This book examines a fundamental problem in Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics: what is the role of syllogistic logic in the
theory of demonstrative knowledge? The answer to this question is
sought in Aristotle's metaphysical theory and his conception of
substance. This interpretation challenges the traditional
interpretation that approaches Aristotle's theory of
demonstration from the standpoint of scientific practice. It is
argued, in this book, that the Posterior Analytics' main
objective is to articulate the notion of knowledge, viewed here as
a conceptualisation, rather than analysing the structure and
methods of scientific explorations. The original interpretation
offered in this book sheds fresh light on issues, such as the
conceptual difference between Aristotle's logic and modern
logic, the relationship between Aristotle's logic and Greek
mathematics, and the differences between the Aristotelian and
modern notions of knowledge and proof. In attempting to present a
comprehensive interpretation of one of the most difficult works in
the Aristotelian corpus, this book is of major importance first and
foremost for Aristotelian scholars and historians of Greek
philosophy; the historical character of the analysis offered here
makes it relevant also to historians of Greek mathematics,
historians of logic, historians of science in general, and
philosophers of sciences.
