *cosmos* itself – as a whole. To describe the world as a *polis*, or “city,” was to transfer to it the then-standard term for the association of greatest importance to human life. There were, of course, different views about the implication of this for actual cities, ranging from Diogenes the Cynic’s rude dismissal of them to later Romanized Stoic views, such as Cicero’s, that effectively reasserted the value of the actual city and rendered the world-city somewhat marginal. Despite these differences, the cosmopolitan idea represented a normative re-weighting of life, conveyed by a term that executed a powerful metaphorical transfer; a transfer that undermines the moral autarchy of political associations, and broadens the context of moral justification.

Concealed in this transfer, however, were some internally contradictory elements. For the world, after all, is not really a city, or even much like one. The “city” that served as the ground of the metaphor was a community of people connected to each other by strong ties of proximity, acquaintance, and definite legal relations – not to mention a sense of exclusiveness. To imagine the world as a city was obviously to abstract from all this for the sake of disclosing a bare, uninstitutionalized moral relation among humans; it is to say that *they* matter too. It is to foreshadow the plateau referred to above. And this in turn, as one scholar of Zeno’s Stoicism has pointed out, can rebound on the conception of the actual, political city. For if we adopt an idea of association from which all the contingency of proximity and acquaintance is removed, we have taken a large step towards ideas such as natural law, which require the just treatment of other humans simply as humans – an idea that “does not *require* for its intelligibility or acceptability any reference to citizenship at all.”<sup>3</sup> In exploiting the normative power of the idea of the “city,” in

<sup>3</sup> Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 103. It should be noted that it is not uncommon to use the term “city” to refer to something like a horizon of awareness: as globalization proceeded, “there were fewer and fewer people whose city was their world, and more

other words, we may empty it of distinctiveness and just make it a part – so to speak – of the “world.” And if so, why is it so important that the world should be thought to resemble a “city”? If the city has distinctive features then it is potentially most significant that the world as a whole is said to resemble it, but if the city is just an instance of generic association the interest of the metaphorical transfer evaporates.

Distant though we now certainly are from the cosmopolitanism of Zeno, I believe there is a lesson in what Malcolm Schofield calls its “unstable” character, that is, its tendency to dissolve its own metaphorical ground. To say that we are citizens of the world is to place in question what our *actual* citizenship is, or what it means. It is to imply that what makes it different from bare human association cannot be normatively important – for if it were, then how could it possibly serve as a model for human association itself? The “instability” here can be resolved either by deciding that cosmopolitanism is really “only” a metaphorical term – which, of course, virtually deprives it of moral force – or else by accepting the implication that the features of citizenship are mere contingencies of no moral importance. The first solution simply leaves the moral autarchy of politics intact: it leads to a sort of gestural cosmopolitanism that has little hope of success against the established, solid and pre-emptive demands of nationality and citizenship – or else, one critic complains, to “a simple negation.”<sup>4</sup> What (if anything) is wrong, though, with the second?

One thing that is wrong with it is that, if we stage a political contest between a contingency-free view of association in which local identities count for nothing, and a view that finds a serious place for local identity, the latter will certainly win. That is, an

and more people for whom the world had become their city.” (Philippe Van Parijs, “International Distributive Justice,” in *Companion to Contemporary Political Theory*, ed. Robert Goodin *et al.* [Oxford: Blackwell, 2007], 638.) Without objecting to this usage, this book concerns citizenship as a political category.

<sup>4</sup> R. B. J. Walker, “Citizenship After the Modern Subject,” in *Cosmopolitan Citizenship*, ed. Kimberly Hutchings and Roland Dannreuther (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999), 177.



objector might say, only a political consideration: but while political theory cannot make itself hostage to political considerations, nor can it simply imagine away the most basic constraints in political life. Among these is the political division of the world, the consequences of which we can reasonably hope to modify in important ways, but the fact of which must be accepted unless attractive and viable alternatives become available. And while exclusive political divisions remain, it is a good thing that people should attach importance to their membership in them, because that can make them more attractive sites for living in. The second – and for the present purpose, more important – thing that is wrong is that, in the world as it is, the prospects for global justice can be achieved only if (actual) citizenship is valued even more than it currently is.

For consider the main components of practical (as distinct from academic) cosmopolitanism. More or less during the years in which scholars have come to embrace cosmopolitanism, weak or strong, three endeavors (to be discussed in the last three chapters of this book) have emerged in the field of global politics. One is a movement, still very much in progress, to re-evaluate the idea of sovereignty so that it admits intervention when states commit atrocious acts. Another is an effort to impose constraints of international criminal law upon state leaders, and their followers, who commit atrocity. A third is the increasingly inescapable view that consumers in wealthy countries will have to accept economic changes in order to avoid exploitative relations with poor countries that are both morally wretched and politically inflammatory. Of course, none of those movements or tendencies are anywhere near complete, and they still face opposition; but they have won the support of many governments of the world, of influential segments of public opinion, and of important international organizations. Whatever one's view of their prospects, those three endeavors comprise what cosmopolitanism, practically, *is*, and, I believe, it is by considering our obligations in those three contexts that we can best work out the implications of an abstract cosmopolitan premise.

But if we consider them, they all entail *additional* demands by states upon their citizens. Their prospects are nil unless states can provide compelling grounds for the sacrifices that their citizens will have to bear if these projects are to be achieved. Humanitarian interventions are very costly, in financial terms and, more importantly, in terms of lives inevitably lost. International criminal law, in the absence of an international police force, is effectively hostage to states' willingness to bear the considerable political and financial costs of arrest, trial, and punishment. Changes in the international trading regime are very likely to increase the cost of living for citizens of wealthy countries and also to lead to employment dislocations to which they would be called upon to adapt. In short, the actions that would have to be taken to promote justice globally, whether by way of reforming the international political economy or of enforcing international criminal justice or of supporting effective aid programs or just interventions, can occur only if citizens accept such things as legitimate and necessary objectives of their states. They will impose economic and political costs that citizens have to bear. So there is an important sense in which global responsibility can be promoted only if local citizenship is taken to impose even more far-reaching demands than it does now – if, in other words, it becomes in some respects stronger, not weaker, as a source of moral attachment.

This book tries to explain how it is that states can at once be more demanding of their citizens and more open to what they owe to outsiders. It rejects the weighing-and-balancing model according to which what one level gets entails a loss to what another might have legitimately expected. It attempts to outline a framework of entitlement that is common to insiders and outsiders. Insiders, it concludes, are indeed special for good reasons, but the reasons for their specialness, while strong, also carry with them strong reasons for concern for outsiders.

Since the argument of this book draws on what it is that justifies local obligation, and seeks to draw broader implications from

it, it must first come to terms (in [chapter 1](#)) with the view that local obligation needs no external justification at all. The meaning of local obligations is falsified, some maintain, by the requirement that they be “derived from” or “reduced to” obligations of a more general kind. That view, developed in various sophisticated ways by theorists such as Oldenquist, Rorty, Scheffler, and Horton, is assessed in this chapter, which discusses the ideas of derivation and reduction and rejects the view in question on the grounds that it draws too tight a connection between the “phenomenology” of association and its moral supportability. It is acknowledged, however, that this critique falls short of resolving what is termed the “particularity problem,” that is, the problem of connecting a view of obligation supported by general morality with membership in an arbitrarily particular society.

[Chapter 2](#) addresses the particularity problem directly, acknowledging that it resists several proposed solutions, but arguing that the failed solutions make the mistake of relying, in various ways, upon the *receipt of benefits* as the source of obligation. Ultimately, it is argued, the time-honored receipt-of-benefits argument, although it corresponds to a good account of what justifies political society in general, simply cannot particularize obligation, because the bare fact of the current receipt of benefits cannot justify the exclusion of others from them. (It can provide justification but not legitimation, to borrow A. John Simmons’ distinction.) However, another feature of association, the fact of *shared exposure to risk* makes a solution possible. Members of a political association are complicit in a set of arrangements that exposes their fellow-citizens to distinctive kinds of risk, and, correspondingly, they have special obligations to their compatriots: obligations to ward off shared risk, and to devote resources to doing so. This argument is distinguished from a currently influential view that special compatriot obligations arise from common exposure to coercion, a view that relies on too sharp a line between state and interstate organizations (as other critics have rightly objected).

Chapter 3 addresses the background theory of justice implied by the preceding chapter. Chapter 2 distinguished between general justifications of political society, in terms of their conferral of benefits, and the legitimation of a particular political society to its members, in such a way as to support local obligation. Although the two levels of argument are importantly distinct, chapter 3 argues for a contractualist version of justice that sustains both of them. We may conceptualize political society in terms of a “social waiver” (of background rights), a waiver that responds to antecedent risks and (as the previous chapter argued) generates subsequent ones. It is in focusing on the notion of *subsequent* risk that the contractualism offered here differs from other versions. The legitimation of a society depends on an ongoing corrective process in which members are morally engaged by their complicity, a notion whose in-context meaning is explored. Since this approach is generalizable to other (substate) institutions, it provides a unified approach that offers an alternative to the moral dualism that Nagel and Scheffler deploy, replacing it with a model of “subsidiarity.”

Chapter 4 situates the argument in terms of other views of particularized obligation or “compatriot preference,” such as those offered by Wellman, Mason, Goodin, and Nagel. Its main focus, however, is on the claim, common to Rawls and his more cosmopolitan followers, that any domestic version of the social contract has no direct implications, in terms of justice, for those who are not parties to it. But the social waiver version, it is argued, has strong iterative implications, so that it serves not only to justify but also to limit the moral basis of preference for insiders: the exclusiveness of one’s own political society, which imposes external costs, is justifiable only on the basis of respect for the parallel social projects of others, and implies a duty of aid when those projects fail, as well as a duty not to promote their failure. These external duties of justice rest on the same moral basis as one’s obligations to compatriots.

The argument developed above is clearly cosmopolitan, in some sense, in taking as its starting-point a moral regard for other

humans. But this regard is mediated, it is argued in [chapter 5](#), by the consequences of political membership, duties arising from it by virtue of the argument from iteration. Other theorists have argued, however, that cosmopolitanism entails direct (unmediated) “natural duty.” Otherwise, they argue, there can be no obligations of justice beyond institutional borders, and hence no obligation to introduce justice in a non-ideal world. To explore this view, this chapter takes up the case of humanitarian intervention, for it is said to be an especially hard case for contractualist views in this regard; and it argues that the idea of iteration leads to a duty to intervene in cases of state failure or violent oppression. The serious practical obstacles to intervention suggest, however, that international law and economic justice, the topics of the next two chapters, often or even generally provide better ways of meeting the duty in question, in a longer-term view anyway.

[Chapter 6](#) continues the iterative argument in relation to the idea of crime against humanity. That idea expresses in its most radical form the category of associative risk introduced in [chapter 2](#): it is the transformation of state power from benign form to extreme malignancy. It should be defined, it is argued, in terms of the perversion or travesty of three features of the state (administrative capacity, local authority, and territoriality) that are essential to its functioning. This provides a reasonable approximation to the legal elements of the crime, such as the “systematic” requirement. It is also defended against other proposed views (the stimulating views of Hannah Arendt, Larry May, James Bohman) as the best way of making sense of the *moral* core of crime against humanity.

The final chapter moves on to the context of international political economy, examining the idea (Pogge, Linklater) of a global harm principle as a basis for the policies and practices of wealthy countries and the international institutions that they support. The principle is endorsed. But just as the domestic harm principle, notoriously, needs an interpreting theory, so too does its global version, because a conception of harm requires a background idea of what

is owed. It is argued that the most coherent interpretation of global “harm” is supported by the framework developed in this book: drawing again on the model of iteration, the “harm” that counts is harm to others’ capacity to develop their own social projects. The distributive implications, although not directly egalitarian, are quite strong, but they are mediated through the political consequences of economic practices.

The conclusion situates the book’s argument in relation to other theories of global citizenship. It offers a distinction between moral cosmopolitanism as “citizenship *of* the world” (variously understood) and cosmopolitanism as understood in this book – “citizenship *in* the world” – the point of the distinction being that the political requirements of the basic moral view are worked out through the implications of citizenship itself, by way of the idea of the social waiver and its iterative implications. The strength of that view, it is argued, is that it places duties of global justice on the same basis as the duties of citizenship itself. The two are not, as is often supposed, in competition, or else incommensurable with one another; on the contrary, to understand why one has duties to those within one’s borders is also to understand the need for cosmopolitan regard.

# I     **Against associative obligations**

This book sets itself the task of showing that the reasons justifying local obligation imply wider duties. That project at once meets a very basic obstacle indeed: the view that local obligations simply need no justifying reasons of a more general kind. The strongest versions of that view hold that all morality whatsoever is essentially local, so that to require further justification of local morality is to make a vain appeal to an empty or imaginary category. More moderate versions accept that there is a general morality that is not tied to local context, but that local obligations do not depend on any more general moral considerations for their force; local and general moralities coexist. Whether we consider the claim's more radical versions (which some would describe as relativistic) or its more moderate versions (best described as "dualist"), we confront, clearly, an issue that must be addressed. If local obligations are sustained by reasons that are themselves essentially local in their reach, the task set by this book is quixotic. If local obligations are self-justifying, we can hardly suppose that further obligations could be extracted from them. This chapter will maintain, however, that such claims about local obligation should be abandoned.

Now it is not at all uncommon to explain our own or other people's action simply by referring to some relevant relationship, or to one person's special position in relation to another. More than that, referring to some relevant relationship serves not just to explain but to justify the action, or else to criticize it on moral grounds. So, for example, "He's my friend" does not just explain why I am lending him some treasured object, but tells us why it is right for me to do so, and "But you're married" would amount, in context, to an immediately intelligible critique of some proposed action or omission, which

it declares to be wrong. To an audience familiar with the expectations standardly connected with the relationship, elaboration is generally not needed. Knowing about the expectations is simply part of the set of practices to which the action in question belongs. But suppose we move to the reflective level, or the level of critical inquiry: is the reference (together, of course, with local background knowledge) enough? Here, interpreters differ quite sharply. Some maintain that the mere citation of relationships can never be enough for reflective purposes. A. John Simmons, for example, using the language of "position" rather than "relationship," writes: "If a positional duty is binding on us, it is because there are grounds for a moral requirement to perform that positional duty which are independent of the position and the scheme which defines it."<sup>1</sup> It follows that, when the existence of the position is cited in support, it is always possible to examine those grounds, even when it is not necessary to do so. Likewise, Brian Barry has made an influential distinction between first-order and second-order levels of moral practice: at the first-order level, it is very often enough to carry out the special duties attached to a position or role, while at the second-order level we can be called upon for an account of why those special duties are justifiable in a general ("impartial") context.<sup>2</sup> Martha Nussbaum employs the example of childcare, which "will be poorly done if each thinks herself equally responsible for all, rather than giving the immediate surroundings special attention and care. To give one's own sphere special care is justifiable in universalist terms."<sup>3</sup> (She believes, somewhat more controversially, that the example should govern our views of citizenship.) There are, then, on such views, no moral duties that cannot be framed, at a more general or abstract or reflective level, in terms of impartial morality. Particular role-obligations should be

<sup>1</sup> A. John Simmons, *Moral Principles and Political Obligations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 21.

<sup>2</sup> Brian Barry, *Justice as Impartiality* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 194–95.

<sup>3</sup> Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in *For Love of Country*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon, 1996), 13.