

VALUES AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Edited by
Gerald Collier, John Wilson
and Peter Tomlinson

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
HIGHER EDUCATION



ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
HIGHER EDUCATION

Volume 4

VALUES AND MORAL
DEVELOPMENT IN
HIGHER EDUCATION



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

VALUES AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Edited by
**GERALD COLLIER, PETER TOMLINSON
AND JOHN WILSON**

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1974 by Croom Helm Ltd.

This edition first published in 2019

by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge

52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 1974 Croom Helm Ltd.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-138-32388-9 (Set)

ISBN: 978-0-429-43625-3 (Set) (ebk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-33499-1 (Volume 4) (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-44404-3 (Volume 4) (ebk)

Publisher's Note

The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.

Disclaimer

The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

VALUES AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION

**EDITED BY GERALD COLLIER,
PETER TOMLINSON
JOHN WILSON**



CROOM HELM LONDON

First published 1974

©1974 Croom Helm Ltd.

Croom Helm Ltd., 2-10 St. John's Road, London SW11

ISBN: 0-85664-171-5

The Editors acknowledge with thanks permission from the editors and publishers of the journal of *Moral Education* to reprint the greater part of Gerald Collier's chapter; permission from the editors and publishers of the *Bulletin of the British Psychological Society* to reprint the diagram on page 86 and permission from Holt, Rinehart and Winston to reprint the extract on page 31 from W.G. Perry, Jr., *Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: a Scheme*, New York 1968.

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
REDWOOD BURN LIMITED
Trowbridge & Esher

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
PART I THE NATURE OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING GAINED FROM THE DISCIPLINES	5
1 The study of 'Moral Development' <i>John Wilson</i>	6
2 Some Perspectives From Academic Psychology <i>Peter Tomlinson</i>	20
3 The Relationship of Depth Psychology to Moral Development <i>Douglas Hamblin</i>	40
4 Sociology and Moral Education: The Conditions of Impartiality <i>Maurice Broady</i>	58
5 Using Formal Knowledge in Education <i>Peter Tomlinson</i>	77
PART II CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PRACTICAL ENTERPRISES: ACADEMIC STUDIES	95
6 Philosophy <i>John Wilson</i>	96
7 Literature <i>Gabriel Chanan</i>	106
8 Drama <i>Roy Knight</i>	116
9 Theology <i>James Robertson</i>	126
10 History <i>James Henderson</i>	137
11 Science <i>David Edge</i>	147
PART III CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PRACTICAL ENTERPRISES: SOCIAL CONTEXTS AND EXPERIENCES	161
12 World Studies <i>Robin Richardson</i>	162
13 Experiments in the Exploration of Values <i>Gerald Collier</i>	172
14 Polytechnics: Moral Education? <i>Valerie Pitt</i>	184

CONTENTS cont'd

15	Institutional Contexts <i>Stephen Hatch</i>	192
16	The Influence of Community <i>John Barnett</i>	198
17	The Role of Student Services in Student Development – A Polytechnic View <i>Denis Coe</i>	206
18	Postscript <i>John Wilson</i>	215
	Notes on Contributors	221
	Index	223

INTRODUCTION

John Wilson

This book ventures not only into a new field of study, but also into a new methodology: the reader is owed some explanation of its origins, structure and general intention.

In the last few decades there has been more interest and discussion (both at home and abroad) focused on titles like 'moral development' and 'moral education' than ever before. The reasons for this are complex, and would require a book in themselves: though one's mind turns naturally to the breakdown in certain types of authority, to mass education, and to the pluralism of values in most advanced societies. There has been some serious research in moral education, and a good number of hit-or-miss practical or developmental projects. But the subject is still in its infancy; and it is particularly striking that little has been said about moral development in higher education. Nobody, I take it, believe that a person's moral development should grind to a halt at the age of 15 or 16; and it seems important, however difficult, to investigate this particular area as sensibly as possible.

Such an investigation must begin by facing squarely the fact that nobody is yet in a position to conduct anything like a strictly experimental study of the moral effects of what is done in institutions of higher education. Adequate tests and assessment methods are not yet available to take account of the bewildering variety of variables. However, we are now a good deal clearer both about the *aims* of higher education and about the *kinds* of psychological and social factors – admittedly very general – which are relevant to the efficacy of practical methods. Briefly: we cannot say anything like 'This method or practice will have such-and-such effects on such-and-such students', but we can say, 'This *sort* of method or practice looks as if it might fulfil some of our aims, in the light of the general psychological and sociological knowledge that we have: it is at least a good candidate for investigation and discussion.

We find ourselves therefore in what we might call the pre-experimental stage of investigation. This is a very important stage, and we must not be in too much of a hurry to pass through it. Too much educational research has rushed too quickly into statistics and quantification, even in areas which do not lend themselves to such

methods. A good deal of hard thinking and discussion is required before we can begin even to formulate sensible and productive experiments. In this process we need to understand and bear in mind both (a) the aims towards which we are working and (b) the relevant evidence from psychology and the social sciences, and to marry these up with (c) descriptions of what goes on in practice. (a), (b) or (c) in isolation is not of much value: it is only putting them together in our minds that is likely to lead to progress in the subject. This, in brief, is what we have to do in this book. The reader will readily perceive that there are gaps, untidinesses, overlaps and perhaps disagreements, but we do not feel inclined to be over-apologetic about them. This condition is the state of the subject, and it would be intellectually dishonest to pretend to a tidiness and coherence which does not exist.

Two other points are, we think, worth making at the outset: first, the practical enterprises described in Parts II and III were not for the most part undertaken *as* attempts at practical moral education in the light of philosophically-derived aims for such education, or for the psychological and sociological study of it. The concerns which moved those responsible for these practical projects (Part III), or which dominate those concerned with teaching particular subjects (Part II), are very varied. What has happened is something like this: a person may have some more or less clear aim in view – say, ‘to break down inter-departmental isolation’, ‘to give the students a sense of identity’, ‘to show them the importance of language and literature’, and so on – and some practical project or style of teaching arises to meet this need. With the increased general interest in moral development, however, we have become increasingly clear that many of these aims and practices overlap, and that our individual aims have wider connotations, which need to be examined. It is less likely today that a lecturer will see himself as *just* a teacher of English or history, for instance: he will want to know about the implications of his subject for the general personality and life-style of the student. In the same way a principal or a tutor will not see himself only as fulfilling a specific, given role in the institution but as, at least to some degree, responsible for the general moral development of the community and its members. Hence the experiences and ideas of the authors in Parts II and III, although perhaps not originally focused on the title ‘moral development’, are highly relevant to that title. What they have been doing *is*, in fact, ‘moral education’; and is now coming to be seen as such.

Secondly, most of these practical projects have taken place within a particular tradition and style of thought of their own. Therefore the language and concepts that naturally used by, say, a lecturer in religious knowledge, a guidance counsellor, an advisor on drama, and a psychologist will all be very different. It would be wrong to deny these

different traditions, or to attempt a common language throughout the book, for it will be seen, we believe, that this variety of conceptual frameworks masks a good deal of common ground: in other words, the general aims are much more similar than the different languages imply. Most, if not all, of such aims – however generally expressed – fit within the philosophical framework described in the first chapter of the book. The same point applies to the psychological and sociological considerations in Part I: for the different empirical disciplines too have their traditional concepts and language. The authors have attempted to focus their writing on common aims, without concealing the particular framework in which they have planned and operated. It is precisely the realisation of a common ground, and the understanding that many individual workers have that they are concerned with the same aims, which seems to us very valuable

Reference

- (1) See *Philosophy and Educational Research* (N.F.E.R. publication), John Wilson, 1972.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

PART I

THE NATURE OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING GAINED FROM THE DISCIPLINES

1 THE STUDY OF 'MORAL DEVELOPMENT'

John Wilson

'Moral development' is in inverted commas for two reasons. First, it is the official title for specific studies in post-Piagetian psychology; second, its meaning is unclear, both when it acts as this official title and when (as now) it is used in a wider sense. It is hard to do without some general heading for the subject of our interest, and 'moral development' is perhaps as good as any. But, in the context of this book, its vagueness at once raises two questions; roughly (1) 'What are we talking about under this heading?', and (2) 'In what ways can contributions from various fields (sociology, literature, etc.) be relevant to the study of "moral development"?' In this introductory section I shall try to deal with these questions: sacrificing, since this is not primarily a philosophical treatise, the conceptual complexities inherent in these questions for the sake of brevity.

Meaning and Aims in 'Moral Development'

There is an area of human thought and action, for which 'morality' may stand as a (more or less misleading) title, which is concerned with those principles, rules, ideals and behaviour-patterns that a man takes to be of overriding importance. Not every man may use the word 'moral' in relation to his overriding principles, and not every man may formulate the reasons for his behaviour coherently but every man, in this sense, has a morality. To him some ends, some objectives, some states of affairs, or some class of reasons for action, will seem overridingly important. This is his morality, and – whatever we may want to do with the word 'moral' – the area with which we are concerned.¹

It would be hard to deny that there are some criteria of success which apply to this area: that is, some general principles or procedures, acceptable or inevitable for any rational person who reflects on the area, in terms of which we may talk of a person 'performing' well or badly in it. Performance in the moral area is surely not wholly *arbitrary*. For instance, it seems clear that principles like 'face facts', or 'get to know yourself and other people' are required by anybody who is going

to evolve his own moral beliefs in a serious and sensible way. Similarly qualities we may call 'self-control' or 'being able to act on one's own decisions' seem to be required by any person, whatever his particular moral values. If somebody denied or abandoned such general principles as these, we should say – not that we disagreed with his particular moral values, but that he was not taking morality seriously at all.

Of course people can, and very often do, think and act without reference to these principles: that is, people are very often unreasonable, arbitrary, or even insane. But we know quite well, even without philosophical proofs, that we ought to begin with the principles. Indeed it hardly makes sense to deny them. If a man said that he ought not to face facts, or have enough self-control to act on his own decisions, we should hardly understand him: we could interpret it only as a wilful refusal to think at all. We all very often make such refusals: but we know that we ought not to.

Without the existence of such principles, it would not be possible to talk of 'education' or 'development' in morality at all. Teachers and others would have no publicly justifiable aims. There would be no meaning in saying that pupils were 'better at' or 'more successful in' the area of morality: just as, if there were no rational principles incumbent on any serious person who was trying to do science, we should not be able to talk of educating a pupil in scientific thought and action. Hence the criteria of success – what is to *count as* being 'developed' or 'educated' in morality – are of immense importance to anyone trying to help students and others. For without a clear grasp of these criteria of success, such a person will not be clear even about what he is trying to do, let alone about how he is to do it. So the task of outlining and clarifying these principles, which form the aims of moral education, is an essential first step.

Two mistakes or inadequacies have afflicted, and continue to afflict, much of what is said on this topic. First, people have taken criteria and aims that are *partisan*. This has usually occurred because these people have not seen the problem as one of educating pupils in the moral area (as one might educate them in the areas of science, history, literature, etc.) but rather as a problem of 'how to make pupils moral'³ – and 'moral', for them, will mean something like 'in accordance with the values I personally favour'. It is one thing to try to produce (by whatever methods) good Christians, good Communists, good middle-class Englishmen, good liberals, good supporters of a technological society, etc. and quite another to try to produce people who are reasonable (educated, sane, sensible, etc.) in this area: people who will raise seriously the important question 'What ought I to do and to feel?', answer them seriously, and act on the answers.⁴ Of course it can be said, if we like, that words such as 'reasonable', 'educated', 'sane', etc.

'contain values'; but it is just as obvious that they are not *partisan* values — they are second-order values which are conceptually connected to the notions of being human and being educated. Whether they can intelligibly be questioned at all, and if so how, are interesting philosophical questions: but educators (rightly) take them as given.

At the cost of being repetitive, I should like to stress the importance of appreciating that this is a matter of logic (or, if you like, common sense); it does not rest upon any particular creed, or faith, or axiom. Such principles as 'facing facts', 'not contradicting oneself', 'gaining understanding and so forth do not rely on any intuition or revelation. They are part of what it means to be a thinking human being, as opposed to an animal or a psychopath. Understanding and following such principles is part of what we *mean* (or should mean, if we were clearer) *by* 'being educated' in morality and other areas of life. They are an expansion of the concept of education itself, not a set of particular moral values. I repeat this because it is just as important that students and pupils should grasp this as that educator should. They, and we, would rightly resent any attempt to foist a particular morality or faith on them, but no-one can sensibly object to clarification of what it means to be educated in the moral area. Unless the distinction is firmly grasped, I fear that much moral education will be ineffective (as well as illegitimate).

Secondly, statements of aims and criteria in the moral area have been intolerably vague. There is much talk about 'sensitivity', 'concern', 'awareness', 'a sense of responsibility', 'personal identity', 'commitment', 'an adult attitude', and so on. Such talk is not so much mistaken as inadequate. On the one hand it allows, by its very vagueness, partisan values to creep in under cover of these expressions; on the other, it fails to provide what any clear-headed educator will surely demand — a specific and detailed list of aspects (or elements) in the 'successful performer' in the moral field. Any such list must identify *different* aspects — the items must not overlap with each other — and must also identify *all* aspects required for moral success. The importance of such a list is obvious for the researcher; it ought to be equally obvious for the practising teacher. For without it he cannot know, even in principle, to what aspects his teaching is supposed to relate, what the gaps are, or may be, in the moral development of his pupils, what new methods might help to fill those gaps, and so forth.

This may save us also from a third mistake, which is connected with the second — the belief (better, the fantasy) that moral development rests on some *one* quality or method: 'it's all a matter of X', where X may be 'personal example', 'having concerned teachers', 'the right sort of atmosphere in the institution', 'gaining sensitivity through literature', and so *ad infinitum*. We have to appreciate that moral development

involves *many different* types of learning, which can not in principle be done by only one method. We still suffer from the fantasy that 'virtue' is the name of some single essence or property, possessed in large measure by 'virtuous peasants' or 'saints', which we need only transfuse (like blood) into our pupils. We need to stop talking about 'sensitivity', 'goodness', 'virtue', 'concern' and so on, and start getting down to business.

There are, I think, only two serious ways of getting down to business. One, using a tradition which goes back to Plato and Aristotle, involves itemising the virtues for our list. We may reasonably say that there are a number of virtues which (a) can be distinguished clearly from each other; (b) are 'culture-free', and logically required by any person who is to be successful in the moral area. (For instance, fear will inevitably sometimes stand between any person and that person's goal so that some kind of courage is inevitably a useful tool for any person not necessarily courage in climbing mountains or facing dragons, but courage to face whatever particular dangers the person meets with. Or again, it is self-evident that 'alertness' and 'determination' or 'self-control' are required since any person will have goals that he cannot immediately attain, and will meet situations which he needs to be able to size up quickly). This is an interesting approach, and some very important work has been done on these lines. There are, however, difficulties, though perhaps not insuperable, which lead one to prefer a different approach. The rationale and central elements of this list have been discussed at length elsewhere,⁵ but I need here to produce it in full, since it is relevant to our second question about the relevance of contributions from other fields.

It seems that anyone who wants to be sure of success in the moral area would need at least the following 'components' (abilities, skills, etc.) to which I have given brief home-made titles for the sake of easy reference:

- | | |
|------------|---|
| PHIL (HC) | Having the concept of a person (that is, of a conscious and rational language-using creature, with a will, intentions, desires and emotions). |
| PHIL (CC) | Claiming to use this concept as the criterion for forming and acting on principles of action: that is, accepting that the wants and interests of other people and himself, regarded as equals, are the relevant reasons for moral thought and action. |
| PHIL (RSF) | Having feelings which support this general principle, at least to some extent: feelings attached to the notion of 'duty' or 'benevolence'. |

EMP (HC)	Having the concepts of various emotions and moods, moods.
EMP (1) (Cs)	Being able, in practice, to identify emotions and moods in oneself, when these are at a conscious level.
EMP (1) (U cs)	Ditto, when these are at an unconscious level.
EMP (2) (Cs)	Ditto, in other people, when at a conscious level.
EMP (2) (Ucs)	Ditto, when at an unconscious level.
GIG (1) (KF)	Knowing other ('hard') facts relevant to moral decisions.
GIG (1) (KS)	Knowing sources of facts (where to find out).
GIG (2) (VC)	'Knowing how' — a 'skill' element in moral situations, as evinced in verbal communication with others.
GIG (2) (NVC)	Ditto, in non-verbal communication.
KRAT (1) (RA)	Being in practice 'relevantly alert' to (noticing) moral situations, and seeing them as such under the right descriptions (in terms of PHIL, etc. above).
KRAT (1) (TT)	Thinking thoroughly about such situations, bringing to bear whatever PHIL, EMP or GIG he has.
KRAT (1) (OPU)	As a result of the foregoing, making an overriding, prescriptive and universalised decision to act.
KRAT (2)	Being sufficiently whole-hearted, free from unconscious counter-motivation, etc. to carry out (when able) the above decision in practice.

I do not want to claim, either that there are no problems attached to various items on this list, or that it may not need revisions and additions. But I would claim that any serious attempt to taxonomise the logical requirements for success in this area would have to look something like this. There are of course logical requirements, not psychological 'forces' or 'factors' or 'constructs': it is the task of empirical researchers and others to tell us what actual types of training, upbringing, teaching or other empirical phenomena will produce these 'components' in individuals. All I have tried to do here is to produce as clear and complete a list of aims as I can.

Perhaps an example may help to show why some such list as this is essential, and also the ways in which it may be of practical help to the educator. Suppose we come across a phenomenon which seems, *prima facie*, to indicate a lack of ‘moral development’: for instance, teenagers beating up a Pakistani in London. Now we need to be able to identify, as clearly as possible, just what sort of failure (vice, moral incompetence, etc.) the teenager suffers from – or what sorts, since he may suffer from more than one. Unless we know this, we cannot even begin to think seriously, or do serious research, about what methods of education will help to remedy the failure – and we cannot know what sort of failure it is without consulting a list of this kind.

Thus, going down the list, we might wonder somewhat as follows: ‘Is it that he has no proper concept of a person – that he doesn’t really count Pakistanis as people – a lack of PHIL(HC)? Is it that he knows Pakistanis are people but thinks that their being people is unimportant compared with their being coloured, or immigrants, or not members of his gang, or whatever – a lack of PHIL(CC)? Is it that he accepts the importance of their being people “on paper”, so to speak, but has no feelings which back up this acceptance – lack of PHIL(RSF)? Is his behaviour due to some failure in emotional perception (various kinds of EMP); for instance, does he fail to recognise the strength of his own racial prejudices, whether conscious or unconscious? Might he perhaps think that coloured people don’t feel pain in the same way that white people do – is there some straightforward “hard fact” of which he is ignorant (GIG(1))? Is it that he can’t communicate with the Pakistani in any other way – would it help if we improved his “know-how” or “social skills” (GIG(2))? Finally, is it that he just doesn’t stop to consider things at all, but acts on impulse – that he isn’t alert to the situation as required under the heading of KRAT(1) (RA), or doesn’t think properly about it as required by KRAT(1) (OPU)? Or that, having done all this, he still doesn’t translate his decision into action – a deficiency in the KRAT (2) area?’

In this case, as with all such cases, some of these failures are more probable than others. It is likely, for instance, that the teenager lacks PHIL and KRAT more than he lacks GIG. But – particularly since there may be more than one thing lacking – it is both important and difficult to identify them. It is difficult because, in practice, it is not easy to separate out these logically distinct elements. The overlaps between PHIL and KRAT are especially hard to untangle, but not until we can do this can we determine the appropriate methods for a cure. There is not much point in stressing the importance of people to somebody who has no clear grasp of what a person is, or in promoting alertness and determination to someone who uses these qualities to his neighbour’s disadvantage. We have, then, to start by *identifying*, both in principle

and in practice, what may be or is wrong; then we can go on to explain and to cure.

Before going further, I should like to disarm (as briefly as I may) those who may still find this list of aims alarming or unsatisfactory, rather than merely advising them to pursue the philosophical literature mentioned in the footnotes. Despite the shorthand jargon (PHIL, EMP, etc.), which we have found useful for research purposes, there is nothing very original or exciting about this list. It serves to remind us (as philosophers often do) of what we know quite well already. Few people would deny the importance of having concern for others and regard for their interests; of emotional insight and awareness; of factual knowledge and 'social skills'; of the various aspects of personality sometimes referred to as 'self-control', 'alertness', 'motivation'. The list is no more than an attempt to separate these out in a little more detail, and independently of any particular language-style (whether derived from psychology, religious belief or any other source). We can talk if we like of 'autonomy', 'ego-strength', 'the grace of God', and so on, but it is best, at least to begin with, to keep our feet on the ground.

Some will feel that this list does not provide a 'true basis' for morality; there is a sense of something missing. I can only ask such people to consider whether what they want is, in however uncertain a form, some kind of *authority* to do their morals (and their moral education) for them — if not a personal god, then some 'intuition of human worth', some 'faith in people', or something of that kind. They may be asking at once for a *logical basis* (the ultimate reasons and criteria that make up what we mean by 'successful performance' in the moral area), and also for some *source of moral strength*; certainly this is a common confusion in morality, though less common when we talk about 'the basis' of medicine, or science, or history, or other areas of thought and action which are now publicly refined and accepted. I have attempted only the former. Particular 'sources of moral strength', whether religious or not, are for empirical researchers to discuss: in my list, they would fit into the area I have called KRAT.

In connection with the above, I am not saying here anything against (or for) any particular creed, faith, political affiliation or 'ism'. That is not the educator's, nor the philosopher's, business. Our business is to encourage our students in forms of understanding and criteria of action which are public and demonstrable, not those which are the peculiar property of partisan groups. If we put our allegiance to any partisan group above the principles of reason and understanding, we are not earning our money as educators: we should rather be paid by some propagandist fund.

Finally, for those who wish to pursue the topic in more detail, I do not of course wish to convey the impression that all the (very complex)

philosophical problems here have been solved. But they are, I would stress, *philosophical* problems, and to approach them seriously is to do philosophy. I think it is true that most competent philosophers, however many difficulties they might raise, would agree that some such list as I have drawn up is, at least, not hopelessly astray. As I mentioned above, it seems to me not so much questionable as boringly obvious (even though, under pressure from prejudice and fantasy, it is commonly forgotten). So perhaps we can allow it to stand, and get on with the urgent task of translating it into practice.

Let us go back now to the phrase 'moral development'. Two points are commonly made by philosophers about 'development', as the word figures in psychological research. (1) The implication is that 'morality', or something to do with morality, 'develops' in the way that flowers develop from buds, or butterflies from grubs and it is taken analogically with the 'development of the brain'; there is the implied picture of something becoming larger and more complicated or sophisticated in accordance with certain laws of nature (hence the talk of 'stages' in development, rather like stages in evolution). But morality is not (could not be) like the unfolding of a bud or a butterfly: it is, at least in part, something *learned*. Coming to perform successfully in the moral area is more like learning to play chess, or the piano, than it is like simply coming to have bigger biceps or more brain-cells. It is something which we *do* and *learn* for ourselves rather than something which just *happens* to us. (2) The (usually well-concealed) implication or assumption is that the more morally 'developed' a person is, the *better* he is. The later 'stages' of development, it is assumed, are *improvements* on the earlier: it is not just that they come later, or are more sophisticated, or are inevitable for 'normal' children. Many psychologists seem simply to assume this; but, obviously, any 'stage' of development can be sophisticated, characteristic of more age and experience, and (in one sense) 'normal' for human beings, without earning our approval. (No doubt Lucifer, Hitler and de Sade 'developed' as they got older; but they may also have got worse.)

'Moral development' for us — that is, for educators — will not be tied to these ambiguities. The process of development will include anything which contributes to the aims of moral education (as set out in the list of 'components' above). We shall not call it 'development' unless it is an improvement and we shall be willing to look at any factors relevant to it, whether factors of 'natural growth' or 'cognitive learning' (both very obscure phrases). We have to be willing to look at them all, for all may be relevant: but, of course, as educators we may only be able to control some of them — that is, those which fit in with the concept of education.

I do not wish here to restrict unduly the particular factors and

methods with which educators can be concerned, but it is as well for them to be clear about certain important distinctions. There are various things we can do with people: we can drug them, sever connections in their brains, inspire them, condition them (and there are various logical types of conditioning), train them for specific tasks, browbeat them, indoctrinate them, make them feel happy, and so on. If we ask 'What is it, specifically, to *educate* them?' we shall probably arrive at some such answer as that given by Richard Peters and others, roughly 'To initiate them into various forms of understanding, "cognitive awareness" and knowledge: basically, to teach them to think and understand, and to care for such understanding'. This marks education off with some (not complete) distinctness from other ways of handling people: and we may try to make further distinctions between training, indoctrinating, conditioning, forcing, browbeating, and so on.

Some of these non-educational processes will be very important for moral education. This is particularly clear when we remember that more sophisticated processes of learning or instruction do not cover all the ground. It is an essential part of the notion of education that the pupil comes to *care for* understanding. In moral education especially, where the 'affective' or 'motivational' side is unusually important, we must not undervalue those non-cognitive processes which are essential for the acquisition of attitudes and dispositions.⁷ At the same time, we have to give the cognitive or conceptual side its due weight — a point sometimes missed by empirical workers, particularly in the behaviouristic tradition of psychology.

Contributions to Moral Development

The logical way to go about moral development would be this: first we establish our objectives, in as much detail as possible. Then we see from the examination of these objectives as well as from experimental and other evidence what *sorts* of processes are likely to achieve them. Then we look at these processes in action, and/or try out new ones (having cast them in the form of educational programmes), and see whether they in fact work: that is, whether they do actually increase one or more of the 'moral components' which form our objectives.

When I talk of 'an examination of these objectives' the point is this: *it is not entirely a contingent or empirical question whether certain methods will achieve certain objectives*. To use an old example, if we were asking how to get a pupil to appreciate Shakespeare, there is something logically odd or (ultimately) contradictory in suggesting that this can be done by any methods fairly described as 'conditioning', 'training' or 'indoctrinating'. The statement of the objective,

‘appreciating Shakespeare’, just does not fit these methods. This point applies to many of the ‘moral components’ as I have described them. For instance, genuine concern for others as people (PHIL) cannot arise solely through conditioning or training processes, or by example, or by an infusion of some magical quality ‘love’ or ‘benevolence’, for it implies the quite complicated business of (a) having a clear concept of another person in the required sense (and very few of us actually have such a clear concept); (b) using *that* concept, and not some other, as the criterion of our actions (for instance, being nice to people *qua* people, not *qua* attractive blondes, rich uncles, powerful tyrants, etc.); and (c) actually applying the criterion in such a way that it issues in action. Of these, the conceptual learning could not, even in principle, be achieved by conditioning or training processes. Pupils will have to be *taught*.

The educator, then, will need to look very closely at all the components in order to get a clear view of what methods could, in principle, be relevant. Some seem required, as it were, *a priori*: for instance, it seems clear that many components, or aspects of them, could not be acquired without an adequate use of *language* and conceptual apparatus (pointing to, for instance, the work of Basil Bernstein). So the educator may, in effect, conceptually deduce the importance of certain methods, given these aims. Further, he will want to examine each component in itself. What is *meant*, for instance, by ‘being able to identify emotions’? is this a matter of correlating the symptoms of emotion with the person’s belief and with his intentional actions? How far is it a matter of induction as against direct perception?⁸ In this example, the methods of teaching this ability (EMP) will naturally follow from a proper conceptual (perhaps we should say ‘phenomenological’) understanding.

As I said earlier, the logical procedure would be to do this first, and then proceed to experiment and the trial of certain methods. But, in fact, we already have a good deal of psychological and sociological research (the names of Piaget, Kohlberg, Durkheim and others are well known in this field), and a good deal of practical methods being used (the names of A.S. Neil, Kurt Hahn, and Thomas Arnold are also not unfamiliar). So we have the very difficult task – much more difficult, I cannot forbear to add, than if we could work straightforwardly from the conceptual points in virgin soil – of trying to determine whether and how various research-findings or approaches are relevant to our aims: that is, to the moral components. Some are not relevant; others are only tangentially or obliquely relevant; most are relevant to aspects of moral development which come under training or conditioning rather than education. A thorough survey of the field would, I am sure, show enormous gaps in our knowledge, gaps due not so much to the