CSS of a Heavy-Light Force in a Desert Environment
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This monograph explores the combat service support (CSS) challenges encountered in operations involving a heavy/light force in a desert environment, with particular interest in determining whether current CSS doctrine is adequate in addressing these challenges. The monograph first establishes a doctrinal base using the logistics imperatives, followed by an analysis of historical precedents for logistics support of light forces used with heavy forces during World War II, the 1973 Middle East War, and at the National Training Center. Historical experience suggests pushing logistics support forwa...
This monograph explores the combat service support (CSS) challenges encountered in operations involving a heavy/light force in a desert environment, with particular interest in determining whether current CSS doctrine is adequate in addressing these challenges. The monograph first establishes a doctrinal base using the logistics imperatives, followed by an analysis of historical precedents for logistics support of light forces used with heavy forces during World War II, the 1973 Middle East War, and at the National Training Center. Historical experience suggests pushing logistics support forward to combat elements, maintaining a strong logistical base, improvising water resupply procedures, and coordinating constantly as key factors to properly support a heavy/light mix in a desert environment. Drawing from these experiences a concept of support is developed for a hypothetical air assault scenario involving heavy/light forces using current doctrine and force structure. Based upon historical and training lessons learned, and insights gleaned from the support concept developed for the hypothetical scenario, an assessment is offered about the adequacy of CSS doctrine. As part of the doctrinal analysis requirements and solutions to support a heavy division augmented with a light brigade in the offense are identified. The analysis concludes that the logistics imperatives, with the addition of a coordination/synchronization imperative, are adequate to provide guidance to logisticians for developing a support concept for a heavy/light force. The analysis of the scenario concludes that a light brigade attached to a heavy division must bring a substantial support slice. The heavy division is not capable of supporting the attached light brigade. Corps must act as primary support in water resupply, graves registration, and transportation.
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