Return of the Dragon



China's Wounded Nationalism

Maria Hsia Chang

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China's Wounded Nationalism

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To the memory of my friend,
Kathy Petrinovich,
who loved without qualification

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1

The Problem

The dawning of a new millennium is bringing closure to the bloodiest hundred years in human history. Not only did the twentieth century witness two cataclysmic world wars, it also gave birth to the phenomenon of totalitarianism, a "historically unique and *sui generis*"[1] form of government that is unparalleled in its systematic and organized brutality. In a totalitarian dictatorship, political rule is "all-embracing"[2] because the state attempts to control every aspect of society, including the individual's private life and thoughts.[3]

Totalitarian systems are conventionally subdivided into those of the right and the left. On the right are Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan—the Axis powers and aggressors in World War II. On the left is the subspecies of communist countries, epitomized by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Although right and left totalitarianism, in the judgment of Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "are sufficiently alike to class them together,"[4] they differ in several important aspects. Anti-Semitism, while often cited as one such distinction, does not seem to qualify. Lawrence C. Mayer contended that whereas racism in general and anti-Semitism in particular constituted a key element in Nazi ideology and that, although Marxism preached the brotherhood of an entire economic class that would presumably encompass all races, in practice the Soviet Union became "one of the world's most vociferously anti-Semitic states."[5]

All totalitarian systems are characterized by central control and direction of the entire economy, but in right totalitarianism, state control of the economy is effected through the economic system of corporatism, which retains the private sector with its private property ownership and enterprises. Left totalitarianism, in contrast, abolishes private ownership altogether and re-

places it with state ownership and central planning. Right and left also differ in their enemies. Whereas the ideology of left totalitarianism pivots on Karl Marx's notion of class warfare and identifies the domestic and international bourgeoisie as the enemy, right totalitarianism's worldview is not class-based but is animated instead by an aggressive and expansionist nationalism.[6] Right and left totalitarianism also differ in their durability. All three exemplars of right totalitarianism were defeated in World War II and became successfully democratized. The communist left, in contrast, has proven to be more pervasive and enduring.

Russia was the first country to embrace communism, in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. From the newly founded Soviet Union, communism ultimately expanded to some 150 countries in almost every continent in the world—in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At its zenith, communism was the ruling system for over one-third of humanity and accounted for more than 40 percent of industrial production in the world.[7]

Communism's inspiration and legitimation was the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, at the heart of which was the promise of universal brotherhood and equality. But "the Devil may appear in the vesture of the Angel of Light."[8] Despite its utopian impulse, the reality of communism proved to be very different. As Brzezinski expressed it, communism, born out of "an impatient idealism" that rejected the injustice of the status quo and sought a better and more humane society, captivated some of the brightest minds and the most idealistic hearts. Despite those benign impulses, communism produced mass oppression and "prompted some of the worst crimes of this or any century."[9] With the clarity of hindsight, Klaus Risse, head of Section A of East Germany's secret police, now could see that communism's basic flaw was that it failed to take into account "the inner *Schweinehund.*" Communism could have worked only if people had been angels.[10]

Instead of utopia, what actually transpired in Marxist states was a dystopic nightmare that took the lives of 85 to 100 million people who perished from misguided economic experiments and deliberate abuse and murder by the state. The People's Republic of China has the dubious distinction of having the greatest human toll, at 45 to 72 million.[11] In the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1987, anywhere from 32 to 62 million people lost their lives;[12] in Lithuania between 1940 and 1955, some 1.2 million were killed or were dispatched to labor camps; in Hungary 15,000 died in Budapest during the 1956 uprising; in Vietnam a minimum of 65,000 were executed after 1975; in Cambodia, in a span of merely three years between 1975 and 1978, the Khmer Rouge regime exterminated a third (2.3 million) of the

population.[13] At a minimum, the human costs of communism amounted to 50 million lives, representing "without a doubt" the most extravagant and wasteful experiment in social engineering ever attempted.[14]

It was because of communism that, instead of international peace, the end of World War II was followed by a Cold War. For more than four decades, the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war between the two superpowers that led their respective ideological camps. Only with the abrupt dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 did the Cold War end. Until that time, the West had regarded communism with equal measures of loathing and fear. If not immutable, communism was believed to be inherently stable.

As an example, Samuel Huntington wrote in 1970 that he expected "revolutionary" one-party systems like the Soviet Union to evolve through three phases to become "established" one-party systems—their evolution propelled by the political leadership's successes in the earlier phase.[15] There were even those in the West who seemed convinced that communist countries possessed strengths, superior to those of representative democracies, which would ensure not only their enduring survival but their continuous advance in the world.[16] Jean-François Revel, for one, observed that democracies were inherently vulnerable to what he called "the totalitarian temptation," their chief weakness being their disposition to be excessively self-critical about the perceived economic and moral failings of capitalism. Communist countries, in contrast, were impervious to that corrosive self-doubt because of the state's iron control over speech, information, and communication. Once a people came under communist rule, Revel lamented, it would be "too late to escape it should they change their minds." After a generation, their capacity to dream and to think would begin to fail because of propaganda and cultural isolation, rendering them incapable of imagining either past or future. Revel concluded that the transition to totalitarian rule "is by definition irrevocable, except in the case of some cataclysm like a world war."[17]

In the aftermath of the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe, the West's insecurity now seems misplaced. What was, to Revel, the major weakness of democracies turned out instead to be their strength. As a leader of Poland's Solidarity movement put it, "only democracy—having the capacity to question itself—also has the capacity to correct its own mistakes."[18]

The almost overnight disappearance of the Soviet bloc has revealed communism to be far from irrevocable, but inherently flawed and untenable. Although Brzezinski in 1961 was convinced that there was no reason to

conclude that the existing totalitarian systems would disappear as a result of internal evolution, the same Brzezinski in 1989 recognized communism to be a "grand" and "historic failure" whose fatal flaws were "deeply embedded in the very nature of the Marxist-Leninist praxis." Possessed of intrinsic shortcomings in every aspect—its operation, institutions, and philosophy—communism "no longer has a practical model for others to emulate."[19]

Since their dissolution, the erstwhile communist states in Russia and East Europe have had varying success at effectuating successful transitions to market-based democracies. Thus far, the more successful cases include Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. For Romania, Russia, and the other constituent republics of the former Soviet Union, the outlook is uncertain. The least effective transitions would have to be those of Albania and Yugoslavia. In the case of Albania, after a spontaneous popular uprising against its corrupt post-communist government, the country dissolved into anarchy that left 2,000 people dead by the end of 1997. For its part, the end of communist rule in Yugoslavia saw the country's descent into the bloodbath of "ethnic cleansing," which was contained only by the forceful intervention and subsequent occupation by NATO troops led by the United States.

The effort to understand, explain, and predict the evolution of communist systems[20] must go beyond the former Soviet bloc countries to take into account the world's remaining communist countries. The latter are subdivided into two distinct groups. A first group is comprised of the unregenerate and unreformed communist states of North Korea and Cuba, the economies of which are in precipitous decline.[21] By introducing market reforms, China pioneered the way for a second group of remnant communist states comprised of China and Vietnam. Unlike the former Soviet Union where Mikhail Gorbachev instituted political reform before (and without) significant economic reform, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took an opposite course of action. Beginning in late 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the CCP undertook radical reform of the economic system while eschewing any meaningful political reform.

Reform of the Chinese economy began in December 1978 in the countryside with agricultural decollectivization. Mao's gargantuan communes were dismantled and the unit of farming reverted to China's millennial tradition of the family household, to which the state conferred usufruct rights over land. From the countryside, the economic reform rapidly expanded to the cities. Private and collectively owned businesses and industries began to pro-

liferate in cities, towns, and villages; an "open door" policy toward the West was inaugurated to attract foreign trade and investment.

The results of Deng's economic reforms were quick and impressive. Since 1979, the Chinese economy has grown by an average real rate of 9 to 10 percent a year—a record that is unprecedented in recent world history. If China can sustain that rate of growth, its gross national product (GNP) will double every ten years,[22] catapulting the People's Republic to superpower status by 2025.

By making China stronger and more prosperous, the economic reforms have extended the lifespan of Chinese communism—but at the cost of ideological dilution. Nor is ideological dilution the only tradeoff. Deng's economic reforms have also spawned a host of unintended consequences that are social, economic, demographic, ecological, as well as political. Today, the most serious of those problems threaten not only the CCP's political power but the very integrity and continuity of the People's Republic.[23]

Seymour Martin Lipset once noted that political leaders in developing countries must suffer the brunt of the resentments and problems caused by industrialization, including rapid urbanization and a growing gap between the newly rich and the poor. If the leaders fail to find an effective way to resolve those problems, they lose their hold on the masses. In the case of *socialist* developing countries, where "there is still a need for intense political controversy and ideology," the position of political leaders is even more tenuous. If the leaders were to admit that Marxism is an outmoded doctrine, they would risk becoming conservatives within their own societies, a role that they cannot play and still retain a popular following. Lipset expected the political leadership to adopt a strategy of blaming the ills of development on scapegoats who could be domestic capitalists, foreign investors, Christianity, or "the departed imperialists."[24]

To further complicate the Communist Party's predicament, the ideocratic[25] nature of China's political system demands more than pragmatic legitimacy. From its inception, political rule in the People's Republic was legitimated by the CCP's claim to possess special truths and insights imparted by an absolutist and comprehensive ideology that presumed to know the past and present, as well as predict the course of societal evolution. Given its ideocratic character, the Communist Party is compelled to seek doctrinal legitimation in some overarching ideology. As Marxism-Leninism-Maoism erodes and recedes in relevance and utility, the party must find a suitable replacement—and it seems to have found that in nationalism. In the words of *The Economist*, "With communism discredited

and democracy distrusted, China is in search of a new ideology . . . [and] nationalism may be filling the gap."[26] All of which would not surprise David E. Apter, who, in 1964, had anticipated China's resort to nationalism when he noted that political leaders in socialist states may turn to "greater nationalism" in order to compensate for weaknesses in solidarity and identity. Nationalism would replace socialism as the dominant ideology in developing countries because, through its ability to incorporate primordial loyalties "in a readily understandable synthesis," it can better provide for the needed identity and solidarity.[27]

There is increasing evidence that post-communist societies and regimes are turning to nationalism as a substitute ideology, as seen in Russia's Chechnya and Yugoslavia's Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Even newly independent Uzbekistan has made a nationalist hero and symbol out of Tamerlane, the Turkish-Mongol warlord who slaughtered millions. A museum worker in Bukhara gave candid testimony to the need that nationalism fulfills when he admitted that "We don't have Communist idols anymore, so we need our own heroes."[28]

In the case of the People's Republic, nationalism not only is an ideological replacement for an obsolete Marxism, it also provides much-needed identity and solidarity to a society experiencing the disruptive forces associated with rapid development. Beginning in the last decade of the twentieth century, the Chinese Communist Party has actively promoted and encouraged a resurgent nationalism so as to extend its lease on power. The appeal to nationalism may be the Communist Party's last resort and the only fixative that could keep intact the People's Republic.

By turning to nationalism as a panacea, the Communist Party is attempting to carve for itself a third way. Today, communism in China is rapidly mutating into a political species that is neither communist nor capitalist. The People's Republic is still a single-party dictatorship but is no longer utopian or totalitarian. Its government's legitimating ideology is only nominally Marxist but is, in reality, increasingly that of nationalism. China is a political system where government is still the monopoly of a single party, the economy a mixture of capitalism with significant state ownership and controls, and political legitimacy more and more rests on an appeal to nationalism that is increasingly reactive, irredentist, and chauvinistic. Some have called such political systems "fascist."[29]

Whatever its name, Chinese communism is mutating into a virulent nationalism. That development has more than academic interest. The irredentist dimension to contemporary Chinese nationalism carries serious implications for the peace and security in Asia and the Pacific because it

transcends mere rhetoric and is manifested in the behavior of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Already the largest in the world in manpower (3 million) and with the world's third largest nuclear arsenal, the PLA is a growth industry. Although it decreased in real terms between 1979 and 1988, China's military budget increased after 1990 by about 10 percent each year[30]—despite the end of the Cold War and the crumbling of the Soviet Union, which China had identified as its major threat. At least part of the budget increases went to military purchases that have significantly upgraded China's military capabilities. Those purchases include air refueling kits from Iran; Su-27s (reportedly superior to American F-15 fighter jets in some ways), Su-24s, MiG-29s, Hind assault helicopters, and state-of-the-art *Sovremenny*-class missile destroyers with supersonic anti-ship missiles from Russia; and most recently, an aircraft carrier from Ukraine. In 2000, China is expected to be able to produce modern mobile ICBMs with Russia's help.[31]

Aside from its arms purchases, the PLA's efforts to modernize and upgrade its capabilities are focused in two other areas. Anticipating that post–Cold War conflicts will increasingly be in the arena of regional limited warfare—epitomized by Desert Storm—the PLA has assiduously worked at developing its rapid reaction force, increasing it tenfold to 200,000 troops. At the same time, the PLA is transforming its navy from a coastal force into a blue-water navy. All of which led former U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley to conclude that the PLA is undertaking a major shift from being a land-based defense force to a military that is "capable of projecting power throughout the Far East and beyond."[32]

Those developments have clearly perturbed China's neighbors, many of whom already have troubled relations with China. Beijing has been explicit in its irredentist objectives regarding Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. In 1997 and 1999, respectively, former British colony Hong Kong and Portuguese colony Macao were returned to the People's Republic. Regarding Taiwan, Beijing is resolved to reunite with its "rebel province" and has not hesitated to employ force to intimidate and persuade. For a week in March 1996, missiles were "test-fired," landing barely miles from the northern and southern coasts of Taiwan—prompting the United States to deploy two aircraft carrier groups to the waters of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing is no less insistent on its irredentist claim to the South China Sea, and has demonstrated by word and deed that it considers the sea to be Chinese sovereign territory.

All of which has alarmed the United States and has provoked a raging debate on the direction of U.S. China policy. There is increasing talk of a need for Washington to change course by moving away from its policy of constructive engagement, extant since 1979, to a policy of containment. One commentator described China as having become America's "greatest threat" and "most feared nation."[33]

This perception of China as America's "greatest threat" is not due simply to the PRC's growing power. China would not be perceived as a threat if its worldview and ideology were compatible with those of the United States. What makes China problematic is its volatile mix of economic growth, military modernization, territorial expansion, and rising nationalism. In that mix, it is China's spectacular economic growth that funds the PLA's modernization; and it is Chinese nationalism that provides the intent, motive, and legitimation for the PLA's disposition and behaviors. An understanding of China's rising nationalism is thus critical to understanding and anticipating Beijing's present and future behavior.

To better understand the intent and nature of Chinese nationalism, a study of its ideological content recommends itself. Michael Mann, a scholar on nationalism, has identified three groups as most susceptible to nationalist appeals. They are (1) the administrators, teachers, and public-sector workers who depend on the state for their livelihood; (2) the youth who have been and are being educated by the state; and (3) the armed forces, comprised of millions of young men disciplined by a military cadre "into the peculiar morale, coercive yet emotionally attached, that is the hallmark of the modern mass army." Mann observed that it is these three bodies of men and women and their families who provide most of the ranks of fervent nationalists—those "super-loyalists" and "nation-statists" animated by an exaggerated loyalty to their nation-state.[34]

In the case of the People's Republic, given Chinese nationalism's irredentist character, the Chinese armed forces are clearly the most important of Mann's three groups. But the ideas of the two other pivotal groups—China's youth and its academicians who specialize and write on nationalism—should also be examined. To date, no study of contemporary Chinese nationalism has devoted itself to an examination of the nationalist thought of these three groups. The present enterprise seeks to fill that lacuna in contemporary sinology. Through an account of the nationalist ideology of China's academics, youth, and the PLA, this study hopes to provide a better understanding of the ideological content of contemporary Chinese nationalism: its worldview, beliefs, values, and prescriptions. That understanding, in turn, may provide policymakers in Washington a basis to construct an effective China policy.

Before we turn to the particular case of Chinese nationalism, an understanding of the general phenomenon of nationalism would be both useful and necessary. Such an understanding should include an effort at defining key concepts, the provision of a classificatory schema for nationalism, and explanations for this enduring human phenomenon. All that will be the subject of the next chapter.

Notes

1. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 5.

2. Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 14.

3. For a more complete definition of totalitarianism, see the descriptive model of totalitarianism in pp. 150–153 of Maria Hsia Chang, "Totalitarianism and China: The Limits of Reform," *Global Affairs* (Fall 1987).

4. Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship*, p. 8. For a more detailed account of the similarities between right and left totalitarianism, see A. James Gregor, *Interpretations of Fascism* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1974), pp. 204–207, 211.

5. Lawrence C. Mayer, *Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Versus Performance* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), p. 251.

6. Ibid., p. 7.

7. Stephen White, John Gardner, George Schopflin, and Tony Saich, *Communist and Postcommunist Political Systems: An Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 3.

8. St. Paul, *The Power of Evil,* as quoted by Polish director Krzystof Zanussi in Marilynne S. Mason, "Moral Moviemaker," *World Monitor*, February 1989, p. 68.

9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), p. 240.

10. Timothy Ash, "The Romeo File," *The New Yorker* (April 28 and May 5, 1997), p. 170.

11. According to the authoritative 846-page French tome *The Black Book of Communism*, collectively authored by eleven French historians. See the English translation (by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer) of Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

12. According to the historian Dmitry Volkogonov, from 1937 to 1938, in a mere two-year stretch at the height of Stalin's Great Terror, nearly 14 million people died. Charles Diggers, "Mass Grave of Stalin Victims Found in Russia," *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 17, 1997, p. A10.

13. According to the Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale University. See *Parade Magazine*, June 22, 1997, p. 18; and *Shijie ribao (World Journal* or *WJ)*,

December 2, 1997, p. 2. *The Black Book of Communism* gives a provisional figure of about a million.

14. Brzezinski, *Grand Failure*, p. 231.

15. Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 24. For a different interpretation, which emphasizes the evolution of communist systems being governed by their failures instead of successes, see Maria Hsia Chang, "The Logic and Dynamics of the Evolution of Chinese Communism," *Issues and Studies, 25*:9 (September 1989), pp. 27–47.

16. As an example, columnist George Will thought that communist countries had tactical strengths that democracies lacked. The latter were "poker-playing" nations that thought "episodically and short-term," whereas communist countries were "chess players, patient and thinking many moves ahead." George Will, in *Seattle Post-Intelligencer,* December 7, 1987, p. F3.

17. Jean-François Revel, *The Totalitarian Temptation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 27, 28.

18. Adam Michnik was also editor-in-chief of Warsaw's *Gazeta Wyborcza*. As quoted in "The Talk of the Town," *The New Yorker*, December 9, 1996, p. 52.

19. Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship*, p. 6; Brzezinski, *Grand Failure*, pp. 241, 232.

20. See, for example, Brzezinski's effort in *Grand Failure*, p. 255.

21. North Korea, in particular, has suffered from consecutive years of crop failure, mass starvation, and political defections.

22. As a point of comparison, during its period of rapid industrialization in the nineteenth century, it took the United States almost 50 years to double its GNP.

23. See chapters 5, 6, and 7 of Maria Hsia Chang, *The Labors of Sisyphus: The Economic Development of Communist China* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998).

24. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1981), pp. 454–455.

25. For a definition of "ideocracy," see Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz and Alfred Wayne Penn, *Politics of Ideocracy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 27.

26. "China: Saying No," *The Economist*, July 20, 1996, p. 30.

27. David E. Apter, "Introduction," in Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (NY: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 28, 24.

28. Geoffrey York, "Uzbeks' Unlikely Hero: Bloodthirsty Tamerlane," *San Francisco Examiner*, January 11, 1998, p. A–27.

29. Liu Xiaozhu, "Jingti jiduan minzu zhuyi zai dalu qingqi (Beware of the rise of extreme nationalism on the mainland)," *WJ*, April 3, 1994, p. A6.

30. Fareed Zakaria, "Let's Get Our Superpowers Straight," *The New York Times*, March 26, 1997, p. A19.

31. Richard D. Fisher, "Dangerous Moves: Russia's Sale of Missile Destroyers to China," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Series, February 20, 1997, p. 1.

32. As reported in *The Wall Street Journal*, October 14, 1993.

33. Marc Sandalow, "Fear and Loathing—The Middle Kingdom," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 23, 1997, p. 9.

34. Michael Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism and its Excesses," in Sukumar Periwal (ed.), *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 55.

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2

On Nationalism

Nationalism has proven its potency time and again through history. Even ostensibly universalistic political movements, most notably those self-identified as Marxist, upon coming to power have devolved into parochial nationalism. As one commentator wryly observed, "Whether on the soccer field or on the battlefield, it has almost always proved easier to mobilize popular passions in the national rather than the international cause."[1]

Today, in the aftermath of the Cold War, there are some[2] who maintain that new circumstances and problems are eroding the power and autonomy of sovereign nation-states. Forces of globalization have created interdependent networks of information, culture, trade, and investment that crisscross the world; new problems of environmental degradation, terrorism, biochemical weapons, overpopulation, and the resultant flood of emigrants and refugees are similarly unconfined by national borders. Neither globalization nor the new problems can be effectively managed by traditional nation-states. Instead, it is argued, they can be addressed only by creating regional entities and international regimes that will render nation-states increasingly obsolete.

Despite all that, there are others who believe that transnational entities simply are unable to meet the human need for community and identity. As one writer explains, "A global culture is memory-less, and the attempt to enforce it merely evokes the plurality of memories that compose particular identities the more intensely."[3] Despite the move toward globalization, nationalism not only persists but seems to become more insistent, its passions demonstrated daily in places such as Chechnya and Kosovo, Tibet and Quebec, East Timor and the West Bank. They are among an estimated 37 stateless nations in the world comprised of 100 million dispossessed people who demand international recognition.[4]

Even in Europe, at the same time as old political boundaries soften, new national identities seem to sharpen. The countries of Western Europe have come together in a new union, but the empire of the former Soviet Union dissolved into newly autonomous states. The German nation expands with the reunification of East and West, but Czechoslovakia breaks into two separate republics while Yugoslavia devolves into the nightmare of ethnic cleansing. Despite repeated peace efforts, the Troubles still plague Northern Ireland, while Italy's Northern League aims to repeal the Risorgimento and sever the country in two. A referendum gives Scotland greater autonomy,[5] propelling the United Kingdom further on the road toward federation, if not ultimate disunion. And beneath the polite rhetoric of a united Europe can be heard the "xenophobic growling" by the "pure nationality"[6] parties of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front and Gerhard Frey's German People's Union, which have arisen *in reaction* to globalization as the flood of immigrant labor into Western Europe from places such as North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and East Europe is bringing racially and ethnically alien peoples into increasing contact and conflict with the natives. It appears unlikely that the power of nationalism will diminish. Instead, nation and nationalism will probably continue "to provide humanity with its basic cultural and political identities" well into the twenty-first century.[7]

Definitions

Given its demonstrated potency, it is all the more curious that nationalism as a concept has been poorly defined and understood. The many efforts at illuminating the meaning of this "slippery term"[8] have been described as resembling an "Alice-in-Wonderland world" where slipshod and inconsistent terminology remain the bane.[9]

Slipshod terminology includes definitions that are tautological in that the concept of nationalism is defined by itself or a derivative. As an example, one author conceives nationalism to be "the conscious demand for political expression of the nation."[10] Another maintains that nationalism is "the belief in the primacy of a particular nation" but avers that "nation is far harder to define than is nationalism."[11]

Not only are some of the definitions for nationalism circular, there is little consistency in the literature regarding its meaning. For some, *nationalism* speaks to an organic community in which membership is secured through "shared roots." For others, *nationalism* is the effort to invent na-