

ROUTLEDGE REVIVALS

Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe

New Politics, Old Predicaments

Michael O'Neill



GREEN PARTIES AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

To Wendie

Nil posse creari De nilo

Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe

New Politics, Old Predicaments

MICHAEL O'NEILL



Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1997 by Ashgate Publishing

Reissued 2018 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © Michael O'Neill 1997

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice:

Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Publisher's Note

The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.

Disclaimer

The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact.

A Library of Congress record exists under LC control number: 97025958

ISBN 13: 978-1-138-31445-0 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 978-0-429-44881-2 (ebk)

Contents

Acknowledgements		vii
Part One	The Green phenomenon: roots and branches	1
Chapter One	The dynamics of Green party politics in contemporary western Europe	3
Part Two	Green parties and Europe's changing political order	51
Chapter Two	Die Grunen in Germany	53
Chapter Three	Green parties in Benelux	99
Chapter Four	Alternativists and alternatives: Green party politics in Alpine Europe	139
Chapter Five	Les Verts in France	177
Chapter Six	Green Lists and Federations in Mediterranean Europe	215
Chapter Seven	The Iberian Verdes	253
Chapter Eight	The Green Party in the United Kingdom	283
Chapter Nine	Comhaontas Glas in Ireland	319
Chapter Ten	The Green Association and the Miljopartieten of Scandinavia	355
Part Three	New politics and Green parties: the problematic of political change	419
Chapter Eleven	New politics for old? An overview of a changing political landscape	421
Chapter Twelve	Party systems in western Europe: persistence, adaptation or radical change?	463
References		497
Index		521



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Acknowledgements

To research and write a book is a solitary and self indulgent pursuit, and one that inevitably accumulates many debts of gratitude along the way. I am especially grateful to those colleagues in the Nottingham Trent University who have contributed in various ways to the finished product. John Stancer and George Thompson provided financial assistance at the outset that enabled me to travel to the great London libraries, to trawl the newspaper archives at Chatham House, and to talk with some of those people who have enabled me to formulate my opinions on the questions considered in this study. Christine Bellamy, the head of Politics in the University, kept my teaching within manageable bounds so that I could find those precious islands of time during the academic year 1995-96 in which to stiffen the intellectual sinews, confront blank pages and write the manuscript. Larry Wilde read a very early draft and was both encouraging and generous in his comments, even though he does not share by any means all of my views on these issues.

Sandra Odell made her usual steadfast contribution to the project by speedily turning round the various drafts, translating a mountain of hieroglyphs into legible text, and using her technical wizardry to shift about the material on disc. And she suffered my requests for successive revisions without any hint of the vexation she would have been entitled to show in the circumstances! Terry Hanstock in the University library likewise responded promptly and efficiently to my regular demands for obscure and far-flung material. Both of these contributions are very much appreciated.

I want to mention some longstanding intellectual debts: to A. H. Birch, whose unassuming brilliance at the lecterns of the University of Hull sparked my enthusiasm for academic politics. And likewise the contributions to my political education of Dennis Kavanagh and Robert Benewick in the tutorial rooms of that University, who between them showed what could be achieved by a well honed curiosity, measured scepticism, and sheer hard work.

I would also like to register my gratitude to the editor of the journal *Contemporary Politics* for permission to use part of the material published therein in an article by me (Volume 1, number 3, Autumn 1995) and included in revised form here in chapter one.

My final and major debt is to my wife Wendie, whose forbearance and support made all the difference between tentatively setting out into the foothills of this inquiry and eventually scrambling up its final peaks. This book is dedicated to her - small recompense indeed for her unstinting good humour.

Screveton, Nottinghamshire
1st January 1997



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Part One: The Green phenomenon: roots and branches

“Great things are done when men and mountains meet;
This is not done by jostling in the street”

William Blake, **Notebooks**



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

1 The dynamics of Green party politics in contemporary western Europe

1. The rise of Europe's Green parties: mixed legacies and radical origins

The ecological movement in western Europe is undoubtedly a child of the cumulative post-industrial crisis which has settled on the continent over recent decades. This 'crisis' followed on from the political impact and economic repercussions of the oil price shocks of the seventies which disturbed the political landscape. The emergence of Green parties mirrored the growing disquiet within the political establishment itself and, beyond that, of publics increasingly concerned with both the negative consequences of three postwar decades of continuous economic growth, followed by the more recent threat of economic recession. The Club of Rome Report of 1972 - "The Limits to Growth"¹ - captured this newfound ambivalence about materialism. The Report's expression of unease marked a watershed. It questioned past nostrums of exponential growth and rejected the complacency associated with them. This concern was reinforced by a growing distaste in some quarters - on the political left and among the young particularly - with the West's increasing strategic reliance on nuclear weapons. A parallel concern was with the growing dependence on nuclear energy for peaceful industrial purposes.

These multiple anxieties fed into an initially inchoate radical protest movement throughout Europe. Originally rooted in localised and small-scale citizen action groups, these movements adopted various forms of direct action or protest. These included demonstrations, 'sit-ins', propaganda campaigns and lobbying the established 'system' parties.² Even in the early stages, and confronted by an unsympathetic and occasionally hostile response from the authorities, most of these 'alternative' movements emphasised their sense of political responsibility by discounting violence or ritualistic confrontation with authority for its own sake. Indeed, many of these movement activists - far from being anomic 'outsiders', social outcasts, misfits or otherwise marginalised individuals drawn from the social fringes - were more often than not well adjusted and, measured in terms of social or educational status, conventionally located members of society.³ For the most part they were motivated neither by envy, malice or bitterness; nor were they committed to subverting the political order. Those activists who took up the case of ecologism emphasised their positive commitment to society. They were concerned above all to 'save' society from, as they saw it, an impending and serious ecological threat - an 'eco-disaster' waiting to happen.

This is not to suggest that the 'new politics' in any of its expressions is merely a factional off-shoot of established leftist politics. Or that ecologism is another, albeit more politically focused, expression of conventional middle class romanticism, channelled into fashionable or progressive issues such as nature conservancy or the defence of public health. On this first point, these new movements - whilst finding clear affinities with the issue agenda of the orthodox libertarian left - remained deeply disenchanted with what they regarded, by and large, as the 'old' left's complicity in and contribution to, the fundamental economic errors of industrialism.⁴ The evidence on this count seemed damning. Socialist governments throughout western Europe had long been led by their redistributive agenda and unquestioning commitment to the industrialism paradigm to endorse the materialist culture of unlimited growth. More recently, during what the new left saw as the twin nuclear 'crises' of the early seventies, the orthodox left had even served in some of those governments which had taken 'heretical' decisions; both to install nuclear energy technology and to accommodate American strategic weapons.⁵ Moreover, the problem seemed a systemic rather than merely a contingent one. European social democracy's close affiliation with the patron-client politics which sustains modern corporatism apparently precluded any fundamental revision of their policy priorities.⁶ Of particular note here was the old left's enthusiastic commitment to the strategy of industrial expansion and economic growth, which had formed a central plank of its policy platform throughout this century.

Although the exigencies of politics have obliged radical ecologism to 'flirt' with social democracy within Europe's various national polities, there remains nevertheless a distinct ideological gulf between them. This clear rift of purpose and perception was further widened by abiding differences of political style and organisation. As far as social democrats were concerned, the new radicalism was both utopian and adventurist. Whereas the new ecologists, for their part perceived the old left as anti-libertarian, unimaginative, rigidly hierarchical, corruptible and authoritarian. In short, they dismissed it as an atrophied movement which discounted internal democracy and political self expression. Indeed, the conventional left seemed to its radical critics to be little more than a mirror image of the political establishment which had co-opted it and then distorted socialism's earlier progressivism. In direct contrast, the ecological movement shunned the velvet embrace of political conformity. It perceived itself to be an expression of an entirely new and radical politics. Within their own particular issue area, ecologists saw themselves as confronting the tacit environmentalism of the moderate conservation lobby.⁷ The contrast here between ecologism and nature conservancy and its adjacent causes was more than one of emphasis.⁸ What began to emerge out of the renaissance of Green political thought in the sixties was a wholly new cosmological paradigm - a *weltanschauung* in which technology, science, philosophy, ethics and politics were synthesised with the imperative to take political action in pursuit of 'real' change.⁹ As one commentator has defined the radical thrust of the emergent Green movement: "Neither conservationist nor environmentalists believe that the Good Life is much different from the one we presently lead, but political ecologists most certainly do. It is in this sense that ecologism can properly take its place alongside other political ideologies.....Ecologism cannot be seen as simply embedded in other political ideologies, it is a political ideology in its own right".¹⁰

It was but a small step from such a damning critique of the status quo to launching an outright political challenge against establishment politics on its own ground, at the ballot box.¹¹ This challenge was, of course, an uneven one. The momentum for a Green party politics was fitful and dependent on local issues and other contingencies. Nevertheless, by the

1970s, a Green agenda was discernible across the western European political landscape. Green politics eventually took root at both the local and national levels and, subsequently, in the transnational arena of the European Parliament itself. One of the new movements' more insistent voices underscores the significance of this rebuttal of the old politics of confusion, duplicity and compromise, by recommending a wholly different agenda to that of the industrial polity; inasmuch as "the most radical (Green aim) seeks nothing less than a non violent revolution to overthrow our whole polluting, plundering and materialistic industrial society and, in its place, to create a new economic and social order which will allow human beings to live in harmony with the planet. In these terms, the Green Movement lays claim to being the most radical and important cultural force since the birth of socialism".¹²

The moral energy and political commitment which fuelled this critique was drawn disproportionately from the younger,¹³ better educated¹⁴ and more articulate strata of postwar European society. As a movement ecologism received its greatest political impetus from the disruptive aftermath of the major oil crisis of 1973-74. The 'oil shock' was a momentous event in postwar history. It can lay claim to many important legacies. Amongst its ramifications this catharsis helped to sustain the West's nuclear energy programme. It also raised up the issue agenda of even the conventional political parties concern about resource scarcity and material priorities. And by extension it presented the new radicalism with a major political opportunity. Likewise, the emergent Greens acquired further political momentum from NATO's dual track decision on its intermediate nuclear forces - followed in the early 1980's by the siting of Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles on European soil.¹⁵ What had so far been localised and politically ineffectual factions, more concerned with 'parish' issues or giving vent to a disparate moral outrage, began to coalesce, albeit with variable success and speed, into a more cogent political movement on the ground.¹⁶ They did so by regrouping under national and eventually European 'umbrella' Green party groups. No-one should underestimate here - and not least in movements that made a political virtue of libertarianism - the sheer variety of organisational patterns and policy priorities in the fabric of this new political ecologism. This was by no means the formula politics of the altogether more centralised and oligarchic 'catch-all' parties cast in the conventional mould. Nevertheless, the very imperatives of political organisation, and especially the dilemmas facing radical parties seeking in some way to locate themselves within the conventional political game, did tend to focus the internal debate within these new parties on some broadly comparable themes. In the course of their development divisions, both tactical and strategic, ensued. These conflicts were sharpened, as they always are in parties wedded to a pristine notion of ideology, by fundamentalist tendencies. Two of the critical fault lines which have given Green party politics its particular cachet occurred over the nature of political organisation per se - the anti-party debate - and indeed, over the elemental purpose of political activity itself - whether or to what extent ecologism represented a wholly novel agenda; or whether it was merely a radical accommodation with the established left. These debates certainly debilitated some of these movements. At the same time, they increased their political profile, if not always their electoral purchase. By the end of the seventies, the Greens could at least no longer be discounted as an entirely peripheral movement on Europe's political landscape.

2. The 'new politics': a model of institutionalised protest

Radical political movements operating on the margins of established polities and challenging their stewardship as resource managers and their legitimacy as guardians of the public interest

are by no means a new phenomenon of western European politics. Anti-system - as opposed to extremist anti-regime - movements have been a permanent feature of the oppositional landscape of modern European politics. There are, however, distinct analytical and empirical differences between these earlier expressions of protest movement, and the current mode of 'alternative' politics. All forms of social movement radicalism are, by definition, primarily oppositional. Yet their intrinsic differences have encouraged students of comparative radicalism to treat them as entirely distinct entities. English Chartism, the food riots which accompanied the earliest phases of European industrialisation¹⁷ or, indeed, the student protest movement of the nineteen sixties, remain quite distinct from the current phenomenon.¹⁸ What distinguishes these earlier movements from the new social movements is their fluid and ephemeral nature. These protests were often reactive and occasionally the irrational expressions of marginalised or otherwise exploited social groups. They resonate with the sheer political frustration of 'victims' unable to control or influence those macro socio-economic changes or cyclical shifts of circumstance which periodically overwhelm the 'wretched of the earth'.¹⁹ While the contemporary student movement in the sixties did reflect an ephemeral element in the social structure, given the relatively brief duration of the higher education process, it gave rise to more durable radicalisms, which were hardly marginalised in either the sociological or social psychological sense of that term. The new radicalism was also different in many other respects from the reactive mass movements which had littered Europe's historical landscape. Indeed, the student movement provides a useful analytical demarcation between what are clearly different social formations. To that extent it marked a clear boundary between the old and new politics of protest.²⁰ In so far as the subsequent Green movement drew on that source, for both personnel and ideas, it follows, too, that any caricature of ecologism as a merely romantic reaction to the imperatives of progress and socio-economic change is misplaced. While there are discernible elements of utopianism apparent on the broad ecological canvas, to misrepresent the Green movement as little more than a retrogressive or instinctive backlash against progress is to misunderstand both its relevance and unique contribution, both to contemporary political discourse and political organisation.

To make this particular claim is not to say that the new radical politics was merely a reprise of the successful translation, over the past century or so, of organised social protest and organised labour into effective modern mass parties. To take but one example of successful political inclusivism, the various European labour movements impinged on, and eventually acquired political space in, the continent's existing quasi-democratic regimes, precisely on the basis of their pre-existing industrial strength and organisation. In spite of deep ideological schisms and factional disputes within these broad movements, Europe's social democratic parties were, for the most part, soon reconciled to the parliamentary route, unfazed by the purpose of winning political power, and committed, whatever maverick dissidents might have suggested to the contrary, to using this political resource as the primary instrument for effecting socio-economic change. Europe's modern radical movements were, by no stretch of the imagination, even a pale shadow of these historical forerunners. On the one hand, student radicalism in Europe and elsewhere fitted the classical mold of a collective but essentially amorphous anti-system movement. To this extent, it coalesced a broad spectrum of leftist or libertarian tendencies.²¹ These were little more than 'groupuscles' expressing a vague and selective neo-Marxian rhetoric; and rooted socially and somewhat uncertainly in a declassé and shifting clientele of youthful elements, passing briefly through higher education.²² This historically distinct form of protest was, in part, a classic instance of

those periodic shifts in social expectation, which frequently occur between successive generations.²³ Such generational 'shifts' invariably have a political impact. They have accounted for many similar, if ill organised, political expressions of socio-economic disorientation. Such a 'zeitgeist' might be detected in, for instance, the shift to political militancy in many European democracies in the aftermath of the Great War, or in the enhanced popularity of collectivist or Keynesian 'solutions' to social welfare problems after 1945. The student challenge to the conventional morality of 'bourgeois' society throughout the 1960s was, likewise, an expression of distaste and even contempt for a 'failed' past; one that was expressed - indeed ostentatiously exhibited - in a lively if fluid counter-culture.²⁴

This particular phenomenon was, however, more than a generational spasm or a mere iconoclastic protest. A longitudinal study by Whalen and Flacks²⁵ rejected the complacent view of the political establishment - either that these youthful rebels were only temporarily marginalized or that the lure of affluence and the responsibilities of careerism would soon reintegrate them into conventional society. The new left deposited instead alternative layers of meaning and ideas which laid the foundations, however irregularly, of a new radical politics that bore intermittent fruit thereafter. Over time, what began as an unstructured and reactive movement acquired its own gravitas as utopianism was replaced by expressions of radical realism.²⁶ The attempts of its enthusiasts, however spasmodic or spontaneous, to challenge what they saw as the structural and policy shortcomings of the contemporary social order, foreshadowed the elaborate critique enshrined in the 'new politics' which followed on from it.²⁷ The 'rationality' of this critique, with its awareness of the important linkage between political means and ends, was an important and discernible quality. This basic strategic sense, however naive or limited its content in some instances, demarcated these new radical movements from their merely reactive or spontaneous predecessors. Klaus Eder has appropriately identified this special characteristic as a form of collective learning. Collective learning does not depend on the mediation of ideas through centralised party machines with their elites, caucuses and oligarchies. Indeed, it is positively encouraged and stimulated in political organisations which are citizen based, where power is deconcentrated, and where ordinary members are encouraged to take ownership of policy and principles. Parties organised in pursuit of ethical concerns, rather than in defence of extant socio-economic interests, are especially amenable to this learning process. For, in Eder's view, "collective learning processes are concerned with particular interests but also with moral considerations. But as soon as moral questions arise, people have to talk with each other in order to be cooperative. The rationality of collective learning consists in the fact that in principle all questions can become the subject of argumentative debate the preconditions of the possibility of collective action are based on the ability of social actors to participate in argumentative debate. This is at the same time the point of departure for the autogenic development of this ability and for the construction and reconstruction of social reality".²⁸ The individualistic and libertarian world of the modern university as it emerged from the cloistered and conservative milieu of pre-war higher education was especially conducive to encouraging this 'autogenic' approach to political discourse and action. Without the experience of student radicalism, in which a new generation of articulate and self-confident radicals developed a persistent critique of the materialism of the status quo and served an important political apprenticeship, the more organised, 'new politics' of protest would not have emerged as quickly as it did, or with the same impact.²⁹

For all of these reasons, student radicalism was an indispensable precursor of the new politics, of which the Greens were such a significant element. It left a pervasive legacy for its political successors in the new movements which followed on from it - a legacy they could

build on. That legacy, in turn, shaped the new movements, moulded their issues and concerns and, not least, their political style and organisational dilemmas. Here was a model of protest politics that exhibited a vigorous, even abrasive, iconoclasm; an anti-elitist orientation, fashioned into an ultra democratic and participatory ethos.³⁰ Underlying the new movement politics was a common and shared agenda. One that rejected the endemic bureaucratisation of social life, opposed what it saw as the authoritarianism of modern organisations and its repressed social relations that instilled a narrow materialism rooted in a productionist ethic, and threatened both peace and the ecological balance.³¹ It emphasised instead, direct action and grassroots participation in pursuit of non material goals, alternative cultural aspirations, public goods (defined in an altogether more radical sense than in the prevailing collectivist models) over private consumption, and a community rather than a narrow class based politics. The new radicalism owed more than an intellectual or inspirational debt to its student predecessor. The student movement also created a social base and a political clientele outside mainstream politics. The 'new left' was able to draw on a residue of recruits forged in the radical crucible of student militancy.³² The postwar shift in the structure of welfare capitalism, to public sector employment and the development of service and educational 'industries', encouraged new, non instrumental, anti-utilitarian values. These structural changes and value shifts were mutually reinforcing. A gradually expanding pool of potential support for 'new age' issues was created as a direct consequence of this. Both from amongst individuals who had graduated into 'conventional' employment in the teaching profession, the expanding public sector (the welfare services and the 'caring' professions);³³ as well as from the relatively large numbers who had remained, as a response to their experience of higher education, permanently 'opted out' into alternative life styles.³⁴

These recruits to the new politics had imbibed the potent cultural legacy of their youth. This resonated with political self confidence, reinforced by direct experience of clashes with authority in countless sit-ins, occupations and demonstrations. And it was sustained cognitively by high levels of education, particularly in the 'non dismal' social sciences which did so much to sharpen critical faculties and legitimise a radical alternative vision.³⁵ Moreover, these elements had acquired the essential organisational skills that accrued from these training and employment opportunities. All in all, these were invaluable resources for effective political organisation.³⁶ And they had a discernable political payoff. Regardless of their lack of political experience, the new radicals emerged across western Europe as an entirely new expression of direct action politics.³⁷ The new politics of the seventies, far from reflecting the transitory faddism, the reactive tilt at authority, or the ineffectual gesture politics of the socially marginalised,³⁸ was generally regarded by commentators as an attempt to address the rising concerns of key sections of public opinion in advanced industrial societies. Whereas the sixties student movement had been an unfocused, rootless and a largely self-indulgent phenomenon - a matter of style rather than substance - the new social movements that crystallised from out of these protests into the seventies, were an altogether more stable, cogent and goal oriented phenomenon. They were, in the nature of things, localised movements directed at particular targets - nuclear power installations, military bases, and 'imported' infrastructural projects that threatened the community, health and amenity values. This type of protest or discontent politics developed further in the eighties into a range of lifestyle or moral movements concerned with ecology, gender issues, racism and civil rights, and concerns with the third world and peace that juxtaposed local and global concerns. And all mobilised by a critical discourse which perceived the same 'social contradictions' (of class, bureaucratic, ecological, racial, patriarchal relations) visible in local communities and

simultaneously at work shaping power configurations at the global level.³⁹ In short, the new social movements came to political prominence precisely because they addressed a lacuna in contemporary political arrangements. For Carl Boggs they "expanded at a time when the growth of centralised power and the bureaucratisation of public life led to a narrowing of political discourse, to a gulf between the nation state apparatus and a more dynamic local sphere. In this context, an independent radicalism implied more than anything the struggle for empowerment, though a struggle confined primarily to civil society".⁴⁰ Boggs construed in these movements a real radical potential, even if this was somewhat blunted by their disparateness, specialisation and scope. To this extent, "if sixties radicalism was more turbulent and had more flair for the dramatic, new social movements carried forward a more sustained organisational presence, as well as a deeper oppositional theory and practice (thus) the complex and highly differentiated milieux of advanced industrial society has given rise to new modes of protest/revolt around plural forms of oppression, identities, and group interests; class forces no longer constitute a privileged agency of historical change. The era of new social movements is therefore also an emergent phase of post marxist radicalism. This momentous shift reflects a novel emphasis on the 'micro' sphere of everyday life - including personal and cultural politics - that was largely ignored by socialist parties, unions, and governments trapped in a world of hard politique".⁴¹ At the same time, this struggle for identity against the conformity inducing tendencies imposed on society and culture by large scale organisations in both the private and politic domains, dissipates this radical potential by working "against the development of a genuine transformative politics".⁴² The new movement politics was, in short, rational but not choate. The emergence of Green parties which have tried to assimilate the various, occasionally competing, strands of the new politics within a cogent party framework, has been the most serious attempt yet to address this problem.

Ronald Inglehart, amongst the many social scientists who have researched this issue, fashioned an explanation of the new protest phenomenon in precisely these rational terms. Inglehart identified what he chose to call a 'Silent Revolution' underway in the cultural and social fabric of advanced industrial societies. He based this dramatic conclusion, not so much on spasmodic or disparate instances of social disorientation rooted in the pathology of the uprooted or psychotic; on the contrary, he defined the universal phenomenon of protest politics as a symptom of a much deeper, structurally located unease with the fabric of modernisation. Moreover, this 'rational' if ethically motivated disenchantment with the prevailing materialism of post-industrialism by key social groups was by no means a modern cult or messianic impulse.⁴³ The rationality of post-materialism was evidenced by its political focus - the intrinsic belief that change could be engineered by harnessing moral protest into a political movement. Environmental issues and movements have played a key part in this 'new politics' phenomenon, although at its broadest extent, it has been far from exclusively concerned with ecologism. Indeed, these 'new movements' have embraced a spectrum of ethical concerns ranging from feminism⁴⁴ and racial discrimination, to peace and all manner of personal and civil liberties.⁴⁵ To some extent this diffuseness was unavoidable. The politics of libertarianism and virtuous individualism will follow the contours of ethical preference wherever they lead. The flowering of a multifarious issue agenda was a sign of the times and reflected the sheer ferment of grass roots politics in Europe as the complacency of the fifties gave way to new issues and moral concerns. This, in turn, gave rise to a new age of radical dissent. The environment issue was particularly important here inasmuch as it coalesced several politically adjacent themes into a viable if fluid movement. As such, it provided a focal point for what grew, by degrees, into distinct and relatively coherent political organisations.

This new form of movement politics gained both political impetus and a degree of salience denied to many of the more organisationally dispersed or culturally peripheral fractions of the 'infantile' new left. This was due in part to organisational and other contingent factors. We should not lose sight here of the cultural resonance of Green ideology with the long-established European radical tradition. Without in any way discounting the hiatus between ecologism and Europe's mainstream ideologies across the political spectrum, the Green parties were able to call upon progressive instincts already deeply rooted in European political culture. The Greens represented the concerns of a long-established radical discourse, a 'great tradition' of liberationist thought and reformist impulses, refined and constantly updated in the post Enlightenment discourse during the long haul of modernisation. This, however, is a general assessment which needs to be qualified by more detailed reference to the actual political experience of the various European Green parties. Two key issues provide a critical lens through which to view Green politics in Europe. The degree of accommodations to the supposedly 'failed' politics of the status quo links them and makes for a useful matrix for mapping the European Greens. The critical issue for any progressive movement - of how it orientates itself to the organisational conventions and procedures of the established political order - is a clear test of commitment, principle and intent; the very criteria by which political scientists have long assessed putative forms of radicalism.⁴⁶ The history of every European Green party shows a remarkable degree of similarity of response to this dilemma, as between a movement and party orientation. Almost without exception, their legacies from the ideology and sub culture of alternativism, protest, activism and direct democracy, were carried over to the new parties. The conflict between community and participation, versus organisation and order - the classical Rousseauian theorem - has pervaded Green party politics over the duration.

An equally critical issue, as far as the Green parties were concerned, was their response to adjacent political forces, particularly on the 'radical' left. There are both practical and philosophical reasons why this issue is salient for new and radical movement parties. These are by no means mass parties with entrenched electorates. They therefore require tangible signs of success, if they are to make their mark and win converts to their cause. This is a matter of political expediency. Some commentators have suggested that the ephemeral nature of protest politics is likely to consign such 'flash' or milieu parties to oblivion anyway.⁴⁷ For the most part, their local roots in a wide range of lobbies and protest movements have disposed them to the art of political networking - even with conventional political groups and interests. Clearly, some ecologists - both pure Greens and the eco-anarchists or far left - have resisted what they see as selling out their radical credentials. Ecologism as a philosophy and as a movement has long debated the extent to which 'nature', with its own esoteric interests, might coexist with man and his preternatural materialism. Translated into conventional political discourse, Europe's Greens have therefore engaged in a deeply divisive debate over whether a pure green strategy, disowning any alliances with the 'old' left, is preferable to a red-green or coalition approach, rooted in the search for progressive common denominators and inevitable compromises.⁴⁸

These two issues have been the meat of Green party politics over recent years. Locating where individual Green parties, or, indeed, different factions of the same national party, stand on these issues should enable us to better understand the movement, and its political momentum and direction vis a vis other actors in the universe of national and European politics. The rise of the Greens, in short, enables us to comprehend the broader patterns of change underway on the landscape of politics. This mapping exercise suggests a

key to understanding the movements' generic or transnational quality through its shared outlook and common affinity to the radical ecological cause that sustains ecologism and gives it political dynamism. At the same time, this exercise also illustrates those important differences over strategy and principle which have reduced the movement's political impact, at a time when the cultural climate might have suggested an altogether better electoral performance in the new and increasingly fluid politics of post industrial society.

3. The dynamics of a modern radicalism

Green parties reflecting a spectrum of ideological persuasions from individual libertarianism to a form of radical reformism bordering on socialism have undoubtedly made an impact on the recent electoral politics of western Europe. The first Green deputy to win a seat in a national parliament anywhere in the world under his own colours, did so in Switzerland (at Lausanne), in October 1979. By 1993, after a decade or more of unprecedented postwar electoral volatility which rocked the confidence of political establishments across Europe,⁴⁹ Green parties had secured representation in almost every democratic national legislature in Europe. There have been, at some time or other throughout the recent past, Green parliamentarians in Germany (pre and post unification), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Malta. The most notable absence from this impressive list is the British Parliament, where a combination of political culture and unfavourable 'opportunity structures',⁵⁰ most notably the plurality electoral system,⁵¹ have conspired to keep the British Greens out of Westminster. Since the European elections of 1984 there has also been an active bloc of Green and associated MEP's in the European Parliament.⁵²

There are remarkable similarities between these Euro-Greens.⁵³ This is apparent whether we focus on the demographic profile of their membership and support base in their respective national settings. Or whether we examine the programmatic content of their manifestos. By the same token, Europe's Green parties reflect much the same internal fault lines, identified above, that provide ecological politics with its procedural dynamism and ideological *raison d'être*. Whether we concentrate on their intrinsic similarities or their internal divisions, the Green parties represent a distinctive phenomenon in contemporary European politics. At the same time, we must be wary of glib over generalisation. It by no means undermines the importance and necessity of the comparative task which confronts the political scientist, to admit to the singular quality of every national political culture. Indeed, the dialectic between uniqueness and correlation - the particular and the general - is what makes for the intellectual stimulus and the endless fascination of political science. It is certainly the case that the precise configuration of circumstances, contingencies and the sort of issues which galvanised grassroots ecological protest movements into becoming organised parties, have differed - sometimes markedly - from one country to another. There is a clear sense in which each of the national case studies of Green party politics in Europe tells a unique story - one that reveals much about the generic process of political change under the unique circumstances of advanced or post industrial societies, as well as the interaction of these broad themes and those cultural configurations and institutional or procedural constraints which shape every country's politics into distinctive national patterns. These particular patterns indicate as much about the particularities of the response to the common structural circumstances which constrain all modernised societies, and of the adaptation of individual parties to the exigencies of social change underway in each European country, as they do

about the universalities of that process of change per se.

We must certainly not lose sight of these particularities in our search for those meaningful, cross cultural comparisons that illustrate the shifting ground and emergent contours of post industrial politics. We need to keep a weather eye on the sui generis quality of each polity. To pursue theoretical abstraction at the expense of descriptive clarity, is to substitute categorical generalisation for its own sake, for real insight into the way politics actually works on the ground. At the same time, a surrender to detail and the avoidance of hypothesising and model building as an aid to understanding and explaining this reality, is also an abdication of intellectual responsibility. The excessive subjectivity of ethno-methodology - that we can only 'know' social reality by depending on the cognitive assessment of the reasoning behind social behaviour by the primary actors concerned - is patently absurd. We must indeed take proper cognisance of the subjective interpretation of their situation by those actors involved in social action. Not to do so would be to compound the ethno-methodological error. What is required, however, by the way of viable explanation of social action, is an appropriate synthesis of both the actor's subjective and the broader structural frame of reference, within which and from which those individual choices and actions derive both social significance and acquire meaning for the individuals involved. This, then, is the primary task of the model builder; as Kitschelt sees it, to "give meaning to a sequence of exchange". For as Kitschelt observes, "social and political processes (do) bring about intended consequences that cannot be reconstructed from the actors perspective alone, but require a structural and behavioural analysis".⁵⁴ It is necessary, then, for the methodology of comparative politics to combine the subjective dimension - what actors themselves choose to see as significant or important - with an account of the objective or structural framework in which they interact. Model building, in short, should discern social patterns from individual behaviour. The procedure begins with the formulation of testable hypotheses. It then processes hypotheses into models, theorems and even full blown theories. All of which stand or fall by the usual scientific criteria, of testing for verification or refutation against the accumulated empirical evidence.

The contribution of this study to this rigorous process is a modest one. It discerns two patterns or indices of political behaviour at work across the spectrum of Green (or for that matter, any other expression of) party politics in western Europe. The success of Green parties in building a base in national politics across the continent has been impressive but it raises more questions than it resolves. Most notably, a debate over whether the Greens are, as some critics have suggested, merely 'flash' parties representing a temporary discontent or 'fad', buoyed up by a recent and uncharacteristic cycle of electoral volatility across a continent confronted by national anxieties and compounded by global insecurities. Yet for all that, a protest doomed - and sooner rather than later - to political oblivion because it was incapable of resolving the dilemmas and addressing the hard choices that confront all serious contenders for political office. Opponents of this sceptical outlook maintain that the Greens, on the contrary, are here to stay; that they will consolidate around a new social cleavage and thereby become a force for change capable of consolidating their position on the continent's political landscape. These are important questions. We will return to this issue of the permanence or obsolescence of a 'new' politics in the concluding chapters. We can only begin to address these questions by undertaking a detailed examination of the dynamics of Green party politics. Two critical issues hold the key to this task. The first of these issues - the radical dilemma - mirrors the persistent dilemma of all progressive movements that aspire to change the world by persuasion rather than by violence. The other issue - the ideological dilemma - reflects the

particular strategic dilemma of how to respond to other conventional parties with whom they might strike bargains for mutual political benefit. For under contemporary circumstances in western Europe the Greens can hardly expect to transform the political scene, let alone the social economic situation, on their own. To exert even a modicum of influence over policy outcomes requires that they strike alliances with other progressively minded parties. These two issues are distinct but, as we shall see, closely connected. Both of them confront Europe's Green parties with deep and disruptive predicaments. How they respond to these issues will do much to determine their impact and, indeed, their chances of political survival. These patterns of party behaviour certainly do have their subjective roots in what the political actors themselves define as being both ideologically significant to their definition of ecologism as a political theory, and as a movement for social change. At one level these are subjective preferences. However, these individuated preferences do occur with regularity across a number of national Green parties. They are part of the structure of radical politics in contemporary European societies. To that extent, they acquire an objective significance and are socially or structurally meaningful. This makes them amenable to comparison between one polity and another. As such, they require a more reliable explanation than that suggested by the merely subjective or ethno-methodological approach. In so far as it is possible, the subjective and the structural imperatives of 'good' social theory must be accommodated within a composite model of party politics. One way of achieving this synthesis is to acknowledge the ambivalent quality of the individuals who make up the membership of all political movements and parties. At the same time these mixed motives are reflected at the level of collective behaviour in the factional tensions over preferences and goals that divide all political parties, in some measure against themselves.

Politics is both a micro pursuit and a macro activity. Individual actors bring to their political roles immensely complex and invariably ambiguous patterns of ideals, values, attitudes, prejudices and expectations. Behaviouralists employ sophisticated techniques for capturing these heterogeneous cognitive profiles. At the same time, individuals who gravitate towards, and invest their political energies in, movements find it necessary to correlate or orientate their individual preferences around much broader or macro configurations which give them a sense of belonging or political identity, and thus connects them with likeminded activists. These are hardly neat, composite arrangements but they do tend in actual political movements, to be expressed as ideological factions or tendencies. The imperative to seek out ideological soul mates is both an intellectual or cognitive impulse, and an organisational or behavioural necessity; a normal part of the 'logics' of party politics. These factions are defined in reference to one another, along various continua. The notion of a left or right orientation has been the dominant response to this imperative and in some degree has been incorporated into the ideological morphology of every political movement, in order to give expression to these affective and organisational imperatives.⁵⁵ Issues or principles are grouped according to these identity clusters, albeit in ways that reflect each party's ideological roots and the political sociology of the societies which give rise to and nurture them. To this extent, the terms 'left' and 'right', although drawing upon a general historical legacy that reflects to an extent a common European experience of modernity, industrialism and democratisation, are also movable feasts that equally reflect different and distinctive national experiences.

To complicate matters further, individuals, being the perverse and complicated creatures that they are, and disposed to a degree of volition that permits all sorts of apparent inconsistencies or ambivalences to inhabit the same personality, may identify with both a radical and conservative cause simultaneously. It is not unusual to find conservatives who

favour retributive punishment as the basis of the criminal justice system (a conventional right wing issue), but who also prefer an interventionist state and welfare as an antidote to crime. Individuals are not programmed and are likely to exhibit all manner of eccentric political propensities. This is no less true of radical politics, where the exclusion from power and its necessary compromises tend if anything, to reinforce an individual's ideological resolution. In principle, any number of permutations of value preferences is possible. In fact, individual activists do tend to at least correlate their value and ideological preferences. That is, they organise them into manageable and easily defensible clusters. Much of what passes for ideologism, and some of what purports to be contributions to critical scholarly discourse, has been generated by a perceived need (whether emotional, intellectual, or for the purposes of practical politics and public consumption) to reconcile the apparent incongruities between thought and action. The search for consistency is a pervasive impulse in all variants of party politics. There is no simple formula at work here. But most political parties are universes populated by broad constellations or loosely associated galaxies, rather than by infinite varieties of unconnected nebula. The Greens are no exception to this 'logic' of party development and organisation. To this extent Green politics is a manageable rather than an unfathomable universe to explore. More so than many of the established 'catch-all' parties, whose ideological core has shrunk or diminished in significance, or the sharpness of its focus blurred as the political exigencies of winning or holding onto power have tamed them, or otherwise persuaded them to adapt to a political market dominated more now by instrumentalism than by primordial beliefs. This is by no means to discount the importance of ideology for the conventional parties of modern liberal democracy, but merely to underline the fact that, in comparison with radical outsider parties on the political margins, other more immediate factors loom larger in the expectations of their supporters and the aspirations of their activists.

The mapping exercise is further complicated by all manner of subtle ideological shifts within and between the broad pragmatist-fundamentalist categories which encapsulate the two axes of the model used here. The time dimension, for instance, adds further complications. Green politics, as with all forms of radicalism, is a far from static phenomenon. Changes continue to occur within the Green movement that reflect ongoing intra party debates, local turbulence caused by current issues, personality clashes, as well as electoral considerations and other contingent factors. It is not unheard of anywhere in the volatile world of movement politics for erstwhile conservatives to be radicalised and vice versa. Green politics, conducted as it is in parties with small memberships, with a high proportion of well-educated activists who place a higher premium on direct participation, and in many cases experiencing for the first time tangible political success by winning representation and even governmental office at every level of European politics from local communes to Strasbourg, have been amenable to tactical shifts and ideological revisionism, in both directions along the ideological-organisational axes highlighted here. What has been particularly noticeable as a trend amongst Europe's Greens, has been a propensity - in both predominantly pure Green parties such as those of Britain, France or Italy, as well as in the mainly radical ecosocialist movements such as Germany's Die Grunen - for some activists who began their political lives as 'fundis', yet impelled by the experience of party office or electoral success, to move towards a more moderate or 'realist' stance. In other words, the map of political ecology in Europe is further complicated by a group of Greens who, in varying degrees, occupy both an eco-socialist, a red-green (rather than a purist) approach, and yet who choose to pursue these ideological objectives by pragmatic means on the moderate, accommodationist or 'realo' side

of the organisational axis. Such shifts within factions need to be tracked and recorded if we are to chart a subtle rather than a crude map of the European Greens. This temporal or diachronic momentum is evident from the movements within many Green parties on the two critical dimensions of party identity indicated in Table Two. These movements reveal not only the precise configurations at any given moment, but also the momentum of contemporary ecological politics. For these patterns of conflict - ideological as well as factional - have been one of the critical dynamics of European Green politics. These shifts are important, too, for what they tell us about the political momentum of these parties and, indeed, of the likelihood or not of a significant degree of change in the party systems in which they operate. In other words, the map of Green politics is constantly shifting, but perhaps less so in random fashion than in response to an unexpected degree of success by Green parties in playing the alien game of 'normal' politics.

This broad observation does not in itself invalidate the unavoidable caveat that must accompany any study of real politics; that every national case study of political ecology will, in significant degrees, be different from others and thus be unique.⁵⁶ At the same time, however, the use of such broad reference points, rooted as these are in the empirical minutiae of national Green politics, does facilitate comparative analysis. The approach may be far from perfect, it is certainly flawed, but it offers a start - a way into the maze of detail across the spectrum of Europe's Green parties. The two comparative themes used here provide useful insights into, or indicators of, what we might call 'the meaning of Greening' in contemporary European party politics. Used in conjunction, they provide us with a reasonably accurate map or template against which to examine and assess the dynamics of each individual national Green party. At the same time, they offer a way into the more daunting comparative task. And one which surprisingly few students of Europe's Green parties have been prepared to undertake.

4. Mapping the Greens: the 'grid references' of political ecology

Regardless of the caveats discussed above, Green party politics can be mapped transnationally, according to a matrix which consists of comparative qualities or related themes. By employing this technique we deepen our understanding, not only of the Greens per se, but also of the broad processes of change underway in the politics of Europe's advanced industrial societies. Alongside the undeniable differences and cultural distinctiveness that make Europe's national political traditions rich in their diversity, are those common responses to the pervasive systemic problems which socio-economic change invariably brings in its wake. The prospect of inexorable change in itself is one which every party of whatever ideological orientation has been obliged to confront over recent decades. Accordingly, the notion of an esoteric and wholly 'local' politics, impervious to those cumulative and ever more insistent transnational influences which are reshaping the political economies of all advanced societies, is fanciful. It has been undermined by a rising awareness amongst political activists and political scientists alike, of the centripetal impact of the global forces which now impinge on all modern polities. In the circumstances of what Keohane defines as 'complex interdependence',⁵⁷ comparative politics has increasingly come into its own. Carole Webb has discerned in this cumulative process of interactions, "the growing economic and technological interdependence of the world, and the rapidly increasing opportunities for global communication, transportation, movement of finance and persons (with a) chain reaction, leading from this heightened sensitivity of societies to one another, to the loosening of

governmental control over contracts between societies".⁵⁸

Structural change, such as that which is undoubtedly underway in the very fabric of European advanced societies, is also causing clear shifts in values and expectations. These, in turn, are certain to trigger further social and political shifts.⁵⁹ The relatively sudden rise of Green politics over the past decade or so is a manifestation of this process of change.⁶⁰ At the same time, we should never oversimplify what is an immensely complex process - or lose sight of its variable pace. These issues are sufficiently important to require some further elaboration. We shall therefore return to the problematics of political change in the conclusion. The political expressions of change, whatever outward political form they may take - from ecological protest to much less seemly forms of ethnic or regional protest politics - are a far from uniform phenomenon. They must always be filtered through the particular prism of 'local' circumstances and contingencies. This explanatory requirement demands then, both proper cognisance of the uniqueness of each set of national circumstances; as well as due recognition of the similarities of those structural imperatives and transnational circumstances to be found in adjacent social systems. This precise formula certainly captures the essence of the problem confronting comparative analysts of the Greens - or for that matter, of any other European political movement. It is essential, therefore, to acknowledge this juxtaposition between what are common transnational trends and national specificity, in any account of political ecogism. The accommodation of diversity and convergence in a common framework is indispensable if we are to deepen our understanding of the contemporary European political process. And to understand the role therein both of the dynamic forces for progressive change, such as the Greens, as well as those political forces resistant to such change. Radicalism and reaction are present in the same political milieu at one and the same time, and the dialectic or tension between these conflicting impulses is present in every political movement.

In order to map the complex patterns that these competing motives give rise to, in so far as they apply to Green politics, we need to bear in mind that ecological politics does revolve around some broadly cognate axioms of commitment and principle. These encapsulate what it is to be 'Green' in the contemporary discourse and practice of European politics. Nevertheless, the superimposition of one of these thematic axes over the other indicates a multidimensional map of political preferences and dispositions, rather than a uniform model in which the key reference points of political identity are mutually reinforcing. The two axes under review here may well be cognate, inasmuch as they are descendent from a common radical instinct and intellectual ancestry. But they are not at all identical, as the evidence of intense factional disputes throughout Europe's Green parties over recent years indicates. The application of this grid to Europe's Green parties reveals a complex map. One in which markedly different Green orientations compete and contest the real meaning, the very 'soul', of ecogism. It offers, too, a useful gauge of the diversity and intensity of contemporary ecological politics, along its two principal trajectories of political identity and ideological meaning. We will now examine in turn these measures of political identity.

(a) The radical dilemma

The first of these significant themes - the vertical axis in Tables One and Two - concerns the critical distinction frequently identified by observers of all political movements; the tension between 'extremism' and 'moderation'. These are by no means unproblematical terms and must be cautiously employed. For one thing, they are highly subjective concepts which are as much

Table 1: Mapping European Green Parties - The Formative Phase 1973 - 1989





Table 2 : Mapping Green Parties in Contemporary Western Europe



Note : See key (Table 3) for full party titles

Table 3: Western Europe's Principal Green Parties, 1973-1997

AGALEV	Wallonian Green Party (Belgium)
ALO	Alternative Liste Osterreich (Alternative List, Austria)
AREV	Alternative rouge et verte (Red-Green Alternative, France)
AVL	Alternative Verde List (Spain)
B90/DG	Bundnis 90/Die Grunen (Germany)
C.G	Comhaontas Glas (Green Party, Ireland)
CLV	Confederacion de los Verdes (Spain)
DM	Danemarks Miljopartiet (Denmark)
DE/GR	De Groenen (The Netherlands)
DG	Die Grunen (The Greens, West Germany)
DGa	Die Greng Alternativ (Luxembourg)
DGA	Die Grune Alternative (Green Alternative Party, Austria)
DGe	De Gronne (Denmark)
ECOLO	Flemish Green Party (Belgium)
ERG	Enhedaliste de Rod Gronne (Green-Left Unity List, Denmark)
EP	Ecology Party (Finland)
EAL	Ecologists Alternatives List (Greece)
EL/AL	Ecological Left (Germany)
FEO	The Federation of Ecological Associations (Greece)
GAZ	Grune Aktion Zukunft (Green Action Future, West Germany)
GE	Generation Ecologie (France)
GL	Groen Links (Green Left, The Netherlands)
GPA	Groen Progressiff Akkord (The Netherlands)
GPN	Groen Partij Nederlands (The Netherlands)
GL-E I	Greng Lesch-Ekologesch Initiativ (Pure Ecology Party, Luxembourg)
GPS/FPE	Federation der Grunen Parteien der Schweiz (Switzerland)
GP	Green Party (UK)
Les V	Les Verts (France)
LVD	Liste Verdi: La Federazione Della Liste Verdi (Federation of Green Lists, Italy)
Los V	Los Verdes (Spain)
MEI	Mouvement ecologiste independant (Independent Ecologist Movement, France)
MGN	Miljopartiet De Gronne (The Green Party of Norway)
MgS	Miljopartiet de grona (The Green Party of Sweden)
ODP	Democratic Ecology Party (West Germany)
OV	Os Verdes (Portugal)
PE	Parti Ecologiste (Switzerland)
P/EP	Peoples/Ecology Party (UK)
VERDE	Vertice Espanol Revivindicacion de Desarrollo Ecologia (The Spanish Vertex for the Reclaiming of Ecological Development)
VGO	Vereinte Grune Osterreich (United Greens, Austria)
VL	Vihrea Litto (Green Association, Finland)

part of the demonology as they are of either the sociology or philosophy of political analysis. Above all, they are difficult to quantify with any degree of precision. This is so, even where they are used judiciously by commentators more concerned with accurate analysis than with awarding perjoratives or plaudits. As it is employed here, this operational continuum is intended to have a descriptive purpose rather than either a prescriptive or philosophical one. It is used as a measure of political disposition; of how and in what ways, individual actors or groups of actors (factions) orientate themselves to the political process. 'Militancy' here, or its antithesis, 'moderation' - or indeed any operational measure of political commitment in between these extremes - is translated as discernible attitudes towards political organisation. These dispositions are measurable in behavioural terms in a way that is empirically verifiable from the accumulated practice of Green party politics throughout contemporary Europe. It deals with the relatively straightforward tactical and strategic issues of how the Green case is actually prosecuted within the available processes and procedures of the established political order. This particular axis has a cognitive (attitudinal) as well as a behavioural quotient. All that is suggested here is the prospect of measuring moderation or 'militancy' in terms of a discernible orientation for or against the normal, established procedures of liberal democratic politics. This axis is amenable to empirical research over time, as the movements in various party positions charted as between Tables One and Two well illustrates. And to this extent, it provides a useful indicator of change - in both its behavioural and value-attitudinal dimensions.

The operational variable is principally concerned to distinguish degrees of conventional, moderate or pro-system behaviour from their opposite, militant or anti-system expressions. Of course, in politics as in life things are not always what they seem. Accordingly, these basic conditions need some additional qualification. It does not necessarily mean, for instance, that actors who take up an extreme posture, or otherwise show a disinclination to compromise their fundamental political principles, preclude themselves from participating in such routine or conventional political activities as electoral politics, courting public opinion or lobbying the authorities. What this axis does illustrate is the dialectic within radical parties who take their ideological debates seriously, between deeply divisive conflicts over principles and the incentives to play the conventional political game. This is a familiar dilemma to every student of non-revolutionary radical politics. Radical politics presents difficult choices and is full of ambivalence for those actors who must face them. Revolution is an uncompromising political strategy; reformism is altogether more conditional. Choosing to work within the political system in order to fundamentally change it, presents radicals with a real predicament. The traps and seductions of the 'sordid' game challenge the radical's sensibilities and exercise his conscience. This is by no means a new phenomenon. The risks of accommodating the system have been the meat of radical discourse over decades. Those radicals who become reconciled to the imperatives of compromise may themselves be captured by the beast they would tame - and thus become 'corrupted' in the process.

The alternative prospect is no less problematical. Radicals who adhere rigidly to moral absolutism and refuse to grasp the unpleasant nettle of compromise, usually find themselves marginalised and faced with political impotence. Moral naval gazing is no substitute for tangible achievement, however modest, for those in a hurry to change the world. This choice between integrity and trimming is the essence of the radical dilemma. Michels identified this predicament in his classic text on radical parties.⁶¹ It principally takes the form of a conflict between two distinct philosophies of party organisation. On one side are those activists who choose to put principle before pragmatism. The merits - indeed the moral imperatives - of

democratic participation are infinitely more preferable to the imposed didacticism of party oligarchies. The virtue of pursuing incorruptible principle soars above tendentious compromise. On the other side of the debate to these 'fundamentalists', are those radical realists who counsel the necessity of strong party organisations, the requirement of effective leadership skills, and firm discipline in pursuit of political influence. This disruptive - and frequently painful - dilemma has visited every radical movement that has opted to pursue political change through the ballot box. The Greens are no exception here. In Europe's Green parties this dilemma crystallised into a protracted debate over organisational disposition and political style. Conflict has ensued between those Greens who preferred an ultra democratic party under grassroots direction, and those who opted instead for participating in an orderly, and in their terms, effective electoral politics. This animus has been a constant source of tension in Europe's Green parties. It is easy to see why this is so. The Greens' early roots in alternativism and in local, single issue movement and direct action politics predisposed many Green activists to retain an abiding suspicion of conventional party politics. This approach placed a premium on spontaneity and participation, rather than the conformity to rigid discipline, hierarchy and leadership preferred in the conventional party model. The stark choice between these competing types of party organisation provided visible and contentious criteria against which the respective factions might, and often have, fought for the soul of many of these parties. This catalogue of dispositions amounts to a ready reckoner of radical intent - a test both of trust and of motives, and a gauge against which to measure and thence to dispute, the meaning of radical commitment. The disputes over organisational questions became a persistent source of friction within Europe's Green parties. As between those fundamentalists hostile to compromise, and pragmatists prepared to entertain procedural and other adjustments to party style and structure, in order to broaden the party's appeal - both with the electorate and with the governing establishments who determine access to the policy process.

An energetic debate has broken out in most Green parties about whether, or how far, they should compromise their radical credentials and conform to a conventional party model. We must illustrate the febrile quality of this debate and its centrality to Green politics before we can gauge its strategic significance, assess its political costs, and estimate its likely impact on the future of an effective Green politics in western Europe's post-industrial states. These schisms over an appropriate style of political organisation have provided the Greens with their most disruptive fault line. This dispute reflects the origins of these parties in social movements, where community based campaigns, assertive localism, the sovereignty of the grass roots, and fierce libertarian instincts held sway over mere organisational exigencies. There are countless instances of Green discord and even civil war over this critical issue. There is not a single Green party in western Europe over the past decade that has avoided conflict over these dilemmas in some measure. The European Green movement resounds with ambiguities. They have confronted even those activists otherwise persuaded of the pragmatic requirements for, or strategic benefits which accrue from, accommodation within conventional parliamentary procedures. All Green activists, wherever they stand on this particular issue, entertain genuine doubts about the traps set for the unwary, by the 'tainted' bourgeois system.⁶² Worse even than corrosive self doubt over this issue for the Greens have been its political consequences for party unity. There has been at times a spectacular and debilitating stand off between these 'reluctant' pragmatists and their uncompromising fundamentalist opponents. Most 'extremists' in this context are by no means revolutionaries manqué. They are, however, serious and principled activists for whom militancy, anti-partyism, anti-elitism

or some other demonstrable expression of radical commitment remains infinitely preferable to 'sordid' compromise or accommodation with the 'failed' political establishment. These are elements for whom 'normal' political behaviour is at best suspect for what it represents; or at its worst, is corrupting, in so far as it might seduce the purist or blunt the radical cutting edge.⁶³

Almost every European Green party has experienced, at some time or other - but with very different outcomes - challenges from those fundamentalists who see it as their task to be the keepers of the movement's political soul; against those, often in leadership positions, who would compromise these pure principles by engaging in conventional politics. This is a perennial problem which has, sooner or later, faced all forms of radical movement as they become involved in the established polity and take part in its political procedures and institutions. The 'old' left parties faced the same dilemmas of inclusivism a century previously, when they sought to shift the issue agenda and direction of the bourgeois state. The problems of 'outsiders' playing within 'the system' are always traumatic. Ideals come up against political exigencies. This conflict between the preferred and the possible invariably creates deep tensions within any radical movements committed to real and far reaching change. The Greens are no exception to these strictures. On the one side of this divide are those cadres, frequently but not exclusively at the leadership and parliamentary level, who are persuaded of the need to follow the conventional logic of party and electoral organisation, in order to exert policy leverage and maximise their political impact - not least because modern governance is a complex, rational-technocratic and hierarchical process. These realists are also aware of the constraints imposed on uncompromising radical politics by a predominantly staid and cautious public opinion which is either deeply conservative, or otherwise aligned to pre-existing patterns of political partisanship whose primary focus lies beyond the new ecological issue area. On the other side of this political equation are those Green activists who prefer to inhabit an uncompromising fundamentalist and utopian universe. Translated into the politics of Europe's national Green movements, this had to be seen as a tendency rather than a uniform or permanent condition. One which has attracted different groups in varying degrees of rigidity at different times, and over different issues. In some Green parties it has spilled over into virtual civil war, with electorally damaging consequences. Elsewhere, it has amounted to a relatively benign and resolvable issue. Again, the rich variety of detail of actual situations within European Green politics requires that we enter the usual caveat here. These are broad behavioural trends. Any map is only a two dimensional approximation of a three dimensional landscape. There are, then, in the 'real world', infinite gradations of response to this critical issue of political accommodation to the conventions and procedures of bourgeois politics.

The available evidence from the recent history of western European Green parties suggests that the more radically inclined ecologists, whether of a pure Green or red-green disposition, are less disposed to place any trust in conventional political procedures. As such, they cultivate, by and large, a principled detachment from what they maintain are the temptations and seductions of a system which fundamentalist ecologists hold responsible for exploiting mankind and nature alike; and, above all, for ravaging the biosphere on which life itself depends. Mere moderation is condemned as plain hypocrisy by those who practise it in the name of ecologism.⁶⁴ Withdrawal or aloofness from conventional political channels, taking refuge in some esoteric expression of eco-anarchism, and venting opposition to the party's pragmatists as much as against the bourgeois political world at large, is a far more typical response of eco-fundamentalists than the politics of violence. Where direct action,

protest politics or confrontations with the 'authorities' - for instance, over hunting or animal liberation - are the preferred tactics, these are expressions of anarchistic protest with staunchly libertarian overtones, rather than an exercise in revolutionary politics. To this extent, they are as much a statement of an alternative and principled form of 'political refusal', a denial of state authority, as they are an outright challenge to it. This oppositionalism in the Green's case usually takes the form of peaceful demonstrations, energetic campaigns on ecological themes, and other tepid forms of the politics of refusal. This radical legacy was imported by its practitioners into Green party politics, along with the liberationist credo of the post 1968 new left movements.

By the same token, those who inhabit the 'moderate' tendency in Green politics may be more inclined to cultivate the conventional tactics of political insiders who wish to use the leverage available from the normal routines of the political system. But they do so, for the most part, with ambivalence rather than enthusiasm. And do so, too, for what they continue to regard as principled and radical purposes.⁶⁵ At the individual cognitive level these pragmatists may be no less happy about making such 'necessary' compromise with their radical principles than those Greens of a more extremist disposition. They are merely more convinced of the political advantages for furthering the ecological cause, and of the utility of such measured moderation.⁶⁶ These utilities are defined here as those tactical advantages which are assumed to accrue from organising what would otherwise be disparate and thereby politically ineffectual movements, into a fully fledged party; of establishing an organisation capable of extending its electoral appeal beyond its immediate activists. And by this means, of exercising a degree of political influence. The procedures for exerting such influence are the routine ones - the occupation of political office, seeking a role in coalitional politics, lobbying government, and so on.⁶⁷ The rationale behind this strategy is to extend influence into a degree of political power. This does not mean, however, that Green pragmatists will necessarily gravitate towards an alliance or working arrangement with other broadly progressive forces, such as the socialist or social democratic parties; although this might be - and has been - one option available to them. For analytical purposes, these two axes are distinct rather than complementary. Any number of strategic choices may be, and have been, exercised in the universe of Green politics. Some red-green parties or factions therein have gravitated towards the conventional left, as an expression of ideological affinity; others will treat the established left as cautiously as any other 'bourgeois' political group. Others, again, continue to define 'left' in narrow terms drawn not from the labourist or Marxian tradition, but from its alternativist, new left and utopian or libertarian roots. Likewise, some pure Green parties or factions who share the pragmatist disposition, have been inclined to strike tactical bargains with the old left. Whereas others remain aloof from such 'coalitions' of interest for reasons that are a complex mix of ideological resistance and strategic calculation.

These critical strategic questions are by no means automatically a matter of contention between Greens of different ideological disposition within the same party. There are, for instance, some generally moderate Green parties which have struck, or attempted to strike, alliances with more radical Greens, by negotiating suboptimal compromises over a range of strategic, organisational and ideological issues - if only to sustain the movement as a serious force in national politics. This equivocation over political means is reflected in the behaviour of the pragmatic wing of the movement. Many of the ecological groups that have embraced full party status, and all of the compromises that go with it, have by no means precluded militant expressions of protest politics from their political armoury. They continue to see themselves as a radical and progressive force for change. Their intellectual roots, and the

reasons they entered politics in the first place, continue to influence their outlook and shape their political perceptions. If this was not the case, we would indeed be confronted with a remarkable case study of the 'end of ideology' thesis. Many of these groups began their political life, alongside more radical colleagues, as local, grassroots movements, organised to challenge official policies in, for instance, the controversial nuclear sector. Adaptation to political exigencies for tactical reasons has nowhere transformed even the most moderate Green party into a clone of the political establishment. Or at least not yet! At the same time, it does present a variable and complex picture of political responses. This unpredictability is one of the reasons why Green politics, in comparison to the politics of the reinvented and 'safe' left, is so fascinating.

The variable responses of the Greens to the important tactical and strategic choices which confront all political activists are apparent on the ground of European politics. They provide a useful organisational indicator or measure which helps to distinguish between different types of Green party; or indeed to illustrate in more detail the texture of those intra party factional conflicts which have afflicted many national parties, and in some instances have blunted their political effectiveness. These distinctions between and within Green parties over tactical and strategic issues alike, are important in as much as they reflect the variety of responses amongst current ecological opinion to the 'great game' of politics. This is an issue of critical importance in defining the 'meaning of Greening'. As such, this organisational issue suggests a key coordinate or reference point in the exercise in ideological mapping, which is central to the argument here. Some examples will put substantive flesh on the conceptual bones of this framework for analysis.

The long and debilitating animus amongst the French Greens over the organisational issue serves to illustrate its significance in the Green experience of party politics. Clear positional differences over the appropriate orientation to the French polity marked out the consensus politics of the moderate. French ecological party, Generation Ecologie (GE), from the more fundamentalist approach of Les Verts. The French Greens had their origins in the alternativist movements spawned by the 1968 'revolution'. The movement retained an abiding suspicion of the 5th Republic and its political structures. This was reflected in a staunchly decentralised organised model based on regional groups that retained considerable autonomy from the centre. At the same time, the degree of autonomism in the party's procedures has recently been under challenge from pragmatists, especially in the wake of its poor electoral showing after the brief surge in support at the 1989 European elections. Les Verts has certainly moved in a north-easterly direction within their quadrant, as between Tables One and Two. This momentum precisely illustrates the flexibility of this mapping exercise. It provides a useful template against which to chart the impact on the party's organisational orientation to this internal debate. It reflects, too, the rationale behind Les Verts eventual if grudging accommodation with their more moderate rivals in GE. To this extent, this mapping exercise offers useful insights into the changing electoral strategy which has altered the political orientation and prospects of both of France's Green parties, after they had assimilated the implications for the Green constituency of their continued antagonism, revealed by their poor showing in the 1992 French regional elections. Their respective performances at these polls, and the data on voter attitudes collected from electoral surveys, obliged Les Verts to soften their hostility to Generation Ecologie's attempts to find a place for ecologism within the established political order.

This shift of emphasis has had important implications for the strategies of both parties, but more especially for the militants in Les Verts. The available electoral data indicated not

only that both parties were in danger of nullifying the genuine if modest potential for building a Green constituency in contemporary France, by each retreating into their respective provincial strongholds. It also suggested that a stubborn refusal to cooperate with one another, or indeed with other progressive political elements on the left, had alienated many potential Green voters. This had significant consequences for the strategies of both parties, but particularly for the militants in Les Verts. The eventual assimilation of these facts, in the form of an electoral pact between the two parties, indicates the rational potential of even radical movements, regardless of their ambivalence about playing the electoral game. It also posts a warning to the student of political parties and movements, by indicating the extent to which apparently explicit terms such as 'moderate' and 'extreme', are temporally specific and potentially misleading. These are always conditional terms which must be employed cautiously and translated into a precise political cultural context, rather than given some fixed and universal meaning. More recently, the very same issue has contributed to the consolidation of the divisions within Les Verts, into two antagonistic (pragmatic and fundamentalist) factions. The organisational axis will, in these circumstances of flux, continue to shed useful light on the dynamics of French political ecology.

These caveats must also be applied to similar fault lines over organisational dispositions reflected in the internal squabbles and factional rifts which have visited and similarly debilitated many other Green parties. Admittedly, in a way that reflects different national opportunity structures or historical legacies. Parties as diverse in their ideological orientation, political salience and strategic orientation as West Germany's Die Grunen or the British Green Party, have exhibited deep rifts over this particular issue. A division over party tactics appears, albeit in a much less overt or electorally damaging way, to add a further complication to the unique division of Belgium's Green politics into two entirely separate parties, reflecting that country's linguistic divisions. The Belgian Greens in this instance proved incapable of surmounting the dominant cleavage of the national political culture and indeed accommodated to it. The dispositional differences here, between the anti partyist tendencies and the pragmatists complemented rather than compounded the communal differences between ECOLO, Belgium's more moderate French speaking Green party, and the initially more overtly radical, Flanders based AGALEV, with its origins in alternativism. AGALEV overcame initial misgivings amongst its rank and file and established an executive committee (Uitroerend Comité) of full-time employees wielding considerable authority within the party organisation. ECOLO, on the other hand, with its roots in more alternative soil, adopted a more decentralised party structure.⁶⁸ Neither party, however, has been militantly opposed to playing the conventional political game. Moreover, they share a progressive consociational outlook on the critical issue of recent times, that of Belgian statehood.⁶⁹ Both, too, are amenable to participating in the complex coalitional politics required by the country's bifurcated politics.⁷⁰ The Belgian case illustrates precisely the interaction of contextual and common variables in accounting for a given pattern of party political behaviour.

The unique combination of national history, political culture and what are, in the terms of the dispositional or organisational axis, in effect differences of strategic temperament, helps to account for the variations within European Green party politics. The organisational dimension is not, then, the independent variable which, on its own, explains the dynamics of ecology. The only claim made here is that this is one important element in a complex equation. The second, and equally significant, theme in this matrix is discussed below. Neither of these variables can be separated out from the political culture in which they find expression. The differences between 'extreme' or 'moderate' dispositions to political

organisation are situational and relative rather than universal and absolute. They acquire their precise meaning and significance only within a particular political context. And especially within the framework of the party system, with its own distinctive values, norms and rules of engagement. The particular expressions of what it is to be 'moderate' or 'extreme' relate in part to local political culture as much as they do to universal absolutes. Nevertheless, national systems do not exist in isolation. The increasing interdependence of modernised social systems has ironed out many of the local or anthropological particularities of politics. Political discourse and practice, certainly within the western European region, has become more uniform if not yet convergent. Modern politics operates according to similar rules, procedures and expectations that facilitate comparison along a set of broadly common principles and shared assumptions. The use of the dispositional variable as a frame of reference for comparing radical movement parties such as the Greens is by no means misplaced. The internal politics of these parties suggests that they can be located on a comparative transnational map. Regardless of their national particularities, Green parties have addressed during their relatively brief existence the same critical issue of their accommodation to a form of politics they originally emerged both to challenge in moral terms and to confront politically.

The differences of orientation to the political order within Die Grunen, the German Green party, illustrates the deep seated tension within the movement over the organisational issue. The fault line here has covered both the question of intra-party democracy as well as the party's general orientation to the Federal Republic's political system. From the party's inception in 1980 its congresses, workshops, local party meetings, and subsequently the meetings of its elected caucuses at city, Laender, and Bundestag level, agonized over an appropriate response to the 'bourgeois' polity. These battles are well documented.⁷¹ The very fact of them - and their negative impact on Die Grunen's electoral prospects - provides graphic evidence for the centrality of this theme in identifying the meaning of political ecologism per se. It precisely reflects the real dilemmas facing new, radical parties which operate within, whilst trying to change, established and conservative polities. This battle has been fought out in many other Green parties. But it was joined early and was particularly hard fought in the West German movement. Libertarian and anti-authoritarian elements, with their origins in citizen action and grass roots initiatives (*Burgerinitiativen*) contested from the offset what they regarded as Die Grunen's unduly hierarchical party system. The tensions between pragmatists and fundamentalists over this issue were palpable at numerous party congresses throughout the eighties. The issue was debated vigorously but without resolution. An uneasy stand off on the issue was followed by periodic outbreaks of internecine warfare. The conflict intensified after 1983 when Die Grunen won parliamentary representation in the Bundestag. The dilemma of a radical party playing 'normal politics' came to a head with this breakthrough into the very heart of the liberal democratic system.

The party's pragmatists responded by seeking changes that would maximise the Green impact on parliamentary politics. The anti-partyists, meanwhile, resisted what they saw as dangerously elitist attempts to accommodate the party to the professional political milieu. Compromises, or more accurately truces, between the 'fundis' and 'realos' were periodically declared on this issue. The deep division over an appropriate organisational structure, for what was after all a self-proclaimed radical party, dominated Die Grunen's internal affairs throughout its first decade.⁷² These tensions, however, even at this stage, when ideology drove the party and pragmatic considerations were secondary, were more a matter of degree than an unbridgeable chasm between two wholly irreconcilable factions. Had that been so it would, paradoxically, have been easier to manage if not to resolve. For in spite of their

growing differences there were also ideological affinities and emotional bonds between the pro-party and anti-party factions. These cross-cutting ties ensured that there were both pure Greens and red-greens on both sides of the dispositional and organisational question. At the same time this drew them into coalitions or networks over policy content and the ideological orientation issues that were by no means a straightforward schism between two discrete and entrenched factions. Nevertheless, the dispositional rift widened as the party became established in national politics.

In spite of shared interests and concerns that spanned Die Grunen's party/anti-partyist divide, an emergent Green parliamentary establishment, encouraged by steady electoral success throughout the eighties,⁷³ eventually brought this dispositional issue to a head. The outcome of the 1990 unification election, when the West German Greens failed to make it back into the Bundestag,⁷⁴ merely accentuated the party's internal ferment over the organisational issue. The 'realos' had gained a degree of ascendancy in the party during the preceding decade. They seized the initiative at the Neumunster party congress (1991), and proposed a programme of procedural changes. These included an end to the arrangement, whose roots were in the anti-party culture of alternativism, whereby parliamentary delegates were periodically rotated in order to retain contact with grass roots opinion. Neumunster went some way to consolidating the notion of a functioning party, by legitimising the role of the parliamentary cadre. The intention of these reforms was clear; to rescue the party from the prospect of electoral decline. Ludger Volmer, an executive spokesman elected at this congress, summarised this instinct for political survival when he observed that, "we hope to consolidate the party in order ... to have a realistic chance of making a comeback in parliament in four years".⁷⁵ Another moderate, Christine Weische, who secured election under the new reform arrangements as one of the two national spokespersons, also recommended an imaginative but above all a practical approach to the country's immense structural problems. She personified the 'realos' position on this issue when she reminded delegates that, "on the ground at local and state level, we need practical politics not theorising".⁷⁶ In similar vein, Udo Knapp saw the task ahead as that of supplanting the FDP as Germany's natural 'half party'.⁷⁷ This required a change in electoral perceptions, especially amongst those middle-class professionals who had become Germany's principal opinion leaders.⁷⁸ The decision of a joint party congress in Hanover in 1993 to amalgamate Die Grunen and Bundnis 90 (the Green Party of the former DDR) into a single party (Bundnis 90/Die Grunen) confirmed this tendency towards organisational realism. The 'new' Greens have used this solid foundation to re-establish their credentials with the electorate. As a consequence, they not only returned to the national parliament in the 1994 elections; they also moved ahead of the FDP as Germany's third largest party measured by electoral performance.

Similar factional disputes over this dispositional issue have appeared, with variable consequences for political effectiveness and electoral appeal, in many other European Green parties. In Britain, for instance, a rift between anti-party elements drawn from the eco-socialist or eco-utopian fringe, and 'electoralists' who opted for a more pragmatic approach which included cooperation with the Liberal Party, and a parliamentary rather than a local and activist strategy, has shadowed the Green Party from its earliest days.⁷⁹ The party began life as did so many other Green parties, as a loose amalgam of local cells, fiercely jealous of their democratic prerogatives. The constraints imposed by the opportunity costs for small parties of Britain's electoral system, with its particularly discriminatory electoral rules, encouraged the pragmatists to push for a more conventional party format. It was felt that this would be more likely to convince a notably conservative electorate to put their trust in the

party. As a consequence, increasingly divisive battles were fought over the party's organisational format throughout the 1980s.⁸⁰ This animus eventually came to a head in the aftermath of the party's failure at the 1992 general election to capitalise on a remarkably good showing (14.9 per cent and 2.25 million votes) in the 1989 European elections. The shock of defeat reopened wounds that have not fully healed. With the party falling in the polls and membership plummeting, pragmatists confronted what one of them called the 'fantasists' over the need to face the realities of a highly conservative political culture with its entrenched tradition of two party politics, and to reorganise the party and repackage the Green message. The reformists had already begun to raise these issues for debate before the 1992 débâcle. The scale of this defeat merely reinforced their sense of urgency. The electoralists evolved a strategy for making the party electable on a pure green platform. This required moving the party away from the self-indulgent eco-anarchism which appealed to many of the party's grass roots. The need for change became urgent once the established British parties began to address Green issues within their own policy agencies, in a deliberate attempt to marginalise the Greens.⁸¹ In the process the reformists faced resistance from the anti-party faction in a guerilla war which sapped the party's energies and brought its electoral momentum to a halt. The British Greens were overwhelmed by intense factionalism, and particularly by the determined opposition of the 'anti-party' faction. A small, inchoate but determined group of militants, libertarian anarchists and assorted mystics, formed a pure Green alliance. This 'faction' eventually turned the party back - 'rescued' it as they saw it - from a brief and unsavoury flirtation with realism, in the aftermath of a disappointing outcome to its campaign in the 1992 General Election. Something akin to civil war broke out in the party. Unlike the German case, where the very real prospect of electoral success in an entirely different opportunity structure galvanised the pragmatists, the British 'realos' for the most part quit the party.⁸² They redirected their energies instead towards the altogether more influential green lobby.

Disagreement over the dispositional issue has likewise visited most of Europe's Green parties. On balance, there were more cases in the early stages of party development where anti-partyism was the prevailing response, than those where Green parties remained comfortable with the conventions and procedures of hierarchical and centralised party politics. Yet, where these debates did occur, they were by no means divisive or debilitating to the same degree. Moreover, as we will see in the case studies that follow, even where Green parties were once deeply divided over these issues, a combination of electoral success and cumulative experience of governance at first or second hand gradually shifted the balance of power within most of these parties in favour of an accommodation with the rules of the political game. Some Green parties were more easily reconciled to these adjustments than others. In the Netherlands' movement pragmatic idealism, encouraged by a consociational political culture, did much to ameliorate the effect of the philosophical differences over both the party issue, and the second of the major issues which characterise Green party politics - the prospects of links with the broad left. The movement here had its origins in disparate alternativist, anti-nuclear and ecological protest.⁸³ On the face of it, the cachet enjoyed by radicalism should have opened a political space for the Greens. At the same time, an enlightened political culture combined with a positive government response to the ecological agenda, and the opportunity structure (particularly an electoral system) favourable to small-scale parties, disposed the Greens to eventually set aside fears of playing the political game. Circumstances, however, conspired against them. A combination of internal squabbling and competition from other progressive but better organised political parties on the left, reduced the Greens' scope

for seizing the available radical space in Dutch politics. This issue was, however, never entirely resolved. An active anti-partyist tendency and debilitating quarrels over party policy continued to plague both De Groenen and the more eco-socialist Groen Links parties, even after their nominal merger in 1989.

Anti-partyism has also characterised Luxembourg's Die Greng Party. The party was founded from an extensive network of local ecology and citizen action groups and electoral lists. Concern to ensure full intra party and grass roots democracy initially encouraged a strong anti-partyist tradition. The party's Statutes authorised the rotation of delegates in the party's structures. Nevertheless, the party did avoid those damaging factional rifts over this issue which were apparent elsewhere. The party's structures and especially its national Coordinating Council - the organisational hub of the party - reflect Luxembourg's conservative political culture and encourages conciliation amongst its factions and the building of consensus over policy, rather than the constant civil war that would almost certainly ensure electoral oblivion. The party, by confronting this potentially disruptive issue and by putting common sense before ideology, has managed to consolidate a small but useful niche on the Duchy's political landscape.

The two Swiss Green parties who initially pursued the ecology issue also reflected the impact of a conservative political culture on a potentially progressive movement. Both were coalitions of disparate political groups. The GPS/FPE was a federation of mainly middle class environmentalists more reconciled to normal politics and amenable to a conventional electoralist strategy. Whereas the more radical GRAS/GBS drew support from a rainbow of radical activists and alternativists committed to broadly 'fundit' issues.⁸⁴ GRAS's local and participatory ethos was hardly a severe handicap in the decentralised Swiss polity. The emphasis on referenda as a decisional device sat easily with both parties' active role in campaigning politics vis a vis the eco-threat, even if this democratic procedure has worked, in practice, rather less in favour of green causes than it might have done.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, pragmatism as much as principle has been evident in the development of the Swiss Greens. So much so that the two parties have by and large overcome their differences, both over procedures and political principles, and now operate as a single party (Grüne Partei Schweiz). This pattern was mirrored in the Austrian green movement. A pure United Green party (VGO) co-existed with an alternativist list (ALO). Differences over ideology did not, however, prevent them from cooperating in order to maximise their electoral pay off, and the access this gave to Austria's generous state funding for political parties. Both parties displayed a pragmatic orientation to the Austrian polity, without surrendering either their natural caution about such accommodations, or their commitment to grass roots politics.⁸⁶ The level of cooperation was such that they submerged their differences and in 1987 formed a united Green Alternative Party.

The Mediterranean Greens have displayed similar internal tensions over their approach to the established political order. The issue here was compounded by the special circumstances confronting post-materialist politics in what were, by and large, economically under-developed societies. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, the experience of democratic politics had been truncated by long years of fascist dictatorship. Even in Italy, an altogether more promising scenario for radicalism, politics had been dominated by strongly entrenched traditional cleavages; clericalism countered by an influential secularist Communist or Socialist tradition. New left and alternativist politics tended to address the issue agenda of the post fascist state, rather than the new politics per se. A motley of local eco-groups did negotiate the foundation of a national Green party. The Liste Verdi was convened primarily as a

decentralised umbrella organisation for national electoral purposes - a way of maximising the electoral prospects of local ecology groups in an electoral system which, even with its unreformed proportionality arrangements, penalised poorly organised parties. The Green Federation was not intended to be a party in any formal sense. Anti-party tendencies have remained endemic in the *Liste Verdi*. The recent corruption scandals have merely confirmed the movement's contempt for a failed system. At the same time, the imperative for political organisation induced by the new electoral rules and for inter-party cooperation in order to maximise electoral leverage has encouraged the Federation's pragmatists to position the party with the other democratic and progressive forces opposed to the new Italian right. Playing within the system is now seen not as a matter of political conviction, but rather as a necessary evil.⁸⁷ But with a peaceful political revolution under way and with so much to play for, the Italian Greens have become reconciled, by and large, to a pragmatic strategy.

Ecologism in Spain has echoed this experience. It grew from an amalgam of quite moderate nature conservationists and radical anti-nuclear, but non-socialist, pure ecology groups. Although these elements did eventually coalesce into a national party organisation (*Los Verdes*) in 1984, they did so out of necessity rather than conviction; and primarily in order to meet the legal requirement of being registered as a party proper under Spanish electoral law. This tactical decision did not resolve the deep residual differences, either over policy or the party's disposition to the political system *per se*. Alternative ecological lists resisted even this limited coherence, in defence of local autonomy. A unification congress was held in 1993, with the Euro-elections in prospect - but without resolving this perplexing dilemma. *Los Verdes* remains, then, a disparate organisation and Green politics enjoys its greatest salience in a succession of localized, single issue campaigns. In Greece and Portugal, too, Green party politics are minimalist, localised and divided between purists and more radical groups. In Portugal the Greens emerged under the tutelage of conventional parties who played a role in confronting the Salazar dictatorship. The pure ecologists have invested more energy in green pressure groups (*Amiga de Terra* and the *Liga Parca Posteaço de Natureza*) than in conventional party politics, whereas the progressive faction of *Os Verdes* has been subsumed under what is a thinly veiled Communist Party front organisation. Green party development in Greece is an altogether more discrete affair, but one which is no more effective. Not because of any continuing tensions between various factions over the party's status - which were largely submerged in order to maximise its electoral prospects in altogether unpropitious circumstances for a post materialist party - but precisely because of an electoral milieu that remains largely unreceptive to its message, compounded by political inexperience and a certain organisational crassness.

Ireland's Greens were organised as a national party from the outset. This arrangement brought together a spectrum of utopians, peace movement activists (for instance, CND), ecologists in *Earth Watch*, and the lobbyists of the *Friends of the Earth*. A central committee coordinated a network of local and for the most part urban-based branches. In spite of adopting a national programme the party remained insular, preferring to build on its regional and community base rather than adopt a national strategy working for a realignment of the nascent radical forces in Irish politics.⁸⁸ The party's constitution emphasises autonomy from the central organisation and puts local above national party prerogatives. The change of name in 1983 to 'Green Alliance', in order to better reflect this preference for localism, speaks for itself here. This approach is, however, quite compatible with electoralism, under a plurality electoral system as the Greens' recent commendable showing in the 1994 Euro-elections indicates.⁸⁹ The Irish Greens were always more concerned with practical politics in an

indifferent yet fluid political milieu. And while they have engaged the same arguments as other Green parties about appropriate procedures for a radical party, they have resolved them for the most part in a practical rather than a utopian direction.

Green parties in Scandinavia were likewise reluctant at the outset to embrace the procedures of conventional party politics. There is only a nascent Green party in Norway with a modest local presence but no national profile as such. In Denmark, a wrangle between a local Green party formed in Jutland (the Danemarks Miljøpartiet) and a national movement (De Gronne) allowed other radical parties (The Socialist People's Party and the Left Socialists) to occupy the Greens' natural electoral territory.⁹⁰ De Gronne remained dominated by anti-partyists and adopted a highly devolved decision making system, as well as displaying an extreme libertarian disposition. This combination of factors has contributed to the paradox of Danish ecologism - the marginalisation of Green politics⁹¹ in a country whose population is as susceptible to the issues raised by the environment debate as any in Europe.⁹² Green parties have fared rather better in both Finland and Sweden. In both countries, local roots in both nature conservancy and the more radical anti-nuclear causes initially reinforced the strong anti-party tendency in the Finnish Vihrea Litto (Green Association) and the Swedish Miljøpartiet de grøna.⁹³ In Finland, an electoral system favourable to loosely organised parties served to delay the Association's emergence (in 1987), compared with the earlier establishment of Green parties elsewhere in Europe. The Finnish Greens' reluctance to become involved in national politics was emphasised in 1989 by their parliamentary representatives' refusal to play any constructive part in resolving the country's deep political impasse. The Green Association has learned to reconcile these doubts about its role in 'normal' politics. Indeed, its parliamentary delegation has been sufficiently disciplined to support the latest coalition government, and to endorse the participation of one of its number in the cabinet. Sweden's Greens, while displaying at the outset a similar strong anti-partyism and a negative disposition towards the political order, did cash in its leverage in the Riksdag, to secure important concessions on nuclear policy from the minority coalition government led by the Social Democrats. In both of these Scandinavian cases there was a discernible tension between the party's local roots, preferences for local control over party hierarchies, and an acknowledgement that political influence requires both compromises and a degree of party discipline. The recognition by some of the pragmatists in these parties' national organisations of the advantages that accrue from electoral leverage has also moved these parties closer to the idea of party organisation, albeit in pursuit of radical post-materialist values.⁹⁴

The contentious and protracted debate within all of these Green parties, over the meaning of party status, was and remains, a critical axis of debate, disagreement and division. The origins of these parties as radical political outsiders, and the intellectual and emotional baggage that activists brought with them into these new parties, meant that it could hardly have been otherwise. The 'map' of party dispositions on this issue (Table One), and the degree of change over time as they assimilated the demands of parliamentary politics (Table Two), illustrates how far from a notional 'break even' point on this axis these Green parties - or indeed, factions of national parties - are. Some Green parties have fared better than others in this regard. While not entirely of one mind, nor conformist vis à vis the political establishment, they opted from the outset for a more pragmatic if cautious orientation to their political environment. The precise political and cultural milieu in which they found themselves, their local and national opportunity structures, the degree of political and particularly electoral success, were the key determinants of their disposition on this matter.⁹⁵ The detailed evidence across the Green party universe also points to a trend in these parties,

rather than any inexorable political law, towards a gradual accommodation to a realist rather than a fundamentalist position on this critical issue. Although this is entirely a matter of degree, and reflects those unique circumstances which shape the destiny of every particular member of any party family. The calculation of organisational shift here is, of course, a qualitative rather than a quantitative one. It involves interpretation as much as precise measurement. It is, nevertheless, an evaluation based on observable issues and themes which do lend themselves to measurable comparisons, rather than hunches or mere guesswork. Charting the development of Green party politics goes beyond intuitive leaps. The task of mapping the evolving response of these parties to their political environments' calls on the evidence from a number of recurrent issues which have prominently figured in the ongoing intra party debates over the place of the Greens in contemporary politics. For instance, the degree of centralisation or hierarchy in the party structure; the nature and extent of the parliamentary accountability of Green MPs; the relationship between party organisers and professionals, and the grassroots; or between the centre and local parties over the virtues of parliamentary politics, as opposed to direct action through various forms of community or local politics. The mapping exercise on this range of related issues is notional but by no means arbitrary. A qualitative assessment of each of these issues, in sequence, suggests the likely location of a particular Green party or faction along this horizontal axis. The closer a party or group is to either side of the continuum, the more militant it is assumed to be, as measured by its response to these issues. Moreover, if these responses are viewed sequentially over time, we are better able to chart these parties' trajectories of development, and thereby to gain some insight into the dynamics of political change at various levels - within individual parties, for a genre of related members of a party family, and even for the state of European party politics per se. The same principles of measurement operate in the mapping exercise along the vertical or left-pure ecology axis.

(b) Cucumbers and watermelons: the pure Green-socialist axis

The second critical issue that has exercised Europe's Green parties and shaped their response to the political system concerns their ideological bearings, and in particular the movement's response to adjacent parties on Europe's left-right spectrum. The caveats discussed above also apply to this major division between and within Europe's Green parties. The vertical axis on the map of political orientations demarcates the Green movement into ideological propensities, rooted in the intellectual history of ecologism. At both the individual or cognitive, and at the collective or factional levels, these differences reflect a response or reaction to the culture of industrialism - the capitalist/modernisation syndrome - which has defined much of Europe's culture, economy, sociology and politics over the past two centuries. This particular axis not only maps how individuals or groups respond to these important ideological issues. It also implies a more precise behavioural response, which has a bearing on political action. This dimension, too, is 'mappable'. It charts the principal reference points in the ideological morphology of political ecology. These ideological coordinates have implications for social action, as well as for framing a subjective political identity at the level of individual cognition. Competing ideological preferences have encouraged internecine quarrels over strategy and the appropriate orientation of these radical parties to the national political milieu - a debate that has occupied Green parties everywhere over the past decade or so. What we are essentially concerned with here is political strategy rather than ideological hubris per se; the self perceived relationship of Green parties to the

political firmament in which they find themselves. The movement's responses to pre-existing political forces - from conservatism in its various guises, through to the complex spectrum of leftist politics, including mainstream social democracy and Marxism, to anarchism - also provides important clues to the meaning of Green politics, as we will see in more detail in the national profiles in Part Two. The main concern here is with the Greens' positioning vis a vis the conventional left - or what we might call the red-green issue. This is less straightforward than it might seem, either for the Greens or those who try to map their politics. The left is by no means a cohesive force in European politics. It is as broad a political church as it has ever been. Socialists have certainly addressed ecologism in recent years. The combination of a palpable environment crisis, a rising awareness of ecology in the public at large, and an emergent Green electorate in most European democracies, has focused the left's attention on this issue. This has further complicated the radical prospectus. There is no singular or coherent leftist outlook on the ecology issue, but instead a myriad of positions. 'Eco-socialism' is a generic term which covers a wide ideological spectrum from post-Keynesian social democracy to the further reaches of militant eco-anarchism or bioregionalism.⁹⁶ The diffuseness of the eco-left is an important consideration when trying to chart the position of Green parties or factions along this particular ideological coordinate. All manner of alliances are possible, both in the mind and on the ground. Even the pure Greens, who perceive ecologism as a unique commitment to nature, and who reject the 'artificial' political divisions of left and right as irrelevancies and distortions of the *Gaia* imposed by a materialistic industrial culture, sometimes echo the polemics of the left. They do so inasmuch as they share the autonomist and iconoclastic forms of eco-socialism otherwise located at some distance on the conventional ideological spectrum from their own preference for pure ecologism.

The hard strategic choices facing Europe's Green parties are bound to engage them with other political forces. Indeed, the issue of ideological positioning is a direct outcome of the Green movement's attempt to find its strategic bearings in an inclement political climate. The 'pure' Greens on one side regard ecologism as a unique political paradigm, above class politics, and for that matter remote from any other narrow social or exclusive ideological base. The pure Green tendency covers a wide spectrum of ideas about the threats posed by mankind's ill judged stewardship over nature, as well as exhibiting markedly different political temperaments about how best to organise a Green response to them. It includes activists of both a realist and fundamentalist disposition. In other words, pure Greens harbour an unrelenting hostility to the procedures and routines of liberal democratic politics. The realists, on the other hand, acknowledge the need to make bargains - to connect with potential allies within the system, in order to exert some influence over policy outputs. On the other side of the pure green-red green spectrum are those ecological activists who have more in common with socialist ideas and leftist agendas. Again, these red-greens are far from being a coherent faction. They cover the entire gamut of the leftist persuasion; from green social democrats to militant eco-socialists and anarchists. And these ideological divisions are further complicated by the dispositional divisions discussed above - that is, between pink 'realists' who are prepared to reach accommodations with the moderate left, and a fundamentalist or dark red tendency who prefer direct action and militant tactics. These 'fundis' resist strategic alliances with the mainstream left. At the same time their anti-party disposition draws them emotionally, if not always ideologically, towards the far left, with whom they share the same distaste for the routines and entrapments of the conventional political game.

In essence, some Green activists, whether of a pure or red-green persuasion, are altogether more comfortable with, and even prepared to engage, the 'old' politics than others.

This ideological and temperamental flux has had two broad consequences for Europe's Green parties, as we will see in the profiles of the various national parties in Part Two. In some Green parties a strong anti-party tendency has combined with fundamentalism, of either a pure or red-green ideological temperament, to make for a chaotic politics. Elsewhere, the particular blend of ideological and organisational dispositions, combined with the particularities of national political culture and the exigencies of the political opportunity structures, has caused much less damage to Green electoral prospects. In some national situations, the precise blend of ideological temperament and organisational disposition has been debilitating. Whereas in others it has been, if not conducive to overt success, at least more politically benign. The issue of ideological positioning has been as critical for defining an effective Green strategy as that of party organisation. In contemporary circumstances the most likely source of Green party influence over policy agendas will come from their linkages with the mainstream parties. They can expect, at best, modest influence rather than any real power. And the Greens' best opportunity here lies with the left for all sorts of reasons. The libertarian right has flirted with ecology, but this issue means little more to them than a notional genuflection to the fickle logic of the market. The abiding notion of a 'global commons' shared by both pure and 'red' Greens, reflects more surely the collectivist thread that runs through all forms of socialist thought. If the Green parties do resolve the radical dilemmas that have preoccupied them, and seek to build alliances to further the cause of ecologism, the left beckons them more assuredly than the right. The Greens' libertarian and new left roots do predispose them to look left rather than right for political allies. Moreover, there are some grounds for modest optimism here. Europe's left is likely to be more receptive to such overtures, faced as most socialist parties are with deepseated dilemmas of their own about the direction of progressive politics in a post Communist, free-market era. There are the makings here of a common issue agenda between these two progressive movements. The left, too, has begun to address the trade-off between environmental damage and human health. The onset of structural unemployment has also opened up a debate about alternative economic strategies. And the Left too remains instinctively wary about nuclear energy in all of its applications.

Accommodation here may be politically expedient, but is nevertheless fraught with difficulties. Cooperation and compromise do not come easily to radical activists engaged, as they see it, in virtuous and novel projects for 'real' change. Radicals are instinctively adversarial. Controversy, however, is often the best way to test the strengths of, and explore the potential for, new political bargains. The Greens do still prefer to emphasise their unique prospectus and remain endemically suspicious of a left which embraced industrialism and, for the most part, still does. Misgivings about the left's motives also play their part. The left everywhere in Europe over recent decades has had to deal with defeat, and even to confront the prospect of political decline. The response here has been some of the most creative political thinking of the century, amounting to a virtual reinvention of the left. However, not every prospective ally has been convinced by this spectacle of renewal. The development of new left agendas that embrace ecologism as part of the project of political renaissance seems to many Greens to be an opportunistic as much as a serious conversion to the cause. Even if this shift is taken at face value, it remains suspect because it is only a partial or selective embrace. The prospects for radical networking are further complicated by the possible ideological permutations. Left wing politics is no more viscous than political ecologism; it is just as fluid and unpredictable. All sorts of alliances are possible here - between, for instance, pure green realists and social democrats, which many Green fundamentalists would

reject out of hand as a contract with the devil. Or between red-greens of both moderate and even fundamentalist persuasions over single issue campaigns; for instance, to rethink energy or roads policy, or to address national and regional defence priorities in the aftermath of the Cold War. There have indeed been other curious juxtapositions between ecologism and mainstream politics. One of the most unlikely combinations was the synthesis of an extremist orientation with a pure green preference, which led to the emergence of a few right wing Green parties or factions. These hybrids had an affinity with an established European tradition of political authoritarianism. Herbert Gruhl, a disenchanted German Christian Democrat, who had initially flirted with Die Grunen in its formative period, before it embraced an unmistakeable radical ethos, quit in order to found the German Ecological Democratic Party (ODP), with right-wing credentials close to those of its equally reactionary predecessor, the German Action Future (GAZ) also launched by Gruhl in 1978. The Austrian ALO and the Swiss GPS both exhibited a similar right of centre ethos in their early days.⁹⁷

These are interesting but typical examples of political ecologism in action. They do illustrate, however, that concern for 'mother earth' is by no means confined to one side of the political spectrum.⁹⁸ On the contrary, it has evoked an intensely emotional and philosophical appeal, capable of spanning the ideological spectrum. While 'nature' conservation appeals as readily to the romantic conservative right as it does to the utopian ecocentric left, ecologism sits more easily with progressive than with reactionary ideas. The empirical evidence speaks for itself on this. Although this fact, in itself, by no means resolves the practical dilemma confronting radical Green parties; of whether or not to pursue an independent political line, or instead to develop links with the non-eco left. This dilemma has been a persistent and prominent theme in Green party politics. It suggests another comparative axis to set alongside the dispositional one. A line of inquiry that encompasses elements of both discourse and action, and along which we might expect to collect and collate data on Green political orientations. This, in turn, should help to further elucidate the 'meaning' of political ecology - and especially to demarcate more clearly the 'watermelon' or red-green tendency from the 'cucumber' or pure Green variant of ecologism. This is not to suggest a simplistic calculus of ideological preferences. The same reservations expressed above also apply here. It offers a useful line of inquiry, and one which must be treated with caution if its methodological pitfalls are to be avoided.

The selection of appropriate data to illustrate this particular axis is, nevertheless, relatively straightforward. As committed activists with a sense of political mission, Europe's Greens have been voluble in support of their agendas. The material which reveals where they stand on their key issue areas is drawn from policy or programmatic statements, election manifestos, interviews, speeches by Green members of parliament and councillors, as well as the material produced at party congress and in party workshops. A cursory analysis of this material indicates that Europe's Green parties have been exercised as much by this ideological axis as they have been by the organisational coordinate - and frequently to the point of immobilism and to the detriment of their electoral prospects. The political liabilities for Green parties of a civil war over the movement's ideological orientations compounds the costs of divisions over the party status issue. In some cases, these two fault lines have been complementary and mutually reinforcing. In others, they cut across one another. In the debate over the political identity of Germany's Die Grunen, for example, the 'realo' faction included pure Greens, as well as those radicals who were amenable to forging closer links with the SPD at the local and national levels, and for ideological as much as for electoral reasons. In the British case, the pragmatist or electoralist wing of the Green Party was led by

individuals such as Porritt and Parkin who were pure Green in orientation, but who saw a political alliance with either the Liberal Party or with sympathetic Labour Party members as the only feasible route to a radical realignment of British politics.

The degree of animus between those 'watermelon' Greens disposed to an eco-socialist strategy, and the purist or cucumber tendency, is dictated by several factors. Amongst the most significant are the movements' origins. Whether, for instance, a particular national movement has its roots in the libertarian or new left. Or in those alternative, anti-nuclear and citizen action movements with close ideological affinities to radical leftist politics. This was the case in a number of European Green parties, where a leftist orientation was incorporated into the party's identity from the start. Not all of these parties embraced a red-green ethos with the same degree of alacrity. Indeed, in almost every case, deep tensions and a persistent ambivalence about 'the left', and its complicity with industrialism, has ensured a lively discourse on this issue. Nevertheless, those Green parties which do harbour a leftist inclination in whatever degree have invariably been influenced here by their particular origins. Other factors, too, have helped to shape the Greens' response to the party political universe. National political culture clearly plays a part here. An important influence on how Green parties orientate themselves to the existing political scene, are cultural arrangements and the procedures which stem from them - a regime's stability quotient; the rules of the electoral game; party funding arrangements; broadcasting regulations and so on. The impact of 'mere' regulations and procedures on the fortunes of new parties should not be underestimated for they frame political opportunities. No-one can say with any degree of certainty whether the British Greens, for instance, would alter their uncompromising approach to the conventions of liberal democracy if they stood the same chance of winning a share of political influence that the German electoral system has accorded Die Grünen. It is, however, a reasonable assumption that the prospect of political success does harbour the potential to alter political behaviour. There are no hard and fast rules here. Even those Green parties with indisputably radical and leftist credentials are just as likely to regard an electoral alliance or coalition with left-wing parties as bad politics. And, on the other hand, to have their own overtures for some kind of cohabitation spurned by their prospective allies on the left - who are, after all, competing for the same progressive constituency. The prospect in Germany before the 1994 national elections, of an SPD-Green cohabitation in the event of a 'hung' Bundestag, is a good case in point. The Greens saw this as their best hope of the breakthrough the 'realos' had worked for. But they were under no illusions that this held as many dangers for them as it did opportunities. Schröder's SPD, on the other hand, avoided coalitional talks with a party it saw as an unreliable and even a politically dangerous ally. Neither side of this prospective political coalition openly welcomed the prospect. Yet both the SPD and the Greens were sufficiently pragmatic to see it as a possible option should political circumstances require it.

The refusal of Waechter's Green's in France to respond to Rocard's overtures⁹⁹ for a realignment of the left likewise illustrates the abiding tension between the old left and the new radical politics. In this case, the issue was resolved differently because Les Verts was a party of the 'cucumber' not the 'watermelon' variety. Rocard's gambit merely confirmed the Green purists' belief that the politics of industrialism was in terminal decline. This assumption was sustained by the collapse of the Socialist vote during the latter years of the 1980s. Why compromise then when the future promises so much?¹⁰⁰ Waechter remained insistent that Les Verts should not be the "Green salad between pink and red tomatoes".¹⁰¹ The German case illustrates that even Green parties with extensive ideological roots and personal links with the new left prefer at most to consider an affair of convenience rather than a complete marriage

with the parties of the established left. Cooperation was confined to local politics. The resultant pacts and cooperation agreements put together in several Laender reflect Green pragmatism rather than unalloyed political realignment. This tentative rapprochement between the left and the Greens in Germany and, after Waechter's passing, in France too, has been echoed in other European polities, especially where native Green movements drew on a radical leftist tradition. This does not mean that those Green parties which displayed a distinct leftist orientation were unequivocally socialist. Europe's Green parties are all complex coalitions. Most of them, given the movement's emphasis on participation, libertarianism and anti-elitism, contain a lively ferment of radical ideas. Many of these parties, too, have experienced a situation akin to ideological civil war. Table One charts where Green parties or their principal factions initially stood in their formative years on the key issues here. There are, of course, temporal limits to any such mapping exercise. A map of the ideological territory drawn up some years later (Table Two), or indeed any future projection, shows a rather different configuration. Nevertheless, the value of the two variables chosen for measurement is precisely their durability over time in the new politics of ecologism. When these two themes cease to provide the crucial grid references of the political content of ecologism, the Green parties will either be defunct, or they will indeed inhabit an entirely different political landscape - a situation that is unlikely for the foreseeable future.

The flux of ideological tendencies illustrated by the second coordinate reflects, then, the intense debates within the Green movement over its appropriate response to 'the left'. This theme embraces more than the strategic question of political cohabitation. It covers, too, complementary ideological and policy issues. Some of these issues will be touched on in the national party profiles that follow in Part Two. We raise for consideration here some of the more notable examples where ideological conflict between these 'cucumber' and 'watermelon' tendencies has shaped the content of Green politics and influenced each movement's strategic orientations within its national political environment. The German case is again significant; in part because the German Greens have been by far Europe's most politically successful example of political ecologism. This degree of electoral success launched Die Grunen, not only into a protracted debate about its disposition towards the political system per se; it has also encouraged a parallel debate on the prospects for a German political realignment. In a polity where no government is likely under present arrangements to govern without a formal coalitional arrangement, the issue of the likely role of an electorally successful Green party in any future government coalition led by the SPD was bound to figure in the party's deliberations. This sparked a lively debate between purists and leftists, and between the left-pragmatists and the party's more libertarian left membership. Die Grunen was a rainbow coalition from the outset. Tension between pure Greens and assorted leftists was further complicated by the flux of leftist opinion within its ranks - from neo-Marxists and Leninists at one extreme, to alternativists and autonomists on the other. These factions saw the Green party as the best vehicle for advancing their particular radical prospectuses. Electoral success, especially at the local level where the Laender Greens (most notably in Berlin, Hamburg, North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse and Bremen) have worked in government with the SPD, has only sharpened this debate over an appropriate radical strategy. There was no question of even the Green leftists endorsing the reformist SPD. However, the pragmatists saw a political advantage in consolidating a working relationship with the 'old' left. This strategic issue became the focus of a protracted debate that enveloped Die Grunen from the mid 1980s. The battle lines here were no more clearly drawn than those over the organisational issue. These intra party divisions were not a straightforward ideological cleavage between pure

ecologists and socialists. The 'realo' wing attracted both purists and leftists, who shared at least a pragmatic commitment to consolidating the Greens on the electoral landscape. They were opposed by fundis of both a far left and pure Green outlook, who were entirely hostile to normal politics. The 'fundi' view on coalitional politics was clearly expressed by Jutta Dittfurth, who argued that, "Reformism, in its Green-Social democratic form, starts out from the assumption that there will be no radical break in our society. The time for revolution is past so the illogical conclusion is drawn that reform is the only option. This is pretty sloppy political thinking. For any serious analysis must take into account the fact that every variant of reformism has proven itself historically bankrupt".¹⁰² The pragmatists on the other side of the issue were equally convinced that ecologism needed to build bridges to non-conservative politics. They drew historical parallels from the heavy price inflicted on democracy in Germany by the insularity of the Weimar left. Otto Schily warned in precisely these terms that "some sections of the Greens underestimate the dangers of a shift to the right, as is clear from their formula of a conservative foreign and security policy. We must take into consideration what effect our rejection of a realistic left coalition perspective would have on the right and how this would clear the terrain for rightist policies".¹⁰³

These statements neatly encapsulate what was at stake in this argument over political alignments. While it has about it a peculiar German ring it has, too, more general application. For similar strategic considerations surfaced in the strategic debate over this issue of political alignments in other Green parties. They were apparent, for instance, in France, in the rift between Generation Ecologie and the purist Greens of Les Verts. They resurfaced more recently in the challenge and overthrow of Antoine Waechter in Les Verts' 'palace coup' in 1993.¹⁰⁴ Similar tensions between pure Green and eco-socialist tendencies, and over prospective accommodations with conventional leftist forces on the national political landscape, have afflicted many other European Green parties. Again, as with the dispositional issue, the intensity of this conflict and especially its negative electoral consequences depends on local circumstances. In Ireland, national politics is still dominated, despite recent signs of change, by clerical and nationalist issues left over from the civil war in the 1920s. The Greens have found a marginal post materialist constituency, but new politics in Eire such as it is has largely gravitated around the Labour party and other conventional party groupings. The Irish Greens concentrated on building local bases on specific issues. A brief challenge to this strategy by a red-green faction in 1986 failed either to undermine the pure Green ascendancy in the Green Alliance, or to refocus the party's policy away from ecological issues and towards a class based politics. The party did embrace protest politics as a matter of course. But there was no sense here of a party in the grip of a fundamental ideological ferment, and a degree of electoral success in recent years has seen the party engage in an intense but as yet non divisive debate over its role in the prospective realignment of Irish politics.¹⁰⁵

Even in those movements where tension does exist between purists and eco-socialists - over electoral or political strategy, or over policy and programmatic issues - the outcomes are variable rather than predictable. In Belgium, the differences between AGALEV's more leftist and alternativist approach and the pure ecologism of ECOLO, has not prevented the two parties from cooperating with one another in parliament, where their representatives sponsor joint initiatives and swear the parliamentary oath in one another's languages as a gesture of inter communal conciliation in that fractured polity. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, factional splits between activists of both a pure Green and red-green propensity caused the national movement to divide into two competing entities. This ideological split was

consolidated into two separate parties - a Groen Links, amenable to socialist ideas; and the 'cucumber' party, De Groenen. The Greens' poor electoral record suggests a measure of their failure to impact on a polity whose opportunity structures favour both new and small parties. Luxembourg's Greens, on the other hand, have concentrated on pure-Green issues (deforestation, water pollution, noise and so on) As such, they have managed to avoid such ideological tensions and to steer clear of the debilitating factionalism that wracked other parties.

The Austrian Greens did divide at the outset along the ideological axis into two parties. The VGO campaigned on a 'cucumber' programme, whereas the ALO adopted a more militant and class based politics. However, neither these differences nor their formal separation prevented them from working together towards agreed goals. Subsequently, tensions arose over their respective red-green and purist preferences. These gained added salience and threatened to diminish the apparently excellent prospects for ecologism in the national issue agenda, especially as EU membership and related issues of traffic congestion, air pollution and other environmental damage from infrastructure development, struck chords with a conservative but otherwise conservation-minded electorate. Both sides of this ideological discourse over the meaning of Greening have apparently assimilated these dangers and opportunities, and now work together within the new unified Green Alternative Party.

Similar tensions are apparent in Mediterranean Green politics. In Italy, a nascent Green movement was weakened in the early days by an absence of red-green and pure green consensus. The recent political crisis has injected a degree of purpose into Green party politics which has brought the Greens into the anti-right coalition, but as much from necessity as conviction. This alliance with the left has brought some limited electoral success, notably the mayoralty of Rome and the guarantee of a modest haul of parliamentary seats under the umbrella of the 'Olive Tree' coalition that recently formed a progressive government. Green pragmatists have begun to draw their own conclusions from these developments, about the best way to secure a measure of influence over national policy outcomes. Green parties elsewhere in the Mediterranean region are either disparate or too new to impact much on national politics. The intense factionalism of Spain's Los Verdes and between it and other local groups (the Catalanian Alte Verde list for example and the conservative VERDE Group) has revolved primarily around personality and regional differences rather than ideological schisms. Portugal's Os Verdes has manifested a clear socialist orientation which reflects the party's dependence on the Communist Party and its successor. However, Os Verdes' role in the United Democratic Coalition (CDU) said more about the agenda of the Communist Party than it did about the prospects for an independent Green party politics. In the Greek case, multiple fractionalism and personality conflicts, rather than ideological factionalism per se, have plagued a Green movement which has found great difficulty in orientating itself to a politics where economic growth rather than post materialism is the principal objective of the mainstream parties. The disparate Green movement has resorted to an extra parliamentary strategy. The Greens' aversion to developing links with the political mainstream was clearly illustrated by the refusal of the Alternative Ecological List to prop up Papandreou's Socialist coalition when it lost its parliamentary majority in 1989. The potential for ideological disputes between the purists and more radical elements have so far been contained. Should ecologism here become as politically viable as it has elsewhere in Europe, the sheer diffuseness of the movement, faced with the prospect of developing a national strategy, could well encourage disputes between the pure Greens and more radical elements that have been familiar elsewhere.

The situation in Scandinavia remains a mixed one on this particular theme. In Denmark the Greens vacated political space to other more overtly leftist parties vis a vis the ecological and adjacent issues. The most protracted debate within the Danish Green movement has been over policy issues rather than political strategy. These have embraced both pure Green conservationism and more radical agendas, and indicate the movement's affinities with new left and libertarian issues (direct democracy, anti-bureaucracy and so on). Likewise in Finland, where a disparate amalgam of regional groups covering the full red-green spectrum of concerns has engaged in wrangling over leftist or social issues - social equality and child care provision for instance. The pure greens, meanwhile, continue to favour conservationist issues. This positioning has not, however, split asunder the Green movement. A strong anti-partyist tendency united both factions, and the reluctance to enforce a definitive party line enables the Green party to function. Vihrea Litto's response to the national crisis of 1989, when it remained aloof from the business of coalition making, indicated its ambivalence about the political establishment. More recently, however, the party has grasped the nettle of practical politics and joined the latest coalition government. It has been moved to do so by recognising that only by working with other parties, can it hope to influence the national policy agenda. Ambivalence was apparent, too, in the Swedish case. Some of Miljöpartiet de grönas most prominent figures - including its pragmatic leader Per Gahrton - tried in the late 1980s to persuade the party to adopt an unequivocal red-green stance. They did so with a view to securing support amongst the progressive and post-materialist constituency that was apparent in this civilised and highly developed democracy. Although the issue was addressed at the Karlskrona Congress in 1988, it was by no means resolved. The Swedish Greens remain divided without being politically debilitated by this issue, and the party has so far avoided changing direction from a 'cucumber' to a 'watermelon' party.

(5) From Green politics to the greening of politics?

This discussion of the dynamics of Green politics enables us to mark out its distinctive territory and to see more clearly where it fits on the map of contemporary radicalism. The outcome of these dilemmas is the core of Green political dynamics, and provide it, for good or ill, with its principal momentum. The issues raised by these Green dilemmas are symptomatic, too, of the intrinsic challenges and opportunities that confront the 'new politics' per se, as changes in public values impact on social change and alter the rules of political engagement. A mood of change is discernible in the European body politic, even if it is so far an inchoate one. The old politics is far from obsolete, yet there remain, too, prospects for a new radicalism, if the political groups and movements that compose it make a shrewd calculus of their options and steer their course by careful strategic rather than narrow ideological lights. The route taken by the German Greens rather than that chosen by their British counterparts represents the most fruitful option. We might well recall here Blake's precept that "great things" indeed may "be done when men and mountains meet" but that this feat "is not done by jostling in the street". The point is, that the conditions conducive to radical change are more likely to be brought about by properly conceived and carefully managed strategies, than they are by misguided militancy or mere wishful thinking. Of course, the future remains an open prospect. Whether the new politics movement, of which the Greens are the most consistent expression, can capitalise on their cultural opportunities and secure a sufficient and durable electoral support to make them the political force to be reckoned across the continent that they have become in Germany remains to be seen. They are on the

verge of a breakthrough of sorts in several countries. But if they are to consolidate their position and defy the predictions of those who see in them merely a 'flash' or transient phenomenon in inherently fluid societies, they must confront and resolve the critical dilemmas discussed in this chapter. The prospect for a new politics is one of the fascinating questions for students of European politics as the new century approaches. The picture so far is a mixed one. And Europe's Green parties do represent the acid test here of the new politics, for some quite obvious reasons. The Greens, in one sense, are the least ephemeral expression of the new politics. Over the past decade or more they have been the most persistent, visible and indeed successful challengers to the old political order. Europe's Green party politics provides a crucible for the persistent tension between pragmatism and principle in the politics of contemporary mass democracy. Europe's Green parties incorporate those critical dilemmas that have defined the politics of advanced industrial democracies throughout its development, since the twin revolutions of the eighteenth century. As we have seen in these brief glimpses of Green parties, the politics of realism and moderation confronts utopianism with some obvious consequences. If the Greens cannot resolve these dilemmas, they will almost certainly fail to harness the deepseated concerns of the post-materialist, post-industrial and post-modern constituencies who are their most likely source of support. The current evidence here is less than reassuring. But these are relatively early days and the case of the German Greens shows what can be achieved if a radical party confronts the unavoidable predicaments of playing within political rules it has little empathy with or commitment to.

This is by no means an inquest on the Greens. If it was the verdict would at this stage be an open one. There is as yet no corpse to ponder over. Yet the Green body politic is much healthier in some places than others. An interim judgement, on the basis of the available facts, must be that the current outcome of the divisive civil wars that have wrecked these parties has damaged, and at the very least delayed, the opportunity of the Greens to help address the contemporary crisis of liberal capitalist societies. Let alone to bring about the radical realignment all Green activists covet, regardless of their ideological preferences. This is, of course, a prescriptive judgement which follows only if we accept the premises on which liberal democratic politics is based. It can, nevertheless, be justified by the electoral data. Those Green parties most obsessed by internecine wrangling and arcane sectarian squabbles have tended to dissipate the electoral support identified in countless opinion polls in favour of a positive ecological agenda. Of course, there is no simple equation between 'realism', defined as a conventional party status or accommodations with the mainstream parties, and electoral success. Even the most pragmatic and accommodating Greens have failed to make any startling electoral breakthrough. This is hardly surprising. All 'new' parties require time to adjust to, and indeed to be adjusted to in turn by, the political establishment. As harbingers of an alternative politics bearing an unpalatable ascetic message for the citizenry of hedonistic societies, they would have an electoral mountain to climb even in the most propitious circumstances. The tendency to shoot the messenger if the tidings are bad is as true in politics as ever it was!

Nevertheless, the Greens are not merely victims of cultural entropy. In some measure they have continued to bring about or add to their own difficulties, and have thereby played into the hands of their opponents along the way. The much publicised spectacle of unseemly and often bitterly contested factional disputes, principally waged around the issues outlined here, has undoubtedly dissipated much political energy and alienated many prospective Green voters, as the polling evidence from several countries confirms. Some of these quarrels have also been accurately perceived by critical electorates to be self indulgent and out of all due

proportion to the degree of ideological and strategic differences involved. The continuing tension within the movement between principle and pragmatism is not seen by those large numbers of well-informed citizens with a genuine concern with environmental matters, in quite the same light as those Green activists engaged in this febrile conflict. What many of these activists regard as the defence of sacrosanct principle, more discerning electorates translate as rank indiscipline - a modern outbreak of the 'infantile disorder' that periodically afflicts progressive politics. The credibility gap between the Greens and their latent constituency continues to be at the root of the radical dilemma.

Some Green activists have avoided rather than resolved this dilemma by turning their backs on the electoral route altogether and concentrating their energies instead on single issue politics prosecuted by the well-organised Green lobby. The apparent advantages of Green lobbying seem incontestable, even in societies less susceptible to Green parties. Britain is the most obvious case in point here. In stark contrast to the Greens' continuing electoral irrelevance, some 5 million Britons are members of a spectrum of ecological cause groups and subscribe millions of pounds annually into their coffers - from Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, down to the heritage groups and the animal rights lobby. But these groups are just as active in politics where Green parties are a more visible presence than in Britain. The case for these transnational pressure groups is self evident, given the insidiousness of pollution, the global reach of its multinational industrial agents and the universal quality of the nature they threaten with their excesses. In short, the two strategies - lobbying and electoralism - are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Single issue politics is an essential element of agenda change in any democracy, but consolidating change requires durable political influence. And this is more surely guaranteed by a bedrock presence in the councils of government at every level. It is this logic that took Green parties, against their basic instincts in most cases, into the political arena in the first place.

The Green fundamentalists, for reasons which illustrate the nature of their dilemma, would refute much of this criticism. They would do so on the same grounds that have inspired serious radicals since Robespierre's well attested preference for a 'seagreen incorruptibility' of pure principle over 'sordid trimming'. This kind of absolutist faith will hardly serve well today's radicals. There is too much at stake in this issue to retreat into an ethical ghetto. Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Bhopal and an untold number of eco disasters waiting to happen, illustrate how much is at stake here. Nor, from the Greens' point of view, can the issue be safely left to other parties. After all, it was the governments formed by these establishment parties who presided over the industrialism that is responsible for much of this environmental blight. And the political debts of these parties to both sides of industry raises serious doubts about their trustworthiness and reliability. If the governing parties are to chart a new course, for reasons of electoral convenience if nothing else, they need to be kept to it. Green parties have a distinctive role to play here in their self-appointed role as the conscience and guardians of a new political economy that balances present utility with the concern for 'futures'. This stewardship function requires that they consolidate their place on the political landscape. If they do not do so, other parties will steal the opportunity and close down the available space - but without getting to the core of the problem. If the Greens fail to face their predicament and resolve their dilemmas, they will indeed be little more than 'flash' parties. The progressive left everywhere is engaged on a crusade of revisionism, to catch up with and re-connect with fast changing public sentiments. As the new right runs out of steam and the market fails to live up to the blind faith of its recent apostles, conservatism, too, may be more susceptible to a new collectivism in tune with public fears and popular aspirations. The

political space currently available to the Greens is a territory whose freehold will almost certainly be expropriated by less serious ecologists, unless its parties can establish a proper title to it.

The Green parties of western Europe are new in several ways. They represent the aspirations and concerns of new social groups. They challenge the materialism and wastefulness on which the current economic order is built. They offer new political solutions to address these ills. The Greens, on all sides, are the vehicle for a distinctive and radical agenda. The cachet of their novel message can only gain in political salience as an increasingly sophisticated, better informed and restless electorate is faced with a rising catalogue of ecological crises; from oil spillages to public health scares; from declining air quality and climatic changes to the immense problems of disposing of toxic waste, without irreparably damaging the finite quality of the global commons. The recent Brent Spar campaign underlined the potential for harnessing public concern and consumer sovereignty, to shift even the most powerful multinational corporations and the most entrenched governments. But this issue, too, was orchestrated by Greenpeace - a globally organised pressure group - not by any particular Green political party. Greenpeace faced an altogether more intransigent opponent in its campaign to halt the French government's nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll. Even so, these 'rainbow warriors', backed up by the consummate professionalism of an organisation well in tune with international sensibilities, through the communications wizardry of cyberspace, put Paris on the moral defensive on this issue for the second time in a decade.

The Green parties have much to live up to when their modest policy achievements are compared with these lobbyists. The threat to the biosphere is, *in extremis*, a challenge to the global commons. The Green parties, preoccupied with esoteric agendas and narrow ideological tribalism, seemed for the most part, curiously unprepared to meet it with the full force of their moral convictions. If the Green parties cannot resolve these strategic and ideological dilemmas, they can hardly expect to be in a position to develop an effective national, let alone a global, strategy. In these circumstances, the loud protestations of concern for mother earth that emit from Green propaganda have about them a hollow ring. They suggest a sham in which the mere articulation of a radical and shocking message amounts to little more than a sort of ideological fetish - a verbal totem that means more in itself than the practical political accommodations needed to realise it. As we will see in the case studies that follow, some of western Europe's Green parties have addressed these critical issues - the litmus test of political relevance - with greater purpose than others. The stakes are high and there is much to play for. There are by no means any guaranteed outcomes as the Green parties continue to face the dilemmas that have visited every radical movement that seeks to use democratic politics to bring about far-reaching socio-economic change. The course of politics is guided not by teleology but by contingency. Chance prevails over certainty. But there are, nevertheless, some structural imperatives - a situational logic at best not a positivist one - that narrow down the likely options, without closing off any particular outcome.

Political ecologism is a live issue. It is likely to remain so and even to gather momentum. Whether the Greens can respond positively to this opportunity is less certain. There are, however, some encouraging signs as the following studies indicate. The Greens are in with more than a reasonable chance of playing their part in the radical politics of the coming century. The extent of their influence and the scale of their impact is impossible to forecast with any accuracy. Suffice to say that they have a chance to put their imprint on future agendas in a world where there are few certainties and much doubt and insecurity. The Green party activists may be fickle and disorientated, but they have come a long way in a short

while. All of these parties seem aware of their situational dilemmas and many of them have embarked on resolving the predicaments raised by them. A start has clearly been made here in most of Europe's Green parties. The potential for a change of direction in the political economy of Europe's advanced post-industrial societies by no means obscures the problematics facing the Greens, or for that matter any other radical movement. Nor does it guarantee that these radical activists will resolve their predicaments in time to steal a march on their rivals in the established catch-all parties. Understanding these fascinating dilemmas and their significance for the future of progressive politics goes some way to deepening our understanding of the dynamics of contemporary European politics. In order to see more clearly how these predicaments have been played out in, and affected the political future of, Europe's various Green parties, there follows a catalogue of case studies which incorporates these broad comparative themes.

Notes

1. "The Limits to Growth", Club of Rome (Earth Island, 1972).
2. P. Lowe, J. Clifford and S. Buchanan, "The Mass Movement of the Decade" Vol.1 (1980), at pp.26-28.
3. Frank Parkin, "Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" (Manchester, 1968).
4. Social theorists have endorsed this critical instinct by pointing out the structural complicity between established elements of the inherently conservative corporatist network which lead to clientist trade offs and insular bargains. See for instance, R. Harrison, "Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modern Democracies" (London, 1980) and S. H. Beer, "Britain Against Herself: The Political Contradictions of Collectivism" (New York, 1982).
5. T. Rochan, "Mobilising for Peace: Anti-nuclear Movements in Western Europe" (Princeton, 1989).
6. G. Smith, "Politics in Western Europe" (Aldershot, 1990) at p.37.
7. J. Porritt, "Seeing Green" (Oxford), at p.5
8. For a comparative analysis of modest resource conservationist or environmentalist movements and more radical ecologist expressions, see P.R. Hay and M.G. Hayward, "Comparative Green Politics: Beyond the European Context?" *Political Studies* 36 (1988) at pp.433-48.
9. This transition was by no means a rapid one. Much of the early 'path finding' work was a far from radical kind of ethical theory. The transformation (and incipient radicalisation) of ecologism began with the work of theorists such as Rachel Carson, "Silent Spring" (Boston, 1962); Barry Commoner, "Science and Survival", (New York, 1966) and *ibid*, "The Closing Circle" (New York, 1972). And Edward Goldsmith, "A Blueprint for Survival" (Harmondsworth, 1972). D. Dickson, "Alternative Technology and the Politics of Technical Change" (Glasgow, 1974). The scientific reappraisal that accompanied the rise of ecological awareness also fed into and sustained that movement itself. In the process, it helped to legitimise it with a wider audience. In this dialectical way, there emerged an ecological lifestyle (or 'culture') and a new scientific paradigm which complemented and sustained it. See S. Toulmin, "The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of Nature" (Berkeley, 1982).

10. A. Dobson, "Green Political Thought" (London, 1990) at p.13.
11. J. Ridgeway, "The Politics of Ecology" (New York, 1970)
12. J. Porritt and N. Winner, "The Coming of the Greens" (London 1988) at p.9.
13. See the survey findings on the age factor in the German Greens' support base in "The Social Background of the Green Voters", chapter two of Gerd Langguth, "The Green Factor in German Politics" (London, 1986), at pp.23-43. The preponderance of youthful support has been repeated across the spectrum of Europe's Green parties.
14. For evidence of the positive correlation between higher than average levels of educational attainment and a propensity to vote Green, see W. Herenberg's survey in R. Mettke (ed), "Die Grunen; Regierungspartner von morgen?" (Hamburg, 1982); for comparative evidence from Belgium, see K. Deschouwer and P. Stouthuysen, "The Electorate of AGALEV" (Centre for Research in Socio-Political Information, Brussels, 1984); and for Denmark and Italy see S. Schuttemeyer, "Denmark: De Gronne" and Mario Diani, "Italy: The Liste Verdi", in F. Muller-Rommel (ed), "New Politics in Western Europe" (London, 1989) at pp.57-58 and pp.117-119 respectively.
15. See F.H. Buttel, "The environmental movement: historical roots and current trends", in C.R. Humphrey and F.H. Buttel (eds), "Environment, Energy and Society" (Belmont, Calif. 1980)
16. See P. Byrne, "The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" (London,1988) for a discussion of the linkages between the peace movement in Britain and the Greens; D. Nelkin and M. Pollak, "The Atom Beseiged: Extra Parliamentary dissent in France and Germany" (Cambridge, Mass, 1981); and T.Rochon, "Mobilizing for Peace: Anti-nuclear Movements in Western Europe" (Princeton, 1989).
17. Charles Tilly, "European Violence and Collective Action Since 1700", Social Research 52 1985 at pp. 714-47.
18. G. DiPalma, "Antipathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies" (New York, 1970)
19. See the discussion in Harold Perkin, "The Origins of Modern English Society 1780-1880" (London, 1972), at pp.32-33.
20. For a review of the debate of the 'newness' of the 'new politics', see C. Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging Boundaries of the Political" Social Research 52 1985, at pp.817-68; *ibid*, "Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements Since the Sixties" in C.S. Maier (ed), "Changing Boundaries of the Political" (Cambridge, 1987); Karl Werner Brand, "Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements: Waves of Cultural Criticism and Mobilization Cycles of New Middle class Radicalism", in R. J. Dalton and M. Kuechler, "Challenging the Political Order" (Cambridge, 1990) at pp.23-42.
21. For a comparative review of this phenomenon see O. Klinberg, M. Zavalloni, C. Louis-Guerin and J. Ben-Brika, "Students, Values and Politics: A Cross Cultural Comparison" (New York, 1979).
22. See C. Rootes, "Student radicalism:politics of moral protest and legitimization problems of the modern capitalist state", Theory and Society 9 (3) 1980; and *ibid*, "Student radicalism in France: 1968 and after", in P. Cerny (ed), "Social Movements and Protest in France" (London, 1982).
23. For a discussion of the role of the young and the generational factor in political change, see R. Flacks, "The revolt of the young intelligentsia: revolutionary class consciousness in post-scarcity America", in R. Aya and N. Miller (eds), "The New

- American Revolution" (London, 1971); and R.G. Braungart, "Family status, socialisation and student politics: a multivariate analysis", *American Journal of Sociology* 77 1971 at pp. 197-202.
24. See for instance, George Melly, "Revolt into Style" (Harmondsworth, 1975)
 25. J. Whalen and R. Flacks "After the Barricades: The New Left Grows Up" (Philadelphia 1989).
 26. See G. Katsiaficas "The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968" (Boston, Mass. 1987).
 27. The debates at the leading centres of student radicalism - the London School of Economics, the Sorbonne, the Berkeley campus of the University of California, and on the campuses of Berlin - addressed not only educational reform, but the wider issues of Third World exploitation, militarism, industrial relations and the cultural 'poverty' of 'advanced' societies.
 28. Klaus Eder, "The 'New Social Movements': Moral Crusades, Political Pressure Groups or Social Movements?" *Social Research* Vol.52 Part 4 at pages 886-87.
 29. H. Kitschelt, "New Social Movements and the Decline of Party Organisation", in R.J. Dalton and M. Kuechler, "Challenging for Political Order: New Social and Political Movement in Western Democracies" (Cambridge, 1990) at p.190.
 30. J. Mushaben, "The Struggle Within" in B. Klandermans (ed), "Organizing for Change" (Greenwich, 1989).
 31. C. Boggs, "Social Movements and Political Power" (Philadelphia, 1986), at Chapter two.
 32. W. Rudig, "Peace and ecology movements in Western Europe", *West European Politics* 11 1988.
 33. See S. Cotgrove and A. Duff, "Environmentalism, Middle Class Radicalism and Politics", *Sociological Review* 2 1990 at pp.333-52.
 34. A point illustrated by H. Kitschelt, "The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany" (Ithaca, New York, 1989).
 35. T. Poguntke, "New Politics and Party Systems: The Emergence of a New Type of Party?" *West European Politics* 10 1987 at pp.76-88; see also S. Barnes and M. Kaase (et al), "Political Action" (Beverly Hills 1979).
 36. H. Kitschelt, "Left Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Systems", *World Politics* 40 1988, at pp.194-234; and R. J. Dalton, "Cognitive Mobilisation and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies", *Journal of Politics* 46 1984, at pp.264-84.
 37. Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach", *Social Science Information* 18 1980, at pp.199-226.
 38. W.M. Chandler and A. Siaroff, "Post Industrial Politics in Germany and the Origins of the Greens", *Comparative Politics* 18 1986, at pp.303-325.
 39. C. Boggs, "The Socialist Tradition: from Crisis to Decline" (New York 1995) at p.208.
 40. C. Boggs, *ibid*, at p.208.
 41. C. Boggs, *ibid* (1995) at pp.211-212.
 42. *Ibid* at p.212.
 43. Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post Industrial Societies", *American Political Science Review* 65 1971, at pp.991-1017.