Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon addresses these key questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. He proposes a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is teleological rather than causal.
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon addresses these key questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. He proposes a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is teleological rather than causal.
Scott Sehon is Professor of Philosophy at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. He received his PhD from Princeton University and his BA from Harvard. He is the author of Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation (MIT Press) as well as numerous articles concerning philosophy of mind and free will.
Inhaltsangabe
1: What's at Stake in the Free Will Debate? Part I. The Teleological Account of Action 2: Teleology and Interpretation 3: Rationalizability and Irrationality 4: Other Objections to the Teleological Account 5: Rationalizing Principles and Causal Explanation 6: Deviant Causal Chains 7: The Commitments of Common Sense Psychology Part II. The Teleological Account of Free Will and Responsibility 8: Application to Free Will: Non-Causal Compatibilism 9: Irrational Actions and Freedom 10: Extraordinary Cases 11: How the Teleological Account Undermines Arguments for Incompatiblism 12: Epistemic Problems for Other Accounts of Free Will Concluding Thoughts References Index
1: What's at Stake in the Free Will Debate? Part I. The Teleological Account of Action 2: Teleology and Interpretation 3: Rationalizability and Irrationality 4: Other Objections to the Teleological Account 5: Rationalizing Principles and Causal Explanation 6: Deviant Causal Chains 7: The Commitments of Common Sense Psychology Part II. The Teleological Account of Free Will and Responsibility 8: Application to Free Will: Non-Causal Compatibilism 9: Irrational Actions and Freedom 10: Extraordinary Cases 11: How the Teleological Account Undermines Arguments for Incompatiblism 12: Epistemic Problems for Other Accounts of Free Will Concluding Thoughts References Index
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