Jonathan Dancy presents a long-awaited exposition and defence of
particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated
for twenty years. He argues that the traditional link between
morality and principles, or between being moral and having
principles, is little more than a mistake. The possibility of moral
thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate
supply of principles. Dancy grounds this claim on a form of
reasons-holism, holding that what is a
reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and
maintaining that moral reasons are no different in this respect
from others. He puts forward a distinctive form of value-holism to
go with the holism of reasons, and he gives a detailed discussion,
much needed, of the currently popular topic of
'contributory' reasons. Opposing positions of all sorts are
summarized and criticized.
Ethics Without Principles is the definitive statement of
particularist ethical theory, and will be required reading for all
those working on moral philosophy and ethical theory.
"It is a hugely rewarding and interesting read, at the cutting edge of contemporary debate in the area: truly a book that cannot be ignored."--Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Inhaltsangabe
1. What are the options? I. CATCHING THE CONTRIBUTORY 2. Contributory reasons 3. Beyond favouring 4. Dropping the catch II. FROM HOLISM TO PARTICULARISM 5. Holism and its consequences 6. Can holism be true? 7. Competing pictures 8. Knowing reasons III. HOLISM IN THE THEORY OF VALUE 9. Intrinsic and extrinsic value 10. Are there organic unities? 11. Rationality, value, and meaning 12. Principles of rational valuing
