

THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

*Discovering
Independence*



Gregory Gleason

Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Republics

THE CENTRAL ■ ASIAN STATES ■



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Republics

Alexander J. Motyl, Series Editor

The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, Gregory Gleason

Lithuania: The Rebel Nation, V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis

Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, Jan Zaprudnik

Estonia: Return to Independence, Rein Taagepera

Published in cooperation with
The Harriman Institute, Columbia University

■ THE CENTRAL ■ ASIAN STATES

Discovering Independence

GREGORY GLEASON

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
New York London

Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Republics

First published 1997 by Westview Press

Published 2018 by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1997 Taylor & Francis

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice:

Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gleason, Gregory.

The Central Asian states : discovering independence / Gregory Gleason.

p. cm. — (Westview series on the post-Soviet republics)

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

ISBN 0-8133-1594-8 (hard). — ISBN 0-8133-1835-1 (pbk.)

1. Asia, Central—Politics and government—1991– 2. Asia, Central—Economic conditions. 3. Post-communism—Asia, Central.

I. Title. II. Series.

JQ1070.G54 1997

958'.04—dc21

96-46419

CIP

ISBN 13: 978-0-8133-1835-6 (pbk)

■ Contents ■

<i>List of Tables and Illustrations</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	xi
<i>A Note on Languages in Central Asia</i>	xiii
1 New States and Ancient Societies	1
Independence and Freedom, 2	
The Many Faces of Central Asia, 4	
The End of Empire, 8	
To Become a Nation, 13	
The Future and the Past, 17	
Notes, 21	
2 Legacies of Central Asia	25
Geography and Destiny, 26	
Central Asian Heritage, 28	
The Meaning of <i>Hurmat</i> , 35	
Kinship, Culture, and Worship, 40	
Language and Identity, 43	
Notes, 46	
3 The Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia	48
Development and Russification in the Kazak Republic, 51	
“Kirgizia”: Soviet Mountain Outpost, 57	
“Tadzhikistan”: Across the Cultural Divide, 60	
“Turkmenia”: Soviet Borderland, 64	
Party Fiefdom in Uzbekiston, 66	
Central Asia and the Demise of the USSR, 72	
Notes, 77	

4 Central Asian States Emergent	82
Asian Liberalism in Kazakstan, 83	
Kazakstan: The Road to a Market Economy, 90	
The Democratic Experiment in Kyrgyzstan, 94	
The Democratic Experiment Goes Awry, 98	
Tojikiston: Land Between Two Worlds, 100	
Tojikiston in Flames, 103	
Turkmenistan: A Central Asian Sultanate, 110	
Authoritarian Populism in Uzbekiston, 118	
Tides of Uzbek Hegemony, 128	
Notes, 132	
 5 Central Asia and the World	 136
The “Great Game” Revisited, 136	
Russia and Central Asia, 138	
Russia and Oil, 141	
Central Asia’s Neighbors, 145	
The United States and Central Asia, 150	
Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, 152	
Agriculture, Land, Water, and the Environment, 155	
Notes, 164	
 6 Transition in Asia	 168
The Gathering Authority of Islam, 170	
Good Government and the Rule of Law, 175	
Central Asia Today and Tomorrow, 181	
Notes, 184	
 <i>Chronology</i>	 187
<i>Sources</i>	205
<i>About the Book and Author</i>	211
<i>Index</i>	212

▪ Tables and Illustrations ▪

Tables

1.1 States, population, territory	14
3.1 The constituent Soviet Central Asian Republics of the USSR	50
3.2 Principal ethnic groups in Central Asia	51
4.1 Presidents of the Republics of Central Asia	84

Photographs

Central Asian <i>aq saqal</i> (graybeards) breaking bread and sharing tea	7
The path to socialism	10
The faithful in prayer	18
Boats stranded as a result of the desiccation of the Aral Sea	19
Tamerlane's tomb in Samarkand	31
Elder Uzbeks in prayer	36
Village elders in the daily tea ritual	39
Lenin pointing to the south in Bishkek	61
Uzbekiston's militia in riot gear cordon off the statue of Lenin	71
Protecting Lenin	85
Nursultan Nazarbaev, former Kazakstan Communist Party leader and independent Kazakstan's first popularly elected president	96
Askar Akaev, independent Kyrgyzstan's first president	96
Sangak Safarov, the mysterious outlaw chieftain who marshaled an army against Tojikiston's political opposition in late 1992 and early 1993 and retook the Tojikiston capital under arms	104
Tojikiston civil war refugees fleeing into Uzbekiston in the spring of 1993	106

Emomli Rakhmonov, the “head of the government” of Tajikiston	107
Abdumalik Abdullajanov, the popular Leninobod opponent of the southern Tojikiston coalition	108
“Turkmenbashi,” Saparmurad Niyazov, the former Turkmenistan Communist Party secretary who became the first president of the Republic of Turkmenistan	113
The <i>manat</i> , Turkmenistan’s national currency	114
Abdurakhim Pulatov, a leader of the Birlik (unity) opposition movement in Uzbekiston, April 1990	122
Muhamad Solih, writer, former member of Uzbekiston’s parliament, and chairman of Erk in 1990	123
Muhamad Sadyk Muhamad Yusuf, former mufti of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakstan, removed from his position by the Uzbek government	124
Islam Karimov, former finance minister and party secretary who became the first president of the Republic of Uzbekiston	125
The main office building of the <i>Milii Havfsizlik Hizmati</i> (State Security Service) in downtown Tashkent	127
Firefighters at the oil field in Ming-Bulak, Uzbekiston	142
The discovery of a large oil field at Ming-Bulak	143
Children swimming in a village irrigation ditch in the Fergana Valley, 1992	157
<i>Navruz</i> celebration in Tashkent, 1993	173
A moment of prayer in Tashkent	174

Maps

Central Asia	xvii
The Post-Soviet states	xix
Uzbekiston’s administrative divisions	119
Fergana Valley border complexity	129
Kazakstan transportation routes	144
Aral Sea Basin water resources	160

▪ Preface ▪

Early in 1991, as the Soviet Union began careening toward its demise, Alexander Motyl of Columbia University and Susan McEachern of Westview Press conceived the idea of assembling a series of studies on the separate “post-Soviet states.” The series envisaged chronicling and analyzing developments in each of the newly independent countries. The intent was to describe and analyze these new countries in terms of their unique historical traditions and of the lingering effects of the common legacy of the Soviet period. The series sought to treat each of the new countries independently in a compact yet reasonably comprehensive way.

From the outset of this undertaking, treatment of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia presented special problems. Geography, history, language, and culture had closely linked the societies of Central Asia. Present-day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan shared common languages, historical traditions, and values in a way that bound them together as inheritors of common cultural traditions. None of these states had ever existed as an independent country. They were linked by their common traditions much more closely than were, for instance, the countries of Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, or even colonial America. In light of these considerations the series editors, as both a practical and theoretical matter, posed the following question: “Are the present states of Central Asia one or many?” This book should be read as a detailed answer to that question.

The Central Asian states are nominally independent, but they are not islands. They are passing through a process of independence and decolonization that will continue to strongly influence their national traditions and aspirations. The lessons of other cases of decolonization should be borne in mind from the onset. Comparisons between the current Central Asian situation and the “decade of decolonization” (1957–1967) in Africa, for instance, offer many suggestions regarding the pitfalls and promises of the process of decolonization. Another lesson that should be drawn from the experience of other decolonizing countries is the importance of international organizations. The CPSU—the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union—was previously referred to as the “leading and guiding force” in Soviet society. The IBRD—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—may replace the CPSU as the most important guiding force in Central Asia’s future.

Although these great “geopolitical” and institutional forces will continue to exert a strong influence on the outcome of the transition to independence, the outcome of this drama will probably be determined not by outside forces but by the inner qualities, the intelligence, and the resourcefulness of Central Asian societies. How are these societies adjusting to the cultural and psychological changes of the collapse of communism and the entrance into a new, often foreign, and sometimes hostile international community? How will individuals confront the personal challenges posed by such dramatic and sweeping political changes? How do the political and economic leaders of these new societies see the road ahead? How will unique Central Asian traditions, languages, cultures, and habits of thought and practice influence the choices ahead?

Field research for this book was made possible with support and encouragement from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the cooperation of the Academies of Sciences of the republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as well as that of the Russian Federation. I am particularly grateful to Kimberly Kotov and Lisa LeMair of IREX. Rick Curtiss supplied the maps.

For help and encouragement I am grateful to D. Balgamis, J. Chavin, T. Daves, L. Donaghey, D. Fane, C. Kedzie, J. Levison, S. Marcum, and M. Olgun. Much of the interpretation recorded here relies upon the perspectives of my Central Asian colleagues, particularly M. Abdusaliamov, L. Anoshkina, B. Atabaev, S. Ataev, S. Borbieva, S. Dzhusupov, A. Esentugelov, A. Faizullaev, A. Ilkhamov, U. Ishankhozhaev, B. Islamov, K. Kekenbaeva, B. Khudaiberdyev, T. Kochumanov, A. Mannonov, M. Mukhitdinova, K. Ovezov, S. Saliev, M. Tazhin, A. Ukubaev, and A. Zholdasov. Responsibility for statements of fact and judgment is mine alone.

Gregory Gleason

A Note on Languages in ▪ Central Asia ▪

One of the most persistent issues in books about Central Asia is how the names of the countries are actually spelled. Is it Tadzhikistan, Tojikistan, or Tojikiston? Is it Uzbekistan, Uzbekiston, or Özbekiston? The answer to these and other questions regarding the writing systems of Central Asian languages is a simple one: It all depends.

Most of Central Asia's indigenous societies are Turkic-speaking. The Turkic languages as a group consist of Turkish (as spoken in Turkey) as well as Uzbek, Turkmens, Kyrgyz, Kazak, and several other languages. All of the Turkic languages are closely related—but they are not all mutually intelligible. Printed material regarding Central Asian countries appears in a number of different languages written in a number of different alphabets. The alphabet common today in Central Asia is Cyrillic, the alphabet in which Russian is written. Some material, particularly in Tojikiston, appears in Arabic script. The amount of material written in Arabic script is growing, but this alphabet does not constitute a major medium of communication.

In recent years an increasing amount of material originally published in the Central Asian indigenous languages has appeared in the Latin alphabet. Moreover, governments in the Central Asian countries have announced plans to switch officially from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet, using an alphabet similar to that of modern-day Turkish. Turkish is written using a variant of the Latin alphabet widely known and used throughout Europe and the Americas. This transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin is expected to require about a decade to complete.

Transliteration is the process of moving from one orthography into another. Transliterating simply means that words are spelled in a different orthography; they are not translated. Until the transition to new writing systems has been accomplished in the Central Asian countries, it will be necessary to transliterate references. Moreover, it will continue to be necessary to transliterate historical references.

All systems of transliteration are based upon certain conventions. There are better and worse ways of doing this, but the goal in transliteration is not so much to attain a perfect system as to maintain a common standard. The standard system for transliterating from the Cyrillic alphabet into the Latin alphabet is the ALA-LC system. This system is endorsed by the American Language Association (ALA) and is used by the U.S. Library of Congress. An alternative system may be found in Edward Allworth, *Nationalities of the Soviet East: Publications and Writing Systems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). The Allworth system is more technically exact. The ALA-LC system, however, is simpler and more widely used. In this book I have used the ALA-LC system but have further simplified it by omitting diacritical marks.

A third standard is the system officially introduced in Uzbekiston during the summer of 1995. The official Uzbek version uses the Latin alphabet but excludes the letters *c* and *w* and eliminates all diacritical marks. All Uzbek words are written with some combination of the following letters: *a, b, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, y, z*. Some sounds common to Uzbek but not to Russian are rendered by letter combinations, in particular: *o', g', sh, ch*, and *ng*.

Even if one of these transliteration systems is faithfully followed, however, there are still many points of ambiguity. Regarding proper nouns, for instance, should one use the indigenous forms of the names of historical figures or the Russianized ones? Using the Russianized version may seem a slight to the indigenous languages. Yet using the indigenous forms would make many historical references unrecognizable. To take some examples, if we follow the Allworth system, the name for Uzbekiston, for instance, is Özbekistan. And should the name of the first president of Uzbekiston be "Karimov"—the Russianized version that is known generally to the outside world—or should it be transliterated from the native Uzbek as "Kärimav"? If we use the ALA-LC system, should the name "Ulugbek" be transliterated from the Russianized version or should it be transliterated from the native Uzbek form, which would be "Ulughbek"? One looks in vain through any encyclopedia for "Al-Qarezm" but may find "Al Khwarezm," a form that was transliterated at one point into Russian or German and adopted as a standard spelling.

As the language reforms unfold over the next decade, many of these issues will find some resolution. And these are not merely linguistic questions: They are issues highly charged with symbolic meaning. Some enthusiasts of Central Asian political independence insist that scholars and analysts switch over immediately to terminology that eliminates any vestige of Russian colonialism. There are advantages to such a move, but there are also disadvantages.

I spell the name of Uzbekiston with an initial *U* and with a final *o*. There are other ways of doing this. However, spelling it with an initial *U* keeps it in the same place in alphabetical order, yet spelling it with a final *o* defers to the native Uzbek pronunciation of the word.

Some people, particularly nonnative Kazak nationalists, consider it important that Kazakstan be identified as “Qazaqistan.” For the outside world to insist on using “Qazaqistan” rather than the Russianized “Kazakhstan”—which is the international spelling for the country that virtually all Kazaks use—would be to place some indistinct psychological gains ahead of the practical confusion that this would create. Until a short time ago, after all, many Kazaks (Qazaqs?) had never even seen a language with a *q* in it. They did not recognize this as the first letter of their country’s name. Of course, if Europeans and Americans repeat it often enough, the Kazaks soon will recognize “Qazaqistan” as the name of their country. But would this be any less of an external imposition than a Russianized form?

Most computer keyboards do not accommodate diacritical marks (even if the software is capable of producing them). For this reason, many highly educated Central Asians today insist on shifting as quickly as possible to a simplified, Latin-based alphabet. They insist that since English has become the language of the international computer community, such a transition is unavoidable. Some Central Asians go further and claim that English should be used as the “international language,” that is, English rather than Russian should be used as the medium for communication among Central Asian groups.

In this book I have tried to take a pragmatic approach to these language problems. I have avoided the use of diacritical marks. As a basis for transliterating, in some cases I have used the indigenous forms, and in some cases I have used the Russianized versions. For instance, I have used the modern spelling “Tojikiston” except in citations to written works, where I have tended to use the Russianized spelling “Tadzhikistan.”

Names of countries are symbolically important. It is not an exaggeration to state that lives have been lost over this symbolic point. But what of more routine names of places and people? The suffixes on most Central Asian names are forms of Russification. The *ov/ev* ending on most surnames (for instance, Nazarbaev, Akaev, Karimov, Rakhmonov, and Niyazov, the surnames of the current Central Asian presidents) are forms of Russification. Most Central Asians are indifferent to these suffixes. Some have dropped them, yet some insist on retaining them. Will they be dropped in historical references? In this book I have used a modernized, that is, a de-Russianized version of names of people, places, and things when it was clear to me that linguistic practice had changed. In references

to published books or other works bearing a former name, I have retained the old spelling convention.

My pragmatic approach to these problems seeks to emphasize communication over aesthetics of symbol and style. To champion the protection of indigenous languages against the onslaughts of colonialism is a noble thing. In a colonized country, the defense of native languages is a means to advance the end of national liberation. After independence, however, the situation changes. The contemporary international community is dynamic and demanding. The facts that computers work in the Latin script and that most computer software commands are in English is hardly related to any deliberate neocolonialism. Yet in the computer age, many small societies feel a necessity to adopt the Latin script simply to stay abreast of technological change. The consequences are the same whether the transition was politically motivated or motivated by technological change.

G.G.



Central Asia



The Post-Soviet States





Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

New States and Ancient Societies

In the closing days of 1991 in a hurriedly arranged meeting in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, eleven communist party officials signed a document declaring that “the USSR shall henceforth cease to exist.”¹ No public referendum was held on the “Alma-Ata Declaration.” No legislature was asked to ratify the agreement. No court was asked to rule on its constitutionality. No international forum was convened to discuss its global ramifications. Among the Soviet citizenry, the Alma-Ata Declaration gave rise to conflicting emotions. Surprise, resignation, and despair mixed with relief, elation, and celebration. The document was almost immediately accepted as legitimate by the international community. With this swift international acceptance of the Alma-Ata Declaration, the so-called Great Bolshevik Experiment—the seventy-year-long excursion into a new kind of civilization—came abruptly to a close. The world’s largest country, a global superpower and what was very probably the most heavily armed state in history, dissolved into fifteen euphoric, anxious, confused, feuding, but at least nominally independent states.

Among these independent states were the five former Soviet socialist republics (SSRs) of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Each of the new states of Central Asia was a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the loosely defined coordinating structure for the post-Soviet community created by the Alma-Ata Declaration. Each of the new states of Central Asia sought and soon received diplomatic recognition as independent republics from major world powers. Each of the new states joined the United Nations (UN). Each of the states sought participation in leading international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(IBRD). Each of the states pledged to uphold international standards of civil and human rights as specified in the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]). Each of the new states entered the international community.

These were crucial steps toward political independence. But given the vast scale of political, economic, and even psychological changes resulting from the transition from the communist paradigm, it was soon clear that creating genuine and enduring political independence in these new countries would require more than merely announcing intentions and issuing declarations. One of Central Asia's most sophisticated political leaders, President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, rightly called attention to the scope of the challenge: "The empire has collapsed, yet sovereign and independent states have not been established. We are dealing with a far more important phenomenon than it may appear. This is probably the greatest political, social, and economic reorganization of the 20th century."² As Strobe Talbott noted, "The new states really are not independent at all. Their economies and infrastructures will take years, even decades, to disentangle."³

Exposed to the extraordinary centrifugal forces of the "end of empire" and the process of entering the ranks of the international community, the new Central Asian states quickly broke with their socialist-colonial past. And despite their common point of departure from within the Soviet system, the new states assumed very different trajectories as each set out on a path to independence. Kyrgyzstan determinedly set upon a course of rapid liberalization. Somewhat more cautiously, multinational Kazakhstan set out to define itself as a liberal Asian democratic power. These countries won immediate praise from the international community.⁴ Remote Tajikistan, impoverished and bordering war-torn Afghanistan, fell prey to vicious internal contests over power. Uzbekistan, the richest, most populous, but also the most diverse Central Asian republic, assumed a path of conservative and even authoritarian national consolidation.⁵ Turkmenistan, ethnically compact and resource-rich, assumed an assertive and proud posture of national self-reliance.

INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM

An upheaval on the scale of the transition to national independence never takes place without it creating an enduring resonance in the lives of the people it affects. Great political events pass through peoples' lives like powerful storm winds. They arise suddenly and swiftly and sweep through the established order, leaving everyday life forever rearranged. As the thunder of great events recedes into the past, individuals are left to

pick up their lives, to sort out the consequences on an individual level as best they can. The collapse of the USSR and the coming of independence swept through the lives of Central Asia's citizens with such force. Whether these people were accustomed to privilege or to deprivation, injustice or the largesse of the old order, the new order brought changes that affected their lives in fundamental ways.

For the journalist or the social scientist, these changes could be described as "economic" or "political" or "social." But for the people whose lives were transformed by these events, the important differences were mainly psychological. A whole civilization was swept aside. To be sure, the Soviet regime was a stagnant, brutal, corrupt, and corrupting system in many ways. But it was also a system based on values, morals, and mutual understandings that millions of people shared. It was a system that exploited people but also created its own beneficiaries, people who personally benefited from the established order. As the old order passed, these things too passed. In their place arose only questions.

The old order demanded conformity and regimentation. It specified what people could comfortably think and how they could safely behave. The new order demanded new values, new ideas, and new behaviors. The new Central Asian societies all emerged from the same Soviet mold, but these societies were very different in their relations with the outside world. The most advanced and promising country was Kazakhstan. It was potentially rich but internally troubled, divided roughly in half by an indigenous population and a settler population of Russians. Kyrgyzstan, to the south, was small and remote and possessed little industry. More important, Kyrgyzstan was divided by mountains, with the country's southern half being more naturally connected to neighboring Uzbekistan. With the largest and best-educated population among the new Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan also possessed the most developed industrial, mining, and commercial structures. And throughout the Soviet period the Uzbeks had retained their cultural features, language, and sense of self more determinedly than had any of their ethnic neighbors.

Further to the south were Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Tajikistan was the poorest of the states and, because of the continuing bloodletting of a brutal civil war, had few prospects for economic development in the near future. Turkmenistan possessed great potential natural gas wealth but suffered from its landlocked geographical position, lack of access to markets, and—most of all—bad government.

Independence did not arise in Central Asia as a result of indigenous forces. The Central Asian states were not "catapulted" to independence, they were subjected to it.⁶ It is true that independence initially came with some nationalist euphoria and flag-waving, but its most profound aspect was disruption.⁷ The implosion and fragmentation of the brittle Soviet

economic system unraveled the mutual economic dependence of the regions. This meant that with the disintegration of the empire entire industries were without materials, supplies, and spare parts from their single-source suppliers. Central Asia's agriculture and mining enterprises were suddenly without their established markets. Transportation between regions ground to a standstill. New restrictions on travel and movement arose as states tried to protect their subsidized goods and services from "foreign" buyers. Russians who had occupied privileged positions in the apparatus of the old regime suddenly found their careers in eclipse and their children's prospects for advancement almost nonexistent.

The changes that have taken place and taken hold in Central Asia were inevitable. But the way in which they took place was surely not. There were important choices for the societies of Central Asia along the way, just as there are important choices ahead. In a certain sense independence is not an end; it is only a means. Independence only implies that people have the opportunity to determine their futures free from the direct control of a colonial power. Albert Camus is attributed with having expressed this double-edged promise of liberty by observing that "freedom is a chance to be better." Freedom is surely not a guarantee of success and progress; it is an opportunity. Just as license by itself need not augment liberty, neither does independence assure advancement and prosperity. Whether the transition to independence in Central Asia actually liberates the peoples of these societies and contributes to the improvement of the human condition depends on many things. Above all, the pressure of the transition to independence invites people to define their goals and their aspirations. It invites people to define themselves. It raises the question: Who are the rightful citizens of Central Asia and the inheritors of this new freedom?

THE MANY FACES OF CENTRAL ASIA

First-time travelers to Central Asia often ask, "What are the different nations that live in these countries?" At first glance, this question seems to make a lot of sense in Central Asia. There are different groups speaking different languages, answering to different leaders, and, at the same time, referring in the abstract to the "unity and commonality" of Central Asian values, customs, and traditions. There are different Central Asian "communities."

The European and North American worlds have grown accustomed to thinking of communities in terms of "nations" and "states." Soviet ethnographers, who rejected analytical categories and concepts that they regarded as "bourgeois apology," preferred to use other terms. They spoke of groups in Central Asia not in terms of "nation" but as *ethnos*, that