Emotional Contagion, Moral Responsibility and Punishment. Why Membership Diminishes Responsibility
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Master's Thesis from the year 2014 in the subject Philosophy - Philosophy of the present, grade: 2,0, University of Bayreuth, language: English, abstract: In this paper I will outline a framework for thinking about moral responsibility in collective context in order to challenge penal code regulations that penalise more severely joint offenders. I will do so by referring to findings of emotional contagion, i.e. the unconscious exchange of emotions between subjects. I will argue that this contagion undermines agency, and thus, show that the mere presence of others diminishes responsibility for ...
Master's Thesis from the year 2014 in the subject Philosophy - Philosophy of the present, grade: 2,0, University of Bayreuth, language: English, abstract: In this paper I will outline a framework for thinking about moral responsibility in collective context in order to challenge penal code regulations that penalise more severely joint offenders. I will do so by referring to findings of emotional contagion, i.e. the unconscious exchange of emotions between subjects. I will argue that this contagion undermines agency, and thus, show that the mere presence of others diminishes responsibility for harm done.My argument proceeds in four steps. First, I will illustrate a scenario representing the type of cases I am considering here (I). These will be cases in which two or more individuals bring about harm. Second, I will evaluate them legally by applying German and British penal law (II). I will argue that most penal codes discriminate joint offenders as opposed to sole perpetrators. Third, I will argue that legal punishment presupposes agency (III). I will begin by arguing that punishment, in order to be principled, must be assigned proportionally to moral responsibility. Afterwards, I shall highlight the significance of agency for moral and legal responsibility. Fourth, I shall provide a framework for thinking about moral responsibility in collective contexts (IV).According to this, the mere presence of others reduces moral responsibility for harm done. I will introduce May's account of shared responsibility. According to this, sharing harmful attitudes qualifies for being held responsible for harm done by another person. Thereafter, I shall derive my own account of shared responsibility. Instead of attitudes and their effect on others, I shall focus on emotions and illustrate how one's emotions can affect others' behaviour. I will do so in two steps. First, I will outline what emotions are and how they affect our behaviour. Second, I will illustrate how emotions are transferred among individuals. Finally, I shall address the moral and legal implications of my findings.
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