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  • Produktbild: Interface Between Competition and the Internal Market
  • Produktbild: Interface Between Competition and the Internal Market

Interface Between Competition and the Internal Market Market Separation Under Article 102 Tfeu

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

01.07.2014

Verlag

Bloomsbury Academic

Seitenzahl

276

Maße (L/B/H)

24/16,1/1,9 cm

Gewicht

581 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-84946-569-4

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

01.07.2014

Verlag

Bloomsbury Academic

Seitenzahl

276

Maße (L/B/H)

24/16,1/1,9 cm

Gewicht

581 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-84946-569-4

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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Die Leseprobe wird geladen.
  • Produktbild: Interface Between Competition and the Internal Market
  • Produktbild: Interface Between Competition and the Internal Market

  • I. The Interface between Competition and the Internal Market: Market Separation under Article 102 TFEU II. Methodological Remarks on the Analysis of 'Market Separation under Article 102 TFEU'
    III. Summary of the Chapters of this Book

    1 Objectives of Article 102 TFEU and Market Integration: From a Historical Analysis to the Current Jurisdictional Approach
    I. Introduction
    II. Objectives of EU Regulation of Unilateral Anti-competitive Conduct (Article 102 TFEU)
    III. Linking the Objectives of Article 102 TFEU to EU Trade Liberalisation
    IV. 'Effect on Trade': An Analytical Approach to Jurisdictional Elements with the Advantage of Hindsight
    V. Conclusions

    2 Market Separation under Article 102 TFEU: The Role of Dominance
    I. Introduction
    II. Cases of Market Separation by Dominant Undertakings under Article 102 TFEU
    III. An Analytical Approach to Market Separation by Private Actors under the Free Movement Provisions
    and its Relationship to Market Separation by Dominant Undertakings
    IV. Functionalism and the Significance of Public Enforcement of the Competition Law Provisions
    V. Beyond Functionalism: The Significance of a Quantitative Threshold for Power
    VI. The Specific Example of Article 106(2) TFEU
    VII. Conclusions

    3 Market Separation under Article 102 TFEU: The Role of Economic Justifications
    I. Introduction
    II. The Analytical Framework for Assessing Market Separation as an Abuse of the Dominant Position
    III. Conceptual Elements of Measures Constituting a Restriction on Free Movement
    IV. Establishing Market Separation as an Abuse of the Dominant Position
    V. The Constitutional Basis for Aligning the Notions of Trade Barrier and Abuse of the Dominant Position
    VI. Conclusions

    4 Market Separation under Article 102 TFEU and the Role of Non-economic Justifications: A Question of Attribution
    I. Introduction
    II. Abuse and Public Policy Justifications: Treaty-Based Arguments
    III. Abuse and Public Policy Justifications: Interpretation of the Case Law
    IV. Conclusions

    5 Shared Responsibility for Market Separation by Dominant Undertakings and the State: The Question of Attribution Revisited
    I. Introduction
    II. Abuse and the State Action Defence: Establishing Private Responsibility
    III. Abuse and the State Action Doctrine: Establishing State Responsibility
    IV. The Interplay between Private and State Responsibility under the Competition Law Provisions
    V. Conclusions

    6 Principled Attribution of Market Separation to the Dominant Undertaking and the State: A Revised State Action Defence
    I. Introduction
    II. From Article 3(1)(g) TEC to Protocol No 27 TFEU: Distinct Substantive Legality Tests and Associated
    Enforcement Mechanisms
    III. Principled Attribution of Market Separation Controlled: The
    Example of the 'Exhaustion' of Intellectual Property Rights
    IV. Conclusions