Eliminating the Rhetoric: An Evaluation of the Halt-Phase Strategy
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The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three ma...
The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three major phases: prehostility preparation, conduct of combat operations, and the results and analysis of the operation. Prehostility preparation specifically examines the doctrine, organization, equipment and technology, and the training of friendly forces. The conduct of operations phase explores the contextual elements, including a summary of the operation, and investigates intelligence, command and control (C 2 ), and logistical factors. The results of each case are analyzed to discover factors that contribute positively, negatively, or not significantly to the outcome of the operation. Each case study's unique circumstances shaped the result; however, the criteria of organization and training appear dominant with C 2 , doctrine, and technology being recurrent in allowing air forces to halt an enemy surface force. The specific context of the battle, the intelligence preparation, and logistics of each conflict cannot be ignored but were not determined as recurrent factors in all three case studies, although intelligence was significant in the Bismarck Sea. This study concludes with three major lessons.
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